

Falklands Wars – the History of the Falkland Islands: with particular regard to Spanish and Argentine pretensions and taking some account of South Georgia, the South Sandwich Islands and Britain's Antarctic Territories by Roger Lorton ¹

Paper 11²

1972 – 1982

Negotiation

“the only other option open to the Argentine government is a resort to force.” ³



In 1965 the United Nations had called upon the UK and Argentina to commence negotiations with a view to resolve the main issue that lay between them – sovereignty over the Falkland Islands.⁴ Talks had started in 1966, but had been slow to produce anything tangible. It needs to be recognised that the talks concentrated on the future of the archipelago. Historic rights were not discussed, as neither side was going to budge from their entrenched positions. But the fundamental problem of the future was grounded in the recognition, by both the United Nations and the UK, that the Islanders' rights in the form of interests/wishes had to be respected. Argentina rejected any interpretation that would have given the Islanders a veto. So, the British Government knew it was in a no-win situation. Pressed on one side by the UN for a 'solution' and the Islanders on the other wishing for nothing more than to remain British. The question was, could they be persuaded? Inducements? A better life under Argentine rule? The agreement signed off by both countries in 1971 was intended to start a process of Argentization. Better access to the mainland. Spanish language lessons. Access to hospitals. Greater interaction. This paper considers this process and the slow breakdown in negotiations. Also the changing political landscape in Argentina which would lead to war.

1972 – January 7th, from Argentina, *Libertad* sails with tourists for Antarctica. On board is Britain's Ambassador, Michael Hadow and Mario Izaguirre, of Argentina's Foreign Ministry. Bound for Stanley. ⁵

January 8th, Argentina initiates twice-monthly amphibious flights between Comodoro Rivadavia and Stanley.

In London, a briefing note on the Falklands is prepared by the Foreign & Commonwealth Office (FCO).

“At present the Islands are something of a liability to Britain; they no longer have a strategic value and they are difficult and expensive to defend, while remaining a constant source of friction in relations with Argentina and with Latin America as a whole.” ⁶

¹ *Falklands Wars – the History of the Falkland Islands: with particular regard to Spanish and Argentine pretensions and taking some account of South Georgia, the South Sandwich Islands and Britain's Antarctic Territories* Roger Lorton LL.B(Hon), M.Phil. 2011 – 2019. Roger Lorton has asserted his rights under the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988 to be identified as the author of this work. **NB.** These papers are about the disputes surrounding the Falklands. The full research can be found here – <https://falklandstimeline.wordpress.com/>

² Citation = Lorton, Roger. *Falklands Wars: Timeline History of the Falkland Islands*. Wordpress 2011 Paper 11

³ Minister Vignes to the Argentine press March 19, 1975

⁴ Argentina also claimed South Georgia and the South Sandwich Islands, but these were not listed at the UN. *cf.* 1946

⁵ *From Chapultepec to the Beagle. Argentine Foreign Policy 1945-1980* Juan A. Lanús 1984 p.478. Some 350 tourists. I have found no British source for this visit.

⁶ *FCO 7/2115 1972* quoted in *Far from Moderate: An account and appraisal of some aspects of the human involvement with the natural environment of the Falkland Islands and South Georgia* S. Palmer 2004.

January 10th, in Stanley, Governor Ernest G. (Toby) Lewis addresses the Falklands Legislative Council.

*“May I turn now to external affairs, and in particular to our relations with the Argentine, much has been said and written and I do not intend to repeat it all. However, I would like to say that the agreements do reflect a degree of political maturity that is rare in these days and that we should not under-estimate what has been achieved. I would like to pay tribute to the work done by our negotiating team including the members from the Islands for the way in which they handled the talks. On the agreements reached in B.A. in June of course the acid test is going to be how these agreements work out in practice, We can only proceed step by step and see how things go: always prepared to talk but not to compromise on our basic position. And now we have to live by and adjust to the changing pattern of our communications network. So far the agreements have worked well and we can expect the first regular amphibian flight in a couple of days thus introducing the fortnightly service and there are many other areas in which the provisions of the agreement have been implemented — not quite as spectacular perhaps as the air link but in important fields such as medical, postal, telecommunications and education, We expect that a third round of talks will take place in Stanley in March...”*⁷

On the same day, *Libertad* arrives in Port Stanley.

January 12th, an Argentine Air Force sea plane lands in Stanley harbour.⁸

*“... on 12 January 1972, a seaplane from the Argentine Air Force landed in Stanley harbour establishing the first regular flight between Comodoro Rivadavia and the Falkland Islands. From then onwards, “sanitary, passenger and general cargo (mail, fresh food, and medicines) became regular flights” ... the sea plane was a Grumman HU-16 Albatross, from the Air Force, which was able to operate on land, sea and snow, and could carry some five passengers. Flights linking Stanley with Comodoro Rivadavia took place twice monthly.”*⁹



January 24th, at Port William, a French liner, *France*, anchors; discharging 500 tourists into Stanley.

January 26th, in London, Viscount Eccles speaks during a House of Lords debate on Latin America.

*“Your Lordships will be glad to know that our political relations with the countries of Latin America are generally most cordial and there are remarkably few points of difference. ... in full consultation with the Islanders, and without prejudice to the question of sovereignty, the Argentine Government and ourselves have made arrangements for modern communications between the Islands, Argentina and the world beyond, both by air and sea. These arrangements when completed will make a material contribution to the welfare of the Island community. ... Now we are looking forward to a third round to be held in Stanley and we very much hope that holding the talks there will contribute to the process of greater mutual understanding between the inhabitants of the Islands and their Argentine neighbours.”*¹⁰

February 9th, in Stanley harbour, a Soviet B-73 Zulu submarine, *Lira*, arrives under the command of Capt. B. Petrushikhin; to rendezvous with a support ship, *Mikhail Kalinin*.¹¹

⁷ *Falkland Islands Gazette* 1972. cf. 1971

⁸ A Grumman HU-16 Albatross aircraft capable of operating on land or sea but only able to carry five passengers. This service continued until November, 1972.

⁹ *MercoPress* January 13, 2022

¹⁰ *HL Deb* 26 January 1972 vol.327 cc333-407

¹¹ Ostensibly, the submarine was an oceanographic research vessel.

May 2nd, Argentina agrees to construct a temporary air strip at Hooker's Point, near Stanley, to replace the sea-plane service. The steel mesh strip to be obtained by Britain from the USA at a cost of \$1 million. Buenos Aires is to provide the workforce and construction equipment. ¹²

"... given weather conditions, its limited payload, and high operating costs, it was soon decided to replace it with land planes. The Argentines offered to build an aluminium landing strip for this purpose. The proposal ran into local opposition mainly on the grounds that the strip would be an encroachment on sovereignty. As Lewis said in a despatch "the local politicians, not known for their ability to stand up to pressure, immediately took cover and we found the road ahead blocked". It took extensive touring of the settlements by Lewis and his colonial, later chief, secretary (Thomas) Layng, to swing Island opinion in favour of the proposal to which councillors eventually agreed unanimously." ¹³

May 14th, from Buenos Aires, an Argentine transport ship, *Cabo San Gonzalo*, sails with 40 workmen and technicians together with 900 tons of construction equipment. A correspondent for *The Financial Times* watches them sail.

"The Argentines have finally established a beach-head on the Falklands."

From Stanley, Governor Lewis writes to the FCO proposing a permanent airport to eventually replace the temporary one about to be built by Argentina.

"Whitehall now experienced a severe bout of interdepartmental warfare. ... Approval was finally given for the project to go out to tender, but only for a short runway." ¹⁴

On East Falkland Island, the European Space Research tracking station ceases operations. ¹⁵

In **June**, the 1971 Agreement on Communications between the Falkland Islands and Argentina is presented to Parliament by the Foreign Secretary. ¹⁶

July 24th, in Britain's House of Commons, asked about a permanent airstrip in the Falkland Islands. Government spokesman, Kershaw. Responds; *"The Governor has applied for a grant of £1615 million for the construction of the permanent airfield. This is being considered and I hope that an early decision will be reached. If the application is approved construction could, barring unforeseen difficulties, be started by August, 1973, and completed about May, 1975. ... I think this is the best we can do. It is a big job which will have to be put out to tender properly. Construction difficulties are considerable, but we nevertheless appreciate the importance of this. ... The Argentine Government are co-operating in the provision of a temporary airstrip. I am sure they see that this is for the good of the islanders, and it will give them satisfaction as well as ourselves."* ¹⁷

In the UK, the Falkland Islands Company (FIC) is acquired by Dundee, Perth and London Securities Ltd. As part of the agreement, the new owners grant the Falkland Islanders' Sheep Owners Association a right of first refusal should they decide to sell.

The Falklands Islands' Emergency Committee, founded in 1968, is re-designated the United Kingdom Falkland Islands Committee; *"To assist the people of the Falkland Islands to decide their own future for themselves*

12 Lanús 1984

13 *The Dictionary of Falklands Biography (including South Georgia): From Discovery up to 1981* David Tatham (ed) 2008

14 *The Battle for the Falklands* 1997 M. Hastings & S. Jenkins 1997 p.32

15 Built in 1967, it had completed its work.

16 See - <https://falklandstimeline.files.wordpress.com/2020/06/1971-anglo-argentine-joint-statement-on-communications.pdf>

17 *Hansard, Commons Chamber, Oral Answers, Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs vol.841 Monday 24, July 1972*

*without being subject to pressure direct or indirect from any quarter.”*¹⁸ Letters are written to the three main political parties with a request that a representative join the Committee.

In **August**, President of Uganda, Idi Amin, declares that the UK will have to take responsibility for British subjects of Asian origin; in effect expelling over 50,000 people. Britain's government contacts the Crown Colonies with regard to settling some of the refugees; *“Only the Falkland Islands gave a positive response, saying they would accept doctors, teachers, domestic servants and farm workers.”*¹⁹

September 27th, at the UN in New York, Argentina's representative addresses the General Assembly.

“.. In order to encourage ties between the Islands and the mainland and as a result of instruments approved by both countries, efforts have been made to allow communications, to increase mutual knowledge and to benefit the population of the Malvinas. Despite these practical steps of undisputed importance, there still are differences outstanding between the two Governments regarding the circumstances that should exist for a final solution to be arrived at over the question of sovereignty. Further talks on the matter are to be held and we trust that they will be fruitful. The result can, in any case, be none other than the return of the Malvinas Islands to the Argentine territorial heritage”

October 23rd, the UK's representative, in a letter addressed to the Secretary-General, responds that; *“... the efforts of our two Governments to solve our differences should be pursued in a climate of mutual understanding...”*

October 24th, an Anglo-Argentine agreement is reached to open a Líneas Aéreas del Estado (LADE) office in Stanley. Also confirmed is the initiation of a regular air service from Argentina.

*“Air Lines of the State (LADE), an Argentine Company in charge of the regular as well as the temporary service, referred to in numbers (8) and (9) of the Joint Declaration, will open a commercial and operational agency in Port Stanley ... 3. The crews and air planes with which the services referred to in numeral (2) of this Agreement are used, will carry the same flight documentation that is de rigueur for crews and air planes that perform internal flights over the Argentine continental territory and its operators will be exempt from payment of landing fees, levies or other charges ...”*²⁰

November 9th, in London, tenders for the construction of a permanent airfield are received by the FCO.

November 16th, near Stanley, the temporary Falklands air strip comes into operation with a weekly air service.²¹

“The islanders regarded the arrival of any group of Argentines as an incursion of their territory. The negotiator Scott thought this sensitivity might disappear with time; unfortunately, his assumption was not correct. He may have begun to realize this when the planned ceremony to open the new Port Stanley airstrip turned



18 Formally adopted in April 1973.

19 *Ministers hunted for island to house Asians* in *The Guardian* January 1, 2003. I can find no suggestion that any actually went to the archipelago.

20 Lanús 1984 p.496

21 The temporary runway was constructed by Grupo I de Construcciones de la Fuerza Aérea (FAA) using aluminum matting from the Harvey Aluminium Co in the USA. It was 730m long by 20m wide.

into a trivial fiasco more humorous than important. The Argentine officials proceeding on the first flight of the air service turned out to be Argentine senior military officers in full uniform. Hearing of this, the Falkland Islands' governor, Toby Lewis, was ordered to hoist the Union Jack and appear at the ceremony himself in full-dress gubernatorial regalia. The islanders themselves feared that ceremonially clad Argentines represented a covert invasion, perhaps even supported by the British Foreign Office. The islands' secretary, John Laing felt a demonstration was likely and called out the Marine guard, a permanent detachment of military stationed on the Falklands to maintain order. Scott's hopes that relations between the islanders and the Argentines would improve must have been dampened as this attempt at a positive step forward fell victim to unfounded fears.”²²

“Beltramino and Scott had meticulously negotiated that the opening of the air link would be a civilian affair, even though it would be run by the military air service, LADE (Lineas Aereas del Estado). When Scott arrived at Buenos Aires for the ceremony to celebrate the launch of the service,... he was horrified to see the inaugural flight filled with senior officers in full uniform. Events worthy of an Ealing comedy ensued. The Falkland Islands' governor, Toby Lewis, was ordered to run up the British flag at the airstrip and appear in full-dress regalia, his plumes blowing proudly in the strong wind.”²³

“Despite the good impression created by the Argentine workforce employed on the construction of the strips, (Governor) Lewis was confronted with the prospect of a demonstration on sovereignty by hardliners at the inaugural ceremony which was to be attended by numerous Argentine visitors, including press. This was only prevented by Lewis' persuasiveness, by a broadcast by a member of LegCo and by tight security measures.”²⁴

Accommodation is provided by the Falkland Islands Government for LADE staff.

“Several Argentine members of staff of LADE naturally had to be resident in the islands; as befitted a military airline they were headed by a vicecomodoro of the Argentine air force, who lived in a house in Stanley provided for him by the Falkland Islands Government, while the remainder lived in rented accommodation in the town.”²⁵

November 21st, in Stanley, a further round Anglo-Argentine negotiations commences.

“When the negotiators met..., the practical measures on communications and movement of persons were almost entirely in full implementation.”²⁶

November 24th, from Stanley, Governor Lewis informs London of local concerns regarding any Argentine monopoly over fuel supplies in the Islands.

December 3rd, in the Falkland Islands, a census is conducted, noting a population of 1,957.²⁷

December 18th, at the United Nations building in New York, the General Assembly defer any consideration of the Falklands question until 1973.

22 *War since 1945: Offensive Air Operations of the Falklands War* Walter F. DeHoust 1984

23 Hastings & S. Jenkins 1997 p.32

24 David Taylor in Tatham (ed.) 2008 p.338. LegCo was an abbreviation of Legislative Council – the unicameral legislature of the Falkland Islands from November, 1845 until January 2009 when the Council became an Assembly.

25 *The Falklands Saga* Graham Pascoe 2022 vol.3 p.570

26 *Las “Conversaciones Especiales” Argentina-Gran Bretaña sobre comunicaciones entre el Territorio Continental Argentino y las Islas Malvinas de 1970-72. Una negociacion Diplomatica Tipica* J. C. M. Beltramino 1997. I am unable to confirm this. See below.

27 See - <https://falklandstimeline.files.wordpress.com/2022/06/report-of-census-1972.pdf>

1973 – January 1st, the UK joins the European Economic Community (EEC); acceding to the Treaty of Rome (1957).²⁸ Britain's dependent territories are 'associated' with the Community and listed under Annex IV to the Treaty of Rome. Argentina protests.

March 9th, in Stanley, the results of the 1972 census are published.

*“Included in the total population of 1,957 are 36 Royal Marines stationed in the Colony and 14 members of the Argentine Airfield Construction Team who were in the colony for the purpose of constructing a temporary airfield, but not the crews (67 males) of locally registered ships at sea on Census Day.”*²⁹

March 11th, in Argentina, Presidential elections are held. Hector J6se C6mpora wins with 49.6% of the vote.

In **April**, during preparatory discussions regarding further talks, the Argentines indicate that they wish to reintroduce the 1968 *Memorandum* proposals, but are now opposed to any Islander representation at the talks. British negotiators respond that they are only prepared to discuss practical matters; not sovereignty. The UK also insists that Islanders must be present. Negotiations stall.³⁰

*“At the meeting in London in April 1973,... after a restatement of the views of the United Kingdom Government, the Argentine delegation declined to continue the meeting ...”*³¹

April 17th, in London, the Falkland Islands Emergency Committee founded in 1968 is formally re-established as UK Falkland Islands Committee (UKFIC).

*“Implementation of the Communications Agreement passed in 1973 to the new head of the Latin America department, Hugh Carless, and his superintending under-secretary, Robin Edmonds. ... To the Falklands Islands Committee, Carless, Edmonds and his successor as under-secretary, George Hall, became the embodiment of the Whitehall Falklands policy.”*³²

May 14th, at the UN, an Argentine citizen addresses a private petition to the Special Committee on Decolonization (C24).

“Mr. Jose Ramon Cornejo maintained that the Argentine claim to the Islands had been based on their proximity to Argentina and the inheritance of title from Spain. He added that the Argentinians did not believe that talks like those recently held between the two Governments could make any progress towards resolving the question of the transfer of the sovereignty of the Territory to Argentina.”

May 25th, in Buenos Aires, Hector J6se C6mpora is sworn-in as President of Argentina.³³

*“In his inaugural speech, President H6ctor J. C6mpora had a few words for the Malvinas. Its recovery would be one of the objectives of his government.”*³⁴

28 The process had started in January, 1972 when the Treaty of Accession had been signed by PM Edward Heath.

Parliament's European Communities Act was passed in October, 1972 and the instrument of ratification deposited with the EEC on October 18, 1972. Coming into effect on January 1, 1973.

29 *Report of Census 1972.*

30 *Official History of the Falklands Campaign, Volume 1: The Origins of the Falklands War* L. Freedman 2005 p.25

31 *UN Yearbook 1973.*

32 Hastings & S. Jenkins 1997

33 One of the election conditions was that only those who were resident in Argentina, could stand; effectively barring Juan Per6n who was still outside the country.

34 Lan6s 1984 p.479

June 20th, former President, Juan Domingo Perón, returns to Argentina. ³⁵

“Juan D. Peron returned to Argentina today, ending almost 18 years of exile, and violence among the more than one million people gathered to welcome him left at least 13 dead and more than 250 injured. ... before Mr. Peron's arrival a number of serious shooting incidents had taken place between left-wing and rightist followers of Mr. Peron. Hostility between left and right factions has been growing in recent weeks. Police sources reported that at least 13 persons died and more than 250 were injured in the shooting. In one of the incidents, rival groups exchanged machine-gun fire in front of the stage where Mr. Peron was scheduled to speak. Snipers continued to shoot into the crowd even as ambulances arrived on the scene, to carry away wounded men, women and children. ... after receiving reports of the shooting incidents, the former President ordered his airliner to land at a military air base 15 miles west of the capital, instead of at the international airport about 20 miles south-west of Buenos Aires, where hundreds of leading Government and Peronist officials had gathered to greet Mr. Peron. ...” ³⁶

“... (there was) an immediate hardening of the Argentine line.” ³⁷

July 12th, Argentine President Campora steps down to allow for a new Presidential election.

August 15th, in New York, Argentina's representative addresses a letter to the UN's Decolonization Committee.

“... his Government regretted to report that the negotiations had been virtually paralysed as a result of the attitude adopted by the United Kingdom, whose position, he said, had changed substantially from that which it had taken since contacts were first established in 1966. When,.. efforts were made to reactivate the negotiations, postponed since 1968, the United Kingdom took the position that the round of meetings could not be called negotiations on sovereignty since in its opinion they involved only talks or discussions, and it was willing to discuss only the collateral question of communications rather than the basic issue of sovereignty over the territory... This position, Argentina considered, was not in conformity with the provisions of the Assembly's resolution of 16 December 1965. Argentina called on the United Kingdom Government to take measures to continue the negotiations without further procrastination, within the framework of that resolution and subsequent decisions, so as to bring about the speedy elimination of the territory's colonial situation.”

In reply the UK's representative denies; *“... that there had been any change in its consistently upheld position on the scope of the discussions. It reiterated its readiness to renew discussions, bearing in mind that in accordance with the provisions of the United Nations Charter and the principles of the Declaration on the granting of independence, it was essential that any solution should recognize the right of the inhabitants of the Falkland Islands to self-determination and should provide for them to express their wishes in this connection.”* ³⁸

August 17th, at the UN, the Special Committee on Decolonization meets to consider the question of the Falkland Islands. Argentina's Ambassador tells the Committee that; *“... failure to settle this dispute within a short and reasonable time will necessitate a thorough reappraisal of the policy (Argentina) has pursued until now...”* ³⁹

35 Perón had fled Argentina in 1955 when the Catholic Church and armed forces turned against him; spending exile in Paraguay and Spain. He had returned in November, 1972 for a brief visit, only remaining a few weeks and being watched closely by the army. From the moment he was sworn-in, Cámpora would seem to have set about arranging Perón's return.

36 *The New York Times* June 21, 1973

37 Tatham (ed.) 2008 p.338

38 *UN Yearbook 1973*

39 *UN Doc A/9023/Rev.1*

August 21st, the UN's Special Committee adopts a Venezuelan resolution calling for the acceleration of negotiations.⁴⁰ Responding, Britain writes to the UN Secretary-General.

“It has been the common purpose of the Governments of Argentina and the United Kingdom since the adoption of General Assembly resolution 2065 (XX) to explore in accordance with that resolution all possible means of finding a peaceful solution to the problem defined in that resolution. The letters addressed to you and your predecessors in successive years,... constitute a record of progress endorsed by both Governments ... there have been no grounds for supposing that there has been any change in the consistently upheld position of the United Kingdom Government. ...

*For their part the United Kingdom Government reiterate their readiness to renew discussions bearing in mind that in accordance with the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations and the principles of resolution 1514 (XV) of the General Assembly it is essential that any solution should recognize the right of the inhabitants of the Falkland Islands to self-determination and should provide for them to express their wishes in this connection.”*⁴¹

October 3rd, in New York, Argentina's Foreign Minister, Alberto Vignes, addresses the General Assembly regarding negotiations on the Falkland Islands; *“My country ... is forced to state that the procedure cannot be indefinitely prolonged,...”*

October 5th, in Washington DC, Minister Vignes, meets US Secretary Henry Kissinger. Alberto Vignes complains that; *“... Argentina is concerned with the indifference of the US regarding the issue of the Falkland Islands, which is a colonial problem within the hemisphere. He could not understand how the US, which was once a colony, could take such an attitude.”*⁴²

October 12th, in Argentina, following his success in the elections brought about by Hector Campora's sudden resignation, 78-year old Juan Perón commences his third term as President; with his wife as Vice-President.

*“The return of a Peronist Government brought an end to the Anglo-Argentine rapprochement.”*⁴³

October 19th, in New York, the UK's representative informs the UN Secretary-General that; *“... his Government was reluctant to believe that Argentina would wish for any solution of the differences between the two Governments which was contrary to the expressed wishes of the inhabitants of the territory.”*

October 25th, in the Falklands, a *Petroleum Products Bill* is debated at a meeting of the Falklands' Legislative Council (LegCo).⁴⁴ Concerns are raised over Argentina's monopoly of fuel supply to the archipelago.

“... the Chief Secretary argued that Y.P.F. required a monopoly to guarantee a demand for its products. He also claimed that the price of petrol, which had more than doubled in the past two years, would fall by nearly a third. Adrian Monk, elected member for East Falkland, offered the only opposition and abstained in the vote. He stressed that, “What I do not like about it all is that the monopoly has been granted to the country which

40 *UN Yearbook 1973*. See December 14, below

41 *Ibid.*

42 *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976, Documents on South America, 1973-1976 Memorandum of Conversation New York, October 5, 1973, 12.45pm*. Apparently, Kissinger's response was so general in nature that it is not clear whether he had heard the Argentine Minister at all.

43 *British Interests in the Falkland Islands: Economic Development, the Falkland Lobby and the Sovereignty Dispute, 1945 to 1989* C. R. Ellerby 1990 p.178

44 The Legislative Council was the unicameral legislature of the Falkland Islands from 1845 until 2009, when it was replaced by a Legislative Assembly.

wants us." *The British Government clearly hoped that the Islanders would accept closer ties with Argentina if they were shown the benefits of co-operation.*"⁴⁵

*"Two supplementary Communications Agreements were reached by the Foreign Office aimed at encouraging economic links with the mainland and permitting the Argentines to build and supply fuel tanks at the airfield. Fuel oil, including that for the islands' modest internal air service, would be provided exclusively by the Argentine state oil concern, YFP, and the base would be staffed by Argentine military personnel. ..."*⁴⁶

November 5th, at the UN, Argentina responds to Britain's August letter to the Secretary-General. Quoting the first paragraph of resolution 2065 of 1966, Argentina's representative points out that the resolution makes "no reference" to the wishes of the population or any right of self-determination.

*"... this tardy and misplaced concern for respect for the right to self-determination would be praiseworthy and legitimate if the United Kingdom had consulted the original population of the Malvinas Islands about their wishes before displacing them by force and replacing them by British settlers in 1833..."*⁴⁷

*"Towards the end of 1973 the Joint Intelligence Committee assessed that Argentine attitudes were hardening and for the first time there were indications that Argentina might be preparing contingency plans for an occupation of the islands."*⁴⁸

November 6th, Islanders hear a report by the BBC.

*"Much consternation was caused in the islands by a report on Radio Newsreel by Adrian Porter the BBC Latin America correspondent. This was to the effect that there might be a likelihood of the temporary airstrip being 'rolled up' and taken back to Argentina if action is not forthcoming soon on the sovereignty. This was in comment on a Note to the Secretary-General of the United Nations by the Argentine Government about the Falkland Islands. (Ed; the contents of which have yet to be revealed to the people who actually live here !) His Excellency the Governor subsequently issued a statement seeking to pour oil on troubled waters, reminding us in his own words, "in this part of the world we are used to squally weather"..."*⁴⁹

In Stanley, Governor Ernest Gordon Lewis is interviewed by a local journalist, Robin Forrester.

"RF: Home months ago the Argentine Government made a statement to the effect that if something didn't happen about talking on sovereignty soon then maybe they'd do something. What is the reaction to that in London?"

HE: You get these emotional terms like the return of the Falklands to the patrimony of the fatherland. To be perfectly frank the reaction was that it wouldn't do any good in improving the climate but you know what it is when people are in the United Nations. That's not to say I'm underestimating the question. It is a very real problem. We are under claim. We are in front of the United Nations. We come up regularly under the Committee of 24, the Fourth Committee and then the General Assembly, and colonialism in all its forms ... is regarded in some quarters as an evil thing. All we can do is repeat time and time again that the British Government is on record as saying that if it is the wish of the people of the

45 Ellerby 1990 pp.176-177 citing *Leg. Co. minutes*, 25 Oct. 1973

46 Hastings & S. Jenkins 1997

47 Quoted in *UN Doc A/9623/Rev.1 vol.6 Chapter XXVI p.112*. See 1833

48 Baroness Young in *HL Deb 25 January 1983 vol.438 cc136-247*

49 *Falkland Islands Times & Falkland Islands Monthly Review* December 1973 p.7

Falkland Islands to come to some arrangement with the Argentine then so be it. But the British Government is not going to push the islanders into doing anything against their wishes. The Argentine attitude on this is that it is not the wishes of the people that matter, it is the interests of the people that matter. In other words the Argentines start from the legal concept that as successors to the Union of 1816 they are automatically the heirs to these islands. Therefore the people that came in afterwards, in their opinion do not matter - that is their stand. ...

RF: Now what would you say to people who have gained this impression, that the British Government doesn't, in fact, want the Falkland Islands?

HE: I would say that this is completely wrong. I think that there is a tremendous amount of understanding for ourselves but we must get it into perspective. We are a small group of islands, with just 2.000 population, situated close to the mainland of Latin America. In the long term there is very little future for places like ourselves if we can't get along with our neighbours. That doesn't mean to say be seduced by them or be taken over by them. Obviously it makes sense to have communications with the Argentine. To say that we are not wanted - we must remember that Britain's role in the world is changing. The days when we could send a fleet down here, when we were a major power I'm afraid, have gone. ... The answer in brief is that there is no question of Britain not wanting us. Britain says that it makes sense to be friends with our neighbours and play our part in the world. That doesn't mean to say that they don't take an interest in us.”⁵⁰

November 13th, *The Falkland Islands Times & Falkland Islands Monthly Review* publishes an editorial:

“People overseas should realise that the majority of residents in the Falklands assume that "they don't want us", 'they' being the British Government. Throughout the islands there is growing a general distrust of the British Government.

Perhaps this is what they want, who can tell? We must assume that the British Government want this impression to cone over otherwise they would put their public relations chaps on to the job of reversing it. Of course the best form of good publicity is promises kept. Here ... Argentina shows up very well. Britain shows up poorly. Argentina promised a weekly air service and it is in operation and has now been so for a year. Britain promised a sea connection with the mainland - and we are now told that the 1971 agreement doesn't mean what it quite plainly says and that there will be no sea service unless the Falklands pays for it. Can anyone wonder that some people are sceptical about the promised permanent airfield from Britain? We hope it is falsely based scepticism.

Of course the issue is not just fuel supplies. Falkland Island children now go in increasing numbers to Argentina schools for education, which of course involves indoctrination in the Argentine way of life. People cannot enter or leave the islands without the consent of the Argentine Government Airline. And now it is proposed to put our fuel supplies in the hands of our Argentine neighbours.”

November 15th, in the Falklands, the first anniversary of the opening of the temporary airstrip is celebrated; “... apparently at the request of the Argentine Government.”⁵¹

“The Argentine delegation was led by a friendly and fit looking Brigadier D. Roberto Bartot, Chief of Staff of the Argentine Air Force. He was accompanied by various officers, diplomats including Coucillor Blanco and reporters. There were also Mr. John Shakespeare and Miss G. Evans from the British

50 *Falkland Islands Times & Falkland Islands Monthly Review* reported November, December 1973 & January 1974

51 *Falkland Islands Times & Falkland Islands Monthly Review* December 1973 p.8

Embassy in Buenos Aires. The Governor in his official uniform, and Mrs Lewis, together with Legislative and Executive Council Members and their wives welcomed the visitors... Speeches were made..."⁵²

November 30th, in Buenos Aires, a new Argentine law establishes June 10th as the – "Day of Affirmation of Argentine Rights over the Malvinas, Islands and the Antarctic Sector."⁵³

"Law No. 20,561

Day for the Affirmation of Argentine Rights over the Malvinas, Islands and Antarctic sector

Sanctioned: November 14, 1973. Promulgated: November 30, 1973.

Whereas: The Senate and Chamber of Deputies of the Argentine Nation Meeting in Congress Sanction by Force of Law:

Article 1 - Set June 10 as the Day of the Affirmation of Argentine Rights over the Malvinas, Islands and Antarctic sector; an expression of sovereignty that will be celebrated every year throughout the country.

Article 2 - That day and at the same time the celebration will be commemorated in the educational establishments of all cycles, of the State and individuals, units and offices of the Armed Forces, judicial headquarters and dependencies of the public administration, inside and outside the territory, with allusive acts, dictating to the effect: Special classes and conferences in which they will indicate the historical background, the legitimacy of the Argentine titles and the way in which it is exercised in the southern sector.

Article 3 -Likewise, and as a symbolic protest against the attacks suffered by the Republic in the region, all the buildings where official offices function will be mandatorily flagged and illuminated on that date.

*"... an official celebration of Argentina's claim to the Falklands, to be held annually on 10 June, the date of the expulsion of the British garrison from Port Egmont in 1770 and of Louis Vernet's appointment as political and military commander in 1829."*⁵⁴

In **December**, the *Falklands' Sheep Owners' Association* negotiates to sell carcasses to *Corporacion Argentina de Productores de Carnes*.

December 5th, at the UN, the Fourth Committee, sitting to consider the work of the Special Committee on Decolonization, approves that committee's annual report.

*"During discussion of the question ..., Venezuela, Peru, Ecuador and Spain were among those supporting the contention of Argentina that the negotiations should be resumed with a view to finding a solution based on recognition of Argentine sovereignty over the islands. Argentina considered that the conflict of sovereignty, which dated from 1833, was the basic point to be resolved if an end was to be put to the colonial situation prevailing in the territory. The United Kingdom did not accept that interpretation; the essential problem was one of self-determination, complicated by a claim to the territory by another Government. The United Kingdom considered that any settlement of the differences between the two Governments must recognize the right of the inhabitants to self-determination and must be in accordance with their expressed wishes."*⁵⁵

52 *Ibid* p.8

53 *Día de la Afiración de los Derechos Argentinos sobre las Malvinas, islas y sector antártico*. No holiday was announced. In 1983, the date was changed to April 2 and that was made a public holiday. In 1984 the public holiday was moved back to June 10 and in 1992, April 2 became Veterans Day but not a holiday. In 2000 June 10 lost its holiday status and April 2 gained it. Both days are currently celebrated, but only the April day is a public holiday.

54 Pascoe 2022 vol.3 p.575. Seem to have forgotten that the British returned in 1771, and Vernet left in 1831.

55 *UN Yearbook 1973*

December 14th, in New York, taking up recommendations from the Fourth Committee, the UN General Assembly adopts resolution 3160 (XXXVIII) – Question of the Falkland Islands (Malvinas).

“... Recalling its resolution 1514 (XV) of 14 December 1960 containing the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples,

Recalling also its resolution 2065 (XX) of 16 December 1965, in which it invited the Governments of Argentina and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to proceed without delay with the negotiations recommended by the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples with a view to finding a peaceful solution to the problem of the Falkland Islands (Malvinas), bearing in mind the provisions and objectives of the Charter of the United Nations and of resolution 1514 (XV) and the interests of the population of the Falkland Islands (Malvinas), ⁵⁶

Gravely concerned at the fact that eight years have elapsed since the adoption of Resolution 2065 (XX) without any substantial progress having been made in the negotiations.

Mindful that resolution 2065 (XX) indicates that the way to put an end to this colonial situation is the peaceful solution of the conflict of sovereignty between the Governments of Argentina and the United Kingdom with regard to the aforementioned islands,

Expressing its gratitude for the continuous efforts made by the Government of Argentina, in accordance with the relevant decisions of the General Assembly, to facilitate the process of decolonisation and to promote the well-being of the population of the islands, ⁵⁷

1. Approves the chapters of the report of the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples relating to the Falkland Islands (Malvinas) and, in particular, the resolution adopted by the Special Committee on 21 August 1973 concerning the Territory;

2. Declares the need to accelerate the negotiations between the Governments of Argentina and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland called for in General Assembly resolution 2065 (XX) in order to arrive at a peaceful solution of the conflict of sovereignty between them concerning the Falkland Islands (Malvinas);

3. Urges the Governments of Argentina and the United Kingdom, therefore, to proceed without delay with the negotiations, in accordance with the provisions of the relevant resolutions of the General Assembly, in order to put an end to the colonial situation;

4. Requests both Government to report to the Secretary-General and to the General Assembly as soon as possible, and not later than at its twenty-ninth session, on the results of the recommended negotiations.”

“... Argentina had been back to the United Nations and emerged armed with yet another resolution, calling this time for ‘accelerated progress’ in resolving the Falklands dispute. To meet this pressure Julian Amery had approved exploring the chances of joint sovereignty, or condominium. It was a measure of growing desperation that this was put forward at all. ... For one thing it was regarded as a legal nightmare.” ⁵⁸

56 Resolution 2065 of 1965 had been the first Falklands specific resolution adopted by the General Assembly. See - <https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/NR0/218/28/PDF/NR021828.pdf?OpenElement>

57 No bias then?

58 *Little Platoon* M. Charlton 1989 p.37

1974 – January 3rd, in London, the Foreign Secretary submits a *memo* to Cabinet regarding the Falklands.

*“Douglas-Home concluded that doing nothing would endanger the interests and security of the islands. He believed condominium was the best way of continuing a dialogue with both parties, reasoning that it would have a greater chance of acceptance from islanders than talks on an outright transfer of sovereignty.”*⁵⁹

January 4th, in Stanley, a meeting of the Falklands' Legislative Council adopts a motion; *“That this House objects strongly to any negotiations or talks being held with the Argentine Government without the prior full knowledge of the Falkland Islands people, ...”*

*“... despite ‘maximum arm-twisting’, Falklands Governor Ernest Lewis was unable to wring concessions from councillors about talks on a possible sovereignty transfer.”*⁶⁰

The Falkland Islands Legislative Council form a select committee to ascertain the views of the electorate on possible changes to the Islands' Constitution, and to make recommendations.⁶¹

January 11th, a Japanese ship, *Taiyo Maru 82*, arrives in Stanley. Chartered by a British fisheries company to assess fish stocks around the archipelago in summer.⁶²

January 21st, Britain's Ambassador to Argentina, Sir Donald Hopson, together with his wife, land at Stanley for a fortnight's tour.


Notices confirming British sovereignty are cemented onto the Shag Rocks by a Royal Navy expedition.⁶³ Six small islets, they are situated some 600 miles to the east of the Falklands archipelago and 150 miles to the west of South Georgia Island.

January 25th, in Britain's House of Commons, the Government announce that they expect the contract for a permanent airfield in the islands to be awarded - *“shortly.”* The project to be completed within two years.

Geology expert, Donald Griffiths, arrives to explore the potential for oil resources around the archipelago.⁶⁴

*“Oil companies began asking the British government for licences to explore the waters around the Falkland Islands in the late 1960s.”*⁶⁵

“In the midst of these investigations, the first energy crisis struck. Between October 1973 and January 1974, the price of oil quadrupled. Suddenly, interest in petroleum resources around the Falklands skyrocketed. A 1974



59 *The British Government and the Falkland Islands, 1974-79* A. Donaghy 2014

60 *Ibid*

61 *HC Deb 18 December 1974* vol.883 cc1565-6

62 *Falkland Islands Times & Falkland Islands Monthly Review* February 1974 p.5.

63 *Who owns the Falkland Island Dependencies in International Law? An Analysis of Certain Recent British and Argentine Official Statements* C. R. Symmons 1984 p.729.

64 Griffiths had originally been commissioned by the UK Government in 1971 to conduct a library survey. That survey had been submitted that same year and suggested that oil resources were likely to be found around Burwood Bank, some 120 miles south of the Falklands. *cf.* 1971 & 1975

65 *Oil and British Policy towards the Falklands/Malvinas Islands* Grace Livingstone 2020

report from the US Geological Survey asserted that the continental shelf between Tierra del Fuego and the Falklands might contain 40 billion to 200 billion barrels of oil. That would be more than the 35 billion barrels purportedly contained in the North Sea and perhaps even greater than Saudi Arabia's reserves, estimated at the time at 119 billion barrels."⁶⁶

February 20th, in Stanley, the first public meeting to discuss constitutional changes is held.

February 28th, a second public meeting is held to consider changes to the Falklands constitution. Suggestions from the public include wider representation and a reduction in the voting age accompanied by an increase in the residence requirement to seven years before a person could vote. Also the transfer of powers from the UK to the local legislature.⁶⁷

March 5th, in Britain, following the election of a (minority) Labour Government, James Callaghan is appointed Foreign Secretary.

April 8th, from Buenos Aires, Britain's Ambassador to Argentina, Donald Charles Hopson, reports a conversation with Minister Manuel de Anchorena, in which the latter insisted that negotiations need to resume.

*"One of the problems about the Falkland Islands was that from Her Majesty's government's point of view it was a marginal problem... always dogged by lack of ministerial time. In addition it was viewed by some senior people in the Foreign Office as an intractable problem about which nothing could be done."*⁶⁸

May 3rd, in London, Foreign Secretary Callaghan submits an assessment of the Falklands issue to Cabinet.

*"Callaghan's conclusion was forbidding: 'A policy of inaction would surely result in the Argentines progressively withdrawing their cooperation (e.g. the air service) and in a weakening of our position at the UN.' The ultimate political, financial and commercial penalties could be severe."*⁶⁹

Callaghan's proposals call for the inclusion of Island councillors as delegates at any talks. Also full consultation with the Islanders throughout any negotiation.

May 10th, after some debate, Britain's Cabinet approve Callaghan's proposals.

*"Callaghan therefore recommended that (Ambassador Hopson) call on Vignes and explain that Britain would shortly resume a dialogue. There would be no mention of condominium until the islanders had been consulted by the governor. Care was also taken to avoid use of the term 'negotiations'. Callaghan believed its inclusion would only alarm islanders and give rise to hostile questions in Parliament..."*⁷⁰

May 22nd, Britain approves the spending of £4.2 million on permanent airport facilities for the Falklands.⁷¹

June 4th, in Buenos Aires, Ambassador Donald Hopson informs Minister Vignes that Britain is working on a proposal to form the basis of a negotiation.

June 7th, Falkland Island councillors are informed of Callaghan's proposals by the Governor.

"Lewis described the councillors' reaction as predictable, in that they saw acceptance of it, as infringing on their sovereignty. ... Adrian Monk, an outspoken opponent of Argentina's territorial claims, referred to the proposals as a 'dilution of sovereignty'. ... Councillors were reluctant to go far without consulting their

66 *The Oil Wars Myth* Emily Meierding 2020

67 *Falkland Islands Times & Falkland Islands Monthly Review* March 1974 p.16-19

68 Hugh Carless quoted in Donaghy 2014

69 Donaghy 2014

70 *Ibid*

71 *Falkland Islands Times & Falkland Islands Monthly Review* June 1974 p.1

constituents... The councillors did not object to the Foreign Office approaching Argentina, but acceptance of the proposal would ultimately depend on the attitudes of the 1,900 islanders.”⁷²

“In other words, the councillors would not go in to bat at any stage without a prior mandate.”⁷³

June 10th, Argentina celebrates its 'Day of Affirmation of Argentina's Rights over the Malvinas, South Georgias and South Sandwich Islands.'⁷⁴


“Reports came in over the BBC World News that June 10th had been observed as a 'Day of Affirmation' by the Argentine when they reiterated their "irrevocable determination to recover their Malvinas Islands and it is likewise determined to discharge its actions to obtain their National objective”, in the words of the Argentine Ambassador in London. The report said that ceremonies were held in Argentine Embassies in many parts of the world. A newspaper report said that ceremonies were held in schools and all units of the armed forces and continued that 'is seen as a result of resurgent nationalism since the Peronista party returned to power last year.'...”⁷⁵

June 11th, in Buenos Aires, a detailed proposal from the UK is handed to the Foreign Ministry.⁷⁶

*“I have now received instructions from Her Majesty's Government to propose that the discussions between Britain and the Falkland Islands should be resumed on the basis of the safeguards and guarantees to be extended to the Islanders in the **hypothesised** event of a condominium. These discussions would be without prejudice to the respective positions of the United Kingdom and the Argentine Governments with regard to territorial sovereignty over the Falkland Islands.*

I am to explain that the main aim of Her Majesty's Government in entering into negotiations on the basis of a condominium would be to settle the dispute about sovereignty by accepting Argentine co-sovereignty over the Islands, and that the end product might be a treaty resolving the Anglo-Argentine dispute and creating a favourable atmosphere in which the Islanders could develop according to their interests. For the duration of the Treaty the two parties would accept shared sovereignty over the Islands. The co-dominion would be Her Majesty The Queen and His Excellency the President of the Argentina Nation.

There are several forms which a condominium might take but the basic elements might include the following:



⁷² Ibid

⁷³ FO 7/3198 March 8, 1976

⁷⁴ Re-established in November, 1973.

⁷⁵ *Falkland Islands Times & Falkland Islands Monthly Review* July 1974 p.16

⁷⁶ In an article in the *La Nacion* newspaper on March 13, 2012, ex-Ambassador Carlos Ortiz de Rosas, stated that the British Ambassador handed the 'non-paper' to President Péron personally at a secret meeting where the Argentine Foreign Minister was also present. There is no evidence to support this. See Donaghy 2014.

1) *The British and Argentine flags would fly side by side and the official language would be English and Spanish;*

2) *All 'belongers' of the Islands would possess dual nationality;*


3) *Existing colony passports would be replaced by travel documents issued in the co-domini;*

4) *The present constitution, administration and legal system would have to be adapted to the needs of a condominium. The Governor might be appointed alternatively by the Queen and the President of Argentina;*

5) *Further constitutional change would require the agreement of the co-domini.*

I also have to inform you that a Joint Session of the Executive and Legislative Councils of the Islands have informed the Governor that they had no objection to talks being held with the Argentine Government on the safeguards and guarantees required in a condominium.

*However, I am to state that Her Majesty's Government would feel free to invite representatives of the Islands to form part of the British delegation, and that before final agreement the Islanders would have to be formally consulted and **their acceptance sought by some form of popular representation**. On this basis, Her Majesty's Government propose that, if the Argentine Government agree, official or preliminary official talks should take place in Buenos Aires as soon as possible." 77*



"This, the secret document detailing Britain's offer to share the Falkland Islands with Argentina in 1974. Harold Wilson's Labour government approached President Juan Domingo Perón with a confidential plan for shared rule. ... Argentine newspaper La Nación today published what it said was a 'non-official document' from the British Foreign Office. It shows that Britain made the offer to then President Perón, whose second wife was the famous Eva, or Evita, on June 11, 1974. The British Ambassador in Buenos Aires, James Hutton,⁷⁸ gave Argentine Foreign Minister Alberto Vignes the text in a secret meeting. The proposals would see both flags being flown over the islands, and Spanish and English being made dual official language. A governor would also be put in place - who would be decided, on a rotating basis, by the British monarch and the Argentine President. The proposal would 'create a favourable atmosphere in which the islanders could develop according to their interests'. It would also 'put an end to the dispute over sovereignty'. It concluded: 'Covering these terms, the government of her Majesty proposes that, if the Argentine government agrees, we should realise official conversations in Buenos Aires as soon as possible'. ... " 79

"Vignes responded cautiously. He promised to put the proposal to Perón, but believed that in view of Argentina's repeated declarations in the UN and elsewhere, it would be 'extremely difficult' to agree to share sovereignty with Britain." 80

77 *La Nacion* March 13, 1974. My emphasis throughout.

78 The British Ambassador to Argentina in 1974 was Sir Donald Hopson (died unexpectedly August 26, 1974 of a heart attack). I can find no record of a James Hutton. Carlos Ortiz de Rozas was 85 in 2012; a lapse of memory perhaps.

79 *Pictured for the first time: The secret document showing Britain's offer to SHARE Falklands with Argentina* Lee Moran in *Daily Mail* March 13, 2012. My emphasis

80 Donaghy 2014

June 12th, news of the offer by the British Government leak out from the Falklands.

*“Despite the fact that I stressed the secrecy of the discussions... some of our members are incapable of keeping quiet. On this occasion the leak may have been deliberate with a view to sabotaging our initiative.”*⁸¹

June 20th, Argentina responds to the condominium proposal by suggesting a fixed term of joint administration preceded by recognition of Argentine sovereignty. Vignes assures Ambassador Hopson that his country's response is only a starting position, and that Argentina would not insist upon a prior recognition of sovereignty. That could be delayed to the end of the joint sovereignty period – 4 or 5 years.⁸²

*“This prior recognition of sovereignty, prior to any discussion, was unacceptable, obviously..”*⁸³

*“Perón is said to have reacted with 'euphoria', according to veteran diplomat Carlos Ortiz de Rozas who today spoke to La Nación. Perón is said to have told his confidante: 'We accept. Once we get a foot on the Falklands no-one will remove us. Shortly after the sovereignty will belong to Argentina alone.’”*⁸⁴

*“It (Argentina) proposed that recognition of Argentine sovereignty should be followed by a period of 'joint administration' for a term to be fixed in the negotiations... The fundamental objectives of the joint administration would be to facilitate the gradual integration of the population of the Islands into the political, social and institutional life of the Argentine Republic. ... (And) in his meeting with Vignes, Hopson found there was more room for manoeuvre. His optimism was not shared in Stanley, however, where Lewis was far less upbeat. The governor ... was pessimistic about the islander response. 'I am certain that this would not be acceptable locally', he declared.”*⁸⁵

On the same day, in Britain's House of Commons, Miss Joan Lester speaking on behalf of the Government, confirms that there will be no change in the status of the Falkland Islands without the consent of the Islanders.⁸⁶

June 24th, from London, Foreign Secretary Callaghan writes to Hopson.

*“The Argentine counterproposal certainly has constructive features... and we note his evident flexibility and readiness to compromise... (However) If the Foreign Minister and President Peron insist on including recognition of Argentine sovereignty in the basis for initiating talks, the islanders will refuse to take part: and **we cannot move without them.**”*⁸⁷

June 26th, in London, an announcement is made to Britain's Parliament.

“With the agreement of the Falkland Islands Executive Council, we have been in touch with the Argentine Government about the possible resumption of discussions between our two Governments in connection with United Nations resolution 3160. If discussions are resumed, representatives of the Islanders will be invited to join the United Kingdom delegation.”

The company of Dundee, Perth and London Securities Ltd is taken over by Charington, Gardner and Locket.⁸⁸

81 Gove Lewis to Callaghan & Hopson June 12, 1974 in FO 7/2699

82 FO 7/2699

83 James Callaghan quoted in Charlton 1989 p.37

84 Lee Moran in Daily Mail March 13, 2012 *op cit.*

85 Donaghy 2014

86 *HC Deb 20 June 1974 vol 875 c240W*. In answer to a question from Sir Nigel Fisher.

87 FO 7/2700. My emphasis.

88 DP & L Ltd had acquired the Falkland Islands Company in 1972.

July 1st, Juan Perón dies of a heart attack. His wife, Isabel Martinez de Peron, assumes the Presidency.

“... the deal, agreed by the then Argentine leader, was scuppered when he died just 20 days later. Britain was said not to trust his successor, his widow María Estela Martínez, and so cut contact with the South American country.”⁸⁹

“The Foreign Office was eager to act quickly. ‘Unless we seize this opportunity, there may be a coup or change of government in Buenos Aires within a matter of weeks’, Carless warned. ‘If so, we shall lose all the momentum we have gained’...”⁹⁰

“Argentina’s Foreign Ministry documents reportedly reveal that the British secretly offered former president Juan Perón ... shared control of the Islands on 11 June 1974, with a carefully considered proposal and concrete plans for making it a reality. The plan only failed to materialise because Perón died three weeks later, otherwise the course of history would have been quite different.”⁹¹

July 5th, from Stanley, Governor Lewis reports that attitudes are hardening against the proposals.

“... it is most unlikely any councillor will be willing to join a British delegation to discuss condominium.”⁹²

“The proposal was for a condominium where the Islands would be ruled partially by Argentina and partially by Great Britain. We at the time in Joint Council decided that this wasn’t on and did everything we could to throw it out, which we did. It just wasn’t going to work; we knew that, so we threw it out.”⁹³

July 10th, in London, the Falkland Islands Committee host a reception at Lincoln’s Inn attended by Earl Mountbatten of Burma. A message from Queen Elizabeth II is read to those present.

“... attended by 50 MPs of all parties, 10 Members of the House of Lords, 20 representatives of the press and media, 10 Commonwealth representatives, 10 civil servants (including former Governors of the Falklands), and about 30 Islanders and Committee members. The presence of the Earl Mountbatten of Burma as special guest reflected the British Government’s approval of the campaign. It was stated that the purpose of the gathering was, “... the rallying of support for the Islanders and of providing visiting Islanders with the opportunity of meeting people friendly to their cause.” The reunion became an annual event.”⁹⁴

“It was an astonishing example of the committee’s organisation and influence.”⁹⁵

July 15th, in London, Foreign Secretary Callaghan concludes that talks on condominium cannot proceed.⁹⁶

89 Lee Moran in Daily Mail March 13, 2012 *op cit*.

90 Donaghy 2014

91 *Chronicle of a referendum foretold: what next for the Malvinas–Falklands?* Cara Levey & Daniel Ozarow in *Revisiting the Falklands-Malvinas Question: Transnational & Interdisciplinary Perspectives* Guillermo Mira & Fernando Pedrosa (eds) 2021. This appears to date from 2013 as a version appears as an opinion piece in *Al Jazeera* dated March 17, 2013.

92 *Lewis to Callaghan July 5, 1974 in FO 7/2700*

93 Ex-councillor William Bowles quoted in *MercoPress* April 13, 2006. This article followed assertions in 2006 by Ambassador Carlos Ortiz de Rosas that the Islanders had been willing to accept the condominium proposal. These were repeated when, on June 14, 2012, Argentina’s President Cristina Kirchner, read this “*secret document*” to the UN’s Special Committee on Decolonization; erroneously suggesting that it was only Peron’s death that had caused the proposal to fail.

94 Ellerby 1990 p.181. These annual receptions still take place at Lincoln’s Inn.

95 Donaghy 2014

96 *Falkland Islands Review Committee Report* Franks Committee 1983 para. 29

“... Lord Goronwy-Roberts, the Foreign Office Minister in the Lords, advised the British government in July 1974 that Argentine foreign minister Vignes should be told that no progress could be made without the islanders' agreement, since otherwise: both the Argentine and the UK would be seen to be engaged in one of the worst forms of "imperialism" i.e. disposing of a people without their consent or even their participation in a discussion on their future.”⁹⁷

July 29th, in the Falkland Islands, representatives of Johnston Construction Ltd, arrive to plan the construction of a permanent airfield.

“By the spring of 1975 there may be up to 90 people working on the airport – both local and expatriate workers. It is expected that 12-15 families will be coming out. ... Setting out work will begin as soon as engineers start to arrive. Specialist machinery required will arrive by ship in late November.”⁹⁸

August 2nd, a letter is published in the *Falkland Islands Times & Falkland Islands Monthly Review*:

*“I am Argentine, married to a Falkland Islander, with two Argentine born children and a third a Kelper, ... What never ceases to amaze me is that many of those people who so fervently say "We want to remain British" are the same ones who accept Argentine scholarships for their children. Surely they must see that their children are being taught to hold a viewpoint contrary to their own. These children, particularly as they move up into secondary education, are learning all about the Argentine's claim to these Islands. I think parents will be dismayed to find that next time they say "we want to remain British" the first ones to shout them down will be their own children. Has this not occurred to anyone else?”*⁹⁹

August 8th, Argentina's National Academy of History meets to consider a paper by Ernesto Fitte entitled '*The National Academy of History and the blood in 1833 Malvinas.*' This concludes that the Falklands massacre of August, 1833, had no political character.¹⁰⁰

“Two gauchos five Charruas Indians led by Antonio Rivero, who worked the cattle in the field, arrived in Port Soledad and because Juan Simon, had denied the change of metallic money, rather than vouchers they made a killing in cold blood of Vernet's men namely the foreman Juan Simon permanent manager of the Argentine government, Brisbane, Vernet's henchman, one German, one Spanish and Scottish Dickson.”¹⁰¹

August 14th, from London, reacting to Governor Lewis's letter of July 5th, Callaghan writes to Ambassador Hopson in Buenos Aires, asking that a message be given to the Argentine Foreign Minister.¹⁰²

*“Given the sensitivity of Parliamentary opinion in the UK to the issue of self-determination, HMG cannot possibly proceed without the concurrence of the islanders.”*¹⁰³

97 Pascoe 2022 vol.3 p.579 citing Freedman 2005 vol.1 p.35

98 *Falkland Islands Times & Falkland Islands Monthly Review* August 1974 pp.11

99 *Ibid.* pp.5 & 6

100*cf.* August, 1833, March, 1956, November, 1965, January, 1966, April, 1966, April 1982, August 2012 and March 2015

101 Historian, and Academy member, Laurio H. Destefani. Dickson was Irish. *cf.* March, 1956, November, 1965, January, 1966, April, 1966, April 1982, August 2012 and March 2015

102 Hopson did not deliver the message. He died unexpectedly from a heart attack on August 26, 1974, aged only 59.

Argentine Minister Vignes was only informed as to the collapse of the condominium proposal on August 27, 1974, by Britain's *charge d'affairs*, Frank Maynard. Surprisingly, Vignes appears to have kept this information to himself; not informing anyone else at Argentina's Foreign Ministry. His reasoning isn't clear, and some confusion arose as a result.

103 Callaghan quoted in *FO 7/2700*

August 22nd, in New York, Argentina informs the UN Secretary-General that contact with the UK has been re-established regarding future Falklands negotiations. ¹⁰⁴

Having ceased its participation in 1971, Britain resumes limited collaboration with the Special Committee on Decolonization. But only to the extent of providing the information required under the terms of Art. 73 of the UN Charter. However, the UK does not take up a seat on the committee; albeit reserving a right to speak on matters concerning the Falkland Islands. ¹⁰⁵

“In 1974 the UK resumed cooperation with the Committee, without rejoining. The US and France were not members either.” ¹⁰⁶

September 5th, at the UN, the Special Committee decides to defer the Falklands question until 1975.

September 13th, an agreement is quietly signed between Argentina and Great Britain, allowing for the continued supply of fuels and gas to the Falklands by Argentina. ¹⁰⁷

“... the Foreign Office reacts feebly to Argentinian encroachment, ... for instance, in the September 1974 Agreement, signed by our Secretary of State, giving the Argentine YPF government department the right to erect a fuel storage tank in Port Stanley with a monopoly of petrol and diesel oil throughout the islands.” ¹⁰⁸

“... agreed by the British and Argentine Governments in 1974 with regrettably little explanation or reference to the people of the Falkland Islands. The YPF (Yacimientos Petroliferos Fiscales) company was allowed to install a Plant at Port Stanley, which required a number of Argentine technical staff to be here permanently to look after it. This seemed to us to be the thin end of the wedge.” ¹⁰⁹

“It's purpose was to reduce high costs, by allowing the Argentine state oil company (YPF) to supply oil fuels to the islands at Argentine mainland prices. Yet there were more than fiscal concerns at hand. It was designed to demonstrate the government's willingness to cooperate with Argentina, as well as buttress its position at the United Nations.” ¹¹⁰

September 23rd, in New York, at the opening of a new United Nations session, Ministers Callaghan and Vignes meet in the sidelines; *“Vignes was downcast, ominously remarking that the situation ‘could not be held indefinitely’.”* ¹¹¹

September 24th, before the UN's General Assembly, Argentina's Foreign Minister; *“... made a moderate speech, which included the obligatory Argentine claim to sovereignty.”* ¹¹²

In **October**, in Stanley, a local committee is formed to liaise with the Falkland Islands Committee in London.

104 Not strictly true, as the unexpected deaths of Argentina's President Peron and Britain's Ambassador Hopson had brought all discussion to a halt.

105 Every year a place is set out for the UK's representative, but not taken up. If someone from the British mission does attend, they sit at the back among the public. *cf.* 1971

106 Memorandum by the Foreign and Commonwealth Office O.T.18 May 2011. *cf.* 1971, 1986 & 1999. See – <https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201012/cmselect/cmfaff/writev/overseas/ot18.htm>

107 Exchange of Notes between the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Government of the Argentine Republic on the Supply and Marketing in the Falkland Islands of Argentine Petroleum-based Products September 13, 1974 Treaty Series No.30 1975

108 Infamous White Card Molly Mortimer 1975 in *The Spectator* July 11, 1975 p.12

109 74 Days: An Islander's Diary of the Falklands Occupation John Smith 1984

110 Donaghy 2014

111 *Ibid.*

112 *Ibid.*

*“... a ten member Falkland Islands Committee (Local Branch) was formed at a public meeting in Stanley with Jack Abbott (an expatriate of independent means who had married an Islander) as Chairman and Sydney Miller (a former Executive Councillor and farmer) as Secretary. The purpose of the Committee was to liaise with the UK (Committee).”*¹¹³

An Islander, Peter McLeod, accepts Argentine citizenship; taking up Argentine ID Card 12,045,643.¹¹⁴

*“The Falkland Islands, are Argentine or they ought to be. I didn’t do it, like the world supposes, as a challenge to Argentine sovereignty in the Islands. Simply, because I can see with my own eyes the advantages etc. ... Recently they (the Islanders) are taking much more interest in the Argentine. Negotiations are going on at official levels for establishing relations and for the Falkland Islands and Argentines to know each other....”*¹¹⁵

October 18th, from Stanley, Governor Lewis writes to the Foreign Office in London.

*“I see no likelihood of islanders agreeing to participate in talks before the end of the year. In fact, unless we are prepared to tell the committee in London the facts of life, I see no hope of any dialogue being renewed with the Argentines in the foreseeable future.”*¹¹⁶

October 24th, the UK writes to the United Nations confirming that contact continues with Argentina on the subject of the Falkland Islands.

In London, it is announced that Mr. Neville Arthur Irvin French is appointed to be the next Governor of the Falkland Islands from January 1975.¹¹⁷

October 30th, Argentina informs the UN Secretary-General that talks with the UK are on-going.

*“... the Government of the United Kingdom insists that the solution must be consonant with the 'wishes' of the inhabitants of the Malvinas... the Argentine Government wishes to reiterate that, ... the negotiations must take place exclusively between the Governments of the Argentine Republic and the United Kingdom. ...”*¹¹⁸

In **November**, in London, the Foreign Office holds meetings with members of the Falkland Islands Committee.

December 4th, in Stanley, a Legislative Council meeting considers a question of oil exploration licences.

“... the Colonial Government should take immediate steps to invite interested parties to apply for licences to examine the possibilities of drilling for oil, both on-shore and within territorial waters.”

Almost immediately, Argentina reacts.

*“Within two weeks a bill had been presented to the Argentine Congress which would, if passed, 'authorise the government to use force to recover the Islands'. Maynard warned that supplying licences in Falkland waters 'would be an act of the utmost provocation'...”*¹¹⁹

113 Ellerby 1990 p.182. This is the only source I have for this, but my general reading suggests that the local committee was more likely to have been formed in September 1974, if not August.

114 McLeod would seem to have been born in the Islands and employed 1957 to 1961 as a radio operator on South Georgia. After accepting Argentine citizenship, he was employed by YPF – in the Falklands.

115 Article in Argentine magazine GENTE (October 1974) quoted in *Falkland Islands Times & Falkland Islands Monthly Review* November/December 1974 pp.17.

116 *Lewis to Callaghan October 18, 1974 in FO 7/2701*

117 For a biography, see - https://www.falklandsbiographies.org/biographies/french_neville

118 *UN Doc A10023/Rev.1 vol.4*

119 Donaghy 2014. Maynard was the British *charge d'affairs* in Buenos Aires.

*“In late 1974, the Falkland Island Times reported that the islands’ government had received multiple new permit requests. In December, the Falklands’ legislative council met to discuss the oil issue. Eager to exploit any potential resources, the council passed two motions asking the governor of the islands, a British official, to invite applications for exploration licenses. Although the governor did not support the initiatives, oil companies continued to submit inquiries.”*¹²⁰

From London, Argentina's Ambassador, Manuel Anchorena, is summoned back to Buenos Aires, where he is publicly insulted as being a *“lawyer for the British.”*¹²¹

December 7th, in Lima, Minister Vignes has a conversation with Minister of State for the Foreign & Commonwealth Office, David Ennals, repeating that there are only two real options – negotiation or invasion.

*“Whatever might have been the rhythm implied by the Scott-Beltramino accords, it was now replaced by an ad hoc combination of sticks and carrots, largely directed at breaking down Falklander intransigence.”*¹²²

*“Vignes was in a truculent mood, perhaps conditioned by an incident in Stanley earlier that morning, when the FIC had blocked an Argentine cargo of goods from docking. He complained that islanders opinion was monopolised by the FIC who were determined to prevent progress.”*¹²³

In London, a meeting of the Commonwealth Parliamentary Association hears from Argentine Senator Hipólito Solari Yrigoyen, who claims that the UK is shedding colonies, and the Falklands *“would go.”*¹²⁴

*“The reception was very successful. The Parliamentarians present are all friends of the Colony but, if anything, they were even more determined to ensure that the Islanders' wishes would be honoured.”*¹²⁵

*“(Solari Yrigoyen) ... roundly denounced the British position. Among other things, he said there were only 2,000 people in the colony, so the Argentine to sovereignty was not an important matter for Britain; the “vast majority of nations had decided that a solution to the problem must be achieved and that solution was transfer of sovereignty and the end of Colonialism”; that Britain could no longer afford to keep the Falklands, and that “With a transfer of sovereignty the Islanders would enjoy all the benefits of Argentine citizenship and would be looked after”. The MPs present were clearly annoyed...”*¹²⁶

December 16th, in Buenos Aires, newspaper *Cronica* mounts a campaign advocating an invasion of the Falklands.¹²⁷

*“For its efforts the newspaper was provisionally closed by the administration of Mrs Peron for ‘endangering peaceful relations with foreign countries’, and legal proceedings were initiated according to the Penal Code and Law 20,840. A week later, a federal judge on hearing the case agreed that there had been an infringement of Article 219 of the Penal Code. Sr Hector Ricardo Garcia, the editor, was only released after paying a high sum and the case continued its normal procedural course.”*¹²⁸

December 18th, responding to a question in Britain's House of Commons, Mr. David Ennals, for the government, responds; *“There have been several discussions between Ministers of Her Majesty's Government*

120 Meierding 2020

121 Hastings & Jenkins 1997

122 *Ibid.*

123 Donaghy 2014.

124 *Falkland Islands Times & Falkland Islands Monthly Review* January/February 1975 p.21. Twenty MPs attended.

125 *Ibid.* p.24

126 Pascoe 2022 vol.3 p.580

127 *Ibid*

128 Makin 1983 p.396. Makin actually gives the year as 1975. This appears to be an error. See Dillon 1989

and Ministers of the Argentine, one occasion being as recent as last week. It is the wish of both Governments to keep in touch and I assure the House that it remains the policy of this Government, as of previous Governments, that no change in the present British Sovereignty over the Falkland Islands shall be made against the wishes of the Islanders.”¹²⁹

December 30th, a Geoffrey Deroath and his partner, Gillian Lipscombe, arrive in the Falklands. Found to be in possession of a revolver and .22 ammunition, their documentation is checked; *“The couple bluffed their way here without white cards by showing LADE officials a leather passport cover with City of London crest on it, convincing them that they were Embassy Officials!”*¹³⁰

1975 – January 3rd, in Buenos Aires, on the 142nd anniversary of HMS *Clio*'s ejection of a Buenos Airean garrison from East Falkland (Soledad) Island, Argentina's Foreign Minister holds a press conference.¹³¹

*“Argentina has decided in this case, even though there is usurpation, to continue to negotiate according to the Argentine pacifist tradition in the solution of international controversies.”*¹³²

Argentina unilaterally imposes immigration controls on all air travel between it and the Falkland Islands.

*“In 1971 Great Britain and Argentina signed, under UN auspices, a communication agreement... The use of only a 'white card' permitted open movement between the Islands and Argentina by both Argentine and Falklands Islands residents. The card contained no fingerprints, no nationality, and no expiration date.”*¹³³

*“In January 1975 the Argentine Government imposed immigration controls on air travel to the Falklands in breach of the Communications Agreement. A declaration that the holder was an Argentine citizen of the Malvinas was added to the 'white card.'...”*¹³⁴

*“The 'white card' was now replaced by one declaring the holder to be an Argentine citizen of the Malvinas.”*¹³⁵

In Buenos Aires, the government of Isabel Martinez de Peron indicates its frustration with the lack of progress in negotiations over the Islands.

*“... the Ministry of Social Welfare instructed Argentine cruise ships not to show a courtesy Red Ensign when they entered Stanley harbour.”*¹³⁶

Joint Hon-Secretary (UK Falkland Islands Committee), E. W. (Bill) Hunter Christie, arrives in the Islands.¹³⁷

*“Bill Christie, on his first visit, was very busy whilst here. He made a long Camp trip ... to visit 11 settlements and to speak to over 300 people. ... In Stanley Mr. Christie busied himself with brief visits to many people both in their homes and in public places such as bars. The major public event was an open meeting in the Town Hall which was very well attended.”*¹³⁸

“Christie spent three weeks in the Falkland Islands. He held 11 formal meetings in Stanley, including a public one with 220 people present, and public meetings for the inhabitants of 12 settlements in Camp. He made 34 calls in Stanley involving interviews and exchanges of view. He concluded that the people of the Islands were

129 Quoted in *Falkland Islands Times & Falkland Islands Monthly Review* January/February 1975 p.9

130 *Falkland Islands Times & Falkland Islands Monthly Review* January/February 1975 p.14. Arrested and deported.

131 See January, 1833

132 *La Nacion* January 3, 1975

133 *An Analysis of the Falkland/Malvinas Campaign* Admiral Harry D. Train 1988

134 Ellerby 1990 p.178

135 Hastings & Jenkins 1997 p.34

136 Ellerby 2009 p.178 citing *The Daily Telegraph* March 5, 1975

137 For a biography see - https://www.falklandsbiographies.org/biographies/christie_eric

138 *Falkland Islands Times & Falkland Islands Monthly Review* March/April 1975 p.24

adamant in their desire to remain British and that strong indirect pressure had been put on the people of this small community to change their allegiance against their will.”¹³⁹

January 20th, in London, aware that Prof. Donald Griffiths is compiling his report, the Department of Energy write to the Foreign & Commonwealth Office.

*“Ministers are very interested in the possibility of exploring offshore oil around the Falkland Islands.”*¹⁴⁰

January 28th, Neville Arthur Irwin French, the new Governor of the Falkland Islands, arrives in Stanley.¹⁴¹

*“He appears to have brought to his governorship of the Falklands many of the characteristics which had served him so ill in Tanganyika in 1958, nearly twenty years before: a single mindedness in carrying out what he correctly conceived to be his duty to his masters coupled with a strong authoritarian streak and lack of judgment. His obsessions about security and secrecy set up a barrier between him and the Islanders. He was openly criticised by the Falkland Islands Committee in London. His previous experience in Latin America (which the FCO doubtless thought appropriate and relevant) probably added to local suspicions.”*¹⁴²

January 31st, in London, Minister David Ennals, writes to Foreign Secretary James (Jim) Callaghan.

*“I am now moving towards the view that the best long-term aim might be a long-term leasing arrangement by which, under a treaty, we would cede sovereignty but would otherwise retain virtually all the arrangements on the Islands which exist now.”*¹⁴³

*“The foreign secretary reacted to the leaseback suggestion with disdain. ... Callaghan felt that Ennals overestimated Britain’s hurdle at the UN, and underestimated its capability to counter an Argentine attack and the parliamentary difficulties which would arise.”*¹⁴⁴

February 13th, in Stanley, shops close in protest regarding the refusal of a cruise ship to fly the Red Ensign.

*“Cruise Ship ‘Regina Prima’ visited Stanley for the 5th time. However the nearly 500 passengers found all shops but three were closed. ‘Regina Prima’ is Greek owned and Panamanian registered and was chartered to an Argentine Government company. It had two captains. The Argentine one had refused to allow the courtesy British flag, Red Ensign, to be flown, maintaining Stanley is an Argentine port for each visit here. Many residents had expressed anger at the local governments refusal to take action and its willingness to grant clearance to the ship for the previous four visits. Finally traders took matters into their own hands and closed down for the day. It was felt that this was hard on the tourists who were ordinary holidaymakers but that a protest had to be made. The incident captured the international news headlines for a day. We heard later that the refusal to fly the flag was the result of non-cooperation between different Government departments in Buenos Aires.”*¹⁴⁵

A representative for six oil companies visits Stanley to discuss the issue of exploration licences for an off-shore area known as Burdwood Bank. A geological feature to the south of the Falkland Islands archipelago.

In London, the Falkland Islands Committee is renamed the United Kingdom Falkland Islands Committee.

139 Tatham (ed.) 2008

140 Lindley to Carless January 20, 1975 FCO 96/369

141 The London Gazette No. 46481 also Falkland Islands Times & Falkland Islands Monthly Review May-July 1975 p.26

142 Tatham (ed) 2008

143 Quoted in FO 7/2964

144 Donaghy 2014

145 Falkland Island Times January/February 1975

March 2nd, the captain of *Regina Prima*, refuses yet again to fly the Red Ensign when entering Port Stanley.¹⁴⁶
“On its final visit the ‘Regina Prima’ still did not fly the courtesy flag, in spite of the intervention of the F.I. Chief Secretary, and the ship was not cleared and sailed without landing any tourists.”¹⁴⁷

March 9th, in Britain's *Sunday Telegraph* newspaper, an article suggests that competition over oil licences could provoke a military clash with Argentina.

March 13th, British intelligence reports indicate that, without negotiations, Argentina is likely to resort to force.¹⁴⁸

March 18th, in Britain's Parliament, the Government confirms that it has received Professor Griffiths's report into the potential for oil exploration around the Falklands. No further details are given.

“Griffiths reported in early 1975 that the prognosis was ‘sufficiently promising to encourage further commercial exploration’. The government submitted the findings to Sir Peter Kent, a former chief geologist at BP, who agreed...”¹⁴⁹

March 19th, from Buenos Aires, aware of Griffiths' Report, Argentina's Foreign Ministry issues a *communiqué*.

“According to cabled information published in the press, the United Kingdom Foreign Office has received a scientific report, ... concerning the possible existence of petroleum deposits under the Argentine continental shelf near the Malvinas Islands. Since the Malvinas Islands and the above-mentioned areas constitute an integral part of the national territory, the Government of Argentina wishes to state that it does not and will not recognize the right of any foreign Government to explore for or extract minerals or hydrocarbons.... Furthermore, the Argentine Government will regard the carrying out of activities of the kind referred to above to be contrary to United Nations resolutions and consensus on the Malvinas Islands, ...”

“... at a press conference... Vignes suggested that if Britain was unwilling to negotiate, “the only other option open to the Argentine government is a resort to force.”... Vignes said his remarks were made unwillingly, forced upon him by public pressure. “People are burning my feet”, he claimed, warning that unless there was progress, grave consequences would ensue: “It would be the big thing, the breaking off of diplomatic relations and an armed conflict”...”¹⁵⁰

Britain's new Ambassador to Buenos Aires, David Ashe, receives instructions to issue a warning that any military action will be met with force.

“The foreign secretary felt that an aggressive approach was required:...”¹⁵¹

146 *The Malvinas, the South Georgias and the South Sandwich Islands: the conflict with Britain* L. Destefani 1982.

Traditionally a ship, on entering a foreign port, displays the flag of that port.

147 *Falkland Island Times* January/February 1975

148 FO 7/2949

149 *Britain and the Dictatorships of Argentina and Chile 1973-82: Foreign Policy, Corporations and Social Movements (Security, Conflict & Cooperation in the Contemporary World)* Grace Livingstone 2018 citing *Geology of the Region Around the Falkland Islands: Summary of Report by P.F. Barker, J. Burrell, F. Simpson and D.H. Griffiths April 11, 1975 and Review of Birmingham Report of Geology of the Falkland Islands Region by Peter Kent June 2, 1975 in FCO 96/369*

150 Donaghy 2014

151 *Ibid*

March 26th, in London, considering the Griffiths Report on the potential for Falklands' oil, the Foreign & Commonwealth Office notes; *"Of one thing we can be certain: there can be no exploration of any oil there may be around the Falklands except in collaboration with the Argentines."*¹⁵²

April 3rd, Britain's *Financial Times* newspaper claims that progress towards greater contact between the Falklands and Argentina has been delayed. Due to the possible existence of oil deposits.

April 7th, the Falklands Government submits a report concerning proposed changes to the Islands' Constitution.

April 10th, in Britain's Parliament, spokesman Goronwy-Roberts confirms that if negotiations between the UK and Argentina take place, Islanders will be invited to attend.¹⁵³

April 14th, in Buenos Aires, Ambassador Ashe delivers Britain's warning to the Foreign Ministry.

*"The Argentine Government must clearly understand that an attack on the Islands would be met with a military response. At the same time Her Majesty's Government wished to avoid any confrontation with Argentina. The only alternative to confrontation was negotiation and they stood ready to examine any proposal which the Argentine Government might wish to put forward."*¹⁵⁴

April 16th, in London, a meeting between Prime Minister Wilson, Foreign Secretary Callaghan and Minister David Ennals considers the policy to adopt with regard to oil deposits on the Islands' continental shelf. Callaghan notes that the current Argentine regime is; *"... so unstable that it was questionable whether a negotiated settlement would stand the test of time."*

*"If we receive no warning of an invasion and we are obliged to liberate the Islands from an Argentine occupation, our political task at the United Nations, and in Washington, would be formidable. The Secretary of State for Defence should therefore advise on the practical aspects of defending the Islands."*¹⁵⁵

Between them, they decide; *"... that economic cooperation and joint oil exploration would provide the basis for a new Anglo-Argentine dialogue, with the sovereignty issue being withheld for a later date."*¹⁵⁶

April 25th, in Buenos Aires, a car bomb explodes outside the British Embassy Residence, killing a guard and injuring two others. The Ambassador and his family are unhurt.¹⁵⁷

May 5th, in New York, Britain informs the UN that it has no doubts about its exclusive sovereign rights to explore for natural resources of the continental shelf around the Falklands' archipelago.¹⁵⁸

Researcher's Comment: Before complaints arrive to say that the Falklands archipelago does not sit upon its own continental shelf – it does. At the least in the theoretical world of international law. In December, 1950 a British *Order in Council* had extended the borders of the colony to include the adjacent continental shelf areas. This was followed in 1958 by the UN's *Convention on the Continental Shelf* which recognised that, for the purposes of international law, islands had their own shelf areas. Unsurprisingly, Argentina declined to sign this convention. Geologically, it appears that the archipelago sits upon its own micro-plate.¹⁵⁹

152 *Coles to Collins March 26, 1975 FCO 96/369*

153 *HL Deb 10 April 1975 vol.359 cc180-1*

154 Quoted in Charlton 1989 pp.42-43

155 Callaghan interviewed in Charlton 1989 p.44

156 Donaghy 2014

157 *Chronicles of Modern Terrorism* Barry & Judith Rubin 2009. Surprisingly little information is available regarding this attack, the attackers or its objective. No group appears to have claimed responsibility.

158 *UN Yearbook 1975*

159 See <https://falklandstimeline.files.wordpress.com/2021/03/geology-of-the-falkland-islands-1999.pdf>

May 8th, in London, at the Foreign Office, Minister David Ennals hosts an informal seminar attended by the United Kingdom Falkland Islands Committee.

*“The agenda covered oil exploration, alginates, fisheries, welfare, the constitution and restrictions on foreigners owning land. There was no attempt to reach conclusions or recommendations, although ideas discussed were passed on to Governor French.”*¹⁶⁰

*“The U.K.F.I.C's representatives included Bill Hunter Christie, Frank Mitchell, Sir John Barlow and Jack Abbott (from the Local Branch in Stanley). Professor Donald Griffiths, a geologist from Birmingham University, and Dr. Peter Calvert, a Politics Lecturer at Southampton University, contributed their specialist knowledge of the region. Commercial interests were represented by the Chairman of the F.I.C., the Chief Manager of Lloyds Bank International's Latin American Section, the Managing Director of the Baring Bank, and a consultant for the Argentine National Bank. Twelve Members of Parliament attended including John Biggs-Davison, James Johnson, Nigel Fisher and Tam Dalyell. Finally, there were officials from the Foreign Office, Ministry of Defence and Department of Energy.”*¹⁶¹

*“Large British corporations with investments in Latin America argued that Britain's commercial interests were being put at risk by the failure to resolve the sovereignty dispute with Argentina. This was the argument put forward by executives of Barings Bank, Lloyds Bank and a former director of Shell at a secret seminar on the Falklands organised by the FCO on 8 May 1975. The only business executive at the meeting who was in favour of maintaining the status quo was the chairman of the Falkland Islands Company.”*¹⁶²

May 14th, Foreign Secretary James Callaghan proposes to the Prime Minister that dialogue with Argentina proceed through the offices of Britain's Ambassador in Buenos Aires. But in strict secrecy, to avoid leaks.¹⁶³

*“Foreign Secretary James Callaghan wrote to the Prime Minister in early 1975 warning that if Britain refused to talk to Argentina, not only would it lead to confrontation, but it ‘would also preclude any possibility of exploring or exploiting either oil deposits on the Falkland Islands Continental Shelf or the resources of the South Atlantic as a whole’. The paragraph on oil in this letter is completely redacted – as are many of the references to oil in the National Archives collection of government papers,...”*¹⁶⁴

Callaghan also suggests that talks concerning the Falklands could be eased by an offer of joint oil exploration.¹⁶⁵

May 18th, in Washington DC, Argentina's Foreign Minister Alberto Vignes has lunch with the US Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger. The situation regarding the Falkland Islands is discussed.¹⁶⁶

May 24th, in Buenos Aires, during an interview with Minister Vignes, Ambassador Ashe proposes *in camera* discussions with regard to a joint development of the resources of the south-west Atlantic. Vignes promptly counter proposes that any negotiations on economic cooperation should be linked to the immediate transfer of sovereignty followed by simultaneous leaseback for a period of 15 years.

160 Ellerby 1990 p.200 citing *U.K.F.I.C. archive (Sussex), group D, file 9: Coles to Christie, 7 Apr. 1975*. Also *Christie to Hall, 31 Dec. 1974*

161 *Ibid.*

162 Livingstone 2018 citing *FCO 7/2958*. Hardly a secret.

163 *FO 7/2950*

164 Livingstone 2018 citing *Callaghan to Wilson PM/75/38 May 14, 1975 in FCO 7/3373*

165 A suggestion approved by the Cabinet Defence and Overseas Policy (OD) Committee in July, 1975. A Cabinet Committee. Its existence was first announced in 1962 and was confirmed as still in being by Thatcher in 1979. Until 1992, the membership of Cabinet Committees, their remits and decisions were not made public.

166 *US National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P820125–0187*. No details provided. The primary conversations appears to have focused on Cuba.

*“Leaseback was a fusion of two basic principles: British administration, as desired by the islanders, and the concession of sovereignty to Argentina.”*¹⁶⁷

May 27th, in Stanley, Island councillors propose that an ‘economic study’ be pursued to advise on the long term prospects of both the Falklands, and the Dependencies.¹⁶⁸

“On the length of the airstrip at Stanley, lies the Falkland Islands' future. An entirely unpublicised, unofficial delegation from the islands is, I understand, currently engaged in discussion of the matter with the Foreign Office. There is no other British territory which can only be reached by courtesy of a foreign country. The present airstrip being inadequate for the landing of long international-flight aircraft, islanders can only leave and return home by way of Argentina. Furthermore, these British, either leaving or entering their Islands, are obliged to get a White Card permit either from the Argentine Office in the Islands or in Buenos Aires, before the Argentine airline (LADE) will confirm a booking. Adding insult to injury, Argentine personnel enter the Islands without it. No such right is granted to Argentina by the Communications Agreement of 1971 with Britain.

*In present circumstances, Argentinians can enter the Islands and could well form a nucleus for takeover, before counter-action could be taken... The key to development and control lies in communications. Conditions for these were laid down by the 1971 Agreement, by which the British government undertook to replace the temporary airstrip by a permanent airfield. Work on it is expected to start this year, but Argentina has refused any aid which will make an international airport and allow the Islanders direct flights to Ascension or the Cape (though this would be cheaper). The current field under construction has a runway of only 1,250 metres; 2,000 metres are needed for international jets. The Seychelles were provided with an international port by British aid; why not the Falklands? In the meantime, it has cost about £1 million to get Johnston Construction and their machinery to the Islands, and the decision whether to do the job properly or not must be made in the next few months.”*¹⁶⁹

June 19th, in Buenos Aires, Ambassador David Ashe again meets with the Foreign Minister. Vignes indicates that Argentina is prepared to start a discussion on economic cooperation. A condition, however, is that Argentina is allowed to occupy the uninhabited islands of South Georgia and the South Sandwich Islands, without condemnation by the UK.

*“That proposal was unacceptable to Britain and the absence of talks on sovereignty unacceptable to the Argentines. For some time following that there were no negotiations.”*¹⁷⁰

*“We have undertaken a careful examination of the resolutions in question. They refer only to the Falkland Islands and do not explicitly mention the Dependencies. Moreover, the list of non-self-governing territories compiled by General Assembly Committees in 1946 and subsequently in 1964 referred exclusively to the "Falkland Islands."...”*¹⁷¹

July 14th, in London, an announcement is made to Parliament

“The association of the Falkland Islands, as a dependent territory for whose external affairs the United Kingdom remains responsible, will, in accordance with Article 117 of the Act of Accession to the

167 Donaghy 2014

168 *Ibid.* See October

169 *Infamous White Card* Molly Mortimer 1975 in *The Spectator* July 11, 1975 p.12

170 Baroness Young in *HL Deb* 25 January 1983 vol.438 cc136-247

171 *PREM* 19-0625 6 May 1982

Community Treaties, take effect upon a decision of the Council of the European Communities. The Falklands Executive Council has approved." ¹⁷²

July 16th, in Buenos Aires, Minister Vignes repeats to Ambassador Ashe that talks on economic cooperation alone hold no interest for Argentina.

July 31st, Ashe informs London that the Peronist administration is unlikely to last much longer. However, Argentina's Foreign Ministry is demanding that sovereignty talks resume before September, when a meeting between Callaghan and Argentina's Foreign Minister is scheduled to take place at the United Nations building in New York.

August 11th, in Buenos Aires, Alberto Vignes is replaced as Foreign Minister by Angel Frederico Robledo.

"We have been some way across a diplomatic minefield with an Argentine foreign minister who has been thrown out of office just at the moment when there was a chance of launching a new dialogue. We must be extremely cautious before attempting to relaunch it." ¹⁷³

August 18th, in the UK, an article in *The Times* newspaper reports on the activities of the United Kingdom Falkland Islands Committee; "... in the autumn they will lead a political campaign to challenge the Foreign and Commonwealth Office's view of the immediate and future needs of the Falkland Islands..."

August 20th, in New York, at the UN, the Special Decolonization Committee refers the Falklands question to the General Assembly.

September 9th, in London, at a meeting of the International Parliamentary Union,¹⁷⁴ Argentina accuses Britain of an act of 'international piracy' in establishing a colony on the Falklands. Forewarned, the meeting is picketed by Falkland Islanders.

September 16th, in Argentina, in an interview with the press, new Foreign Minister Robledo describes the wishes of the Falkland Islanders as "irrelevant."

September 18th, in Buenos Aires, Britain's Ambassador protests Robledo's comments. Robledo responds by questioning Britain's insistence on Islander consent for talks to proceed.

September 23rd, in New York, in a speech at the opening session of the UN General Assembly, Robledo raises the question of the Falklands.

"We are a people convinced of the merits of negotiation. We apply this to what concerns us most directly. As is well known, my country suffers from the usurpation by a foreign Power of a part of its territory, namely the Malvinas Islands. For that question to be settled, there is no solution other than the return of those islands to the territorial patrimony of the Republic, since their occupation by force was carried out against every law..."

He claims that the application of self-determination to the Falklands; "... was excluded, in view of the fact that the British occupation constitutes a violation of the principle of territorial integrity specifically laid down in resolution 1514." ¹⁷⁵ Robledo also asserts that Argentina has the support of the Non-Aligned Movement. ¹⁷⁶

September 25th, in New York, Callaghan meets with Robledo at the Waldorf Towers.

172 *HC Deb 14 July 1975 vol.895 cc324-5W*

173 *Callaghan to Ashe August 15, 1975 in FO 7/2952*

174 Founded in 1889, this is the international organisation for Parliaments.

175 *UN Doc A3125/Rev.1 vol.4*. See 1960 for comments on the non-retroactive nature of resolution 1514.

176 A forum for the UN members which are not formally aligned with any major power bloc.

*“Robledo conveyed an invitation to Callaghan and the Queen to visit Argentina. He gave no commitment to Callaghan's proposals for economic cooperation, agreeing only to "consider them urgently." Consequently, Callaghan's suggestion that a senior official might go to Buenos Aires to discuss an agenda also went unanswered. Robledo accepted that economic cooperation would be mutually beneficial to promote stability and progress. He did not adopt the hard-line approach expected, nor emphasise the need for early progress on sovereignty. Far from being a source of distraction it appeared that the Falklands might even take a back-seat, as Argentina confronted its domestic woes. Like his predecessor, Robledo saw condominium as providing Argentina's best hope, suggesting that negotiations might be renewed in the near future...”*¹⁷⁷

Minister Robledo assures the Foreign Secretary that there is; *“... (no) question of an Argentine invasion of the Islands, nor of an attempt to solve the problem by force.”*¹⁷⁸ Responding, Callaghan informs the Foreign Minister of plans for an economic survey, at the request of the Islanders; *“... Its purpose is to quantify the options for future economic development...”*¹⁷⁹

*“There is no record of a response from Robledo to this, indicating that he had not grasped the magnitude of the enterprise to be undertaken.”*¹⁸⁰

In Montreal, on the same day, a protocol is signed concerning the international carriage of parcels by air. On signing, Argentina protests the UK's inclusion on ratification of the Falkland Islands, South Georgia, the South Sandwich Islands and the British Antarctic Territory. The UK submits a counter declaration:

“In reference to the declaration made by the Argentine Republic when depositing the instruments of ratification of Protocols Nos. 1, 2 and 3 as well as Montreal Protocol No. 4, signed at Montreal on 25 September 1975, the position of the United Kingdom is well known and remains unchanged. The United Kingdom has no doubt of its sovereignty over the Falkland Islands, South Georgia and the South Sandwich Islands and its incontestable right to apply the treaties thereto. As for the part of the declaration concerning the British Antarctic Territory, the Embassy recalls the contents of the Antarctic Treaty and particularly the provisions of Article IV of the said Treaty.”

October 2nd, in Buenos Aires, after less than two months in office, Frederico Robledo is replaced as Argentina's Foreign Minister by Arauz Castex.

October 9th, from the Mar de la Plata naval base, Argentine submarine ARA *San Luis* (S32) departs for a fifty-day mission to reconnoitre the South Atlantic and survey the coasts of the Falkland Islands.

October 14th, in the Falklands, in poor weather conditions, a Beaver aircraft goes missing with its pilot, Capt. Ian Campbell and one passenger Dr. Bernard Lee.¹⁸¹

October 16th, in London, following the May suggestions from the Islanders, the British Government announces a comprehensive economic survey; to be led by Lord Shackleton. Its purpose to inquire into the development possibilities of the Falkland Islands.¹⁸²

177 Donaghy 2014

178 Freedman 2005 vol.1 p.38

179 *HC Deb 14 January 1976 vol.903 cc391*

180 Donaghy 2014

181 Subsequently discovered upside down on a reef. Nearby was a cold, but alive Dr. Lee. Capt. Campbell's body was found on November 2, 1976. The incident led to a huge fall out between Governor French and the Islands' Executive Council. It may have led to the Governor's early departure from the archipelago. See below.

182 Franks 1983, para.34. Son of the explorer, and a respected Labour peer, Shackleton was under no illusions that his report was to emphasise the importance of Argentine/Island relations and to included the possibility of a take-over.

“Terms of Reference: In the light of the weakening of the colony’s economy and the decline in population, and taking into consideration previous reports including those of Theophilus, Armstrong, Comben/Waller and Davies:-

1. To examine the resources of the colony and the dependencies and the prospects for economic development with particular reference to agriculture, the wool industry, the need for diversification and possible developments in oil, minerals, fisheries, and alginates and to make recommendations.

2. In this context to examine the present fiscal structure and the provision of government services in the colony and dependencies in the light of the present uncertain economic climate and to make recommendations. To advise on priorities for capital expenditure over the next five years with particular reference to the need for improved infrastructure and to programmes for public utility development and housing.

3. To assess the financial, manpower and social obligations of any recommended economic strategy, with particular reference to the encouragement of small scale enterprise and scope for local investment, and the extent to which all these needs can be met from local resources and to the degree which recourse to all potential external resources may be necessary.”

“It appears that the economic survey was sanctioned by the British Government in response to the increase in Argentine hostility. In April 1975 the British Embassy in Buenos Aires reported the need for a diplomatic initiative after the Argentine Government warned that the only option open was a resort to force. ... The Government wanted to persuade Parliament and the Islanders through an "informed approach" that collaboration with Argentina was the answer.”¹⁸³

“Concerned about the continuing decline of the local economy, councillors had requested 'a comprehensive economic study' of the Falklands region, which would advise on long-term prospects and include the Dependencies. But for the British Government there were different motives at hand. The Foreign Secretary saw this as an ideal way to show the islanders that future development rested on cooperation with Argentina rather than dependence on Britain, and thereby encourage closer links... by the Autumn of 1975, certain factors had convinced the Foreign Office that the councillor's proposals justified investigation.”¹⁸⁴

From Edinburgh, the firm of Christian Salvesen informs the Foreign Office that they own two old whaling harbours on South Georgia, and are trying to acquire two more.

“It is a long shot, but I think that sometime in the future there may be use for these bases, either for fishing or for oil. I hope that HMG will not absent-mindedly hand it over to Argentina.”

In the Netherlands, at the Hague, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) presents an Advisory Opinion (AO) regarding the situation in Western Sahara.¹⁸⁵

“54. The Charter of the United Nations, in Article 1, paragraph 2, indicates, as one of the purposes of the United Nations: "To develop friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples..." This purpose is further developed in Articles 55 and 56 of the Charter. Those provisions have direct and particular relevance for non-self-governing territories, which are dealt with in Chapter XI of the Charter. As the Court stated in its Advisory

183 Ellerby 1990 p.201 citing, *inter alia*, J. Callaghan, *Time and Chance* (London, 1987)

184 Donaghy 2014

185 A disputed territory on the north-west coast of Africa.

Opinion of 21 June 1971 on The Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970):

*"... the subsequent development of international law in regard to non-self-governing territories, as enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations, made the **principle of self-determination applicable to all of them.** (ICJ reports 1971. p.31)"*

55. The principle of self-determination as a right of peoples, and its application for the purpose of bringing all colonial situations to a speedy end, were enunciated in the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV). In this resolution the General Assembly proclaims "the necessity of bringing to a speedy and unconditional end colonialism in all its forms and manifestations". To this end the resolution provides inter alia:

*"2. **All peoples have the right to self-determination;** by virtue of that right they freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development*

*The above provisions, in particular paragraph 2, thus confirm and emphasize that the application of **the right of self-determination requires a free and genuine expression of the will of the peoples concerned.** ...*

*59. The validity of the principle of self-determination, defined as the need to pay regard to the freely expressed will of peoples, **is not affected** by the fact that in certain cases the General Assembly has dispensed with the requirement of consulting the inhabitants of a given territory. Those instances were based either on the consideration that a certain population did not constitute a 'people' entitled to self-determination or on the conviction that a consultation was totally unnecessary, in view of special circumstances" ¹⁸⁶*

As is usual, some of the judges publish separate opinions.

"... it is for the people to determine the destiny of the territory and not the territory the destiny of the people." ¹⁸⁷

"... it follows ... that the principle of self-determination could be dispensed with only if the free expression of the will of the people was found to be axiomatic in the sense that the result was known to be a foregone conclusion or that consultations had already taken place in some form or that special features of the case rendered it unnecessary." ¹⁸⁸

"... the first type of exception exist, for example, in the case of Gibraltar or Malvinas (Falkland Islands) where the General Assembly has requested the States concerned to negotiate the issue of sovereignty and the transfer of territory, and they have refused to accept the effects of a referendum or consultation to the present inhabitants of these territories." ¹⁸⁹

"The self-proclamation of a "people" and a subsequent claim of entitlement to the right to self-determination are ... insufficient." ¹⁹⁰

¹⁸⁶ *Western Sahara, Advisory Opinion, ICJ Reports 1975* (advisory opinions have no mandatory effect). My emphasis. For the full ICJ report see <https://www.icj-cij.org/files/case-related/61/061-19751016-ADV-01-00-EN.pdf>

¹⁸⁷ Judge Dillard *ICJ ref: 061-19751016-ADV-01-07*

¹⁸⁸ Judge Nagendra Singh quoted in *Trinidad* 2018 p.57

¹⁸⁹ *Los Derechos Argentinas Sobre Las Islas Malvinas* Alfredo Bruno Bologna 1982

¹⁹⁰ *The Malvinas/Falklands Between History and Law* M. G. Kohen & F. D. Rodriguez 2017 p.214. cf. January, 1952 & August, 1982

“... it cannot be denied that self-determination has, at the very least, attained a position of high normative regard, being seen as a peremptory norm with regard to the issue of decolonisation.”¹⁹¹

“Although the ICJ approved of its earlier opinion in the Namibia proceedings that the principle of self-determination applied to ‘all’ Chapter XI Non-Self-Governing Territories, it cast doubt on the generality of this proposition in what is arguably the most ambiguous passage in the Western Sahara Opinion:... (para. 59) ... The fact that the passage is not supported by factual examples makes it particularly prone to a wide range of interpretations and to speculation regarding the specific anomalous cases the ICJ had in mind. ... it is important to recall that in the ICJ’s view, the fact that the General Assembly dispensed with a consultation of the inhabitants does not affect [t]he validity of the principle of self-determination, defined as the need to pay regard to the freely expressed will of peoples.’...”¹⁹²

“... in its decision the Court explicitly upheld the Saharawis’ right of self-determination, in paragraphs 70 and 162 of its Advisory Opinion of 16 October 1975 ... If the Falklands case were taken to the ICJ, the Court might decide along similar lines: that there were certain historical links between Argentina and the Falklands, but they were not sufficient to override the self-determination of the Falkland Islanders.”¹⁹³

“... following the Chagos opinion (2019), a persuasive argument can be made that self-determination and the right to decolonization come close to being one and the same thing,.. Identifying the right to self-determination with colonization has the further advantage that all the traditional and difficult questions relating to self-determination no longer pose insurmountable obstacles. If self-determination is essentially limited to non-self-governing territories (i.e. colonies), there is no need to figure out what on earth the notion of ‘peoples’ means, as in the phrase ‘all peoples have a right to self-determination’. ... the identity of the right-holder is now clear: the right-holder is the non-self-governing territory. Secondly, the consequence of self-determination has become clear as well: the self-determination of non-self-governing territories will ideally materialize in their independence, unless they themselves opt freely for association or integration with another state, in accordance with General Assembly resolution 1541 (XV).”¹⁹⁴

October 18th, in Stanley, following an emergency Executive Council meeting, two Councillors walk out after a disagreement with Governor French over an official inquiry into the loss of the Islands Beaver aircraft and the death of Capt. Campbell.¹⁹⁵

“On 21st October it was announced that a team of three from the Accident Investigation Branch of the Dept, of Trade in London and headed by Mr G.C. Wilkinson would be arriving on the 28th.”¹⁹⁶

“On 14 October a very popular local pilot, Ian Campbell, died in the crash of a FIGAS Beaver aircraft. There followed a strong disagreement between Governor French and Executive Councillors over the circumstances of the crash and the setting up of an enquiry into it and a subsequent angry public meeting of some 200 people on 20 October.”¹⁹⁷

October 22nd, from Buenos Aires, Argentina’s Foreign Ministry comments regarding the Shackleton mission.

191 *Uti Possidetis: The Procrustean Bed of International Law?* M. Wesley 2017

192 *Self-determination in Disputed Colonial Territories* Jamie Trinidad 2018 p.56 & 58

193 *Falklands Facts and Fallacies: The Falkland Islands in History and International Law* Graham Pascoe 2020 p.317

194 *Shrinking Self-determination – The Chagos Opinion of the International Court of Justice* Prof. Jan Klabbers in *European Society of International Law ESIL Reflections* 2019 vol 8, issue 2

195 Leading to a public protest on October 19, 1976

196 *The Falkland Islands Times & Falkland Islands Monthly Review* November 6, 1976

197 Tatham (ed) 2008

“In response to the proposal made by the British Government to send a mission to the Islas Malvinas with the object of carrying out an economic and financial survey of the archipelago and the surrounding areas, the Ministry of External Relations and Worship states that:-

- 1) It reiterates in full the communique issued by the Foreign Ministry on 19 March 1975;*
- 2) Contrary to a report appearing in a London newspaper, the Argentine Government has on no occasion given its consent to the mission in question;*
- 3) Since the question of the Malvinas Islands is subject to the procedure recommended by the United Nations General Assembly in its resolution 2065 (XX) and 3160 (XXVIII), the parties to the dispute must abstain from any new unilateral action affecting the basic aspects of the question. Any such action will undermine the clear objective of the resolutions in question and will be contrary to the spirit which has prevailed in all the dealings so far between the two countries concerning the archipelago, and also is unacceptable to the Argentine Government;*
- 4) The mission which Great Britain proposes to send would not be welcome because investigations to assess the possibility of the economic exploration of the natural resources of the Malvinas Islands – resources which therefore belong to the Argentine Republic – would violate the principle of not undertaking new action. Consequently, the sending of this mission constitutes an inconsiderate act which the Argentine Foreign Ministry would not wish to interpret as an attitude of provocation because this would imply that Great Britain does not accept the normal continuation of bilateral negotiations, a fact which could have unforeseeable and certainly serious consequences for which Great Britain alone would be responsible;*
- 5) The essential factor in the process of reaching a final settlement of the dispute is negotiation between the two Governments and hence the initiation of acts which may prejudice this process will upset relations between the Argentine Republic and Great Britain and will impede the achievement of a peaceful settlement of the Malvinas question;*
- 6) Once more, Argentina urges Great Britain to take the view that negotiations to settle the dispute concerning sovereignty over the archipelago is the best procedure and is in conformity with the decisions of the United Nations and the recognized standards of the civilized world.”*

In Buenos Aires, Ambassador David Ashe is summoned to the Foreign Ministry. To be presented with a communique complaining that the Shackleton mission; “... represents a step not previously concerted with the Argentine Government.” Ashe responds that Robledo had been informed in September, but had raised no objection.

October 23rd, Ambassador Ashe informs London, warning that Shackleton’s plans need to ensure that he does not pass through Argentina, as he would make a “sensational hostage.”¹⁹⁸

October 26th, as regards a change of Governor; “It was announced on 26th October that Her Majesty the Queen has been pleased to approve the appointment of Mr James Roland Walter Parker OBE as our next Governor and Commander in Chief.”¹⁹⁹

198 FO 7/2961

199 *The Falkland Islands Times & Falkland Islands Monthly Review* November 6, 1976. For a biography, see - https://www.falklandsbiographies.org/biographies/parker_james

October 28th, from London, Argentina's Ambassador, Manuel de Anchorena, is summoned back to Buenos Aires for 'consultations.'

November 5th, in Buenos Aires, Anchorena and Ambassador Ashe meet. Anchorena complains about Britain's insistence that Islander consent is required before any progress can be made; and the emphasis being placed upon their 'wishes' rather than their interests. ²⁰⁰

*"It is of course impossible to rule a people according to their interests but against their wishes, since their wishes define what their interests are. Interests are not an objective reality; they are defined by the perspective of the person defining them."*²⁰¹

November 10th, Argentina's Ministry of Foreign Affairs announces that Lord Shackleton will not be permitted to transit through Argentina.

Off the north-eastern coast of East Falkland, Argentine submarine ARA *San Luis*, covertly photographs the Cape Pembroke lighthouse (right).



November 13th, in Buenos Aires, British Ambassador David Ashe meets with ex-Minister Robledo and his successor, Arauz Castex; to seek an explanation as to why Argentina suddenly objects to the economic survey and why Robledo had not argued against the idea in September. Initially Robledo denies that Callaghan had mentioned the survey but then, on seeing the notes from the meeting, excuses himself by saying that there had been too much to take in at that time, and there had been no talk of appointing Lord Shackleton. ²⁰²

November 14th, in Buenos Aires, Argentina's Foreign Ministry informs the British Embassy that the research ship, *RSS Shackleton*, will require Argentine permission to carry out any activity within 200 miles of the Argentine coast.

Also that 'Argentine waters' is being interpreted to include the area around the archipelago in accordance with "Argentine law." Britain's Ambassador informs Foreign Secretary Callaghan.

"So, what had seemed to be a very fruitful means of keeping the Argentines engaged, and recognising some of their legitimate interests in the waters around the Falklands, disappeared. The Argentine government raised a lot of difficulty about the Shackleton expedition..." ²⁰³

In Stanley, on the same day, elections for the Legislative Council of the Falkland Islands are postponed until January 1976. ²⁰⁴

November 16th, in Stanley, on the arrival of James Roland Walter Parker, Governor Designate French announces that he is to return to the UK. ²⁰⁵

"On 16th November Governor French gave a broadcast address in which he announced that due to the desire of Her Majesty's Govt., to discuss with him directly a number of issues raised by the Shackleton Report he would

200 FO 7/2954

201 Pascoe 2020 p.311

202 Donaghy 2014. Neither side had taken an interpreter for the September meeting.

203 James Callaghan quoted in Charlton 1989 p.47

204 *The Falkland Islands (Legislative Council) (Amendment) Order 1975 (no.1706)*. This was an attempt to hold the elections under a new Constitution which was in the process of being approved in the UK. See below.

205 Ostensibly for consultations on the Shackleton Report. However, French's replacement had been announced in the UK on October 26, 1976, and this departure appears more likely associated with the Governor's authoritarian attitude towards the Islanders. A population not easily cowed.

be leaving the Islands on December 2nd. His Excellency said that although Councillors felt strongly that he should return to the colony ... it would be an unjustifiable charge on public funds.”²⁰⁶

“French had not been responsible for any single catastrophic decision and there is no evidence that he had any agenda apart from the implementation of British policy. His style, however, had increased Islanders' suspicions and apprehensions about that policy when what they needed was reassurance. French was governor of the Falkland Islands from 27 January 1975 until 2 December, 1976, the shortest tenure of any governor of recent times.”²⁰⁷

November 21st, in Buenos Aires, Britain's naval *attaché* receives a warning that RSS Shackleton will be 'arrested' if found in seas that Argentina claims as its own.

December 5th, at the UN, the Fourth Committee recommend that the Falklands issue be deferred till 1976.²⁰⁸

December 8th, at the UN, Britain informs the General Assembly that; “... exchanges between the United Kingdom Government and the Argentine Government have continued over the past year with a view to finding a settlement of the differences between us. In seeking a solution, my Government has said repeatedly that we wish to observe the terms of resolution 1514 (XV). It is therefore the wishes of the people of the island which must be paramount, not an arbitrary idea of what their interests might be...”

Britain's representative also informs the Assembly that all information regarding possible oil deposits around the Falklands have been shared with Argentina, and that the UK has no intention of acting unilaterally.

“My Government has similarly informed the Argentine Government, as a courtesy about its proposal for a survey of the economy of the island, and we regret that this survey is apparently regarded by the Argentine Government as an unacceptable innovation.”

Exercising a right of reply, Argentina's mission writes to the Secretary-General.

“The Argentine Government reserves its position regarding the responsibility which rests with the British Government for the breaking-off of negotiations and will not fail to assert its rights in the form which it deems most appropriate.”

“... The limits of our patience and tolerance must not be underestimated should we be confronted with an obstinate and unjustified refusal to negotiate.”²⁰⁹

December 17th, in Paris, France, during an International Economic Cooperation conference, Britain's Foreign Secretary James Callaghan talks to Arauz Castex. Callaghan indicates his belief that progress can be made concerning economic co-operation. Castex suggests that if Argentine scientists are added to Shackleton's team, it would change the surveys' image in Buenos Aires. Callaghan expresses his doubts, but agrees to put the proposal to Lord Shackleton.

December 18th, in London, Shackleton agrees to accept the addition of a small Argentine contingent to his team. Informed, Castex, suggests that a retired Argentine Admiral, Jose Alvarez, be added to the party, but demands that he be given the position of 'deputy leader.' Castex also adds that Shackleton's conclusions, to be sent to both Governments, must be followed by sovereignty negotiations. Secretary Callaghan offers to take Alvarez on as 'chief Argentine scientist', but declines to reopen talks. Minister Arauz Castex protests.²¹⁰

206 *The Falkland Islands Times & Falkland Islands Monthly Review* December 7, 1976

207 Tatham (ed.) 2008

208 *UN Yearbook 1975*

209 Ortiz de Rozas in *La Nacion* December 12, 1975

210 *Pink Ice: Britain and the South Atlantic Empire* K. Dodds 2002 p.151. Also Donaghy 2014

December 29th, Shackleton's team arrive in Brazil; where they join HMS *Endurance*.²¹¹

*“... the mission was composed of five experts entrusted with assessing and making recommendations concerning the prospects for development in oil, minerals, fisheries, wool and alginates. The mission was further requested to advise on the need for capital expenditure over the next five years, and to assess the financial and social implications of any recommendations.”*²¹²

1976 – January 2nd, Argentina's Government issues a statement asserting; *“... that the United Kingdom representatives had finally stated that they were not in a position to accept the reopening of negotiations aimed at solving the dispute on sovereignty;...”*

*“(Shackleton) was portrayed as a 'pirate and buccaneer' to his evident delight.”*²¹³

January 3rd, at Stanley, Shackleton and HMS *Endurance* arrive. Argentina's Foreign Minister Castex describes the timing as *“unfriendly and unthoughtful.”*²¹⁴ Castex adds that, if the British Government refuses to resume negotiations, then the two countries are; *“... rapidly moving towards a head-on collision ... his Government could accept no responsibility for such a disastrous outcome.”*

January 8th, in London, intelligence reports suggest that an invasion by Argentina remains unlikely.

*“... the JIC assessed that a sudden invasion was unlikely, but that there was an increased likelihood of Argentine political and economic action against British interests and that, as the sequence of Argentine measures proceeded, the possibility of military operations must be regarded as that much nearer.”*²¹⁵

January 12th, from the Foreign Office, James Callaghan writes to Arauz Castex, referring to the dispute as *“sterile.”*²¹⁶

*“Great Britain, ... contrary to the letter and the spirit of Resolution 2065, at the beginning of 1976, insisted upon the right of self-determination of the Malvinas, refused to discuss the problem in-depth and attempted to replace the subject of sovereignty with Argentine-British economic cooperation in the region of the south-western Atlantic.”*²¹⁷

In the South Atlantic, as military aircraft overfly the Falklands, Argentina indicates that its Ambassador to London, on leave in Buenos Aires, will not be returning and suggests that Britain's Ambassador be recalled; *“... the Argentine Government have evidently reached the conclusion that they must make a gesture.”*²¹⁸

January 14th, in London, Foreign Secretary Callaghan makes a statement to Parliament.

“Our traditional friendship with Argentina is marred only by issues arising from the Argentine claim to sovereignty over the Falkland Islands, whose inhabitants wish to remain British. Successive British Governments have undertaken to respect their wishes. ... As the House is aware, the Argentine Government have stated that the Argentine ambassador, who returned to Argentina in October, will

211 The original plan was that the team join *Endurance* at Montevideo. However, Uruguay was unwilling to offend Argentina, at least publicly. It was later claimed in South America's Press that *Endurance* waited at Montevideo for the arrival of Shackleton, before sailing to meet an airlift. Other sources suggest that the team boarded the British ship at Montevideo as planned, but under some secrecy.

212 UN Doc A3125/Rev.1 vol.4

213 Hastings & Jenkins 1997

214 On January 3, 1833, HMS *Clio* had arrived at Port Louis and ejected an Argentine garrison. See 1832 & 1833

215 Baroness Young in *HL Deb 25 January 1983 vol.438 cc136-247*

216 *The Falklands, Politics and War* G. M. Dillon 1989

217 General Juan E. Gugliamelli in *Estrategia* No. 43-44 1977

218 FO 7/3208. There was not, however, a breach in diplomatic relations, just the absence of senior appointees.

*remain in Buenos Aires until further notice and that, in view of the present state of affairs over the Falklands question, it would be advisable for the British Government to withdraw our Ambassador. ... I shall shortly be recalling Her Majesty's ambassador for consultations.”*²¹⁹

*“Mr. Callaghan noted that the HMS Endurance of the Royal Navy was in the vicinity of the archipelago and that two other vessels were ready to proceed there,...”*²²⁰

*“In a press interview the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Argentina said that the decision to request the recall of the United Kingdom Ambassador did not mean a break in diplomatic relations with that country.”*²²¹

*“Staff who remained ..., monitored these reports but they concluded that the tenor of press comment was predictable and that the Argentine Government seemed willing to control displays of anti-British sentiment. There had been no threats or demonstrations against the Embassy itself, for example, and no repetition of Cronica's invasion campaign of December 1974.”*²²²

January 15th, in Argentina, Arauz Castex is dismissed and replaced as Foreign Minister by Raul Quijano.

In London, on the same day, members of Britain's Foreign Office discuss the possibility that the prospect of oil exploration may sway the attitudes of the Islanders towards Argentina.

*“Some in the FCO saw oil primarily – in the words of one official – as ‘a lever to cajole the Islanders into accepting that there could be ... benefit from closer relations with Argentina’. ...”*²²³

January 19th, from Buenos Aires, Ambassador Ashe is recalled to London, leaving *charge d'affaires* John Shakespeare as the senior position at the Embassy.

At Port Stanley, following on from that of November 1975, a new Statutory Instrument further delays elections for the Legislative Council of the Falkland Islands, until February, 1976.²²⁴

January 23rd, in London, an Foreign Office official complains about the Falkland Islands Committee's effectiveness in Parliament.

*“... their ability to manipulate a dedicated and vocal parliamentary lobby could limit severely HMG's room for manoeuvre.”*²²⁵

February 4th, in the South Atlantic, an Argentine destroyer, *Almirante Storni* (Capt. Ramón Arosa), attempts to stop and 'arrest' the unarmed RRS *Shackleton*. The British ship is 78 miles south of Stanley and some 450 miles east of the Argentine coast. Capt. Arosa instructs the British vessel to steer for Ushuaia. From *Shackleton*, Capt. Philip Warne radios the Governor in Stanley before responding.

“We are not in Argentine waters; we are more than 200 miles from the Argentine mainland and the British Government does not recognise these as Argentine waters. I have no intention of stopping.”

219 HC Deb 14 January 1976 vol.903 cc391

220 Permanent Representative of Argentina to the Chairman of the Special Committee on Decolonization May 6th 1976

221 UN Doc A3125/Rev.1 vol.4.

222 Dillon 1989

223 Livingstone 2018 citing *Heap to Hall January 15, 1976 FCO 7/3234*

224 *The Falkland Islands (Legislative Council) (Amendment) Order 1976 (no.52)*. A further delay in the hope that the Islands' new Constitution would be approved in the UK. This would not be achieved until 1977. cf. February 27, 1976 below

225 *Hall to Carless January 23, 1976 FCO 7/3232*

Shots are fired across *Shackleton's* bows; an action observed by helicopters from HMS *Endurance*.

“... an instruction was given for the vessel *Shackleton* to be intercepted for the purpose of inspecting the vessel. On 4 February the Argentine naval destroyer *Almirante Storni* approached the *Shackleton* and told it to stop its engines and to permit boarding for inspection, as is customary in these cases. The captain of the United Kingdom ship continued his course, disregarding the instruction and thus endangering the lives of the crew and the safety of the ship. In accordance with existing rules, warning shots were fired from small arms, but, in the knowledge that the United Kingdom vessel was carrying explosives and in order to exercise maximum prudence, the commander of the Argentine vessel was instructed not to use force., as would have been appropriate in the circumstances. The reckless and provocative attitude of the British captain is clearly indicative of the intention to conceal the activities in which the *Shackleton* had been engaged.”²²⁶

“In the first few days of February 1976, an Argentine Navy ship fired warning shots at RRS *Shackleton* which had refused to be boarded and inspected. This incident occurred 87 miles from the coast of East Falkland and was a clear sign that Buenos Aires was demonstrating that the waters around the archipelago were Argentine.”²²⁷

“... to fire five shots at an unarmed research ship, and to threaten to fire to hit it, cannot be said to be part of a "peaceful solution" as required under Resolution 2065 – Argentina was treating Resolution 2065 as void.”²²⁸

Throughout the time it takes to sail to Stanley, RRS *Shackleton* is continually harassed by the *Almirante Storni* and by Argentine aircraft. One of these, a *Neptune*, flies at mast height above the British vessel. Argentina's ship only breaks away some six miles from the archipelago.²²⁹

“London's intelligence sources later confirmed that the plan to intercept the vessel had been in existence for about six weeks prior to the incident, and that the action had been inspired by the armed forces rather than the Argentine Government. The JIC concluded, nevertheless, that Argentina's military commanders were opposed to military invasion and that a policy of 'continued pin-pricks' rather than a precipitated attack was likely.”²³⁰

In Buenos Aires, with Ambassador Ashe now in London, *charge d'affaires* John Shakespeare receives instructions to register a formal protest. At the same time, Shakespeare is summoned by Argentina's Foreign Ministry to see the new Foreign Minister, Raul Quijano.

“I had not been with him more than thirty seconds before I realised that he in fact had summoned me to hand over an Argentine protest.”²³¹

“When the *charge d'affaires* sought an explanation in Buenos Aires, he discovered that the new Foreign Minister Raul Quijano had pre-empted his visit... Quijano blamed the British government for the incident...”²³²

Shakespeare tells Quijano that the British Government; “... took the gravest view of the incident which, in other times, might well have been regarded as an act of war.”

In London, Argentina's *chargé d'affaires* is also summoned to the Foreign Office to receive a copy of Britain's protest. The *chargé*, Rafael Gowland, claims that the incident took place within Argentine waters.

226 Permanent Representative of Argentina to the Secretary-General of the United Nations February 23rd 1976

227 *The British Political Parties & the Falklands War* Domenico M. Bruni 2018

228 Pascoe 2020 p.316

229 *The Falkland Islands as an International Problem* P. J. Beck 1987. Anecdotal accounts suggest that the two vessels came close enough together for the British sailors to respond by throwing turnips and potatoes at *Almirante Storni*.

230 Dillon 1989. The same policy that Argentina had employed in the 1930s. JIC = Joint Intelligence Committee

231 Quoted in Donaghy 2014

232 Donaghy 2014

February 5th, in Britain's House of Commons, the incident is reported to MPs by Edward Rowlands.

*“The incident took place 78 miles south of Cape Pembroke as "Shackleton" was returning from a period of scientific work in the South-West Atlantic under an international programme. On learning of the incident, my right hon. Friend immediately instructed the chargé d'affaires at Buenos Aires to deliver the strongest protest to the Argentine Government and to request that the Argentine destroyer immediately be ordered to stop harassing the "Shackleton". I also protested to the Argentine chargé here in equally vigorous terms. The Argentine Government have been left in no doubt of the serious view we take of this incident.”*²³³

In Buenos Aires, Argentina responds to the UK's protest with a formal *note verbale*.²³⁴

*“The Ministry of Foreign Affairs ... has the honour to refer to the activities of the British ship Shackleton in maritime areas under the jurisdiction of the Argentine Republic. The Argentine Government is aware of the fact that the said ship has been engaged in scientific research activities geophysical and geological surveys – on the Argentine continental shelf, without having complied with the prior requirements of Argentine legislation on the matter, which is in conformity with existing international law. In view of these activities an Argentine naval vessel told it to stop, with a view to exercising the right to inspect and board. This order was disregarded by the British vessel, which thus incurred another violation of the pertinent law. ... The situation is all the more serious in that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Worship had already reminded the Embassy, in its note of 14 November 1975, that if the planned research activities were to be conducted, the requirements of Argentine law must be respected, which was not done. In view of the foregoing, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Worship lodges the most formal and vigorous protest of the Argentine Government and demands, without prejudice to the continued exercise of the rights on which it is relying, that the British Government take measures to punish those responsible and to prevent the recurrence of such acts.”*²³⁵

In London, Britain's Defence Secretary agrees “reluctantly” to keep *Endurance* in service for another year.²³⁶

February 6th, the UK writes to the President of the United Nations Security Council complaining of; “... an unlawful, and dangerous action by a warship of the Republic of Argentina against the Royal Research Ship *Shackleton* peacefully in passage on the high seas ... engaged in scientific research connected with the theories of the continental drift and was a British contribution to the International Geo-dynamics Project.” The letter contains a demand that Argentina “... refrain from further harassment on the high seas of peaceful vessels in contravention of recognized international law, and reserved the right to request at a later stage appropriate action by the Security Council on this matter.”

In Buenos Aires, the newspaper *La Nacion* reports.

“In spite of a request by the Command of Naval Operations, the Navy was not allowed to take more drastic action.”

233 *HC Deb 05 February 1976 vol.904 cc1414-7*

234 A diplomatic communication drafted in the third person and unsigned. This is more formal than an *aide-memoire* but less formal than a *note*.

235 *UN Doc A3125/Rev.1 vol.4 Appendix II*. It is actually the South American Continental Shelf and international law did not (and does not) recognise Argentina's outlandish claims regarding that shelf.

236 As ever, Britain's defence budget was under scrutiny. Despite there being little enthusiasm within the MOD for keeping a force in the South Atlantic, the deployment of a support vessel of the Royal Fleet Auxiliary was also approved.

*“In the short term the incident prompted not only the precautionary deployment of a British frigate to the area and a reprieve for HMS Endurance (whose presence in the region was threatened by the 1974 Defence Review) but also the resumption of more meaningful negotiations on sovereignty.”*²³⁷

February 9th, on completing their mission, the Shackleton team return to the UK.

February 10th, in New York, Argentina also complains to the UN Security Council of a; *“... serious violation of the legislation concerning Argentine maritime jurisdiction committed by the United Kingdom vessel Shackleton in consequence of the scientific-geophysical and geological research activities undertaken by that vessel on the Argentine continental shelf which were clearly directed towards geological surveying, with a view to the exploitation of hydrocarbons, if found.”*

February 11th, Edward Rowlands flies into the USA with instructions to inform Minister Quijano, and the UN, that the British are fully prepared to defend the Islands with force if necessary.

*“In February 1976 the chiefs of staff produced a paper on military options. It was the first of four such papers. According to the report all were similar in scope and the language used was substantially the same. Having noted the limitations of the airstrip at Port Stanley and other difficulties, the 1976 paper continued, it would not be practicable to provide, transport and support the force necessary in the Islands to ensure that a determined Argentine attempt to eject the British garrison was unsuccessful.”*²³⁸

*“At their rendezvous on 11 February, Quijano assured Rowlands that British ships would not be harassed ‘provided they took no survey work in the critical area’... Quijano wanted to return the dialogue along the lines of earlier formulas. Yet he did not suggest any particular proposal... Quijano was open to the idea of returning the ambassadors once a basis for resuming talks had been reached.”*²³⁹

*“On 11 February Ted Rowlands,.. held talks with the Argentine Foreign Minister in New York. He was instructed to ascertain Argentina's views on future sovereignty discussions and restate that the Islands would be defended. ... Ted Rowlands commented eleven years later that the Government had, “... no clear goal... [we] had to feel our way.”...”*²⁴⁰

February 17th, Argentine newspaper newspaper, *La Nacion*, reports that the British Government, in a *quid pro quo*, has promised that RRS *Shackleton* will not operate in Argentine waters. A report immediately denied by Rowlands. Argentina writes to the UN’s Special Committee on Decolonisation disputing the UK’s interpretation of UN General Assembly resolutions.

*“In presenting its case, the United Kingdom ... persists in citing resolution 2065 (XX) and 3160 (XXVIII) in such a way as to suggest that the question of the Malvinas is one involving self-determination. Both of these resolutions clearly refer to the “interests” of the population of the islands and not to its “wishes”. When it is considered that Argentina was deprived of the islands by an illegitimate act of force, it becomes clear that the governing principle here is that of territorial integrity ... to take any other view would mean accepting this act of force, which also entailed the expulsion of the indigenous Argentine population and its replacement by subjects of the colonial Power.”*²⁴¹

237 Beck 1987

238 Baroness Young in *HL Deb 25 January 1983 vol.438 cc136-247*

239 Donaghy 2014

240 Ellerby 1990 p.212 citing Rowlands interview with Charlton, *The Little Platoon (BBC Radio 3)*, broadcast on 3.5.87

241 *A/AC.109/520*. Those settlers to be found on East Falkland (Soledad) Island in 1833 were from France, Germany, Britain, Uruguay and the Argentine Confederation. They were most certainly not 'indigenous.' Nor were the members of the garrison from Buenos Aires, the only 'population' to be told to leave. *cf.* 1833

February 19th, in Britain, the Chiefs of Staff inform the government that it is not feasible to establish and maintain a garrison capable of repulsing a determined Argentine attack on the archipelago. ²⁴²

February 27th, in the Falklands it is announced that approval of the new draft-constitution has been delayed.

“What was not announced and yet what would probably not have been very surprising was the reason for the delay; it being that the new Constitution was not acceptable to a foreign country who want a bigger say in our affairs - Argentina. Apparently some Councillors (elected ones) wanted His Excellency to tell us why the new Constitution had not been approved by the British Government - and this he was not prepared to do. Had he broadcast the truth on our own radio station it would have caused noises in Buencs Aires and this our Masters would not like.

The report of the Select Committee on the Constitution was submitted to Her Majesty's Govt., some time ago and there has been ample time in which to make the necessary amendments before the next General Election. It seems that the approval was stalled last December when the British Ambassador in Bogota gave a press conference in which he happened to mention that the Falkland Islands was soon to have a new Constitution. Argentina saw this change in our Constitution as a deliberate attempt to forge closer links between ourselves and the Motherland which of course our 'neighbours' do not want. They hastily made it known that such a move would cause further deterioration in Anglo-Argentine relations - the result being that the British Government have not recommended approval of our new Constitution to the Privy Council.

As a result of this fiasco we are obliged to hold a General Election (the date of which has now been set for 17th - 21st May) under the existing Constitution which means that out of the nine members of the Legislature (including the Governor who is President) only four will be elected by the populace - the other four members being the Chief Secretary the Financial Secretary and two nominated by the Governor. Had the new Constitution been approved we would have still had a Legislative Council of nine but six of the members would have been Elected Members.” ²⁴³

“My Lords, we are anxious not to postpone the implementation of these changes, which have been asked for by the Falkland Islanders, for longer than is necessary. The noble Lord will, of course, recall that there will be a General Election in the Falkland Islands in May, and it seems to us appropriate that these changes should then be the subject of discussion and confirmation by the popular vote. Secondly, my noble friend Lord Shackleton has rendered very great service to the Islands by visiting them and reporting back on certain economic possibilities to help the islanders. These recommendations are now expected fairly soon. They may require further constitutional changes for their implementation. For those two reasons, it therefore seems that we should postpone the implementation, at least for the next few months.” ²⁴⁴

March 3rd, at the United Nations, and responding to Argentina's February letter, the UK tells the Special Committee on Decolonization that it does; *“... not accept that resolutions 2065 and 3160 entail a commitment ... to transfer sovereignty over the Falkland Islands. ... (and) they cannot agree to any settlement of those differences which is not in accordance with the wishes of the Islanders...”* ²⁴⁵

242 Ellerby 1990 p.212

243 *The Falkland Islands Times & Falkland Islands Monthly Review* March 11, 1976 p.1

244 Lord Goronwy-Roberts (on behalf of the UK Government) in the House of Lords March 17, 1976. Hansard vol369

245 Quoted in *UN Yearbook 1976*

*“It may also be helpful (to) comment on the incident in 1833, ... when British sovereignty was confirmed. In January 1833, a British naval vessel peaceably reasserted British sovereignty, which was first established in 1765. ... It is a demonstrable fact that since 1833, that is to say for nearly a century-and-a-half, a period which, coincides very closely with the period during which the nation States of Latin America have been able to assert their own right to self-determination, the United Kingdom has maintained an open, continuous, effective and peaceful possession of the Falkland Islands.”*²⁴⁶

Researcher's Comment: Worthy of note as there were remarkably few references by the British Government recalling the history of the British in the Falklands with any degree of accuracy prior to 1982. English involvement in the Falkland Islands actually goes back to 1592, when they were first sighted – over 400 years of history. Argentina has hardly been in existence for half that.

March 4th, in London, Foreign Secretary Callaghan, after speaking to Lord Shackleton, suggests that the runway on East Falkland Island is extended. Reg Prentice, the Minister for Overseas Development, from whose budget the costs are likely to come, is less than enthusiastic.

*“Shackleton pointed out privately that a longer runway would make rapid troop deployment possible in the event of a threatened invasion from the mainland.”*²⁴⁷

During the first two weeks of **March**, judges from the International Court of Justice visit the disputed Beagle Channel Islands as part of the arbitration process commenced in 1971 between Argentina and Chile.²⁴⁸

*“Chile presented evidence from maps including the 1882 Latzina map, which showed the PNL group (and incidently the Falklands too) as being outside Argentina, and pointed out that these maps only later began to show the islands as Argentinian.”*²⁴⁹

March 10th, in London, following a review of policy initiated by Foreign Secretary James Callaghan, Britain's Cabinet approves proposals for fresh dialogue with Argentina on all aspects of the dispute. Including the possibility of Anglo-Argentine economic co-operation in the South West Atlantic, and *“the nature of a hypothetical future constitutional relationship.”*²⁵⁰

*“Any agreement we reach eventually with the Argentines will still be subject to the islanders' concurrence...”*²⁵¹

*“... the then Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary was given a mandate to send a personal message to the Argentine Foreign Minister proposing that the two governments should start a fresh dialogue...”*²⁵²

*“The closest Argentina has yet come to military action against the Falklands was in the months before the 1976 coup, ie at a time when the Government of the day were anxious to divert attention from internal problems. The heat was only taken out of the Falklands dispute in 1976 when HMG showed a willingness to negotiate.”*²⁵³

246 *Ibid. cf.* 2012

247 Hastings & Jenkins 1997

248 Set up under the auspices of the British Crown as a result of an arbitration treaty of 1902, the arbitration panel of five ICJ judges was tasked to decide sovereignty over the Beagle Channel Islands, aka the PNL Group (Picton, Nueva and Lennox).. See February, 1977

249 Pascoe 2022 vol.3 p.594.

250 Franks 1983 para.48

251 Callaghan memorandum quoted in FO 7/3198

252 Hugh Carless memorandum in FO 7/3201 at 304a

253 ALW 0420/325/1 (FCO 07-3801) entitled UK/Argentina dispute over the Falkland Islands – Policy 1980

*“As the Cabinet prepared to launch a fresh initiative to discuss the sovereignty of the Falkland Islands with Argentina in March 1976, the FCO’s speaking notes for Foreign Secretary James Callaghan warned that if Britain did not start serious negotiations, Argentina might attack the Islands or ‘a lesser but still harmful option open to the Argentines would be to terminate... valuable contracts for the equipment of their navy and merchant marine’. The rather strange logic was that the Argentine military posed a threat to the Falkland Islands; therefore talks should be pursued which would then enable Britain to sell more military equipment to Argentina.”*²⁵⁴

In the Falklands, on the same day, LADE announce price increases on the Stanley to Comodoro Rivadavia air route.

*“To many people in the Islands tonight’s Broadcast Announcement from L.A.D.E. in which they referred to the F27 service as an ‘internal’ flight, must have been yet another irritating and provocative statement in the great Malvinas Saga. What may have escaped their notice is the amazing way in which our ‘friendly neighbours’ are trying to influence our choice of sovereignty. Whilst the flight, to the Argentinians is ‘internal’ we may not pay for the service in pesos nor indeed at the same price! For, although the cost of a ticket to Buenos Aires from here now costs £100.10 (an increase of nearly 100%) and which must be paid in sterling, the same journey paid for in pesos in Argentina costs under 6,000 pesos or, at our exchange rate approximately £10. Now that’s what I call neighbourly!”*²⁵⁵

March 16th, Britain's Prime Minister, Harold Wilson, announces his resignation.²⁵⁶

March 18th, in London, a Cabinet meeting considers making an offer of talks to Argentina.²⁵⁷

*“... the Labour cabinet agreed, on March 1976, to offer talks on sovereignty or ‘the nature of a hypothetical relationship’, with a view to offering Argentina a leaseback.”*²⁵⁸

March 23rd, Argentina is informed of the willingness of the British government to enter into new talks, although it is made clear that discussions are to be on a ‘without prejudice’ basis. Also that - *“at the appropriate stage”* - the British delegation will include Islander representation; *“Leaseback was not mentioned, I may say, at any time to the Argentines, even though I was prepared to consider it...”*²⁵⁹

On the same day, the *International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights* of 1966 (ICCPR) enters into force.²⁶⁰

“Article 1 – All peoples have the right of self-determination. By virtue of that right they freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development....

*Article 3 – The States Parties to the present Covenant, including those having responsibility for the administration of Non-Self-Governing and Trust Territories, shall promote the realization of the right of self-determination, and shall respect that right, in conformity with the provisions of the Charter....”*²⁶¹

254 Livingstone 2018 citing *Speaking Notes for Secretary of State OPD(76)14: The Falkland Islands: Future Policy March 10, 1976 FCO 7/3198*

255 *The Falkland Islands Times & Falkland Islands Monthly Review* March 11, 1976 p.2

256 Something of a sensation at the time as the announcement was unexpected; although he had warned the Queen of his intention some three months before. Many conspiracy theories followed, but after 13 years as Labour leader and nearly 8 years as PM it would seem he'd had enough.

257 *CAB 128/58/11*

258 Livingstone 2018. Not entirely supported by other evidence. See below.

259 Callaghan interviewed in Charlton 1989 p.53

260 See December 16, 1966 & May 20, 1976. See also <https://treaties.un.org/doc/publication/unts/volume%20999/volume-999-i-14668-english.pdf>

261 The UK ratified the Covenant on May 20, 1976 (below). See [https://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/RES/2200\(XXI\)](https://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/RES/2200(XXI))

*“Self-determination was thereby confirmed as a right of all peoples including those of non-self governing territories, and it became an obligation on states responsible for such territories to promote "the realization of the right of self-determination" for the peoples living in them. ... Thus Britain is obliged to promote external self-determination for the Falkland Islanders. To hand the islands to Argentina would be a breach of that obligation...”*²⁶²

Argentina declines to ratify the Covenant as it objects to the emphasis on the right of self determination.²⁶³

Researcher's Comment: This event needs to be recognised for the effect it had on Britain's thinking regarding the Falkland Islands, and indeed, all of its old Colonies. Before it, UK governments had tended to consider self-determination as a principle rather than a right held by the peoples of the territories. After the Covenant was ratified by the UK (see below), Britain's administration had little choice but to recognise self-determination as a human right, specifically held by those Non-Self Governing Territories listed at the United Nations. Compliance with the ICCPR is monitored by the United Nations Human Rights Committee.

March 24th, in Buenos Aires, Argentina's President, Isabella Perón, is ousted in a military coup.²⁶⁴

*“The Argentines have long held that they have only two possible policies: negotiation or invasion. We believe that invasion was spoken of, though not prepared for, during the last confused weeks of Isabel Perón's administration.”*²⁶⁵

A military junta²⁶⁶ consisting of General Jorge Rafael Videla (army), Brigadier-General Orlando Agosti (air force) and Admiral Emilio Massera (navy), take command of the country. Videla takes the position of President with Admiral César Guzzetti as Foreign Minister.

“The three commanders of Argentina's armed forces took office as a governing junta today 10 hours after overthrowing and arresting President Isabel Martinez de Perón. The long-awaited military takeover, meticulously planned, was swift and smooth when it came after midnight. The only resistance came in a brief shooting incident at a union headquarters. Numerous Peronist union leaders and political figures were being arrested, both here and in Cordoba, Argentina's second largest city. Martial law was proclaimed and communiques were broadcast threatening terrorists and saboteurs with death. Troops and tanks guarded public buildings, banks and transport services. ...

*A proclamation was issued saying that the armed forces had taken power "to restore the essential values" of the nation, eradicate left-wing subversion, promote economic development and "assure subsequently the establishment of a republican, representative and federal democracy". The Argentine economy is in serious difficulties. Inflation raised prices 335 percent last year, and \$1 billion in foreign debts must be met by May. ... The United States today recognized the new military Government in Argentina...”*²⁶⁷

“... a ruthless dictatorship with a narrow-minded, nationalistic, anti-democratic, anti-socialist, "statist" ideology similar to that of the Fascist regime in Italy under Mussolini, except that whereas Mussolini's

262 Pascoe 2020 p.312

263 Argentina eventually ratified the covenant on August 8, 1986. See below.

264 The sixth in Argentina in seventy-five years – 1930, 1943, 1955, 1962 and 1966.

265 Hugh Carless memorandum in FO 7/3201 at 304a

266 The term means 'meeting/committee' and originated in the national and local groups organised during Spain's resistance to Napoleon's invasion of the Iberian Peninsula in 1808.

267 *The New York Times* March 25, 1976

dictatorship was essentially secular, the Argentine junta professed an ultra-conservative hardline Roman Catholicism. It was not long before people began to die in large numbers, as the regime stepped up the so-called "Dirty War" ("La Guerra Sucia") against "subversion"."²⁶⁸

Admiral Massera immediately proposes an invasion of the Falkland Islands – *Plan Goa*. Requiring a surprise landing on the archipelago; the removal of the existing population to Montevideo and the introduction of Argentine settlers which would; "... *neatly reverse the 1833 action and forestall any wrangling about the status of the islanders under Argentine rule.*"²⁶⁹ Concerns are expressed regarding Britain's submarine force, and Massera's plan is not adopted by the junta.

March 26th, Britain formally recognises the new Argentine government.

*"The day before the military took power, the British Government had given a message to the Argentine foreign minister offering secret talks on the Falklands. The Foreign Office's top priority, therefore, on hearing of Isabel Peron's overthrow, was to recognise the regime 'as soon as practicable' in order to ensure that Argentina's new military leaders did not make Britain's secret communication public."*²⁷⁰

April 5th, in Britain, James Callaghan becomes Labour Party leader and Prime Minister. Anthony Crosland is appointed Foreign Secretary; *"Prime Minister Callaghan decided to undertake a major policy review. He suggested a fresh dialogue with Argentina on all aspects of the dispute, including possible economic cooperation and "the nature of a hypothetical future constitutional relationship" ..."*²⁷¹

Speaking in Parliament, Viscount Boyd refers to the rights of the Islanders; quoting a Canadian newspaper.

*"Somewhere in the Third World there must be hidden away the secret rules about who is entitled to self-determination. One suspects that they consist of just one rule and one exception. The rule seems to be that any colonial territory, however minuscule, is not only entitled to independence but obliged to demand it. The exception simply states that European populated territories are different."*²⁷²

On the same day, representations are made via the Foreign Office in London, and the British Embassy in Buenos Aires, with regard to the large increase in the costs of air travel on the Stanley-Comodoro Rivadavia route.²⁷³

In Argentina, the military junta introduce a compulsory course on geopolitics in secondary schools. Designed to teach students about; *'Argentine National Sovereignty'*.²⁷⁴

*"... Argentines argue that their country was the rightful heir to the entire Viceroyalty and that all those countries that were once a part of the Viceroyalty and which are now independent states – Bolivia, Paraguay and Uruguay – must be computed as territorial losses. This is a deeply entrenched perception in Argentine culture, ... The perception of huge territorial losses makes the Argentines extremely sensitive to territorial disputes. Insignificant controversies, ... acquire a disproportionate importance..."*²⁷⁵

268 Pascoe 2022 vol.3 p.587. During the lifetime of this regime, 1976-1983, it is estimated that up to 30,000 people may have "*disappeared*". Not all of them Argentines.

269 Hastings & Jenkins 1997 p.39

270 *Britain and the Dictatorships of Argentina and Chile 1973-82* Grace Livingstone 2018 citing *Carless to Lamour March* 26, 1976 FCO 7/3027. See March 23, 1976 above.

271 *Peaceful Territorial Change* Arie Marcelo Kacowiz 1994 p.155

272 *Falkland Islanders cling to Britain* in the *Alberta* newspaper. *HL Deb 20 April 1977* vol.382 cc222-66

273 *The Falkland Islands Times & Falkland Islands Monthly Review* April 15, 1976.

274 Dodds 2002 p.161

275 *Argentine Territorial Nationalism* Carlos Escude in *Journal of Latin American Studies* 1988 (May 1988, vol.20. no.1 pp.139-165

April 12th, in London, the Foreign Office proposes that Britain’s Ambassador return to Buenos Aires.

*“The new government has made a most promising start and hardly put a foot wrong during its first month in power.”*²⁷⁶

*“The Foreign Office had suggested reinstating a British ambassador to Argentina less than a month after the March 1976 coup, but Labour minister Ted Rowlands wanted to wait to see how talks on the Falklands progressed.”*²⁷⁷

April 29th, from Buenos Aires, Argentina’s new Foreign Minister, Admiral César Guzzetti, responds to Britain’s message of March 23rd.

*“Unlike his predecessor, Guzzetti sought clarification on the phrase about the future relationship between the Falklands and Argentina. He also ruled out the return of ambassadors until a basis for a new dialogue had been reached. Guzzetti did not object to islanders participating as part of a British delegation in talks over economic cooperation. However, this did not extend ... (to) sovereignty.”*²⁷⁸

In London, Lord Shackleton submits his 400-page report – *Economic Survey of the Falkland Islands* – to the Government.²⁷⁹

*“To guide the reader through what is a lengthy report, the following remarks may be of assistance. Volume One contains an introduction by the Chairman and under various chapter headings: a. an analysis of the overall economy of the Falkland Islands; b. description of the resources of the Islands and their surrounding waters; c. an assessment of their development potential, pointing out opportunities, constraints and the impact of any development. Volume Two begins by summarising the findings of Volume One, then goes on to discuss and propose a development strategy, and finally presents recommendations for a policy and programme of economic development, together with the financial implications and implementation arrangements which we judge to be necessary for them to be carried out.”*²⁸⁰

Unexpectedly, it reveals that, contrary to the previous assertions of the Foreign Office, the Islands are not only self-supporting but making a profit for the Exchequer.

*“I would now like to point briefly to one or two important conclusions that emerged from our Survey. The Falkland Islands economy has suffered historically from a lack of local investment and a continual flow of private funds out of the Islands to the United Kingdom. The transfer of company funds alone over the last twenty years has amounted to over £5 million in current prices. A result of this has been that the UK Exchequer has substantially benefited from tax, on both the profits and private dividends remitted to the UK. It is against this economic background, as well as the evaluation of the resource potential of the Islands, that we have put forward recommendations for a development programme which will call for certain UK expenditure, capital and recurrent, over the next five years (see Chapter 20). The major item is the extension of the runway of the new airfield, without which any substantial new development would, in our judgement, be greatly handicapped.”*²⁸¹

276 *Shakespeare to FCO April 24, 1976 FCO 7/3034* quoted in Livingstone 2018. Shakespeare was Britain’s top official in the Buenos Aires Embassy at that time.

277 Livingstone 2018 p.152 citing *Carless to Larmour April 12, 1976 FCO 7/3029*

278 Donaghy 2014

279 Exact date unknown. Published July 20, 1976. A copy of *Volume 1 Resources and Development Potential* can be found here - <https://falklandstimeline.files.wordpress.com/2023/07/shackleton-report-1976-vol-1.pdf>

280 *Economic Survey of the Falkland Islands* vol.1 p.i

281 *Ibid.* vol.1 p.iv

Shackleton estimates that UK based companies had made a £4 million 'profit' between 1950 and 1970, even after defence costs, subsidies and grants had been taken into account. Shackleton is also critical of the powers that the Falkland Islands Company (FIC) has to make decisions affecting the lives of the Islanders, noting that between 1951 and 1974 absentee landowners had taken £11.5 million more in profit than they had invested.²⁸² Most controversially, Lord Shackleton recommends public investment projects totalling £13 million, in addition to the cost of the proposed runway.

*“The main points of the Shackleton report, which was produced in collaboration with The Economist Intelligence Unit and was published on July 20, 1976 ... pointed principally to the fact that there had been a flow of resources out of the Falklands and a decline in the population, especially a drop in the proportion of native-born to overseas-born inhabitants, and devoted a section to fishing and oil policy.”*²⁸³

*“A lot of the report was about the tremendous opportunities and enormous potential for development... our particular appreciation of the Shackleton Report,.. was that it would be just frankly physically, politically, militarily impossible to adopt. It was a grand scale concept of development without any form of negotiated settlement on the other issues.”*²⁸⁴

*“As the Shackleton Report showed, Britain exploited the Falklands for decades and made a handsome profit out of them, while at the same time strangling their growth and increasing the hardship of the Falkland Islanders. For over a century British officials filled the important executive positions and treated the Falklands like any other colonial territory in the British Empire, discriminating against the native-born islanders and keeping them out of participation in decision making.”*²⁸⁵

May 7th, from Buenos Aires, Britain's charge d'affaires, Shakespeare, considers Shackleton's conclusions.

*“It will be highly unpalatable... It will hardly escape their notice that the whole thrust of the report's recommendations is in the direction of greater self-sufficiency for the Falkland Islands and thus greater independence from Argentina – the opposite, in fact, of what Argentina and, paradoxically, HMG have been trying to achieve...”*²⁸⁶

*“Argentina wallows in a legalistic and declarative policy on the South Atlantic, ill-designed to profit from the crucial point made by Lord Shackleton that the Falkland Islands were neither economically nor demographically feasible unless they integrated with Argentina.”*²⁸⁷

May 20th, the United Kingdom ratifies the *International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights* (1966). Under the act of ratification, the terms of the ICCPR are extended to Britain's Overseas Territories – including the Falkland Islands.²⁸⁸

“Article 1 – All peoples have the right of self-determination. By virtue of that right they freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development.

Article 2 – All peoples may, for their own ends, freely dispose of their natural wealth and resources without prejudice to any obligations arising out of international economic co-operation, based upon the

282 The FIC's response can be found here - <https://falklandstimeline.files.wordpress.com/2023/07/fic-on-the-shackleton-survey-1976.pdf>

283 *Keesings Contemporary Archives* June 24, 1977 p.28406

284 Ted Rowlands interviewed in Charlton 1989 p.48

285 Pascoe 2020 p.296

286 *Shakespeare to Crosland* May 7, 1976 in FO 7/3226

287 *Macri's victory – the first election won by the establishment: Argentina now to be managed by its proprietors* Guillermo Makin 2015. Shackleton's conclusions remain misunderstood in Argentina to this day.

288 Argentina delayed ratification until 1986.

principle of mutual benefit, and international law. In no case may a people be deprived of its own means of subsistence.

Article 3 – The States Parties to the present Covenant, including those having responsibility for the administration of Non-Self-Governing and Trust Territories, shall promote the realization of the right of self-determination, and shall respect that right, in conformity with the provisions of the Charter... ”²⁸⁹

Argentina imposes customs charges on goods entering the Falkland Islands.

“From time to time we in the Falklands are subjected to bullying tactics from our 'neighbours' control of external travel in the form of the infamous 'white card' and the dictating of the air fares for the service they operate the prevention of the Shackleton Team to travel here by air and the act of aggression on the RRS Shackleton. The latest one is the imposition of a 'customs charge' on a 1 kg package consigned from England that arrived: last Thursday May 20th. The package contained veterinary vaccine and when the consignee went to collect it from the LADE office they were told that there was a charge of approx £14 in respect of Argentine customs charges as it was deemed necessary to inspect it in Comodoro Rivadavia to make sure that it did not contain prohibited drugs. To add insult to injury it was quite obvious that the Package had not been opened en route, only the address altered from Falkland Islands to Islas Malvinas. The cost of the customs 'inspection' was about 1,600 pesos which in Argentina would amount to approx £4 at the official rate - but then of course not being Argentine we are expected to use the strange, unexplained and 'special' rate of about 98 pesos to the £.”²⁹⁰

May 21st, in the Falklands, elections are held for seats on the Legislative Council.

“The final results of our General Elections held under the old Constitution were announced last Friday evening ... Fortunately the system by which the Governor nominates two members to the Legislative Council will be abolished under the new Constitution.”²⁹¹

May 24th, in London, at the Foreign Office, a policy paper is drawn up by Hugh Carless on Britain's relations with the new regime in Argentina. This is sent to Minister Ted Rowlands.

“The ideal policy objective was to ‘establish an across-the-board dialogue with Argentina ... with the aim of reducing the Falkland Islands dispute to more reasonable proportions’....”²⁹²

May 25th, Rowlands speaks to Lord Shackleton regarding the report's conclusions.

“Rowlands felt it was a fantasy to consider proposals without close cooperation from Argentina, and spelled out to Shackleton the international political repercussions which could arise.”²⁹³

June 2nd, in Buenos Aires, *charge d'affairs* Shakespeare is informed by the Foreign Ministry that the junta wish to reopen talks; suggesting that a forthcoming conference in Paris may present a suitable opportunity.

June 10th, in Santiago, US Secretary Kissinger and Argentine Foreign Minister Guzzetti meet. Guzzetti tells Kissinger; *“Until now, the United States Government has abstained on the Falkland Island issue. The issue is very important to Argentina. We hope that the United States Government would reconsider its position and*

289 As an idea, self-determination was born after WWI, but only really became accepted, if at all, after WWII. Outside of the Non-self Governing Territories (Colonies) listed at the UN, it remains controversial. For a recent consideration, see - <https://falklandstimeline.files.wordpress.com/2021/11/shrinking-self-determination-the-chagos-opinion-of-the-international-court-of-justice-by-jan-klabbers-2019.pdf>

290 *The Falkland Islands Times & Falkland Islands Monthly Review* May 25, 1976.

291 *The Falkland Islands Times & Falkland Islands Monthly Review* May 25, 1976.

292 Livingstone 2018 citing *Carless to PS/Rowlands* May 24, 1976 FCO 7/3029

293 Donaghy 2014

help us.” Kissinger responds; *“It is difficult for us to get involved... But I suspect that, even so, over time the problem can be solved. The original purpose of the British presence is no longer being served by the Falklands, which are no longer necessary to protect sea lanes.”* Guzzetti answers; *“That is true, but what troubles us is that Great Britain wants self-determination for 2,000 people – and 1,600 of them are employees of the Falkland Island Company. This is not a question of historic rights. So long as this uncertain situation is unresolved it can always be complicated by collateral issues.”*²⁹⁴

June 11th, in London, Ted Rowlands notes that Lord Shackleton’s report is likely; *“... to embarrass and endanger HMG’s policy of opening a new dialogue with Argentina... the inference that any Argentine government will draw is that this report is nothing more than an assertion of British sovereignty...”*²⁹⁵

On the same day, the Foreign Office respond to the junta’s requests for talks in Paris. In Buenos Aires, Shakespeare tells the Argentine Foreign Ministry that the British Government agrees to a conversation taking place provided that such is as; *“informal and free-ranging as possible.”* Most importantly any conversation has to be, *“in confidence.”* Ezequiel Pereyra responds that the delegation will be briefed only to cover the issue of sovereignty in any depth.

June 22nd, Shackleton acknowledges that his views are *“not palatable,”* coming at an, *“awkward moment.”*²⁹⁶ Under pressure from the Foreign Office, Lord Shackleton agrees to amend his introduction to the report; to include a paragraph acknowledging a need for cooperation with Argentina.²⁹⁷

*“..., the hopeful development in international affairs which has led to regional cooperation between different nations is as relevant to this part of the world as to other areas where economic cooperation has been achieved, It is logical therefore that in any major new developments of the Islands economy, especially those relating to the exploitation of offshore resources, cooperation with Argentina - even participation - should, if possible, be secured. The sovereignty issue overhangs our Report, as it does the Falklands, and the absence of a settlement could well inhibit the full development of the Islands.”*²⁹⁸

June 29th, in London, a Foreign Office official, Hall, submits his thoughts on how handle the Falkland Islands Committee.

*“We should not underestimate these people. They are skilled and persistent interrogators ... but they have a human weakness for flattery – which may be of use, must be subtle and I would like to see a rather broader based contact with them. A little pretence at consultation and some modest hospitality ... might pay dividends.”*²⁹⁹

In early **July** in London, Falkland Islanders speak to Members of Parliament and the Foreign Office. They are not told of the Anglo-Argentine meeting due to take place in Paris.³⁰⁰

July 10th, in Paris, France, delegates from Britain and Argentina sit down for informal, exploratory, talks. Argentina’s Deputy Foreign Minister, Gualter Allara, proposes that the two countries return to the idea of a joint

294 *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976, Documents on South America, 1973-1976 Memorandum of Conversation, Santiago, June 10, 1976 8:10-9:15am*

295 Rowlands to Croskland, June 11, 1976 in FO 7/3200

296 Freedman 2005 vol.1 p.45

297 Donaghy 2014

298 *Economic Survey of the Falkland Islands* vol.1 p.iii

299 Hall to Sindall, Carless and Edmonds June 29, 1976 FCO 7/3232 quoted in Livingstone 2018. Various Committee members seem to have been wooed by the FCO at private dinners and meetings, without obvious effect. Which Hall is not clear, possibly George Hall.

300 *The Friends of the Falkland Islands: Newsletter* Nov 1976

administration of the Islands, similar to the previously abandoned condominium. Britain's Robin Edmonds points out that Islander objection caused this to fail and that the Islands lobby could not be easily ignored. A copy of Lord Shackleton's report is handed over to the Argentine team.

"The exploratory talks ... have so far remained strictly confidential and we have not informed the Islanders. They have been of use in initiating the fresh dialogue proposed by the then Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary in March ... the Argentines have predictably concentrated on moving towards their aim of bringing us to negotiate about the transfer of sovereignty. But, in contrast to their Peronist predecessors, they have shown some understanding of our position. In particular, they seem to accept that future discussions/negotiations should cover our theme of economic co-operation ... as well as their theme of sovereignty – which we have so far insisted on referring to as "the nature of a hypothetical future constitutional relationship between Argentina and the Falkland Islands." ..." ³⁰¹

July 13th, from Paris, Minister Allara travels to the UK to speak to Rowlands. An agreement is reached that negotiations on the future of the Falklands should resume in August.

July 20th, in Britain, Shackleton's report is published. Lord Shackleton speaks to the Press. ³⁰²

"In recent years instead of the Islands living on Great Britain, Great Britain has been living on the Islands. More has come out as taxes than has gone in as aid."

"The 450 odd page report compos(es) of two volumes - the first containing some 344 pages devoted to an analysis of the overall economy of the Falklands and their surrounding watery assesses the development potential and points out opportunities constraints and the likely impact of development, and the second containing 108 pages summarising the first volume and goes on to discuss and propose development strategy, presents recommendations for a policy and programme for economic development and discusses the financial implications and the arrangements which the Team judge to be necessary to implement them ... Publication of the Survey was widely reported in the British press. The possibility of off-shore oil and the fisheries potential was the main lead. There were comments on the financial gains to Britain from taxation of remittances sent to this country and on possible future problems with Argentina." ³⁰³

"The Argentine Foreign Ministry said after the publication of the report that it could not comment on proposals for co-operation until the 'sovereignty dispute' had been resolved." ³⁰⁴

"Shackleton rejected at a news conference the idea that development was doomed without Argentine collaboration but thought it would be "foolish" not to seek it." ³⁰⁵

At No. 11 Downing Street, on the same day, Argentina's Minister of Finance is treated to lunch by Britain's Chancellor of the Exchequer, Dennis Healey. ³⁰⁶

"British banks, including Lloyds, Barclays, Midland and Natwest, showed their confidence in the new regime by offering US\$60m of new loans to the Argentine junta." ³⁰⁷

301 Hugh Carless memorandum in FO 7/3201 at 304a

302 For comments by Lord Shackleton in the Geographical Journal, see <https://falklandstimeline.files.wordpress.com/2018/01/1977-shackleton-report.pdf>

303 *The Falkland Islands Times & Falkland Islands Monthly Review* July 30, 1976.

304 *Keesings Contemporary Archives* June 24, 1977 p28406

305 Ellerby 1990 p.205

306 Martinez de Hoz was on a tour of Europe in an attempt to persuade creditors to reschedule his country's debts.

307 Livingstone 2018

August 2nd, from Colombia, Britain's Ambassador Geoffrey Crossley, writes to the Foreign Office.

“It is ludicrous that the interests of less than 2000 persons... should be allowed to be a thorn in the flesh of Anglo-Latin American relations... Surely the time has come for HMG to let the inhabitants of the Islands know that they are a nuisance...” ³⁰⁸

August 7th, in the port of Buenos Aires, *in-camera* negotiations between Britain and Argentina are held aboard *Fragata Sarmiento*. Argentina proposes a gradual transfer of sovereignty, with a provisional administration lasting for a single period of eight years under alternating British/Argentine Governors. Each serving for 2 years. Britain's delegation raise the need for further Islander consultation, asking; *“What means were envisaged for ascertaining the views of the islanders both during the negotiations of the proposed Agreement and prior to the specified date?”* ³⁰⁹ *“This question was avoided by the Argentines in their answer...”* ³¹⁰

August 8th, talks continue off Buenos Aires. Minister Allara asserts that resolution 1514 limits the question to a matter of territorial integrity and that self-determination is inapplicable in this case. He considers the dispute, therefore, as a bilateral one that cannot involve the islanders, whose *interests*, only, may be considered. Allara adds that his proposals extend to the Dependencies.

“At the second round of talks, the Argentines produced a paper proposing joint administration of the Islands to be followed, after 8 years, by the transfer of sovereignty to Argentina. As it stands, this paper is quite unacceptable.” ³¹¹

“... the British delegation made no written commitments. But Edmonds concluded by repeating that whatever the sovereignty model proposed, it would be examined by two interrelated criteria of great importance to the British government. (a) What was likely to be acceptable to the islanders? (b) What was likely to be acceptable to the British Parliament and public.” ³¹²

August 26th, in Britain, an article in *The Times* newspaper considers the Shackleton report and suggests that the Islands' Governor is in favour of an Argentine take-over. ³¹³

September 14th, in London, advice from the Foreign Office's legal advisers is sought and given.

“... an agreement on the lines of the proposal as it now stands would contain an unconditional undertaking by HMG to cede the Islands on a specified future date. ... such an agreement could only be implemented by Act of Parliament... It would also be necessary to use an Act of Parliament if the new arrangements for the Falkland Islands had the effect of restricting the right of Parliament or the Sovereign to legislate for the territory, or were repugnant to any previous Act of Parliament.” ³¹⁴

September 17th, in New York, the United Nations Special Committee on Decolonization adopt a draft-resolution calling for the UK and Argentina to expedite negotiations concerning the dispute over sovereignty.

At the end of **September**, Argentina's Minister for Marine Resources, Capt. Noe Guevara, visits the UK to discuss the purchase of ships and the regulation of fishing in the South Atlantic. During the visit, Guevara meets with the head of the Foreign Office's Polar Regions Section, John Heap. ³¹⁵

308 Crossley to Carless, August 2, 1976 in FO 7/3229

309 Quoted in FO 7/3201 at 283a

310 Legal advice in FO 7/3201 at 283a

311 Hugh Carless memorandum in FO 7/3201 at 304a

312 Donaghy 2014

313 *Governor: We must have cooperation with Argentina* Michael Frenchman *The Times* August 26, 1976

314 FO 7/3201 at 283a & 304a

315 Livingstone 2018. If Guevara was aware of the Southern Thule operation, he does not appear to have mentioned it.

October 8th, in London, Hugh Carless submits an assessment of the situation for the Foreign Secretary.

*“We have now reached a turning point where we must decide about the next stage in the dialogue. We cannot embark on a third round of talks without having some idea of where we intend to go thereafter, since our tactics will to some extent vary according to the strategy we choose.”*³¹⁶

Carless lists four options; “... *in the short term.*” The first calls for talks to be stopped on the basis that the British side cannot accept any development into negotiations over sovereignty. His second option is to play for time - “*The aim would be to persuade the Argentines that we were serious about making progress, without in fact taking any substantive steps forward.*” Third is to develop the present talks into; “... *substantive, but still secret, negotiations...*” with the aim of securing Argentine acceptance of terms of reference for a series of negotiations about Anglo-Argentine interests. Finally, Carless suggests the option of going public about the intention to negotiate.

*“If we chose this course, we must recognise (and probably state) that these negotiations could not exclude the question of sovereignty over the Falkland Islands. The experiences of Mr. Michael Stewart in the House in 1968 show that it would be essential to give assurances from its outset that we were being frank about the subject matter for negotiation and that the wishes of the Islanders would not be disregarded at any stage... This option would allow us to retain the initiative and of reducing the Falklands lobby’s ability to launch accusations of planning a secret sell-out.”*³¹⁷

Listing longer term objectives, Carless mentions ‘leaseback’, ‘joint sovereignty/condominium’, a ‘buy-out’ of the Islanders and ‘transfer of sovereignty.’ Concluding, he suggests that a public round of negotiations take place (option 4) with the long term aim of some ‘leaseback’ or ‘condominium’ arrangement.

*“At every stage it will be essential to pay particular attention to nursing Islander opinion. Our ability to bring them along with us will be crucial to the success or failure of our strategy. Given that the Islanders are likely to reject the idea of an early transfer of sovereignty to Argentina, however qualified, we may have to adopt a two-stage approach to negotiations. This would mean concentrating initially on a politico-economic package which would fall short of full transfer of sovereignty but which the Argentines would see as a stepping-stone to a fuller settlement at a later stage – by which time the Islanders would, we hope, have adjusted to the prospect of a change in sovereignty status.”*³¹⁸

On seeing the Carless assessment, Robin Edmonds, notes; “*The Falklands problem taken as a whole is complicated, but the nub of it is simple: Parliament.*”³¹⁹

October 14th, at the Foreign Office, Minister Ted Rowlands notes; “*All that can be said of successive British Governments is that they avoided war and brought the Islanders and Argentines marginally closer together... we are trying to reconcile two apparently irreconcilable demands: the Argentine demand for us to hand over sovereignty – or at least to talk about handing it over – and the demand of the Islanders and the Lobby here that we do no such thing.*”³²⁰

On the same day, the UK Falkland Islands Committee severs its link with the Falkland Islands Company.

Britain’s Overseas Development department rejects Shackleton’s Report as overambitious. However, as regards the recommendations for an airport, a ‘feasibility study’ is promised.

316 Hugh Carless memorandum in FO 7/3201 at 283a

317 *Ibid.*

318 *Ibid.*

319 Edmonds quoted in Livingstone 2018 citing FCO 7/3201

320 FO 7/3201/307

*“The British government was presented with a report containing proposals which it was incapable of fulfilling, and this could only spell further trouble for its relationship with the islanders...”*³²¹

October 26th, it is announced that the next Governor of the Falkland Islands is to be James Roland Walter Parker OBE. Handover is expected to be in January, 1977.³²²

In **November**, Argentina lands a military expedition on Morrell Island in the Southern Thule group of the South Sandwich Islands. Twenty soldiers under the command of a Major. Weather and radio stations are established, jointly given the name Corbeta Uruguay.³²³

*“The idea of landing at Thule island allegedly dates back to 1974 and was first suggested to then president Juan Peron, by captain Juan Jose Lombardo (who later played a role as head of South Atlantic Theatre of Operations during the Falklands conflict). The purpose of such an action in the island of Thule was to test and assess the UK's reaction. However Operation Sun did not receive the kick-off and full support until 1976, when a new military Junta was again in control of Argentina.”*³²⁴

*“Southern Thule was the kind of territory the Labour Foreign Secretary Anthony Crosland favoured giving to Argentina as part of a compromise. It also fitted precisely the scenario that Argentine Admiral Juan Jose Lombardo revealed to me after the (1982) conflict – that Argentina's long term plan, code named Project Alpha, was to continue to occupy isolated British Islands so long as there was no British reaction. He mischievously described the South Sandwich landing as the 'first bite of the sandwich'!...”*³²⁵

Researcher's Comment: An invasion. There is no other word for it. Southern Thule had been claimed by Britain since 1908. By Argentina only after 1938, although 1952 is legally more correct. The action was covert and not published nor mentioned by Argentina in any forum.

November 4th, in England, three by-elections eliminate the Labour Party's thin majority, rendering it a minority government and increasing the power of Parliament.

November 15th, in New York, at the UN, the Fourth Committee reviews the work of the Special Committee on Decolonization. Argentina's representative makes a statement.

*“... resolution 1514 (XV) of 14 December 1960 established quite clearly, in paragraph 6, that in certain circumstances – including without any doubt, those deriving from acts of territorial usurpation against a country – the applicable principle was territorial integrity and not self-determination.”*³²⁶

He also refers to the 1975 International Court of Justice (ICJ) opinion concerning Western Sahara.

“... the Court, while recognizing the important role of the principle of self-determination, had pointed out that on a number of occasions the General Assembly had given priority to the principle of territorial integrity, particularly when the colonial Territory had been created to the prejudice of the country to which the Territory belonged originally. Furthermore, in paragraph 87 of the opinion, the Court had affirmed quite clearly that in

321 Donaghy 2014

322 Taking over from Governor French who had served an unusually short term of two years. The majority of Governors serve for three to four years. French's relationship with the Islanders can best be described as “uneasy”.

323 Exact date unknown. The Southern Thule group consists of three islands.

324 *Thule island occupation: Argentine navy tested UK's resolve as part of its long term plan to take the Falklands in MercoPress* August 29, 2019

325 *Fight for Falklands Freedom: Reporting Live from Argentina and the Islands* Harold Briley 2022

326 Britain had long argued that art.6 of UN GA resolution 1514 (1960) only applied to the listed Non-Self Governing Territories and offered no protection outside of that limited application. This perception was proved correct finally in 2019 when the ICJ gave its advisory opinion on the Mauritian decolonization in relation to the Chagos Islands.

all cases the "special characteristics" of the Territory should borne in mind.³²⁷ However, the most decisive paragraph on the subject was paragraph 162, from a reading of which it was perfectly clear that in those situations where there was a dispute regarding sovereignty over a colonial Territory, whether or not the principle of self-determination should be applied depended on the nature of the link between the Territory in question and the State in question at the moment of colonization."³²⁸

Britain's representative exercises a right of reply.

*"The United Kingdom delegation was told that the Falkland Islands was a special case. It did not accept that. ... The people of the Falkland Islands had the right to be consulted and to have their wishes about their own future taken into account. Yet, the draft which was before the General Assembly deliberately set those wishes aside as though the views of the people of the Falkland Islands were of no account."*³²⁹

The draft-resolution calling for negotiations on the issue of sovereignty receives the Fourth Committee's approval; however, more nations abstain than Argentina had anticipated, causing consternation among its UN delegation.

*"While his delegation respected the right of every delegation to change its position on a particular question when and for whatever reasons it deemed appropriate, he said that his delegation was surprised at the decision of certain countries which, having voted in favour of resolutions 2065 (XX) and 3160 (XXVIII), had, on the current occasion, taken a different position."*³³⁰

327 Inaccurate. What para.87 actually said was – *"Western Sahara (Rio de Oro and Sakiet El Hamra) is a territory having very special characteristics which, at the time of colonization by Spain, largely determined the way of life and social and political organization of the peoples inhabiting it. In consequence, the legal régime of Western Sahara, including its legal relations with neighbouring territories, cannot properly be appreciated without reference to these special characteristics. The territory forms part of the great Sahara desert which extends from the Atlantic Coast of Africa to Egypt and the Sudan. At the time of its colonization by Spain, the area of this desert with which the Court is concerned was being exploited, because of its low and spasmodic rainfall, almost exclusively by nomads, pasturing their animals or growing crops as and where conditions were favourable. It may be said that the territory, at the time of its colonization, had a sparse population that, for the most part, consisted of nomadic tribes the members of which traversed the desert on more or less regular routes dictated by the seasons and the wells or water-holes available to them. In general, the Court was informed, the right of pasture was enjoyed in common by these tribes; some areas suitable for cultivation, on the other hand, were subject to a greater degree to separate rights. Perennial water-holes were in principle considered the property of the tribe which put them into commission, though their use also was open to all, subject to certain customs as to priorities and the amount of water taken. Similarly, many tribes were said to have their recognized burial grounds, which constituted a rallying point for themselves and for allied tribes. Another feature of life in the region, according to the information before the Court, was that inter-tribal conflict was not infrequent."* (Western Sahara, Advisory Opinion, ICJ Reports 1975 para.87) See <https://www.icj-cij.org/files/case-related/61/061-19751016-ADV-01-00-EN.pdf>

328 Again inaccurate. Para.162 actually said – *"The materials and information presented to the Court show the existence, at the time of Spanish colonization, of legal ties of allegiance between the Sultan of Morocco and some of the tribes living in the territory of Western Sahara. They equally show the existence of rights, including some rights relating to the land, which constituted legal ties between the Mauritanian entity, as understood by the Court, and the territory of Western Sahara. On the other hand, the Court's conclusion is that the materials and information presented to it do not establish any tie of territorial sovereignty between the territory of Western Sahara and the Kingdom of Morocco or the Mauritanian entity. Thus the court has not found legal ties of such a nature as might affect the application of resolution 1514 (XV) in the decolonization of Western Sahara, and, in particular, of the principle of self-determination through the free and genuine expression of the will of the peoples of the Territory."* (Western Sahara, Advisory Opinion, ICJ Reports 1975 para.162)

329 UN Doc A32/23/Rev.1 Chapter 28

330 This resolution passed 102:1 (UK) with 36 abstentions. 13 Commonwealth countries voted in favour – Bangladesh, Cyprus, Ghana, India, Lesotho, Malaysia, Malta, Mauritius, Sri Lanka, Swaziland, Uganda, Tanzania & Zambia.

In London, on the same day, Lord Shackleton presents his findings regarding the Falkland islands to the Royal Geographical Society. ³³¹

December 1st, in New York, the General Assembly of the United Nations adopts *Resolution 31/49 (XXXI)*. ³³²

“... 2. Expresses its gratitude for the continuous efforts made by the Government of Argentina, in accordance with the relevant decisions of the General Assembly, to facilitate the process of decolonisation and to promote the well-being of the populations of the islands;

3. Requests the Governments of Argentina and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to expedite the negotiations concerning the dispute over sovereignty, as requested in General Assembly resolutions 2065 (XX) and 3160 (XXVIII);

*4. Calls upon the two parties to refrain from taking decisions that would imply introducing unilateral modifications in the situation while the islands are going through the process recommended in the above-mentioned resolutions;..”*³³³

“Paragraph 2 is absurdly one-sided in thanking only Argentina – it was actually Britain that had been making efforts to “promote the well-being of the populations of the islands” ..., whereas Argentina’s efforts had been devoted to taking over the territory against the wishes of those populations. ... Argentina continues to demand that Britain should respect Resolution 31/49 – an impossible demand since the premise on which it is based (ongoing negotiations) no longer applies.” ³³⁴

December 8th, in London, the Cabinet approve a mixed approach to future talks with Argentina. ³³⁵

“It included two courses of action in the event of continued islander objections to leaseback. Firstly, the government would tell Argentina that it could not proceed with the negotiations against the islanders’ wishes. It could then buy time by making a series of minor arrangements (e.g. shared administration of the Dependencies) or a single large concession, such as an Argentine sovereign base on these uninhabited islands. In exchange Britain would seek Argentine economic cooperation covering fishing, oil exploration and research... This was to be followed by a ministerial visit to Stanley and Buenos Aires in February, the second stage of Crosland’s formula. Rowlands brief would be ‘to establish prospects for a move forward into some form of negotiations in 1977 which might lead towards the [politico-economic] package deal” ³³⁶

“... in December 1976, cabinet ministers noted that if they were to ‘state plainly’ their intention to talk to Argentina, there would be a ‘political storm’, so they agreed instead to play for time.” ³³⁷

In the Falkland Islands, the Royal Marines are granted the Freedom of Stanley. Col. Sir Stuart Pringle RM presents a sword to the Government and the People of the Falkland Islands.

December 16th, in Stanley, James Roland Walter Parker arrives; appointed Governor of the Falkland Islands, and High Commissioner for the British Antarctic Territories. ³³⁸

331 See - <https://falklandstimeline.files.wordpress.com/2018/01/1977-shackleton-report.pdf>

332 Operative paragraph 4 is described in Ellerby 1990 (p.213) as a; “veiled reference to the Shackleton Report.” See https://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/RES/31/49

333 As this resolution mentioned 2065(XX) of 1965, it cannot be viewed as a replacement for that earlier resolution. However, see 1985.

334 Pascoe 2020 pp.319-320

335 CAB/128/60/20

336 Donaghy 2014

337 Livingstone 2018

338 *The London Gazette* No. 47113

*“His Excellency gave an impressive speech in which he said that it was his hope that he would discharge the responsibilities to the Government and people of the Colony to the best of his ability . and hoped that at the end of his ‘several years’ stay he would have some satisfaction at doing his best? Mr Parker also said he regarded himself as a Civil Servant brought up in the discipline that by his duty to the Queen his concern was the welfare and well-being of the people amongst whom he was required to serve and that this would be the abiding purpose of his activities whilst here. In what could be described as an astute awareness of the low morale of Islanders in their relations with the Administration, His Excellency asked us to express our views frankly to him...”*³³⁹

*“Parker ... took over at a time when Argentine pressure on the Islands was steadily increasing.”*³⁴⁰

In Argentina, two British Petroleum (BP) executives seek meetings to discuss the prospect of a joint approach to oil exploration.³⁴¹

December 29th, on Morrell Island in the Southern Thule group, a helicopter crew from HMS *Endurance*, visiting to retrieve scientific equipment left earlier in the year, discovers the Argentine military presence.

December 31st, in London, Britain’s Secretary of State for Defence, Fred Mulley, proposes that, with tensions with Argentina easing, now is the time for *Endurance* to be withdrawn.



*“... when I have been obliged to accept cuts in the defence budget for 1977/78 and 1978/79, I cannot justify the expenditure of an estimated £1.8m for a purpose which has no relations to our NATO commitments...”*³⁴²

Researcher's Comment: Worthy of note that HMS *Endurance*, the Falkland Islands only effective protection, had been in danger of removal from the South Atlantic long before Margaret Thatcher's Conservative Government turned their attention to it.

339 *The Falkland Islands Times & Falkland Islands Monthly Review* January 20, 1977

340 Tatham (ed) 2008. See - https://www.falklandsbiographies.org/biographies/parker_james

341 Livingstone 2018

342 *Mulley to Crosland December 31, 1976 DEFE 24/911*. Quoted in Donaghy 2014

1977 – January 5th, in London, Argentina's *charge d'affaires* is summoned to the Foreign Office to explain the presence of a military base on Southern Thule.

*“A JIC assessment in January 1977 concluded that the Argentine Government were unlikely to order withdrawal until it suited them to do so and, depending on the British Government's actions in the situation, could be encouraged to attempt further military measures against British interests in the area.”*³⁴³

January 7th, in London, executives from the BP oil company meet with Foreign Office officials to discuss the possibility of oil exploration around the Falkland Islands.³⁴⁴


January 14th, Argentina informs the UK Government that the purpose of the Southern Thule operation is to establish a scientific station within the jurisdiction of Argentine sovereignty. They express the hope that nothing will cloud the, *“auspicious perspectives”* for negotiations. News of the landing is not made public within the UK.

*“On January 5, 1977, Britain requested that Buenos Aires explain its presence on the Dependency. Nine days later, the Argentine Ministry of Foreign Affairs told its British counterparts that the work on the island was scientific in nature and implied that its presence would not be permanent.”*³⁴⁵

A 'Falkland Islands Office' opens in London.³⁴⁶

January 19th, Britain's Government formally protests the violation of British sovereignty in Southern Thule.

*“... (Admiral) Guzzetti said to Rowlands, "These Argentine scientists are only going to be there for a short summer season." We accepted that explanation at the time. We accepted it because we were at the beginning of the Crosland concept of long-term negotiation... We agonised over it considerably. But if we had made a public song and dance about it, we would then have had to decide whether to break off the whole negotiating process. We decided that negotiation was more important.”*³⁴⁷



Researcher's Comment: Britain's Labour Government not only acted inadequately in the face of an Argentine invasion of British territory, but then compounded the offence by keeping it a secret from the British public. More importantly, kept secret from Parliament and there is no doubt that the Commons would have erupted. How this could have been viewed as a reasonable policy under any circumstances is unfathomable. It would be 1982 before the Argentines were ejected from the Corbeta Uruguay base.

The British Government receive intelligence that Admiral Massera's *Plan Goa* – an invasion of the Falklands – is being reconsidered by the junta.³⁴⁸

343 Baroness Young in *HL Deb 25 January 1983 vol.438 cc136-247*

344 *Hall to Anglin January 7, 1977 FCO 7/3409*

345 *Re-examining the Falkland Islands War: The necessity for multi-level deterrence in preventing wars of aggression* Steven G. Stransky 2012

346 This was under the control of the *UK Falkland Islands Committee* and the *Falkland Islands Research & Development Association*. Not the Falkland Islands Government, whose representative office opened in 1983

347 Hugh Carless quoted in Charlton 1989 p.60

348 Donaghy 2014. *cf.* March & June 1976

January 31st, following reports that Argentina is commissioning two American oil companies – Geophysical Services International and Western Geophysical – to carry out seismic surveys in the seas off the Argentine coast, a Labour MP, Colin Phipps, sends a warning to the Foreign Office.

*“The British were concerned that the Argentine-sponsored seismic studies would cross the (unofficial) median line between Argentina and the Falkland Islands. Although the British government had not formally claimed the waters beyond the 200-metre isobath from the islands, it wanted to reserve its rights to up to 200 miles of the continental-shelf.”*³⁴⁹

February 1st, in London, Britain's Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC) assess the Southern Thule occupation; describing it as a political act that may be considered so successful by Argentina as to encourage further displays.

February 2nd, Foreign Secretary Anthony Crosland, makes an announcement to Parliament.

*“... the time has come to consider both with the Islanders and the Argentine Government whether a climate exists for discussing the broad issues which bear on the future of the Falkland Islands, and the possibilities of co-operation between Britain and Argentina in the region of the South West Atlantic... I must make certain things absolutely clear. First, any such discussion, which would inevitably raise fundamental questions in the relationship between the Islands, Britain and Argentina, would take place under a sovereignty umbrella; that is, Her Majesty's Government would wholly reserve their position on the issue of sovereignty, which would in no way be prejudiced. Secondly, any changes which might be proposed must be acceptable to the Islanders, whose interests and well-being remain our prime concern. In consequence, thirdly, there must be full consultation with the Islanders at every stage; nothing will be done behind their backs.”*³⁵⁰

*“At the same time he announced that the Government did not accept the more costly recommendations in the Shackleton Report, notably the enlargement of the airport and the lengthening of the runway. At a time when Argentina had just occupied British territory, what sort of a signal was that?”*³⁵¹

February 4th, in the Falkland Islands, a message from Alginat Industries Limited is delivered.

“As the Islanders will know, Humphries and Glasgow carried out a feasibility study on Alginat Industries behalf in 1974 covering the production of dried milled seaweed, and also the production of calcium alginate. At the time of the Shackleton report it was considered that only the production of dried milled seaweed would be a viable proposition. It is now considered that sodium alginate, worth even more than calcium alginate since it is an end product and is worth around £2000 per ton, can be produced in the Falkland Islands. Our internal estimate of the Capital Costs based upon updating the Humphries and Glasgow final reports of June 1974, taking account amongst other things of cost inflation since then, amounts to £13 million for a plant to produce 10 tons of sodium alginate a day or 3170 tons a year. At £2000 per ton this amounts to a turnover of £6½ million a year. If the Alginat Industries seaweed harvesting concession were operated to full extent these figures would become £40 million capital expenditure and a turnover of £25 million p.a. based on 1976 prices.

During 1977 Alginat Industries hopes to produce about 8,000 tons of alginate and by using various other minor sources of seaweed it is believed that we shall in due course be able to produce up to 11,000 tons a year. At this point only marginal further supplies of seaweed will be available unless the supplies from the Falkland Islands/Tierra del Fuego are used. Judging by past experience Alginat Industries’

349 Livingstone 2018 citing *Philips to Rowlands January 31, 1977 FCO 7/3409*

350 *HC Deb 02 February 1977 vol.925 cc550-61*

351 Baroness Young in *HL Deb 25 January 1983 vol.438 cc136-247*

own increase in sales potential will amount to around 1,000 tons of alginates a year so that on this basis it will be likely that the 11,000 tons limit will be reached soon after 1980. Since supplies of alginates from the Falkland Islands will cost considerably more than alginates made from more accessible raw material nearer at hand it is, of course, necessary to establish that the market will continue to require more alginates based on this higher cost, but in our view the chances of this are good.

The overriding question is the political future of the islands vis a vis the Argentine and Alginate Industries has made it clear to H.M. Government that, an assurance regarding the continued British Sovereignty of the Islands is essential. The Shackleton report considered, that it would be logical for any major new developments of the Falkland Islands economy, especially those relating to offshore resources such as oil and fish, if possible to be carried out in cooperation - even participation - with Argentina. This, must not apply, nor does Alginate Industries believe that it is intended to apply, to seaweed resources or any inshore operations. Furthermore no alginate development could take place without the recommended extension of the airstrip” ³⁵²

February 7th, in the UK, intelligence suggests that *Plan Goa* has been placed on hold over fears that the United Nations will not support an Argentine invasion of the Falklands.

*“... later intelligence indicated that this plan had been shelved, not because of any action by the then British Government but because Argentina could not count on the support of the Third World or the Communist bloc.”*³⁵³

“Argentina could count on ‘qualified’ support: backing its claim in the fight against colonialism, but (this) was not considered strong enough to achieve a fait accompli.” ³⁵⁴

February 10th, from New York, Keith Unwin, Britain’s delegate to the UN Commission on Human Rights, seeks guidance from the Foreign Office on the subject of human rights in Argentina. ³⁵⁵

In London, on the same day, the Falkland islands Company issue a statement.

The Falkland Islands Company Ltd, welcomes the forthcoming visit to the Islands of the Minister of State, Mr, Edward Rowlands. The Minister has taken a close personal interest in the Islands and has availed himself of every opportunity of meeting Islanders in this country. In the discussion in the House of Commons yesterday at which the announcement of the Ministerial visit was made, the Foreign Secretary stated that the economy of the Islands was stagnant and that without political and economic co-operation with Argentina the outlook for the Islands is bleak. The Company does not share this view although it does wholly accept Lord Shackleton’s statement that no off-shore developments are likely to take place without a form of co-operation agreement with Argentina.

Since publication of the Shackleton Report the Gross National Revenue of the Colony has increased by 80% in 1976, and a further increase of between 50 and 40% is anticipated this year, The outlook for Falklands wool, over the next few years is very favourable. The Company, in common with Islanders, wishes to continue friendly relationships with Argentina but considers that any Argentine involvement, other than on a commercial basis, within Falklands territorial waters impinges on British Sovereignty.

352 *The Falkland Islands Times & Falkland Islands Monthly Review* February 11, 1977 p.7

353 Baroness Young in *HL Deb* 25 January 1983 vol.438 cc136-247

354 Donaghy 2014

355 Unwin to Callan February 10, 1977 FCO 58/1165 in Livingstone 2018

The Company, as has previously been announced, is currently considering joint participation with non-Argentine interests in in-shore fishing which is likely to have a significant effect on the Colony's economy. British Government aid would not be required for the venture which involves fish meal and shell-fish." ³⁵⁶

February 15th, in Buenos Aires, Minister of State³⁵⁷ Edward (Ted) Rowlands, lands en-route to the Falklands. He holds brief talks with the Argentine Foreign Minister before moving on.

"... the visit was in fulfilment of his pledge that "there must be full consultation with the Islanders at every stage; nothing will be done behind their back. The forthcoming visit by Mr. Ted Rowlands has, for some islanders, signalled the turning point in our fortunes. However, there are many who don't seem to be very optimistic at the out-come and this view is understandable for various reasons. It was a Labour Government Minister of State (in the form of Lord Chalfont) who came here in 1968 hoping that it would take little persuasion to get us to embrace Argentina like some kind of foster parents. ... None of us expect Ted Rowlands to come out next week with a magic wand – but I wouldn't say that he won't be carrying thirty pieces of silver." ³⁵⁸

"... by 1977 alarm bells were beginning to ring as the Argentine Military Junta, which had over-thrown the civilian Government of President Isabel Peron, widow of the famous Juan Peron, started demanding a return for their investment in the Falklands. Had not the British Foreign Office promised that the naive Islanders would by now be totally receptive of the Argentine and be prepared to accept some form of acceptance of the long standing sovereignty claim? Also it was presumed that the younger members of the community were supposed, by now, to be speaking fluent Spanish while a vast majority of the population would have enjoyed the many delights which Buenos Aires offered. A vast majority of the Islands population suddenly realized that they had been lured into a trap which was going to be difficult to extract themselves from." ³⁵⁹

February 16th, on his arrival in Stanley, Rowlands is met by a crowd of some 400 Islanders waving Union Jacks and shouting "We want to stay British." ³⁶⁰ The Minister is addressed by Islands' Councillors.

"Initially councillors were non-committal, seeking to circumvent the sovereignty debate by stressing the need for a referendum. Yet Rowland's patient, frank explanation turned their stance,..." ³⁶¹

"Rowlands was a voluble Welshman who talked far more than he listened, and his visit was remembered with some bitterness in the islands." ³⁶²

February 17th, from the Islands, the Falklands Legislative Council issue a statement.

"We understand that the Minister will have to have discussions on the sovereignty question while in Argentina. We realise that these discussions will take place under the sovereignty umbrella and so the stand of all parties concerned will remain unaffected..."

356 *The Falkland Islands Times & Falkland Islands Monthly Review* February 11, 1977 p.3

357 A grand sounding title, but in reality this is only a mid-level government role in the UK.

358 *The Falkland Islands Times & Falkland Islands Monthly Review* February 11, 1977 p.2

359 Patrick Watts MBE quoted in *Penguin News* February 26, 2021

360 Letter in *The Falkland Islands Times & Falkland Islands Monthly Review* March 8, 1977 p.6 complaining about Argentine news reports that the Minister was only met by local dignitaries and a party of 10 children waving flags.

361 Donaghy 2014. This does not accord with the position outlined in *The Falkland Islands Times & Falkland Islands Monthly Reviews* of March 8 and March 28, 1977 which suggests that the Islanders were distinctly unimpressed with the Minister's visit. See (from p.21 of the pdf.) - <https://falklandstimeline.files.wordpress.com/2022/06/falkland-islands-times-falkland-islands-monthly-1977-to-1979.pdf>

362 Pascoe 2022 vol.3 p.610

*“A Labour Foreign Office Minister Ted Rowlands arrived in the Falklands and emphatically warned members of the Legislative Council that unless they agreed to talks on sovereignty being initiated then it was likely that LADE would withdraw their air link and the British Government was not prepared to come to the aid of the ever-diminishing Islands population.”*³⁶³

On the same day, Britain’s Foreign Office respond to Unwin’s letter of the 10th.

*“We had in mind (a) general statement to the effect that HMG deplore violations of human rights wherever they occur rather than a statement specifically relating to the situation in Argentina. As you know, our relations with Argentina are especially sensitive in view of the Falkland Islands dispute.”*³⁶⁴

February 18th, at the Hague, the Beagle Channel (PNL) arbitration group of judges submit their final decision to the British Crown – ruling in Chile’s favour.³⁶⁵

“... the Parties were agreed in principle that their rights in the matter of claims or title to territory were governed prima facie by the doctrine of the uti possidetis juris of 1810. This doctrine – possibly, at least at first, a political tenet rather than a true rule of law – is peculiar to the field of the Spanish-American States whose territories were formerly under the rule of the Spanish Crown, and even if both the scope and applicability of the doctrine were somewhat uncertain, particularly in such far-distant regions of the continent as are those in issue in the present case, it undoubtedly constituted an important element in the inter-relationships of the continent. As the Court understand the matter, the doctrine has two aspects.

First, all territory in Spanish-America, however remote or inhospitable, is deemed to have been part of one of the former administrative divisions of Spanish colonial rule (vice-royalties, captaincies-general, etc.). Hence there is no territory in Spanish-America that has the status of res nullius open to an acquisition of title by occupation.

Secondly, the title to any given locality is deemed to have become automatically vested in whatever Spanish-American State inherited or took over the former Spanish administrative division in which the locality concerned was stipulated (uti possidetis, ita possideatis, – the full formula). Looked at in another way, uti possidetis was a convenient method of establishing the boundaries of the young Spanish-American States on the same basis as those of the old Spanish administrative divisions, except that the latter were themselves often uncertain or ill-defined or, in the less accessible regions, not factually established at all, – or again underwent various changes.”

*“... essentially an accord on boundaries between successor states of the same (Spanish) empire, not an assertion of sovereignty against outsiders.”*³⁶⁶

363 Patrick Watts MBE quoted in *Penguin News* February 26, 2021

364 *Callan to Unwin* February 17, 1977 FCO 58/1165 in Livingstone 2018

365 Queen Elizabeth II signed the ratification on April 18, 1977. There was no immediate response from either of the parties. In January 1978 a letter was sent to both Chile and Argentina to discover whether they were content that the arbitration process had been completed. Chile answered in the positive and to say that, as far as it was concerned the Award had been duly implemented. Argentina did not reply. Nor did Argentina reply to a further inquiry in March, 1978, despite having already contacted Chile. On July 10, 1978, the President of the Court of Arbitration notified Queen Elizabeth II that, in its opinion, *“... the Award stands fully and materially executed.”* The arbitration panel then stood down. cf. 1848, 1971, 1976 & 1978 The decision is here - https://legal.un.org/riaa/cases/vol_XXI/53-264.pdf

366 *Falklands Title Deeds* M. Deas 1982

*“As a principle, it could be applied only to a dispute between Latin American nations... Whether it is applicable in a dispute with a non-Spanish American nation is open to doubt.”*³⁶⁷

*“In 1977, an arbitration award was favorable to Chile, but as soon as the Videla government received the result, it rejected it and declared its nullity. For its part, the Chilean government issued a statement stating that it was unwilling to restart discussions on an area that it now considered legitimately its own. This hardened relations between the two countries again...”*³⁶⁸

*“The Falklands were not at issue, but the evidence from history and maps applied to them exactly as it did to the PNL group.”*³⁶⁹

February 19th, Britain's Foreign Secretary, Anthony Crosland, dies of a cerebral haemorrhage aged 59.

February 21st, as Rowlands leaves Stanley, he is met by a large crowd of Islanders and handed a letter from the Falkland Islands Committee.

“We all wish you a safe and pleasant journey back to Britain and hope you will always remember your visit to the Falkland Islands.

(Keep the Falklands Islands British)

We fervently hope that you will recommend an extension to our airfield - this appears to be the only way that development of the Colony can take place.

(Support the Falkland Islands' wish to stay British)

We do not believe our economy to be stagnant. The wool industry is holding its value - in fact its value is increasing. This means more assistance to your balance of payments through increased hard currency and taxation.

(The Falkland Islands want to stay British)

We wish to have co-operation with Argentina only in the form of a normal relationship between any two countries.

(Keep the Falkland Islands British)

We would like to see the infamous 'White Card' abolished'

(Support the Falkland Islands' wish to stay British)

We do not want Argentine participation within these Islands and only accept it in off-shore ventures insofar as within a fully international legal framework.

(The Falkland Islands want to stay British)

The South American way of life is as foreign to us as the oriental one is to you. Our cultures, laws, politics, language etc., are entirely different. If we wanted the South American way of life we would go there and live.

(Support the Falkland Islands' wish to remain British)

We do not acknowledge that Argentina has any legitimate claim on our Islands.

*(Keep the Falkland Islands British)”*³⁷⁰

367 *Falklands or Malvinas? The Background to the Dispute* J. Metford 1968

368 *Génesis de la Guerra de Malvinas (1976-1982)* Valeria Lourdes Carbone 2008

369 Pascoe 2022 vol.3 p.594.

370 Quoted in *The Falkland Islands Times & Falkland islands Monthly Review* March 8, 1977 p.2. Also Ellerby 1990 p.214

*“The four and a half day visit by the Minister and two officials from the FCO was well covered by the British and Argentine press and international news agencies. Reports indicate that the Argentine press have distorted facts to support the Argentine propaganda machine.”*³⁷¹

Following negotiations between Rowlands and Minister Allara, a joint-statement is released. All this says is that there is a need for the two sides to consult their governments.

*“In light of the concessions which we were able to bring them, the talks were much stickier than expected. It does not bode well for the next round, when the really difficult stage – of substantive negotiations – begins.”*³⁷²

In London, after the unforeseen death of Anthony Crosland, Dr. David Owen takes over as Foreign Secretary.

*“It seemed to me that we had an obligation to try and ensure the economic prosperity of the islanders, to reduce its isolation, and to accept that they would live happily in the region if there could be a mutual understanding with Argentina. Did I believe that the Islanders should have a veto on negotiations? My answer to that, ... was no.”*³⁷³

February 22nd, Rowlands flies back to the UK.

*“I came back convinced that it was a perfectly legitimate and, in my opinion, important right of British foreign policy to defend the rights of a minority. ... I came back convinced that while I believed I could carry the Islanders with me, if we could get a workable solution and something Argentines would agree to, I was also convinced that we could not actually over-rule the Islanders.”*³⁷⁴

*“Dear Editor, Yes some of us did get a chance to meet Lord Ted Runway (sic) but had a job to get a word in as he talked so much that he filled the airspace. By the time he'd said how he'd come to listen, that "our hopes lie on the doorstep" (whatever that means!) twenty times, and how Wales' international airport is a "huge white elephant", he was off ... As a result of this morale boosting visit by one of our great chiefs and his entourage the Argentines are now claiming to be about to discuss our Constitution (Thank you BBC).”*³⁷⁵

February 23rd, in London, *Guardian* newspaper journalist Richard Gott, in a piece on Rowland's round-trip, writes about the islanders.

“... (They) need to be told quite firmly.. that although they wish the islands to remain a British colony, the British in 1977 plainly do not. The Falkland Islands are an absurd colonial anachronism.”

March 3rd, the *Falkland Islands Research & Development Association* is incorporated as a non-profit making business as the *Falkland Islands Association*; *“Its objectives were to represent the interests of the Falklands and to promote the economic, social and cultural development of the Islands for the benefit of the inhabitants. The Association had four functions. First, to provide the U.K.F.I.C. and affiliated groups with an office and salaried staff in London. Secondly, to incorporate a members' organization to which sympathizers in Britain and the people of the Falklands could subscribe. Thirdly, to provide Islanders visiting Britain and anyone interested in the Falklands with an information centre. Fourthly, to stimulate the commercial implementation of the Shackleton Report's recommendations in accordance with the wishes of the Islanders.”*³⁷⁶

371 *The Falkland Islands Times & Falkland islands Monthly Review* March 8, 1977 p.1 & p.6.

372 Shakespeare quoted in Donaghy 2014

373 Owen quoted in Donaghy 2014

374 Ted Rowlands interviewed in Charlton 1989 p.57. Rowlands, had not heard a word.

375 Letter by A. Chater in *The Falkland Islands Times & Falkland islands Monthly Review* March 28, 1977 p.3

376 Ellerby 1990 p.240

March 11th, in Buenos Aires, Argentina's Foreign Ministry proposes that there should be one set of negotiations; to include both sovereignty and economic cooperation. The UK government agrees; *"Allara was delighted. He emphasised the need to make a statement soon, since public opinion was getting 'restless.'... Shakespeare believed his desire for an early announcement was linked to his government's need to have something favourable to give the public, and offset the 'disastrous effect' of the forthcoming award to Chile."*³⁷⁷

March 16th, in a broadcast, the Falklands' Governor tells the Islanders that changes to the Constitution are being proposed which include the inclusion of six elected members to the legislature and the reduction of the voting age to 18.

March 18th, in Britain's Private Eye magazine; *"Connoisseurs of the Foreign Office news management will have noticed how the Falkland islands story has been handled. The F.O. considers that compared to British interests in the Argentine and assorted other dictatorships, the Falkland Islands are a drop in the bucket. Unfortunately for the F.O. the Shackleton Report made it perfectly clear that the Falklands had a viable economic future. In order to get around this, the F.O. assisted by the loyal hacks of the diplomatic lobby, have started to misquote the report. Contrary to the F.O. handouts, the report did not recommend £14 million expenditure, nor did it say that Argentinian co-operation was essential to future development. Instead it spoke of a small-scale £5.4 million development project spread over five years, bring profitable industry to the Islands. The Islanders remain rightly suspicious of the F.O.'s interventions. The F.O. Have decided that rather than be seen to sell the Falklanders out, they should complicate or hinder all future development and thus let the Islands die a slow death."*³⁷⁸

March 23rd, in Britain's House of Commons a written question is put down by John Biggs-Davison MP asking the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs what representations the Minister of State (Rowlands) had received at Goose Green. Rowlands responds.

*"During the public discussions I held with the Falkland Islanders at Goose Green, the local branch of the Falkland Island Committee read out an eight point statement, prepared before my arrival, which expressed concern over discussion of the Falkland Islands sovereignty dispute with Argentina. I assured those present that, contrary to the suggestion in the statement, I had not discussed sovereignty with the Argentine Government en route to the Islands. I explained why the Government thought it right to establish whether Anglo-Argentine negotiations might be held and how United Kingdom sovereignty over the Islands and the position of the Islanders would be fully protected. Those present at the Goose Green meeting indicated their satisfaction with these explanations and with the Government's intention to see whether a climate for Anglo-Argentine negotiations existed."*³⁷⁹

In **April**, it is reported that a prominent Argentine businessman, César Cao Saravia is prepared to pay \$US 10 million for the Falkland Islands Company; at least \$1 million more than the asking price.³⁸⁰

*"The Board of Directors of the Company announced that they would not agree to a transfer of ownership to Argentine interests and pointed out that in any event a pre-emptive right to purchase the Company is vested in the Falkland Islands Sheep Owners' Association Ltd. and that the Islands Government would need to approve any transfer of control to an alien."*³⁸¹

377 Donaghy 2014. The Beagle Channel arbitration decision had actually been reached 3 weeks before, but was not formally ratified by Queen Elizabeth II until April, 1977 and only announced in that May.

378 Quoted in *The Falkland Islands Times & Falkland Islands Monthly Review* August 31, 1977 pp.4 & 5

379 *The Falkland Islands Times & Falkland Islands Monthly Review* March 28, 1977 p.6

380 There is some evidence that another Argentine entrepreneur, Hector Francisco Capozzolo was involved in the offer. In 1978, Capozzolo also attempted to purchase a Falklands Farm – Douglas Station. See below.

381 *The Friends of the Falkland Islands: Newsletter* June 1977. cf. July, 1972

In London, Ted Rowlands makes a statement to the House of Commons.

“... no land can be alienated on Falkland Islands without the permission of the Falkland Islands Government itself; the British Government would not support such a move.”

April 20th, in Britain’s House of Lords, Lord Goronwy-Roberts makes a statement regarding the negotiations.

*“There is absolutely no doubt in this country in legal or Government circles about where sovereignty lies. It is here, in the United Kingdom.”*³⁸²

April 26th, simultaneously in Buenos Aires and London, a Joint Communique is released. Read to the House of Commons by Foreign Secretary, Dr Owen.

“The Governments of the Argentine Republic and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland have agreed to hold negotiations from June or July 1977 which will concern future political relations, including sovereignty, with regard to the Falkland Islands, South Georgia and South Sandwich Islands, and economic co-operation with regard to the said territories, in particular, and the South West Atlantic, in general. In these negotiations the issues affecting the future of the Islands will be discussed and negotiations will be directed to the working out of a peaceful solution to the existing dispute on sovereignty between the two states, and the establishment of a framework for Anglo-Argentine economic co-operation which will contribute substantially to the development of the islands, and the region as a whole.

A major objective of the negotiations will be to achieve a stable, prosperous and politically durable future for the Islands, whose people the Government of the United Kingdom will consult during the course of the negotiations

The agreement to hold these negotiations, and the negotiations themselves, are without prejudice to the position of either Government with regard to sovereignty over the Islands.

*The level at which the negotiations will be conducted, and the times and places at which they will be held, will be determined by agreement between the two Governments. If necessary, special Working Groups will be established.”*³⁸³

May 6th, Britain’s Department of Energy urge the Foreign Office to ensure that Argentina’s planned seismic studies off its continental shelf, do not cross the median line between the Patagonian coastline and the Falklands archipelago.

*“The worst would be to do nothing, ... as this could lead to ‘our giving up without so much as a whisper the title to any oil which might lie beneath the sea outside the 200 metres line’. ...”*³⁸⁴

May 7th, in Argentina, following an attempted assassination of the Foreign Minister, the Montoneros Group claim responsibility. They assert that Guzzetti had been negotiating a deal with Britain over the Falklands, that would reduce Argentine sovereignty and allow for the exploitation of oil and the fisheries by British interests.

Argentina immediately declares a 200-mile fishing limit around the Falkland Islands.

382 *HL Deb 20 April 1977 vol.382 cc222-66*

383 *UN Doc A/37/553/Add.1*. Also quoted in *FCO 76/1892 Annex 2*, and Franks 1983 para.60. Owen's willing inclusion of South Georgia and the South Sandwich Islands was not explained.

384 Livingstone 2018 citing *Brown to Cortazzi May 6, 1977* in *EG 14/38*

*“... in May 1977 Argentina declared a 200-mile fishing right around the Falkland Islands. Despite United Kingdom official protests, Argentina subsequently contracted fishing rights in this area with Japan and West Germany. It must be as apparent to noble Lords as it is apparent to me that the commercial and strategic importance of these waters is evidenced by the attention being paid to them by nations other than the United Kingdom...”*³⁸⁵

*“During the 1970s, the United Nations was coordinating negotiations on a new Convention on the Law of the Sea, which included the concept of an Economic Exclusion Zone (EEZ) in which a sovereign state had the right to explore and exploit the maritime resources within 200 nautical miles. Although negotiations on the Convention (UNCLOS) did not end until 1982 and did not come into force until 1994, the concept of 200-mile maritime zones was very much in the minds of officials ...”*³⁸⁶

May 9th, in the UK, a British Petroleum (BP) executive, Dr. J. Birks, writes to the Foreign Office to seek an opinion on the likely attitude to BP setting up a consortium with Argentine companies in the search for oil around the Falklands.³⁸⁷

*“Birks added that the Falkland Islands Company had expressed an interest in joining such a consortium.”*³⁸⁸

May 18th, in London, a cross-departmental meeting to discuss negotiations, is held at the Foreign Office.

*“... Hugh Carless explained that the FCO envisaged splitting British possessions in the South Atlantic into four areas of consideration: the Falkland Islands; the 200 miles of sea around the Falkland Islands including their maritime and subterranean resources (oil and fish); the Dependencies of the Falkland Islands (South Georgia and the South Sandwich Islands); and their 200-mile maritime zones. While leaseback would be the most appropriate solution for the Falkland Islands themselves, said Carless, there should also be a separate leaseback arrangement for the maritime zones, ‘which would allow Britain to exploit the resources of the area’. In regard to the Dependencies and their maritime zones, Britain’s aims should be ‘to retain access to the economic resources’. ...”*³⁸⁹

May 20th, Britain's Ministry of Defence warns the Foreign Office that it intends to withdraw HMS *Endurance* in May, 1978.

May 23rd, in Buenos Aires, Oscar Montes is appointed as Argentina’s Foreign Minister.

May 31st, in Buenos Aires, John Shakespeare receives instructions from London to make a formal protest to the Argentine government regarding any seismic oil studies carried out in Falklands waters.

*“The FCO also feared that inaction would weaken Britain’s sovereignty claim, so in May 1977, it instructed its charge d’affaires to deliver a formal protest to the Argentine Government, noting: ‘We must make sure that we do not prejudice our rights ... over the Falkland Islands Continental shelf in advance’. ...”*³⁹⁰

June 13th, in London, the Falkland Islands are discussed at a meeting of the Cabinet’s Defence and Overseas Policy Committee.

385 Lord Morris in *HL Deb* 22 May 1979 vol.400 cc233-432

386 Livingstone 2018

387 *Birks to Rowlands* May 9, 1977 FCO 7/3409

388 Livingstone 2018

389 *Ibid.* citing *Record of a Meeting to discuss Anglo/Argentine Negotiations on the Falkland Islands Dispute* May 18, 1977 in *EG* 14/38

390 *Ibid.* citing *FCO to British Embassy* May 31, 1977 FCO 7/3409. The protest was ignored, so Britain gave its own authorisation to the two American oil companies commissioned by Argentina, to survey within Falklands waters.

*“... Foreign Secretary David Owen felt that in order to secure the main objective of retaining the sovereignty over the Falkland Islands themselves, Britain should be prepared to concede sovereignty over the Dependencies and the maritime resources of both the Islands and the Dependencies. ... In speaking notes prepared for Owen, his case was made more explicit: "We have to get it across to Argentina that we are not after economic advantage at their expense, and that our concern for the Islanders is our real and genuine concern. I do not in any case believe that it is right for us to seek to secure for ourselves, economic resources 7000 miles away ... we should not lay ourselves open to accusations ... that we are economic imperialists.".”*³⁹¹

In the House of Commons, questions are asked of the Minister of Overseas Development by Sir Nigel Fisher MP.

“1. When will the four feasibility studies which she is undertaking arising from the Shackleton Report, and recommended by the Falkland Islands Government, be completed; 2. What plans she has to implement the recommendations contained in the Shackleton Report on the Falkland Islands.

*Mrs Hart replied: "Certain recommendations fall either to the private sector to implement or to the Falkland Islands Government themselves. Some of- the major suggestions which do or might involve aid, such as a possible extension of the Airport and the development of fisheries and tourism would require prior investigation which I would be prepared to initiate only when a framework of political and economic cooperation with Argentina has been established. My Advisers are at present considering a proposal from the Falkland Islands Government for a new school hostel in Stanley. At the Government's request I am setting up a study of internal communications covering the Air Service, roads and coastal shipping, to see what the needs in this field are and how they can best be met. I hope it will be completed not later than early next year. I am prepared to set up feasibility studies in other areas recommended in the Shackleton Report when the Falkland Islands Government request them, including sheepskin processing, mutton freezing and local television. I have also offered to provide advice to the Government if and when they enter into negotiations with any commercial enterprises that are prepared to explore those Shackleton recommendations which fall outside the aid programme. The already considerable technical cooperation programme in the Falklands covers several of the Shackleton proposals, including an expanding Grasslands Trials Unit and the provision of fiscal advice, which is an essential preliminary to any social and economic development."...”*³⁹²

June 14th, in Stanley, the annual budget session of the Falklands Legislative Council commences.

*“In reply to questions from Councillors, the Chief Secretary informed them that the Government hoped that the new Stanley airport would be acceptable for operation by LADE aircraft during July, that Camp mail drops would continue to receive very high priority and that it was hoped that all Camp settlements would be equipped with the new radio/telephone sets (AEL) within eight to nine months.”*³⁹³

July 4th, in London, the Foreign Office prepare for negotiations with Argentina, with a paper presented to the Cabinet's Cabinet's Defence and Overseas Policy Committee by Secretary Owen.³⁹⁴

*“... serious and substantive negotiations were necessary to keep the Argentines in play, since the Islands were militarily indefensible except by a major, costly and unacceptable diversion of current resources.”*³⁹⁵

391 *Ibid.* citing *Secretary of State's Meeting on the Falkland Islands June 13, 1977 FCO 76/1616*

392 *The Falkland Islands Times & Falkland islands Monthly Review* June 15, 1977 p.5

393 *The Falkland Islands Times & Falkland islands Monthly Review* July 18, 1977 p.2

394 The minutes of this meeting remain embargoed (2020).

395 Quoted by Baroness Young in *HL Deb 25 January 1983 vol.438 cc136-247*

The OD Committee conclude that the Foreign Office should ‘play for time’ during the next round of negotiations with Argentina, and not offer concessions.

*“The Committee decided that the aim should be to keep the negotiations going... Broadly speaking it was the Government’s strategy to retain sovereignty as long as possible, if necessary making concessions in respect of the dependencies and the maritime resources in the area, while recognising that ultimately only some form of leaseback arrangement was likely to satisfy Argentina...”*³⁹⁶

*“The British objective, yet again, was to play for time.”*³⁹⁷

*“A proposal to offer ‘concessions over maritime resources’ was put to the cabinet’s Defence and Oversea policy Committee in July 1977. The Department of Energy was vehemently against this; a briefing note for Tony Benn noted that separating the continental shelf from the Islands could set a dangerous precedent for British claims in other areas... David Owen’s DOP paper argued that if concessions on maritime resources were not enough, Britain should consider offering full leaseback of the Islands themselves.”*³⁹⁸

July 13th, in Rome, Italy, delegations from Argentina and the UK meet for three days of talks.

*“On the day that the talks commenced, questions by Members of Parliament were put to Mr Ted Rowlands in the House of Commons. In replying, Mr Rowlands gave assurance that the British Government would, once again, make clear to the Argentines its commitment to the principle of self-determination for Islanders and that HMG would inform Islanders about its actions and approach to the talks. Once again questions were asked about the possible extension to the permanent airport and the Minister of State said that he was a keen supporter of the Falkland Islanders’ welfare but an extension would be a multi-million £ project and HMG feared that if the runway was extended and it turned out to be a white elephant it would be a considerable burden to the Islanders.”*³⁹⁹

*“A change of location did not alter proceedings... minimal progress was being made. Allara repeated that the principle of self-determination was ‘absolutely inapplicable’ to the Falkland Islands archipelago, and that the restitution of Argentine sovereignty took priority over the economic dimension. ... The British team were unimpressed. Cortazzi ... (re-emphasised) that no British government could conform to proposals which were being forced on the Islanders.”*⁴⁰⁰

*“... the British put forward the ‘mixed approach’ in general terms (i.e. separating the Islands from their maritime zones and from the Dependencies), but did not make a specific offer to cede the sovereignty of the maritime zones. ... The ‘mixed approach’ concept bemused the Argentine delegation, which continued to demand sovereignty over the whole area,...”*⁴⁰¹

July 14th, in Britain, *The Daily Mail* newspaper complains that talks are taking place “behind Islanders’ backs.”

*“The (Falkland Islands) Committee’s relationship with the Foreign Office was contradictory ... antagonism derived from the campaign’s propaganda, which centred on the accusation that the Foreign Office was secretly trying to persuade ministers to ‘sell out’ the Falklands – a charge FCO officials resented.”*⁴⁰²

396 *Ibid*

397 Donaghy 2014

398 Livingstone 2018

399 *The Falkland Islands Times & Falkland islands Monthly Review* July 18, 1977 p.1

400 Donaghy 2014

401 Livingstone 2018

402 *Ibid*. Bill Hunter-Christie, the Falkland Islands Company Secretary, was a particular cause for concern. An informal Foreign Office rule required that no official should meet him unaccompanied.

The British Labour Party's National Executive Council publish a resolution. ⁴⁰³

"We call on the Government to ensure that under no circumstances will the inhabitants of the Falkland Islands be handed over to any Argentine regime which violates human and civil right."

"... while the labour party's official statements did not persuade ministers to halt talks with Argentina, they did make them more cautious in their approach..." ⁴⁰⁴

July 15th, in Rome, talks end without any progress. A communique is issued.

"In accordance with the announcement made simultaneously by the Argentine and British Governments on 26th April 1977, delegations representing the two Governments met in Rome from 13th-15th July 1977 in order to conduct the first round of negotiations concerning future political relations; including Sovereignty, with regard to the Falkland Islands, South Georgia and the South Sandwich Islands, and Anglo-Argentine economic co-operation with regard to the said territories in particular and the South West Atlantic in general. The two delegations were led respectively by Capt. Gualter Oscar Allara, Under Secretary for Foreign Relations of the Republic of Argentine and by Mr H.A.H. Cortazzi, Deputy Under Secretary of State at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office. In accordance with the terms of reference for negotiations announced in the statement of 26th April 1977 the two sides conducted a full exchange of views in order to agree on the procedure for defining the issues to be covered in their negotiations. The discussions between the two delegations were conducted in a positive spirit. They led to a better awareness of the position of each side as a basis to continue to seek understanding. It was agreed that the negotiations now established should be continued at a further high level meeting to be held at the beginning of November. The venue for this second meeting would be decided upon through the diplomatic channel." ⁴⁰⁵

"We are told that in the talks the British side put forward the idea that the sovereignty of the uninhabited dependencies might be "looked at separately" from the sovereignty of the Falkland Islands themselves. The Argentine reaction to that further signal is not recorded." ⁴⁰⁶

"Argentine proposals to establish 'working groups' were rejected by Cortazzi, who felt the gap was too large to begin discussing compromises. Allara suggested further negotiations in September but Cortazzi, citing party conferences and South Africa, said there would be no ministerial time until November. Allara accepted this and the talks fizzled out." ⁴⁰⁷

In London, Hugh Michael Carless, Head of the Foreign Office's Latin America Department, is appointed *charge d'affairs* at Buenos Aires.

"During July, Hugh Carless assumed the thankless job of chargé d'affaires in Buenos Aires. He spent his first few weeks writing of Argentine dismay at the outcome of Rome. ... Carless was gloomy about the prospects: "I believe that, unless progress on some aspect of sovereignty can be achieved at the next round in November, there is a probability that they will consider whether to switch from a policy of negotiation to a policy of pressure". This was not an isolated report." ⁴⁰⁸

403 *Argentina, Chile, Brazil: A Statement by the NEC of the Labour Party July, 1977*

404 Livingstone 2018

405 Quoted in *The Falkland Islands Times & Falkland Islands Monthly Review* July 18, 1977 p.1

406 Baroness Young in *HL Deb 25 January 1983 vol.438 cc136-247*

407 Donaghy 2014

408 *Ibid.* As Head of the FO Latin America Dept., Carless had been dealing with the Falklands since 1973.

July 18th, in Argentina, President General Videla signs decree 2065 (unpublished) authorising the Navy Command to continue to occupy Morrell Island in Southern Thule.

*“According to Secret Decree 2085, from 18 July 1977, and signed by then head of the military General Junta, Jorge Rafael Videla, the Ministry of Defense through the Navy's Command was authorized to continue and complete the logistic tasks and aspects for the mounting and necessary equipment leading to the effective and peaceful occupation of the island of Thule, part of South Sandwich islands. Through "Operation Sun", Argentina will reaffirm with scientific activities its rights and sovereignty over the South Atlantic islands occupied by the United Kingdom, added the decree. The foreign ministry considered these activities as necessary in support of Argentine foreign policy reaffirming National Sovereignty, underlined the secret decree. The first steps of Operation Sun had started during 1975 and 1976. The decree also provides funds from the 1977 Budget destined to Jurisdiction 47 of the Navy's commander in chief, some 300 million Argentine Pesos and US\$ 100.000.”*⁴⁰⁹

July 27th, in Britain's House of Commons, 140 backbenchers from all parties sign a motion acknowledging the Falkland Islanders' wish to remain British.

*“The fear of a ‘political storm’ was uppermost in ministers' minds throughout the dispute. Every cabinet meeting which discussed the Falklands problem during Callaghan's period of office discussed the possible reaction of parliament.”*⁴¹⁰

July 28th, a meeting is held at the House of Commons, attended by the Falkland Islands Company, the Foreign Office and representatives of Britain's fishing industry.

*“It was sponsored by James Johnson, the Labour M P for Kingston-upon-Hull West (a constituency seriously affected by the decline in the distant-water fishing fleet) and chaired by Bill Hunter Christie. As a result the S.A.F.C.⁴¹¹ was formed composed of representatives from British United Trawlers, Christian Salvesens Ltd., the Confederation of Fried Fish Caterers' Associations, the National Farmers' Union, the National Fish Fryers' Federation, the White Fish Authority, Alginate Industries Ltd. and the F.I.C.”*⁴¹²

In the Falklands, in **August**, an expedition from Cambridge University arrives to collect data on wrecks.⁴¹³

In London a 'Falkland Islands Week' is held; *“... which included the presentation of a petition to 10 Downing Street. National newspapers produced photographs of Sukie Cameron, a daughter of Norman Cameron, modelling a 'Keep the Falkland Islands British' T-shirt.”*⁴¹⁴

*“... there are certain powerful influences whose intentions seem to conflict with opinion in the Islands. As an example, the Argentine government has appointed the second largest public relations company in the world to sway public opinion, principally through the media.”*⁴¹⁵



409 MercoPress August 29, 2019

410 Livingstone 2018

411 South Atlantic Fisheries Committee

412 Ellerby 1990 p.250 citing F.G. Mitchell papers, S.A.F.C. minutes, 28 July 1977. cf. 1980

413 Cambridge Expedition to the Falkland Islands 1977: Report to the National Maritime Museum

414 Ellerby 1990 p.244

415 Falkland Islands Committee – Letter from London August 11, 1977 in The Falkland Islands Times & Falkland Islands Monthly Review August 31, 1977 p.8

August 17th, the UN's Special Committee on Decolonization refers the Falklands issue to the Fourth Committee.

In **September**, in Falklands waters, Argentine Navy ships fire on Russian and Bulgarian fishing vessels.

In Ottawa, Canada, Adrian Monk, representing the Falkland Islands Legislative Council, attends the 23rd Commonwealth Parliamentary Conference.

“We ... wonder why, when the Argentinian claim to our country is discussed in the United Nations and elsewhere, so few Commonwealth countries support our desire to retain our democratic, British way of life. We are continually being pressured to join with that country, whose way of life is alien to us, a country often without even the pretence of a democratic government, a country where human rights are virtually non-existent, a country with different cultures and a different language. ...”

September 23rd, in Britain's *Sunday Times*.

“The Falkland Islands have undoubtedly suffered from the amalgamation of the Commonwealth Office with the Foreign Office; passing under the control of the Latin American department whose main care is to foster easy relations with those States, not to defend a handful of people's rights to self determination.”

September 25th, in Britain, the *Observer* newspaper, asks whether the Foreign Office are intent upon “giving away” the archipelago.

In the South Atlantic, Argentina's navy ‘arrest’ Russian and Bulgarian fishing vessels operating within Falklands waters.

October 4th, Britain's Foreign Office prepare for a new round of talks with Argentina, scheduled for November.

*“Rowlands sent Owen a four-page minute outlining the FCO position. It contrasted sharply with the cautious approach adopted at Rome. Leaseback was now being pushed to the front of the agenda; a development which would again illustrate the differing views of Foreign Office diplomats and senior ministers.”*⁴¹⁶

October 24th, the November negotiations are postponed until December.

October 26th, in Buenos Aires, Britain's *charge d'affairs* Hugh Carless is summoned to the Foreign Ministry. He is told that Argentina intends to complete its installation on Southern Thule Island.

*“Unless we are prepared to deploy sufficient power physically to dislodge the Argentines from Southern Thule, we must surely tolerate them as squatters...”*⁴¹⁷

October 28th, in London, Britain's Joint Intelligence Committee reports its concern regarding Argentina's increasingly hostile attitude. In particular, the belligerence of the Argentine Navy which has announced its refusal to fly the Falklands' red ensign while in Port Stanley.

November 10th, at the United Nations building in New York, the Fourth Committee considers the report of the Special Committee on Decolonization. Representatives of Ghana and Zaire assert the self-determination rights of the inhabitants of the Falklands. Argentina claims that three General Assembly resolutions have established that the dispute could only be resolved through negotiations between itself and the UK; taking into account the 'interests' of the inhabitants, but no application of self-determination.

416 Donaghy 2014

417 Carless to Owen October 27, 1977 in FO 7/3375

November 16th, in London, the Secretary of Defence reluctantly accepts the need to retain HMS *Endurance* in the South Atlantic for the foreseeable future.

November 21st, following an intelligence assessment concluding that Argentina may be planning an incident along the lines of the Southern Thule encroachment, British Ministers decide to establish a military presence in the area.

*"We deployed forces in 1977 because we discovered that there were to be major problems in the negotiations. At that time I was an inexperienced Minister and therefore I approached the then Prime Minister, my right hon. Friend the Member for Cardiff, South-East (Mr. Callaghan), ... I put it to my right hon. Friend that the deployment of force could be an over-reaction that would lead to a reaction that would trigger a host of uncontrollable events. ... My right hon. Friend asked me, "Can you guarantee or assure me that there will not be a threatened invasion and that you will be able to keep the talks going?". I replied, "No, Prime Minister, I cannot guarantee that". My right hon. Friend responded by saying "Let me remind you of an old truth: it is better to be safe than sorry"..."*⁴¹⁸

From Stanley, the Legislative Council urge the British Government to implement Shackleton's proposals.

*"We must not be deterred from initiating and developing such ventures as coastal and off-shore fishing and similar activities merely because this would be against the appeasement policy of the British Government towards Argentina."*⁴¹⁹

November 22nd, Britain's Foreign Office decide that Islands' representatives should not be present at talks with Argentina in future

*"The newly elected councils had given no indication that islanders wished to participate at these talks (a similar stance to Rome). Instead it was agreed that Ted Rowlands, popular after his successful February visit, would meet islander representatives in Rio de Janeiro shortly after the New York summit had been concluded."*⁴²⁰

November 24th, frigates HMS *Alacrity* and HMS *Phoebe* are ordered to proceed to the South Atlantic, and stand-off about a thousand miles distant from the Falklands (*Operation Journeyman*).⁴²¹

*"In mid-Atlantic we rendezvoused with "HMS Alacrity", RFAs "Resource" and "Owen" were to join us later,... At that stage the ship's companies were briefed on our mission. We were told that Operation Journeyman had been ordered by the then Prime Minister, James Callaghan, as fifty Argentine 'scientists' had landed on Southern Thule in the South Sandwich Islands, prompting fears of an Argentine invasion of the Falklands. Apparently the Argentines had set up a military base on Thule. ... We were to set up a 50 mile security zone and any ships entering the zone were to be asked to identify themselves and state their intentions..."*⁴²²

November 26th, from Gibraltar, nuclear submarine HMS *Dreadnought*, is ordered to close on the Falklands.

"Commanding officers and aircraft captains are to respond to any aggression with tactful firmness and are to exhibit a determination to meet any escalation, though not to exceed that already carried out by

418 Rowlands in the House of Commons – *HC Deb 03 April 1982 vol 21 cc633-68*.

419 Quoted in Ellerby 1990 p.218 citing *Leg.Co. minutes, 21 Nov. 1977*.

420 Donaghy 2014. Reports in the Falklands journals following his visit, contradict any suggestion that Ted Rowlands was 'popular.'

421 *Operation Journeyman*. James Callaghan only revealed this operation to Parliament in 1982. See below.

422 Chris Cole, Supply Officer aboard HMS *Phoebe* quoted in *Mercopress* August 8, 2012 citing the July 2012 edition of the *South Georgia Newsletter*.

the enemy. All use of force must be governed by the principle of using only the minimum force necessary to achieve the aim." ⁴²³

"The rules were quite explicit... If Argentine ships came within 50 miles of the Falkland Islands and were believed to have displayed hostile intent, the submarine was to open fire." ⁴²⁴

"The run up to the first round of talks with the Argentines, fixed for December 1977 proved as fraught and intense as the earlier contacts. Intelligence emphasized the mercurial role played by Admiral Massera, impatient with the lack of progress in the negotiations and, seemingly, with his fellow Junta members. The incident involving the Admiral Storni in 1976 and the occupation of Southern Thule were attributed to him and the naval 'hawks'. Following detailed discussions within the department and with the Ministry of Defence, Prime Minister Callaghan and Foreign Secretary Owen, all concerned agreed that a task force including a nuclear submarine should support the talks; if they went badly the Argentines would be told of the Force's presence." ⁴²⁵

In the Falkland Islands, Stanley Airport officially opens for operations. ⁴²⁶



"The airport was first used on November 24 1977 ... Bill Luxton tells the story of the airport's first use - "The day before the flight Jim Kerr had heard that the Argentines were planning to officially land at the airport. ...(so) Jim telephoned me later and said the Argentines were planning to make the first landing and asked me, 'How do you feel about pre-empting them?' My response was, 'absolutely'" so we met down near the Hookers Point strip the next morning. We went in and landed there and left the aircraft on the airfield that night. The Argentines were bloody furious; they had wanted a senior Argentine air force officer to open the airport." ⁴²⁷

November 28th, at the UN, the General Assembly defer consideration of the Falkland Islands until 1978.

December 1st, in Britain, the *Financial Times* reports that "major international oil companies" are to carry out seismic exploration for oil in the waters around the archipelago.

A week later than announced, LADE makes its first landing at Stanley Airport.

December 7th, in Britain's House of Commons, the Government is questioned as to why it is prepared to negotiate with a "Fascist-type dictatorship about the future of a democratic British community." ⁴²⁸ Minister of State, Ted Rowlands, responds.

"... we are negotiating because, following my visit to the islands and by agreement with the islands council, it was decided that it was necessary to have negotiations on the economic and sovereignty issues. Otherwise we would let the stalemate of the position of the islands continue, and that would be a much worse prospect for the islanders themselves. ..."

⁴²³ Quoted in *Secret Falklands task force revealed* Ben Fenton in *The Telegraph* June 1, 2005

⁴²⁴ Foreign Secretary David Owen quoted in Donaghy 2014. Following the revelation in 1982 of this task force's deployment there was some controversy over the accuracy of Owen's memory regarding the rules of engagement. See Donaghy 2014, for a full account.

⁴²⁵ Rowlands, Edward (Ted) in *Dictionary of Falklands Biography* Tatham (ed) 2008. Authored by Ted Rowlands. See https://www.falklandsbiographies.org/biographies/rowlands_edward

⁴²⁶ At the last minute, LADE cancelled the first flight citing 'administrative difficulties.'

⁴²⁷ *Penguin News* December 6, 2002

⁴²⁸ Sir Bernard Braine in *HC Deb 07 December 1977 vol.940 cc1359-64*

MP Jeremy Thorpe asks a question.

“Will he confirm that Argentina has not accepted that part of the Hague Convention whereby it agreed to be bound by the decision of the International Court? Does this not shed some light on its lack of competence in international law in laying claim to the sovereignty of the Falkland Islands? May we take it that the question of sovereignty is not a matter that the Minister regards as being for negotiation in his New York meetings later this month?”

Ted Rowlands responds.

*“On the first part of the question, yes, that is the position... Sovereignty has been part and parcel of the terms of reference of the negotiations and will therefore be subject to negotiation in New York. ... They are not just about sovereignty they are about the whole issue of political and economic cooperation between Britain, Argentina and the Falkland Islands. ... Sovereignty issues are also involved. I repeat yet again that we shall not bring any proposals to the House unless they are acceptable to the islanders.”*⁴²⁹

*“The Labour government also accepted the FCO's argument that Britain needed to pursue good relations with Argentina in order to resolve the Falklands dispute – ignoring the party's official policy that the Islanders should not be handed over to a regime that abused human rights.”*⁴³⁰

December 8th, the London Falkland Islands Office organises a ceremony at the Cenotaph to commemorate Falkland Islands Battle Day 1914.⁴³¹

December 12th, reported in *The New York Times* -

*“Britain begins high level negotiations in New York tomorrow that may well lead to a change in the status of the Falkland Islands, one of the 15 remaining colonial fragments, of the British Empire. ... But Argentina has claimed the Falklands, on and off, since 1828 (sic). Now the British have finally agreed to discuss with the Argentines, at the ministerial level, the questions of sovereignty and economic development. ... But the issues to be discussed are as tangled and as hotly argued as the ones in a nuclear weapons negotiation. ... The Falkland islanders know perfectly well that they could not survive as an independent state, especially with a hostile Argentina close by. What they want, as they regularly make clear in petitions to Parliament signed by almost every one of them, is to remain a colony, no matter how anachronistic that seems to outsiders. British governments used to pledge that they would never yield sovereignty against the wishes of the islanders, and that no pressure would be put on the islanders to change their views. But the islanders, who will not be present at the meeting in New York, are already under pressure. ... Only the stable political situation that the British Government can insure, say the islanders' supporters, will attract the foreign investment needed to exploit the economic opportunities. The Government, on the other hand, apparently believes that the best hope lies in a wide-ranging agreement between Britain and Argentina for joint economic development and gradual political transition. So when Ted Rowlands, Minister of State in the Foreign Office, sits down opposite Capt. Oscar Allara, the Argentine deputy Foreign Minister, for three days of negotiations, the questions of sovereignty and development will be intertwined. The British want economic cooperation first, with political change coming later, while the Argentines put things in the reverse order.”*⁴³²

429 *HC Deb 07 December 1977 vol.940 cc1359-64*

430 Livingstone 2018 p. 153

431 Now an annual event

432 *British, Argentines Hold Falkland Talks in The New York Times* December 13, 1977.

December 13th, in New York, two days of talks between Britain and Argentina commence.

*“Gaulter Allara opened proceedings by venting frustration over the lack of progress on sovereignty. ... Rowlands assured the captain that his government had no desire to conduct Byzantine (never ending) talks, pointing out that it had ‘crossed the Rubicon’ in February by taking the decision to discuss sovereignty. The Argentine premise, Rowlands argued, was that the negotiations were simply related to how and when Britain would transfer sovereignty. But the British government’s concern was with how a compromise could be reached.... If the issue was the principle of sovereignty there could be scope for discussion. But if Argentina wished to ‘transform the islanders, exercise all the actual attributes of sovereignty over them’, then there would be considerable difficulty.”*⁴³³

The Argentine delegation propose an 8-year joint administration before a recognition of total Argentine sovereignty by Britain. Rowlands rejects this; instead offering a ‘mixed approach’ - involving economic cooperation and the possibility of cessions from amongst the Dependencies. Allara rejects these proposals. The Argentines are not informed about the squadron lying off the Falkland Islands.

*“... there seems to be a difference of view between the then Prime Minister and the then Foreign Secretary about the events in 1977. The right hon. Member for Cardiff, South-East (Callaghan) said that this (task) force in 1977 became known and that a diplomatic solution followed, whereas the right hon. Member for Plymouth, Devonport (Dr. Owen) said yesterday on the radio that it was done in total secrecy but he added that it gave him confidence in his negotiations, whatever that might mean.”*⁴³⁴

*“66. Cabinet Committee papers show clearly that it was agreed that the force should remain covert. We have found no evidence that the Argentine Government ever came to know of its existence.”*⁴³⁵

*“Once the talks had started, the Argentines were allowed to learn of the existence of the naval force and soon afterwards the 50 Argentines on South Thule left and the status quo was restored.”*⁴³⁶

*“The Argentine government was privately warned by the UK that a nuclear submarine was in the area, but other countries were said to be unaware.”*⁴³⁷

December 14th, a final statement emerges from the negotiation.

*“The two sides recognized that there was a wide range of issues involved which would require detailed study. They accordingly agreed to establish at official level two parallel working groups on political relations, including sovereignty, and on economic co-operation, to pursue these studies in depth and to report back to the heads of delegations. ... A further round of negotiations will be held ... ”*⁴³⁸

“The broad Falkland Islands ‘lobby’ had both parliamentary leverage and informal social access to influence policy makers. It was strong enough to make ministers and officials extremely cautious in negotiations with Argentina and helped to ensure that no agreement on sovereignty was ever reached. Although the cabinet had

433 Donaghy 2014. Also *Minutes of Anglo-Argentine Talks, December 13-15, 1977* in FO 7/3394

434 Defence Secretary John Nott in the House of Commons debate of April 3, 1982

435 *Falkland Islands Review Report of a Committee of Privy Counsellors Chairman: The Rt Hon the Lord Franks, OM, GCMG, KCB, CBE Presented to Parliament by the Prime Minister by Command of Her Majesty January 1983*. A copy of what is now commonly referred to as the Franks Report can be found here – <https://falklandstimeline.files.wordpress.com/2020/02/franks-report.pdf>

436 Fenton in *The Telegraph* June 1, 2005 *op.cit.* Unsupported by the evidence. See February, 1978

437 *Secret Falklands fleet revealed* BBC News June 1, 2005. Unsupported by the evidence.

438 *UN Doc A3323/Rev.1 vol.4*

agreed in principle to explore leaseback, it was never formally proposed to Argentina during Labour's period of office." ⁴³⁹

"At the New York talks in December Rowlands tabled a paper expressing HMG's willingness to discuss fresh sovereignty arrangements in favour of Argentina in relation to the dependencies, and to explore cooperation to develop the continental shelf resources. However, the paper asserted that it was essential that sovereign rights in respect of the Falkland Islands should continue to rest with Britain, and that the present system of administration and government of the Islands should be maintained. Rowlands did not include in the discussions the other possible arrangement - leaseback - having been convinced that such a proposal would have been totally unacceptable to the Islanders. Fortunately, there was sufficient interest within the Argentine delegation in the novel proposals on sovereignty to agree a communiqué setting up two working parties - economic cooperation and political development." ⁴⁴⁰

December 16th, in Britain's House of Commons, a debate is held on Lord Shackleton's report. MP Hugh Fraser raises the Falklands negotiations.

"Today, we have had an announcement in The Times of what has happened in the joint talks. It seems that the British and the Argentine Governments have agreed to form two joint working parties on the issues of sovereignty and economic development. I do not want to go into the issue of sovereignty, but I do not see how we can have an effective working party on a matter which should be a subject for a judicial decision. A working party seems to be a bit of a nonsense. The subject of that working party, I would have thought, should be one for The Hague court. With regard to the second working party, I would have thought that there was grave danger of burying the Shackleton Report before it is implemented. Lord Shackleton spent four months finding out what the developments were. I suggest that a further working party on economic development would only support what Lord Shackleton, recalling the 20 earlier reports, said in his report. When asked to define the Falkland Islands, he said: The Falkland Islands is a piece of land entirely surrounded by advice". There is far too much of that already." ⁴⁴¹

Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Overseas Aid, John Tomlinson, makes a statement.

"British aid is not imposed on the Falkland Islands but is provided at the request of, and after discussion with, the Falkland Islands Government – we have to consider the amount of aid which the Falkland Islands can absorb without putting strains on its economy. The islands have hitherto been self-supporting, in the sense that the United Kingdom has not provided them with financial means to balance the budget." ⁴⁴²

December 18th, in Rio de Janeiro, Edward Rowlands meets with the Governor and Falkland Island Councillors. To update them on the progress of negotiations.

"Rowlands remained in New York anxiously awaiting news of the Junta's reaction to this communiqué and only when it was favourable did he leave to brief the Islanders' deputation in Río. They accepted his exploring these proposals further." ⁴⁴³

439 Livingstone 2018

440 Rowlands, Edward (Ted) in Tatham (ed) 2008. Authored by Ted Rowlands. Link above.

441 HC Deb 16 December 1977 vol.941 cc1226-36

442 Ibid

443 Rowlands, Edward (Ted) in Tatham (ed) 2008. Written by Rowlands. Link above

December 20th, in the South Atlantic, the Royal Navy squadron receives instructions to quietly retire. ⁴⁴⁴

“66. ... In the event the negotiations went reasonably well. The Argentine threat receded, and it was agreed after the talks that the naval force could be withdrawn.” ⁴⁴⁵

“According to the report, Ministers accepted that, such a force would not be able to deal with a determined Argentine attack”...” ⁴⁴⁶

“No evidence has emerged that Argentina was made aware of the British defence plans... Owen, a close friend of Callaghan has always maintained that Operation Journeyman remained covert.” ⁴⁴⁷

“The more I consider the 1977 deployment, the more I realise what an irresponsible and useless act it was.” ⁴⁴⁸



Researcher's Comment: Following Argentina's invasion in April, 1982, the deployment of 1977 became public knowledge. Used to gain political capital during the 1982 conflict by the Labour Party criticising Thatcher's response to the threat of war. However, in the debate of January, 1983, following the publication of the Franks Report, ex-PM Callaghan declined to answer clearly whether or not the 1977 deployment had been made known to Argentine negotiators. Callaghan had also declined to give evidence on the subject to the Franks Committee, which was forced to conclude that there was no evidence that the information had been supplied to Argentina. Despite being pressed on the inconsistencies in Labour's 1982 claims, Callaghan remained evasive on the issue before refusing to answer any and all questions on the subject

December 24th, press reports speculate that the Foreign Office is intent on pressuring the Falkland Islanders into accepting a reduction in the level of sovereignty over the archipelago. ⁴⁴⁹

⁴⁴⁴ Owen to Callaghan, January 6, 1978 in PREM 16/1504.

⁴⁴⁵ Falkland Islands Review Report of a Committee of Privy Counsellors Chairman: The Rt Hon the Lord Franks, OM, GCMG, KCB, CBE Presented to Parliament by the Prime Minister by Command of Her Majesty January 1983. Now commonly referred to as the Franks Report. Link above.

⁴⁴⁶ Baroness Young during the debate on the Franks Report – HL Deb 25 January 1983 vol.438 cc136-247

⁴⁴⁷ Donaghy 2014

⁴⁴⁸ John Nott quoted in Donaghy 2014 p.17

⁴⁴⁹ Mentioned in a House of Lords debate on January 25, 1978 (vol.388 col.339)

1978 – January 7th, in Antarctica, at Argentina’s *Esperanza* base, a child – Emilio Palma – is born. ⁴⁵⁰

“2. No acts or activities taking place while the present Treaty is in force shall constitute a basis for asserting, supporting or denying a claim to territorial sovereignty in Antarctica or create any rights of sovereignty in Antarctica. No new claim, or enlargement of an existing claim, to territorial sovereignty in Antarctica shall be asserted while the present Treaty is in force.” ⁴⁵¹

“In the case of the "Antarctic question", it should be taken into account that, if traditionally this was an area where the Armed Forces perceived they had a "special responsibility", this feeling increased considerably in the reference period. It could be affirmed that Argentina followed a "double standard" policy in relation to Antarctica, that is, continuity in participation within the Antarctic System but, at the same time, a high "consumption" of the image of sovereignty at the internal level. The latter can be found in a "multiplicity of measures and actions tending to affirm Argentine rights in the claimed Antarctic sector. Among them stands out, without a doubt, the implementation, at the beginning of 1978, of a "population policy" through the settlement of families at the Esperanza Base, marriages and the first births were registered, inaugurating, in May of the same year, the First Antarctic School for its inhabitants.” ⁴⁵²

“As well as claiming the Beagle Channel islands, the Argentine junta sought to strengthen Argentina's claim to a segment of Antarctica by arranging for the wives of several military officers to give birth to their babies in the maternity facilities at the Argentine army Antarctic base "Esperanza". In the course of this exercise in what may be called a "claim by parturition", eight babies were born between 1978 and 1983.” ⁴⁵³

Researcher's Comment: Presumably for internal consumption within Argentina as, under the Treaty, births hold no significance and would not be recognised by any other signatory.

January 9th, Argentina presses for talks earlier than planned. Foreign Secretary Owen accepts the proposal.

January 25th, in a letter to Chile, Argentina formally rejects the decision of the arbitral Court regarding its dispute over the Beagle Channel (PNL) Islands. Argentina, however, fails to inform the arbitration panel or the Hague judges of its decision.

“... the Government of the Argentine Republic, after carefully studying the arbitral Award by Her Britannic Majesty on the Beagle Channel dispute, has decided to declare the Arbitrator's decision irrevocably null and void under international law.” ⁴⁵⁴

“... they would consider the violation of a treaty no greater offence than a lie told by schoolboy. With the Bey of Tripoli or the Emperor of Morocco we might for a time maintain unviolated the provisions of a Treaty but with these people if a temporary advantage could be gained they would violate a treaty on the day of its ratification.” ⁴⁵⁵

450 Not the first person born in Antarctica however. An Australian, James Robinson, was born to the wife of a sealing captain on March 11, 1859. The first British birth certificate for Antarctica was issued to Solveig Jacobsen born October 8, 1913. It seems unlikely that getting born somewhere, gives sovereignty rights to the country of the child's mother.

451 Antarctic Treaty 1959 Article.4

452 *Cambios y continuidades en la política antártica argentina, 1959-1983* Miryam Colacrai de Trevisan 1997

453 Pascoe 2022 vol.3 p.617

454 *Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Argentine Republic to the Ambassador of Chile in Argentina January 25, 1978*

455 *US charge d'affaires to Buenos Aires, Francis Baylies, speaking of the possibility of a treaty between the USA and the Argentina Confederation in July, 1832. Quoted in Las Islas Malvinas R. R. Caillet-Bois 1982 (6th ed.) p.252*

*"The strategic importance of the Falkland Islands is recognised in a recent issue of the U.S. Military magazine "Parameters". A lengthy article on the dispute between Chile and Argentina over the Beagle Channel,... states that "if Argentina loses her dispute with Chile, her interests in the Falkland Islands will also be jeopardized".*⁴⁵⁶

*"... Argentina, having accepted the jurisdiction of an international court of arbitration on the Beagle Channel dispute with Chile, then refused to accept its results. It is difficult to believe in Argentina's good faith with that very recent example in mind. ... it would be hard to have confidence that Argentina would respect a judgement that it did not like."*⁴⁵⁷

In the UK, reviewing the situation following Argentina's Beagle Channel decision, Britain's Foreign Office conclude that Argentina's failure in its dispute with Chile has increased pressure on the junta to gain some success elsewhere. The Falkland Islands are mentioned.

*"This dispute, in fact, impacted upon the Anglo-Argentine exchanges in Lima when, surprisingly, the Argentines insisted that the Islands did not generate a continental shelf, a factor in the Beagle Channel issue."*⁴⁵⁸

On the same day in Britain's House of Lords, Lord Mottistone refers to rumours and asks about the "present position regarding the Falkland Islands."

*"Lord Goronwy-Roberts: My Lords, the position is clear. With the agreement of the Falkland Islands Council, we are conducting negotiations with Argentina covering political relations, including sovereignty and economic co-operation. As the terms of reference state, a major objective of the negotiations is to achieve a stable, prosperous and politically durable future for the Falkland Islands. The Islanders are being fully informed and consulted as the negotiations proceed. ... My Lords, I can assure the noble Lord and the House that those rumours were groundless. I hasten to repeat once more the categorical assurance given by my right honourable friend in the other place, and by myself in this House. The Government have given full assurances to the Islanders that no proposals affecting the future status of the Falkland Islands will be brought before Parliament unless they are acceptable to the Islanders themselves. ... these discussions (with Argentina) are mainly, in our view, aimed at ensuring the right sort of climate and opportunity for such developments not just in the Falkland Islands but in the South-West Atlantic generally. We feel that we, Argentina and the Falklands could very profitably engage in consortial action to develop the undoubted riches of this area with benefit to all three peoples."*⁴⁵⁹

Lord Hailsham adds; "... is it not a fact that these Islands of English-speaking people in or near the South American continent are not simply relics of colonialism, but small peoples whose rights and culture and right to self-determination should be accepted, irrespective of the character of the regimes to which they are neighbours? Will Her Majesty's Government - am sure they will - constantly bear in mind that British people all over the world are not for sale?"

456 *Falkland Islands Newsletter* November, 1978. See - https://www.fiassociation.com/shopimages/pdfs/NL_Archive/FIA_NL_05.pdf

457 Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher speaking to the House of Commons *HC Deb 29 April 1982 vol.22 cc980-1059*

458 Rowlands, *Edward (Ted)* in Tatham (ed) 2008. Link above

459 See - <https://hansard.parliament.uk/Lords/1978-01-25/debates/f7dfc9fc-1332-4a4a-9f12-4163eb649e42/TheFalklandIslands>

February 6th, in London, David Owen writes to the Prime Minister to explain the difficulties the Foreign Office has experienced maintaining a rational approach to talks with Argentina; in the face of the attitudes of both Parliament and the British Press.⁴⁶⁰

February 15th, in Lima, Peru, Anglo-Argentine talks on economic cooperation resume. Argentina's head of delegation is Medina Muñoz, while for Britain, the delegation is led by George Hall of the FCO's Americas Desk.

*“No sooner had the British delegation taken their seats than a further complication arose. The head of the Malvinas department was attempting to separate the question of the continental shelf from the negotiations; a stance which would jeopardise any hope of reaching an agreement on economic or scientific cooperation.”*⁴⁶¹

Despite the 1958 Geneva Conventions, Argentina refuses to acknowledge that the Falklands have any continental shelf rights.⁴⁶²

*“Islands generate their own territorial sea and continental shelf. Furthermore, the principle that islands should be treated as any other land territory for the purpose of delimiting the territorial sea, contiguous zone and continental shelf was expressly recognised in Article 10(1) of the 1958 Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, and Article 1 of the 1958 Convention on the Continental Shelf. In so far as the continental shelf is concerned, the Convention on the Continental Shelf 1958, at Article 1(b) provided that the term 'continental shelf' is used as referring inter alia 'to the seabed and subsoil of similar submarine areas adjacent to the coasts of islands'. Any insular formation, which is above water at high tide, therefore possesses a territorial sea and a continental shelf.”*⁴⁶³

*“Britain... could claim that, as the sole UN-recognised administering power of the South Atlantic Islands, it had a legitimate title to the rights prescribed by the conventions. Moreover, in its Article 6 the convention outlined the process whereby a continental shelf adjacent to two or more states could be divided between them and provided that, in the absence of an agreement, the boundary would be the median. This last proviso suggested that the convention applied even to those states, like Argentina, which had refrained from signing it.”*⁴⁶⁴

*“Argentina's new stance was linked to its quarrel over the Beagle Channel. If Britain were to cede sovereignty over the continental shelf, the Argentine position in the dispute with Chile would be strengthened.”*⁴⁶⁵

In the South Atlantic, Argentina's military base on Southern Thule is sighted by the crew of Antarctic survey ship RRS *Bransfield*. This information is quickly relayed to London where Foreign Secretary David Owen, fearing a back-lash once the occupation becomes public knowledge, warns the British Embassy in Buenos Aires.

*“... the crew might talk about this on their arrival in Port Stanley on February 20th.”*⁴⁶⁶

“Ministers were informed and it set in train a series of urgent messages between London and negotiators in Lima highlighting a possible plan to legitimise the base as a joint scientific station before it came to light. Officials warned the Argentines of the "danger of a leak" and urged them to agree quickly. ... In the event of a

460 Owen to Callaghan February 6, 1978 PREM/ 16/1504

461 Donaghy 2014

462 Including the *Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone* and the *Convention on the Continental Shelf*. cf. April & June 1958

463 *Islands* Andrew J. Jacovides in *Peaceful Order in the World's Oceans: Essays in Honor of Satya N. Nandan* Michael Lodge & Myron Nordquist (eds) 2014

464 González 2014 p.109

465 Donaghy 2014

466 Owen quoted in *Royal Prayer: A Surprising History* David Baldwin 2009 p.25. cf. September & December, 1976

leak ... the British Government would need to make it clear publicly that they had protested to Argentina about a violation of British sovereignty. It would be a complicating factor in our negotiations.”⁴⁶⁷

February 17th, in Lima, the talks finish abruptly with no joint communique issued. Britain’s delegation reports back to London; “Medina Muñoz made it absolutely clear that they saw these negotiations as a long process which should not be hurried...”⁴⁶⁸

“Previous negotiations on the colony’s future broke down earlier in the year, when the Argentine delegation walked out of a meeting in Lima, Peru.”⁴⁶⁹

March 23rd, in London, Minister Ted Rowlands raises the issue of continental shelf rights in the Commons; “As a consequence of its sovereignty over the Falkland Islands, the United Kingdom enjoys sovereign rights over the continental shelf...”⁴⁷⁰

April 7th, during further talks, Argentina once again refuses to accept that the Falkland Islands have their own continental shelf.⁴⁷¹

May 7th, in the UK, news of the Argentine base on Southern Thule appears in newspapers.

May 10th, in Britain’s House of Lords, Lord Carrington⁴⁷² asks whether the newspaper reports are true regarding an Argentine presence in Southern Thule. Lord Goronwy-Roberts responds for the Government.

“... it would be incorrect to assume that these activities were in any way concealed from public knowledge. I understand that they were reported at the time in the news media; that is, towards the end of 1976. It is a fact that we are pursuing negotiations across the board on all outstanding issues, including the general issue of the future of that part of the world, with the Argentinians. Indeed, we expect that the two working groups on political and economic matters will reconvene this summer, followed by a ministerial meeting. It is in that context that an incident or a situation like this – which, again, I agree is a serious matter and should not be allowed to prejudice the success of the larger negotiations – will be viewed...”

The Argentinians established a research station on Thule Island some time in 1976. We protested, and in that way protected our legal claim to sovereignty. We understood that the residence, if I may call it that, was to be temporary; and it is a fact that, because of climatic conditions, seasonal adversity, it is practically impossible to be there all the year round. In that sense, it is a non-continuous residence.

*However, it is important, in the context of the larger negotiation now proceeding, in which we are seeking general accord and general co-operation for the development of the South-West Atlantic area, to the mutual benefit of all three countries – the United Kingdom, the Falkland Islands and Argentina – that incidents or situations like this, whether temporary or not, should not be allowed to grow out of proportion and imperil those larger and vital negotiations.”*⁴⁷³

Researcher's Comment: It cannot be denied that the Government lied to the House of Lords. A lie effectively told, via Parliament, to the nation; and in full knowledge that the 1976 occupation by Argentine forces had been

467 *The Telegraph* December 29th, 2008

468 FO 7/3528

469 *Falkland Islands Newsletter* November, 1978

470 Quoted in the *Falkland Islands Newsletter* November 1978. If anything, Argentina’s raising of a question regarding the continental shelf appears to have reminded the UK that it had rights. A shot in the foot by Argentina?

471 Livingstone 2018 citing *Owen to Callaghan April 7, 1978 PREM 16/1504*. cf. April, 1958

472 Peter Carington (one ‘r’), 6th Baron Carrington (two ‘r’s’).

473 *HL Deb 10 May 1978 vol.391 cc976-81*. My emphasis.

kept a secret. From the Press and from the people. To suggest that Argentine troops were not on-station in Southern Thule all year round was yet another lie.

In Buenos Aires, on the same day, the Argentine Government issue a statement affirming their sovereignty claim to Southern Thule and the South Sandwich Islands; rejecting Britain's protest of January, 1977.

May 13th, in Berkeley Sound, a Polish fishery vessel, *Zulawy*, is harassed by an Argentine aircraft.

*"We have formally protested to the Argentine Government about this violation of Falkland Islands airspace and left them in no doubt of our concern about unauthorised overflights of any kind and the need to avoid their repetition."*⁴⁷⁴

On the same day, fishing some 63 miles from the archipelago, a Polish trawler, *Otol*, is stopped and boarded by marines from an Argentine destroyer. *Otol's* Captain is told that he is fishing in Argentine waters and ordered to leave the area.⁴⁷⁵

*"... may I ask the noble Lord whether Her Majesty's Government would not agree that the Argentinians' somewhat petulant belligerence, their recent boarding of a trawler under the threat of traversing guns, their buzzing of a trawler in Berkeley Sound, their continued occupation of Southern Thule... together indicate Argentinian frustration at Her Majesty's Government's most praiseworthy resolution and diplomatic determination over the question of the sovereign integrity of British possessions in the South-West Atlantic?"*⁴⁷⁶

May 16th, in London, Minister Rowlands speaks to the House of Commons with regard to Southern Thule.

*"The Argentines carried out scientific work on Southern Thule in the 1954 and 1956 Antarctic seasons and established their present scientific station in late 1976. There have been no other cases of unauthorised foreign activity in the Falkland Islands, South Georgia or the South Sandwich Islands. Argentine Service personnel provide logistic support for Argentina's Antarctic scientific activities. We have remained in communication with the Governor throughout, and he has reported that the Islands councillors know of and fully support our actions to protect British sovereignty."*⁴⁷⁷

May 24th, Ted Rowlands further informs Parliament that the Argentines have not left the Southern Thule base, and that a further protest has been sent to the Argentine Government.

In the Falklands, a second weekly flight between Stanley Airport and Comodoro Rivadavia commences.⁴⁷⁸

June 10th, in Buenos Aires, President Vidella reaffirms his country's claim to the Falklands on the *Día de la Afirmación de los Derechos Argentinos sobre las Malvinas, islas y sector antártico*.⁴⁷⁹ Admiral Massera, is more aggressive.

*"The Malvinas are an open wound in the dignity of the Republic, and we Argentines are disposed to correct what negligence, cultural submission and a mistaken concept of international good manners have kept segregated from the metaphysical map of the Fatherland. The Malvinas are not a fragment of soil. The Malvinas are a fragment of our soul and we must go forth to find them because sovereignty, like dignity, is not negotiable."*⁴⁸⁰

474 Mr. Luard MP in *HC Deb 19 June 1978 vol.952 cc79-80W*

475 *Falkland Islands Newsletter* June 18, 1978

476 Lord Morris *HL Deb 13 June 1978 vol.393 cc175-80*. Lord Goronwy-Roberts's muted response referred to "current negotiations."

477 *HC Deb 16 May 1978 vol.950 cc160-1W*

478 *MercoPress* November 29, 2019

479 See November, 1972

480 Quoted in Pascoe 2022 vol.3 p.606

“... on Malvinas Day, which they celebrated recently, President Videla referred to the successful outcome, as he hoped, of current negotiations;... This gives hope that the current negotiations based on the two working groups, political and economic, may possibly bear fruit.”⁴⁸¹

June 15th, in London, during a Commons debate regarding fishing, it is asserted that the British fishing fleet is failing to tap into the resources around the Falkland Islands. Patrick Wall MP, claims that; “... the Foreign Office is discouraging British fishing in the area because it might annoy Argentina.”⁴⁸²

“... a junior Minister stated in April; "All the evidence is that this area is unlikely to provide the domestic British industry with viable fishing opportunities." She did not say what was the evidence she had in mind.”⁴⁸³

“West German trawlers are now fishing the waters around the Falkland Islands under Argentine colours. Reports from the Islands confirm that the fishing grounds are densely stocked and according to one German skipper, processed hake are selling Europe for £1,000 per ton. The German vessel could process 20 tons a day, he said. Under an agreement with Argentina, the West Germans are fishing waters in the 'Argentine Sea' for the export trade⁴, but the fish must be registered as exports from Argentina, where the ships are registered.”⁴⁸⁴

June 16th, Britain declines to issue a licence for the purchase of a Falklands farm – Douglas Station – by Argentine businessman Hector Francisco Capozzolo.⁴⁸⁵

“Undaunted, (Harland) Greenshields has tried to talk the council into purchasing his 135,000 acre 500,000 dollar farm if they will not allow him to sell it. A recent article by Michael Frenchman in the Times of London (written before Capozzolo's application for a licence had been turned down) said: "Undoubtedly pressure will be exerted by the Argentine government in their talks with Britain to get the sale accepted. Captain Walter Allare, under-secretary for foreign affairs, said that future business between Britain and Argentina depended to a large extent on a satisfactory outcome."... ”⁴⁸⁶

June 19th, in Britain's House of Commons, Mr. Evan Luard MP, states that British officials in Argentina have been given fresh instructions to “reaffirm our sovereignty” over the Falklands archipelago. This following the 'buzzing' of trawlers by Argentine aircraft near the Islands.⁴⁸⁷

June 22nd, in the House of Lords, Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, Lord Goronwy-Roberts, speaks regarding the measures proposed in Shackleton's report.

“... we have made further progress. We are financing the construction of an all-weather road from Darwin to Stanley and of a new school hostel in Stanley. We are also ... carrying forward our urgent discussions with the Falkland Island Government on expanding the internal air service...”

June 25th, in Argentina, after the host nation wins the FIFA World Cup, Admiral Massera suggests that *Plan Goa* should be authorised.⁴⁸⁸

481 Lord Goronwy-Roberts *HL Deb 13 June 1978 vol.393 cc175-80*

482 *HC Deb 15 June 1978 vol.951 col.1231 in Hansard*

483 *Falkland Islands – Why do the British want to quit?* Penelope Tremaine in *The Falkland Islands Times* May 1978 p.3

484 *Falkland Islands Newsletter* November 1978 p.1

485 Harland Greenshields had spent eight years attempting to sell his farm, but as every offer he received involved Argentina he was rebuffed by the Foreign Office. The farm was eventually sold in early 1982. Capozzola has been implicated in a 1977 attempt to purchase the Falkland Islands Company.

486 *The Falkland Islands Times* August 24, 1978 p.1

487 *Falkland Islands Newsletter* November 1978 p.1

488 Hastings & Jenkins 1997 p.39. See March, 1976 above.

In **July**, from Argentina, Constantino Davidoff, a Buenos Aires scrap metal merchant, contacts *Christian Salvesen* seeking a contract to remove the old equipment and scrap metal from the whaling stations at Leith, Stromness and Husvik on South Georgia. Gerald Elliot, managing director of *Christian Salvesen*, seeks advice from the Foreign and Commonwealth Office in London, who refer the question to Governor Parker in the Falkland Islands. Parker advises against. ⁴⁸⁹

“When approached by Salvesens in 1978, the British Foreign Office were not happy about allowing an Argentine citizen to do the salvage work – but did not raise any serious objections, ...” ⁴⁹⁰

July 5th, in the House of Commons, Ted Rowlands again addresses the situation in Southern Thule.

“We are not dealing with an illegal occupation of the Falkland Islands themselves. ... Nor are we dealing at this time with a military occupation. It is important to say that. Although the Argentines use service personnel for logistic support in their Antarctic work, their activities on Thule are purely scientific. I do not think that anybody has challenged that assumption. ... We object to the fact that they are being carried out on British territory without our permission. That is the bone of contention ... What the Argentines are doing there does indeed constitute a violation of our sovereignty, and, as hon. Members are already aware, we have firmly protested to them about this. Our sovereignty position has thus been protected fully and explicitly...”

“When we learnt of it, we pursued the matter immediately. We are going back 18 months, but at that time we had reason to believe that the dispute would be resolved speedily and satisfactorily. I had a difficult decision to make on how to handle the issue. I thought that it would be wrong for us to have a slanging match with the Argentine Government...” ⁴⁹¹

Argentina’s Admiral Massera visits London, holding meetings with the First Sea Lord, Sir Terence Lewin and senior officials at the Department of Trade and the Foreign Office. The Foreign Secretary, however, declines. ⁴⁹²

“It is extraordinary that the commander of the Argentine navy met the commander of the British navy four years before the Falklands war, yet all official files relating to the visit have been destroyed.” ⁴⁹³

July 31st, in the House of Commons the Minister of Overseas Development is asked what further plans there are for the economic development of the Falkland islands and whether these include an extension to the runway so that it can take international aircraft.

“We are providing funds for the reorganisation and re-equipment of the public works department, which is to begin construction of a road across East Falkland in September. A new school hostel is to be built shortly in Stanley. We propose to increase support of the grasslands trial unit and the possibilities of salmon ranching and inshore fishing are now being examined. A newly appointed development officer will take up his post in the autumn. There are no plans for extending the runway.” ⁴⁹⁴

August 4th, in Rugby, England, a 1933 £1 Falklands centenary stamp sells for £875 at a philatelic auction. ⁴⁹⁵

489 Freedman 2005 vol.1 p.146. Further negotiations resulted in a contract signed in September, 1979.

490 Pascoe 2022 vol.3 p.616

491 *HC Deb 05 July 1978 vol.953 cc620-30*

492 Owen was criticised for this decision by those vested interests that wished to sell arms to Argentina. No records survive, but Owen would later describe Massera as a “*little shit*”. See Livingstone 2018.

493 Livingstone 2018

494 *Hansard Written Answers (Commons) July 31, 1978 col.3w*

495 *Birmingham Evening Mail* August 4, 1978. See 1933

August 24th, in London, Owen suggests that talks recommence towards the end of September.

*“The Argentines are known to have been putting their case within the United Nations and wrote a letter in August to Dr. Kurt Waldheim, General Secretary of the UN, stating that Britain's intention to extend her territorial limits around the Falkland Islands was prejudicial to any negotiation.”*⁴⁹⁶

August 31st, from Buenos Aires, Britain's naval attaché, Capt. Leggatt, writes to the FCO to complain that a recent failure to win a contract to supply frigates to Argentina's Navy was as a result of “*the Falklands issue*”.⁴⁹⁷

September 29th, in New York, at the United Nations building, Dr. Owen and Oscar Montes agree that Anglo-Argentine negotiations will resume in December.

*“Doctor David Owen, Britain's Foreign Secretary, has announced that a review of the routine diplomatic exchanges on the future of the Falkland Islands will be made at a one day meeting in December between Mr. Ted Rowlands MP (Minister of State, FCO) and his Argentine counterpart Sr. Gaulter Allara.”*⁴⁹⁸

*“I make no secret of the fact that I would not transfer sovereignty to Argentina. ... I must make it clear that when in office I was never prepared to contemplate it. I never accepted lease-back, and have great difficulty with it. The furthest that I was prepared to go was a sharing of sovereignty. In those days, one of the options that I thought was most hopeful was that sovereignty over the uninhabited islands would be transferred to Argentina, and the inhabited islands—the greater space, I admit—would remain with Britain, with a shared economic unit covering all the islands, inhabited and uninhabited, and the territorial waters...”*⁴⁹⁹

October 8th, Britain's *Observer* newspaper reports that the Foreign Secretary and his Argentine counterpart have agreed to Argentine sovereignty for the Islands, but continued British sovereignty for their inhabitants.⁵⁰⁰

*“A meeting of Members of Parliament, Peers and Falkland islanders concluded that a referendum should be held in the Falkland Islands. At a Commonwealth Parliamentary Association meeting in the House of Commons, it was suggested that the only way to prove the wishes of the islanders was by following the example set in Northern Ireland, when a referendum on constitutional reform was held. The Ulster referendum showed that a majority in the province wished to retain links with the United Kingdom. The colony of Gibraltar recently held a referendum to confirm the people's overwhelming preference for British, rather than Spanish sovereignty and the British colony of Belize has been promised a referendum on any proposals worked out with neighbouring Guatemala, which has territorial ambitions over Belize. Ninety seven per cent of the people in the Falkland Islands are of British stock.”*⁵⁰¹

October 12th, in London, an inter-departmental request is submitted for permission to allow the testing of a French *Exocet* missile at a British firing range, for a group of Argentine military observers.

*“The Defence sales department ... asked that the Argentine navy be allowed to test Exocet missiles in Cardigan Bay, because ‘unless we demonstrate to the Argentinians our willingness to be helpful in all requests of a military nature then our chances of securing substantial military contracts likely to be awarded in the future are considerably diminished’. The French-made Exocet missiles were, of course, used to lethal effect against British forces in the Falklands War.”*⁵⁰²

496 *Falkland Islands Newsletter* November 1978 p.1

497 Leggatt to Carless August 31, 1978 FCO 7/3450

498 *Ibid.*

499 Dr. David Owen speaking in 1985 in *Falkland Islands (Foreign Affairs Committee Report) HC Deb 14 March 1985 vol.75 cc492-530*. A change in attitude from October, 1977 or a failure of memory?

500 *Falkland Islands Newsletter* November 1978 p.1. The *Observer's* source was not stated.

501 *Ibid.*

502 Livingstone 2018 citing *Spencer to Keeling October 12, 1978 DEFE 68/377*

October 19th, in London, the first Annual general Meeting of the Falkland Islands Research and Development Association is held.

*“We have not yet made the progress for which we had hoped in achieving the implementation of the recommendations in Lord Shackleton's Report. The British Government has moved exceedingly slowly It is worth noting that, under pressure in particular from those in this country who have now for ten years supported the Islands, some £9½ million of aid has been provided by the Ministry of Overseas Development.”*⁵⁰³

October 20th, a new Argentine Presidential Decree is promulgated.

*“Government House has just received details of a published in the official Argentine bulletin on the concerning the issue of the controversial "White Card". The main points of this decree are as follows:- Presidential decree 20th of October, concerning the issue of the controversial "White Card" travel permit. The main points of this decree are as follows:- White cards for residents of the Islands and of Argentina are unchanged. An "embarkation and disembarkation card" is to be issued to non-residents. They will complete it in duplicate when they purchase their air or sea tickets, and will retain one copy. The retained copy will be checked by the airport or port police at the point of departure for the Falklands. On return from the Islands the retained copy will be checked by the same authorities and given back to the non-resident. It will be surrendered at the point of final departure from Argentina. If a non-resident leaves the Islands without passing through Argentina again, the Argentine Representative of the Special Consultative Committee in Port Stanley shall, whenever possible, ask for the return of the retained copy. Government is waiting for more information concerning the new non-resident regulations and details will be published as soon as they are known. It is understood that these regulations will come into effect as from January the 1st 1979.”*⁵⁰⁴

November 1st, in Britain's House of Commons, during a debate on the Address⁵⁰⁵, MP Michael Hutchinson speaks regarding the Falklands and the outstanding question of Southern Thule.

“I much regret that no mention of the Falkland Islands was made in the Gracious Speech. It is extremely difficult to obtain any information from the Government about proposed developments there and about what is generally in the Government's mind concerning the islands. Open government seems to be all the rage these days. The word "open" is the latest watchword, but it certainly does not apply to Government thinking about the Falklands.

Hon. Members will recall that in December 1976 there began an illegal occupation by Argentine citizens of Southern Thule island in the South Sandwich Islands, controlled by the Falkland Islands. The people concerned were supposed to be scientists.

We did not learn about the occupation until several months later. Then we were told that the Foreign and Commonwealth Office had made a protest, that there was not much need to worry, as so few people were involved, and that our legal position was covered. But I do worry. I am not convinced that a protest is sufficient. If the Argentine party has been in the island for more than 12 months, that strengthens Argentina's position and weakens ours. International law is by no means united on what the

503 *Falkland Islands Newsletter* November 1978. Link above

504 *The Falkland Islands Times* November 10, 1978 p.1

505 The Debate on the Address (or Loyal Address) is the formal name for the King's Speech debates that are held over several days in both Houses at the start of a new session of Parliament. The debates takes place on the motion: 'That an humble Address be presented to His Majesty' thanking him for the speech, but they are also an opportunity to discuss what the Speech contained: the Government's programme for the year ahead.

exact position is. Therefore, I should very much welcome a statement from the Minister concerned. It seems to me that there are two courses open to deal with the matter. One is to mount a small police expedition to remove the intruders. That is my instinctive reaction and choice. The other is to set up our own scientific party and to land it in the island so that the Argentine claim is reduced. ... I am extremely concerned about the general stranglehold that the Argentine Republic is exerting over the Falkland Islands. The white card system still exists, air communication with the mainland is in Argentine hands, as is the supply of petrol and oil to the islands, and the Argentine people offer certain educational facilities. Those are merely some examples. Why should that be so? It would seem that there is a lack of interest or of will. ...

The Falklands are British. The inhabitants wish to keep their ties with us. The islanders have many friends in this country, including many friends in the House, and they have backing from the British public. I believe it to be entirely wrong that Parliament should not be fully in the picture about what is happening there. I resent the Government's air of mystery—indeed, secrecy—about the islands' future.

*Therefore, I ask for more open government and a very strong policy, and for there to be no truck whatsoever with the "phoney" Argentine claims.”*⁵⁰⁶

Britain's Labour Government approves the sale of blowpipe surface-to-air missiles to Argentina.

*“... in order to protect employment at the Shorts Brothers factory in Belfast...”*⁵⁰⁷

December 9th, Argentina sends a naval force south towards Chile's Beagle (PNL) islands, intending to occupy them on December 22. Chile, warned by its intelligence network, sends its own navy.⁵⁰⁸

*“In November and December 1978 a propaganda campaign was organised by the Argentines, with Army, Navy and Air Force units prepared to fight a just war against Chilean territorial encroachment.”*⁵⁰⁹

*“The Plan provided for starting the war "quickly and violently" to gain greater control over Chilean territories in the early days invasion, impose that status quo and force Chile to negotiate from a position of strength...”*⁵¹⁰

December 13th, in New York, at the United Nations, the General Assembly defers consideration of the Falkland Islands question until its 1979 session.

December 18th, in Geneva, Switzerland, three days of negotiations commence between Argentina and Britain.

*“The Argentines accepted that, under such an agreement, these activities – including their station on Thule, would have no implications for sovereignty... We rejected the idea that the aim of the negotiations was simply to transfer sovereignty to Argentina.”*⁵¹¹

“The more problematic issue was co-administration of the Dependencies maritime zones. Allara agreed that Argentina and Britain should jointly declare a 200-mile fishing zone, but failed to explain how he planned to

506 *HC Deb 01 November 1978 vol.957 cc9-156*

507 Livingstone 2018 p.151

508 *Operación Soberanía*. What is known, all of it unconfirmed, is that the plan involved a number of incursions into Chilean territory in an attempt to force them into accepting Argentina's terms. All three forces – navy, air force and army – were to be employed. Argentina's success in maintaining troops in the South Thule group of British islands may have emboldened it to try force with the Chileans; whose intelligence network within Argentina was very effective. See below.

509 *The Falklands War* D. George Boyce 2005

510 *Conflicto de límites con Chile y operaciones militares de las Fuerzas Armadas argentinas en 1978. Experiencias de la artillería de campaña en el «Operativo Soberanía»* Germán Soprano 2021

511 *ALW 045/325/1 Part A* filed at the Margaret Thatcher Foundation

reconcile this with Argentina's own sovereignty claim... Allara held out for a transfer of the Dependencies as his price for an agreement to the co-administration of a fisheries zone. Rowlands rejected this out of hand."⁵¹²

December 20th, On the final day of the Geneva talks, agreement is reached over scientific activities on Southern Thule and within the Dependencies. The two sides agree to meet again towards the end of March.

"Agreement between Britain and Argentina on scientific cooperation in the Malvinas (Falkland) Island dependencies constitutes a first step to affirm Argentine presence in the region, Argentine sources said yesterday. Commenting on the three-day talks here, the sources said the negotiators discussed all issues, including sovereignty over the islands and the dependencies of South Georgia and South Sandwich Islands, all ruled by Britain and claimed by Argentina. A press communique issued on Wednesday night on the talks made no specific mention of the sovereignty issue. It said the delegations "reached agreement in principle on the outline of a scheme or cooperation in their scientific research activities in the island dependencies". The sources said Argentina saw this as a "first step towards affirming our presence in an area where other countries are carrying out fishing activities without accepting any regulation or control, leading to possible prejudicial effects on the preservation of the natural resources of the region"."⁵¹³

In London, under pressure from Defence Secretary Mulley, and Trade Secretary Edmund Dell, Britain's Foreign Secretary Davis Owen agrees to invite General Orlando Agosti, Argentina's Air Force chief, to visit London. To discuss the sale of Lynx helicopters and Hawk trainer jets.⁵¹⁴ General Agosti initially accepts the invitation but then suddenly cancels, citing 'domestic' reasons.

*"Although the Agosti visit was cancelled, there were numerous other visits by Argentine officers to the UK during Labour's period of office and many British defence officials visited Argentina."*⁵¹⁵

December 22nd, finding the Beagle Channel Islands protected by a Chilean naval force, Argentina withdraws.

*"In 1978, the dictatorship led the country to the brink of war with Chile by rejecting the arbitration convened in 1971 and delivered to the parties in 1977. ... In the conflict with Chile, ... much of the problem on the Argentine side was the bureaucratic and complex way that the Argentine military junta made its decisions. ... The 'war that was not' is an indispensable step towards understanding the war that did take place."*⁵¹⁶

*"... in the early morning of D-Day (December 22), the vanguard of the troops stationed in the province of Neuquén began to advance towards the border and some elements of it reached to enter Chilean territory for about three or four kilometers, until they received a counter-order and withdrew. There the implementation stopped of Operación Soberanía."*⁵¹⁷

*"On 23 December, ... the Pope called for a peaceful solution and announced that he was sending cardinal Antonio Samoré to Buenos Aires and Santaigo to mediate ... Both sides accepted the Vatican as mediator and the immediate danger of war receded."*⁵¹⁸

512 Donaghy 2014. See also *ALW 0420/325/1*

513 *A first step towards affirming our presence in the Malvinas* Buenos Aires Herald December 21, 1979

514 Two Lynx helicopters had been sold to Argentina earlier in 1978. It was hoped to sell eight more.

515 Livingston 2018

516 *State, national identity and power: a historical tour in search of the causes of the Falklands–Malvinas War* Guillermo Mira and Fernando Pedrosa 2021

517 Soprano 2021. Available here -

https://ri.conicet.gov.ar/bitstream/handle/11336/176919/CONICET_Digital_Nro.da114069-39f4-4d1c-95aa-18fa2125ee8a_C.pdf?sequence=5&isAllowed=y

518 Pascoe 2022 vol.3 p.614. In fact the Pope had made an offer to negotiate in October, 1978, which Chile accepted while Argentina declined to answer. See Soprano 2021.

1979 – January 7th, in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, Falklands Councillors meet Minister Rowlands for an update.

*“During the Geneva talks, proposals for scientific cooperation in the Falklands are were drawn up between Britain and Argentina. Legislative Councillors were briefed by Mr. Ted Rowlands MP, the minister responsible, in Rio on January 7 but have not disclosed the proposals or their attitude towards them. The Falklands Office in London is concerned and the situation is being closely watched.”*⁵¹⁹

In London, Britain’s Labour Government issues guidelines restricting arms sales to Argentina. The Ministry of Defence is told that sales cannot be approved if they include equipment that could be directly used for internal repression. Or which could threaten the Falkland Islands.

*“In fact, as soon as they were introduced, Labour’s Defence Secretary, Fred Mulley said that, while he accepted the guidelines, each order should be looked at on a case by case basis, because ‘we would be reluctant to take any action which would seriously damage our prospects of obtaining at least a reasonable share of this market.’ Mulley then asked the FCO to approve sales of ammunition by British companies for use with weapons that had already been sold. Owen agreed... the first of many instances when the guidelines were bent.”*⁵²⁰

January 8th, Argentina reaches an agreement with Chile to refer their Beagle Channel dispute to the Pope.

*“... an important by-product of this tension was that the Argentine Government spent billions of dollars on arms procurement, including 40 A-4 Skyhawk aircraft and five Chinook helicopters bought from the United States, and 42 Dagger aircraft purchased from Israel. The Argentine armed forces were therefore mentally and physically prepared for war...”*⁵²¹

January 13th, in Stanley, the agreements achieved at Geneva are rejected by the Falkland Islands Government, with Councillors fearing an erosion of British sovereignty over both the Islands and Dependencies.

*“The occupation of South Thule Island, the most southerly of the Falklands group, was described by Islanders as the ‘thin end of the wedge’. Islanders fear continued Argentine encroachment, even under the name of science.”*⁵²²

*“The Islanders are loathe to admit any Argentine foothold in the archipelago. When after the December, 1978 round of talks, the sides announced tentative agreement toward potential cooperation in scientific research in the outer island dependencies, the Islanders emphatically rejected the proposal.”*⁵²³

*“...following the talks, Rowlands met the Island councillors in Río in early January 1979 to report the outcome. However, at a subsequent joint meeting of ExCo and LegCo councillors objected to the proposed terms and, particularly, feared that the Argentines would extend their activities to other parts of the dependencies. The UK government subsequently agreed not to sign the agreement but to pursue further exploratory talks.”*⁵²⁴

*“An Anglo-Argentine agreement over Southern Thule would have been difficult to digest; the inclusion of South Georgia made it nigh impossible.”*⁵²⁵

519 *Falkland Islands Newsletter* April 1979 no.6

520 Rowlands, Edward (Ted) in Tatham (ed) 2008. Authored by Ted Rowlands. Link above

521 *The Falklands War* D. G. Boyce 2005

522 *Falkland Islands Newsletter* April 1979 no.6

523 *Airgram From the Embassy in Argentina to the Department of State* Buenos Aires, May 16, 1979 in *Foreign Relations of the United States: 1981-1988 vol.XIII: Conflict in the South Atlantic 1981 – 1984*

524 Rowlands, Edward (Ted) in Tatham (ed) 2008. Authored by Ted Rowlands. Link above

525 Donaghy 2014

In Buenos Aires, Argentina expresses an interest in the restoration of Ambassadors with the UK.

*“Towards the end of Labour's period of office, Argentina expressed an interest in restoring ambassadors. The head of the FCO's Latin America department, John Ure, advised that reinstating ambassadors could facilitate talks over the Falklands, but that such a move could provoke criticism from the 'human rights lobby' and the 'Falkland Islanders and their lobby'. He suggested that Argentina be invited to appoint an ambassador to Britain, after which the British would consider re-appointing their ambassador. David Owen approved this, although his political advisor told FCO officials that this needed 'very careful' press handling. But a leaked press report, announcing that an exchange of ambassadors had been agreed to, led to an angry response from the Labour party. The party's national executive passed a resolution calling it 'totally inappropriate'. With just weeks to go until the general election, the British ambassador was not reinstated until the Conservatives came to power, but Labour ministers had not objected, in principle, to the move.”*⁵²⁶

January 16th, in Britain's House of Lords, Government spokesman, Lord Goronwy-Roberts notes, in answer to a question, that the aid provision to the Falkland Islands is greater *per capita* than that made to any other territory. Baroness Elles points out that with a population of only 1800, that figure was too easy to achieve. The Baroness seeks assurances that no decision will be taken regarding the future of the Falklands without a full and public consultation. Lord Goronwy-Roberts confirms that; *“Proposals will not even be put to Parliament without the full acceptance of the Falkland Islanders.”*⁵²⁷ Responding to a question from Lord Morris concerning the December negotiations, Goronwy-Roberts states; *“I am not yet in a position to say what are the results of that consideration by those Governments; but as soon as it is clear what the conclusions are by those various Governments, a full statement will be made to the House in accordance with the noble Lord's very proper request.”*⁵²⁸

January 24th, Americans visits the archipelago; to prepare a report for the US State Department.⁵²⁹

*“American businessmen, American historians and marine architects, American conservationists, American journalists and tourists, and resident American settlers met in Stanley expressed an interest in having on record at the State Department basic information on the Islands, including travel, communications, documentation, and visitors' facilities. ... The paper concludes that Argentina will eventually regain political sovereignty over the disputed Malvinas Islands, as a result of gradualist bilateral negotiations with Great Britain. Deterioration of the current talks could postpone but probably not avoid the eventual end of Britain's admittedly anachronistic colonial rule. It is less clear whether the Argentines will be successful in populating and rejuvenating the Islands' economy over the long term. As long as the Malvinas do not fall into unfriendly hands or are not exploited for harmful strategic and military ends, US interests are unlikely to be adversely affected by future disposition of the Islands.”*⁵³⁰

The American team note that there are ten US citizens living on the Islands and that all but one of these are associated with the religious sect 'Bahai'. *“Members abstain from political activity and alcohol, but are not rigidly organized or segregated. The reporting officer did not detect any aberration or coercion in connection with their presence or activities in Stanley.”*⁵³¹

526 Livingstone 2018 p.152

527 *Falkland Islands Newsletter* April 1979 no.6

528 *HL Deb* 16 January 1979 vol 397 cc843-6

529 See - <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1981-88v13/d1>

530 *Airgram From the Embassy in Argentina to the Department of State* Buenos Aires, May 16, 1979 in *Foreign Relations of the United States: 1981-1988 vol.XIII: Conflict in the South Atlantic 1981 – 1984*

531 *Foreign Relations of the United States: 1981-1988 vol.XIII: Conflict in the South Atlantic 1981 – 1984* p.9. A religion originating in Persia (Iran) in 1844. The first follower, John Leonard, arrived in the Islands in 1954.

February 6th, in Britain's House of Lords, Lord Goronwy-Roberts, speaking on behalf of the Government, explains the agreement concerning scientific activities in the Dependencies. ⁵³²

“... it relates to a wide range of scientific questions, from meteorology to Antarctic questions generally. It is the kind of question that arises in conditions and circumstances of this geographical sort. The scope of the discussions, while not including hydro-carbons, is sufficiently wide not only to offer hope for development in the Dependencies but also perhaps to give added strength and confidence to the larger discussions which are proceeding amicably between us and Argentina in regard to the future of the Falklands. ... The illegal station in South Thule remains illegal. We have asserted, and continue to assert without reservation, our claim to sovereignty over South Thule, as indeed over these Dependencies generally. However, any discussions specifically aimed at advancing matters in the Dependencies can only help to resolve not only the disagreement about the station in South Thule but, as I said, the larger question of our relations with Argentina, a country with which, historically, we have for many years enjoyed close and fruitful relations.”

Lord Goronwy-Roberts confirms that the Government regard the continental shelf around the Falklands as British sovereign territory. ⁵³³

“It was admitted in the House of Lords on February 7 (sic) by Lord Goronwy Roberts that the scientific cooperation proposals would legitimise the illegal occupation by Argentine scientists of South Thule Island in the Falkland Islands Dependencies.” ⁵³⁴

February 23rd, in Britain's House of Commons, in a written answer, Foreign Secretary David Owen states that the 1978 seismic surveys are still being evaluated.

“Whatever the outcome of the evaluations and in spite of the close and continuing interest of oil companies and the certainty of a world oil shortage by 1985, the true potential of the Falklands will not be known until exploratory drilling takes place, at a cost of approximately £7.5m.” ⁵³⁵

March 22nd, in London, a petition signed by 36 members of the TUC and several MPs is handed in to the Argentine Embassy calling for information regarding the fate of some 25,000 Argentines who have 'disappeared' during a period of three years of military rule.

“The protest coincided with the announcement that Argentina and Britain were considering the re-establishment of full diplomatic relations, broke off in 1976...” ⁵³⁶

March 21st, in New York, three days of Anglo-Argentine talks commence.

“There is no question of any decisions being taken in New York this month; our intention is to pre-empt trouble and continue talking.” ⁵³⁷

“Domestic considerations hindered meaningful dialogue... Hall explained that the scientific cooperation agreement could not proceed, due to the islanders' 'deep suspicion' of Argentine motives... Subsequent discussions yielded no progress.” ⁵³⁸

532 *HL Deb 06 February 1979 vol.398 cc589-91. cf. 1958*

533 *Ibid. at cc.591*

534 *Falkland Islands Newsletter April 1979 no.6*

535 *Ibid.*

536 *Ibid.*

537 *ALW 045/325/1 Part A*

538 Donaghy 2014

March 23rd, negotiations end without any firm agreement, nor any decision as to future talks.

*“Talks between the British and Argentine governments over the future of the Falkland Islands appear to have failed. The most recent meeting took place in New York on March 21-23 between Mr. George Hall of the Foreign Office and his Argentine counterpart, Senor Lopez. The communique issued following the discussions gave no indication of their substance and was markedly less cooperative in tone than the statement issued following the previous round of talks in Geneva during December.”*⁵³⁹

*“The communique released after the last round of talks in New York in March, 1979 conspicuously omitted any mention of joint scientific cooperation and announced only that the talks were held and another session would be scheduled later in the year. Argentina is clearly annoyed at British foot dragging on the question. It also feared a Conservative victory in the upcoming British elections. The Conservative Party has traditionally shown far less willingness than the Laborites to discuss the future political disposition of the Islands. In the meantime, however, Argentina is following a patient, multi-front policy designed to build international pressure to force Britain into speeding negotiations on the sovereignty question while, at the same time, steadily seeking to win the Islanders’ confidence if not their loyalty.”*⁵⁴⁰

*“Anglo/Argentine exchanges on the Falklands date from 1966,... The most active periods have been 1967/8, 1972/3 and 1977/9. Differences over sovereignty have been central: we have never been able to get the Argentines to accept our view that sovereignty cannot be transferred against the wishes of the Islanders; we have refused to accept the Argentine formula recognising only the "interests" of the Islanders.”*⁵⁴¹

An Argentine stamp-set celebrates 150 years since the '*Civil and Military Command of the Malvinas.*'⁵⁴²

In **April**, the Falklands’ Legislative Council calls for a 200-mile maritime limit around the archipelago; “to replace the existing three-mile limit.”⁵⁴³

Britain's Ministry of Agriculture commission a 'desk study' into the fisheries potential in the South Atlantic.

In London, 118 MPs sign a Commons *motion* demanding that the Government implement the Shackleton recommendations.

May 1st, in the islands, the airport at Cape Pembroke is officially opened by polar explorer Sir Vivian Fuchs.

*“The construction of the permanent airfield had just been completed at a final cost of £6m million. Yet the new runway, measuring 1,370 yards, could only take short and medium-haul aircraft. The islanders thus remained reliant on the airport at Comodoro Rivadavia, southern Argentina, as their only available staging post for reaching the outside world.”*⁵⁴⁴

May 3rd, following a General Election, Margaret Thatcher becomes Prime Minister of the UK. Peter Carington is appointed Foreign Secretary.⁵⁴⁵ Nicholas Ridley is appointed Minister of State at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office.⁵⁴⁶

539 *Falkland Islands Newsletter* April 1979 no.6

540 *Airgram From the Embassy in Argentina to the Department of State* Buenos Aires, May 16, 1979 in *Foreign Relations of the United States: 1981-1988 vol.XIII: Conflict in the South Atlantic 1981 – 1984*

541 *FCO 76/1892 Annex 3*. See October, 1979

542 See 1829

543 *Falkland Islands Newsletter* April 1979 no.6

544 Donaghy 2014.

545 6th Baron Carington, Carington of Upton, a hereditary Peer at the time of his appointment. His family name, however, has only one 'r'. Lord Carington would later refer to the Falklands question as having been “*number 249*” on his list of priorities, on becoming Foreign Secretary.

546 For a biography, see - https://www.falklandsbiographies.org/biographies/ridley_nicholas

*“Fellow MP and contemporary at Eton, Tam Dalyell, described (Ridley) as a man who was 'gratuitously confrontational', and who 'enjoyed being rude'.”*⁵⁴⁷

*“Carless wrote again soon after Margaret Thatcher's election, saying: 'Since the British elections ... the concept of Argentina opting for a closer relationship with Britain would seem to have gained ground here.' He suggested that in exchange for granting Argentina 'political recognition as a valid partner', sharing military and nuclear technology, and a 'symbolic' agreement on the Falklands, British business could win lucrative contracts.”*⁵⁴⁸

May 10th, in London, John Ure, Under-Secretary in the Foreign Office's South American Department, minutes Nicholas Ridley, the new Minister responsible for the Falkland Islands.

*“There is a vociferous and highly organised Falkland islands lobby in this country with the capacity to enlist considerable support in Parliament and the media. Its function, in the name of the Falkland Islanders, is to monitor and oppose any attempt by the British Government to establish closer links between the Falkland Islands and Argentina. ... The Argentine claim enjoys widespread international support...”*⁵⁴⁹

May 14th, Minister Ridley responds to Ure.

“... I would hope to preserve the Falklands as British – maybe it's not possible – in return for helping Argentina to carve up the Antarctic with us as a partner. I do think it's important for me to go a) to the Falklands, b) to Argentina.”

*“The Foreign Office argued that good relations with Argentina were necessary in order to resolve the dispute – an assertion with which Nicholas Ridley agreed – noting, in an early meeting with officials, that it might be possible to persuade Argentina to accept a continuation of British sovereignty 'if we acted in a friendlier fashion and tried to help them in other areas', ...”*⁵⁵⁰

May 16th, from Buenos Aires, a paper entitled, *'The Malvinas (Falkland) Islands: A Political and Social Review'* is transmitted by the US Embassy to the Department of State in Washington DC.⁵⁵¹

“The Embassy predicts, based on contacts and information available here, that eventually Argentina will regain political sovereignty over the Malvinas, most likely with solid guarantees conserving the Islanders' patrimony and life style and bilateral agreements for joint economic and scientific exploitation of the area. The opposition of the new Conservative government in Britain could delay that outcome, but it is clear that the continued decline and depopulation of the Islands will require some accommodation if the Islands are to remain viable at all. Another outburst of Argentine impatience and revanchism could, however, upset and maybe destroy the delicate gradualist approach underway today. Such an event would probably stiffen British backs and public opinion from letting go of the Islands and bring about further deterioration in bilateral UK-Argentine relations.

It appears unlikely at this writing that Argentina would attempt an armed occupation of the Islands, which would only bring international sympathy to the stalwart Islanders as an endangered species. The Argentine Foreign Ministry officials currently responsible for the Malvinas negotiations have expressed

547 Ridley, Nicholas Graham Bound in Tatham (ed) 2008

548 Livingstone 2018 citing *Carless to FCO June 11, 1979 FCO 7/3573*. Hugh Carless was Britain's *charge d'affaires* in Buenos Aires.

549 *ALW 045/325/1 Part B*

550 Livingstone 2018 citing *Minister of State's meeting, minutes May 16, 1979 FCO 7/3573*

551 Authored by Maxwell Chaplin, Deputy Chief of the US Mission to Argentina 1976-1980.

to an Embassy officer their support for the present gradualist process and their confidence that the Islands will revert to Argentina sooner or later. The recent unnerving near-war with Chile over conflicting Beagle Channel claims may have also helped to temper Argentine officials' impatience in pursuing a Malvinas solution. At the same time, Argentine diplomats will be compelled to demonstrate to the home audience real progress in the ongoing talks, balancing that off against potential British backlash at any sign of a "selling-out" of the Islanders." ⁵⁵²

May 22nd, in London, the issue of the Falklands is raised in the Lords during a debate on the Address.

"Lord Morris: My Lords, I should like to confine my contribution to matters concerning the South-West Atlantic. ... It must be as apparent to noble Lords as it is apparent to me that the commercial and strategic importance of these waters is evidenced by the attention being paid to them by nations other than the United Kingdom, and in particular by the merchant fleets of the Warsaw Pact countries. The South-West Atlantic fishing grounds are being exploited concentratedly by the merchant fleets of Russia, Poland, Bulgaria, East Germany, Japan and West Germany. At this very moment there are two Polish supply ships permanently based at Port William in the Falkland Islands. Yet there is not one British fishing vessel, or any other vessel for that matter, in sight.

In the light of that, I beseech the Conservative Administration as a matter of urgency to review, report back upon and act upon the desk survey by the White Fish Authority, which was commissioned by the former Administration, and to do so in conjunction with the most admirable report of the noble Lord, Lord Shackleton. Although I appreciate that the survey has been on the Minister's desk only since 14th May last, many believe, as I do, that time is of the essence.

Noble Lords will recall that early last December, as a result of a Question tabled by my noble kinsman, the Earl of Lauderdale, it was learned that Her Majesty's Government had received a hydrocarbons survey of some 200,000 square miles around the Falkland Islands. Furthermore, on 13th March last the noble Lord, Lord Goronwy-Roberts, declared that the results of the survey would be forthcoming "in the near future". Bearing in mind that some six months have passed since Her Majesty's Government received that survey, may I ask the Minister whether the Conservative Administration will be as coy as their predecessors were about informing your Lordships' House of the result of this survey?" ⁵⁵³

May 24th, in the UK, Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher invites Foreign Secretary Lord Carrington, and Home Secretary William Whitelaw, to a working lunch at Chequers.

"Carrington mentioned that one of the problems he faced was what to do about the Falklands. "I think we will soon be in trouble if we go on having meetings about them with the Argentines without saying anything at all," Carrington said. "One of the options which seems to me worth exploring is a leaseback arrangement similar to what we have in Hong Kong." Lady Thatcher "erupted in anger", ... She spent the next ten minutes denouncing the very idea of exploring a Hong Kong solution. "That's the trouble with your Foreign Office," she said. "Everyone in it is so bloody wet!" ⁵⁵⁴

May 25th, in Britain's House of Lords, Sir Ian Gilmour responds to questions with a written answer:

"Successive British Governments have left the Argentine Government in no doubt as to British sovereignty over the Falkland Islands and Dependencies.

552 Airgram From the Embassy in Argentina to the Department of State Buenos Aires, May 16, 1979 in *Foreign Relations of the United States: 1981-1988 vol.XIII: Conflict in the South Atlantic 1981 – 1984*. Link above

553 Lord Morris in *HL Deb 22 May 1979 vol.400 cc233-432*

554 *The Telegraph* October 12th, 2013

*The majority of the recommendations put forward by Lord Shackleton in his economic survey of the Falkland Islands have now been implemented.*⁵⁵⁵

The Government will continue to maintain a close interests in the development of the Falkland Islands. We are looking closely at the problems of the Falkland Islands but no change of policy is currently planned.”⁵⁵⁶

June 4th, in London, Nicholas Ridley minutes Lord Carrington, seeking a decision as to the policy to be adopted.

“I have been looking at the various options open to us. These seem to be: (a) thumbing our noses at the Argentines and provisioning and defending the Falkland islands – the “Fortress Falkland” option: (b) selling out the Falkland Islanders: (c) negotiating with Argentina.

*I think that negotiation is the only valid option. The Argentines will not negotiate unless the negotiations include questions of sovereignty so, although I am much more interested in negotiating with them about economic co-operation, we will have to agree to discuss sovereignty. If we are going to do this we must keep the Falkland islanders with us. If we do not they will complain and we will have a blow up in Parliament and in the press. I am therefore proposing to go out to the Islands in July...”*⁵⁵⁷

June 7th, in Buenos Aires, the *La Prensa* newspaper reports that a further meeting has been arranged for later in the month between Deputy Foreign Minister Cavándoli and Nicholas Ridley. Topics are to include; “... an analysis of the state of negotiations on the Falkland Islands, the establishment of the basis for a formal meeting to be held at Buenos Aires in July 1979 following Mr. Ridley's visit to the Territory, and the resumption of bilateral relations at the ambassadorial level.”

June 12th, Minister Cavándoli indicates that his Government requires sovereignty to be central to negotiations.

June 14th, Lord Carrington responds, vaguely, that Britain is willing to continue with discussions.

*“The talks ... between 1977 and 1979 were based on the prospect of some deal on sovereignty being possible. We kept the Argentines in play only with difficulty and there was continuing suspicion among the Argentine officials about the genuineness of our intentions.”*⁵⁵⁸

June 19th, in the Falklands, the people celebrate Falkland Islands Day.⁵⁵⁹

*“The Falkland Islanders are determined to remain British – but they look forward to increasing cooperation with Argentina in the development of the South West Atlantic in the interests of the Falkland Islands, of Argentina and of Britain in two sectors: fishing and the possibility of finding oil in commercial quantities.”*⁵⁶⁰

June 26th, speaking in Cordoba, Dr. Carlos Helbling, calls for; *“The reconquest of the Malvinas; effective control of the Antarctic and the reoccupation of the geopolitical area belonging to the nation.”*⁵⁶¹

July 4th, from Buenos Aires, Britain's *charge d'affaires* reports to London on the visit to Argentina by the Chairman of General Electric Company, Lord Nelson, who has held meetings with the junta's military staff.

555 Not true.

556 *Falkland Islands Newsletter* June 19, 1979. See - <https://www.fiassociation.com/newsletter/FIA-NL-06A.pdf>

557 *ALW 045/325/1 Part B*

558 *ALW 0420/325/1 (FCO 07-3801) 1980*

559 After 1982, this was changed to June 14.

560 *Falkland Islands Newsletter* June 19, 1979. See - <https://www.fiassociation.com/newsletter/FIA-NL-06A.pdf>

561 *FCO ALA 020/1 Part A Political Relations between UK and Argentina File No. 141/1*. Helbling would seem, at that time, to have been Baring Bank's agent in Buenos Aires.

*“Lord Nelson,.. met the chief of the Argentine air force in July 1979 to discuss a nuclear contract and was told that ‘Britain would never win any major contracts in Argentina unless progress were made over the Falkland Islands’...”*⁵⁶²

In Britain's House of Lords, a question (Lord Morris) is asked regarding the government's progress in implementing the recommendations of the Shackleton report. Lord Trefgarne, responding for the Government, insists that a *“majority of the recommendations have now been implemented.”* This assessment is challenged by Lord Morris, and by the author of the Report, Lord Shackleton.⁵⁶³

*“My Lords, I suppose there is some room for variation in interpretation of what constitutes a recommendation, but we certainly maintain that, quantitatively, a majority of the recommendations have been implemented.”*⁵⁶⁴

*“...for reasons which are not clear, the Foreign and Commonwealth Office have given the wrong impression to Parliament and the public. Moreover, in terms of importance, the majority of the major recommendations of the Shackleton report have not been implemented. The matter is still being pursued at parliamentary level.”*⁵⁶⁵

July 11th, in Argentina, a draft executive decree announces; *“... the concession contract for the Rio Gallegos Area (8,700 km²) and the Magellan Area (4,700 km²) of the Austral Basin to Shell Hydrocarbons and Shell Argentina. This contract is closely related to the proposal of the Foreign Office to postpone any claim on our sovereignty in the Malvinas and to enter into negotiations on a vast program of (economic) cooperation, related in the first instance to the exploitation of oil in the Marine Basin Austral and Falklands Basin. ... the Minister of the Economy Dr. (Jose Alfredo) Martinez de Hoz in his various trips to London, has unconditionally accepted the program of "economic cooperation". So the contract with Shell is the principle of execution of a tacit agreement.”*⁵⁶⁶

July 20th, at Port Stanley, Minister of State Nicolas Ridley arrives for consultations.

“... the party drove into Stanley where many houses were decked out with stickers such as 'Keep the Falklands British' and 'God Bless Our Queen.' Around about 50 people gathered at the entrance to Government House drive and although it was raining quite heavily, the Minister along with His Excellency the Governor, got down from the official car to talk with the crowd. The early arrival of the aircraft meant that some people were a little late in arriving at the drive but the Minister moved around quite freely and spoke with many of the late-comers. Mrs. Betty Miller unfurled one of the biggest banners which read: "We want our 200 miles, for Falklands Fish are British Fish". The Minister admired the banner and wanted to know who had thought up the slogan. He also observed another banner which said 'Long to reign over us, God bless our Queen.' ... The crowd meanwhile had swelled to about 80 and in answer to some questions Mr. Ridley said that he was pleased to be in the Falklands. ... Mr. Ridley referred to the possibility of an exchange of Ambassadors during his recent visit. It was understood that Her Majesty's Government are responding to an Argentine request: it was they who originally withdraw their Ambassador from London and asked for the withdrawal of the British

562 Livingstone 2018 citing *Carless to FCO July 4, 1979 FCO 7/3574*

563 *Hansard. Lords Chamber July 4, 1979 vol.401* See - <https://hansard.parliament.uk/Lords/1979-07-04/debates/f535937e-2449-479b-b5a9-0309fe878608/FalklandIslandsShackletonRecommendations>

564 *Ibid.* Comment by Lord Trefgarne, following Lord Shackleton asking if he was being accused of lying.

565 *Falkland islands Newsletter* November 1979 no.7. This gives an annotated breakdown of Shackleton's recommendations. See - <https://www.fiassociation.com/newsletter/FIA-NL-07.pdf>

566 *Contrato con Shell coopera con los ocupantes de las Malvinas* in *El Diario del fin del mundo* July 7, 2017, quoting Adolfo Silenzi de Stagni of the *Politica Petrolera y la Cuenca Marina Austral* from July 7, 1979. The implication is that this decree was prepared for the benefit of Ridley's visit, but there is no evidence that he was ever made aware of it.

Ambassador and the first move for a restoration of Ambassadors has properly to come from them. What Her Majesty's Government are agreeing to is simply a return to normal full diplomatic relations."⁵⁶⁷

*"He considered 'lease back' the best available option, ... but Thatcher was hostile and could sense unease among Conservative MPs who already resented the compromises that had been made to arrange a settlement in Rhodesia. Ridley was sent to the Falklands in July 1979 ... for discussions. The islanders were still firmly against a transfer of sovereignty."*⁵⁶⁸

July 21st, from Stanley, Ridley flies to Buenos Aires for preliminary talks with the Argentine Foreign Ministry. Agreement is reached on the reinstatement of Ambassadors – but little else. As Ridley is about to depart, the Argentine Foreign Ministry present an *aide-memoire* stating that they will find it unacceptable for the Islanders to become 'third parties' to any negotiations. Also that Argentina "demands" that negotiations move at a more dynamic pace.

*"Ridley returned to London determined to sort this one out once and for all."*⁵⁶⁹

August 16th, in New York, at the United Nations building, the Special Committee on Decolonization decide to defer consideration of the Falkland Islands until the next session in 1980.⁵⁷⁰

August 17th, in London, an internal Foreign Office *minute* considers negotiations.

*"... we need to clear our lines with Cabinet on the next moves in our dispute with Argentina on sovereignty over the Falkland Islands. I recommend that the Secretary of State write to the Prime Minister and her OD colleagues seeking their agreement to resume negotiations with Argentina in the autumn, to see whether an overall solution involving a leaseback, or some other special status, is possible. ... No solution stands any chance of success if we do not take the Islanders with us."*⁵⁷¹

Following enquiries by the arms manufacturer Marconi, with regard to the promotion of the Stingray lightweight torpedo in Argentina, the Ministry of Defence argue that a sale will not be permitted. One of the factors presented is the possible threat to the Falkland Islands; "An MOD sales representative responded by saying: 'I was surprised to see you making so much of a military threat against the Falkland Islands,' adding: 'I was under the impression that ... we had accepted that the Argentinians could take the Falkland Islands at any time they wish.' ..."⁵⁷²

September 18th, in New York, at the opening session of the United Nations, Argentina's Foreign Minister, Brigadier Carlos Washington Pastor, addresses the General Assembly regarding the Falkland Islands.

"My government ... reiterates its firm decision to persevere in the search for a prompt and just solution to this problem. But the Argentine decision cannot be unilateral. It has to be matched by a similar spirit on behalf of the British authorities."

"In response, the Foreign & Commonwealth Office stated that Britain's position had not changed. A spokesman said that it was evident that Britain had exercised sovereignty over the Islands for 150 years and it was equally obvious that the Islanders, being of British descent, wished to remain under British rule. Despite this statement, it is known that Lord Carrington, the Foreign Secretary, agreed at the UN General Assembly in

567 *The Falkland Islands Times* August 13, 1979 no.11/79

568 *Britain's International Role 1970 – 1991* Michael J. Turner 2010 p.207

569 Hastings & Jenkins 1997 p.47

570 *UN Doc A/34/23/REV.1[VOL.IV](Supp)*

571 *Ure to Hall August 17, 1979 ALW 045/325/1 Part C*. OD is short for the Defence and Overseas Policy Committee.

572 Livingstone 2018 citing *J.R. Hill to The Secretary RMI Sub-Committee, MOD August 21, 1979 DEFE 678/378*. After some lobbying, the sale of one version of the torpedo was approved.

*private talks with his Argentine counterpart that the negotiations on the future sovereignty and economic status of the Falkland Islands will be resumed.”*⁵⁷³

September 19th, following extensive talks, Constantino Davidoff contracts with *Christian Salvesen* to recover whaling equipment at the stations at Leith harbour, Stromness and Husvik on South Georgia.⁵⁷⁴ Under the contract, Davidoff agrees to comply with all British entry conditions at South Georgia, and accepts that any equipment remaining after March 1982 reverts to *Salvesen*.⁵⁷⁵

*“I can confirm that in the period leading up to the conclusion of the contract there were a number of exchanges between Salvesens, the FCO and the then Governor of the Falkland Islands. Mr. Davidoff also contacted the Embassy in Buenos Aires. ... While there were misgivings about the political implications of the contract, legal advice was that there was no lawful way of preventing Salvesens concluding the agreement if they were determined to do so. Accordingly Salvesens were not obstructed in their pursuit of a contract. Ministers were consulted at the time and approved. There is no letter from the FCO to Salvesens acquiescing in the arrangement.”*⁵⁷⁶

*“Thatcher's Foreign Office not only cleared the way for Salvesens to enter into a salvaging contract, but it also sweetened the deal. First the Foreign Office authorized Salvesens to acquire the Albion Star leases at Husvik and Grytviken, giving the company control over all four of the whaling stations on the island. Then, Salvesens offered Davidoff an option contract to dismantle the stations at Leith, Stromness, and Husvik, all located at Stromness Bay and one more than Davidoff originally sought. The fourth station, at Grytviken, twenty miles away from the other three, where the BAS were located, was excluded from the deal... Although Davidoff signed a three-year contract with Salvesens in September 1979, and despite the fact that scrap metal prices reached their historic peak in 1981, Davidoff's enterprise lay dormant until activated in late 1981.”*⁵⁷⁷

*“The company signed a contract with Davidoff for £115,000, to remove machinery and other metal from the deserted whaling stations on South Georgia at Leith Harbour, Stromness and Husvik, and Davidoff was given three years to complete the job ... For several years he made no progress, but he did not give up the project.”*⁵⁷⁸

September 20th, in London, Lord Carrington seeks consensus on policy within the *Defence and Overseas Policy Committee*. He puts forward options: 1) *Fortress Falklands*’; 2) protracted negotiations with no concession on sovereignty; or 3) substantive negotiations on sovereignty.⁵⁷⁹ Carrington favours the last option and again suggests that the best solution is some kind of leaseback arrangement with a preferred term of 99 years. He highlights that it will be necessary to ensure that the leaseback option has the support of the Islanders, and of Parliament.⁵⁸⁰

“NO! ... I could not possibly agree to the line the foreign secretary is proposing. Nor would it ever get through the H of C – let alone the parliamentary party.”

*“(Margaret Thatcher) ... wrote angry notes on Carrington's draft, rejecting the entire leaseback idea...”*⁵⁸¹

573 *Falkland islands Newsletter* November 1979 no.7

574 *Davidoff to Williams* March 25, 1982 in *AW 040/325.12*. The station at Grytviken was not included, possibly because it was the base for the British Antarctic Survey (BAS).

575 This was subsequently extended to December 31, 1982 and then to March 31, 1983

576 *Falkland Island Dependencies: Whaling Stations February 1, 1983* FCO note to Downing Street.

577 *The Reagan Revolution II: Rebuilding the Western Alliance* Richard C. Thornton 2004

578 Pascoe 2022 vol.3 p.616

579 *PM/79/81*

580 A lease arrangement had first been mooted in January, 1975. See above

581 Livingstone 2018 citing *Carrington to Thatcher September 20, 1979 PREM 19/656*

September 21st, Cabinet Secretary John Hunt, *minutes* the Prime Minister.

“Lord Carrington... proposes that in the margin of the UN General Assembly meeting next week he should suggest to his Argentine Foreign Minister that negotiations should start soon ... In these negotiations we should, for the first time, formally put to the Argentine the suggestion that we might concede sovereignty over the Falklands and the Dependencies in return for a leaseback to ensure continued British rule for as long as possible...”

Thatcher writes on the top of the *minute*; *“I cannot possibly agree to the proposed course of action.”*⁵⁸²

September 22nd, in the UK, Energy Secretary David Howell, also writes to Thatcher.

*“I have seen Peter Carrington's (sic) paper to you on the subject of the Falkland Islands ... It is true that the presence of oil (or gas) has yet to be proven, but the continued interest of the oil companies and the results of recent geophysical surveys ... lead us to think that there is at least a good chance that hydrocarbons are there. We ought to be very careful about adopting a course which could lead to British oil companies losing a favourable position ... ”*⁵⁸³

*“When, in late 1979, Lord Carrington proposed a 99-year lease-back formula, the Secretary of State for Energy, David Howell, wrote to Margaret Thatcher ... He called for a full discussion of the economic implications of leaseback, warning that if sovereignty was transferred ‘it could also involve a substantial loss to the British economy if oil were found’. ... The Chancellor of the Exchequer, Geoffrey Howe, agreed...”*⁵⁸⁴

September 25th, after speaking to Thatcher, Carrington informs Ridley that the Prime Minister will not be rushed into making a decision on his proposals and that Ridley should inform Argentina that this; *“complex problem”* was being considered.⁵⁸⁵

In New York, at the UN, Argentina's Foreign Ministry proposes a *“programme of work”* in which Secretary of State Ridley meets with Argentina's Deputy Foreign Minister informally twice a year with an open agenda.

October 1st, in London, anticipating a discussion on the Falklands at the next Defence and Overseas Policy Committee, John Ure circulates a *memo*.⁵⁸⁶

*“On historical and legal grounds we are confident that our sovereignty is soundly based. Nothing in the negotiations so far has eroded this. Equally, no progress has been made. ... Our objectives in the dispute include the following (i) To defend the right of the British settlers to remain under British administration. (ii) To end a dispute which is damaging to trade; damaging to international relations (most of the UN vote against us) and politically explosive at home... (iii) To ensure that the UK derives advantage from the economic resources of the area: possibly oil and certainly fish. Argentine objectives appear to include: (i) achieving nominal sovereignty for reasons of national pride. (ii) Securing a share of the economic offshore resources. (iii) A possible non-national objective in providing a cause to further the ambitions of individual Argentine officers.”*⁵⁸⁷

Three options are raised for discussion: a refusal to negotiate; negotiation but a refusal to make concessions on sovereignty; or the adoption of: *“... a more constructive approach... insisting on preserving our essential interests... On sovereignty, we could explore various arrangements, the most promising of which would*

582 PREM 19/656 fl 14 Margaret Thatcher Foundation

583 PREM 19/612. Lord Carrington's family name, has only one 'r'.

584 Livingstone 2018 citing *Howell to Thatcher September 22, 1979* PREM 19/612

585 Franks 1983 para.73

586 An OD Committee meeting was scheduled for October 4, 1979. As yet, I have found no record. See October 15, 1979

587 FCO 76/1892. Original emphasis.

appear to be a "leaseback" analogous to the New Territories in Hong Kong, under which Argentina would acquire nominal sovereignty while the Islanders continued to enjoy the security of British rule. ..." ⁵⁸⁸

Annex 3 to Ure's memo notes.

"The question of British sovereignty over the Falkland Islands and their Dependencies has not been submitted to the International Court of Justice or to any other international arbitration. Since Argentina has not accepted the compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice, and reference to the Court could only be made with the agreement of the Argentine Government." ⁵⁸⁹

October 2nd, John Grundon, an Exploration and Commercial Manager for British Petroleum, informs the Government's Energy, Science and Space Department that; "... BP had all but written off the Falkland Islands as a prospective offshore oil area. This was not because of the political obstacles... The main reason for BP lack of interest was geological." ⁵⁹⁰

October 3rd, in the Falklands, the first edition of the *Penguin News* is published. Founded by Graham Bound. From Buenos Aires, Constantino Davidoff writes to the Falkland Islands Government.

"175. Mr. Davidoff signed a contract with the company "Salvensen Limited" of Edinburgh, which was notarized before the notary public Ian Roger Frame on 19-SET-79 with validity until 31-MAR-83. In October 1979, the Argentine merchant contacted the authorities of Port Stanley, in order to inform them of the existence of the aforementioned contract and explore the possibility of renting a boat to transport the scrap metal obtained from the scrapping of the factories. To which the local authorities refused." ⁵⁹¹

October 12th, in London, Lord Carrington again seeks a decision from Cabinet.

"I ... invite my colleagues to agree that the FCO should resume talks with the Argentines at Ministerial level. The purpose of the talks in the first instance would be to explore, without commitment, political and economic solutions... We would seek not to rush matters: so long as the Argentines believe we are negotiating seriously, they will desist from precipitate action." ⁵⁹²

"A memorandum by Foreign Secretary Lord Carrington in late 1979 warned that if Britain refused to negotiate, the Islands could be blockaded or even invaded. But he also argued that if an agreement was not reached with Argentina, the Islands could fall into economic decline, British trade with Argentina could be damaged and that it would be impossible to exploit the economic resources (primarily oil and fish) of the South Atlantic. Long annexes attached to the memorandum outlined not only the cost of defending the Islands militarily, but also the threat to British commercial interests in Argentina,..." ⁵⁹³

October 15th, Thatcher defers the issue. *"The Prime Minister has seen the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary's memorandum of 12 October... She has asked that discussion of the Falkland Islands by OD should be postponed until after the Rhodesia issue has been settled."* ⁵⁹⁴

588 *Ibid*

589 *Ibid*. In Annex 3, 1947's decision of the Law Officer was highlighted; while the 1966 legal advice which broadly agreed with that of 1947, was only mentioned. *cf.* 1947 & 1966

590 *Ibid*.

591 *Junta Militar: Comision de Analisis y Evaluacion de las Responsabilidades del Conflicto del Atlantico Syr – Informe Final* a.k.a. The Rattenbach Report (undated). Commissioned by the Argentine Junta after the 1982 war, a final, official, version was published in 2012. This appears to be earlier. See - <https://www.casarosada.gob.ar/pdf/InformeRattenbach/01-InformeFinal.pdf>

592 *CAB 148/183*

593 Livingston 2018 citing *DOP Committee October 12, 1979 CAB 148/183*

594 *ALW 040/325/14*

In London, Argentina's recently retired Admiral Massera, visiting the UK, has a meeting with Foreign Secretary Ridley; *"During their meeting, the retired Admiral told Ridley that in ideal "military terms", Argentina wanted to "take" the Islands, but as this was 'unrealistic' they were seeking a compromise with Britain. The Foreign Office hosted a lunch for Massera at the Savoy..."*⁵⁹⁵

October 20th, from Argentina's Antarctic Base Esperanza, a radio station - 'Arcángel San Gabriel' - commences operation under the auspices of the Ministry of Communications.

November 2nd, in London, Argentina's *charge d'affaires* invites Ridley to meet with Deputy Foreign Minister Cavándoli. Ridley turns down the invitation.

November 21st, in New York, the UN General Assembly defer consideration of the Falklands until 1980.

November 27th, from Stanley, the Governor of the Falklands writes to Christian Salvesen Ltd to express his "reservations" regarding that company's contract with Davidoff.⁵⁹⁶

*"176. Mr. Davidoff's next step was to formalize a company for the entity "Islas Georgias de Sur Sociedad Anónima" (in formation) with two more partners. Subsequently, he tried to hire a transporter that would allow him to observe "in situ" the magnitude and tools necessary for the work to be carried out in the whaling factories."*⁵⁹⁷

In **December**, in Finland, the Argentine Embassy complains about a television programme to be aired on MAINOS-TV; *Falkland Islands: Summer in the middle of Winter*. This refers to the archipelago as British. As a result of the protests, the recording is re-edited to avoid any political references; *"The (Finnish) Foreign Ministry's rather silly reaction no doubt gave the Argentinians immense satisfaction."*⁵⁹⁸

1980 – January 9th, from Stanley, Governor Parker gives his response to the suggestion of a *lease-back* arrangement; *"... maybe I have been here too long but after even only three years among the Islanders I would instinctively find it as difficult to accept as they would."*

In London, facing pressure from arms manufacturers unhappy that the Foreign Office keeps blocking sales to Argentine, Minister Nicholas Ridley notes; *"The prime minister was most insistent when I saw her about the Falkland Islands that we should not sell Argentina any arms."*⁵⁹⁹

January 24th, a confidential Foreign Office *memo* sums up an internal debate on whether or not the UK should recognise Indonesia's *de facto* possession of East Timor. Occupied by force in 1975, Foreign Office mandarins suggest that the result of such recognition could set an embarrassing precedent, the *memo* notes.

*"... there is a residual danger of an Argentine invasion of the Falkland Islands and should this take place, Britain's UN case would be seriously flawed were we to accord full legal recognition to the Indonesian seizure;..."*⁶⁰⁰

January 25th, in London, the Cabinet Secretary, Robert Armstrong, writes to Thatcher to remind her that any discussions on the Falklands should include the question of oil.

595 Livingston 2018 citing *Temple to Ure October 31, 1979 FCO 7/3589*

596 *Falkland Island Dependencies: Whaling Stations February 1, 1983 FCO note to Downing Street. cf. September, 1979*

597 *Junta Militar: Comision de Analisis y Evaluacion de las Responsabilidades del Conflicto del Atlantico Syr – Inform Final* a.k.a. The Rattenbach Report (undated). See August, 1981 below

598 *ALW 0420/325/1*

599 Notes dated January 14, 1980 in *FCO 7/3730* and quoted in Livingstone 2018. Despite the Prime Minister's views, several arms contracts were approved in 1980 and export licences granted, including military aircraft, surveillance equipment and a missile control system. It is not clear what was eventually supplied. See Livingston 2018.

600 *ALW 0420/325/1*

“... ministers needed to consider ‘the possible oil and fishery benefits at stake’ and ‘the implications for our oil and fishery interests elsewhere of the possible cession of sovereignty over the Falkland Islands continental shelf. ...”⁶⁰¹

January 28th, from Stanley, Governor Parker, coming to the end of a 3 year term, sends a valedictory despatch to London.

*“(The) greater part of a Governor's time is taken up by the day-to-day maintenance of the community's services ... it is a necessary part of the job also devote time to the planning of the further improvement of those services, alongside long term schemes for urban and rural development - just as if the place had the longest of all futures. And then the cold thought comes: that all this work and planning could be set at naught because of the need to meet the emotional and nationalistic demands of a country, Argentina, 400 miles away across the sea ... It might clarify thinking considerably if Britain were to drop her attitude of apparent detachment, assess her advantages and interests, and openly meet the Argentines on the same terms in the dispute as they have chosen for themselves.”*⁶⁰²

At the British Foreign Office, Robin Fearn, head of the South America department, receives Parker's communication.

*“Mr Parker tends to look at the problem from the islanders' viewpoint. ... We must try to ensure that the new Governor retains a more objective view of his mission and of the need to bring the Islanders to recognise the narrow options open to them and to us.”*⁶⁰³

January 29th, at Downing Street, London, a Cabinet Defence and Overseas Policy (OD) Committee meeting considers the relative strengths of claims regarding the Falklands.

*“Argentina's legal claim to sovereignty over the Falkland Islands was very weak. That was why they did not wish to let the matter go to arbitration. Any agreement to discuss sovereignty might damage Britain's strong legal position.”*⁶⁰⁴

Summing up the debate, PM Thatcher says; “... that the nub of the problem lay in the danger that any resumption of talks might appear to foreshadow a surrender of sovereignty over the Falkland Islands at some time in the future. There was no legal basis for such a surrender.” The meeting agrees to a new round of talks, but asks Carrington to seek agreement from the Islanders that negotiations with Argentina resume.

*“In January 1981 at a further meeting of that committee – the eighth collective discussion – was held to review the situation in the light of the islanders' reactions to the leaseback proposal and the comments in both Houses on the Statement of December 1980. The committee endorsed the noble Lord, Lord Carrington's, proposal that the aim should be to keep the negotiations going with a view to finding an acceptable basis for a negotiated settlement. They agreed to early talks for which Argentina was pressing, and at which the islanders were to be represented.”*⁶⁰⁵

*“Department of Energy officials, however, were concerned that the commitment to preserving Britain's oil rights was not strong enough when ministers agreed, in January 1980, to start exploratory ministerial talks with Argentina.”*⁶⁰⁶

601 Livingston 2018 citing *Armstrong to Thatcher January 25, 1980 PREM 19/656*

602 Quoted in Parris & Bryson 2012

603 *Ibid*

604 *CAB 148/189*

605 Baroness Young in *HL Deb 25 January 1983 vol.438 cc136-247*

606 Livingston 2018 citing *Birchmore to D'Ancona January 30, 1980 EG 14/92*

February 5th, Energy Secretary David Howell writes to Lord Carrington to emphasise the importance of retaining access for the UK, to any potential oil fields around the Falklands. ⁶⁰⁷

February 7th, Stanley's *Penguin News* editorial says;

"We can trust the British Government as little as we trust the Argentina Government and feeble cries of 'Keep the Falklands British' and other cliches will win us no support. Instead we should look to ourselves and proclaim the Falklands belong to us, and not to Britain, Argentina or any other foreign country. ... independence."

February 11th, in London, an internal FCO memo notes that with regard to Britain's dependent territories:

"The present British Government are fully committed to the policy followed by successive Governments since 1945 of giving every help and encouragement to those Dependent Territories which wish to become independent, while not forcing independence on those which do not wish it... Where local government have made it clear that they do not wish their territories to become independent, we are content to retain sovereignty for the time being. But we must also retain the legal powers necessary to ensure that we are able to fulfil the responsibilities that sovereignty entails. ... Each case will be considered on its merits, bearing in mind the constraints imposed by external political circumstances and the wishes of the local population.... Responsibility and power must go together. Political development must therefore stop some way short of full internal self-government where territories choose to remain dependent. In such cases the British Government, through the Governor, will retain overall responsibility for:-

- (i) external affairs;*
- (ii) defence;*
- (iii) internal security, ...;*
- (iv) the administration of the police;*
- (v) the administration of the public service;*
- (vi) the judiciary..."* ⁶⁰⁸

In Buenos Aires, Anthony Williams arrives as British Ambassador to Argentina, re-establishing formal diplomatic relations. ⁶⁰⁹

"... a consistent advocate of closer ties with Argentina." ⁶¹⁰

"... Ambassador Anthony Williams said the Islanders could not continue to use facilities provided by Argentina – such as air service, supplies of fuel, food and other freight – whilst 'insulting' the Argentines. He wanted to visit the Islands 'to install fear in them of the consequences'. He was criticised by the islanders for appeasement." ⁶¹¹

February 13th, in Stanley, the Falkland Islands Government agree to renewed talks, provided that an Islander was present and that the negotiations remain 'general,' 'exploratory' and 'without commitment.'

607 *Ibid.* citing Howell to Carrington February 5, 1980 PREM 19/612

608 ALW 040/325/1. The first three appear reasonable. The remainder, less so.

609 His predecessor had been recalled in 1977.

610 Livingstone 2018

611 Briley 2022

In London, briefing notes issued by the Foreign Office call into question Argentina's interpretation of UN resolutions.

"The UK does not accept the assertion by Argentina that the " illegality of the occupation of the Falkland, South Georgia and South Sandwich Islands by the United Kingdom has been recognised by the United Nations." Resolutions have simply called for the settlement of the dispute by negotiation between the two Governments." ⁶¹²

February 27th, Rex Masterman Hunt is appointed Governor of the Falkland Islands. ⁶¹³

"By 1980 there were only three British territories whose governors merited a full-dress ceremonial uniform: Bermuda, Hong Kong and the Falklands, so he was duly measured for his uniform at Messers Hogg and Johnston of Sackville Street." ⁶¹⁴

March 18th, in London, an internal FCO memorandum notes that British businesses are likely to side with Argentina on the subject of Falklands sovereignty, which is viewed as an obstacle to a good trading relationship. ⁶¹⁵

In **April**, a study into fish resources around the Falklands archipelago is released.

"The study concluded that there were two principal species of fish found within 200 miles of the Falklands. Patagonian hake was fished intensively by Argentine, German, Japanese and Spanish vessels and was thought to have reached the maximum sustainable yield. The unexploited blue whiting stocks could produce an estimated yield of 800,000 to 1 million tonnes a year. There was an urgent need for conservation measures. The White Fish Authority identified a number of problems with the S.A.F.C.'s proposals. The fillet freezer trawlers, which were required for the exploratory voyage, had nearly all been sold or converted to whole fish freezing. The development of the fisheries would be constrained by Port Stanley's limited facilities. Finally, the declaration of a 200 mile fishing zone would be unprofitable to police." ⁶¹⁶

April 28th, in New York, British and Argentine delegations meet for two days of talks. Councillor Monk represents the Islanders. Nicolas Ridley's Foreign Office brief notes:

"Sovereignty Options: Points to Make (only if raised by Argentines)... this exploratory round is not the place to undertake any substantive discussion of sovereignty proposals. 3. All these have to be seen in the context of the paramountcy of Islanders' wishes... International Arbitration: Points to make (Defensive) 1. We should not raise this question and it is most unlikely that the Argentines will. If they do ask whether we would consider taking the dispute to an international tribunal, Mr. Ridley should say that he will need time to consult his Ministerial colleagues before giving HMG's answer. ...

Legal Advisers do not dissent from the views expressed by the Law Officers in 1966, nor do they consider the composition of the ICJ as any more favourable to the UK position than in 1966." ⁶¹⁷

612 A4 ALW 0420/325/1

613 *The London Gazette* August 13, 1980. For a biography, see - https://www.falklandsbiographies.org/biographies/hunt_sir

614 Pascoe 2022 vol.2 p.622

615 Malcomson to Bright, Duggan and Fearn March 18, 1980 FCO 7/3726

616 Ellerby 1990 p.252 citing *F.I.A. archive (London), box file 6, V.F.A., Fisheries Dec. 1979*. A surprising conclusion considering the success of the subsequent EEZ declared around the Islands in 1991; with fishing revenues by 2020 accounting for a large part of the FIG's income. See - <https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/how-the-falkland-islands-became-one-of-the-worlds-most-affluent-places-f9kc8fzjk>

617 *Brief No. A4 – A6 ALW 0420/325/1 (FCO 07-3801) 1980*. Legal advice provided in 1966 remained embargoed in 2020, but is understood to confirm a similar opinion given in 1947. That is available in the National Archives. *cf.* 1947 & 1966

On the issue of a leaseback option.

*“It would be a formidable task to negotiate an agreement of this kind acceptable to Britain, Argentina and the Islanders. It would require Argentine agreement to leave the administration and way of life of the Islanders unchanged throughout the period of the lease. It would probably also require outside guarantees.”*⁶¹⁸

April 29th, in New York, on the second day of talks, Argentina’s Minister Cavándoli tells delegates; *“Sovereignty was a sine qua non, an underlying condition, for progress on the other questions,”* and that sovereignty must be discussed. With little achieved by the end of the day an impasse arises over the wording of the final joint *communiqué*. Britain wishes to refer to the meetings as ‘discussions’ while the Argentine’s want to call them, ‘negotiations’. A decision is deferred to the next day.

*“Ridley, like the Foreign Office, saw oil as a way of resolving the dispute through Anglo-Argentine cooperation and, when he met Argentine deputy foreign minister Carlos Cavándoli, in April 1980, he proposed joint exploration ... But Argentina would only consider it as part of an overall deal on sovereignty.”*⁶¹⁹

*“An April 1980 meeting between the Argentines and Nicholas Ridley in New York failed to agree co-operation on fishing, oil exploration and improved communications. The Islanders’ representative, Legislative Councillor Adrian Monk, a tough-talking farmer and anti-Argentine critic, was refused access to the briefing notes, with the excuse that he did not have security clearance.”*⁶²⁰

April 30th, on the final day of talks, an agreed *communiqué* states that; *“... the discussions were of a comprehensive and wide-ranging nature, and were conducted in a cordial and positive spirit,..”* and that the two governments, *“intend to hold future meetings in order to continue these exchanges.”*

*“In a written answer to a parliamentary question from Mr. Ted Rowlands MP, Mr Ridley’s predecessor and now a member of the Falkland Islands Committee, the Foreign Office replied that the talks in New York were ‘wide ranging and exploratory’. The exchanges were conducted in a cordial and positive spirit and each side was able to reach a better understanding of the other’s position. No decisions were taken at the talks although it was agreed that contact on ‘day to day’ matters between the Islands and Argentina should be expanded. Each delegation is reporting back to its government. It is hoped to continue exchanges, said the Foreign Office.”*⁶²¹

May 5th – 20th, in Canberra, Australia, a conference is held concerning the Antarctic Treaty.⁶²² The resulting Convention includes South Georgia and the South Sandwich Islands despite them being above the Antarctic Treaty’s area of 60°S.

*“The Antarctic Treaty powers have signed a convention which will bring the Falkland Islands Dependencies into the Treaty Zone – a protected area under the 1959 pact between Russia, the United States, Britain, France, Norway, Argentina, Chile, New Zealand, Australia, Belgium, Japan, Poland, South Africa. The Treaty Powers are seeking agreement on the future developments of the area, which is of unique scientific importance but also of significant economic potential. The United Nations Law of the Sea conference is watching developments closely.”*⁶²³

618 *Ibid* – Brief No. A4

619 Livingstone 2018

620 Briley 2022

621 *Falkland Islands Newsletter* June 1980 no.8. See also *HC Deb* 14 May 1980 vol 984 cc.1476-1479

622 Resulting in the Convention on the Conservation of Antarctic marine Living Resources. Entered into force April 7, 1982. See - https://documents.ats.aq/keydocs/vol_1/vol1_12_CCAMLR_CCAMLR_e.pdf


623 *Falkland Islands Newsletter* June 1980 no.8

May 21st, in Britain's House of Lords, during a debate on the Canberra Conference relating to Antarctic fishing and marine conservation, Lord Trefgarne offers assurances with regard to the Falklands.

*“There is no question of any change in sovereignty arising from this convention. Furthermore, the Falkland Islands fishing rights in the seas around the dependencies remain unaffected by this new convention.”*⁶²⁴

June 5th, visiting London, Dr. Jose de Hoz, Argentina’s Economy Minister, meets with PM Thatcher.

*“Yesterday, Dr Jose Alfredo Martinez de Hoz, the Argentine Minister of the Economy, who is on an official visit to Britain had discussions with ministers and officials and called on Mrs Thatcher, ... He said in an interview: “For the first time some progress has been made and there is a little light on the horizon ... and I think the economic side can help. We have two common interests, which could be oil and fishing. So long as some sort of discussions on sovereignty can go on at the same time we might be able to reach some kind of agreement on joint oil exploration or fishing which would be the beginning of a get-together on this issue”. ...”*⁶²⁵



*“... most controversially, and barely featuring in British collective memory, Sir Lawrence Freedman, professor of War Studies at King’s College London recounts how Margaret Thatcher’s government offered to hand over sovereignty of the Islands at a clandestine meeting with a senior member of the Argentine military junta in June 1980, less than two years before the conflict in the South Atlantic and, unlike in 1974, to a dictatorship rather than a democratically elected government.”*⁶²⁶

June 27th, Lord Carrington, in a *memo*, proposes an agreement involving transfer of title over the Falklands and the Dependencies, provided that these were immediately '*leased back*' to the UK for an indefinite period. Arrangements could then be made regarding co-operation on fishing and oil exploration.

July 2nd, in London, the Cabinet Defence and Overseas Policy Committee consider Carrington's proposals; *“In discussion there was general agreement with the practical advantages of the course of action proposed although considerable misgivings were expressed about its domestic political implications.”*⁶²⁷ At the end of the debate, Lord Carrington is authorised to initiate '*exploratory*' and '*confidential*' talks with Argentina.

*“Margaret Thatcher and members of the cabinet’s Defence and Overseas Policy (DOP) Committee ... agreed, in July 1980, to begin exploratory discussions on a solution that could include a ‘surrender of sovereignty and simultaneous leaseback arrangements’...”*⁶²⁸

July 30th, Britain's Government informs Parliament that it is to publish a White Paper on the issue of nationality; to contain proposals for new legislation.⁶²⁹

624 *HL Deb 21 May 1980 vol.409 cc955-1004*

625 *The Times* June 6, 1980

626 Levey & Ozarow 2021 citing Freedman 2005 p.698. I can find no reference to this in Freedman’s 2005 work.

627 *CAB 148/189*

628 Livingstone 2018

629 See below. Also January, July and October, 1981

*“We have, ... been impressed with the argument that a separate citizenship should be established for the dependencies as a whole. We propose that this should be called citizenship of the British dependent territories. I emphasise that the establishment of this separate citizenship will not alter the United Kingdom's obligations and commitments to our overseas territories. Those who are now citizens of the United Kingdom and Colonies but do not qualify for British citizenship or for citizenship of the British dependent territories will become British overseas citizens.”*⁶³⁰

*“Nobody would doubt that, by 1981, British Nationality Law was in need of reform. The problem was, where to begin. ... For the Government matter were quite simple. The chief problem about existing nationality law was that it provided no clear statement as to who had the right of unrestricted entry.”*⁶³¹

*“The perception of the Government trying to get rid of the islands was reinforced in 1980 when its work on a reformed British Nationality Law was widely discussed. ...”*⁶³²

In **August**, in Buenos Aires, Britain's Minister for Trade, Cecil Parkinson, arrives with company executives from Lloyds Bank, Hawker Sidley, GEC and Wimpey.

*“Neither the Falkland Islands nor human rights featured strongly in discussions...”*⁶³³

*“The drive to capture more of Argentina's lucrative market was reflected in the growing number of British trade missions sent to Argentina in the Thatcher years: these rose from four in 1978 to eight in 1979, and ten in 1980. But ... British diplomats continued to lament that the Falklands factor inhibited trade and prevented British companies from winning large state contracts from the regime.”*⁶³⁴

August 9th, in the Falklands, Royal Marine Alan Addis, a member of NP 8901, is reported missing following an evening with other marines and locals, at North Arm in Lafonia.⁶³⁵

September 10th, near Geneva, Switzerland, Nicholas Ridley and Minister Cavándoli meet for two days of talks.

*“It was agreed at the outset that complete secrecy was essential to both sides. Mr. Ridley was ostensibly on holiday with his wife at the Hotel de Lac at Coppet. Comodoro Cavandoli and Comandante Bloomer-Reeve were on their way back to Buenos Aires from Cyprus, where they had been attending an Argentine Regional Heads of Mission conference ... Mr Ridley opened the proceedings by saying that he had the authority of his Ministerial colleagues to put forward the ideas which he was about to explain but that anything agreed at this meeting would have to be ad referendum and would be subject to endorsement by the British Cabinet and, no less important, would have to be acceptable to the Islanders.”*⁶³⁶

630 *HL Debate 30 July 1980 Hansard vol.412 cc891-8*

631 *Citizenship, Law and the State: The British nationality Act 1981* Charles Blake in *The Modern Law Revue* 1982 vol.45 no.2 March pp.179-197. The previous Labour Government had considered changes and produced a Green Paper which had failed to gather much support.

632 *The Sovereignty Dispute over the Falkland (Malvinas) Islands* L. S. Gustafson 1988

633 *Ambassador Williams to FCO August 11, 1980 FCO 7/3728*

634 Livingstone 2018

635 Naval Party 8901 was the name given to the detachment of Royal Marines based on the Islands from 1966: generally 43 marines on an annual rotation. The steamer *MV Forrest* was half an hour out of North Arm that morning, before Addis's absence was noticed and reported. Last confirmed sighting of the 19 year-old marine was established to be around 0130 that morning, following a function at the local social club. No body was ever found and no further information has ever come to light. Foul play or misadventure? Theories abound.

636 *ALW 040/325/10 & FCO 7/3808 (Received in Registry 15 Sep 1980.)*. See -

<https://falklandstimeline.files.wordpress.com/2022/06/summary-record-of-a-confidential-meeting-between-the-minister-of-state-and-the-argentine-deputy-foreign-minister-at-geneva-on-10-and-11-september-1980.pdf>

Ridley suggests a 200 year lease. Minister Cavándoli responds that; *“The only difficulty he saw was in the length of the lease ... a period of, say, 20 years would have to be ruled out as being much too short for the Islanders. We ought to think of some median figure (Comandante Bloomer-Reeve suggests 75 years).”*⁶³⁷ Cavándoli goes on to propose that the British Government remove the Royal Marine detachment from the Islands, to underline to Islanders that Argentina was no longer viewed as a threat; and to please Argentine public opinion. He also suggests that the terms of any lease should include an Argentine right to buy or rent land.

September 11th, Ridley hands over an *‘exploratory proposal’* to Cavandoli suggesting:-

1. Titular sovereignty to be transferred to Argentina;
2. Continued British administration via a lease-back arrangement for 99 years. Subject to periodic review;
3. British and Argentine flags to be flown side-by-side;
4. British Governor with locally elected Council responsible for the administration of the islands;
5. Argentina to be represented by a Commissioner-General;
6. A Joint-Council to arrange co-operation over economic development.

It is agreed that both parties will report back to their respective Governments.

*“In The Official History of the Falklands Campaign, Freedman explains how the Foreign Office devised a plan to cede sovereignty to Argentina with a leaseback agreement to Britain for 99 years. This was agreed (sic) at a secret meeting between Foreign Secretary, Nicholas Ridley and his opposite number, Comodoro Cavandoli in Switzerland. Given that Britain had already enjoyed a cosy relationship with the ruling dictatorship, having sold Lynx helicopters and naval missiles (which were later used against the British forces in 1982) to the regime, the deal was a master-stroke from a business perspective as it would lay the ground for further multi-million pound arms sales for as long as the Junta remained in power.”*⁶³⁸

September 12th, on his arrival back in London, Secretary of State Ridley reports to Lord Carrington.

“... we are left with a clear option ... We can either seek a solution by negotiation along the lines of the Geneva talks (to which I think we could get Argentina to agree), or we could say that the concessions are beyond our political ability to deliver, and break off the talks (with all the obvious consequences). I do not think that there is much to gain by attempting to find a different package: both sides are close to their rock bottom positions. ... I believe it can be sold to the Islanders, but I am not certain.”

In London, a letter from Falkland Islanders, concerning the British Nationality White Paper, is published in *The Times* newspaper.⁶³⁹

“The Government White Paper – British Nationality Law (Cmnd 7987) – effectively reduces many Falkland Islanders to second class citizens. The White paper defines three classes of citizenship: British Citizenship, Citizenship of British dependent Territories and British Overseas Citizenship. Falkland islanders whose parents were born, adopted, naturalized or registered in the United Kingdom qualify for British Citizenship, but there are several hundred Falkland islanders who only qualify for citizenship of British dependent Territories and thus have no right of abode in the United Kingdom. The Islanders' case is different from other citizens of British Dependent Territories for several reasons. There was no indigenous population when the

637 *Ibid.*

638 Levey & Ozarow 2021. In reality, nothing had been *‘agreed’* as everything was subject to referral.

639 Signed by Sir John Lapsey who had been brought up in the Islands, and Lionel Daillie and Patrick Vincent, who were both born there.

*Islands were first settled by Britain. Falkland Islanders have no 'mother country' except the United Kingdom. There is no question of the Falkland Islanders seeking independence and the Service pensioner settlers who came out in 1832 (sic) were promised the right to retain full British citizenship. The Falkland Islands Office believe that Falkland islanders are British and should be given the full right of antry and abode in their mother country.”*⁶⁴⁰

*“... second class citizenship (would be imposed) on several hundred Falkland islanders who do not have grandparents who were born in the United Kingdom, but whose pure British nationality extends unbroken since the early nineteenth century, ...”*⁶⁴¹

September 25th, in New York, Lord Carrington and Argentine Foreign Minister Carlos Pastor meet.⁶⁴²

October 29th, in London, following a question asked by Minister Ridley, a Foreign Office official explains to him that the proceeds of any oil found around the Falklands would, by precedent, be paid to the Falkland Islands Government; *“(However)... in practical terms, we ought to be able to ensure ... that we get a substantial share of the action and the profit.”*⁶⁴³

November 2nd, published in Argentine newspaper, *La Prensa*, a map of the Falklands archipelago employs Spanish language names for places in the Islands; many from the 18th century.⁶⁴⁴

*“... it called Port Egmont "Puerto de la Cruzada" and Kepple Sound "Bahia de la Cruzada" ... However, ... the 1973 map retained a few original English names, including Darwin, Fitzroy, "Puerto Howard" and "Puerto Stanley" ... The new maps ... look as if they were produced in preparation for taking the islands over. That was now becoming a confident expectation in Argentine government circles.”*⁶⁴⁵

November 5th, from Buenos Aires, Ambassador Williams reports that the government have endorsed the concept of *lease-back*, but will wish to negotiate over the length of the lease.

November 6th, in the *Herald Tribune* newspaper, Argentina's State Petroleum Company (YPF) advertises for tenders for oil exploration licences over an area it calls, *'Magalenes Este.'* This extends to within 96 miles of the Falklands archipelago – crossing the median line between Argentina and the archipelago.

November 7th, in London, at an Cabinet Defence and Overseas Policy (OD) Committee meeting PM Thatcher is again presented with *'leaseback'* as the only viable option.

*“It seemed likely that, on balance, given the bleakness of their present situation, the majority of Islanders would be ready to support negotiations with Argentina on the lines proposed, recognising that, while the Government would not go back on its commitment to defend them, it was not able to offer alternative ways of improving their position.”*⁶⁴⁶

*“... it is clear from the official record that, while she had misgivings, she saw no other alternative. Nor did any of the other ministers present at the meeting. But when Ridley proposed the plan to the House of Commons three weeks later, no other minister came to his defence.”*⁶⁴⁷

640 Quoted in the *Falkland Islands Newsletter* December 1980 no.9

641 Gustafson 1988

642 *UN Doc. A.AC.109/670 Falkland Islands (Malvinas) Working Paper by the Secretariat* August 5, 1981. There is no British record of this meeting.

643 *Duggan to Ridley* October 29, 1980 EG 14/93

644 Based, seemingly, on a 1973 map produced by the Instituto Geografico Militar (Hoja 5260).

645 Pascoe 2022 vol.3 p.624

646 *OD (80) 23rd Meeting, Confidential Record* November 7, 1980 CAB 148/196 quoted in Livingstone 2018

647 Livingstone 2018

The decision of the Committee is that Ridley should visit the Falklands in order to assess Islander views.

*“.., Margaret Thatcher and the Defence and Overseas Policy Committee (DOP) agreed to seek the Islanders’ approval of leaseback. During this DOP meeting, ministers also noted: ‘It would be important to make satisfactory arrangements for any oil that might be discovered ... (and that) further thought should be given to ways in which the United Kingdom might be guaranteed entitlement to a substantial part of the revenues.’...”*⁶⁴⁸

*“The Foreign Office told Ridley to paint a grim picture of the alternatives of economic decline and Argentine aggression to make Falklands ‘Councillors flesh creep’. He had to avoid accusations of conspiracy and keep secret the progress with Cavandoli.”*⁶⁴⁹

Researcher's Comment: Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher is often accused of being willing to hand over the Falkland Islands to Argentina in 1980 without the support of the Falklands people. This was not true. Carington, Ridley and the Foreign and Commonwealth Office railroaded the Prime Minister, against her better instincts, into the leaseback option. Thatcher's instincts would be proven correct.

November 11th, in New York, the UN General Assembly defers the question of the Falklands until 1981.⁶⁵⁰

November 18th, Britain’s *The Times* newspaper reports.

“... it is stressed in London that British policy towards the Falklands remains as it has always been, that no solution would be acceptable that was not agreed by both the islanders and the British Parliament.”

November 21st, in Buenos Aires, Minister Nicholas Ridley, en-route to the Falklands, stops off to speak to the Foreign Minister. Seemingly unaware that he had intended to do so, Argentine authorities appear irritated.⁶⁵¹ However, Cavandoli and Ridley have a private meeting.⁶⁵²

*“Ridley travelled to the Falklands through Buenos Aires, where he had a ‘quiet drink’ with Cavandoli and presented him with a silver spoon for his newly born grandson. Ridley urged the Argentines, not to be ‘nice to him in public’ but maintain antagonism and complain about ‘lack of progress’...”*⁶⁵³

Before leaving, Ridley speaks to journalists.

*“Mr Ridley told reporters that he had come to meet the islanders on whose total acceptance depended any solution to the dispute. Argentine feathers have been ruffled ... The local press enjoyed an orgy of indignation, and the Foreign Ministry replied in a communiqué that the British Government had not made one positive move to solve the sovereignty question.”*⁶⁵⁴

*“He made it clear that the Islanders’ wishes would be paramount and that their readiness to contemplate lease-back could not be taken for granted. He also made it clear that the concept was not regarded with any enthusiasm in London and it would not be easy to satisfy Parliament...”*⁶⁵⁵

648 *Ibid.*

649 Briley 2022

650 UN Doc. A.AC.109/670 *Falkland Islands (Malvinas) Working Paper by the Secretariat* August 5, 1981.

651 *Falkland Islanders at War* Graham Bound 2002. Ministers do not just ‘turn up’ in a foreign country. Farce or conspiracy?

652 At an International Conference on the Falkland Islands in 1990, Argentine author Virginia Gamba-Stonehouse claimed that Ridley agreed the ‘lease-back’ arrangement with Argentina, before moving on to the Islands.

653 Briley 2022

654 *The Times* November 23, 1980

655 PREM 19/656 f62 at the Margaret Thatcher Foundation.

November 22nd, at Port Stanley, Minister Ridley arrives with a set of objectives agreed in London.

*“(i) to persuade Councillors (and through them Islanders) that the prolongation of the dispute is not in their interests or those of HMG; and that we must work towards a negotiated settlement with the Argentines; ii) therefore to obtain their agreement that we should enter into negotiations with Argentina to explore the scope for a settlement based on leaseback; iii) to impress upon them our respect for their wishes to remain British, our interests in their welfare and our concern for their future.”*⁶⁵⁶

“When Ridley arrived in Stanley, the local paper Penguin News reported that “the burning question is, what is he here for?””⁶⁵⁷

November 24th, Nicholas Ridley meets Island Councillors.

*“Mr. Bennet asked if the question could be taken to the ICJ. Mr. Ridley said that internationally, we were in a minority of one on the issue. The Argentines would not accept ICJ arbitration...”*⁶⁵⁸

At a public meeting, Ridley puts forward his three proposals.

*“There was the ‘freeze’ idea, whereby both sides would agree to disagree and take no action to further their claims for a specified time. But the minister pointed out that at the end of the moratorium period the old problem would return with a vengeance. Then there was the possibility of ‘condominium’, joint government. The Argentine flag would need to fly alongside the Union Flag. There would also need to be two police forces, two governors, and two official languages. Even Ridley believed this was a non-starter. Finally he explained his preferred idea: ‘leaseback’. This, he suggested, was a workable solution. Britain would formally cede sovereignty to Buenos Aires, and before the ink had dried on that document would sign another, leasing the Islands back for an agreed period, say 99 years. The Falklands’ way of life would be maintained and everyone would be happy. Across Ridley’s face spread a cadaverous grimace, which was as near as he could get to a smile.”*⁶⁵⁹

Nicholas Ridley’s proposals are met with annoyance and anger by his audience. He is shouted down. Clearly not expecting such a response, Ridley loses his temper and shouts back; *“They (Argentina) cannot be strung along for much longer.”*⁶⁶⁰

*“Britain is suggesting that the sovereignty of the Falkland Islands be transferred to Argentina,... This is said to be one of a number of options which are being put to the islanders by Mr Nicholas Ridley ... who is now in the Falklands.... Air Commodore Frow said that the lease-back solution, which has been raised before, is the one which is preferred by Whitehall.... A spokesman at the Foreign Office said last night that he could neither confirm nor deny the reports... When asked if Britain intended to cede the sovereignty of the islands to Argentina the spokesman said ... no solution can be finally agreed without the endorsement of the islanders and Parliament...”*⁶⁶¹

Ridley then says that the Islanders' would be to blame for any consequences.

656 ALW 040/325/1

657 *Invasion 1982: the Falkland islanders’ Story* Graham Bound 2007

658 ALW 0400/352/12

659 Bound 2007

660 Quoted in Bound 2007

661 *The Times* November 26, 1980.

"To many he had seemed aloof and intolerant of what he regarded as the short-sightedness of many Falklanders. ... A future member of the Islands Council, John Cheek, was harsher: "If anyone other than Ridley had tried to sell us leaseback, then it would have had a chance." ..." ⁶⁶²

"His audience did indeed appear bellicose, but their bellicosity was directed at the British minister. It was clear that few in the Town Hall and throughout the Islands would accept leaseback." ⁶⁶³

"Meeting 400 Islanders in Stanley Town Hall, Ridley curtly rejected their objections." ⁶⁶⁴

November 25th, further meetings takes place involving Ridley, businesses and local communities.

"During his meeting with the Sheep-owners, Mr Ridley said that another option would be to break off talks altogether but he felt that this might antagonize the Argentine Government." ⁶⁶⁵

"He then visited eight settlements in Camp together with Hunt, trying to "sell" the idea of leaseback, but was not noticeably successful. In meetings at Green Patch and Fox Bay he lost his temper and shouted at the islanders, banging his fist on the table; small wonder that they remained suspicious that he was preparing them for an Argentine takeover." ⁶⁶⁶

November 27th, in London, newspaper reports of Ridley's reception in the Islands are raised in Parliament. Both MP's and Lords demand a statement from the government. In the Lords:

"(The Earl of Lauderdale) My Lords, is my noble friend aware that following the visit of Mr. Ridley leaks have begun to appear in the London press in a fashion all too familiar to those of us who are Whitehall-watchers; and will he give us an assurance that this Government will put absolutely no pressure on the islanders to accede to whatever may be the Whitehall view?"

(Lord Paget of Northampton) My Lords, why are we talking to the Argentine at all? What is their locus standi here? They are 500 miles away from islands which, when uninhabited, were occupied by British people and have, in the period since then, been British territory. What has it got to do with the Argentine?"

(Lord Carrington) My Lords, like it or not, over a great many years the Argentinians have claimed the Falkland Islands. We of course do not admit that claim, but the fact that there has been that claim has cast an economic blight over the Falkland Islands, as anybody who knows the subject will be well aware. Consequently, if an agreement could be reached which is acceptable to the Falkland islanders, to the Argentinians and to ourselves, it will be greatly to the benefit of all of us.

(Viscount Thurso) My Lords, can the noble Lord give us an assurance that before assuming that we know the views of the Falkland islanders they will be given some chance of being heard by a referendum or by a means that ascertains their views person by person?"

(Lord Carrington) My Lords, I think that at this moment we had better take one thing at a time. I have no idea at the moment what the views of the Falkland islanders are, but I should like to hear what my honourable friend the Minister of State says when he comes back to England, and then we can discuss it all. But certainly there will be a lot of opportunity in your Lordships' House to discuss how we go, if we go anywhere." ⁶⁶⁷

662 *Falkland Islanders at War* G. Bound 2002 p.10. Also Hastings & Jenkins 1997 p.49

663 Bound in Tatham (ed) 2008

664 Briley 2022

665 *The Times* November 26, 1980

666 Pascoe 2022 vol.3 p.626

667 *Hansard. Lords Chamber* November 27, 1980. vol.415 col.200

Unaware of the reaction in Britain, Ridley's staff send an optimistic telegram back to London.

"It will take time for a clear reaction to emerge and one cannot be optimistic on the prospects for leaseback." ⁶⁶⁸

November 29th, in Stanley, Ridley's final meeting with the Islands Councils fails to result in any decision.

"But for the intervention of Councillor Adrian Monk the "lease back" proposal may have obtained enough support to encourage the British Government to approach the Argentines and seek their cooperation with the plan. Mr. Monk, who lived at San Carlos, and fearing censorship, secretly recorded a message on a cassette which he sent for broadcast to the Radio Station in Stanley. He urged the inhabitants not to accept any form of lease-back and that in the event of any aggression by Argentina that the British Government had a duty to defend the Falklands in the future. His words changed the mood and attitude of the population and within a few days it was obvious that leaseback back was a dead duck in the water." ⁶⁶⁹

Interviewed by *Penguin News*, Nicholas Ridley is asked whether Argentina was prepared to make life difficult for the Islanders.

"I am a man of peace. I would feel that I had failed if that happened. I can't foresee what Argentina would do, your guess is as good as mine, because you live near them and know them perhaps better even than I do. I merely say that in the long term one has to come to terms with one's neighbours and one has to live in peace with them. What one cannot do is live in a perpetual state of siege and antagonism, suspicion and bellicosity." ⁶⁷⁰

"Ridley was not going to stay a day longer than necessary, but shortly before leaving he told Penguin News of his assessment of the situation. He studiously avoided the 'I-word', but in doing so could not find another to adequately describe the threat. "It's a mood of impatience," he said of the climate in Argentina. "No, not of impatience; it's a mood of sooner or later, sometime, one way or another, we have to get further on. We have to make more progress. That's their mood, not my mood." ..." ⁶⁷¹

As Minister Ridley departs on a *LADE* flight back to Argentina, he is jeered by an angry crowd of Islanders.

"Ridley left Stanley Airport - ironically, aboard an aircraft of LADE, the Argentine Air Force airline - to the sound of furious demonstrators and the rare sight of normally rather supine Islanders waving banners and fists." ⁶⁷²

In Buenos Aires, on the same day, in Buenos Aires, it is reported that Argentina's State Petroleum Company has submitted a bid to drill for oil in an area straddling the median line between the Falklands and Patagonia.

November 30th, from Buenos Aires, Britain's Embassy reports that the Islands Councillors are split on the proposal of leaseback.

"Councillors' general assessment was that of those in Port Stanley who had already declared their views the majority was strongly opposed to the leaseback concept ... There was however real division of opinion and everyone needed more time for thought." ⁶⁷³

668 PREM 19/656 Telegram No.183 of 27 November

669 Patrick Watts MBE quoted in *Penguin News* February 26, 2021

670 Bound 2002 p.10

671 *Ibid.*

672 Bound in Tatham (ed) 2008

673 *British Embassy, Buenos Aires to FCO November 30, 1980 FCO 7/3809*. Ambassador Williams would later be accused of providing misleading information by Lord Carrington.

*“There are conflicting accounts of the islanders stance before the Ridley debate, some asserting that the population were always steadfastly opposed to leaseback. The correspondence in the newly-opened FCO files suggest a more mixed response: officials in the British embassy in Buenos Aires reported that four Island councillors would be ready to see leaseback explored, four were undecided and two against.”*⁶⁷⁴

December 2nd, in London, Minister Nicholas Ridley makes a statement to the House of Commons.

*“We have no doubt about our sovereignty over the islands. The Argentines, however, continue to press their claim. The dispute is causing continuing uncertainty, emigration and economic stagnation in the islands. Following my exploratory talks with the Argentines in April, the Government have been considering possible ways of achieving a solution which would be acceptable to all parties. In this, the essential is that we should be guided by the wishes of the islanders themselves. I therefore visited the islands between 22 and 29 November in order to consult island councillors and subsequently, at their express request, all islanders on how we should proceed. Various possible bases for seeking a negotiated settlement were discussed. These included both a way of freezing the dispute for a period or exchanging the title of sovereignty against a long lease of the islands back to Her Majesty's Government. The essential elements of any solution would be that it should preserve British administration, law and way of life for the islanders while releasing the potential of the islands' economy and of their maritime resources, at present blighted by the dispute. It is for the islanders to advise on which, if any, option should be explored in negotiations with the Argentines. I have asked them to let me have their views in due course. Any eventual settlement would have to be endorsed by the islanders and by this House”*⁶⁷⁵

In the debate that follows, nine Conservative MPs denounce the ‘leaseback’ proposal, as do six Labour MPs. Among the latter is Labour’s shadow Foreign Affairs spokesman, Peter Shore.

“This is a worrying statement. Will the Minister confirm that involved here are the rights and future of 1,800 people of British descent in a territory which was originally uninhabited—people who, above all, wish to preserve their present relationship with the United Kingdom? Will he reaffirm that there is no question of proceeding with any proposal contrary to the wishes of the Falkland islanders? Their wishes are surely not just "guidance" to the British Government. Surely, they must be of paramount importance. Has the hon. Gentleman made that absolutely clear to the Argentine Government? Is not the Minister aware that proposals for a leasing arrangement represent a major weakening of our long-held position on sovereignty in the Falkland Islands, and that to make them in so specific and public a manner is likely only to harden Argentine policy and to undermine the confidence of the Falkland islanders? Will he, therefore, make it dear that we shall uphold the rights of the islanders to continue to make a genuinely free choice about their future, that we shall not abandon them and that, in spite of all the logistical difficulties, we shall continue to support and sustain them?”

No Conservative MP speaks in support of Nicholas Ridley.⁶⁷⁶

“The House of Commons came together in total concord yesterday to voice its deep suspicion of the intentions of the Foreign Office and of Mr Nicholas Ridley, a Minister of State, for the future of the Falkland Islands and their relationship with the Argentine. Seldom can a minister have had such a drubbing from all sides of the

674 Livingstone 2018 citing *British Embassy, Buenos Aires to FCO November 30, 1980 FCO 7/3809*. Relying on the Buenos Aires Embassy for an assessment of Islanders’ views appears naive.

675 *HC Deb 02 December 1980 vol.995 cc128-34*. See -

<https://hansard.millbanksystems.com/commons/1980/dec/02/falkland-islands>

676 See p.3 - <https://www.fiassociation.com/newsletter/FIA-NL-09.pdf>

*House, and Mr Ridley was left in no doubt that whatever Machiavellian intrigues he and the Foreign Office may be up to, they will come to nothing if they involve harming a hair on the heads of the islanders. ... From the Conservative benches, Mr Julian Amery told the minister that his statement was profoundly disturbing. For years the Foreign Office had wanted to get rid of this commitment, although the islands had an important part to play in the future of the South Atlantic... A few moments later, Mr Ridley floundered into deeper water when he was asked whether the Government would accept the views of the islanders if they opted for the maintenance of the status quo. The minister seemed to many to be dodging the issue..."*⁶⁷⁷

*"No one listened. Alerted by the Falkland Islands Committee to the Minister's leaseback enthusiasm, MPs gave Ridley a battering worse than anything MPs could recall in the course of the Parliament.... One MP said that he had just watched a man wreck his career on a pile of rock."*⁶⁷⁸

*"I have never seen such a mauling, of any of my colleagues, in all my life. Nicholas Ridley, who had shown great courage in putting this forward, was looking pretty white by the end of it, poor chap.... Now that rough ride was not just from the Conservative side; it was from the Labour side; it was from the Liberals. It was absolutely united in its violent sense of opposition to the idea of leaseback."*⁶⁷⁹

*"Back in the UK, the strong pro-Falklands lobby had been galvanised into action, and Ridley was savaged in a debate in the House of Commons on 2 December for his alleged treachery."*⁶⁸⁰

*"The leaseback plan, ... was effectively killed on 2 December 1980 when MPs from all parties reacted with horror when it was proposed by Ridley in the House of Commons. ... Almost half of MPs who spoke were supporters of the Falkland Islands Committee or had previously taken a strong interest in the Falklands, which suggests that the Falklands 'lobby' was influential"*⁶⁸¹

Britain's Foreign Office send a telegram to Argentina's Minister Cavándoli, stressing the need for patience.

*"Islander distrust of Argentines acute. Even if agree to lease-back being explored, eventual acceptance will depend on very long lease, no Argentine presence, international guarantees and probably financial assistance to develop economy."*⁶⁸²

December 3rd, in London, at Downing Street, a further meeting of the Cabinet Defence and Overseas Policy Committee considers the situation.

"The Prime Minister, summing up the discussion, said that the Committee would wish to resume consideration of the subject when the Islanders' leaders had reported further on local opinion. Unfortunately, Parliamentary hostility to the idea of a settlement was now so strong that, even if the Islanders considered view was that one should be sought, this might be regarded as merely the result of pressure from Government. It should therefore be made clear that, if the islanders favoured maintaining the status quo, they would be fully supported. Further thought would need to be given to the way in which the proposed nationality Bill would affect the Islanders..."

"It agreed that this was a highly emotive issue for parliamentary and public opinion, while noting that the Islanders' hostility to Ridley's appeal seemed to have been exaggerated; and concluded that it would

677 *The Times* December 3, 1980

678 Hastings & Jenkins 1997 p.50

679 Richard Luce quoted in Charlton 1989 p74

680 Bound in Tatham (ed) 2008

681 Livingstone 2018

682 Quoted in Freedman 2005 vol.1 p.112

be 'tragic' if the Islanders' chances of escaping from economic blight were to be dismissed by the attitude of their champions at Westminster. This was not quite to appreciate the depth of the Islanders' feelings..."⁶⁸³

The Falkland Islands Committee meet with Minister Ridley.⁶⁸⁴

December 9th, in Buenos Aires, Britain Embassy formally protests to Argentina regarding licences issued for oil exploration that cross into Falklands waters.

*"The Argentinians refused the British note as 'flatly unacceptable' and went on to say 'there does not exist any boundary dispute in the area in question, for the simple reason that the whole area corresponds to Argentine sovereignty'. ..."*⁶⁸⁵

December 11th, in New York, the United Nations adopt *Resolution 35/118* entitled - '*Plan of Action for the Full Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples.*'⁶⁸⁶

*"Annex – 8. Member States shall adopt the necessary measures to **discourage** or prevent the systematic influx of outside immigrants and settlers into Territories under colonial domination, which disrupts the demographic composition of those Territories and may constitute a major obstacle to the genuine exercise of the right to self determination and independence by the people of those Territories."*⁶⁸⁷

Researcher's Comment: Worthy of note, as Argentina regularly argues that its citizens have never been allowed to settle in the Falklands archipelago.

In London, on the same day, Argentina's Ambassador Ortiz urges Minister Ridley to arrange more talks.

December 15th, in Britain's House of Lords, answering a question regarding Argentina's advertisement for oil tenders on November 6th, Lord Carrington states:

*"No agreement has been reached between the United Kingdom and Argentine Governments on the delimitation of the continental shelf as between the Falkland islands and Argentina. In the absence of an agreed boundary, neither party, in Her Majesty's Government's view, would be entitled to exercise continental shelf rights beyond the median line between the Falkland Islands and Argentina. We have protested to the Argentines about the YPF tender which does indeed go beyond the median line ..."*⁶⁸⁸

December 17th, in London, during an unattributable press briefing, Minister Ridley tells selected journalists that the dispute with Argentina blights the daily lives of the Islanders and cannot be ignored.

*"The Islanders were, (Governor) Hunt said, 'mature, intelligent, law-abiding people, not a bunch of impossible schoolchildren who need to be told what is in their best interests.'..."*⁶⁸⁹

December 18th, in Britain's House of Commons, Minister Ridley answers MPs' questions.

"... we want to maintain the British link, British rule and the British way of life, of which my hon. Friend and I are so proud. We desperately want to develop the economy of the islands. My hon. Friend

683 Boyce 2005

684 *Falkland Islands Newsletter* December 1980 no.9

685 *Towards a Theory of State and Sovereignty in Contemporary Britain* Ellen Kennedy in *Britain in the World* Lawrence Freedman (ed) 2010 p.154

686 See https://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/RES/35/118

687 My emphasis. Argentina had been pushing for greater freedom of movement to and from the Islands including the right for Argentines to buy and sell property, and to live there.

688 *HL Deb 15 December 1980 vol.415 col.972*

689 Boyce 2005

mentioned improved farming and markets for farming produce. A great deal of credit is needed to open up those possibilities, and we must get commercial banks to perform their functions in the islands. There is also the question of revenue from the rich harvest of fish and the possibility – there can be no certainty – of finding oil. My hon. Friend wanted us to exert our undoubted rights over the fishing zones and the economic zones that surround not only the islands but our dependencies. My hon. Friend mentioned the vexed question of Magellanes Este, the oil block that straddles the median line. Nothing would give us more pleasure than to be able to say that we had agreed the median line and that we and the Argentine respected that median line, so that oil exploration and exploitation could go ahead. That is also common ground. We hold the same view about control of the seas. There have been two incidents recently, when seas that would have been in the Falkland Islands maritime zone were subject to harassment by Argentine vessels.

My hon. Friend was right to raise the question of Southern Thule. At the talks in New York in April, I protested again to the Argentine Foreign Minister about the presence of the Argentine mission on Southern Thule without the permission or consent of the British Government. It is impossible to establish any of these things because the Argentine Government have never conceded our sovereignty over either the Falkland Islands or the dependencies, nor have they agreed that we should declare the various zones of the seas around them to which we would normally be entitled...

At present, the relationship between Great Britain and Argentina is good and friendly. We are still negotiating in a series of talks with the Argentine Government, as we were for many years before this Government took over. In spite of that, it is still not possible to declare those 200-mile fishery zones, to get the licence fees from foreigners fishing in those zones, to explore or exploit oil or to legalise the position of Southern Thule. Even the commercial banks are unwilling to set up in the islands because of the political risks. These hazards are real. It must be recognised that solving these problems requires an overall political settlement.”⁶⁹⁰

With regard to Shackleton's Report, Ridley adds; “... a very large number of the recommendations have been implemented – 49 out of 90. Of the remainder, 14 have been rejected, 20 are in train and 7 are undecided. I concede that the bulk of the recommendations in terms of money have not been implemented because we come immediately to the question of the runway.”⁶⁹¹

In London, the Falkland Islands Office issue a press statement.

“On 18 December the Falkland Islands Office issued a statement which said that the intentions of the Argentine government on the proposal to cede sovereignty and immediately lease the islands back to the United Kingdom should be publicly known before any comment could be made. This reservation should also apply to the Falkland Islands government and the islanders themselves. In addition, the committee considers that there is no urgency in deciding this issue or other options, and that the Falkland Islanders should demand more time – possibly six months or more – for discussion. A formal referendum under United Nations auspices is probably needed, once the issues have been properly studied and the various options examined, said the committee. The committee unanimously agreed that the principle of 'full rights of Class One British Citizenship' for Falkland Islanders under the terms of the recent Nationality White Paper should be a prerequisite in any further discussions.”⁶⁹²

690 *HC Deb 18 December 1980 vol.996 cc647-52*

691 Quoted in Ellerby 1990 p.218

692 *Falkland Islands Newsletter* December 1980 no.9 p.1

In Buenos Aires, *La Nacion* publishes a private letter from banker César Alberto Cao Saravia, demanding that his Government interrupt communications to the Falklands; ban the importation of British goods and break off diplomatic relations with the UK. ⁶⁹³

December 31st, in the Falklands, Islander Adrian Monk makes a radio address.

“I think the whole campaign stinks... Don't be misled. Don't be worried about the consequences of saying “We are British.” Our country will remain British.” ⁶⁹⁴

“(It) certainly changed the minds of a lot of people in the Falklands without doubt, and a lot of people will not now admit that they considered leaseback as a possibility.” ⁶⁹⁵

1981 – January 7th, in Stanley, Councillors pass a motion.

“While this House does not like any of the ideas put forward by Mr. Ridley for a possible settlement of the sovereignty dispute with Argentina, it agrees that Her Majesty's Government should hold further talks with the Argentines at which this House should be represented and at which the British delegation should seek an agreement to freeze the dispute over sovereignty for a specified period of time.” ⁶⁹⁶

“At their next meeting in January 1981, a little over a year before the invasion, councillors agreed a motion stating that they did not like any of the Ridley proposals but that they could reluctantly accept a moratorium, or freeze. Only Adrian Monk opposed the motion. Of course this was a failure for London. The hopeless freeze concept had only been included in the Ridley package to make leaseback look more attractive.” ⁶⁹⁷

January 13th, from London, Carrington sends a message to Cavándoli in Buenos Aires.

“Ministers will need to give careful consideration to the Islanders' response and to next steps before any decision can be taken on a meeting... we may be unable to present firm proposals before the end of the month.”

In Buenos Aires, the Foreign Ministry issue a statement rejecting Islander opinion.

“15 years of useless negotiation: London's proposals are unacceptable from every point of view.” ⁶⁹⁸

“In Buenos Aires the British Ambassador, Anthony Williams, fussed around the Argentine Foreign Office, apologising for Islanders' hostility and trying to patch up relations. The Argentines issued a statement dismissing the importance of Islanders' opinions. They would, they said, only negotiate with Britain.” ⁶⁹⁹

January 20th, from London, the US Embassy sends an assessment of the situation to Washington DC.

“The end-of-year push to achieve some movement toward a settlement with Argentina on the Falklands dispute came to naught. Ridley's efforts to employ a forcing strategy in negotiations with the Islanders were thwarted by a small but highly-effective Falklands lobby in London, concentrated in the House of Lords and the Conservative media. As a result, Ridley was forced to back off and give public assurances that nothing would be done to change the status of the Islanders without their express approval. The Foreign Office, though

693 Savaria had previously been reported as being willing to purchase the islands from Britain.

694 Quoted in Ellerby 1990 p.260. Also *United Nations A.AC.109/670*

695 *P. Watts interview, H. of C. Foreign Affairs Committee, Session 1982-83, Falkland. Minutes of Evidence (H.M.S.O., London, 4 Feb. 1983), p.293.*

696 Quoted by Sir Ian Gilmour in *HC Deb 21 January 1981 vol.997 cc248-9*

697 Bound 2007

698 *La Prensa* newspaper

699 Bound 2007

*discouraged, will probably have another go at moving things off dead centre before the current Parliament is dismissed. Ridley may have decided it is simply not worth the trouble.”*⁷⁰⁰

January 21st, in Britain's House of Commons, William Shelton MP asks if the Government has received the views of the Falkland islands on the proposals presented to them by Nicholas Ridley. Responding, Sir Ian Gilmour quotes the Council motion from the Falklands (above) before confirming that the “*interests*” of the islanders remain paramount. He does, however, confirm that the leaseback proposal is not currently on the government's agenda.⁷⁰¹

January 27th, from Buenos Aires, Argentina's Foreign Ministry demands that negotiations on sovereignty are resumed, “*sooner, rather than later.*” They also complain about a group of new emigrants to the archipelago.⁷⁰²

*“The Falkland government's plans to obtain a small number of immigrants from St. Helena have met with a large stumbling block in the form of Argentine official anger. Commodore Carlos Cavandoli told the British Ambassador to Buenos Aires that his government was concerned at reports from various sources of migratory movements towards the Falklands. Many Argentine newspapers appear to be disturbed that the potential immigrants may be black and are somewhat obsessed with the fact. There are very few black people in Argentina. The Penguin News has checked with the government here, and they have confidence that the race of potential immigrants is not being taken into consideration, and providing they are suitable in other ways, they will be welcomed regardless of race. Only four families are to be accepted for the present. Should this pilot scheme prove successful more families could follow at a later date.”*⁷⁰³

January 28th, in London, the British Nationality Bill has its second reading in the House of Commons; moved by the Secretary of State for the Home Department – William Whitelaw.

“The first is that the Bill provides for a composite citizenship covering all the dependent territories. I am sure that this is right. ... I should like to reaffirm that the proposed legislation is in no way intended to weaken those links to which we attach great importance. I do, however understand the feelings of some of the dependencies which feel that their particular situation is special. We have taken with great seriousness the approaches which have been made to us by Gibraltar. It is obviously important that the Gibraltar House of Assembly has unanimously passed a motion asking us to reconsider the position so as to categorise them as British citizens. The position of the Falkland Islands also commands a great deal of sympathy.

Nevertheless, it remains right that the citizenship of our dependent territories should apply in a uniform way throughout those territories. Unimaginable confusion would result if this were not so. What I want to stress, however, is that the Bill in no way alters the position as regards the United Kingdom's moral and constitutional responsibilities for the territories in question. Nor does it in any way affect the special position of Gibraltar as part of the European Community.

On the Falkland Islands, I want to say this. In December 1979, following the publication of the White Paper on the revision of the immigration rules, my hon. Friend the Minister of State, Foreign and Commonwealth Office sent a message to the people of the Falkland Islands assuring them that in the event of an emergency the problems of any islander who did not possess the right of abode in the United Kingdom and who was in trouble at that time would be most carefully and sympathetically considered.

700 Telegram 1165 from London, Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File D810029-0299

701 HC Deb 21 January 1981 vol.997 cc248-9

702 PREM 19/656 Telegram No. 27 of 27 January. In 1980, the FIG had advertised in St. Helena for people willing to live and work in the Falklands. With spare housing for three families, the FIG expected to get few applications. In fact, over 300 Saints applied to move.

703 *The Penguin News* March 5, 1981

In the light of the concern recently expressed on behalf of the islanders, I wish to reaffirm that pledge and assure the islanders that in such circumstances they can depend upon the most sympathetic consideration of their position.” ⁷⁰⁴

“An amendment to the Nationality Bill claiming special status for Falkland Islanders was put down by Mr Michael Shersby MP (Con – Uxbridge) during the Committee stage, but was not carried.” ⁷⁰⁵

January 29th, in London, a meeting in Downing Street authorises further negotiations with Argentina.

“On 29 January 1981 the Defence and Overseas Policy Committee, chaired by the Prime Minister, endorsed Lord Carrington's recommendation that the aim should be to keep the talks going and to let the Islanders come to see the need to explore a solution based on leaseback.” ⁷⁰⁶

February 23rd, in New York, representatives from Argentina and Britain meet for two days of talks. Adrian Monk and Stuart Wallace represent the Islanders. Britain's delegation report back promptly to London.

“Comodoro Cavándoli ... could not understand or accept that Argentina's one requirement, sovereignty, should be ignored permanently. The British side had said that Islander wishes had to be taken into account; why could not Argentine wishes be taken into account? ... any progress had to include the question of sovereignty... The two sides could not go on endlessly meeting in New York. Time for Argentina had now run out; these meetings could not continue year after year simply expressing views...

Mr. Ridley wanted to make it quite clear that the British Government had no doubt at all of the legality and strength of their title to the Islands. He had always said to the Islanders that the legal position was not in doubt. It would indeed be possible to go on resting on that position for all time...

Mr. Monk pointed out that one of the UN's basic principles was the right to self-determination. Why were the Argentines not prepared to accept the Islanders' rights to determine their own future?

Sr. Ortiz de Rozas said that the relevant UN resolutions referred to the principle of territorial integrity. Argentina's had been harmed.

Mr. Ridley said that the principle of self-determination was nevertheless overriding; ...” ⁷⁰⁷

“The Argentines were in a belligerent mood even before the talks began. They were incensed by a proposal being considered by the Islanders to encourage the immigration of laborers from the British dependency of St. Helena. The Falklands have a labor shortage and St. Helena has a labor surplus. What the Islanders viewed as a mutually beneficial economic arrangement sent the Argentines straight up the wall. They regarded it either as a scheme to ensure long-term British domination or as an insidious plot "to dilute Argentina's racial stock." Not the best way to start negotiations, ...” ⁷⁰⁸

February 24th, on the second day of talks, Minister Cavándoli speaks directly to the Islanders' representatives.

“The leader of the Argentine delegation reaffirmed the Argentine rights of sovereignty over the Falkland islands... He went on to explain that the British proposal for a freeze on the sovereignty issue was unacceptable to the Argentine delegation, because it disregarded the request addressed to both parties by resolution 31/49 of the United Nations General Assembly to expedite negotiations with a view to resolving the dispute.” ⁷⁰⁹

704 Hansard HC Deb 28 January 1981 vol.997 cc935-1047. cf. July, 1980, July & October 1981

705 Falkland Islands Newsletter June 1981 no.10

706 Ellerby 1990 p.260

707 PREM 19/612

708 Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D810117-1025

709 The Penguin News March 5, 1981

*“He offered them 'most pampered region status' within Argentina; they could keep their laws, local government, language and customs, yet receive roads, school, television. Just let him have the one word: sovereignty.”*⁷¹⁰

*“It was a dismal meeting and it was announced on 24 February that the Argentines had thrown out the freeze concept. That was no surprise. Of more interest was the desperate personal appeal by the leader of the Argentine delegation to the two Islanders. Recognising that they hobbled British policy, Wallace and Monk were told that Argentina would give them all the material comforts and special status that they wanted in exchange for some symbolic gesture over sovereignty. Any mealy-mouthed mumbo-jumbo would do so long as the Argentines could hold a piece of paper up to their people saying that the 1833 score had been settled. It was clear that leaseback would have been seized enthusiastically by the Argentines.”*⁷¹¹

*“The Argentine ambassador promised the Islanders all sorts of advantages if sovereignty was transferred, but Falkland Islands councillor Stuart Wallace impressed on the Argentines that the Islanders ‘were primarily concerned with the structure of their way of life; that came before any economic benefit.’...”*⁷¹²

February 26th, from New York, a final *communiqué* is released. Following a last minute intervention by the Argentine Embassy, this is a dramatically shorter version than the one agreed by the delegates. Amended, all the final *communiqué* says is that the question will be examined in “*further negotiations.*”⁷¹³

*“With the failure of the talks in New York we are faced with the problem of deciding what to offer them (the British and the Argentines) next. The choice has been narrowed down, and of the Ridley proposals we are left with only one: leaseback. There is, however, one other choice that was not offered in Mr. Ridley's package. That is independence. More and more people are now beginning to give the idea some consideration and we have seen the subject brought up at recent Council meetings and even at the negotiations in New York. It is certainly not as ridiculous as many people like to think.”*⁷¹⁴

*“The victor in the sterile talks had been Britain, since she had won time.”*⁷¹⁵

*“Argentine Government hopes that recent New York talks have convinced Falkland Islanders and HMG that freeze in the status quo is unacceptable. The GOA would be willing to consider a lease-back arrangement. EmbOff called on Ricardo Forrester of the Foreign Ministry's Office of Antarctic and Malvinas Affairs. Although Argentines firmly maintain that the negotiations are bilateral between the UK and Argentina, Forrester did not indicate that GOA is miffed at the participation in the UK Delegation of the two Islanders, known as "Kelpers" (for the seaweed that grows along the Islands' shorelines). Noting that the Kelper lobby is strong in London, he implicitly acknowledged that Islander attitudes are an important factor in finding a solution. He said he hopes that a more realistic debate will now take place on the Islands. An Argentine Army Colonel who works on Malvinas matters told EmbOff that he was cautiously optimistic that negotiations would not get off dead center, although, he added, previous talks have gone through cycles of hope and disillusion in the past. Argentines, therefore, seem to approach a new phase in the discussion with circumspection.”*⁷¹⁶

710 Jenkins & Hastings 1997

711 Bound 2007

712 Livingstone 2018 citing *Anglo-Argentine ministerial Talks on the Falkland Islands February 23/24 1981 PREM 19/612*

713 See *PREM 19/612 Annex B (Original Joint Communiqué) and Annex C (Agreed Joint Communiqué).*

714 Editorial in *The Penguin News* no.12 March 5, 1981

715 Editorial in *La Prensa* March 6, 1981 quoted in *ALW 040/325/2 Part B 76-150*

716 *Telegram From the Embassy in Argentina to the Department of State March 30, 1981 in Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, vol. xiii, Conflict in the South Atlantic, 1981–1984*

February 27th, in Washington DC, Foreign Secretary Lord Carrington and US Secretary Haig meet.

*“Carrington briefly outlined what he regards as the principal elements of the UK dispute with Argentina over the Falkland Islands. **Argentina will not agree to put its claims before the International Court because they are not valid.** Problem for Britain is similar to what they frequently encounter when they try to cast off a colony: The people who live on the Falkland Islands do not want to become Argentines. The British tactic is to keep the ball in the air as long as possible in order to avoid a showdown with Argentina. One idea the British are considering is to cede sovereignty of the Falkland Islands to Argentina on the understanding that Argentina would lease back the Islands to Britain for 99 years. The Falkland Islanders don't like this idea.”*⁷¹⁷

February 28th, at the UN building in New York, Islanders Adrian Monk and Stuart Wallace hold a press conference; attracting international attention. This raises some political issues within Argentina as the negotiations have not been made public there.

March 6th, Argentina's Foreign Ministry issues a communique referring to rumours regarding the status of negotiations with the UK; declaring that they reject any proposal that does not recognise Argentine sovereignty over the Islands as a first principle.⁷¹⁸

March 7th, in the Falklands, an Argentine ship *Yehuín*, is ordered away from Weddell Island.

*“The Captain of Yehuín said that he was sheltering from south-westerly gales and he was instructed by the Master of Endurance to leave the harbour as soon as weather permitted. Weddell Island Manager Bob Ferguson reported that the Argentine ship had left later that day.”*⁷¹⁹

March 13th, in London, Lord Carrington tells the Prime Minister that there is little point in further talks while the Islanders remained hostile to the leaseback proposal.

*“We can reach no conclusions now; ... If in the end the Islanders decide that they would prefer the status quo to any deal involving cession of sovereignty, then we must prepare for the possibility of a deterioration of our relations with Argentina:...”*⁷²⁰

March 17th, a Papal arbitration panel considering the Beagle Channel dispute between Argentina and Chile, gives its verdict. As with the 1977 arbitration decision, this favours Chile. Despite agreeing to abide by the panel's decision, Argentina immediately rejects the result.⁷²¹

Researcher's Comment: Once again Argentina proved that its word, was not its bond.

March 29th, in Argentina, President Videla is replaced by General Roberto Eduardo Viola. Oscar Camilión becomes Foreign Minister with Enrique Ros as his deputy.

March 30th, in London, at the Foreign Office, British National Oil Company (BNOC) executives meet officials.

“During a meeting at the FCO, a BNOC executive emphasised: ‘The Government should be careful not to give away what could be of great worth i.e. the prospects for oil finds in the Falklands Continental Shelf.’ The chairman of the company, Philip Shelbourne, added: ‘Above all BNOC did not want to wake up one day to find

⁷¹⁷ *Foreign Relations of the United States: 1981-1988 vol. xiii: Conflict in the South Atlantic 1981 – 1984* p.13. My emphasis.

⁷¹⁸ *Telegram From the Embassy in Argentina to the Department of State March 30, 1981* in *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, vol. xiii, Conflict in the South Atlantic, 1981–1984*

⁷¹⁹ *The Penguin News* no.13 April 19, 1981

⁷²⁰ *Carrington minute to MT March 13th*

⁷²¹ See 1977, January, 1978, 1980, 1982 & November, 1984

that someone else had picked up concessions in Falkland Islands waters without their having been given a chance to compete.”⁷²²

April 30th, following an expression of interest by the oil company Shell to Argentina's invitation for oil exploration tenders, the UK takes out an advert in the *International Herald Tribune*. This restates Lord Carrington's announcement of December 15, 1980.

*“No agreement has been reached between the United Kingdom and Argentine Governments on the delimitation of the continental shelf as between the Falkland islands and Argentina. In the absence of an agreed boundary, neither party, in Her Majesty's Government's view, would be entitled to exercise continental shelf rights beyond the median line between the Falkland Islands and Argentina. We have protested to the Argentines about the YPF tender which does indeed go beyond the median line. Her Majesty's Government assume that oil companies will take the above into full account in considering whether to place tenders to drill for oil in the Magallanes Este block.”*⁷²³

*“Emphasising a need for action, a Foreign Office official wrote: ‘We must maintain that any oil in the Falkland Islands continental shelf is British, without specifying whether we mean HMG or Falkland Islands have the right to exploit it. The important point is that it is ours not Argentine.’ ...”*⁷²⁴

May 5th, from Buenos Aires, Ambassador Williams telegrams the Foreign Office to urge a further round of talks, which he sees as necessary to keep diplomatic channels open.

Admiral, Armando Lambruschini, speaks to an audience at the *Centro de Estudios Estratégicos de la Escuela Superior de Guerra* (Center for Strategic Studies of the Superior School of War).⁷²⁵

*“... as a sovereign nation, we must place ourselves on the international stage in our rightful position and play our rightful role accordingly... the South Atlantic is a vital area for the Argentine Republic, it has political, economic and strategic rights that arise from its geography, its history, its future projection, all of which legitimize and impose an adequate national presence in the area.... an approach to the current situation in the strategic area of the South Atlantic cannot dispense with the historical imperative of the return of the Malvinas Islands to the national heritage, as these represent a key factor in our strategic conception.”*⁷²⁶

HMS *Endurance* arrives back in the UK; *“HMS Endurance, the Royal navy's ice patrol ship, and the British Antarctic Survey ship Bransfield, have recently returned to British ports after seven-month voyages throughout the Falkland Islands and Dependencies.”*⁷²⁷

May 18th, in London, Parliamentary Under-Secretary for Defence Keith Speed, is removed from his position for criticising the government's proposed defence cuts, and particularly any withdrawal of HMS *Endurance*.

*“Speed had protested vehemently against the proposed cuts in the Royal Navy – and was sacked for his pains in May 1981.”*⁷²⁸

May 28th, reported in Britain's *Financial Times*;

722 Livingstone 2018 citing *Record of Meeting with BNOc March 30, 1981 FCO 7/3984*

723 Quoted in *Falkland Islands Newsletter* June 1981 no.10 See. *HL Deb 10.11.1981 vol.425 c170 Hansard*

724 Livingstone 2018 citing *Smith to Williams December 4, 1981 FCO 7/3985*

725 Lambruschini was head of the Navy Chiefs of Staff. Jailed for crimes following the 1982 war, he was pardoned in 1990.

726 Quoted in Carbone 2008

727 *Falkland Islands Newsletter* June 1981 no.10

728 *The Postwar Legacy of Appeasement: British Foreign Policy since 1945* R. Gerald Hughes 2014

*“(The) idea of a South Atlantic Treaty Organisation has come to birth successfully, if a little furtively, this week in Buenos Aires, despite the fact that its parents are somewhat shy of acknowledging parenthood. Called together under the auspices of private institutions in Argentina and the US, strategic experts from Washington, South Africa, Argentina, Paraguay, Uruguay and Brazil are meeting in the Argentine capital to consider the next steps in a plan, long proposed, to link the armed forces of the US, South Africa and Latin America in an effort to counter a perceived Soviet threat in the South Atlantic. ... A notable absentee from the reported meeting is Chile, which is in dispute with Argentina over the ownership of three islands in the Beagle Channel... The importance of the Falkland Islands within the sphere of activity of such a group cannot be understated. The Islands ... would be an ideal base for such a force. ... The strategic value of the Falkland Islands to a naval power has never been in doubt.”*⁷²⁹

May 29th, in Argentina, General Galtieri, Commander in Chief of the Army, refers to the dispute in a speech.

“Neither are we prepared to allow those who are discussing with us the return of island territories that are Argentine by historical inheritance and legal right to interfere in the slightest way with the search for and exploitation of the wealth of our continental shelf... Nobody can or will be able to say that we have not been extremely calm and patient in our handling of international problems, which in no way stem from any appetite for territory on our part. However, after a century and a half they are becoming more and more unbearable.”

In London, the Ministry of Defence is asked by the Foreign Office for a short assessment of the UK's ability to respond to military acts by Argentina in the South Atlantic.

*“Admiral Leach sent the prime minister a forthright note in May 1981 regretting that she was too busy to see him ... "The [defence cuts programme] has been devised ad hoc in two months" he wrote. "It has neither been validated nor studied in depth. No alternative options have been considered."... His note was copied to the defence secretary, John Nott, ...”*⁷³⁰

June 1st, Argentina's new Foreign Minister, Oscar Camilión, is quoted in Britain's *Daily Express* newspaper; *“I can understand the Islanders ... and I can understand that this very peculiar isolation of the Islanders creates a very peculiar attitude to the world. We are the eighth largest country in the world and the islands are just a fragment of what we regard as our territory. They are outmoded – an anachronism, some people say.”*⁷³¹

June 2nd, Robin Fearn, head of the South American Department, lists the Foreign Office's objectives for a possible oil deal with Argentina.

*“1. We get the maximum possible preferential treatment for British companies in the issue of licences... 2. British equipment is used as much as possible. 3. A share of the oil goes to the UK... 4. FIG obtain an appropriate share of the proceeds consistent with its developmental needs and its capacity for absorption... 5. The impact of oil related development on the Islanders traditional way of life should be kept to a minimum. 6. The Argentines should not benefit to any greater extent that we can help...”*⁷³²

June 5th, Lord Carrington writes to Defence Secretary John Nott, pressing for the retention of HMS *Endurance*; *“... on the ground that, until the dispute with Argentina was settled, it was important to maintain the British Government's normal presence in the area at the current level; any reduction would be interpreted by both the*

729 Quoted in *Falkland Islands Newsletter* June 1981 no.10

730 Thatcher warned of defence cuts danger before Falklands War in *The Guardian* December 30, 2011

731 Quoted in *Falkland Islands Newsletter* June 1981 no.10

732 Quoted in Livingstone 2018 citing Fearn to P. Harding June 2, 1981 FCO 7/3984

*Islanders and Argentina as a reduction in Britain's commitment to the Islands and in its willingness to defend them.”*⁷³³

June 7th, at Grytviken, South Georgia, the base commander reports that an Argentine C130 Hercules aircraft, with military markings, has flown over the facility.

*“It would seem that despite our protests Argentina overflights of Falkland islands and Dependencies are increasing. Such incidents only harden the Islanders' resolve to stand firm against any proposal to have closer links with the Argentines.”*⁷³⁴

In Buenos Aires, on the same day, Foreign Office Assistant Under-Secretary John Ure arrives to hold talks with Foreign Minister Camilion and Ambassador Enrique Ros.

“In Argentina, I found the Ministers and officials with whom I spoke reasonably relaxed about the progress – or lack of progress – on the Falklands negotiations and well disposed towards the lease-back idea... while they themselves appreciated the constraints on our progress in the Falklands negotiations, their military masters were less patient ...”

June 10th, in London, Foreign Office and Defence Department officials meet to discuss retaining HMS *Endurance*; *“... following which Foreign and Commonwealth Office officials judged that there was no prospect of the decision being reversed...”*⁷³⁵

June 9th, in Stanley, John Ure arrives.

“I formed the impression that opinion was not yet irrevocably hardened against the lease-back proposal and that many of the better informed and more progressive islanders recognised that an accommodation with Argentina was necessary ...”

June 16th, in London, aware of Ure's visit to the South Atlantic, Britain's Department of Energy suggests that the Falkland Islands Continental Shelf should be excluded from any deal on leaseback with Argentina.

*“... an official noting, ‘Such a surrender of sovereignty must surely make more difficult ... an oil regime which secures HMG control over those rights (e.g. to petroleum exploration and production activities).’ The Department recommended that, if the continental shelf were included in the leaseback, then Britain should have the ‘exclusive’ right to explore for oil within it and that there should be no joint administration with Argentina. ... while British oil companies had been a lobbying force for a sovereignty deal with Argentina in the 1970s, they had now become, if anything, a gentle brake on the process.”*⁷³⁶

June 18th, First Lord of the Admiralty Sir Henry Leach, has a meeting with PM Thatcher about defence cuts.

*“The point he wished to emphasise was the most serious miscalculation which we would be making [if] we disregarded the deterrent effect of a major maritime capability in peacetime.”*⁷³⁷

*“Lord Peter Carrington, foreign secretary, wrote in a letter to Sir John Nott, the defence secretary, in June 1981 that “any reduction [of military force in the region] would be interpreted by both islanders and the Argentines as a reduction in commitment to the island and our willingness to defend them” ...”*⁷³⁸

733 *Falkland Islands Review (Franks Report)* January 1983 para.114

734 ALW 040/325/5

735 *Falkland Islands Review (Franks Report)* January 1983 para.114

736 Livingstone 2018 citing *H.M.L. Ross to Mary Dickson June 16, 1981 EG 14/93* and *Dickson to Fearn July 22, 1981 FCO 7/3985*. Original emphasis.

737 Thatcher warned of defence cuts danger before Falklands War in *The Guardian* December 30, 2011

738 Ministers were warned of Falklands threat Michael Stothard in *Financial Times*, December 30, 2011

June 26th, in Stanley, aware of the proposal to withdraw HMS *Endurance*, the Falkland Islands Councils hold a joint meeting. Their conclusions are transmitted to Lord Carrington.

*“The people of the Falkland Islands deplore in the strongest terms the decision to withdraw HMS Endurance from service. They express extreme concern that Britain appears to be abandoning its defence of British interests in the South Atlantic and Antarctic at a time when other powers are strengthening their position in these areas. They feel that such a withdrawal will further weaken British sovereignty in this area in the eyes not only of islanders but of the world. They urge that all possible endeavours be made to secure a reversal of this decision.”*⁷³⁹

June 30th, in London, a review of policy takes place at the Foreign Office in a meeting chaired by Secretary of State Nicholas Ridley. Falklands' Governor Rex Hunt is present, as is Ambassador Williams from Buenos Aires. Hunt makes it clear that the Islanders wish to have nothing whatsoever to do with Argentina, and that they do not believe that a leaseback settlement can provide the guarantees they want. The meeting concludes that the British Government should play for time; that the new Legislative Council, when elected, should be persuaded to allow negotiations to continue; that the Islanders should be educated as to the various pros and cons; and that contingency defence plans should be updated.

*“While on leave in Britain, (Rex Hunt) attended a meeting with Nicholas Ridley, the British Ambassador to Argentina and other senior officials, at which the prevalent view was that Islanders should still be pressed to make concessions to the Argentines. It was reported that Argentina was well disposed towards the leaseback idea and that they were 'reasonably relaxed' about the progress of negotiations. However, Argentine diplomats had said their military compatriots were less patient. Rex Hunt listened, amazed, as the diplomats disregarded all the evidence that must have been gathered by Ridley and subsequently by a senior Foreign Office official who visited Stanley to quietly confirm opinion. The tack was to change slightly. Rather than emphasising the supposed benefits of friendship with Argentina, Islanders should be educated about the dangers of hostility to change. It was suggested that Islander confidence could also be secured with offers of resettlement in the UK for those who could not accept leaseback, promises of more distribution of farming land and economic development initiatives. To his credit, Rex – who clearly risked confirming he had gone native – repeated the message that had been reiterated many times: Islanders were not going to buy any of this. “There was an air of unreality in the meeting, far removed from the realities of the situation in the Falklands,” he wrote. Pouring cold water on the Foreign Office dogma might have had some impact. Rex recalled that by the end of the meeting it had simply been decided to play for time with Argentina, and persuade the new Falklands Council, when elected, to allow talks to continue.”*⁷⁴⁰

*“The ambassador (Williams) said: ‘If we allowed the leaseback initiative to die then we would be left with no way out of our dilemma,’ while Assistant Under Secretary John Ure, warned: ‘Time is running out.’ Ure argued that ‘the most important single factor in influencing the Islanders views was the public debate in the UK.’ Ridley was insistent that the Islanders should not be seen to be put under pressure, but agreed that a public relations campaign explaining leaseback should be launched.”*⁷⁴¹

*“Lord Carrington (later) told me he was misled by Ambassador Anthony Williams.”*⁷⁴²

739 *Falkland Islands Review (Franks Report)* January 1983 para.115

740 Bound 2007

741 Livingstone 2018 citing *Record of a Meeting held in 1 Carlton Gardens on 30 June 1981 FCO 7/3964*

742 Briley 2022. Harold Briley was the BBC's Latin America Correspondent.

On the same day the House of Lords debates the question of the Falkland Islands.⁷⁴³ Lord Trefgarne, speaking for the government, sums up the debate.

*“I can confirm that HMS “Endurance” will be paid off in 1982 on her return to the United Kingdom, following her deployment in the South Atlantic and the Antarctic Region later this year. There are no plans to replace her. However, the Royal Marines garrison in the Falkland Islands will be maintained at its present strength, and from time to time Her Majesty’s ships will be deployed in the area. ... we have every wish to continue the discussions with the Argentines in order to solve the sovereignty dispute. The decision does not, however, lie entirely in our hands: the Islanders have to decide for themselves which avenues they wish us to explore for them, in the knowledge that the situations has to change if the dispute is not to be allowed to stifle all hopes of development. The Islanders have to be the best judges of their own interests. We await their decision.”*⁷⁴⁴

*“Next year the British Navy will give up vigilance over the Falklands and Antarctic Territories claimed by that country when the patrol ship Endurance goes.”*⁷⁴⁵

July 9th, in London, the Cabinet are informed that intelligence threat assessments suggest that Argentina is more likely to pursue diplomatic and economic measures than any use of force. However, an attempt to establish a foothold on one of the Dependencies, or even on one of the more remote Falklands Islands, is considered a possibility.⁷⁴⁶

From Buenos Aires, the British Embassy report that several Argentine newspapers are carrying articles about the withdrawal of HMS *Endurance* from the South Atlantic – claiming that Britain is; *“abandoning the protection of the Falkland islands.”*⁷⁴⁷

July 20th, Minister Ridley warns Lord Carrington that if Argentina concludes, by early 1982, that the British Government is unable or unwilling to negotiate seriously; retaliatory action must be expected.⁷⁴⁸

*“Ridley wrote to Carington recommending that a PR campaign should be discussed at a meeting of the Defence and Overseas Policy (DOP) Committee. Officials drafted a paper for the committee, which said it was ‘increasingly urgent’ to find a solution, adding: ‘Simply playing for time ... is not a viable option.’ Three possibilities were outlined • to talk to Argentina without Islander concurrence. • to launch a PR campaign explaining leaseback; • or to break off negotiations and take contingency defence measures.”*⁷⁴⁹

July 27th, in Buenos Aires, Dr. Oscar Camilion writes to Ambassador Williams expressing his concern at the lack of progress in the decade following the communication agreements.

“... to postpone further a profound and serious discussion of the complex essential constituents of the negotiations – sovereignty and economic co-operation – in a simultaneous and global fashion with the express intention of achieving concrete results shortly. A resolute impetus must therefore be given to the negotiations. The next round of negotiations cannot be another mere exploratory exercise, but must mark the beginning of a decisive stage towards the definitive termination of the dispute.”

743 *HL Deb 30 June 1981 vol.422 cc166-87*. For the full record, see - <https://hansard.parliament.uk/Lords/1981-06-30/debates/1c0a9643-ff36-494a-8897-a99f5206bc2f/TheFalklandIslandsSovereignty>

744 *HL Deb 30 June 1981 vol.422 cc185-187*

745 Unnamed Argentine newspaper quoted in *Falkland Islands Newsletter* December, 1981 no.11. A number of protest letters were published in *The Times* and other newspapers.

746 *Falkland Islands Review (Franks Report)* January 1983 para..94

747 *Ibid.* para.116

748 *FCO 7/3964*

749 Livingstone 2018. See September 7 below

That same day, in a press statement, the Argentine Government declares that negotiations to have become; “... an unpostponable priority for its foreign policy ... it is not possible to defer this question which affects territorial integrity and national dignity.”

“Ominously, there was an understated reminder that the air and fuel services could be withdrawn if there was no progress. These veiled threats were precisely what many Islanders had feared since the Communications Agreement was signed in 1972.”⁷⁵⁰

July 28th, in the House of Lords, during a debate on the proposed British Nationality legislation introduced by the Conservative Government, an amendment to give the Falkland Islanders full British citizenship is withdrawn.⁷⁵¹

“Lord Trefgarne ... It was argued that Gibraltar was thus a special case; now it is being argued that the Falkland Islands are another special case. Nearly all the dependencies believe that they have a special case to make for exceptional treatment in this Bill and they have represented their views to us. But if we are to have a distinctive citizenship for the United Kingdom, then we must have another citizenship for the dependencies, not an inferior or second-class citizenship but a parallel citizenship, and having created that citizenship all the people of the dependencies should be entitled to it. It would be invidious and discriminatory to make exceptions, especially if these were on grounds of race, as has been alleged.

....

*We are very conscious of the problems that the people of the Falkland Islands face, and we are concerned to help them with these, but we do not believe the grant of British citizenship to them, with all the anomalies that would cause elsewhere in the dependencies, can be justified. We believe that the pledges we have given to the Falkland Islanders are much to be preferred to measures which, however well intentioned, would have consequences which could go a long way to nullifying the objectives of this long overdue legislation. I am afraid the Government see very real difficulties with these amendments. I hope that, in the light of what I have been able to say and the pledges I have been able to repeat, the noble Baroness and her noble friends will not press them.”*⁷⁵²

“When the Bill reached the House of Lords, an amendment was put down ... by Baroness Vickers with all-party support. This was later withdrawn as the debate took place. On July 28th, the night before the Royal Wedding and the House was not well attended.”⁷⁵³

In **August**, Argentine scrap metal dealer, Constantino Davidoff, applies to the Argentine Navy for permission to use one of its Antarctic transport ships to get to South Georgia. The stated purpose is to inspect the whaling stations in order to assess what needs to be done in fulfilment of his contract with *Christian Salvesen*. Argentina's naval command see an opportunity; “177. Informed our Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Mr. Davidoff's activities, the Director of Antardida and Malvinas of said Portfolio of State, Ambassador Blanco, sent a memorandum dated 10-AUG-81 to the Undersecretary of Foreign Relations, by which he It recommended the approval of the activities of the Argentine private company in the South Georgia Islands and advised the Navy to give it its support.”⁷⁵⁴

750 Bound 2007

751 *Hansard HL Deb 28 July 1981 vol.423 cc694-732*. Introduced by Baroness Vickers but, on the day, moved by Lord Mishcon. Full debate here - <https://api.parliament.uk/historic-hansard/lords/1981/jul/28/british-nationality-bill-1>

752 *HL Deb 28 July 1981 vol.423 cc694-732*

753 *Falkland Islands Newsletter* December 1981 no.11

754 *Junta Militar: Comision de Analisis y Evaluacion de las Responsabilidades del Conflicto del Atlantico Syr – Inform*

*“Ministry officials, acting on the perceptions of the moment regarding the need to reaffirm an Argentinian presence on all South Atlantic islands, enthusiastically recommended Davidoff to the Transportation Bureau of the Navy (auxiliary ships). The legal presence of Davidoff’s men would prevail long after the British Antarctic Survey left the place, ... In international forums this action would reassert Argentina’s interests in the sub-Antarctic.”*⁷⁵⁵

*“... in August 1981 (Davidoff) applied to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and to the Argentine Navy for permission to use its Antarctic transport ships at a favourable rate. This would involve a place on the ship to get to the Islands and then subsequent logistic runs over the four-year span of the contract. It was quite standard for naval transports to be used in this way in the Sub-Antarctic. When they were approached by Davidoff the Argentine authorities were aware that the British Antarctic base at Grytviken could be removed in the near future, and that the decision had been made to withdraw Endurance from the South Atlantic. An Argentine presence for the next four years, with yearly runs by transports to the Islands, under a legal contract between a British and an Argentine company, offered a way of strengthening their position in the disputed territories while setting precedents for joint ventures in the South Atlantic. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs therefore recommended to the Navy that it agree to Davidoff’s request.”*⁷⁵⁶

*“In August 1981 Constantino Davidoff, having failed to obtain any civilian means of transport, applied to the Argentine navy for permission to use Argentine naval ships to go to South Georgia to assess the potential to make a big profit from recovering scrap metal at the derelict whaling stations.”*⁷⁵⁷

Also, during **August**, the first of five Super Étendard fighter aircraft, together with five anti-ship, sea-skimming Exocet missiles are transported from France to Argentina.⁷⁵⁸

In early **September**, Argentine Admiral, Jorge Anaya, instructs his planning staff to consider the options for establishing a presence on South Georgia - 'Project Alpha.'⁷⁵⁹

*“... there was ... a scheme to take advantage of the Davidoff venture to establish a base covertly. ... This was to replicate the successful venture in 1976 when, in one of the first Junta’s earliest acts a presence had been established on South Thule in the South Sandwich Islands. ... The precedent was enticing. ... The plan was to infiltrate Davidoff’s workforce with military ‘scientists’ who would then be part of the ‘legal’ landing party on South Georgia. They would later be joined by a group of marines ... and establish a more permanent military base of some fourteen men from April onwards.”*⁷⁶⁰

*“The Argentine Navy saw Davidoff’s contract as an opportunity to assert Argentine sovereignty over South Georgia and, in September 1981, began planning ‘Project Alpha’ to infiltrate Argentine marines into Davidoff’s team of workers and establish a permanent presence on the island.”*⁷⁶¹

Davidoff is told that he can use a Naval ice-breaker, the *Almirante Irizar*, from the Antarctic Squadron.⁷⁶²

Final a.k.a. The Rattenbach Report (undated).

755 *The Falklands/Malvinas War: A Model for North-South Crisis Prevention* Virginia Gamba-Stonehouse 1987 p.121.

756 *Signals of War: The Falklands Conflicts* Lawrence Freedman & Virginia Gamba-Stonehouse 1990 p.40

757 Pascoe 2022 vol.3 p.633

758 Part of an order for 14 of each, the last of the first five aircraft arrived in Argentina in November, 1981. The arms embargo imposed by the EU in April, 1982, then delayed completion of the order for both the aircraft and the missiles.

After the war, France recommenced deliveries in November, 1982 and the order was finally completed by 1984.

759 *Painful Choices: A Theory of Foreign Policy Change* David A. Welch 2005 p.78

760 Freedman & Gamba-Stonehouse 1990

761 *Remember the Falklands? Missed Lessons of a Misunderstood War* David A. Welch 1997

762 See November, 1981 below.

From Buenos Aires, Britain's *defence attache* supports an Argentine request to purchase 12 *Vulcan* bombers from the UK. He confirms that the aircraft would not be appropriate for use against the Falkland Islands. ⁷⁶³ Meanwhile, in the UK, Argentina's *naval attach*, Rear-Admiral Walter Alara, is invited aboard HMS *Invincible*, to watch a *Sea Harrier* display.

September 7th, in London, at a meeting with Sir Ian Gilmour MP,⁷⁶⁴ Lord Carrington decides against approving a public relations campaign to explain leaseback for the Falklands. Instead, he asks Foreign Office officials to review the possibility of taking the Falklands dispute to the ICJ. ⁷⁶⁵

"... Carrington settled instead for sending a letter to ministerial colleagues, recommending no new initiative except asking Argentina to put forward constructive proposals. Officials had warned that action was urgent and it was clearly a political decision not to act on their advice,.." ⁷⁶⁶

"The PR drive in favour of leaseback was rejected even though, as newly-opened FCO documents now confirm, many of the government's most vocal critics expressed support for leaseback in private. By October 1981, a majority of the Falkland Islands Committee backed leaseback,.." ⁷⁶⁷

September 14th, in London, the Ministry of Defence announces that HMS *Endurance* will be withdrawn before the end of March, 1982.

"Her withdrawal is taken to be an indication that Britain will be less committed in the future to the Falkland Islands and the South Atlantic. Islanders are also convinced that the British Government is not taking account of the massive economic potential of the waters surrounding the Falkland Islands, where there are vast fishstocks and known hydrocarbon resources." ⁷⁶⁸

An intelligence report quotes Argentine diplomatic correspondence as believing that; *"... the withdrawal of HMS Endurance had been construed ... as a deliberate political gesture."* ⁷⁶⁹

Britain's Defence Secretariat prepares a draft-assessment for the approval of the Chief's of Staff.

"Military measures to deter or counter Argentine military action against the Falkland Islands would require the despatch to the area of additional forces, primarily naval, and possibly on a substantial scale. Any such deployment would be costly and pose considerable logistical difficulties. To deter or repel even a small scale invasion would require a significant commitment of naval resources at the expense of commitments elsewhere, for a period of uncertain duration. To deal with a full scale invasion would require naval and land forces with organic air support on a very substantial scale, and the logistic problems of such an operation would be formidable." ⁷⁷⁰

"They, ... concluded that to deter a full-scale invasion, a large balanced force would be required, ... There was a danger that its dispatch could precipitate the very action it was intended to deter." ⁷⁷¹

763 *The Daily Express* September 6, 2015. In fact these long-range aircraft could have been easily adapted to take a conventional bomb load. The purchase was cancelled in early 1982.

764 Lord Carrington's spokesman in the House of Commons

765 Livingstone 2018 citing *Fearn to Williams September 23, 1981 FCO 7/3965*. Also *ALW 040/325/1 Part B 26*. Noted in the Franks Report, there is no official record of the meeting between Carrington and Gilmour.

766 *Ibid*.

767 Livingstone 2018. I can find no evidence for this.

768 *Falkland Islands Newsletter* December 1981 no.11

769 *Falkland Islands Review (Franks Report)* January 1983

770 *Defence Implications of Argentine Action Against the Falkland islands (A Note by MOD officials) COS (Misc) 268/742 at the Margaret Thatcher Foundation (50DBC02EAA664225AA8ECBE065CD1306)*

771 Charlton 1989 p.141

Minister Nicholas Ridley is transferred to the Treasury.

September 15th, in London, Lord Carrington writes to Thatcher.

“... the Argentines are showing renewed impatience ... They have sent a Note and circulated a Communique at the United Nations deploring the hitherto slow speed of negotiations and the lack of results and making clear that, if progress is not made soon, they may have to look to other means of achieving their purpose... In short, the present outlook is not good.” ⁷⁷²

September 22nd, in New York, at the United Nations, Argentina's Foreign Minister Dr. Camilion addresses the General Assembly.

“It is a strange paradox that our country, which was in the vanguard of the struggle for national independence, should still suffer from a breach of its territorial integrity, and anachronistic persistence of colonialism. The Malvinas Islands have not been restored to Argentina in spite of the long time elapsed since this General Assembly adopted Resolution 2065 (XX) in 1965. The Malvinas are still a colony to this day, ... Obviously, Mr. President, the Malvinas cannot remain a colony, nor can Argentina passively accept that part of its territory be one of the last colonies.”

September 23rd, Lord Carrington informs Dr. Camilion that the British Government cannot coerce the Islanders and that, therefore, it would be preferable if Argentina put forward proposals when talks resumed. Camilion responds that the key question remains that of sovereignty, which can only be negotiated between the UK and Argentina; and that the Islanders cannot be allowed a *veto*. ⁷⁷³

“For the British, the Falklands are item 242 in the order of priorities in foreign policy.” ⁷⁷⁴

“HMG's Ambassador here (Buenos Aires), Anthony Williams, told me that Lord Carrington made clear to Camilion in New York that the question is not one of respecting the "interests" of the Islanders, but rather of respecting their "desires." Williams says that the current elections in the Islands seem to be producing an even harder line there. The general sentiment in his understanding is against any more talks whatsoever with the Argentines. Williams nevertheless expects a new negotiating session, if not before the end of the year, in the early months of 1982. But he looks for nothing positive by way of results. In his view HMG has about exhausted its ingenuity, particularly with the idea of ceding sovereignty and then leasing back the Islands. The Argentines, on the other hand, seem unwilling or unable to go beyond saying "the Malvinas are ours." ...” ⁷⁷⁵

September 24th, in the Argentine press, Dr. Camilion is quoted as saying that; *“Lord Carrington advanced to the point of saying that the present status quo is difficult to sustain today.”* Camilion is also reported as dismissing the forthcoming Island elections as of no importance to Argentina. ⁷⁷⁶ When questioned about this by the British press, Lord Carrington responds that the Argentine Minister; *“... can have been left in no doubt about our commitments to respect the wishes of the Islanders.”*

October 2nd, from Buenos Aires, Britain's Ambassador Williams expresses his opinion that there is now a clear risk that Argentina will conclude that talking is a waste of time. He believes it better to speak frankly, and face the consequences.

⁷⁷² ALW 040/325/2 Part D 226

⁷⁷³ ALW 040/522/1 Telegram No. 909

⁷⁷⁴ Camilion quoted in *Falklands: The Secret Plot* Oscar Cardoso, Ricardo Kirschbaum & Eduardo van der Kooy 1983.

This appears to have been 'borrowed' from a statement by Carrington referring to his appointment as Foreign Secretary (see above).

⁷⁷⁵ Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D810469-0965

⁷⁷⁶ PREM 19/656 Telegram No. 259 of 24 September

October 4th, in Buenos Aires, following his return from the USA, Oscar Camilion, is interviewed.

*“The Minister replied to a question on the attitude of the inhabitants of the Islands with the statement that Argentina is committed to respect their interests but will not consult them. In his view, the Islanders have no right to veto in a negotiation that is between the UK and Argentina. According to the press, the Minister became irritated and refused to answer when questioned as to what specific steps the GOA (Gov of Argentina) might take to resolve the issue.”*⁷⁷⁷

October 7th, in Britain's House of Lords, a *British Nationality (Falkland Islands) Amendment Bill* is laid before the House by Baroness Vickers.

*“Today's debate, therefore, provides our first opportunity to debate the matter thoroughly. We do so on the basis of my noble friend's Bill, which seeks to ensure that all the Falkland Islanders become British citizens. As things stand, about three-quarters of all Falkland Islanders will become British citizens when the British Nationality Act 1981 comes into force on 1st January next year. That will be the case whether my noble friend's Bill becomes law or not. But the remainder, about 400 people in all, may not do so because their ties are mainly with the Falkland Islands, while their connections with the United Kingdom are more distant. Those 400 would therefore hold the important parallel citizenship which is called British Dependent Territories citizenship.”*⁷⁷⁸

On October 7th, Baroness Vickers reintroduced the amendment. After a debate which lasted over an hour the vote was 90 'contents' and 90 'non-contents', an almost unprecedented occurrence in the House of Lords. Understanding orders, a casting vote from the Chair disagreed the amendment. The Bill went back to the Commons towards the close of the Parliamentary session and Mr Shersby put an amendment to give Islanders the same status as the Gibraltarians who had won their amendment in the House of Lords... However, the Falkland Islands amendment was not called during the proceedings and when Mr Shersby tried to raise it, he was ruled out of order.”⁷⁷⁹

October 13th, from Portsmouth, HMS *Endurance* (Capt. Barker) sails for the Falkland Islands.

October 14th, in London, having reviewed a possible submission to the International Court of Justice regarding the Falkland Islands, the Foreign Office reports.

*“The question of British sovereignty in the area has not been submitted to the ICJ or to any other international tribunal. In 1947 and subsequently HMG offered to submit the dispute over Argentine claims in the Dependencies to the ICJ; and in 1955 HMG applied unilaterally to the Court against encroachments on British sovereignty in the Dependencies by Argentina and Chile. However, the matter could not be pursued since both Argentina and Chile declined to submit to the Court's jurisdiction in the matter. In 1966 the question arose as to whether in the course of negotiations with the Argentines, the UK should offer to refer the dispute over the Falkland Islands to the ICJ...”*⁷⁸⁰

The question was not, however, pursued further. This was partly because reference to the Court would have had no attraction for Argentina (as Argentina does not accept the compulsory jurisdiction of the ICJ, any reference to the Court could only be made with the agreement of the Argentine Government.)...

777 Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D810469–0965

778 HL Deb 29 November 1982 vol 436 cc1076-106 . Lord Elton opening the debate. See -

<https://api.parliament.uk/historic-hansard/lords/1982/nov/29/british-nationality-falkland-islands>

779 Falkland Islands Newsletter December 1981 no.11

780 There is evidence that an offer to put the question before the ICJ was made to Argentina, but that this was turned down. See March 24, 1969.

If for political reasons it seemed advisable to offer international adjudication or arbitration to the Argentines again as a method of resolving the dispute, the Law Officers would first need to be consulted. Legal Advisers also consider that reference to an ad hoc arbitration tribunal might be preferable to reference to the ICJ since the composition of the former would have to be agreed between us and the Argentines. But given the Argentines repudiation of the award made by an arbitration tribunal in the Beagle Channel case, despite their prior agreement to accept its findings, no reference to international arbitration is likely to help solve the dispute. The Argentines would be unlikely to accept a ruling that the Islands were British and it would be politically very difficult for the UK to hand them over to Argentina, if the ruling went the other way. If arbitration went in our favour we might gain some advantage at the UN, but this would be only temporary as the great majority of UN member-states will continue to see the dispute as a colonial problem.” ⁷⁸¹

On the same day, from Buenos Aires, Ambassador Williams reports on a conversation with Dr. Camilion; “*For serious and constructive negotiations it was necessary to tackle all the component parts of what was a complex issue.*” ⁷⁸²

“I was trying to convey first of all that it was necessary to start meaningful negotiations, and it was necessary to find a new approach. In those days I was toying with something like a Hong Kong style approach ...” ⁷⁸³

October 25th, a documentary is aired on British television – *More British than the British* – concerning the political issues facing Falkland Islanders.

Talks scheduled to be held in Geneva in December are postponed, at the request of Argentina.

In the Falkland Islands, a new Legislative Council is elected.

October 30th, in Britain, the British Nationality Act receives Royal Assent; to take effect on January 1st, 1983. ⁷⁸⁴

“The British Government, by successfully blocking every attempt to modify the Nationality Bill in favour of Falkland Islanders who do not have grandparents born in the United Kingdom, has forced some 300 or so to accept second class citizenship. This gives them no right of abode and employment in the United Kingdom” ⁷⁸⁵

“... Margaret Thatcher stripped them – and all other overseas territories – of (full UK citizenship) in 1981 in order to stop the people of Hong Kong moving to Britain before the handover to China.” ⁷⁸⁶

“Its main purpose was to prevent millions of Hong Kong citizens from coming to Britain before and after the return of the territory to China in 1997, but some 600-700 native born Falkland Islanders who were not “patrial”, i.e. who did not have at least one British parent or grand parent (precisely those who had lived longest in the islands), also lost their full British citizenship including their right of abode in Britain. ... The Act was seen both in the Falklands and in Argentina as a step on the road towards the abrogation of all responsibility for the islanders by Britain.” ⁷⁸⁷

781 P. R. Fearn to Nick Ridley October 14th, 1981 ALW 040/325/1 Part B 26

782 Charlton 1989 p.106

783 Oscar Camilion interviewed in Charlton 1989 p.107

784 Section 14 was the relevant part of this legislation. For those with a strong constitution, and a lawyers eye, it can be viewed here - [https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1981/61/section/14#:~:text=14 Meaning of British citizen \(by descent\).&text=\(b\)in service under a,a member of the Communities.&text=\(b\)service of any description,under section 2\(3\)](https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1981/61/section/14#:~:text=14%20Meaning%20of%20British%20citizen%20(by%20descent).&text=(b)in%20service%20under%20a,a%20member%20of%20the%20Communities.&text=(b)service%20of%20any%20description,under%20section%202(3).). The Falkland islanders were removed the provisions of this enactment by the British Nationality (Falkland islands) Act 1983. See March, 1983.

785 *Falkland Islands Newsletter* December 1981 no.11

786 *Banished Islanders are Citizens Again* Anthony Browne in *The Guardian* May 12, 2002

787 Pascoe 2022 vol.3 pp.629-630.

The British Antarctic Survey, following budget cuts, suggests they close their base at Grytviken, South Georgia.

November 9th, in Buenos Aires, President Roberto Viola, is rushed to hospital.

November 10th, in Britain's House of Lords, the proposed withdrawal of HMS *Endurance* is again opposed.

*“... Argentina continues to press her claims to the Falkland Islands. The recent argument put forward is that they form part of the Argentinian continental shelf... Against the general background of uncertainty in the region it seems improvident of the Ministry of Defence – one presumes with the tacit acceptance of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office – to withdraw the Royal Naval Ice Patrol Ship HMS "Endurance" from Antarctica in 1982 as part of the wider decision to reduce the size of the active fleet. ... Could this decision not be interpreted by all other involved nations as a sign of declining interest in the Antarctic by Great Britain? Obviously there can be no such intention. But the best and most obvious way to prove it, in my view, is to reverse the decision to scrap HMS Endurance.”*⁷⁸⁸

On the same day, Argentine Army General Leopoldo Fortunato Galtieri returns to Buenos Aires following a successful trip to the USA.

*“Galtieri was warmly received on his 1981 visit to Washington and returned convinced the US would turn a blind eye to the invasion.”*⁷⁸⁹

November 16th, in Buenos Aires, US envoy, Vernon Walters, arrives for discussions with General Galtieri.

*“Walters was in Buenos Aires, intermittently, for many days, between October 1981 and February 1982. He discussed, inter alia, the establishment of a South Atlantic Treaty Organisation. He also discussed the advantages for such an organisation of an island-base in the Falklands, somewhat along the lines of Diego Garcia. However, the understanding was that the agreement on Hemispheric and other grounds should be between the United States and Argentina, the bulwark of American policy in the South Atlantic, and not between the US and Britain. Asked by the Argentine Military what Britain would do, the American replied to the effect that the British would huff, puff and protest, and do nothing, with the implication that the Americans could soothe ruffled British feathers.”*⁷⁹⁰

*“When asked whether the United States would remain neutral in the event of a conflict, Walters intimated that neutrality would be contingent upon the absence of any British casualties from Argentine military action.”*⁷⁹¹

*“... Galtieri unjustifiably trusted that the United States would appreciate the role played by the Argentine army in the armed repression of Honduras and the fight against Sandinismo in Nicaragua – in the so-called "Plan Charlie". This Argentine role in Central America – carried out at the instigation of the United States – together with Galtieri's radical anti-communist discourse, made him believe, in Cold War logic, that US support for his cause would be unconditional. ... It should not be forgotten that the close alliance between the United States and England was a long-standing reality, especially during the history of the 20th century. Therefore, to suppose that the North American country would support Argentina to the detriment of England was one of the great strategic errors of the Military Junta.”*⁷⁹²

November 25th, at the UN, the General Assembly defer consideration of the Falklands' question until 1982.

788 Lord Murton in *HL Deb 10.11.1981 vol.425* Hansard

789 Obituary in *The Guardian*, January 13, 2003.

790 *One Man's Falklands* Tam Dalyell 1982 pp.133-4

791 *The Reagan Revolution II: Rebuilding the Western Alliance* R. C. Thornton 2004

792 *Guerra Fría e intervención estadounidense en Malvinas (1982)* Ana Laura Bochicchio 2021 in *Quinto Sol: Revista de Historia* vol.25 no.1

November 26th, in London, at the Foreign Office, Robin Fearn of the South America Department, writes to Ambassador Williams in Buenos Aires (copied to Governor Hunt).

"1. ... Research Department have now completed their paper(on which we were consulted while it was in draft) and I enclose a copy.

2. Our original intention had been, ... to produce a classified paper and an accompanying sanitised version for use with suitable contacts. However, the nature of the paper and its conclusions have led us to decide to have the whole classified secret and not to produce any companion unclassified paper. The facts would seem to be that our case rests almost entirely on 148 years of continuous settlement, and that while the Law Officers have previously been relatively certain that this would be sufficient in International Law to uphold our claim, there is certainly some risk in putting the contention to the test, particularly given the probable in-built anti-colonial bias of most of the international institutions which might be involved if the case went to arbitration.

3. This paper, then, is for the information of you and your staff only: I do not need to stress how potentially damaging the consequences would be if the Argentine's came to suspect that we doubted our ability to justify our claim to sovereignty before 1833." ⁷⁹³

In Buenos Aires, Davidoff puts his final plans together for the dismantling of the scrap metal on South Georgia.

"... in late November, two high-ranking naval officers and two foreign office officials met with Constantine Davidoff at a restaurant in Calle Florida a popular shopping district in down town Buenos Aires. One of the navy men was Captain Adolpho Palau, of naval transport command, and the other was Captain Cesar Trombetta, of the navy's Antarctic Squadron.... the purpose of their meeting was for the navy officers to tell Davidoff that the Argentine navy was now prepared to transport him free of charge to South Georgia and for the foreign office officials to confirm that the scrap metal he brought back would enter duty-free, increasing his profit margin... Davidoff, never having been to South Georgia, proposed to make a brief trip to inspect the whaling stations. Trombetta agreed; it would provide an opportunity to take a closer look at the island and test the likely British reaction." ⁷⁹⁴

December 2nd, in the UK, Foreign Secretary Lord Carrington writes to the Prime Minister.

"... talks are due to be held on 17 and 18 December in Geneva;... Islander opinion is even more strongly opposed to any 'deal' with the Argentines over sovereignty. ... We therefore have little room for manoeuvre,... Argentines have requested this meeting, so we can allow them to make the running." ⁷⁹⁵

"HMG views Argentina as the proposer and HMG as the responder in the upcoming talks. The sovereignty issue remains central, and the Islanders seem more determined than ever to remain British. HMG's position is straightforward: It seeks a resolution of the issue, but will not agree to a settlement "over the heads of the Islanders." ..." ⁷⁹⁶

December 9th, from Port Stanley, Governor Hunt sails in HMS *Endurance*; to visit the Dependencies.

December 11th, in Buenos Aires, following a palace coup, a new junta takes over led by Army Commander General Leopoldo Galtieri, Admiral Jorge Anaya and Air Force General, Lami Dozo.

⁷⁹³ Fearn to Williams November 26, 1981 in AW 040/325/1. The attachments are subject to embargo. Closed for 47 years under exemption 27(1)(c) dated August 28, 2012. Likely to include the legal opinions of 1947 and 1966. Despite the 1947 being available at the Public Records Office at Kew. cf. 1947

⁷⁹⁴ Thornton 2004. There are different versions of this story; none of which can be confirmed.

⁷⁹⁵ ALW 040/325/2 Part E 301

⁷⁹⁶ Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D810588-0688

“... what I would stress is that I doubt whether, from our point of view, any change is going to make a vast difference.”⁷⁹⁷

“In the 19th and 20th centuries Argentine elites deliberately used irredentism to cultivate an Argentine national identity among a diverse immigrant population. By all indications this was enormously successful: to this day Argentine nationalism is an unusually potent strain. The Junta that came to power in 1982 was the first to have passed through Argentine schools after the claim to the Malvinas gained prominence in the textbooks. In this sense the moral claim itself has a domestic political explanation. Nevertheless, the Junta's perception of historical injustice was sincere.”⁷⁹⁸

In a deal with Anaya, Galtieri becomes President-elect whilst retaining his position as head of the Army.

“Seeing the Argentina flag fly over the Malvinas was the life-long dream of Admiral Jorge Isaac Anaya, commander-in-chief of the navy and the driving force behind Argentina's policy on the sovereignty dispute. In December 1981 he supported his boyhood friend Leopoldo Galtieri's bid for the presidency on the condition that Galtieri would secure sovereignty over the disputed islands once and for all.”⁷⁹⁹

“It is said by associates of both men that this agreement ... involved assurances on a number of policy issues. One of these was an understanding that the recovery of the Falklands should be achieved within the two years of Galtieri's presidency term, preferably before January 1983...”⁸⁰⁰

“(Anaya) was an ardent 'Malvinist', but the suggestion that he made the recovery of the islands a condition of his support for the new President is not supported by senior Argentine Admirals. They believe that when Galtieri became President he asked Anaya and Brigadier Lami Dozo, the air Force member of the junta, what future plans the old junta had been developing ... the head of the list for foreign policy was the resolution of the 'Malvinas problem.' ...”⁸⁰¹

“Contrary to popular impression, however, Galtieri obtained neither a mandate nor a full term of office, and would be required to relinquish his army command in a year. In short, as president, Galtieri could count on exercising considerable power for a year, after which the junta would be enlarged by an additional member, Galtieri's replacement as army chief. This arrangement was clearly an incentive for Galtieri to take action while his power was relatively unconstrained.”⁸⁰²

In Buenos Aires, Dr. Nicanor Costa Mendez is appointed Foreign Minister.

“According to the Rattenbach report, when he took over the Chancellery, Dr. Nicanor Costa Méndez had two meetings with Galtieri in which he was given the directive of activating as much as possible the diplomatic negotiations aimed at the recognition of Argentine sovereignty in Malvinas, adding that he would not rule out the need to reach something more than diplomacy in the event that Britain once again attempted to delay the resolution of the question. Thus, during the months that followed, the Junta appealed to both formal and informal channels to make British diplomats understand that the option of the invasion was a reality and not a mere bluff to coerce them to sit down and negotiate.”⁸⁰³

797 Williams to FCO December 3, 1981 FCO 12/384 f29

798 Welch 1997

799 Ibid.

800 Jenkins & Hastings 1997

801 *Argentine Fight for the Falklands* Martin Middlebrook 2003

802 Thornton 2004

803 Carbone 2008

*“The new Junta updated its invasion plans and gave public clues as to its intentions. Galtieri appointed Dr. Nicanor Costa Méndez as Foreign Minister, a diplomat obsessed with seizing Falklands sovereignty. Galtieri made a speech saying he wanted to create a 'Greater Argentina', which, my Argentine contacts told me, meant getting possession of the Falkland Islands and the Beagle Channel from Chile.”*⁸⁰⁴

December 12th, at South Georgia, Governor Hunt speaks to the BAS base commander, Peter Witty and visits the old whaling station at Grytviken.

December 14th, in London, dealing with a question regarding the occupation by Argentina of Southern Thule, Lord Carrington states; *“... if my noble friend is suggesting the use of force, he will recollect that international law and the United Nations Charter require disputes to be settled by peaceful means. That is what we have been trying to do,..”*⁸⁰⁵

December 15th, Argentina requests a postponement of the negotiations due to start on the 17th. Britain agrees. From Buenos Aires, Admiral Jorge Anaya flies to Puerto Belgrano.

*“On Tuesday 15 December 1981, Admiral Jorge Anaya flew from Buenos Aires to the main Argentine naval base at Puerto Belgrano, 280 miles away to the south-west. He went there to perform the official installation of Vice-Admiral Juan Lombardo as the new Chief of Naval Operations; ... After the ceremony, Anaya surprised Lombardo by quietly telling him to prepare a plan to occupy the Falkland islands: to 'take them but not necessarily to keep them' are the words Lombardo remembers.”*⁸⁰⁶

From the Rio de la Plata, on the same day, an Argentine naval transport - *Almirante Trizar* (Capt. Cesar Trombetta) - sails for South Georgia.⁸⁰⁷ Constantino Davidoff is on board.

*“178. Once the transfer of Davidoff and a small group of people have been agreed to evaluate the work to be carried out, on 15-DEC-81 the ARA "Almirante Trizar" set sail from Buenos Aires.”*⁸⁰⁸

*“Davidoff and his men were issued with the 'white cards' that served as bilateral documentation in the dealings of both countries in the South Atlantic region as per the 1971 Communication Accords.”*⁸⁰⁹

*“... Davidoff's enterprise lay dormant until activated on late 1981. At that point scrap metal prices began to plummet from \$93 to \$63 per ton, suggesting that profit was not necessarily the reason for the venture...”*⁸¹⁰

*“The business was inviting. It was estimated according to The Sunday Times that (for) those 35,000 tons of metal Davidoff had paid £115,000, when in 1979 a tonne of scrap was sold at £214, representing a profit of £7 million.”*⁸¹¹

804 Briley 2022

805 *HL Deb 14 December 1981 vol.426 cc5-6*. At this time, Argentina's meteorological station on Southern Thule was staffed by seven naval scientists and four civilians, of which three were radio technicians.

806 *Argentine Fight for the Falklands* M. Middlebrook 2003. In *El fracaso de la cumbre entre argentinos y británicos que decidió la guerra: “En un mes tomamos las Malvinas”* Juan Bautista Tata Yofre March 1, 2022 the date is given as December 22, 1981.

807 *Junta Militar: Comision de Analisis y Evaluacion de las Responsabilidades del Conflicto del Atlantico Syr – Inform Final* a.k.a. The Rattenbach Report (undated). Other sources suggest the 16th.

808 *Ibid*.

809 Freedman & Gamba-Stonehouse 1990 p.42. In fact the white cards did not apply to South Georgia or any of the Dependencies. *cf.* 1971

810 Thornton 2004. There are different versions of this story. None can be confirmed.

811 *Malvinas: las causas inmediatas de la Guerra* M. Meneghini 2015

December 16th, in Buenos Aires, the British Embassy receive a letter informing them of Davidoff's intention to visit South Georgia.⁸¹²

*"Although Davidoff had permission for the visit, the manner in which he was taken by the Argentine Navy was not calculated to ease British suspicions. He notified the British Embassy in Buenos Aires of his date of sailing, but the letter arrived after he had left and it was vague in detail and did not ask for diplomatic clearance for the Almirante Irizar."*⁸¹³

*"Davidoff deliberately delayed sending the letter to the embassy, on Trombetta's advise, who intended it as a "provocation". But Davidoff also sent a telex to Christian Salvesens in Edinburgh, informing the company of his trip, and Salvesens had promptly informed the Foreign Office. London had thus been informed of Davidoff's visit well in advance of his arrival."*⁸¹⁴

December 18th, in Buenos Aires, the new junta meet to discuss tactics regarding the Falkland Islands.⁸¹⁵

*"(Dr. Méndez) ... briefed the Junta ... as to the dismal state of negotiations with Britain and the need to develop a policy prior to the resumption of talks in the coming February. ... From the Argentine perspective serious discussions, addressing the sovereignty issue, only took place for two short periods during ... sixteen years: between 1966 and 1967, and from 1977 to 1980. For the rest of the time the Falkland Islands lobby undermined the flexibility of the Foreign Office and its conduct of the negotiations. ...The immediate Argentine objective was to return to the original negotiating framework of 1965-7."*⁸¹⁶

*"Why Malvinas? ... it contained that element that would guarantee, in some way, unquestionable support from Argentine society as a whole. But in addition, it had the potential capacity to transform the character of the Armed Forces, since for the latter it could mean – in the words of Leon Rozitchner – to move from "dirty internal war to external clean war", by recovering that part of a formerly usurped country, finally re-establishing true national integrity, and at the same time making the "enemy" of the Argentine people to England and not the Military Junta. In this way, what was intended was to "reconquer" the Falkland Islands to "conquer" the Argentine people."*⁸¹⁷

*"(Admiral Anaya) ... told a retired admiral on 19 December that the military government faced collapse and had to find an element 'to bring cohesion to the country and that element is the Malvinas'..."*⁸¹⁸

December 20th, at Stromness Bay in South Georgia, Almirante Irizar anchors.⁸¹⁹

*"En route the Almirante Irizar maintained radio silence and did not notify the Magistrate (the designation given the commander of the British Antarctic Survey to indicate Crown authority) at King Edward Point, Grytviken, to notify him of the arrival. King Edward Point was the official point of entry where Customs and Immigration clearance was obtained."*⁸²⁰

812 In correspondence with the British Ambassador dated March 25, 1982, Davidoff would later claim that this letter was delivered to the Embassy on December 11, 1981

813 Freedman & Gamba-Stonehouse 1990 p.42

814 Thornton 2004

815 Freedman 2005 vol.1 p.132

816 Freedman & Gamba-Stonehouse 1990

817 Carbone 2008

818 Briley 2022

819 According to the *Junta Militar: Comision de Analisis y Evaluacion de las Responsabilidades del Conflicto del Atlantico Syr – Inform Final* a.k.a. The Rattenbach Report (undated), the ship arrived on the 18th. However, four days from Buenos Aires seems a little quick. This Report also states that the Argentine ship stayed only a few hours before leaving for Ushuaia, from where Davidoff flew to Buenos Aires. Other sources suggest that the vessel remained three days.

820 Freedman & Gamba-Stonehouse 1990 p.42

*“Trobetta traversed the 1,650-mile passage in four days maintaining radio silence, an unusual procedure, and without radioing the magistrate at Grytviken, the official port of entry, of his impending visit. Upon arrival on December 20 (?), Trombetta declined to follow prescribed landing procedures by obtaining clearance at Grytviken. Instead he proceeded directly to Leith..”*⁸²¹

*“There he inspected the material that (he) had purchased: 30 fuel storage tanks, cooking plant, diesel power plant of 1,500kw, boiler and machinery, in Leith; other facilities in Husvik and Stromnes, plus two floating docks of 700 and 1,000 tons in the latter port.”*⁸²²

December 22nd, in Buenos Aires, during his inauguration speech at the National Congress Building, General – now President - Galtieri surprisingly makes no reference to the Islands.

December 23rd, at the Leith whaling station on South Georgia, after Davidoff and the Argentine ship have sailed, a member of the BAS checks the station; finding the phrase – '*Las Malvinas son Argentinas*' – scrawled on the walls. Governor Hunt is informed by radio.

*By the time that the BAS discovered that the visit had been made the Almirante Irizar had gone. The Magistrate visited Leith on 23 December to find traces of the Argentine visit including a wall defaced with the slogan 'Las Malvinas son Argentinas', helpful dated 20 December. The news of the visitation was passed on to Governor Hunt, who in turn passed it to London on 31 December.”*⁸²³

In Argentina, during the evening of the same day, Admiral Anaya issues written instructions to Admiral Lombardo to confirm his conversation of the 15th, for plans regarding an invasion of the Falkland Islands to be updated.⁸²⁴

“By order of Senor COAR, he must personally prepare and hand over to me the updated plan for the recovery of Malvinas.

A. For this purpose, (he) will arrange for the sending of selected personnel to carry out the necessary reconnaissance with adequate coverage.


B. Said plan must include the detailed development of the following aspects of the occupation:

- 1- Personnel that should remain in Port Stanley*
- 2- Support these troops*
- 3- Defense of Port Stanley*
- 4- Port Stanley support logistics*

*Plan delivery date: 31 Mar 1982”*⁸²⁵

*“(Admiral) Lombardo, who commanded the South Atlantic operations, had a series of meetings with the head of Marine Special Forces who was to lead the invasion, Admiral Carlos Bússer...”*⁸²⁶

In Buenos Aires, a number of discreet press briefings take place at the Foreign Ministry.



821 Thornton 2004.

822 Meneghini 2015

823 Freedman & Gamba-Stonehouse 1990 p.43

824 Some Argentine sources date this to December 22, 1981.

825 Armada Argentina No. 326 "S"/81 JEOP, PI4

826 Briley 2022

*“... the task of preparing the Argentine people for the possible military operation to be carried out, was also in the hands of the Minister for Foreign Affairs. This task had begun in late December 1981 when Costa Méndez began to inform a select group of journalists about the government's intentions. He told them that Argentina was determined to recover the Malvinas by the end of 1982, through diplomatic channels if possible, by force if necessary.”*⁸²⁷

December 31st, London is informed of the unauthorised visit of the *Almirante Irizar*. Governor Hunt advises a strong protest and legal proceedings against Davidoff.

1982 – January 1st, from Buenos Aires, Ambassador Williams sends a report to the Foreign Office, evaluating the previous year's events with regard to the Falkland Islands.

*“... it has not been an easy year for the UK in its relations with the Argentine Republic, either politically or in export promotion. In the former, as regards the Falklands, we have had to walk like Agag all year to avoid offence to Argentine, Islander or Falkland lobby sensitivities ... We have come through without a bust-up, but certainly with the Argentines and the Islanders more on each others' nerves than a year ago.”*⁸²⁸

January 2nd, in Argentina, the junta meet to debate plans for military solutions in the South Atlantic.

*“... on 2 January 1982, the Junta considered the so-called "Alpha Project", first produced in May of the previous year at the request of the Admiral Lombardo and never executed. Seen against the success of 1976, when one of the first acts of the (military) had established a military presence in Thule, ... with the objective of founding a base with a view to the scientific research in the future. Despite English protests about this presence on "British territory", the program was not suspended, which made an attractive precedent. Supporters of the "Alpha Project" assumed that Britain would learn to tolerate an Argentine presence in South Georgia as they had in South Thule. However, at the request of the Naval Operations Command, it was again considered that the time to execute it was not appropriate, since any isolated action could be inconvenient in the circumstances in which the negotiations were held, and it was intended to avoid a potentially negative event for the development of future dialogue with the English. Despite this, the meeting was not unsuccessful as the Junta ... resolved "to explore the possibility of using military power to achieve the political objective"...”*⁸²⁹

January 4th, from London, Ambassador Williams is instructed to make a formal protest to the Argentine Foreign Ministry with regard to South Georgia. Governor Hunt is instructed, however, not to start legal proceedings against Davidoff, as such an action would; *“... risk provoking a most serious incident which could escalate and have an unforeseeable outcome.”*⁸³⁰

January 5th, in Buenos Aires, the junta again meet to consider the Falklands question.

*“It resolved to 'reactivate to the fullest extent all negotiations for the sovereignty of the Malvinas, South Georgia and South Sandwich Islands' and at the same time 'prepare a contingency plan for the employment of military power should the first alternative fail.'...”*⁸³¹

*“It was only a contingency plan. The mood was dictated by the absolute lack of progress in negotiations... at that time, at the end of five years of fruitless negotiations, we had become very frustrated.”*⁸³²

827 Carbone 2008

828 FCO Diplomatic Report 14/82 ALA 014/2. To “walk like Agag” apparently means – to walk on eggshells.

829 Carbone 2008

830 Franks 1983

831 Freedman & Gamba-Stonehouse 1990

832 Rear-Admiral Gaultier Alara quoted in Middlebrook 2003

*“The newspapers of Tuesday, January 5, 1982, reported that the three Commanders-in-Chief of the Armed Forces would meet to discuss, among other issues, “the recomposition of the cadre of governors” and the appointments of some political ambassadors. The meeting was held in the Libertador building, headquarters of the Army, starting at 9 in the morning. At that meeting, the Malvinas issue was analyzed in the context of foreign policy and it was concluded that an “aggressive” policy should be adopted. According to the report of the Military Junta, “At that meeting, the Malvinas case was dealt with outside the agenda of the Military Junta” and it was decided to commission an “abbreviated” General Staff study with the participation of one representative for each armed force. Also “it was discussed that not only had to obtain a restructuring of the negotiations with Great Britain with a view to the new round of negotiations, but also that studies should be started to analyze the feasibility and convenience of an occupation of the islands.” ... As emerges from the exposed documentation, the determining date was January 5, 1982. On that day, it was considered to take a military step in the event that the diplomatic channel did not progress. The decision was made with the formal participation of the three commanders in chief. However, the matter had been analyzed and planned by the Navy, first, and discussed between Anaya and Galtieri later.”*⁸³³

*“The decision was made on Tuesday, January 5, 1982, and it was considered that “an aggressive policy” should be adopted, which “should be kept in the greatest secrecy so that it would not be misunderstood.”*⁸³⁴

January 6th, in Buenos Aires, Ambassador Williams acts on London's instructions to formally protest Davidoff's violation of British sovereignty; *“When he approached the Argentine Ministry of Foreign Affairs ... he was told that the Ministry had no knowledge of the incident and was investigating.”*⁸³⁵ Williams also presents a proposal from Lord Carrington that a further round of talks should take place in New York in February.

On the same day, Argentine Foreign Minister Costa Mendez repudiates the arbitration treaty with Chile, regarding the Beagle Channel dispute between the two countries.⁸³⁶

*“Argentina has renounced peace treaty with Chile on their Beagle Channel dispute over three islands and the surrounding sea potentially rich in oil ... The dispute has soured relations for years and brought them to the brink of war in 1978... War was averted only at the last minute by the Pope's whose compromise peace plan has now been rejected by Argentina ... Argentina says the Pope's compromise breaches a century-old bi-ocean principle that what's in the South Atlantic is Argentina's and in the Pacific is Chile's.”*⁸³⁷

January 12th, Argentina's governing military junta establishes a planning group to refine Falkland Islands invasion plans; to comprise Admiral Lombardo, Army General Garcia, and the Air Force's Brigadier Sigfrido Plessl. The Junta recognise that, in the case of invasion, casualties amongst the Islanders would be politically unacceptable.

*“The first issue was logical since the population, although they were not sympathizers of Argentina as such were situated inside Argentine territory and therefore should be protected as much as possible. The idea of a bloodless operation also meant no unnecessary destruction should accompany the operation. On the issue of British troops this meant that the fewer the military casualties for Britain, the less the need for an emotive reaction on the part of the population or of the British Government.”*⁸³⁸

833 *El plan de la Armada que llevó a la guerra de Malvinas y los esfuerzos de un empresario por evitar el conflicto* in Cadena 105 February 28, 2021

834 *El fracaso de la cumbre entre argentinos y británicos que decidió la guerra: “En un mes tomamos las Malvinas”* Juan Bautista Tata Yofre March 1, 2022

835 Freedman & Gamba-Stonehouse 1990 p.43

836 See 1881, 1971, 1977 & 1981

837 BBC dispatch of January 22, 1982 in Briley 2022

838 *Operation Rosario* Admiral Carlos Busser 1984

*“The other armed services soon became involved. Their work was overseen by a Comisión de Trabajo – a Working party – which held its first meeting at Army Headquarters in the Libertador Building in Buenos Aires in mid-January 1982. ... Admiral Anaya's initial plan to take the islands but not necessarily to stay or to defend them was abandoned at an early stage... A date of 15 September was given for the completion of the planning. No move was envisaged before that date...”*⁸³⁹

*“Its role would be to draw up a military plan that would be an alternative to the diplomatic strategy, envisaging the seizure of the Malvinas by the Argentine Armed Forces. ... From (Galtieri's) point of view, a "triumph" on the Falklands issue would have historically and definitively justified the Military Government and would support Galtieri's leadership electorally in a future civilian-military transitional government.”*⁸⁴⁰

In Buenos Aires, instructions are prepared for Foreign Minister Mendez with regard to future Anglo-Argentine negotiations.

*“The Argentine delegation will keep in mind permanently the fact that it is a national objective and permanent recognition of the Republic, the recognition by Great Britain of Argentine sovereignty over the Falkland Islands, South Georgia and the South Sandwich Islands, and that therefore it is crucial for the successful development of the negotiating process that the negotiations deal essentially on this topic.”*⁸⁴¹

January 21st, Argentina renounces the 1972 General Treaty on the Judicial Settlement of Disputes that it had signed with Chile. Argentina stations troops on the border with Chile.

*“Dictator Pinochet was an admirer of Britain and all things British, but the most important reason for the help his regime gave Britain in 1982 was the Chilean fear that if Argentina defeated Britain and obtained the Falklands, Chile would be the next item on the Argentine junta's menu.”*⁸⁴²

January 24th, Argentine newspaper, *La Prensa*, predicts that Argentina will present strict conditions for the continuance of negotiations with Britain. In an article, journalist Iglesias Rouco also refers to probable US support and expresses a belief that; *“... Buenos Aires will recover the islands by force this year,.. an ambitious diplomatic and strategic plan which would assure the country of a relevant role in the South Atlantic.”*

*“... it became clear that Argentina was contemplating invasion four months before it happened. We tried to persuade the Foreign Office in London it had a serious problem, either to build Fortress Falklands to avert invasion or negotiate sovereignty. The Foreign Office took the comfortable course of pretending nothing had changed. The blame really does lie in London...”*⁸⁴³

January 25th, in Ushuaia, commanding officer Captain Nick Barker takes HMS *Endurance* into the southern Argentine port. In contrast to previous occasions, he receives a frosty welcome.

“They declined to play football against the ship and even refused the use of their ground for a match against a local civilian side. All this was completely against the pattern of cordiality we had experienced on previous visits to Argentine ports, even as recently as our visit to Puerto Belgrano two months earlier. There was a partial belief that this may have had something to do with the fact that we were going on to Punta Arenas in Chile, but was this enough to explain such a complete snubbing? I did not think so and reported my misgivings in a signal. When I went to call on Captain Russo, in the

839 Middlebrook 2003

840 Carbone 2008

841 *Cadena 105* February 28, 2021

842 Pascoe 2022 vol.3 p.615. In 2009, Junta member Lami Dozo admitted that Chile's fears were well founded.

843 James Neilson, editor of the *Buenos Aires Herald* quoted in Briley 2022

absence of Admiral Zaratiegui, I was informed that I was in the Malvinas War Zone... I laughed and asked who the Argentines were fighting. 'You,' he said without a flicker of emotion... All this I reported to London."⁸⁴⁴

*"As Endurance was leaving, the Argentine harbor pilot had confided to Barker that something was 'very wrong' with the Argentine navy."*⁸⁴⁵

*"There were warnings aplenty from British official intelligence reports, from Argentina and from Falkland islanders who came back from visits to Argentina convinced the junta intended to invade at the end of March."*⁸⁴⁶

January 26th, in Argentina, the junta sign off *Directiva Estrategica Nacional* (National Strategic Directive) 1/82.⁸⁴⁷

*"The Military Committee, faced with the evident and repeated lack of progress in the negotiations with Great Britain to obtain recognition of our sovereignty over the Malvinas, Georgias and South Sandwich Islands; convinced that the prolongation of this situation affects national honour; the full exercise sovereignty and the exploration of resources; has resolved to analyse the possibility of the use of military power to obtain the political objective. This resolution must be kept in strict secrecy and should be circulated only to the heads of the respective military departments."*⁸⁴⁸

*"The junta charged Rear-Admiral Carlos Busser with planning "Operation Azul". "The order was not to update the plan but to draft a plan from scratch", Busser later recalled. "Argentina had made many plans in the past to recover the Malvinas, but the order we got was to make a out a new plan. We started doing so in January 1982. The basic idea was to negotiate throughout 1982, but at the same time have a military plan, just in case the negotiations failed. In that case we would take the military option. But that would only be towards the end of 1982, or the beginning of 1983."*⁸⁴⁹

January 27th, in Buenos Aires, the governing military junta responds to Lord Carrington's proposal for talks in a *bout de papier* delivered to the British Embassy. They agree to a fresh round of negotiations but call for them to be "serious," "in-depth" and to culminate; "within a reasonable period of time and without procrastination." Included is a pre-condition.

"... in the first place, British recognition of Argentine sovereignty ... It remains a sine-qua-non requirement for the solution of the dispute. So long as this question is unresolved the dispute will continue."

844 *Beyond Endurance: An Epic of Whitehall and the South Atlantic* Nicholas Barker 1997. Barker's warnings to the Admiralty appear to have been dismissed as an attempt to save his ship, which was due to be taken out of service. Captain Barker had been energetic in the defence of *Endurance* before the decision and had been active in the campaign to have that decision reversed. These actions had not endeared him to the MoD's political masters, in particular Michael Power, the Under-Secretary of State at the Ministry. Nor, indeed, Secretary of State John Nott. The Frank's commission of inquiry that followed the Falklands War do not appear to have been fully informed of the warnings given by Barker. This may be seen as some tactical whitewashing by the Conservative Government.

845 Thornton 2004.

846 Briley 2022

847 This document is undated and appears to be made up of 14 pages of handwritten notes – badly written Spanish. It appears among the appendices of the original Rattenbach Commission Report from pages 297-310. None of the online copies of the Rattenbach Commission Report, officially published March 30, 2012, include the appendices. A copy for those with good eyesight can be found here - http://www.radarmalvinas.com.ar/dar/ENE_82_DENAC_1.pdf

848 Quoted (and dated) in Pascoe 2022 vol.3 p.643 citing Freedman 2005 vol.1 pp.156-157.

849 *Justice and the Genesis of War* David A. Welch 1993 p.167

Argentina also proposes the establishment of a permanent negotiating commission, to meet in the first week of each month; subject to denunciation by either side without notice.⁸⁵⁰

*"I asked Forrester for his views on a recent article in Buenos Aires daily La Prensa by gadfly Iglesias Rouco, who alleged that the Galtieri administration may be considering sending an "ultimatum" to Her Majesty's Government demanding recognition of Argentine sovereignty over the Malvinas and significant movement toward resolution of the drawn-out dispute. Forrester brushed aside the article as Rouco's fantasy. He acknowledged that there are officials in the Armed Forces and the Foreign Ministry who would like to threaten or use force, but these people are not involved in the issue. He noted, for example, that in the Foreign Ministry the only officials involved are Under Secretary Ros, the Malvinas directorate, the legal division in a supporting role and, of course, Foreign Minister Costa Mendez. He said that he did not know the attitude of Costa Mendez or the President, but it appeared to him that the administration is fully engaged in other issues (e.g. the economy and, in foreign affairs, the Beagle dispute). The Malvinas problem is on the back burner."*⁸⁵¹

*"On 27 January, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs delivered a bout de papier to the British Ambassador which called for negotiations that would end 'within a reasonable period of time and without procrastination' in the recognition of Argentine sovereignty. Britain agreed to a series of talks in New York, but refused to accept preconditions to the outcome."*⁸⁵²

*"Argentina produced a proposal on January 27, 1982 to constitute a permanent negotiating commission, with a mandate of one year, with the purpose of concluding the negotiations on sovereignty. This initiative had a considerable impact in London, due to the peremptory deadlines it contained."*⁸⁵³

In Argentina, a very public discussion in newspapers such as *La Prensa* and the *Buenos Aires Herald* consider the advantages and disadvantages of military action to seize the Falkland Islands.

*"Argentina will set a series of pre-conditions before continuing talks with Britain on the future of the Malvinas/Falklands islands ... If not met, other forms of action, including recovery of the islands by military means would be considered."*⁸⁵⁴

*"What was published by a Buenos Aires morning paper on January 27, 1982, linked to retired admiral Emilio Massera, is symptomatic: "Right now we are in optimal conditions: we are governed by the Armed Forces, we have a president (Galtieri) with drive and a great decision-making capacity, and we have a luxury chancellor (Nicanor Costa Méndez). If, in addition to having won the war against terrorism, the Falklands are recovered, the Process will be marked by these events (...). Regarding the internal front, the public would feel invigorated (...) The Malvinas are prior to the Beagle."*⁸⁵⁵

February 2nd, while the junta consider their next move, Davidoff is instructed not to visit South Georgia.⁸⁵⁶

850 ALW 040/325/1 Part C 101

851 Memorandum of Conversation Buenos Aires January 27, 1982: *Status of Falklands Dispute in Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981-1988 vol.xiii*. Participants were Richard Forrester, Malvinas Desk, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and John E. Keane, Political Officer, American Embassy.

852 Welch 1997

853 *La política británica hacia las Malvinas* Vicente Berasategui 2013

854 *Latin American Weekly Report* February 12, 1982

855 *Lessons from the Malvinas* Martin Balza in *Perfil* July 29, 2023. Balza served as a Lieut-Colonel in 1982 in charge of Artillery Group 3 and became Chief of the Argentine Army from 1992-1999.

856 Freedman & Gamba-Stonehouse 1990 p.44

In Britain, after considering an Argentine request to purchase 12 *Vulcan* Bombers, the Ministry of Defence decide against the proposal; “... a sale of strategic bombers to Argentina would bound to be misunderstood or at least misinterpreted (by Chile).” At the Foreign Office, Robin Fearn raises another problem; “On the face of it, a strike aircraft would seem to be entirely suitable for an attack on the Falklands.”⁸⁵⁷

February 3rd, from London, Ambassador Williams is instructed to lodge a further protest regarding the visit by the *Almirante Irizar* to South Georgia without clearance.⁸⁵⁸

February 4th, off Patagonia, members of an Argentine diving club find the remains of *Swift*, which foundered in March, 1770.⁸⁵⁹

February 7th, in Buenos Aires, a meeting takes place; “... between Capitan de Fragata de Infanteria de Marina [Lieutenant-Colonel of Marines] Guillermo Botto, an intelligence officer, ... and two naval officers who knew the islands well. They were Vicecomodoro [Wing Commander] Héctor Gilobert, who had been the local manager of LADE in Stanley in 1980-81, and Capitan de Fragata [Commander] Adolfo Aurelio Gaffoglio, liaison officer for Argentine naval transport services. Botto asked them questions in order to identify targets for the invading forces, ...”⁸⁶⁰

Argentine newspaper, *La Prensa*, publishes an article by journalist Jesús Iglesias Rouco; “If London does not agree to stick to a timetable, Buenos Aires reserves the right to take other actions. We already announced fifteen days ago that among these actions, the recovery of the islands by military means is not ruled out, far from it.”⁸⁶¹

“Iglesias Rouca, writing in *La Prensa*, which had close contacts with the navy, warned ... Britain had no more than four months to acknowledge transfer of sovereignty...”⁸⁶²

February 9th, in Buenos Aires, Britain's Ambassador responds to the *bout de papier* of January 27th.

“(The UK) can not ... accept the Argentine assumption that the purpose of the negotiations is the eventual recognition by HMG of Argentine sovereignty in the area...”⁸⁶³

Ambassador Williams also protests Davidoff's unauthorised landing on South Georgia.

“... some fifty days after the offence had been committed, he (protested). Ambassador Williams warned that this had been a violation of British sovereignty, and that if a further attempt were made to land without proper authority the British Government reserved the right to take whatever action necessary.”⁸⁶⁴

“... Ambassador Williams delivered a low-key response to the Argentine note, agreeing to resume talks on February 27, but loudly protested Davidoff's three-hour (sic) December stay on South Georgia.”⁸⁶⁵

Reported in the *Buenos Aires Herald*.⁸⁶⁶

857 Quoted in *The Daily Express* September 6, 2015

858 Freedman & Gamba-Stonehouse 1990 p.43

859 See 1770

860 Pascoe 2022 vol.3 p.644

861 Quoted in *El fracaso de la cumbre entre argentinos y británicos que decidió la guerra: “En un mes tomamos las Malvinas”* Juan Bautista Tata Yofre March 1, 2022

862 Briley 2022

863 *ALW 040/325/1 Part C 101 Annex B*

864 Freedman & Gamba-Stonehouse 1990 p.43

865 Thornton 2004

866 *ALW 040/325/3*. Documents released to the *Margaret Thatcher Foundation* per FOI request 0181-12.

“New Argentine Governments, no matter what their provenance or their ideology, have at least two things in common: they all aspire to reduce the inflation rate and they all strive to establish, once and for all, unquestioned Argentine sovereignty over the islands known in English as the Falklands ... This Government is no exception but ... its Falklands approach will be far tougher than anything we have seen so far. Besides the attendant historical rights and the infinite patience so far shown by Argentina, the truth of the matter is that the Malvinas situation is seriously interfering with our security in the South Atlantic, is limiting our economic and geopolitical plans, including ones relating to Antarctica, and bears moreover in a most negative fashion on our dispute with Chile over the Beagle.

Looking at the subject from an international, or western, viewpoint, the British presence there deprives Argentina of its proper participation in the defence of the region against constant Soviet penetration ... this makes any strategic planning for the area virtually impossible or of doubtful value. So if it is borne in mind that it is not only this country which finds itself daily more prejudiced by Britain's inexplicable obstinacy, it seems easy to predict that an initiative involving force could count not only on the understanding of the international community, particularly of the third world, but also on the support, or at least the interested tolerance, of NATO.”

February 13th, on South Georgia, two members of the Joint Services Expedition arrive at Leith harbour to find three yachts moored there. *Isatis* and *Kim* are French registered and have complied with entry procedures, although *Kim* has overstayed. *Caiman's* origins are unknown and she is flying the flags of the UK, Belgium and Panama. Her crew are believed to be in radio contact with Buenos Aires.⁸⁶⁷

*“Although flying the Panamanian flag, on board were an Italian crew of three and an Argentinean bank official, Adrion Marchessi. Marchessi claimed that his bank was financing Davidoff's enterprise and he was simply inspecting the whaling stations. Suspicions were raised when three "very sophisticated" radios were found aboard the yacht, and more so when Davidoff, contacted by the British embassy to verify Marchessi's story, denied it.”*⁸⁶⁸

In the Falkland Islands, aircraft overfly Stanley.

*“By February the Argentines had become quite brazen in their sabre-rattling and intelligence gathering. There were unexplained nocturnal flights over Stanley. Those who heard the aircraft or saw the lights in the small hours believed that they were military Hercules planes. Twice they dropped flares as they flew over Stanley Airport. The flares may have been signals to LADE staff who would have confirmed the accuracy of their navigation.”*⁸⁶⁹

*“Mendez told me he first heard of the junta's invasion plans on 13 February, 1982.”*⁸⁷⁰

February 15th, in London, Lord Carrington writes to the Prime Minister regarding Argentina's demands.

“The Argentine Government have given us, as a prior notification of their position and objectives at New York, a substantial and toughly worded document which asserts that the sole purpose of the negotiations is to cede sovereignty to Argentina, denies the relevance of the Islanders' wishes (as

867 *Caiman's* owner was an Italian, Giovanni Raggio. It has been suggested that this vessel, and possibly the French yachts too, were on a spying mission for Argentina. See *Large Animals and Wide Horizons: Adventures of a Biologist* Richard M. Laws Scott Polar Research Institute undated.

868 Thornton 2004

869 Bound 2007

870 Briley 2022. Harold Briley was the BBC's Latin America Correspondent.

opposed to interests) and, without explicit threats, refers to the Islanders' dependence on services provided by the Argentines."⁸⁷¹

Thatcher responds that it should be made clear that the wishes of the Islanders remain paramount.⁸⁷²

*"... the British were pursuing two contradictory policies: (1) negotiate a settlement with Argentina over the Falklands; and (2) protect the rights of the Falkland Islanders as British citizens. Both were undermined by the inherent difficulties of doing things "in twos." Britain was unable to make the kind of offer to the Argentine government that would have settled the issue peacefully, because the islanders and their supporters in Britain would have seen this as betrayal."*⁸⁷³

*"... at the British Embassy, the ambassador, Anthony Williams, was hosting a reception for a joint Anglo-Argentine military climbing expedition which had scaled a volcano in the Andes. Amid the celebrations and clinking of glasses, the ambassador turned to me and said: 'See the camaraderie. Relations have never been better between our two countries.' At that moment, preparations were well advanced for the invasion. The ambassador's remark was surprising as he was involved in the attempts to diffuse the threatening crisis. It was later revealed that his sympathies lay with Argentina, to the extent that there were allegations that he betrayed the United Kingdom by withholding vital information from Lord Carrington."*⁸⁷⁴

February 17th, after speaking to Foreign Minister Costa Méndez, the junta agree to postpone Operation Alpha.

*"In February 1982 the Argentine foreign Minister, Nicanor Costa Mendez, recommended that project Alpha be postponed so as not to complicate the forthcoming negotiations in New York. On 17 February the Junta agreed. Nevertheless, there is some indication that the navy – without the knowledge of either the Junta as a whole or its own commander-in-chief – decided to proceed."*⁸⁷⁵

February 18th, from Buenos Aires, Argentina rejects Britain's February 8th protest regarding Davidoff.⁸⁷⁶ Argentine newspaper *La Prensa* reports:

*"The least that can be asked of military governments is that they do not dither in the face of any military eventuality when questions of sovereignty are involved. After decades of fruitless negotiations, Argentina has good cause to know that Great Britain will not give up the Malvinas either voluntarily or via any agreement that would mean losing its administrative power in the islands... the time is approaching for Buenos Aires to think in terms of force."*⁸⁷⁷

"Speaking of "the measure of Argentine need", the "Galician" Iglesias Rouco, at that time with the help of influential sources in the San Martín Palace, made a scan of the reasons that (lay behind) the military decision of April 2: "1) The isolation that the country suffers with regard to the political and strategic schemes of the West, caused by its erratic foreign policy of the last thirty years, its progressive internal weakening and more recently, the methods used in the so-called anti-subversive war, which have placed Argentina in a kind of international ghetto; 2) the unfavorable results of the arbitration on the Beagle, and now of the Papal

871 *ALW 040/325/1 B 51-100*

872 Freedman & Gamba-Stonehouse 1990

873 *When Governments Collide in the South Atlantic: Britain Coerces Argentina during the Falklands War* Patrick Bratton & Wallace Thies 2011 in *Comparative Strategy* 30:1 1-27

874 Briley 2022

875 Welch 1997, citing circumstantial evidence that the Navy afterwards authorised another voyage without notifying the Foreign Ministry. See Freedman & Gamba-Stonehouse 1990 p.46

876 Freedman & Gamba-Stonehouse 1990 p.43

877 Iglesias Rouco quoted in *ALW 040/325/3*

mediation, which poses an imminent threat to our position in the South Atlantic; 3) the Soviet penetration in the zone, with the consequent North American concern [...]. In short: if Argentina does not immediately obtain a new foothold in the South Atlantic, it runs the risk of being excluded from everything that is cooked there" ... " 878

February 23rd, in Buenos Aires, scrap dealer Constantino Davidoff turns up at the British Embassy where he apologises for his earlier failures to comply with South Georgia's regulations. He informs Embassy staff that he wishes to return to Leith on March 10th, with 30 workers, and expects to stay some 6 months. Davidoff is warned that the appropriate formalities must be complied with on his arrival at South Georgia.

"Davidoff was never, of course, given any permission by this Embassy but, on the contrary, warned personally in February ..." 879

"Admiral Otero's office, in charge transportation and logistics, gave the go-ahead to the trip without further consultation with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs." 880

"... the time to conduct salvage operations on South Georgia was between November and March, not March and October. Yet, Davidoff's declared plan of operations called for his men to work for the next four months through the worst of South Georgia's winter when there would be nineteen hours of darkness out of every twenty-four, heavy winds and several feet of snow. This was a poor choice of timing for what purported to be a purely commercial enterprise." 881

"Whitehall's complacency was shared by the Ambassador in Buenos Aires, Anthony Williams, who, belonging to the Neville Henderson school of diplomacy, believed that even a horrible dictatorship like General Galtieri's would not stoop to actual aggression, especially if Britain kept on good terms with it. Williams, a 'brilliant' public-school and Oxford diplomat, carried weight in the Foreign Office; Rex Hunt, the Governor of the Falkland Isles, a plain commonsensical man who shared Barker's fears, did not." 882

From Buenos Aires, Harold Briley, the BBC's Latin American Correspondent, reports: *"Speculation that Argentina's generals may resort to force in an attempt to invade the Falkland Islands to get their way is emphatically discounted by the Foreign Ministry. ... A Foreign Ministry spokesman told me Argentina's patience is running out and the new Galtieri government wants 'quick results' (on surrender of sovereignty). ... The Argentines have promised to respect the interests of the Islanders and guarantee their lifestyle, traditions and democracy. The Islanders are understandably sceptical, pointing out that successive Argentine regimes have been unable to guarantee democracy in their own country."* 883

February 26/27th, in New York, Anglo-Argentine negotiations resume with Argentina's delegation led by deputy-Foreign Minister Enrique Ros. Britain's team are led by Richard Luce. Representing the Islands people are Tim Blake and John Cheek.

878 *El fracaso de la cumbre entre argentinos y británicos que decidió la guerra: "En un mes tomamos las Malvinas"* Juan Bautista Tata Yofre March 1, 2022.

879 Ambassador Williams in a telegram to London dated March 20, 1982 quoted in *PREM 19/613*. The 'warning' was actually given by Richard Gozney, a junior member of the Embassy staff, and later described by *Endurance's* Capt. Barker as; *"so weakly worded it was no more discouraging than a few dandelions in the lawn of opportunity."*

880 Freedman & Gamba-Stonehouse 1990 p.46

881 Thornton 2014. Thornton calls the Embassy reaction - *"nothing less than extraordinary"* after Davidoff's previous failure to follow regulations. Sadly, Thornton's interpretation of events is tainted by his belief that Thatcher's government was complicit in the fomenting of a conflict for its own political ends; which he was trying to prove.

882 *The High Cost of Cuts* Correlli Barnett in *The Spectator* May 16, 1997 p.42

883 Briley 2022

*“Mr. Luce explained that he wished to make the British position clear from the outset. We had no doubts about British sovereignty over the Falkland Islands and the Dependencies. The wishes of the Islanders themselves were paramount ... Sr. Ros recalled that Argentina had been trying to reach a solution to this dispute for over 16 years ... He stressed that the principal question for Argentines' was sovereignty. The key to their position was the need for Britain to recognise Argentine sovereignty in the area. ... Argentina had no intention of disturbing the Islanders' style of life; what they wanted was a balance between Islanders' interests and Argentine sovereignty rights. ... For the Argentines it would not be possible to accept any agreement that excluded the Argentine claim to sovereignty. ... ”*⁸⁸⁴

*“We knew before the talks took place in February 1982 what the Argentines were going to propose. Lord Carrington agreed that I should accept their concept of a ‘negotiating commission’ which would look at every facet of the Falkland Islands problem, including sovereignty. However, I was to make it absolutely clear to them that, as far as sovereignty was concerned, there would be no change without the consent of the Islanders and of Parliament. Against that background I was given the broad brief to go into negotiations, to keep dialogue going and, to be quite blunt about it, if things were getting difficult, we would just have to buy time. ... I say, quite bluntly, that we were blocked in. Leaseback had not made any progress, and we saw no easy way out. We hoped, I hoped, that perhaps the Argentines would come forward with something positive out of the negotiating commission, which might lead us to a new way forward ... all we could do was buy time. We had run out of any innovating ideas. Of those, leaseback had been the most important.”*⁸⁸⁵

*“At the end of day one we were going to continue discussing ways of cooperation, and ways forward. All we had to do after that was draft a communiqué. But they had obviously conveyed to BA what they thought had been agreed, and were told to go back and start again. So we covered exactly the same ground on day two.”*⁸⁸⁶

*“A bilateral meeting was scheduled in February to continue talks. It fell to Richard Luce, then Minister of State at the FCO who replaced Ridley, to represent London, with instructions to resist the deadlines set in the Argentine memorandum and maintain that any agreement on the Commission should be ad referendum.”*⁸⁸⁷

*“At one point (February 26 at 10 a.m.), Luce said that “the wishes of the islanders take absolute priority.” An unacceptable condition for the Argentines, since only “the interests” of the islanders should be taken into account. Such is the written letter of the United Nations resolution 2065 that gave rise to the negotiations in the sixties (presidency of Arturo Illia). The terms of the dialogues hinted at the difficult possibility of an understanding. LUCE: The wishes of the islanders are of absolute priority to us. There must be no change without their consent and Parliament [...] They have no doubts about British sovereignty. ROS: Argentina has no doubts about its sovereign rights. In the future we must reach a “common understanding”. [...] The element of recognition of our sovereignty is essential. We must bear in mind that this problem will persist until a solution is reached. In Argentina there is increasing pressure in this regard [...] And nothing should be interpreted in Buenos Aires that could lead to the inference that the dispute over sovereignty is set aside. LUCE: I don't think we're misunderstanding each other. I understand the special sensitivity but it also exists in our Parliament. Our common goal is to work towards the solution. ORTIZ DE ROZAS: I do not underestimate the sensitivity of your Parliament, but it is more acute in Argentina.”*⁸⁸⁸

From the US Embassy in Buenos Aires, a telegram to the US State Department reports on rumours.

884 ALW 040/325/1 Part C 101

885 Richard Luce interviewed in Charlton 1989 p.182

886 Tim Blake quoted in Bound 2007

887 *La política británica hacia las Malvinas* Vicente Berasategui 2013

888 *El fracaso de la cumbre entre argentinos y británicos que decidió la guerra: “En un mes tomamos las Malvinas”* Juan Bautista Tata Yofre March 1, 2022

*“Some of our contacts in the GOA have sought to convey a sense of urgency about the current round of negotiations... we have also heard references to an Argentine desire to accelerate the pace of the negotiations but it is hard for us to tell what precisely the Argentines hope to accomplish.”*⁸⁸⁹

February 27th, in Argentina, the morning newspaper *Convicción* notes; *“All the conditions are given: we have a determined president and an excellent foreign minister. If after winning the war on terrorism, we take back the Falklands, history will forget the economic stupidities. Argentina will be alive, aware of its vigor and ready to take a place in the world.”* The article concludes that a positive outcome for Argentina would reinforce Argentina's position regarding the Beagle Channel Islands.

March 1st, in New York, the negotiating delegations release a joint statement to the press.

“The meeting took place in a cordial and positive spirit. The two sides reaffirmed their resolve to find a solution to the sovereignty dispute and considered in detail an Argentine proposal for procedures to make better progress in this sense.”

*“Ros's superiors in Buenos Aires were furious. Here the assessment was that Britain was procrastinating once again. The aim of demonstrating British intransigence before the international community was not going to be helped by cryptic reports of cordial meetings. The key fact was that Britain had not formally accepted the Argentine proposal and had given no indication of when it intended to do so.”*⁸⁹⁰

*“Then we drafted a communiqué, saying that we would aim to progress the relationship, and that we respected each others' position on the sovereignty dispute. It was another long grass' situation. We had no inkling that they were losing patience. It was odd. To this day I don't believe that the people in New York were aware of the level of planning in BA. The idea that we were [made] aware that they were going to invade is something that people have invented.”*⁸⁹¹

*“The talks appeared to go well and resulted in an agreement to set up a commission that would consider both parties' demands. The Argentines, however, decided to turn up the pressure on London rather than wait to see what the commission might accomplish.”*⁸⁹²

From Buenos Aires, Argentina's Ministry of Foreign Affairs issues its own statement.

*“... the representatives of Argentina and Great Britain considered an Argentine proposal to establish a system of monthly meetings with a pre-established agenda, pre-arranged meeting place, and led by top-level officials. The aim of such meetings will be genuinely to speed up to the maximum the negotiations in train to achieve recognition of Argentine sovereignty ... The new system constitutes an effective step for the early solution of the dispute. However, should this not occur, Argentina reserves the right to terminate the working of this mechanism ...”*⁸⁹³

*“Ambassador Ros was satisfied with the progress made in the meetings in New York, but that was not the feeling, nor the desire, that reigned in the mind of Foreign Minister Nicanor Costa Méndez.”*⁸⁹⁴

In New York, Britain's delegation respond that the Buenos Aires statement; *“... creates a more difficult and unhelpful climate for continuing the negotiating process.”*⁸⁹⁵

889 Department of State, *Central Foreign Policy File, D820105–0567*

890 Freedman & Gamba-Stonehouse 1990 p.28

891 Tim Blake quoted in Bound 2007

892 Bratton P. & Thies W. 2011 p.4

893 *ALW 040/325/1 B 51-100*

894 Juan Bautista Tata Yofre March 1, 2022. *Op cit.*

895 Freedman 2005 vol.1 p.137

*“Alarm bells should have been ringing loudly in London. Instead, it was judged that negotiations would continue. The government's Joint Intelligence Committee concluded no major military action was likely before the start of the southern summer in October. There was little sense of urgency.”*⁸⁹⁶

March 2nd, in Buenos Aires, the newspaper *Clarín* reports on the talks.

“The press release stated that Argentina had negotiated for more than fifteen years with the UK, with patience, loyalty and good faith and within the framework of the UN and had proposed a new mechanism for negotiations which is to include South Georgia as well as the Sandwich Islands. If there was no agreement, Argentina retains the right to ... resort to whatever procedure is commensurable with the interests of Argentina. This last paragraph obviously does not exclude the possibility of military occupation of the islands.”

*“On 2 March, the military attaché in Buenos Aires, Colonel Love, envisaged the Argentine navy landing marines on the Falklands, and if the Argentines believed a negotiated settlement was no longer possible, there might be 'a straight seizure of the Islands.' ...”*⁸⁹⁷

In Argentina, Brigadier-General Mario Benjamin Menéndez is informed that he will head the military government on the Falklands, once they have been seized.⁸⁹⁸

*“On 2 March, when Galtieri offered the governorship of the Malvinas to General Mario B. Menéndez, he told Menéndez that the invading force would only remain on the islands until November-December 1982...”*⁸⁹⁹

*“On 2 March, (the military leadership) issued a statement in which it reported that, given the negative outcome of the negotiations, and in the absence of substantial progress in the short term, Argentina arrogated to itself “... the right to terminate the operation of this mechanism and to choose freely the procedure best suited to its interests” and then decided to launch the engine of the military operation. That same day, Brigadier General Mario Benjamín Menéndez was informed about the existing plans to militarily recover the islands and his intended role: Military Governor of the Malvinas.”*⁹⁰⁰

From New York, Island delegates Tim Blake and John Cheek return to the Islands but are unable to comment due to the level of confidentiality insisted upon by the Foreign Office.

*“The meetings have been shrouded in secrecy to a degree that would not exist in most other democratic countries ... we, whose way of life is up against the wall are left uninformed and wondering.”*⁹⁰¹

*“The councillors returned to Stanley on 2 March, exactly one month before the invasion, and reported confidentially to their colleagues on Executive and Legislative Councils (Exco and Legco). Even before their LADE plane touched down in Stanley the Argentine popular press was shrieking outrage at the 'failure' of the talks and quoting bellicose words from the military government.”*⁹⁰²

March 3rd, in Argentina, *La Prensa* reports that Britain has only a limited time period in which to acknowledge Argentine sovereignty over the Falkland Islands.

896 Briley 2022

897 *Ibid.*

898 Cardoso, Kirschboom & van der Kooy 1983 p.52

899 *The Origins of the South Atlantic War* John Arquilla & Maria M. Rasmussen 2001

900 Carbone 2008

901 *Penguin News*

902 Bound 2007

*“No diplomat can talk about the use of force. A decision of this nature is taken without any prior notice. We are willing, very firmly, to go as far as need be if the archipelago is not returned as soon as possible.”*⁹⁰³

Argentina's *Buenos Aires Herald* sees the Foreign Ministry announcement as containing a “veiled threat”, and warns the UK that this time Argentina, “means business.”⁹⁰⁴

*“Even the Buenos Aires Herald (never a lapdog of the military government) soberly reported a source in the government, believed to be the Foreign Minister, Nicanor Costa Mendez, saying that Argentina was preparing to break off diplomatic relations with Britain unless there was a successful outcome very soon.”*⁹⁰⁵

In London, on receiving news of the Argentine press reports, PM Thatcher minutes; “we must make contingency plans.”

*“On 3 March Mr Luce sent a personal message to Enrico Ros referring to the agreement that the discussions should remain confidential until Governments had been consulted. He said the communique and residual press comment had created more difficulty and an unhelpful climate for continuing the negotiation process. He added, 'I am deeply disturbed by what may be interpreted as threats...!...'”*⁹⁰⁶

*“.., Margaret Thatcher would say that the Argentine government "violated the procedures agreed during the meeting" through Costa Méndez's (public) statement. ... However, she said years later, "despite my trepidation, I did not expect anything resembling an invasion, thinking consistent with the most recent assessment of our intelligence."...”*⁹⁰⁷

March 5th, in London, Britain's Cabinet request that the next Defence and Overseas Policy Committee paper include; “Annexes on both civil and military contingency plans for counter-action against Argentina.”

From Stanley, unidentified military aircraft are reported to have flown over the town.

In Buenos Aires, Minister Costa Mendez tells Ambassador Williams that he is dissatisfied with the progress of negotiations, while David Joy, a member of the Embassy staff in Buenos Aires, reports a conversation with Raul Schmidt of the Chilean Embassy.

*“The Schmidt thesis is based essentially on the Argentine Navy's need of a strategic port further south than its current and most secure port, Puerto Belgrano. The obvious option Ushuaia was not satisfactory from a security point of view because it is under constant Chilean surveillance. Therefore the Argentines are, according to Schmidt, desperate to have some other secure port further south, a goal that could be satisfied by having access to the islands south of Beagle or the Falklands. In this context, he believes the sovereignty disputes are linked.”*⁹⁰⁸

In London, Guy Huntrods, a director of Lloyds Bank International, complains at the implications of rising tensions for trade with Argentina, and Britain's financial interests in that country.⁹⁰⁹

March 6th, at Stanley airport, an Argentine *LADE Hercules* transport aircraft lands unannounced; citing an in-flight emergency (fuel leak).

903 Foreign Minister Mendez quoted in Bound 2007

904 *ALW 040/325/1 B 51 – 100*

905 Bound 2007

906 Barker 1997

907 Juan Bautista Tata Yofre March 1, 2022. Op. Cit.

908 Quoted in *Daily Telegraph* 21.2.2013

909 Livingstone 2018

*“Overflights by Argentine military aircraft were a frequent topic of conversation. The emergency landing of an Argentine C-130 at Stanley Airport ... had given the people the jitters. (As port Stanley reported by telegram, the plane arrived without formal warning and it was only thanks to a local ham radio operator that anyone knew it was coming in. The control tower was not manned since it was a Sunday, and the plane could presumably have landed before anyone could have got out to the airport. As it was there was still time for the Airport Manager, Mr. Gerald Cheek, and a contingent of armed marines, to drive out to the airport before the plane landed). The incident certainly demonstrated the relative ease with which unannounced military aircraft could land at Stanley ...”*⁹¹⁰

*“Ricupero cited the recent surprise landing of an Argentine air force Hercules at Stanley and surmised that despite what Costa Mendez had told his own Ministers, this might indicate the sort of additional pressure which the Argentines might feel tempted to use.”*⁹¹¹

*“With hindsight, Dick Baker saw the flight and the landing as either a spying mission or a rehearsal for an Entebbe-style raid. It was a quiet Sunday afternoon and the pilot had radioed Stanley claiming his Hercules, supposedly on a routine mail dropping flight to an Antarctic base, was leaking fuel. He needed to land immediately. When Vice Comodoro Hector Gilobert disturbed the Baker household asking for permission, Dick did not refuse it, but decided he would drive to Stanley Airport to have a look at the aircraft. Dick watched with growing concern as a few dozen obviously senior officers disembarked. They were not the sort of men to go on supply flights, but they were the kind of invasion planners who would love to have a good look around Stanley. The Chief Secretary smelt a rat and the stench became stronger when one of the airport's technical staff told him that there was no firm evidence of a fuel leak.”*⁹¹²

*“The deputy Governor and Dick Chief Secretary, Dick Baker, said to me that efforts to sound alarm bells in London were wasted. 'A lot of us did foresee it. The tragedy was no one in London seemed to want to know or to react to the signals... Why nothing happened in response is a great mystery to me.' He suspected there was a deliberate policy to ignore the signals and weather an invasion in the hope that Britain would be rid of a troublesome colony. 'We used to joke we were expendable,' said Dick Baker.”*⁹¹³

In Mendoza, Argentina, Alejandro Orfila, current President of the Organization of American States (OAS), makes a statement to the press; *“It will not be long before that corner of national territory flies the flag of the Fatherland.”*⁹¹⁴

March 8th, in London, PM Margaret Thatcher speaks to Defence Secretary John Nott regarding preparations for an Argentine blockade, or invasion.

*“The Prime Minister indicated to Mr Nott on Monday evening that she would like to know how quickly RN ships could be deployed to the Falkland Islands.”*⁹¹⁵

From London, HMS *Endurance* is instructed to remain 'on station' at the Falklands. Governor Hunt increases security at the Islands' airport. In the midst of these preparations, Lord Carrington telegrams Governor Rex Hunt asking him to discern the views of local Councillors to a resumption of negotiations with Argentina.⁹¹⁶

910 ALW 040/325/1 Part C 101. Hickson minute following duty call to the Island dated 19th March 1982

911 PREM 19/657 Telegram No.42 of 11 March 1982. This telegram details a conversation in Brasilia between Ambassador George Harding and the Head of the Brazilian America's Department.

912 Bound 2007

913 Briley 2022

914 Cardoso, Kirschboom & van der Kooy 1983 p.51. Orfila would later deny any pre-knowledge of the *Junta's* plans.

915 Ministry of Defence memo March 12, 1982. The seemingly reluctant answer was, “20 days”. Albeit with reservations regarding support and maintenance.

916 PREM 19/657 Telegram No.30 of 8 March 1982

In Buenos Aires, Assistant US Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs, Thomas Enders, holds meetings with Foreign Affairs Minister Costa Mendez and Under-Secretary Ros. During these he raises the question of the Falklands negotiations.

*“Ros presented a picture of British intransigence. The GOA has long been willing to accord the Islanders every kind of special status to safeguard their way of life, he said. However, the GOA insists that the British recognize Argentine sovereignty in the Malvinas and their dependencies. When Enders observed that HMG’s position does not seem to be based on economic or strategic concerns but on its belief that the wishes of the Islanders must be respected, Ros said that UN decision on the Island clearly set aside the concept of self-determination for the Islanders. Ros said with emphasis that ‘the United Nations did not give the Islanders the right of veto.’ Ros stated that at the recent bilateral talks with the British, the GOA had proposed the establishment of a permanent high-level commission in London and Buenos Aires to seek out a solution. The GOA is now waiting for the British answer. Ros stated that his government is under increasing pressure from various sources to solve the Malvinas problem. Now the government is trying to see if the British are really interested in resolving the issue or instead are just looking for ways to procrastinate. Argentina is willing to do its utmost to find a negotiated solution but a solution cannot be delayed indefinitely, Ros stated.”*⁹¹⁷

*“We were contacted by the British government prior to my trip. They raised their fears about the unproductive character of these talks, and that they might be broken off. I raised that fear with the foreign minister of Argentina, saying that the United States did not intend to change its historic view – which was not to take a position, one way or the other, on the territorial dispute. We wanted countries with which we had friendly relations to solve that problem, but we were concerned that the talks appeared to be headed nowhere. Costa Mendez did not commit himself, although he was not negative.... He said they were ‘working on it’ and they ‘hoped to have something.’...”*⁹¹⁸

*“... during the visit to Buenos Aires of the United States Undersecretary for Latin American Affairs, Thomas Enders, the foreign minister and Enrique Ros discussed the Malvinas issue: Mr. Enders, who, as we have seen, had been informed by Luce in Washington, stated that the United States was not worried about the Malvinas issue and that his country’s position on the issue was hands off (expression he used). Although it was known that Great Britain had apparently asked Enders to discuss this issue with Argentina, he did not make any statement in Buenos Aires in relation to the British position or [the] requests.”*⁹¹⁹

In Buenos Aires, at a dinner hosted by US Ambassador Harry Shlaudeman, Thomas Enders addresses the possibility of war with Costa Méndez, who assures both Shlaudeman and Enders that there will be no war.

*“Nicanor Costa Méndez was not telling the whole truth. Years later, former ambassador and former foreign minister Bonifacio del Carril recounted that between March 9 and 10, 1982 –that is, hours after the foreign minister’s meetings with Enders– he had an interview with Costa Méndez in his office. He was surprised to see so many maps of the south(ern) Seas spread out. After discussing the issue that had brought him there and when he was saying goodbye, the chancellor told him: –With all the trouble I’m in, now the junk dealers are coming. “What junkyards?” asked Del Carril. “Some who go to Georgia,” answered his friend the chancellor. And after a few seconds, in a low voice, he added: “in a month we will take the Malvinas.” ...”*⁹²⁰

917 Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D820137–0228

918 Thomas O. Enders interviewed in Charlton 1989 p.165. This 'historic' view had only become policy after 1945.

919 Juan Bautista Tata Yofre March 1, 2022. *Op. Cit.* Not supported by Enders' interview in Charlton 1989 (above)

920 *Ibid.*

March 9th, in Argentina, the final plan for an invasion of the Falklands nears completion.

*“The basic landing plan was ready by the third week in February and was presented to the junta on 9 March. The junta accepted it and forwarded it to Admiral Suárez del Cerro...”*⁹²¹

*“... a plan was drawn up which envisaged: the landing in the Falklands ... the establishment of an Argentine government, and the immediate withdrawal of the troops involved, with the exception of the troops indispensable for maintaining security and control over Malvinese territory. In addition, it was determined that, in order for the plan to succeed, it was necessary to meet two requirements: to act with "tactical surprise", that is to say, to disembark without prior warning and, if possible, without bloodshed; and to act under the greatest "strategic secrecy" to prevent England from having the opportunity to strengthen its reduced strength – of 40 Marines – on the islands. Once the military operation – which in the end only contemplated the landing of military forces in the Falklands – had been carried out, the stage of diplomatic negotiations with Great Britain would come. They would seek to convince the British government of the 'fait accompli,' offering concessions ranging from compensation to the Islanders and commercial companies, to offers of economic cooperation with British companies that would like to exploit with Argentina the oil from the Southern Basin or the Krill fishery. In addition, it was intended to involve the United States in the negotiation, to convince Britain that there was no 'reverse' and that they should accept the new situation in the South Atlantic as it was.”*⁹²²

March 10th, in Buenos Aires, the British Embassy receives a message from Davidoff's lawyers to say that he is sending a party of 41 workers to South Georgia to dismantle the derelict whaling station at Leith, and that an Argentine naval support vessel, *Bahia Buen Suceso* has been chartered for the operation. Embassy staff try to contact Davidoff in order to remind him of his obligations, but are unable to locate him.

*“A well-placed official interviewed for this study who asked specifically not to be identified on this point expressed his conviction that Davidoff's team included marines with orders to carry out the principle elements of Project Alpha.”*⁹²³

March 11th, Davidoff's lawyers are warned, by the British Embassy, that there will be consequences should he not comply with South Georgia's landing restrictions. The owners of the whaling station at Grytviken, *Christian Salvesen*, confirm that they are aware of Davidoff's plans, and that his contract has been extended to March 31st, 1984.

From the Rio de la Plata, *Bahia Buen Suceso* (Capt. Oswaldo Miello) sails for South Georgia.

*“The ship carried Davidoff's equipment and the forty-one civilian workers of his party; it also carried some general cargo for delivery to the Argentine port of Ushuaia... Sr Davidoff was not on board the Bahia Buen Suceso when it sailed from Buenos Aires; one of his engineers would be in charge of the dismantling crew.”*⁹²⁴

Observed from Grytviken, Argentine military aircraft overfly South Georgia.

*“The Argentines are considering a wide range of options for 'unilateral action', according to sources in Buenos Aires, These include initiatives in the UN, a break of diplomatic relations and, in the final analysis, an invasion of the islands.”*⁹²⁵

921 Middlebrook 2003

922 Carbone 2008

923 Welch 1997 fn.8

924 *Ibid.*

925 *Latin American Weekly Report* March 12, 1982

In London, intelligence reports indicate that Admiral Anaya is behind the more belligerent press articles.

*“The military planning was, with the Falklands in Argentine hands, to invade the disputed islands in the Beagle Channel. That was the determination of the navy...”*⁹²⁶

March 12th, in the UK, a Ministry of Defence *memo* notes that HMS *Endurance* is off Adelaide Island, and within three days sailing time from Port Stanley.

March 15th, HMS *Endurance* visits South Georgia.

March 16th, South Georgia's Magistrate leaves a prominent notice at the old whaling station at Leith.⁹²⁷

‘British Antarctic Survey... Leith Field Station... Unauthorised Entry Prohibited.’

March 17th, from the UK, ships of the Royal Navy sail to Gibraltar for a NATO maritime exercise in the eastern Atlantic - *Exercise Spring Train*.⁹²⁸

March 18th, from London, the US Embassy reports to Washington DC.

“FCO South America Department Head Robin Fearn has told us that the negotiations over the Falkland Islands are in real danger of breaking down. At the recent meeting in New York, he said, the Argentine delegation was “clearly uninterested” in discussing anything other than the early transfer of sovereignty. ... HMG is anxious to keep the negotiations going, fearing that Argentina might otherwise feel impelled to attempt a military solution.

*The British remain convinced of the legality of their position and the issue is an emotional one in Parliament, particularly in the House of Lords. Fearn fears that talks may be broken off if the Argentines refuse to take a more flexible approach. Should negotiations break down, HMG is considering the feasibility of bringing the question before the United Nations. The British believe they would stand a good chance of winning there, given the Argentine record on human rights, the UK's recent successes in decolonization (Zimbabwe and Belize), and the contrast between British democracy and the Argentine Junta. HMG would prefer, however, to avoid such a course if at all possible.”*⁹²⁹

March 19th, HMS *Endurance* arrives in Port Stanley.

At South Georgia, *Bahia Buen Suceso* (Osvaldo Niella) sails directly into Leith Harbour, bypassing Grytviken in defiance of British instructions to Davidoff.⁹³⁰

*“While Davidoff may have been anxious to keep the British happy, the Argentine navy was less concerned to do so. Once again the boat travelled in radio silence...”*⁹³¹

A large party of both civilian and uniformed personnel are observed to land; shots are fired,⁹³² and the Argentine flag raised.

926 *Memorias Políticas* Oscar Camilion 1999

927 Freedman 2005 vol.1 p.149

928 An annual event, some 18 British destroyers and frigates were scheduled to take part, accompanied by support vessels.

929 *Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D820146-0021*

930 Middlebrook (2003) gives the date of arrival as March 16, 1982. Carbone (2008) as March 20. Freedman & Gamba-Stonehouse 1990 suggest March 18, 1981.

931 Freedman & Gamba-Stonehouse 1990 p.47

932 Meneghini (2015) suggests that the shots were fired by a party from a French yacht, hunting deer, but, in support, erroneously quotes a message of March 17. There are a few references to a 40' French yacht, *Cinq Gars Pour*, having arrived at Grytviken on, or around, March 14. Damaged in a storm, the crew of three (Serge Briez, Olivier Gouon and Michel Roger) sought assistance from the BAS and hunted deer for their food supplies.

*“The workers at Leith raised an Argentine flag, in a ceremony without much pomp. According to military sources, this act had previously been agreed by Davidoff with the Navy.”*⁹³³

*“... I was deeply concerned at the way this happened. Nevertheless, I was informed that, quite clearly, he had this contractual arrangement, it seemed to me that the problem really lay in the fact that he was there without clearance from our Embassy in Buenos Aires. The important thing therefore was for him to get his papers in order. My concern was to smooth this one over.... The advice from our Ambassador was "Look, I think we can see a way through this one, because all we need to do is to try and legitimize his papers..." Clearly Governor Hunt was concerned about the position, and saw it from a slightly different viewpoint...”*⁹³⁴

*“On 19 March a party from the British Antarctic Survey arrived at Leith Harbour, where they found the Bahia Buen Suceso unloading and the Argentine flag flying ashore. ... There seemed to be around 100 people ashore. They were making themselves comfortable, having occupied the BAS refuge and shot some reindeer (although this was a protected species). ... The four observers then reported all this back to King Edward Point from where, with some difficulty, the information was transmitted to Rex Hunt, the Governor of the Falkland Islands.”*⁹³⁵

*“... this was the second move in "Project Alpha", the Argentine navy's plan to use Constantino Davidoff's scrap-metal venture to establish an Argentine presence on the island. Some of the men were genuine civilian scrap-metal works, but others were military personnel;... that evening the BAS reported their activities to Stanley.”*⁹³⁶

Following an exchange of messages between the Falkland Islands and London, instructions are sent to Grytviken requesting that the Magistrate, Peter Witty, demand that the Argentine commander lower his country's flag.

In London, Argentina's Ambassador is summoned and told that the incident is regarded as serious. He is also told that if the *Bahia Buen Suceso* does not leave forthwith, the UK will take whatever action it deems necessary.

March 20th, following the receipt of further instructions from London, two BAS staff on South Georgia deliver a message from Governor Hunt to the Captain of the *Bahia Buen Suceso*.

“You have landed illegally at Leith without obtaining clearance. You and your party must go back on board the Bahia Buen Suceso immediately and report to the base commander Grytviken for further instructions. You must remove the Argentine flag from Leith. You must not interfere with the British Antarctic Survey depot at Leith. You must not alter or deface the notices at Leith. No military personnel are allowed to land on South Georgia. No firearms are to be taken ashore.”

Argentina's flag is lowered 15 minutes later.

From Buenos Aires, Ambassador Williams telegrams London.⁹³⁷

“I suggest that great restraint be used at least until it is clear whether this is a deliberate challenge authorised at high level, or just a piece of low level bravura combined with Davidoff's well-known fecklessness.”

In the Falklands, *Endurance* is ordered to sail immediately with a detachment of Royal Marines.⁹³⁸

933 Cardoso, Kirschboom & van der Kooy 1983 p.67.

934 Richard Luce interviewed in Charlton 1989 p.184

935 Freedman & Gamba-Stonehouse 1990 p.48

936 Pascoe 2022 vol.3 p.652

937 PREM 19/613.

938 PREM19/613 /53. Its own marines plus Naval Party (NP) 8901 amounting to 22 Royal Marines.

*"Davidoff blames the war on the British. "Why should they have sent a warship, the Endurance, to take our men away?" he asks. "That was ridiculous. What if I went to North America and raised an Argentine flag? They would just take it down and say I was nuts". "*⁹³⁹

*"The prompt dispatch of Endurance did not accord with the Argentine strategy. Buenos Aires was at this stage unprepared both militarily and diplomatically for a sudden escalation in the Falklands dispute. Yet Argentine citizens were ashore on territory which Argentina claimed as her own. The British were demanding the formal acknowledgement of sovereignty through the obtaining of permits, on pain of removal by force. This would constitute a conspicuous loss of face for Buenos Aires. ... The South Georgia incident had come at least six months too soon ... Endurance ... should have been safely back in Britain before any invasion."*⁹⁴⁰

*"In the case of Malvinas, the crisis began on March 20. ... On March 20, 1982, a crisis originated from a strong British reaction – in my opinion disproportionate – as a result of the scrapping of an old factory located on the island of San Pedro de las Georgias del Sur, located 1,500 kilometers southeast of the Falklands. In charge of this was a private Argentine commercial company, belonging to the citizen Constantino Davidoff, who had carried out the corresponding legal procedures before the British authorities in Buenos Aires. As events have unfolded, I have always appreciated that the intention of the United Kingdom (UK) was clearly to escalate the crisis, which did not surprise the Argentine government."*⁹⁴¹

March 21st, from Stanley, Captain Adolfo Gaffoglio, the LADE representative, informs Buenos Aires of the departure of HMS *Endurance*. He also reports that his office has been broken into and the Argentine flag covered over with a Union Jack. *"Tit for tat you buggers,"* is written on the desk in toothpaste, and *"UK OK"* on the office windows.

*"There was frustration in Stanley and relations with the few Argentines living there became fraught. The LADE air service was continuing, but on the night of Saturday 20th a few local youths, fuelled with bravado and beer from the dance, broke into Vice Comodoro Gilbert's office ... It was relatively harmless stuff, but Vice Comodoro Gamin, who had just replaced Hector Gilbert, was worried. The LADE Fokkers never scheduled overnight stops at Stanley, but on this occasion one of the aircraft had developed a fault and needed to remain on the tarmac."*⁹⁴²

Argentina's representative insists that the airport must be guarded by the local Marines.

*"We had been on a shorter state of alert for a couple of weeks. For a few days before the invasion we had a section [about seven men] in the airport terminal building every night. A few guys kept watch while the rest of us slept and were ready to move at very short notice."*⁹⁴³

*"(Comodoro Gamin)... insisted that Gary Noott's Marines guard it around the clock. This was not too much bother to Noott, as, unknown to Gamin, the Marines had been staking out the airport."*⁹⁴⁴

In Buenos Aires, Costa Mendez tells Ambassador Williams that the *Bahia Buen Suceso* is not in South Georgia officially; that it has no military personnel on board and that the ship will depart that day. He expresses the hope

939 *Bizarre Salvaging Incident was Fuse in Falklands War* Margot Hornblower in *The Washington Post* May 14, 1982

940 Hastings & Jenkins 1997 p.70

941 *Lessons from the Malvinas* Martin Balza in *Perfil* July 29, 2023. It is clear that Davidoff had not complied with 'legal procedures' and that Buenos Aires was very much 'surprised'.

942 Bound 2007

943 Acting-Sergeant Geordie Gill quoted in Bound 2007

944 Bound 2007

that the significance of the affair will not be exaggerated. Ambassador Williams makes it clear; “... *that if the party left without regularising their conduct at Gryviken they would have made an illegal landing and be liable to arrest.*”⁹⁴⁵

In London, the Foreign Office informs Argentina's *charge d'affairs* that the British Government accept the explanations provided by Minister Mendez, and trust that the ship will depart with the landing party.

A British Antarctic Survey observation point is established overlooking Stromness Bay. At Leith, the *Bahia Buen Suceso* sails away early evening; but some personnel are seen to remain.

*“Contrary to some accounts, she did not take any of the scrap-metal workers with her; they were all left at Leith. The ship set course for Ushuaia, her captain and crew unaware of the intense diplomatic activity caused by the visit.”*⁹⁴⁶

March 22nd, staff at Grytviken report to Stanley, which passes the information on to London.

*“Base Commander has confirmed presence of at least six Argentines still ashore at Leith... In addition to launch ... they had also seen a landing craft ... they also observed a vehicle with a mechanical arm on the jetty...”*⁹⁴⁷

From Stanley, Lord Buxton, on an unofficial visit, telegrams the FCO in London.

*“It has been naïve to regard Davidoff as a casual scrap dealer and it is abundantly clear that every move has been carefully researched, planned and timed throughout... If our reaction is placatory and is not firm and final this time I predict that more unopposed illegal landings will follow ... British reactions are being tested.”*⁹⁴⁸

En-route to South Georgia, HMS *Endurance* receives orders from London to remove any trespassers. Captain Barker's instructions clearly state that he is not to use force however and, if resisted, should withdraw and seek fresh instructions.

*“Ministers have agreed that HMS Endurance should continue to South Georgia in order to remove the remaining Argentines. The continued Argentine presence at Leith, ... leaves us no option but to take this action. ... It is hoped that the political consequences, with careful handling on both sides, can continue to be minimised. But it should be quite clear that this situation has not been of our seeking. It has been Davidoff's irresponsible action and the apparent inability of the Argentine Government to take the necessary remedial action which has brought it about.”*⁹⁴⁹

*“The foreign ministries of both countries sought to smooth over the incident and agreed that Bahia Buen Suceso would quietly leave South Georgia as indeed it did on 22 March. The British, however, assumed that Davidoff's party would be aboard and reported publicly that evening that Argentina had agreed to withdraw the workers. When it became clear that Argentine personnel had remained behind, the British press played the event as an 'invasion' of South Georgia.”*⁹⁵⁰

From Buenos Aires, Ambassador Williams also telegrams the FCO, urging; “... *no forceful action be taken which would irritate public opinion in Argentina.*”⁹⁵¹

945 PREM 19/657 Telegram No. 85 of 21 March 1982

946 Middlebrook 2003

947 ALW 040/325/12 Part A 1 – 100 Telegram No. 45 of 22 March Rex Hunt to FCO. In fact there were 39 still onshore.

948 Quoted in Freedman 2005 vol.1 p.154

949 Quoted in Cardoso, Kirschboom & van der Kooy 1983 p.71

950 Welch 1997

951 Freedman & Gamba-Stonehouse 1990

*“The Argentines ... appreciate the gravity of the hoisting of the Argentine flag, but say that they have just received reports that there has been a parallel insult to the Argentine flag at the LADE office in Stanley.”*⁹⁵²

From *Endurance*, Capt. Barker reports that overheard radio traffic indicates collusion between Davidoff and the Argentine Navy.

*“The naval headquarters in Buenos Aires had congratulated the Bahia Buen Suceso on a successful operation and directed her to return to Buenos Aires as soon as possible.”*⁹⁵³

March 23rd, in Buenos Aires, Britain’s Ambassador Williams copies *Endurance*’s orders to Argentina’s Foreign Ministry. On receipt Costa Mendez expresses surprise that the British are proceeding so rapidly to such very grave action, without exhausting the diplomatic options. He gives a warning that, if the action to remove the party on South Georgia is not postponed, those like himself, who are trying to deal with the dispute in a moderate way, will lose control of events. Mendez threatens that harsh action will precipitate a harsh response, and that perhaps the men should be removed by an Argentine vessel in order to take some heat out of the situation.⁹⁵⁴ Williams, conveying this to the FCO, adds that he considers the events at South Georgia as *“trivial and low-level misbehaviour.”*

The Foreign Office respond; *“Our intention is to conduct this operation correctly, peacefully and in as low a key as possible. We hope that the Argentine Government will, if they are able to do so, advise the Argentine workmen at Leith to co-operate. ... any lesser action than we are now taking would not be defensible to public and parliamentary opinion.”*

In Britain, a statement is made to Parliament by Mr. Richard Luce.

*“We were informed on 20 March by the Commander of the British Antarctic Survey based at Grytviken on South Georgia that a party of Argentines had landed at Leith nearby. The Base Commander informed the Argentine party that its presence was illegal as it had not obtained his prior authority for the landing. We immediately took the matter up with the Argentine authorities in Buenos Aires and the Argentine Embassy in London and, following our approach, the ship and most of the personnel left... However, the base Commander has reported that a small number of men and some equipment remain. We are therefore making arrangements to ensure their early departure. ...I must make it plain once again, as I have done on several occasions, that there will be no question of any changes on the islands without the consent of the islanders. The islanders’ wishes are paramount. Nor would we do anything without the consent of the House.”*⁹⁵⁵

From Stanley, HMS *Endurance* is ordered to 'hold' off Grytviken.

*“In view of continued diplomatic activity at ministerial level aimed at allowing Argentine authorities an opportunity to remove party and equipment by Argentine vessel, HMS Endurance should proceed to Grytviken and await further instructions. Pending these instructions, HMS Endurance should not, repeat not, enter nor conduct any Naval operations in the vicinity of Leith harbour.”*⁹⁵⁶

952 PREM 19/657 Telegram No. 82 of 22 March 1982

953 Franks Report 1983 para.175

954 *Ibid* para. 182

955 HC Deb 23 March 1982 vol 20 cc798-801 . See <https://api.parliament.uk/historic-hansard/commons/1982/mar/23/south-georgia-incident>

956 Quoted in Barker 1997

From London, Lord Carrington sends a message to Costa Méndez.

*“... it is now essential for the Argentine personnel that still remains in South Georgia to be evacuated promptly. If the Argentine Government can order the immediate return of the Bahia Buen Suceso to Leith Harbour to carry out this action, the use of HMS Endurance will not be necessary. If this is not done, we would have no alternative but to proceed. ...”*⁹⁵⁷

At Stanley, the scheduled LADE flight arrives with, among others, 16 employees of the Gas de Estado (State Gas) company. All fit young men of military age, local suspicions are aroused. Also disembarking is an Argentine photographer, Rafael Woolam, employed by an Argentine weekly magazine, *Gente*.⁹⁵⁸

Argentina's Navy Command orders the ice-breaker *Bahia Paraíso* to take its marines as quickly as possible to Leith to protect the Argentine workers there.

*“The Junta, determined to avoid humiliation, ordered a second ship in the vicinity, the ice patrol vessel Bahia Paraíso, to land a party of marines at Leith to protect Davidoff's men.”*⁹⁵⁹

*“In view of this, the Superior Command of the Armed Forces decided that another vessel – the ARA Bahía Paraíso – which at that time “coincidentally” was on the Orkney Islands completing a phase of Antarctic planning, would immediately be highlighted to the Georgias to disembark the “Alpha Group”, a curious name given that the operation of the same name had been abandoned. This group of “elite troops” of the Navy, with Lt. Alfredo Astiz at the head, had the objective of taking positions in the whaling facilities and protecting the Argentine workers from any future action by British forces. Apparently, given the seriousness of the situation, the Junta considered activating the plan that had been prepared at the beginning of the year...”*⁹⁶⁰

From Buenos Aires, Vice-Admiral Juan Lombardo is; *“... directed by the junta to accelerate planning so that an invasion force could launch within 48-72 hours of notification.”*⁹⁶¹

*“They did not think that there would be a military reaction by the British.”*⁹⁶²

*“I immediately ordered an increase in my staff, and we worked all through that night and very hard in the next two days. We gave an answer to the junta on the 25th; I think that Admiral Lombardo went to Buenos Aires and told them that the decision was that it would be possible to land on the Malvinas on the 1st of April.”*⁹⁶³

From Buenos Aires, a message is sent by the US Embassy to the US State Department in Washington DC, reporting a conversation between the Argentine Foreign Ministry and the US Ambassador.

“During a meeting March 23, the Foreign Minister and Under Secretary Ros at their initiative briefed the Ambassador on the Argentine version of this affair. They said a local entrepreneur had entered into a contract in London to take the scrap from the whale ‘factory’. He then hired a crew of workmen (four they thought) and bought passage for them on the ‘Bahia Buen Suceso’ which deposited them in Leith. Ros emphasized that the ship regularly plies those waters, is unarmed and crewed entirely by civilians. ... HMG protested because permission was not sought to land the workmen. As indicated in the press, the ship has departed; but, contrary to the impression left by the press accounts, the workmen are still there, according to Ros. He was unable to say how long they might remain, that presumably

957 Quoted in Freedman 2005 vol.1 p.157

958 Pascoe 2022 vol.3 p.658

959 Welch 1997

960 Carbone 2008

961 *The 1982 Falklands-Malvinas Case Study* Douglas N. Hime 2010

962 Vice-Admiral Lombardo quoted in Middlebrook 2003

963 Rear-Admiral Büsser quoted in Middlebrook 2003

*depending on the time required to finish the scrap job and on when the ship might come around again. It would seem, at least, that the incident may not be closed.”*⁹⁶⁴

March 24th, *Endurance* arrives off Grytviken, where Capt. Barker liaises with the BAS commander at King Edward Point.

In London, intelligence reports suggest that the forced removal of the workforce at South Georgia will be used by the junta as a pretext for military action. Either at South Georgia, or against the Falkland Islands. Lord Carrington writes to the Prime Minister; “... *the situation on the dispute has developed to a point where we now face the prospect of an early confrontation with Argentina.*”⁹⁶⁵

In London, a House of Commons *motion* signed by 91 MPs calls for a tough line to be taken with Argentina.

From Buenos Aires, a further telegram from the US Embassy is transmitted to Washington DC.

*“... we doubt that an attempt at a "military solution" will be made any time soon. Foreign Minister Costa Méndez and others in the GOA are looking for ways to enlist U.S. support for the Argentine cause. This issue is likely to complicate Argentine-U.S. relations...”*⁹⁶⁶

At South Georgia, just before midnight, *Bahia Paraiso* arrives at Leith, some 25 kilometres north-west of Grytviken.⁹⁶⁷

March 25th, around dawn, *Teniente de navio* Alfredo Astiz⁹⁶⁸ and ten Marines disembark from *Bahia Paraiso*, accompanied by a few sailors who start to unload supplies. Three landing craft and a military helicopter are sighted by the BAS observation team; shortly after joined by Capt. Barker.

*“Tony Ellerbeck flew me to the top of one of the mountains and we landed at 3000 feet on a narrow section of flat ground with excellent binocular vision over Leith Bay... all we could do was to sit and watch. We noted the continuing disembarkation of stores from the Bahia Paraiso and it was clear to us that the operation had been long pre-planned.”*⁹⁶⁹

Argentina’s naval planning committee informs the Junta that their forces can be ready to sail on the 28th.⁹⁷⁰

In Buenos Aires, Dr. Méndez speaks to Britain's Ambassador to suggest that the impasse can be broken if it is agreed that the workers at Leith now comply with the landing formalities – by going to Grytviken and having their 'white cards' stamped. Then returning to work on the whaling stations. Informed of this proposal, Lord Carrington's responds that; “*only passports will do.*” This is passed on to the military junta.

*“A series of progressive demands culminated in the imposition that the Argentine workers of the Davidoff company – who were on land that we consider under a sovereignty dispute – should seal their passports at Grytviken, as if they were entering a foreign territory...”*⁹⁷¹

964 Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D820154–0489

965 ALW 040/325/1 Part C 101

966 Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D820157–0409

967 Pascoe 2022 vol.3 p.660. Barker (1997) gives the vessel's arrival as the 22nd.

968 Astiz had a reputation for violence; implicated in the 1977 kidnapping of 12 human rights activists, including two French nuns; none of who were ever seen again. *cf.* 1982

969 Barker 1997

970 From an interview with Rear-Admiral Carlos Busser in Charlton 1989 p.115

971 President Galtieri in *La Nueva Provincia* November 28, 1985

*“... this was the last straw. Permitting Endurance to evict Davidoff's party or acquiescing in the British demand that they present their passports would be tantamount to acknowledging British sovereignty over South Georgia and, by extension (so they believed) over all of the disputed territories, including the Malvinas proper. In Anaya's view: "This was aggression on the part of Britain against the territory of Argentina." ...”*⁹⁷²

*“Britain's escalation of the dispute – especially its demand about passports – came as a complete surprise ... There was unanimous agreement that we could not permit it.”*⁹⁷³

From Buenos Aires, well informed, America's Embassy reports promptly to Washington DC.

*“It appears likely that the Argentine Navy will in fact act if the Endurance attempts to remove the working party.”*⁹⁷⁴

At South Georgia, during the evening, *Bahia Paraiso* sails from Leith, taking up a position just off the island.

March 26th, from South Georgia, a sitrep is radioed to Stanley:

*“Argentine party are still ashore at Leith. Although only two people were actually sighted this morning, smoke was emerging from several buildings and 2 boats were still alongside jetty. 65 blue drums had been stacked at inshore end of jetty. A large quantity of stores and equipment was visible, even dead reindeer. Consider shore party were working late into evening yesterday disembarking stores from Bahia Paraiso and are now established for a long stay at Leith. It is clear that this operation had been preplanned for some time as Bahia Paraiso came from Antarctic...”*⁹⁷⁵

At Montevideo, 43 Royal Marines under the command of Major John Norman, flies in to meet the RRS *John Biscoe* for the journey to Falkland Islands; where they are to relieve NP8901.⁹⁷⁶

*“Defence was the responsibility of the small Royal Marines detachment, NP 8901.”*⁹⁷⁷

From Stanley, Governor Hunt telegrams London regarding the authentication of the scrap metal workers' white cards.

*“... I am more than ever convinced that this whole exercise was carefully planned ... Proper documentation does not (repeat not) mean stamping of white cards. I am instructing the base commander to ask for passports and, if produced, to stamp them in the normal way with an entry permit...”*⁹⁷⁸

*“Now the British assert that the 1971 treaty does not extend to South Georgia, although it had always been understood that the dependencies of the Falklands were included. (I can confirm that this was also Ambassador Williams's understanding until yesterday.)”*⁹⁷⁹

“The issue of the South Georgias precipitated the events. When the 40 or 41 Argentines landed there, and,

972 Welch 1997

973 Interview with Larni Dozo quoted in Welch 2005

974 Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D820160–0043

975 Barker 1997

976 *John Biscoe* was a civilian vessel owned by the British Antarctic Survey. With *Endurance* busy elsewhere, the BAS had given permission for the ship to transport the marines to Stanley. This was a standard rotation and not connected to the rising tensions on South Georgia. Bad timing from Argentina's perspective.

977 *Official History of the Falklands Campaign, Volume 2: War and Diplomacy* L. Freedman 2005 vol.2.

978 PREM 19/613

979 Shlaudeman to State Department March 26, 1982 in Dept. of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D820162–0574.

*departing from (the) agreement of coexistence of 1971, the British demanded the signing of the cards at Grytviken... or else they were going to remove them with the 'Endurance' or other ships. That affected the dignity and honor of the Nation. And that forced us to make the decision that was taken on March 26.”*⁹⁸⁰

Researcher's Comment: The agreement of 1971 made no mention of South Georgia, so how it could have been 'understood' to have applied to that island is not clear. When it came to contracts, treaties and formal agreements, the words used are important. Britain had never considered that the 'white card scheme' applied to its uninhabited dependencies.

In Buenos Aires, at a meeting at the Liberator Building attended by the military junta, Argentina's Foreign Ministry considers the evolving situation on South Georgia. Raising the question of an invasion of the Falklands archipelago, Admiral Lombardo informs those present that a naval force can be readied for April 1st - 3rd, 1982. Foreign Minister Costa Mendez then speaks regarding the diplomatic situation.

*“Costa Mendez's view was that, from 1956, Britain's behaviour was always to deal, but not on the basis of force. Rhodesia was the most recent example. There Britain had abandoned 600,000 British subjects. The sum of perceptions led to the conclusion that Britain would not respond with force. ... How could we doubt his judgement?”*⁹⁸¹

On being informed that a British submarine has been observed leaving Gibraltar, the junta members agree to bring forward their plans.⁹⁸²

*“We interpreted the sailing of an SSN from Gibraltar on 26th March as coming south and that the Brits would keep one on station indefinitely thereafter, so ... we had about twelve days in which to fix it.”*⁹⁸³

*“... that is what (Admiral) Anaya describes as a 'war-starter.' That announcement turned out to be false. But based on that announcement he decided to execute a contingency plan... He decided to advance it because, if he did not, he would never be able to do it.”*⁹⁸⁴

*“On the evening of 26 March, the Junta decided to occupy the Malvinas as soon as the necessary military preparations could be completed ... The Junta believed that with Endurance in the vicinity of South Georgia, Argentina had a narrow window of opportunity in which to act without interference from the Royal Navy. The 500 men assigned to Operation Rosario were to capture and disarm the forty-two-man garrison of Royal Marines at Port Stanley and evict the British Governor. They had strict orders not to shed British blood. Once they had secured Port Stanley, they were to withdraw, and Argentina would place the islands under temporary international administration while Britain and Argentina finalized an agreement recognising formal Argentine sovereignty over the islands and safeguarding the 'interests' of the Islanders. ... The Junta seems clearly to have underestimated the danger and misgauged world reaction.”*⁹⁸⁵

“With no solution in sight, at 11 p.m. on Friday, March 26, the Military Junta decided to occupy the Malvinas Islands militarily. The Memorial of the Military Junta will say that "on March 26 the Military Committee met

980 Galtieri quoted in the Rattenbach Report. Translation by Fabian Turcato.

981 Interview with Admiral Jorge Anaya, quoted in Welch 2005 p.87

982 Hastings & Jenkins 1997. There is some evidence that the original date had been set for May 15, 1982

983 Admiral Jorge Anaya in an interview with Hugh Scully quoted in *The Falklands War* Andrew Dorman, Michael Kandiah & Gillian Staerck (eds) 2005 p.20. In Charlton (1989 p.187) it is suggested that news of the submarine's departure was published in the *Daily Express*. This particular submarine, however, was actually headed north. No decision to despatch a submarine to the Falklands was made before March 29, 1982.

984 US Admiral Harry Train in Charlton 1989 p.116. Train interviewed Admiral Anaya immediately after the 1982 conflict.

985 Welch 1997

at 7.15 pm in the Libertador building and taking into account the different circumstances that arose (listed), the decision was made to occupy the islands (the) object to affirm and defend the Argentine position in (South) Georgia; prevent Great Britain from militarizing the islands and establishing a naval and air defense system for them... as this would have a negative impact on the rights, strategy, positions and objectives of Argentina in the South Atlantic and Antarctica. It would also activate the negotiation and improve the Argentine negotiating position. The occupation of the islands was not intended to initiate a warlike escalation or to terminate the negotiations or to replace them (...) on the contrary, it was intended to achieve the beginning of a serious and substantive negotiation, despite the decision taken, and the provisions were adopted to suspend the occupation if there are positive signs in this regard. For this reason, it was emphasized that the operation should be bloodless and that it should provide for the maintenance of a small garrison in the Malvinas once the recovery was made" ...”⁹⁸⁶

“Admiral Anaya, when he was a student at the Ciclo de Formacion del Oficial de Estadi Mayor (Argentine war school) did his final paper on the taking of the Malvinas.”⁹⁸⁷

“I was told on 26 March the invasion would take place... We thought that occupying the Islands would press Britain to negotiate or press the international organisations to intervene and try to obtain a peaceful end of the conflict.”⁹⁸⁸

In Buenos Aires, Dr. Costa Méndez is authorised to provide limited information to the Press.

“... a firm decision has been taken to give the men on South Georgia all necessary diplomatic protection... nor is this protection diplomatic only, since there is a navy ship called Bahia Paraiso in the area to provide any necessary protection.”

Acting on the press release, US Ambassador Shlaudeman informs Washington DC; “...it would appear from here that the Endurance is the key to the problem of the moment. If the ship moves in to take off the workmen, there will surely be trouble. If it stays where it is, the impasse and the tensions accompanying it will continue.”⁹⁸⁹

March 27th, Argentina's Foreign Ministry announces that the *Bahia Buen Suceso*, *Granville* and *Drummond*, will be sent to South Georgia to protect the scrap-metal workers there.⁹⁹⁰ After being denied a direct interview with the Foreign Minister, and backtracking on his previously held views, Britain's Ambassador Williams reports his fears that Costa Méndez has been less than honest with him; that Argentina had been “*playing us along*”.

*“I cannot, however, discount the possibility that any action on our part to disrupt the Argentine working party at Leith will be taken as a trigger for armed action by the Argentines.”*⁹⁹¹

“... an R. W. Apple despatch to the New York Times in early April stated that the embassy, on 26, 27, or 28 March, had warned the Foreign Office of an Argentine invasion plan. Embassy officers later complained, “They chose to ignore it entirely. It was a complete error of judgment on London's part.” ... If Apple's information is accurate, this episode would stand as another familiar example of unwillingness of a government preoccupied with higher priority problems to hear and accept warning.”⁹⁹²

986 *Cadena 105* February 28, 2021

987 Nora Femenia March 19, 2021

988 Costa Mendez quoted in Briley 2022.

989 *Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D820162-0574*

990 Pascoe 2022 vol.3 p.667

991 Williams quoted in Franks 1983 para.207. *PREM 19/613 Telegram Nos.110 & 113 of 27 March 1982*

992 CIA Doc *RDP85T00153R000200020037-8* Approved for release July 12, 2007

*“Anthony Williams and Whitehall making 'Tut! Tut!' noises is not impressing the Argentines. Rex Hunt and a few others taking a good firm stand. C-in-C (Fleet) is sailing some ships in support. In my view some Buccaneers are required.”*⁹⁹³

*“Williams was met by deputy foreign minister Enrique Ros, who simply stated that the junta had given the foreign ministry new instructions. Later that day Costa Méndez called his five top officials to his office, told them to look at the crucifix on the wall, demanded an oath of silence, and revealed that Argentina was about to enter a war.”*⁹⁹⁴

From Buenos Aires, Britain's *defence attaché*, Stephen Love, reports a number of ships, and a submarine, leaving the Rio de la Plata.⁹⁹⁵ Comodoro Carlos Bloomer-Reeve flies into Buenos Aires from Germany.

*“He was of British descent, bilingual in Spanish and English, and had been serving as Argentine air attaché in Germany.... With another bilingual officer, Capitan Barry Hussey, he was given two days to plan a civilian administration for the islands.”*⁹⁹⁶

In London, PM Thatcher considers again the prospect of taking the question of the Falklands to the ICJ; *“... if we win or if we lose, at least we know where we are.”*⁹⁹⁷

*“In March 1982, in the light of the growing Argentine pressure, the Buenos Aires Embassy suggested that it might be worth offering to submit the Falklands to the (ICJ) 'as a last resort if things really turn nasty.' If the offer was refused, which was quite likely given the Argentine attitude, then Britain would have gained moral support; if accepted then the whole matter would be put on ice for a considerable period... In March the FCO saw insufficient merit in adopting this strategy, ...”*⁹⁹⁸

En-route from Curaçao to Britain, RFA *Appleleaf* is ordered to make for Gibraltar; take on general stores and then sail back south in support of HMS *Endurance*.⁹⁹⁹

March 28th, in Argentina, all leave for military personnel and diplomatic staff is cancelled. Argentina's Embassies around the world are told to await new instructions.

*“There were no major setbacks, and the troops started loading in the ships at Puerto Belgrano at 8.00am on Sunday 28 March. Secrecy had been well maintained. ... The Argentine newspapers announced that a joint anti-submarine exercise was to be carried out with the Uruguayan Navy.”*¹⁰⁰⁰

In Buenos Aires, Ambassador Williams receives a statement from the Argentine Foreign Ministry.

“The activities of the group of workers disembarked at Leith are of a private and peaceful character based on the undisputed fact that they were known in advance by Her Britannic Majesty's Government and in any case on the fact that they are being carried out on territory subject to the special regime agreed in 1971 between the Argentine and Great Britain. It is moreover within Your Excellency's knowledge that these territories are considered by the Argentine Republic as her own and that the sovereignty dispute about them had been recognised by the United Nations in its relevant Resolutions. Your Excellency's Government has accepted the existence of the sovereignty dispute. However the

993 From Capt. Barker's *Endurance* diary in Barker 1997

994 Pascoe 2022 vol.3 p.667 citing Cardoso *et al.* 1987 pp76-77

995 Barker suspected that Love's sources were local Argentine newspapers; and the information old or simply inaccurate.

996 Pascoe 2022 vol.3 p.667

997 Freedman 2005 vol.1 p.164

998 Freedman 2005 vol.2

999 Pascoe 2022 vol.3 p.667

1000 Middlebrook 2003

*British Government has reacted in terms which constitute a virtual ultimatum backed by the threat of military action in the form of the despatch of the naval warship Endurance and a requirement for the peremptorily immediate evacuation of the Argentine workers from the Island. ... In light of this attitude my Government can only adopt those measures which prudence and its rights demand, in this context the Argentine workers in South Georgia must remain there since they have been given the necessary documentation to do so. ... the present situation is the direct result of the persistent lack of recognition by the United Kingdom of the titles to sovereignty which my country has over the Malvinas, South Georgia and the South Sandwich Islands. This is confirmed by the negative attitude of your Excellency's Government throughout many years of negotiations”*¹⁰⁰¹

Williams reports to London and Stanley that Costa Méndez insists that South Georgia was included in the *white card* scheme arrangements. On receiving his copy of the Argentine message, Governor Hunt telegrams London.

*“The 1971 Communications Agreement does not apply to the Dependencies ... (and) ... does not absolve the holder of the requirement to present himself to an immigration officer at a recognised port of entry ... I am appalled at the arrogance of the message which confirms my previous fears that the Argentine Government are using Davidoff as a front to assert with a physical presence their sovereignty claim over South Georgia.”*¹⁰⁰²

From Puerto Belgrano, Argentina's fleet sails. The main force consists of an aircraft carrier, *Veinticinco de Mayo*, four destroyers, *Comodoro Py*, *Hipólito*, *Bouchard*, *Piedra Buena* and *Segui*, accompanied by a tanker, *Punta Medanos*. An invasion element, led by a destroyer, *Santisima Trinidad*, includes a tank landing ship, *Cabo San Antonio*, the icebreaker *Almirante Irizar* and a submarine, *Sante Fe*.

*“In the islands we are going to meet a population that we must treat deferentially... They are inhabitants of Argentine territory and, therefore, they have to be treated the same as those who live in Argentina. You will have to strictly respect personal property and integrity; you are not going to intrude into any private residence unless it is necessary for combat reasons. You are going to respect women, children, elders and men. Be tough to the enemy but courteous, respectful and kind to the population of our territory which we have to protect. If anyone engages in rape, robbery, or looting, I will immediately apply the maximum penalty.”*¹⁰⁰³

*“Those of us who knew where we were going were very proud. We felt very lucky that we had been chosen and extraordinarily fortunate to have the opportunity to regain the Malvinas... April was a lovely month that year.”*¹⁰⁰⁴

Further east, closing on South Georgia, is the corvette *Guérrico*, accompanied by a naval auxiliary, *Bahia Paraiso*. Argentine frigates *Drummond* and *Granville* position themselves between South Georgia and the Falklands.

*“Britain had only HMS Endurance in the South Atlantic and a total of 69 marines in Stanley and 22 on South Georgia, so there was no need for such a vast force; the Argentinians were using a sledgehammer to crack a nut... it is hard to escape the conclusion that the main purpose was "prestige and display";...”*¹⁰⁰⁵

1001 PREM 19/657 Telegram No.116 of 28 March 1982

1002 The agreement signed on August 5, 1971 can be found here - <https://www.fiassociation.com/shopimages/pdfs/2.1971-Anglo-Argentine-Joint-Statement-on-Communications.pdf>

1003 Rear-Admiral Büsser's address to his officers, quoted in *74 days under the Argentine flag: The experiences of occupation during the Falklands/Malvinas War* 2018

1004 Rear-Admiral Büsser quoted in Middlebrook 2003

1005 Pascoe 2022 vol.3 p.670

From London, Lord Carrington telegrams US Secretary Alexander Haig with an update as to the situation in the South Atlantic.

“I should accordingly be grateful, if you would consider taking the matter up with the Argentines. Stressing the need to defuse the situation and find a solution we can all accept. ... I fear the gravest consequences.”

*“To his astonishment, he received a message from Haig's deputy, Walter Stoessel, pointing out that both Britain and Argentina were 'good friends' of the USA and counselling caution. America's Ambassador ... would nevertheless see what he could do. ... Carrington hit the roof.”*¹⁰⁰⁶

Furious with the equivocal response, Lord Carrington summons the US *charge d'affairs*, Edward Streater.

*“(The UK had) supported American policy in Sinai, had supported it in El Salvador; that this support had not been particularly willing, not wholly consistent with our own better judgement, but we had given it; and now we expected a better response than this not very friendly message, equating our case and position with that of Argentina.”*¹⁰⁰⁷

March 29th, from London, Margaret Thatcher and Lord Carrington fly to Europe for a meeting.

*“By the time their plane landed at Brussels, they had agreed that three nuclear submarines should be sent south immediately. John Nott at the MoD was telephoned from the airport and instructed accordingly. Considering the abuse heaped on British ministers and their cabinet staffs in the prelude to the Falklands invasion, it is worth pointing out that a submarine force was ordered to sea within two and a half days of the junta's probable decision to proceed with an early invasion.”*¹⁰⁰⁸

HMS *Spartan*, a nuclear powered submarine, is directed to embark stores and weapons at Gibraltar. The support vessel, RFA *Fort Austin*, is ordered to sail from Gibraltar to resupply HMS *Endurance*. First Sea Lord Sir Henry Leach and his senior staff meet at the Ministry of Defence; after which Defence Secretary John Nott advises the Prime Minister that it will take a week to ready a “viable” naval force, then three more weeks to get them to the Islands; although a group of seven destroyers and frigates, on *Exercise Spring Train* in the eastern-Atlantic, could be off the Falklands within two weeks.

In Buenos Aires, newspapers refer to the cancellation of all military leave, and report that five Argentine warships are heading towards South Georgia. Ambassador Williams writes to the Foreign Office in London.

“I am receiving gestures of sympathy ... but I fear that in general, the Argentine Government will not only gain in popularity by playing the jingoist drum, but be accepted as doing the right thing in taking even the most extreme measures.”

At Stanley, RRS *John Biscoe* anchors with 43 Royal Marines on board, reinforcing NP 8901.¹⁰⁰⁹

Out in the Atlantic, Commander-in-Chief Fleet, Sir John Fieldhouse, observing *Exercise Spring Train* from HMS *Glamorgan*, is notified of events. Fieldhouse summons the flag officer in charge of the exercise, Rear Admiral Woodward, to a conference before flying by helicopter to Gibraltar, and then on to London. All British vessels involved in *Exercise Spring Train* are ordered to report their readiness for war.

1006 Hastings & Jenkins 1997 p.82

1007 Quoted in Freedman & Gamba-Stonehouse 1990

1008 Hastings & Jenkins 1997 p.76

1009 Originally intended as replacements, Norma's team merged with that of Gary Noot; some of which had deployed to South Georgia with HMS *Endurance*. The result was a force of 69 Royal Marines in Stanley, together with a few officers and men left behind by *Endurance*. Rather more than Argentina had been expecting, although the news appears to have reached Argentina before April 1, 1982. Argentina had eyes in Stanley.

From Buenos Aires, US Ambassador Shlaudeman reports to the State Department in Washington DC.

*“British Ambassador Williams called on me this morning... Williams is now persuaded that the Argentine military have stage-managed this entire incident as a means of pressing the British for accelerated negotiations on the Falklands/Malvinas without revealing their full intentions to the Foreign Ministry. One particular piece of evidence in this regard is the fact that the Bahia Paraiso has been unloading equipment at Leith Harbor. Costa Méndez told Williams initially that the ship had been sent there suddenly to watch over the working party and perhaps to evacuate them.”*¹⁰¹⁰

In the South Atlantic, Argentina's invasion fleet encounters bad weather.

*“The intention was to sail down the coast of Argentina until well past the Falklands and then approach the islands from the south, but a fierce storm which blew up on... Monday the 29th – lasted for forty-eight hours and spoiled that plan.”*¹⁰¹¹

In London, intelligence reports suggest that the Argentine submarine, *Sante Fe*, has been ordered to reconnoitre beaches near Stanley. However, the information is a day old.¹⁰¹²

March 30th, in Britain's Parliament, Richard Luce makes a statement regarding the situation in South Georgia.

*“The situation which has thus arisen, while not of our seeking, is potentially dangerous. We have no doubts about British sovereignty over this Falkland Islands dependency as over the Falklands themselves. We remain of the view that the unauthorised presence of Argentine citizens in British territory is not acceptable. We have no wish to stand in the way of a normal commercial salvage contract, but the position of those carrying it out must be properly authorised. Further escalation of this dispute is in no one's interest. In those circumstances, it is clearly right to pursue a diplomatic solution of the problem. This we are doing. I hope that the Argentine Government will take the same view. Meanwhile, the question of security in the Falklands area is being reviewed, although the House will understand that I prefer to say nothing in public about our precautionary measures. I can, however, inform the House that HMS "Endurance" will remain on station as long as is necessary.”*¹⁰¹³

From the opposition benches, ex-PM James Callaghan reveals his 1977 deployment of a force to the South Atlantic.

*“... is the Minister aware that there have been other recent occasions when the Argentinians, when beset by internal troubles, have tried the same type of tactical diversion? Is the Minister aware that on a very recent occasion, of which I have full knowledge, Britain assembled ships which had been stationed in the Caribbean, Gibraltar and in the Mediterranean, and stood then about 400 miles off the Falklands in support of HMS "Endurance", and that when this fact became known, without fuss and publicity, a diplomatic solution followed? ...”*¹⁰¹⁴

1010 Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D820165–0179

1011 Middlebrook 2003

1012 Intercepting and decoding Argentine signals was not a quick process, taking up to a day during the early stages of the intelligence operation. Even when GCHQ managed to improve that operation, it could still take 14 hours.

1013 *HC Deb 30 March 1982 vol.21 cc163-70*. See - <https://api.parliament.uk/historic-hansard/commons/1982/mar/30/south-georgia-falkland-islands>

1014 There is no evidence that Argentina ever became aware of this deployment. When pressed, in the days that followed, Callaghan refused to say how Argentina's government had become aware of his sending a squadron to the South Atlantic. Eventually, Callaghan refused to take any further questions on the matter. *cf.* 1977

After an *in-camera* meeting of the Conservative back-bench committee, at which Luce refused to confirm anything, a leak suggests that a submarine force has been ordered south. Immediately broadcast by the *International Television News (ITN)* service.

*“The information was flashed to Buenos Aires where it confirmed rumours already current ... Britain's Parliament, ... had turned a covert deterrent to invasion into a public invitation to one.”*¹⁰¹⁵

In Buenos Aires, unaware of what is happening, a large demonstration in the Plaza de Mayo demands a return to democracy. Similar protests take place in other Argentine cities.

*“On the 30th, a protest was held that concentrated thousands of demonstrators in all the major cities of the country. And the government prepared to receive them: Plaza de Mayo was surrounded by patrol boats, fire trucks, police on horseback, assault cars and even helicopters. The restriction on access to the square provoked clashes between demonstrators and security forces, as happened in Pueyrredón Bridge – where a large column of workers was intercepted and repressed—courts and the port of Buenos Aires. Similar situations occurred in cities of the interior where there were acts: Mendoza, Rosario, Tucumán, Córdoba and Mar del Plata. The day of protest left more than a thousand detainees (including many union representatives), wounded and one dead in Mendoza.”*¹⁰¹⁶

*“In 1982 inflation was running at 150%; 400,000 children in northern Argentina were suffering chronic malnutrition, and the peso had been devalued by 500% in less than a year – a new 100-million-peso banknote was introduced which was worth only just over £50. ... Three days later, the same square was filled with crowds cheering the same dictatorship.”*¹⁰¹⁷

From London, Britain's Foreign Office telegram Argentina's Foreign Ministry in Buenos Aires.

*“The potentially dangerous position which has now developed has in no way been of our seeking. ... A confrontation, which could have far-reaching consequences and which would seriously prejudice our attempts to resolve the whole Falklands issue through peaceful negotiation, is in neither of our interests.”*¹⁰¹⁸

In London, the Defence Operations Executive (DOE) receives intelligence of an Argentine task force lying 800 miles north of the Falklands; consisting of an aircraft carrier, 4 destroyers and an amphibious landing craft.¹⁰¹⁹

From Faslane naval base in Scotland, a nuclear powered submarine, HMS *Splendid*, deploys, while another, HMS *Conqueror*, is readied.

In Stanley, the scheduled LADE flight lands and Vicecomodoro Héctor Gilobert steps off the aircraft. Also four British journalists trying to get to South Georgia.¹⁰²⁰

In Buenos Aires, US Ambassador Shlauderman speaks to Costa Mendez making an offer to mediate between the UK and Argentina regarding the situation on South Georgia.¹⁰²¹

1015 Hastings & Jenkins 1997

1016 Carbone 2008

1017 Pascoe 2022 vol.3 p.674

1018 *PREM 19/657 Telegram No.77 of 30 March*

1019 The DOE acted as the executive agency for the Chiefs of Staff. Franks 1983 para.224

1020 Pascoe 2022 vol.3 p.675. Simon Winchester (*Sunday Times*), Ken Clarke (*Daily Telegraph*), David Graves (*The Sun*) and William Langley (*Daily Mail*). Gilobert had been tasked with organising a civilian administration. See above. The LADE flight left the next day. Pascoe notes that it was the last LADE flight which had commenced operations in 1971.

1021 Referred to as a *demarche*. See below.

March 31st, in the UK, following the ITN news report of the 30th, Britain's morning newspapers carry stories of Royal Navy submarines sailing for the South Atlantic.

*“The Argentine chargé d'affairs in London, Alfredo Molteni, had a call from the local manager of Aerolineas Argentinas, who told him that flights between Argentina and London had been "suspended". Molteni ... phoned the London manager of the Argentine national bank to warn him there might be financial restrictions if there were an "incident" in the Falklands.”*¹⁰²²

From Buenos Aires, Britain's defence *attaché*, reports that all the Argentine fleet have sailed.¹⁰²³

In the South Atlantic, with the fleet still encountering poor weather conditions, Rear Admiral Allara postpones the date of the invasion by 24 hours.

*“On the morning of Wednesday 31 March, with the planned landing less than twenty-four hours away, it became obvious that the proposed timetable could not be met, even by sailing directly to the Falklands from the north. It was decided to postpone the landings by one day, until Friday 2 April.”*¹⁰²⁴

In Argentina, aware of British submarines heading towards the South Atlantic, Costa Mendez is widely quoted in the press as saying: *“Argentina would not give way to threats of force, ...”* and that the workers at Leith are; *“... Argentine workers working on Argentine soil.”*

In the UK, GCHQ Cheltenham reports Argentine radio traffic ordering submarine, *Santa Fé*, to take reconnaissance troops to Mullet Creek, near Stanley. Defence Secretary John Nott seeks an urgent meeting with the Prime Minister - who is at the House of Commons.

*“John gave the MOD's view that the Falklands could not be retaken once they were seized. This was terrible, and totally unacceptable. I could not believe it: these were our people, our islands. I said instantly: "if they are invaded, we have got to get them back." ...”*¹⁰²⁵

*“Those gathered in Mrs. Thatcher's office room included Margaret Thatcher, and Nott himself, Humphrey Atkins and Richard Luce from the FCO, Mrs. Thatcher's Parliamentary private Secretary Ian Gow and several others. They were shocked by the sudden crisis...”*¹⁰²⁶

Admiral Sir Henry Leach arrives at the Palace of Westminster, with copies of the latest intelligence reports. Asking to speak to John Nott, the Admiral is allowed into the meeting where he, in opposition to much of the advice already given, tells Margaret Thatcher that Britain could, and should, send a task force if any of the Islands are invaded.

“Because if we do not, or if we pussyfoot in our actions and do not achieve complete success, in another few months we shall be living in a different country whose word counts for little.”

*“... the main thrust of this was that I left ... with full authority to assemble, but not yet sail, a task force.”*¹⁰²⁷

“Leach's advice was that whatever was done must not be half-hearted, for that was likely to result in a shambles. ... He argued for sending every element of the fleet of any possible value. ... Leach's conviction that a

1022 Pascoe 2022 vol.3 p.676 citing Cardoso *et al* 1987 p.88

1023 Stephen Love would later accuse the Ministry of Defence of “burying” his reports and warnings. *cf. The Threads that Link the Falklands to Iraq* Simon Jenkins *London Spectator* March 30, 2007

1024 Middlebrook 2003

1025 Thatcher 1993

1026 Pascoe 2022 vol.3 p.677

1027 Sir Henry Leach in *The Falklands War* A. Dorman, M. Kandiah & G. Staerck (eds) 2005 p.28

*fleet able to look after itself if subjected to air and sea attack by Argentine forces would be ready to sail early the next week made a deep impression on the politicians present.”*¹⁰²⁸

*“... the hour produced the man. Admiral Sir Henry Leach, the First Sea Lord, joined us in my room in the Commons, where colleagues and advisers gloomily combined to tell me why every option was unthinkably risky. I asked the Admiral: "If this invasion happens, precisely what can we do?" I won't forget his answer. Quite calmly and confidently, he replied: "I can put together a task force of destroyers, frigates, landing craft and support vessels, to be led by the aircraft carriers Hermes and Invincible. It can be ready in 48 hours. All I need is your authorisation. I gave it.”*¹⁰²⁹

*“(Thatcher's) ... government had been guilty, like previous governments, of reducing Britain's commitment to the Falklands to the point of encouraging Argentina to invade, but once the crisis came she was second to none in her single-minded devotion to the righting of a wrong and the defence of democracy and British interests. It is hard to believe that the Falklands would be British now if any other politician of that day had been in No. 10 Downing Street...”*¹⁰³⁰

From London, Lord Carrington sends a message to Minister Costa Mendez offering to send a high-level British official to discuss the situation of Argentina's scrap-metal workers on South Georgia.¹⁰³¹

In Stanley, Governor Hunt, informed of the probability of an invasion, reviews his options. At his immediate disposal are the remaining marines of NP 8901 and their newly-arrived replacements bring the total to 69. Also 11 Royal Navy personnel onshore from HMS *Endurance*. And one ex-Royal Marine, who had promptly re-enlisted on hearing rumours of an attack. Of the civilian Defence Force, 21 men report for duty.¹⁰³²

*“Major Gary R H Noot, the outgoing commanding officer, and his replacement, Major Mike J Norman, were halfway through the administrative handover when the first hints of the impending invasion were received. The handover meant that the defending force was about twice what might otherwise have been expected...”*¹⁰³³

*“On Wednesday afternoon, 31 March, the mood changed. The Marines' secure link with Britain was through their Commander in Chief, Rex Hunt, at Government House. He had received a message which was as confusing as it was disturbing. American intelligence had picked up a radio signal indicating that some action around the Falklands was imminent and they had passed it to London.”*¹⁰³⁴

In Washington DC, Britain's Ambassador Sir Nicholas Henderson calls on Secretary Alexander Haig.

“British Ambassador Sir Nicholas Henderson, under instructions from London, called on the Secretary evening of March 31 to inform him that HMG believed it had solid evidence that the Argentine Government was moving a large Naval task force toward the Falkland Islands. The information, which the British believe the US also has, indicates that the task force is due to reach Port Stanley at 0006 hours April 2 and will join a submarine which has orders to observe a beach as a possible landing site.

1028 Freedman 2005 vol.1 p.181

1029 The Rt. Hon. Margaret Thatcher in *The Falklands War: Then and Now* Gordon Ramsey (ed) 2008

1030 Pascoe 2022 vol.3 p.678

1031 Referred to in *Telegram from the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom April 1, 1982, 0429z* in Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, vol. xiii, Conflict in the South Atlantic, 1981–1984. See below.

1032 Defence Force members were: Ally Biggs, Les Biggs, Fraser Wallace, Marvin Clark, Teddie Summers, Len McGill, Gavin Short, Brian Summers, Rag McAskill, Neil Ford, Robert King, Robert King, Martyn Smith, Owen Summers, Phil Summers, Keith Summers, Les Harris, Derek & Tony Pettersson, Pat Peck, ‘Tubby’ Smith, Vernon Steen, Gerald Cheek, Kenneth McKay, Dougie Hansen, Stewart Wallace, Jeremy Smith, Duane Andrade, Charles Coutts, Robert Rozee, Irwan Summers, Robert Stewart and Anthony ‘Taff’ Davies. Information provided by Taff Davies.

1033 Freedman 2005 vol.2

1034 Bound 2007

The Ambassador stated that Argentine aircraft overflew the Falklands March 30. More serious, according to the British, is other intelligence which they believe shows that the Argentine Junta is contemplating military action on April 2 no matter what kind of assurances they are giving us.

Henderson reported that the UK is still trying to diffuse the situation and that Lord Carrington had offered to send a high level figure to Buenos Aires to try and deal with the problem of the workers at Leith Harbor. The British believe however, that the GOA is not interested in negotiating over the status of the workers, but only on the question of sovereignty over the Islands. HMG is convinced that the Argentines will only hold off if the US immediately immediately raises the issue with the Argentine President. ...” ¹⁰³⁵

Disturbed to discover that US agencies, including the CIA, have no information, Haig immediately alerts the White House. At the same time, Thatcher telegrams US President Reagan requesting that he; “... *talk urgently with the Argentine President and ask him to give you an immediate assurance that he will not authorise any landing, let alone any hostilities.*”

Secretary Haig telegrams Ambassador Shlauderman in Buenos Aires.

“In telegram 85684 to Buenos Aires, March 31, the Department instructed Shlauderman to deliver a message from Haig to Costa Mendez expressing the former's "hope that both governments will be able to move forward towards a satisfactory resolution" of the "longstanding issues" between Argentina and the United Kingdom. Haig continued: "Because the issues are not new, it would appear that arrangements and understandings have been agreed upon in the past for how to deal with problems such as that now posed at Leith Harbur. I urge your government do everything possible to adhere to such arrangements, and to avoid any actions that would make solution even more difficult. I have made the same requests to the British. I am convinced that it is in the interest of both governments to resolve the current impasse as quickly as possible. If our good offices can be of assistance, please let me know".” ¹⁰³⁶

In New York, Argentina's new Permanent Representative, Eduardo Roca, tells the President of the Security Council (SC) that his country is considering putting the issue of South Georgia before the Security Council. ¹⁰³⁷

“It is appropriate for me to emphasise in the clearest possible terms that the means employed by the British Government and their unilateral acts have created a situation of serious tension whose continuation could jeopardise the maintenance of international peace and security.” ¹⁰³⁸

In Moscow, Argentina's Embassy requests the Russian Government to use its veto should a Security Council vote go against Argentina. ¹⁰³⁹ China receives a similar request to use its veto in the event of an unsupportive Security Council resolution.

At the UN building, Secretary-General Pérez de Cuéllar asks both Roca and Britain's Permanent Representative, Anthony Parsons, to meet him.

1035 *Telegram from the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom April 1, 1982, 0429z* in Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, vol. xiii, Conflict in the South Atlantic, 1981–1984

1036 *Telegram from the Embassy in Argentina to the Department of State March 31, 1982 2208z* in Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Latin America/Central, Argentina (01/01/1982–04/02/1982).

1037 *The Falklands crisis in the United Nations, 31 March-14 June 1982* Anthony Parsons in *International Affairs* vol.59 Issue 2 (Spring) 1983 p.169

1038 Quoted in Freedman 2005 vol.2

1039 Cardoso, Kirschboom & van der Kooy 1983 p.91. It is not clear how much information regarding Argentine intentions was attached to the requests.

*“As the crisis developed on 31 March he was about to leave for a tour of Europe. He summoned both Roca and Parsons successively to express concern at the rising tension and urge a diplomatic resolution of the dispute... By this time Roca was already preparing the diplomatic ground for the invasion, circulating a letter to the President of the Security Council, referring to the South Georgia incident and the dispatch of British warships to the area, and complaining about Britain's 'obstinately negative' approach to Argentine efforts to find a peaceful resolution to the illegal occupation of the islands”*¹⁰⁴⁰

In Buenos Aires, Minister Costa Méndez hands a declaration to Britain's Ambassador Anthony Williams.

*“Since the problem raised is disregard of Argentine sovereignty, I judge pointless the despatch of a person to examine the events in the Georgias since Argentina considers this incident resolved. ... I cannot omit to draw attention to the unusual British naval deployment towards our waters reported in the international press which can only be interpreted as an unacceptable threat ...”*¹⁰⁴¹

*“In telegram 1888 from Buenos Aires, April 1, Shlaudeman reported that Williams had received from Costa Mendez a verbal answer that morning regarding the proposed visit of a high-level British official to discuss the workers at Leith Harbor. Costa Mendez said the Government of Argentina was "not interested" and that "from the Argentine point of view the Leith Harbor affair is closed". Conveying this reply to Shlaudeman, Williams added that Costa Mendez did indicate that "the GOA would be prepared for immediate discussions on the sovereignty issue". ... Later that day, Williams provided Shlaudeman with the text of Costa Mendez's written follow-up to his verbal response, an informal translation of which Shlaudeman transmitted to the Department in telegram 1908 from Buenos Aires, April 1.”*¹⁰⁴²

From South Georgia, HMS *Endurance* is ordered back to Port Stanley.¹⁰⁴³ Before sailing, Capt. Barker transfers a platoon of Royal Marines onto South Georgia island to maintain a presence and protect the unarmed BAS civilians. At 1900 local time, HMS *Endurance* slips away from South Georgia.¹⁰⁴⁴

From Washington DC, Secretary Haig cables the US Embassy in London.

*“I am instructing our Ambassador in Buenos Aires to convey my concern to the Argentine Foreign Minister and to urge that his government take no steps which would aggravate the present crisis. Furthermore, I am urging the Argentine Government to abide by existing arrangements and understandings concerning regularizing the status of foreign residents on South Georgia Island. We will, of course, have a greater chance of influencing Argentine behavior if we appear to them not to favor one side or the other. We will continue quietly to try and move the Argentines away from taking further steps which would make a peaceful resolution more difficult to achieve.”*¹⁰⁴⁵

From Buenos Aires, US Ambassador Shlaudeman telegrams Washington DC.

“Foreign Minister Costa Méndez called me in late this afternoon ... The Minister said he had conveyed my demarche of yesterday to the governing Junta. ... he gave me the following response from the three commanders: the GOA is prepared to accept the proffered good offices of the USG, but only on the

1040 *Ibid*

1041 *Ibid*

1042 *Telegram from the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom April 1, 1982, 0429z in Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, vol. xiii, Conflict in the South Atlantic, 1981–1984*

1043 This order appears to have come directly from the MOD in London where Leach was stamping his new authority.

1044 Barker 1997. See also Pascoe 2022 vol.3 p.680 for details as to the means by which *Endurance* avoided detection by the *Bahia Paraiso*.

1045 *Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Cable File, Falkland File 03/31/1982–04/01/1982*

basis that HMG first recognize the sovereignty of Argentina over the Malvinas and agree to deliver those Islands and their dependencies to Argentina within a reasonable period of time. The good offices of the USG would then be employed to help arrange such details as the future status of the Islanders under Argentine rule and the establishment of a permanent British fuelling station to support operations in the Antarctic. ... he reiterated that there would be no confrontation unless the British tried to take the working party off South Georgia. I said we would regard any confrontation as most serious. ... Costa Méndez closed the meeting by delivering himself of some harsh observations on the British, asserting that the GOA had had enough, that HMG had tried to dupe and string along Argentina for years and that the GOA was prepared "to break relations" without any qualms." ¹⁰⁴⁶

Shlaudeman adds a comment; *"The Junta's response is, of course, absurd. It sounds like Galtieri playing Patton. In any event, the GOA is clearly bent on pressing to the utmost the advantage it thinks it has. ... If the press reports of British Navy ship movement towards the South Atlantic are true, the Argentines may simmer down a bit. Our impression from contacts in the Argentine navy is that no armed action is expected in that quarter for the time being at least."*

The US Ambassador also notes that Haig's message for Costa Mendez had arrived while his current cable was being drafted, adding; *"I would prefer not to deliver any high-level message until after the CNO has had a chance to talk to the navy here and to give us his insights."* ¹⁰⁴⁷

Researcher's Comment: It is sometimes stated that the UK should have seen the Argentine invasion coming. However, if the USA - far friendlier with Argentina than the UK - had not been able to see it, what chance had the less well connected British Government? It is clear that the British had woken up to the danger before the Americans.

In Washington DC, the Central Intelligence Agency circulates an intelligence cable.

"On the evening of 31 March 1982, Argentine President Leopoldo (Galtieri) and the other two members of the ruling military Junta were determined that Argentina will take military action, if necessary, to resolve the current conflict with the United Kingdom over conflicting claims of sovereignty over the South Georgia Islands (sic) in the South Atlantic. In meetings late on 31 March, Galtieri and the other two members of the Junta were in firm agreement that Argentina will not back down on this matter. ...Late on 31 March, Costa Mendez told members of the Junta that the current impasse with the UK is a military problem, not a diplomatic problem; Galtieri forcibly echoed this statement." ¹⁰⁴⁸

An article in the National Intelligence Daily, prepared by the CIA, states: *"Argentina evidently plans an invasion as early as tomorrow of the disputed Falkland Islands, if its increasingly tough diplomatic posture does not yield results. ... Argentina's Foreign Minister has stated that it will require British recognition of Argentine sovereignty over the Falkland Islands and South Georgia groups and expeditious transfer of them to Buenos Aires. He said, however, that there would be no confrontation unless the British try to remove the Argentine nationals from South Georgia."*

1046 Telegram from the Embassy in Argentina to the Department of State March 31, 1982 2208z in Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Latin America/Central, Argentina (01/01/1982-04/02/1982).

1047 Ibid. CNO = Chief of Naval Operations

1048 Reagan Library, Roger W. Fontain files, Falkland Islands [04/01.1982-04/02/1982], Secret.

April 1st, from Washington DC, Secretary Haig again cables the US Embassy in Argentina.

*“Request you contact Galtieri immediately. Tell him we have disturbing reports. Tell him that we don't want to overreact, but would like very much to be reassured. Tell him that from the US point of view we believe that we are embarked on one of the most fruitful periods in the history of our relationship, in which we can become not only the partners in the struggle against Communism in the Hemisphere, but together we can again achieve that standing in international life which we both can rightfully claim. Tell him that should any military action occur, for whatever reason, it is a simple fact that overriding internal and external pressure would be brought to bear on us to abandon the new and promising relationship we are building.”*¹⁰⁴⁹

In New York, at the UN, early afternoon local time, Britain's Sir Anthony Parsons, demands that the President of the Security Council convenes a meeting to call upon the Argentine Government to refrain from the use of force.¹⁰⁵⁰

*“... we had never been to the Security Council before with this dispute. It had only touched the Fourth Committee; it had scarcely been to the plenary of the General Assembly and it hit everyone by surprise. The day before the invasion I got word to call an emergency meeting of the Security Council which I did. I rang up colleagues in turn personally, saying would you be down at the Council in an hour's time, the invasion of the Falklands is pending. My American colleague (Jeanne Kirkpatrick), who was very mixed up with Latin American policy, said that I had gone mad and that she would block the vote.. I said that if you are going to block me from having a meeting you will have to do it in public and I shall insist on a public meeting so ...? My Russian colleague said: it is April 1st and I know this is an April Fool's joke, the kind of thing you do the whole time, but you don't know your own rules; it is after mid-day. I had quite a problem persuading him that this was serious ...”*¹⁰⁵¹

*“Kirkpatrick,.. was less than pleased, having told Roca that such a move was unlikely... Parsons was suspicious of Kirkpatrick's 'close and sympathetic relationship with Roca.' He suspected that she had given the Argentine Ambassador to understand that, if Argentina could support the US over Nicaragua, she would return the compliment over the Falklands.”*¹⁰⁵²

On being informed that a meeting of the Security Council is being called, Argentina's Permanent Representative, Roca, responds.

“It was ironic and inadmissible for the Council to be convened by the United Kingdom on that day to consolidate the spoils of colonial plundering. Argentina rejected being accused when in fact what should be judged, if justice was to be served and peace preserved, was the conduct of the accuser.”

From Washington DC, US Secretary Haig sends a message to Lord Carrington indicating that the USA will do all it can to help and that their Ambassador in Buenos Aires is seeking an urgent meeting with President Galtieri; who is resisting the invitation to hold a personal telephone conversation with President Reagan.¹⁰⁵³

1049 Telegram from the Embassy in Argentina to the Department of State in Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Latin America/Central, Argentina (01/01/1982–04/02/1982).

1050 The Presidency of the Security Council revolves monthly among its members. The USA had held the position during March, 1982 with Jeane Kirkpatrick, an Argentine sympathiser, taking the chair. On April 1, the position moved to the Republic of Zaire with Gerard Kamanda wa Kamanda taking the presidency. A stroke of luck considering Kirkpatrick's subsequent behaviour.

1051 Sir Anthony Parsons interviewed by Jane Barter March 22, 1996

1052 Freedman 2005 vol.2

1053 General Galtieri “resisted” for 4 hours.

*"In his memoirs, Haig wrote that Reagan had attempted to telephone Galtieri at 6:30 p.m., but had been informed by Galtieri's aide that he was "unavailable" to take Reagan's call."*¹⁰⁵⁴

Haig summons Argentine Ambassador Takacs to see him.

*"The Secretary called in Argentine Ambassador Takacs at 7:45 p.m., April 1. They met for 15 minutes, The Secretary told Takacs that the President and he are deeply concerned about the situation in the South Atlantic. Our assessment suggests that the use of force is contemplated on the Falkland Islands and in South Georgia as well. We know that the UK will take a counter action if this happens. The situation would become a tragedy. Nothing would be more self defeating for Argentina's interest in good relations with the United States. The Secretary described our present relations as those of unprecedented cordiality after many years of languishing. GOA use of force would reverse our cooperation in Central America and the hemisphere. The reaction of the American people will be overwhelming, we will have to side with the British, and US-Argentine relations will be back to the worst days. The Secretary said he had been in touch with Lord Carrington and received the clear impression the British will react. He said he had urged the President to call Galtieri. He was shocked to learn that the Argentine President would not take the call. ..."*¹⁰⁵⁵

In Buenos Aires, US Ambassador Shlaudeman speaks to President Galtieri.

"... I emphasized to him, as I had to the Foreign Minister, that any armed confrontation would do serious damage to the excellent relations we have been developing between our two countries. I asked for the assurances on the use of force as set forth in para five of the refel. Galtieri did not address that question... but when later I pressed it said bluntly that he was not going to tell us whether or not he intended to use force.... With respect to US/Argentine relations, the President insisted that Argentina has the support on this issue of the great majority of nations and that the failure of the U.S. to understand its position would do us damage in the Southern Cone and elsewhere. He referred several times to Argentine support for our position in Central America—support which I acknowledged—and seemed to suggest there should be a quid-pro-quo in this case.

The talking paper, which the President handed to me at the end of the meeting, reviews the Argentine complaints about HMG's lack of response to the Argentine proposals of January and February. It describes the current situation as "intolerable and impossible to maintain" in terms of "our national honor." The paper contains the following sentence: "We have not considered for a moment that at a time when the freedom of the American people is seen to be seriously threatened your government (USG) would be inclined to defend a colonial system represented by fewer than 2,000 persons thousands of kilometers from the metropol. We believe firmly that such situations belong to the history of past centuries and that it is not rationally possible to ask us to be the last example of a colonial aggression."

...

The last point in the paper responds in a way to our request for assurances. The Foreign Minister commented that this point was the key. It states: "We can offer all the tranquillity and security required if public and express recognition of our sovereignty is made real, along with the stipulation, also public, that in a period not to exceed the end of the year 1982 the consequences of said recognition will be made concrete." I told the President that we were not talking about US support or lack of support for the British position, that we were not taking sides, and that we were only speaking of the possibility of

1054 Footnote 2 in *Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassies in Argentina and the United Kingdom: Washington, April 2, 1982 0304z Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Latin America/Central, Argentina (01/01/1982–04/02/1982).*

1055 *Ibid.*

military action, a possibility which concerns us greatly. I said that such action could bring unforeseen and very grave consequences. The President said that Argentina was prepared to face such consequences." ¹⁰⁵⁶

Informing Washington DC, Shlaudeman comments; *"Galtieri was emotional and, I believe, quite nervous. I'm still not certain that he means to take action tomorrow. It would be in his nature to run a bluff to the very end. On the other hand, his ego shows signs of serious inflation and I'm afraid that he is capable of doing something stupid."* ¹⁰⁵⁷

In Washington DC, Britain's Ambassador receives a message from the US State Department; *"... that their Ambassador has informed them from Buenos Aires of his meeting with the Argentine President. The latter would not say what the Argentines were going to do. The Americans have deduced from this that the Argentinians are therefore planning to go through with their military operation. The Argentine President muttered some mumbo-jumbo, to use the State Department's phrase, about the need for the British to talk about surrendering sovereignty..."*

In New York, at the UN, Security Council President Kamanda wa Kamanda calls for restraint; announcing a meeting for that evening

From Buenos Aires, a signal to its invasion force informs General Garcia and Rear-Admiral Allara that the garrison at Stanley is larger than usual, and that they are aware of the approach of the Argentine force.

"This recent information undoubtedly came from inside Stanley, almost certainly from the Argentine airline office based there.... A LADE officer, Vicecomodoro Hector Gilbert, ... had just returned unexpectedly to Stanley, ostensibly to check some financial documents. This officer, experienced in local conditions, was probably the source of the intelligence now reaching the landing force." ¹⁰⁵⁸

Without the advantage of surprise, the invasion plans are quickly subject to revision. Afraid that the target beach will now be defended, another landing site is selected. A squad whose objective was to be Goose Green is reassigned to reinforce those attacking Stanley.

"... making a total of 940 Argentine troops who would be attacking eighty-one British marines and sailors." ¹⁰⁵⁹

The new plan calls for Government House to be seized by the sixteen members of the Amphibious Commando Group, under the command of Lieut-Commander Pedro Giachino.

From London, information regarding the approaching invasion fleet is relayed to Governor Hunt. ¹⁰⁶⁰

"We have apparently reliable evidence than an Argentine task force will gather off Cape Pembroke early tomorrow morning 2 April. You will wish to make your dispositions accordingly." ¹⁰⁶¹

"Faced with that Hunt arranged for his staff to sleep at houses in the town rather than near Government House, then he put all available staff to work shredding or burning secret papers,...Then he summoned the two Marine Majors, Gary Noott and Mike Norman, to Government House ..." ¹⁰⁶²

1056 Telegram from the Embassy in Argentina to the Department of State, Buenos Aires, April 1, 1982 2345z: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Latin America/Central, Argentina (01/01/1982-04/02/1982)

1057 Ibid.

1058 Middlebrook 2003

1059 Ibid.

1060 By telegram, which arrived in Stanley at 3.30pm local time.

1061 FCO 7/4490 f113 The Governor is alleged to have responded; *"They might have added goodbye and the best of British!"* cf. *The Guardian* November 12, 2012

1062 Pascoe 2022 vol.3 p.684

Major Noot, as officer commanding NP8901, briefs his marines before deploying them in small groups to sites around the town.

In Stanley, at 2015hrs local time, Governor Hunt goes on Falklands local radio to warn the Islanders. ¹⁰⁶³

“I have an important announcement to make about the state of affairs between the British and Argentine Governments over the Falkland Islands dispute. We have now sought an immediate emergency meeting of the Security Council on the grounds that there could be a situation which threatens international peace and security. I don't yet know whether it has been possible to arrange a meeting today, but our spokesman has been asked to make the following specific points. The Secretary General has today summoned the British and Argentine Permanent representatives to express his deep concern over the situation in the South Atlantic and has urged restraint on both sides. It is right that the Security Council should endorse and back up his approach.

We, for our part, have continued to make every possible effort to resolve the current problems by diplomatic means. The British Ambassador in Buenos Aires yesterday delivered a further message to the Argentine government urging a negotiated settlement to current problems, and offering to send a senior emissary to Buenos Aires. The Argentine Foreign Minister had today responded to this approach in negative terms. He had declined to discuss further the problems occasioned by the illegal presence of Argentine nationals on South Georgia, and he had specifically stated that he no longer wished to use diplomatic channels to discuss the situation in South Georgia. In addition to the Foreign Minister's unwillingness to pursue diplomatic exchanges, there is mounting evidence that the Argentine armed forces are preparing to invade the Falkland Islands. In these circumstances it is essential that the Security Council urge that there should be no resort to armed force and that diplomatic negotiations should be resumed.

In these circumstances, I think it is necessary to take certain precautionary measures here in Stanley. I have alerted the Royal Marines and I now ask for all serving members or active members of the Falkland Islands Defence Force to report to the Drill Hall as soon as possible. They will be on guard tonight at key points in the town. Schools will be closed tomorrow. The radio station will stay open until further notice. If the Security Council's urging to keep the peace is not heeded by the Argentine Government, I expect to have to declare a state of emergency, perhaps before dawn tomorrow. I shall come on the air again as soon as I have anything to report. But in the meantime I would urge you all to remain calm, and to keep off the streets. In particular, do not go along the Airport Road. Stay indoors, and please do not add to the troubles of the security services by making demonstrations or damaging Argentine property. This would play into their hands and simply provide them with the excuse they need to invade us.” ¹⁰⁶⁴

“We were all dumb, ... We couldn't believe it. In the dining room, there were four English journalists, eight state gas operators, a British visitor by the name of Carisley, (and) the owners of the hotel... After the speech the silence continued ... We all watched, silent, but I felt that the eyes were fixed more on me because they knew I spoke English. Then they asked me what I thought. I told them I didn't believe that news. We got up, left the

1063 Times are complicated by the distances involved and there being more than one time zone. I have tried to use the local time wherever possible. The military campaign HQ at Northwood (CINCFLEET) insisted the timing would be 'Zulu' time (GMT), despite the time in London being one hour ahead of that (BST), and the time in the Falklands, three hours behind GMT. I have chosen to use the 24 hour clock in the hope that it will be familiar to readers.

1064 Bound 2007. Also *The First Casualty* R. Phillips 2017 pp.115-116

*food almost intact (Lamb, as every night, every day) and along with the four English journalists we walked to (the) telex office to try to speak, each (man), to his country. They passed the news to their newspapers. I couldn't talk to Buenos Aires. Nothing could be heard across the line. Cut.”*¹⁰⁶⁵

*“Rafael Wollmann, a photojournalist for ILA (Imagen Latinoamericana) agency, along with British correspondents Simon Winchester (of The Sunday Times) and Ian Mather with his photographer Tony Prime of The Observer were the only reporters on the islands when the occupation occurred. Wollmann arrived earlier (March 23) in order to make a report for the Gamma agency on the islands, while the British came to report on the South Georgia incident.”*¹⁰⁶⁶

Civilian Defence Force (FIDF) members make their way to the Drill Hall.

*“... corps spirit is a strong thing, and Anthony Davies, known as Taff, was the only experienced soldier among them. Taff had been a Marine and met his wife Jackie when serving with Naval Party 8901 in the late 1970s. He left the Corps in 1979 and settled in Stanley. That night he felt he had to do something to help and became the FIDF's newest member. Taff recalled that, in spite of the lack of experience and the understandable nerves, the men were calm.”*¹⁰⁶⁷

*“... the Marines took most of the FIDF General Purpose Machine Guns (GPMGs) and magazines for SLR rifles, leaving the FIDF with SLRs in the racks but no magazines to put in them, so quite number of the 32 FIDE volunteers who reported for duty were armed with Second World War .303 rifles. ... Once each man had been issued with a weapon (of whatever vintage) and 100 rounds of ammunition, the FIDF dispersed to their allotted posts around the town.”*¹⁰⁶⁸

From Stanley, Governor Hunt reports to London.

“(1) Royal marines disposition will be made near expected landing beach and will do what they can to contain landing and to defend airport.

(2) FIDF will round up Argentines in Stanley before dawn tomorrow and bring them to Government House for safe-keeping. They will then deploy at probable helicopter landing sites.

*(3) Marines will fall back to outskirts of Stanley but will not fight in Stanley. Survival party will take off to the hills as Argentine forces reach Stanley. I shall remain at Government House. ... ”*¹⁰⁶⁹

HMS *Endurance* is ordered to return to South Georgia.

*“I made for the south-east corner of the island. This was because we had a report that two corvettes, two destroyers, a submarine and a tanker were heading for South Georgia; the assumption was they would make their approach from the north.”*¹⁰⁷⁰

Off South Georgia the corvette, *ARA Guerrico*, with two helicopters and 40 marines, joins the *Bahia Paraiso*.

1065 Rafael Woolman, Argentine photo-journalist, who had arrived in Stanley a few days before on a LADE flight. Quoted in *La Gesta de Malvinas y sus protagonistas, conocidos y no tanto* in *El Diario del Fin del Mundo* January 4, 2008 citing *Malvinas. El desembarco de una primicia* Rafael Woolman in *La Nueva Provincia de Bahía Blanca* April 2, 2007

1066 *The relationship between the military and Argentine correspondents authorized to report from the islands during the Falklands War* Eva Lavín & Jorge Gallardo-Camacho 2017

1067 Bound 2007

1068 Pascoe 2022 vol.3 p.695. With two detachments of marines in the Islands, the NP8901 stores did not contain enough weapons.

1069 FCO 7/4490 f124 Telegram No. 64 of 1 April 1982

1070 Barker 1997

Closing on the Falklands, Argentina's invasion force begins to deploy.

*“At 9.30pm on 1 April, ... the Type 42 destroyer Santissima Trinidad anchored one mile south of the Falklands coast. Twenty-one inflatable rubber boats were lowered into the sea, and the marines of the Amphibious Commando Company transferred to the small craft.”*¹⁰⁷¹

At 2130, Buenos Aires time, Galtieri finally agrees to take a telephone call from US President Reagan –

Reagan: *“I have reliable news that Argentina is about to adopt force in the Falkland Islands. As you will understand, I am very worried about the repercussions such an action would have. I want to express to you Mr. President, the concern of United States in this matter and the need to find an alternative to the use of force.”*

Galtieri: *“... I want to remind you that my country has always maintained a favorable attitude towards negotiations in this dispute with Great Britain. This is demonstrated by seventeen years of fruitless discussion under the auspices of the United Nations. We have conducted these negotiations with a nation which, more than a century and a half ago, used force to usurp a territory which by right belongs to Argentina. Our negotiating position remains the same – but the patience of the Argentine people has a limit. Great Britain has threatened Argentine citizens legitimately going about their business in South Georgia, and my government has an obligation to protect them. Besides, the United Kingdom persists in ignoring Argentine claims in order to put an end to the negotiations and has not responded – in spite of our insistence – to the last proposal that we formulated in order to speed up the process. I want to repeat to you, Mr. President, that our negotiating stance has not changed...”*

Reagan: *“I understand, Mr. President, but I consider it essential to continue the discussions and seek an alternative to force. ... Believe me, ... I have good reason to assure you that Great Britain would respond with force to any Argentine military action.”*

Galtieri: *“Argentina has always been in favor of a peaceful solution to this dispute. It will only be possible to find the alternative you seek, Mr. President, if there is recognition on the part of the United Kingdom of Argentine sovereignty over the Falkland Islands. And that recognition would have to be explicit and public.”*¹⁰⁷²

Reagan offers mediation via Vice-President Bush and Jeanne Kirkpatrick, but Galtieri rejects the offer.

“... There are all those resolutions of the General Assembly, such as 1514, 2065 and others which repeatedly call on the parties to seek a negotiated settlement to this sovereignty dispute.”

Reagan: *“Mr. President, I believe that it is my obligation to bring to your notice that Great Britain is ready to respond militarily to an Argentine landing. This has been made known to me by the United Kingdom. Furthermore, Mrs. Thatcher, a friend of mine, is a very determined woman and she would have no other alternative than to make a military response. The conflict will be tragic and have grave consequences for the Hemisphere. ... I want to make clear, therefore, that the relationship between your country and mine will suffer greatly. American and world-wide opinion will take a negative attitude to an Argentine use of force.”*¹⁰⁷³

From London, Britain's Foreign Secretary, Lord Carrington, responds to Governor Hunt's earlier telegram, urging caution in the treatment of Argentines present in the Islands.

1071 Middlebrook 2003

1072 Quoted in full in Cardoso, Kirschboom & van der Kooy 1983 pp.83-86

1073 *Ibid.*

*“... This must be for your judgement, but you will wish to bear in mind that although the evidence of Argentine intentions to attack the Islands tomorrow is highly suggestive, it is not yet entirely conclusive. The action we are taking in the Security Council and US representations in Buenos Aires could yet deter them. To arrest the few Argentines in Port Stanley before it is entirely clear that a landing is about to take place could simply provide the Argentines with the excuse they need. On present information we would not anticipate that a landing itself would take place until later in the morning. It would however seem a sensible precaution for the FIDF to keep a close watch on any Argentine citizens. We leave it to your discretion on when to inform the civilian population but it would seem right to do so with adequate warning...”*¹⁰⁷⁴

From Washington DC, President Reagan telephones PM Thatcher with regard to his conversation with Galtieri.

*“... I conveyed to him my personal concern about the possibility of an Argentine invasion. I told him that initiating military operations against the Falkland islands would seriously compromise relations between the United States and Argentina and I urged him to refrain from offensive action. I offered our good offices and my readiness to send a personal representative to assist in resolving the issues between Argentina and the United Kingdom. The General heard my message, but gave me no commitment that he would comply with it. Indeed, he spoke in terms of ultimatums and left me with the clear impression that he has embarked on a course of armed conflict. We will continue to cooperate with your Government in the effort to resolve this dispute. Both in attempting to avert hostilities and to stop them if they should break out. While we have a policy of neutrality on the sovereignty issue, we will not be neutral on the issue of Argentine use of military force.”*¹⁰⁷⁵

*“The over-riding complication is the President's closeness to Mrs. Thatcher. The President called Galtieri and Galtieri told him to mess out.”*¹⁰⁷⁶

In New York, the UN Security Council meets in public session.¹⁰⁷⁷

*“We decided in the Mission that if we were going to get a Resolution – we didn't think the odds were good but we must do it quickly, avoid all the negotiations over blue drafts and black drafts and I don't know what other drafts, we must slap down something we could live with – we must demand that Argentina withdraw and we must get a vote on it within 24 hours because if we allowed it to drag out it would be fatal. So we did exactly that;..”*¹⁰⁷⁸

Britain's Permanent Representative, Anthony Parsons, addresses the Security Council.

“As members of the Council will be aware, there have been differences for many years between my Government and the Government of the Republic of Argentina concerning the Falkland Islands. My Government has asked for this emergency meeting of the Council because it now has reason to believe that the Government of Argentina is planning to attempt to invade these Islands. ...

For several years, the affairs of the Falklands have been discussed by the General Assembly. The Falklands are one of those territories about which the United Kingdom reports to the United Nations under Article 73(E) of the Charter. At the most recent session of the General Assembly, a decision

1074 Carrington to Hunt ALQ/050/5

1075 PREM 19/657 Telegram from White House to Cabinet Office, London

1076 Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary International Security Affairs (Noel C. Koch) to the Senior Military Assistant to the Deputy Secretary of Defense April 2, 1982. Washington National Record Center, OSD Files, FRC 330-84-0003

1077 See <https://falklandstimeline.files.wordpress.com/2019/05/security-council-discussion-1-to-3-april-1982.pdf>

1078 Ambassador Parsons quoted in *British Diplomatic Oral History Project (Interviewing Sir Anthony Parsons)* J. Barder 1996

was adopted to the effect that the Committee of 24 should keep the situation in the territory under review. The Assembly has not adopted a Resolution on the subject for several years but has contented itself with taking note of developments. My Government and the Government of Argentina have held a series of meetings to discuss the situation in the Falkland Islands. In these meetings, elected representatives of the local population have regularly taken part. Reports have been submitted to the General Assembly about these meetings, most recently in Notes dated 1 April 1981 (document A.36/156).

In this Note, it is stated that: "Both delegations agreed that this question should be examined in further negotiations at an early date." Such discussion did in fact continue, most recently in New York at the end of February. Representatives of the two Governments confirmed on that occasion their wish to continue their discussions within the negotiating framework referred to in the relevant resolutions of the General Assembly. But regrettably the Argentine Government appears to have decided, following those discussions, that it did not wish to continue on this course. The Joint Communique which had been agreed at these talks in New York was not published in Buenos Aires. Recently, relations between the United Kingdom and Argentina deteriorated as a result of an incident in South Georgia, one of the Dependencies of the Falkland Islands,...

On 31 March the British Ambassador in Buenos Aires proposed to the Argentine Foreign Minister that a senior official should visit Buenos Aires to discuss a diplomatic solution, adding that the diffusing of this incident would help prepare the way for a resumption of a dialogue on the broader sovereignty issue. Earlier today, the Argentine Foreign Minister gave the reply of his Government to the British Ambassador in Buenos Aires. His reply was negative. He declined to discuss further the problems occasioned by the illegal presence of Argentine nationals on South Georgia. He specifically stated that he no longer wished to use diplomatic channels to discuss the situation in South Georgia.

Mr President, ... the purpose of my Government in calling this meeting of the Security Council is to consider the threat not to South Georgia but to the Falkland Islands,.. We have evidence that the Argentine Navy is about to launch an invasion, possible as early as tomorrow morning. ...

Mr President, my Government views the present situation with the utmost seriousness. We call on the Security Council to take immediate action in order to prevent an invasion. We ask this Council to exercise its responsibility under the Charter to maintain international peace and security. We ask this Council to call upon the Government of Argentina to refrain from the threat or use of force against the Falkland Islands and to exercise restraint. I can assure the Council that my Government has conducted the recent negotiations in perfect good faith and that the British Government stands ready to continue these negotiations in the future. What is unacceptable is an attempt to change the situation by force. ...”¹⁰⁷⁹

“After a brief exchange between myself and Ambassador Roca, who appeared to be taken by surprise by this development, the (SC) President read out the statement. I immediately took the floor to assure the Council that my government would be guided by the Presidential appeal and challenged Ambassador Roca to respond similarly. He remained silent.”¹⁰⁸⁰

1079 UKMIS to FCO April 2, 1983. Telegram 363. See <https://falklandstimeline.files.wordpress.com/2018/04/parsons-to-security-council-emergency-meeting-april-1-1982.pdf>

1080 Parsons 1983 p.170

From London, Governor Hunt is sent permission to destroy Stanley airstrip; “... if you can do so, to prevent it being used after invasion to resupply an invasion force.”¹⁰⁸¹

“Clearly, the members of the Junta miscalculated. ... They saw Britain's unexpected vehement response to the South Georgia incident as the first act of aggression in the conflict. From their perspective, it was Argentina, not Britain, which had to choose between appeasement and demonstrating resolve. As Galtieri puts it, 'Everything has to be put in the larger context of Britain pushing Argentina up against the wall.' They also incorrectly gauged the extent to which the international community would sympathize with Argentina. They expected that world leaders would accept or even applaud a bloodless use of military force in the pursuit of a just end, especially since Argentina was sending troops into what many countries – including virtually all of Latin America – considered to be Argentine territory. Moreover, they believed, Argentina was carrying out the operation in pursuit of decolonization, a principle endorsed by the United Nations.... they believed that either China (because of Hong Kong) or the Soviet Union (because of its geopolitical rivalry with the United States and Britain) would veto any resolution unfavourable to Argentina. They also believed that the United States would restrain Britain and encourage Thatcher to negotiate a final diplomatic settlement because of Argentina's support for American policy in central America. ... the Junta relied specifically and heavily on the advice of Costa Mendez, an experienced diplomat who, of all senior Argentine officials, should have been able to anticipate the Western perspective and the Western response. ... Thus when Argentine commandos stormed ashore on East Falkland in the early hours of April 2, decision-makers in Buenos Aires did not consider this the first use of force to solve the sovereignty dispute, and they anticipated no further military conflict. Accordingly, there were no plans for defending the islands against a possible British response. As the Argentine military governor of the islands, General Mario Benjamin Menendez, recalls: 'There was nothing in the plans about what would happen after five days. The last entry was "D+5: Menendez becomes governor." ..’¹⁰⁸²

At 2350 local time, Argentina's advance force forms up on the beach south of Stanley.

“The invaders soon realised they had underestimated the difficulties of the terrain – as they struggled uphill on the south side of the hills on whose north slope Stanley stands, as the floundered ankle-deep in the peat and began to straggle. After only 15 minutes Lieutenant Arias called a halt...”

In the Falkland Islands, a few moments before midnight, Cape Pembroke lighthouse is turned off. Two hydrographers left behind by HMS *Endurance*, board the FIG vessel *Forrest* and sail out to try to give the Governor an early warning of approaching vessels using *Forrest's* radar.

The die was cast. Argentina's military government had abandoned negotiation and chosen trial by combat as an approach to dispute resolution. There could only be one winner, and that winner must be seen to have right on its side – as tradition would have it.

Paper 12 considers the following 74 days in some depth but with particular emphasis on the diplomatic and political battles that surrounded the main fight.



Bibliography <https://falklandstimeline.files.wordpress.com/2019/04/bibliography-1.pdf>

1081 FCO 7/4490 f104 Telegram No. 50 of 2 April 1982. A hand written note suggests that this was not received by Hunt.
1082 Welch 1997