

*Falklands Wars – the History of the Falkland Islands: with particular regard to Spanish and Argentine pretensions and taking some account of South Georgia, the South Sandwich Islands and Britain's Antarctic Territories by Roger Lorton*¹

Paper 12²

74 days in 1982³

Trial by Combat

“Between a heavyweight diplomatic machine which had been playing power politics on the world stage for more than four centuries, and a foreign ministry that could just about manage relations with a few of its Latin American neighbours”⁴



United Nations sponsored talks had not proven fruitful for Argentina. Unwilling to take a case to the International Court of Justice, Argentina chose the only other route left open to it – invasion. Trial by combat. By taking such drastic action the military junta in Buenos Aires hoped to present Britain with a *fait accompli*; a situation that could not be overturned. Their expectation was that Britain would see the futility of its position and recognise that any attempt to restore islands 8,000 miles away was tactically doomed to failure. After 150 years of dealing with the British, Argentina had clearly learned very little. Worth remembering, perhaps, that at dawn on April 2nd, 1767, Spain first raised its flag over East Falkland. With a fondness for anniversaries, it seems unlikely that Argentina, Spain's supposed heir, invaded on the 2nd by coincidence; or due to the weather.

Day 1⁵

April 2nd – at midnight, the first elements of Argentina's invasion force arrive on the Falklands foreshore; commencing *Operation Rosario*.⁶

“The ninety-two marines were all present. They removed their neoprene outer suits, took their weapons and other equipment out of waterproof packs and prepared to move. The small party under Lieutenant-Commander Giachino who were to capture Government House had the shortest distance to go – two and a half miles due north – but Moody Brook Barracks, the destination of the main party, was six miles away over a high ridge.”⁷

1 *Falklands Wars – the History of the Falkland Islands: with particular regard to Spanish and Argentine pretensions and taking some account of South Georgia, the South Sandwich Islands and Britain's Antarctic Territories* Roger Lorton LL.B (Hon), M.Phil. 2011 – 2019. Roger Lorton has asserted his rights under the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988 to be identified as the author of this work. **NB.** These papers are about the disputes surrounding the Falklands. The full research can be found here – <https://falklandstimeline.wordpress.com/>

2 Citation = Lorton, Roger. *Falklands Wars: Timeline History of the Falkland Islands*. Wordpress 2011 Paper 12

3 Generally referred to as lasting 74 days; in reality, the invasion had started just before midnight of April 1, 1982.

4 *The Falklands War 1982* Duncan Anderson 2002

5 See Paper 11 for the events that led up to Argentina's invasion.

6 Originally code-named *Azul*, the name was changed to honour the Virgin of Rosario. *cf. Argentina's Failed Crusade* J. Burns published in the *Tablet* 2002.

7 Middlebrook 2003. It would take the main group six hours to cross the difficult ground. Far longer than expected.

“The Marines split into two groups, the larger making for the Royal Marines barracks at Moody Brook, and the smaller for Government House.”⁸

“Once on shore at Mullet Creek, a few miles south of Stanley, the group divided into two – one to pin down, kill or capture the Marines at Moody Brook, and the other to snatch Rex Hunt from Government House, which, it was hoped, would be undefended.”⁹



Argentina's News Agency issues a report.

“It said the invasion force was on its way and that the Army Chief of Operations, General Mario Menendez, has been named as Military Governor of the Islands, with three other senior officers to help him. The Argentine aircraft carrier was reported to have fifteen hundred assault troops on board, and many more, including airborne troops, had been mobilised in the southern ports of Rio Gallegos and Comodoro Rivadavia, facing the islands about three hundred miles away in the South Atlantic.”¹⁰

At 0030 in the Falklands,¹¹ Governor Rex Hunt makes a radio announcement.

⁸ Freedman 2005 vol.2

⁹ Bound 2007

¹⁰ BBC despatch 0600 GMT April 2, 1982 in *Fight for Falklands Freedom: Reporting Live from Argentina and the Islands* Harold Briley 2022

¹¹ Some confusion can arise as most official reports used Zulu time (GMT), so Hunt's report notes that his message was

*“You probably heard the outcome of the Security Council Meeting on the BBC – both Britain and Argentina were called upon not to use force to settle their dispute over the Falkland Islands. We must now wait and see what effect this has upon the Argentine Government. As I speak there is no indication that the Argentine Navy task force heading this way has changed course. Unless it does, we can expect it off Cape Pembroke by dawn. Now please don't be inquisitive and go see for yourselves. You'll just get in the way. Stay indoors and we shall keep you informed by radio.”*¹²

*“Coups and battles had been covered before on live radio, but Patrick Watts, the manager of the government-owned Falkland Islands Broadcasting Station (FIBS), made broadcasting history with the first invasion phone-in. Rex Hunt had a dedicated line to the FIBS studio and used it to update Islanders and issue whatever instructions he thought necessary. But before the day was out locals would be calling in with tactically useful reports of the Argentine advance.”*¹³

At 0127, London time, HM Ships *Hermes*, *Invincible*, *Fearless*, *Alacrity*, *Antelope* and RFA *Resource* are put on four hours notice for operations in the South Atlantic. *Antrim*, *Glamorgan*, *Glasgow*, *Coventry*, *Brilliant*, *Arrow*, *Plymouth* and RFAs *Applefleet* and *Tidespring* are ordered to Ascension Island.¹⁴

British Petroleum tankers *British Esk* and *British Tamar* are taken up from trade (STUFT).¹⁵

At 0430, Governor Hunt makes a declaration before deploying his available forces.

*“I have no alternative other than to declare a state of emergency with immediate effect under the Emergency Powers Ordinance of 1939. Under these emergency powers I can detain any person, authorise entry to any premises, acquire any property, and issue such orders as I see fit. I must again warn people in Stanley to stay indoors. Anyone seen wandering on the streets will be arrested by the security forces. I have no further news about the Argentine Navy task force, but may I just say that the morale of the Royal Marines and the Defence Force is terrific, and it makes me proud to be their Commander in Chief.”*¹⁶

The men of the local Defence Force are positioned as observers on Sapper Hill and at Cape Pembroke.¹⁷

*“Norman based one third of his small force in and around Government House, and the remainder he split into sections to cover the airport peninsula and the approaches to the harbour and the town.... The airport runway was blocked with vehicles and oil drums.”*¹⁸

broadcast at 0330z. GMT is three hours ahead of the time in the Falklands.

12 Quoted in *Strangers in the Night: The Falklands conflict as a Radio War* Alasdair Pinkerton 2007

13 *Invasion 1982: the Falkland Islanders' Story* Graham Bound 2007

14 It would be the 5th before the first of these was ready to sail. RFA *Tidepool* had been sold to Chile and was en-route when London asked if the UK could have her back. Chile promptly agreed and the ship (a tanker) was turned around. Ascension Island was a British Dependency (now part of the St. Helens Overseas Territory) albeit leased out at various times to the USAF, NASA, Cable & Wireless and the BBC. Wideawake airfield, built by the USA in the 1940's, had a 10,000 ft runway and was operated by the USAF in 1982. Currently operated jointly by the RAF and USAF, the airport is a military base and only available to military and diplomatic flights. There were rumours in 1982 that the USA had initially objected to any use of the airfield. That was not true. See April 5, 1982 below.

15 *British Tay* was taken up shortly after.

16 Quoted in Bound 2007

17 The contents of Hunt's radio messages appear to have been quickly passed to the Argentine commander. Suspicion later fell on the LADE representative, Hector Gilobert, who had returned to Stanley unexpectedly on March 31st. Phillips (*The First Casualty* R. D. Phillips 2017 p.125) suggests that a message had been received in Stanley the night before the invasion, from the Argentine fleet, calling for the surrender of the Islands. I can find no evidence to support this.

18 *Official History of the Falklands Campaign, Volume 2: War and Diplomacy* L. Freedman 2005 vol.2

0500 three Argentine vessels are seen.

*“... one landing craft heading for the narrows and two others in Port William west of Yorke Bay. I instructed Wells to send off our message that invasion forces were landing. Cable and Wireless were having problems with their emergency circuit and they suggested trying to reach you through Portishead. That was the last we heard from Cable and Wireless.”*¹⁹

0530 Moody Brook barracks is attacked by Lt.-Commander Sabarots' specialist force.

*“Explosions were heard from Moody Brook and shortly after movement was reported behind Government House from Sappers Hill. I instructed Wells to destroy our last Cypher machine.”*²⁰

*“Disturbed night. 1st shots heard at 5.00amish. The invasion is on.”*²¹

*“Everything was silent and dark. On my watch I saw that it was five o'clock when the first shots were heard. Machine gun bursts and mortar blasting. Very close, in the governor's house. We listened, without being able to decipher, the orders that the sailors gave to organize the defense.”*²²

*“It was still completely dark. We were going to use tear-gas, to force the British out of the buildings and capture them. Our orders were not to cause casualties if possible.... We surrounded the barracks with machine-gun teams, leaving only one escape route along the peninsula north of Stanley harbour, so that anyone who did get away would not reach the town and reinforce the British there. Then we threw the tear-gas grenades into each building. There was no reaction; the barracks were empty.”*²³

*“The commandos undoubtedly planned to hit both targets (Moody Brook and Government House) simultaneously, but their timing was out and the abandoned barracks were attacked some ten minutes before Government House. Their attack was supposed to be a coup de main; so sudden, precise and overwhelming that the Marines would not have been adequately organised to defend themselves or the Governor, and would have surrendered quickly in disarray.”*²⁴

Argentina's main invasion force arrives off Stanley; units deploy onto a beach four miles away.

*“At 0637 (sic) hours, the first 5 vehicles carrying the platoon from 25 Inf Regt reached the beach on the north coast of the airfield peninsula, without encountering any resistance. The vehicles immediately deployed ready to open fire if necessary, while Infantry soldiers from the Army charged at full speed towards the high ground which dominated the Airfield from the South East.”*²⁵

19 *Telegram No. 41* of April 3 from Montevideo (Hunt) to FCO. The 'Narrows' are the entrance to Stanley Harbor. The failure of radio contact with London remains intriguing. Freedman (2005 vol.2) put this down to *Cable & Wireless* having problems with their emergency circuits, while Pinkerton (2007) asserts that it was due to a planned “readjustment of the radio link with the United Kingdom earlier that morning.” Whatever the reason, the timing was very convenient for the Argentines.

20 *Telegram No. 41* of April 3 from Montevideo (Hunt) to FCO.

21 *Valeries Diary in A Falklands Family at War: Diaries of the 1982 Conflict* Neville & Valerie Bennett 2021

22 Argentine photo-journalist Rafael Wollmann quoted in *La Gesta de Malvinas y sus protagonistas, conocidos y no tanto* in *El Diario del Fin del Mundo* January 4, 2008 citing *Malvinas. El desembarco de una primicia* Rafael Wollmann in *La Nueva Provincia de Bahía Blanca* April 2, 2007

23 Lt.-Commander Sabarots quoted in *Argentine Fight for the Falklands* M. Middlebrook 2003. The large number of bullet holes discovered in the walls of the buildings raises doubts about Argentine claims that the primary objective of the invasion was to take control without inflicting casualties. After the war, Argentina would allege that the barracks had been strafed by British aircraft. *cf.* Phillips 2017

24 Bound 2007

25 Translated Argentine Report; provenance unknown

0550 Government House comes under fire. Governor Hunt makes a further radio transmission to the Islands' population.

*"This is just to let you know that the first Argentine ships have been sighted in Port William and one landing craft approaching the narrows. Everything is under control, we are keeping them under surveillance. That is all for now. There have been one or two bangs at Moody Brook, but we consider that this is a diversion... That's all for now."*²⁶

*"WHAT THE HELL WAS THAT? Quickly out to the kitchen, Rex Hunt was saying that a boat had come in through the narrows and was firing on Government House ... no it wasn't ... something blew up in The Narrows, anyway it was a big explosion."*²⁷

0600 the BBC's airs a broadcast by its Latin American Correspondent, Harold Briley.

*"Argentina's threatened invasion of the British Colony, the Falkland Islands, is reported to be underway. A fleet headed by Argentina's flagship Veintecino de Mayo (25th of May) was reported to be heading the invasion assault in which thousands of troops and aircraft were taking part. Official confirmation was expected from the President, General Leopoldo Galtieri, in a nationwide television and radio broadcast."*²⁸

"The Governor of the Falkland Islands, Rex Hunt, with communications to the outside world cut off, told me he listened to my broadcast crouched under a table in Government House, radio beside him and revolver in hand to repel Argentine intruders. 'As I listened to you' he said, 'Argentine troops arrived, shooting out all the windows in my conservatory.'" ²⁹

0615 Giachino's detachment approaches Government House.

"Enemy forces attacked Government House and got within 20 yards before they were repulsed (Three prisoners were subsequently taken from outbuildings)." ³⁰

"At 6.15 I heard a call. Someone shouted: "Álvarez ...!" And then an unintelligible phrase. We look at each other. The English asked me if those words had been pronounced in Spanish. I told them yes. There were no doubts: the Argentine soldiers were in the Falkland Islands.... At 6.25, abruptly, the fire stopped. From the terrible silence we heard the screams of a man who, in perfect English, asked Governor Rex Hunt to surrender. It was still dark."³¹

"The lack of detailed plans caused an early failure. Giachino and his party did find a door, broke it open and entered, but they were in a separate, smaller building which contained the servant's quarters. It was empty. The five Argentines came out again and made for the back of the main building. ... A hail of fire from the defenders in the rear of the house fell on Giachino and his men. Giachino fell..." ³²

26 Quoted in Phillips 2017 p.161

27 *Neville's Diary* in Bennett 2021. cf. Phillips 2017

28 Quoted in Briley 2022.

29 *Ibid.*

30 *Telegram No. 41* of April 3 from Montevideo (Hunt) to FCO.

31 Argentine photo-journalist Rafael Wollmann, *op.cit.*

32 Middlebrook 2003. Giachino died of his wounds either at the scene or later in hospital – reports are not consistent. His death certificate notes that he died in Puerto Rivero, possibly the only person to ever do so (Argentina's new name for Stanley would only last for 14 days before being changed again). Posthumously he was awarded Argentina's *Cruz-La Nacion Argentina al Heroico Valor en Combate*.

*“At Government House, the initial assault was repulsed, leaving one Argentine dead and three wounded, although the Marines believed that they had inflicted much greater casualties. Later three commandos who had got into the servants quarters were disarmed and taken prisoner. As dawn broke, it was relatively quiet, but the local radio transmitter was off the air and some 120 Argentine troops were on the hillsides overlooking them.”*³³

*“Marine sharpshooters at Government House also claimed, credibly, to have killed more men than the single man the Argentines acknowledged.”*³⁴

0645 Hunt is informed that armoured personnel carriers, and an estimated 120 troops, are “coming ashore.”³⁵

0715 Argentine troops moving towards Stanley are engaged by a section of Royal Marines commanded by Lieut. Trollope: 2 missiles hit an Argentine Armoured Personnel Carrier (APC) before British troops retire.

*“Six Armoured Personnel Carriers began advancing at speed down Airport Road. The first APC was engaged at a range of about 200 to 250 metres. The first three missiles, two 84mm and one 66mm, missed. Subsequently one 66mm fired Marine Gibbs, hit the passenger compartment and one 84mm (Marines Brown and Betts) hit the front. Both rounds exploded and no fire was received from that vehicle. The remaining five APCs which were about 600 to 700 metres away deployed their troops and opened fire. We engaged them with GPMG, SLR and sniper rifle (Sergeant Shepherd) for about a minute before we threw a white phosphorus smoke grenade and leap-frogged back to the cover of gardens. Incoming fire at that stage was fairly heavy, but mostly inaccurate.”*³⁶

*“In the early light, I could make out the forms of six or seven Marines, crouching down at the corner, using my uncle's house and the pillarbox (sic) as cover. They were firing continuously at the trees at the back of Government House, or where the trees would be if there was enough light to see them by. One tall 'Bootie' with a General-Purpose Machine Gun was blazing away to the westwards and getting some answering fire. He was complaining he had put 'so many rounds into the bastard but the f***ing idiot didn't know when to give in'...”*³⁷

*“The fact that no one was observed to emerge from the first Amtrac to be engaged encouraged the Royal marines to think that one of their rocket rounds had punched a hole in it and that some of the machine-gun fire had penetrated the hole and caused serious casualties among the men inside. Local civilians who observed the action optimistically supported this view later. There was no rocket hit, however, just the scars of ninety-seven machine-gun bullets. Only one Argentine marine was slightly wounded by a sliver of metal cutting his hand.”*³⁸

*“(This) brings into question the Argentines' insistence that they lost only one man during the invasion... Whether or not the Argentines lost men in this incident remains a moot point. They certainly never admitted it. ... The Argentine death toll may have been embarrassingly high, and it is worth remembering that covering up death was not new to the junta; they had kidnapped, murdered and disposed of thousands of their own people – the 'disappeared' – over the preceding six years.”*³⁹

33 Freedman 2005 vol.2. There had been six men in Giachino's team, leaving two unaccounted for.

34 Bound 2007

35 *Telegram No. 41* of April 3 from Montevideo (Hunt) to FCO.

36 Report of Lieutenant William Trollope quoted in Phillips 2017 pp. 169-170. Also Bound 2007. Argentina's official report (Phillips 2017 p.168) notes that one APC (#07) was hit by machine-gun fire only, without serious casualties.

37 *Neville's Diary* in Bennett 2021

38 Middlebrook 2003

39 Bound 2007

Around 0730, Argentine forces reach the airfield.

*“...CO 25 Inf Regt reported that he had captured the Airfield and that he had prepared it for the air landing. He had experienced virtually no opposition, since the forces which had been defending that sector had pulled back towards the built-up area after putting up weak resistance. The more complicated task of clearing the runway, which was occupied by approximately 25 vehicle of different types (light trucks and tractors), required considerable effort to carry out but was achieved within the time-frame anticipated. By then troops of 2 Marine Bn had succeeded in occupying the locality.”*⁴⁰

*“More shooting and explosions. The radio announcer came on again, this time to say that the Argies had cleared away all the obstructions on Stanley airport and a large number of tracked vehicles were on their way up to the town. ... Two houses had been hit by mortar bombs. No fire resulting although there was some damage. Tome (Davies) couldn't say much more as his roof had collapsed on him and he could hear running water as the water supply tank in the loft space had been hit by bullets.”*⁴¹

In London, Sir Humphrey Atkins makes an announcement to the House of Commons.⁴² Telegrams are sent to British Embassies in Commonwealth countries, with a message to be passed to the local Government leader.

*“The Argentine Government's invasion of the Falkland Islands, ... will I fear have the gravest consequences. I am sending this... to seek your support in giving the strongest and earliest possible condemnation... You should of course bear in mind that the right of self-defence is applicable.”*⁴³

With little verified information to hand, instructions are sent from London to the UK's Mission at the UN to make a further approach to the Security Council.

0800 in Stanley, Argentine commanders broadcast a message calling upon the, now surrounded, British forces at Government House to, “act prudently” and surrender.

*“This is a call to the British colonial Government of the Islas Malvinas. In order to fulfil orders from the Argentine Government, we are here with a numerous task force remaining faithful to our Western and Christian principles for the purpose of avoiding bloodshed and property damage among the population, we hope that you will act prudently. Our concern is for the welfare and safety of the people of the Malvinas.”*⁴⁴

0810 Vice-Comodoro Héctor Gilbert approaches the Governor's residence holding a white flag.⁴⁵

“1015z: Made contact with Gilbert who was most reluctant to come out of his house and professed ignorance of the whole operation. 1045z: Armoured personnel carriers reported entering town. Managed to persuade Gilbert to walk from his house to Government House with a white flag to act as emissary (he was shot at by his own troops as he reached Government House) 1100z: Persuaded Gilbert accompanied by my Chief Secretary to walk down road from Government House to meet approaching armoured personnel carriers. They reached Town Hall without seeing them and reported

40 Translated Argentine Report; provenance unknown

41 *Neville's Diary* in Bennett 2021

42 The announcement was limited as the lack of contact with Stanley meant that the Government was still unable to confirm that the town had been captured. It would be another hour or so before reports were received from *Endurance*.

43 *Telegram No.99* of 2 April

44 Quoted in Pinkerton 2007

45 Gilbert had previously overseen the LADE operation that maintained an air link between Argentina and the islands. He returned a few days before the invasion, ostensibly to check on some financial documents. See Middlebrook 2003 p.23.

from there. We issued local radio announcement and reply came from commander of Argentine forces to say that he would meet them at the Town Hall.” ⁴⁶

*“At 8.10 I saw through the window that Vice-Gilbert appeared at a bend in the path that leads to Hunt's house. I lifted the camera and pointed towards it with the 180 mm telephoto lens. I managed to press the shutter twice. Two pictures. Someone, I don't know where, at that moment, I pulled a trigger and fired a bullet that exploded the glass of the two-leafed window through which I was peeking. That bullet went to a meter and sank into the wall, less than half a meter from one of the English journalists.”*⁴⁷

“According to Wollmann,... Wollmann received an intimidating shot at the window of his lodge while photographing the Argentinean Vice-chancellor Hector Gilbert heading for the governor's house.” ⁴⁸

One section of Royal Marines, under Corporal York, are unable to reach Government House; instructed instead to make their way out of the town and disappear into the countryside.

“Recalling Norman's joke about the best thing to do if the Argentines invaded, Corporal York replied, "Right boss, we're going fishing." They booby-trapped their GPMG with a grenade (it subsequently exploded injuring or killing an Argentine) and jumped into the Zodiac for a hair-raising ride across Port William. In broad daylight, they dodged an Argentine frigate, hiding between the few Polish fishing vessels in port, and escaped. Their continued evasion became a morale booster for the Islanders. Other units were ordered to hold their fire, stay where they were and await orders.” ⁴⁹

0815 Admiral Busser, with two aides, walks to Government House with Hector Gilobert and Hunt's Chief Secretary.

“Our phone rang, 'Would Valerie please get over to the hospital as soon as she could as there is a bit of an emergency. ... I had a look out through the front porch and saw that Gerald Cheek was being escorted home to the Police Cottages by two armed men. He seemed to be minus a fair bit of his FIDF uniform.” ⁵⁰

“... We managed to agree an effective ceasefire so that he could remove his three badly wounded from outside Government House and three Prisoners of War. ... He appealed to me to call a halt to the fighting otherwise they had such a superior force that they would inflict heavy and needless casualties. I had no alternative but to agree, and gave the order to our forces to hand over their arms.” ⁵¹

“The images of British colonialism literally brought to its knees were deeply humiliating, and allowing such photographs to be taken was the Argentines' biggest mistake after their decision to invade. The pictures shocked and enraged the British so deeply that the Thatcher government had to restore the country's honour or fall.” ⁵²

46 *Telegram No. 41* of April 3 from Montevideo (Hunt) to FCO.

47 Argentine photo-journalist Rafael Wollmann, *op.cit.*

48 *The relationship between the military and Argentine correspondents authorized to report from the islands during the Falklands War* Eva Lavin & Jorge Gallardo-Camacho 2017

49 Bound 2007. York and his men surrendered on April 4, 1982.

50 *Neville's Diary* in Bennett 2021

51 *Telegram No. 41* of April 3 from Montevideo (Hunt) to FCO.

52 Bound 2007. An unnecessary act and, as it would prove, a provocation. Comments later made by the photographer, suggest when the Argentine commander saw what was happening he ordered the marines back to their feet.



Rafael Wollmann 1982



Rafael Wollmann 1982

Patrick Watts announces over Falklands radio that an Argentine flag is flying at Moody Brook Barracks.

0915 Hunt walks to the Town Hall with Vice Comodoro Gilbert.

1030, the Governor formally surrenders the town to General Osvaldo Garcia. On it being proffered, Hunt refuses to shake Garcia's hand, telling the General that; *"This is British property and you are not invited"*. Garcia responds; *"It is very ungentlemanly of you to refuse to shake my hand"* to which Hunt replies; *"It is very uncivilised of you to invade my country."*⁵³

53 FCO 7/4490 f57

*"Büsser entered the (Town Hall). ... "I will not shake the hand of the one who illegally invaded British territory," said the governor. " I urge you to leave the islands." Büsser answered: "We landed as you did in 1833. I have orders to evict you and restore these lands to Argentine sovereignty." Hunt wanted to insist, but Büsser interrupted: "Be reasonable and surrender quickly. We have overwhelming superiority." The British official understood that he had already shown sufficient dignity. There was No point in delaying capitulation. ... It was 9.25 on April 2, 1982."*⁵⁴

The Governor is permitted a final message to the Islanders.

*"Hello Kelpers and Islanders, I hope you can hear me on the phone. The machine here doesn't work. I'm sorry it happened like this... The Admiral came along to me and I told him that he had landed unlawfully on British Sovereign territory and I ordered him to leave forthwith. He refused, claiming that he was taking back territory that belonged to Argentina and that it was Britain that was unlawfully in possession... I'm sorry it's happened this way. ... rest assured, that the British will be back."*⁵⁵

*"Hunt was told that he would be flown out of the Falkland Islands that evening. It was agreed that he could broadcast to the islanders so long as he also contacted the Royal marines at Grytviken in South Georgia to tell them of the position in Stanley. Hunt refused to ask them to surrender without resistance."*⁵⁶

1017 Argentina's national anthem is played over the Islands' radio. The *Falkland Islands Broadcasting Service* is renamed *LRS 60 Radio Nacional Islas Malvinas*. It is also announced that the captive Royal Marines, together with their families, will be deported to Argentina.⁵⁷

*"We carried Cheryl Black's bags across for her... Felt dreadfully sad for Cheryl and the other wives... It was here for the first time I turned and saw in the pale evening sunlight the Argentine flag flying from the mast at Government House. I really felt physically sick and emotionally drained; the cold light of awful reality set in."*⁵⁸

A few Royal Marines are escorted to Moody Brook Barracks to collect personal items.

*"The old barracks had been devastated in what looked like a classic house-clearing operation: walls were riddled with bullets and scorched by white phosphorous grenades. Again, there was no sign that the Argentines did not intend to kill."*⁵⁹

Falklands' Governor, Rex Hunt, in full regalia, leaves the official residence. He, together with his family and the surrendered Royal Marines, are airlifted to Montevideo via Comodoro Rivadavia.⁶⁰

*"The agents of British authority were quickly removed. ... Major Norman commented that his men were reasonably treated by their original captors, the amphibious Commandos, but that the men of the 2nd Marine Infantry Battalion acted as 'arrogant victors' who had done no fighting and who set out to humiliate the Royal marine prisoners."*⁶¹

⁵⁴ *Malvinas. El desembarco de una primicia* Abel Escudero Zadrayec 2007

⁵⁵ Quoted in Pinkerton 2007

⁵⁶ Freedman 2005 vol.2. Pinkerton (2007) suggests that the Governor's last message was an impromptu affair with Patrick Watts holding a telephone to a microphone while three Argentine soldiers argued with each other outside the studio.

⁵⁷ Corporal York's section remained free until April 4th.

⁵⁸ *74 Days: An Islanders' Diary of the Falklands Occupation* John Smith 1984 p.31.

⁵⁹ Bound 2007

⁶⁰ Many of the Marines of NP 8901 would volunteer to return and formed the nucleus of J Company, 42 Commando, Royal Marines.

⁶¹ Middlebrook 2003

In Buenos Aires, *Decree No.681* is sanctioned, and Brigadier General Mario Menendez is appointed as Military Governor, and ordered to make his way there.

“The territory of the Malvinas, Georgias and South Sandwich Islands, with the exclusion of any other jurisdiction over the same, as of 0000 hours on April 03, 1982, is constituted as a Military Government.” ⁶²

“Statement from the Military Junta No. 10: The Military Junta informs the Argentine people that it has decided to constitute the territory of the Malvinas Islands, South Georgia and the Sandwich Islands in the military government, discarding them from the national territory of Tierra del Fuego, Antarctica and the South Atlantic Islands, starting at 00:00, April 3, 1982. In addition, Mr. Brigadier General Mario Benjamín Menéndez has been appointed military governor of the territory of the Malvinas, Georgia and South Sandwich Islands, he will exercise all the powers of the military and civil government in its jurisdiction. This resolution has been promulgated by Decree No. 681.” ⁶³

In an announcement over the local radio service, Port Stanley is renamed Puerto Rivero. ⁶⁴

“The warships under Rear Admiral Allara returned to the mainland while the transports completed the unloading of heavy equipment. Stanley airport became Base Aerea Militar Malvinas, and four Pucara aircraft flew in on 2 April. General Garcia and Rear Admiral Busser returned to the mainland... As the Governor and the Royal Marines left, the civilian population at Stanley was allowed to carry on 'as usual'. By and large Argentine forces behaved properly towards the islanders. There were some exceptions. Major Patricio Dowling soon got a reputation for being tough and threatening.” ⁶⁵

In Buenos Aires, President Galtieri makes a short broadcast to the Argentine nation.

“Compatriots: We have recovered, safeguarding the national honor, without rancor, but with the firmness that the circumstances require, the Austral Islands that make up the national heritage ... by legitimate right. The step just taken was decided without taking into account any political calculation. It was designed on behalf of each and every one of the Argentines, regardless of sectors or factions and with the mind set on Governments, institutions and people that in the past, without exceptions; and through 150 years, have struggled to claim our rights. I know, and we acknowledge with deep emotion, that already the whole country lives the joy of a new gesture and it is preparing to defend what you own regardless of sacrifices, ...”

Galtieri then moves onto the balcony of the Casa Rosada to greet a jubilant crowd outside. He tells them that his government have *“interpreted the sentiments of the Argentine people.”*



⁶² *Decree S681/1982 National Executive Branch (Poder Ejecutivo Nacional)*. Published National Bulletin of May 6, 2019

⁶³ Repealed by decree No. 879 of 1985.

⁶⁴ By who is not very clear, and a controversial choice even within Argentina (see 1833). Puerto Rivero appears to have only lasted until the 5th, when it was changed to Puerto Soledad for a day and then to Puerto de las Islas Malvinas (April 6). I am unable to find any official *Decree* legitimising these name changes however. See April 16, 1982.

⁶⁵ Freedman 2005 vol.2

"The reaction of the Argentine people was extraordinary and much greater than expected. Many believed we could keep the Islands forever, without concessions. This reaction limited the Government's negotiating stance."⁶⁶

"The same people who had demonstrated against the regime just days before flooded the Playa de Mayo cheering, screaming, crying, singing and waving the Argentine flags. Galtieri was overcome with emotion standing on the balcony of the Casa Rosada, basking in his reception as Libertador de Las Islas Malvinas. On the spur of the moment – and without consulting his colleagues in the Junta – he proclaimed that Argentina would never withdraw. According to one senior official who asked not to be identified: "He did not expect this [reaction]. But the crowds made him feel like a hero, and it went to his head. He decided unilaterally to countermand the withdrawal and to declare that Argentina would never leave the Malvinas. It was an understandable emotion, but with hindsight it was a big mistake. It tied our hands..."⁶⁷

In early afternoon London time, the BBC reports from Buenos Aires that people are dancing in the streets.

"In Buenos Aires, intense military activity fuelled invasion fervour. I witnessed raucous rejoicing for a long-cherished ambition, at last achieved..."⁶⁸

All those arrested during the March 30th protests are released, so that they "... can associate themselves with the events of this historic day for the Republic."⁶⁹

"Buenos Aires now erupted in a day of ecstasy ... Galtieri announced that his government "had no alternative than to do what has been done."... the square was filled with men and women weeping tears of joy."⁷⁰

"Buenos Aires was euphoric. Never had Argentina gained territory in conflict or diplomatic dispute. Argentina had not had a war since 1870. Ever since Spanish colonial rule Argentina had lost land to its neighbors. In the city's shops there were school text illustrations that recalled 1806 and 1807, when Buenos Aires creoles under the rule of Castille had defeated two British expeditions to the River Plate."⁷¹

"... the news of the recovery of sovereignty, accompanied by the publication of photographs of the Argentine flag at Port Stanley... elicited one of the most enthusiastic popular responses that the regime had ever experienced, with the possible exception of the organization of the World Cup in 1978."⁷²

The clipping is from the newspaper 'LA NACION', second edition, dated March 2, 1982. The main headline is 'Desembarco argentino en el archipiélago de las Malvinas'. Below the headline, there is a sub-headline: 'Efectivos de las tres fuerzas, mediante una operación comando, iniciaron la toma de Puerto Stanley. Gran Bretaña pidió la intervención del Consejo de Seguridad de la UN. El embajador argentino en ese organismo señaló que "la razón de la crisis es la irracional negativa británica a una justa y lógica solución"'. There are two photographs: one of a man in a suit (likely Galtieri) and another showing a map of the Falkland Islands with a small boat icon. Text columns provide details about the military operation and the political context.

66 Costa Mendez quoted in *Signals of War: The Falklands Conflict of 1982* Freedman & Gamba-Stonehouse 1990 p.149

67 *Remember the Falklands? Missed Lessons of a Misunderstood War* David A. Welch 1997. This author argues that it was never the Junta's intention to remain. Only to make the gesture. See 1981

68 Briley 2022

69 *Génesis de la Guerra de Malvinas (1976-1982)* Valeria Lourdes Carbone 2008

70 *The Battle for the Falklands* M. Hastings & S. Jenkins 1997

71 Graham-Yool A. *South Atlantic 1982: A Forgotten War (Part 1)* 2007. cf. 1806

From Geneva, Switzerland, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) offer their good offices to both Argentina and Britain. London accepts immediately, Buenos Aires does not respond.

Staff at the Argentine Embassy in London instruct *Banco Nacion* to start transferring funds out of the UK.

Britain breaks off diplomatic relations. Argentina's Ambassador is given four days to leave the country, while Britain's Ambassador is recalled from Buenos Aires.

*“... four British officials remained behind to man a British Interest Section in the Swiss Embassy in Buenos Aires.”*⁷³

At the Foreign Office in London, Foreign Secretary, Lord Peter Carington, seeks advice from the FCO's legal advisor, Sir Ian Sinclair.

*“Any action Britain now took could depend upon the 'inherent right of individual or collective self defence' as confirmed in Article 51 of the UN Charter. Not only was a firm declaration (of war) unnecessary it would also attract considerable baggage in international law. States at war not only acquire a distinct legal status but so do states not at war, who become neutrals, a status with its own rights and duties. A British declaration of war in 1982, for example, would have had immediate implications for all Argentines resident in or carrying on business in British territory. They could be subjected to a variety of restrictions, up to internment, and the process could lead to the effective abrogation of all contracts involving Argentine nationals, and turn any trading with Argentina into a criminal offence, allowing for the seizure and requisitioning of Argentine merchant ships in British ports and the suspension of all bilateral treaties.... Because of these far-reaching implications the tendency, unsurprisingly, is to consider entry into a state of war as a technical legal matter rather than as a reasonable description of events.... The absence of such a state might suit both parties to a conflict as a means of keeping it limited and avoiding difficult questions in relation to third parties. ...”*⁷⁴

From Guyana, Shridath 'Sonny' Ramphal, the Commonwealth Secretary-General, sends a message to all Commonwealth Heads of Government.

*“... stand by Britain in this matter, consistent with your support for the principles of territorial integrity, the right of self-determination and the rejection of the use of force..”*⁷⁵

At the UN Building in New York, Britain's Permanent Representative, Anthony Parsons, seeks permission to put forward a resolution to the Security Council.

*“(Parsons) persuaded Kamanda to allow him to introduce the resolution at a meeting called for another purpose at 1030 New York time on 2 April.”*⁷⁶

In Washington, US Secretary Alexander Haig calls for information from the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) only to discover that they too, were caught unawares; reliant on public media outlets for information; *“... Argentine press reports indicate that some 4,000 to 5,000 troops are on the Islands, and the 10 to 14 naval ships in the area include the country's only aircraft carrier as well as several guided missile destroyers, frigates, corvettes, transport and amphibious craft, and at least one submarine.”*⁷⁷

⁷² *Argentine Soldier Known unto God: The Darwin Cemetery and Conflicts in the Retelling of the Falklands/Malvinas War* Jeremy Rubenstein 2011 in *Le Mouvement Social* 2011/4 no.237

⁷³ Freedman 2005 vol.2

⁷⁴ *Ibid*

⁷⁵ PREM19/614

⁷⁶ Freedman 2005 vol.2. Gerard Kamanda wa Kamanda

⁷⁷ *CIA Situation Report #1 CIA-RDP84B00049R000701780020-2*

With little certain, Haig meets with President Reagan.

*“We must proceed cautiously and objectively on this question—not endorsing Argentine force while not unnecessarily jeopardizing our relations with Argentina.”*⁷⁸

Haig then instructs the US Mission at the United Nations in New York, to vote for a resolution; “... which the British have informed us they will introduce in the Security Council calling on all parties to refrain from the use of force in the Falkland Islands dispute ...”⁷⁹

At 1930 in London, the Cabinet meet to approve the formation of a *Task Force* to retake the islands.

*“I received advice from the Foreign Office which summed up ... that Department. I was presented with the dangers of a backlash against the British expatriates in Argentina, problems about getting support in the UN Security Council, the lack of reliance we could place on the European Community or the United States, the risk of the Soviets becoming involved, the disadvantage of being looked at as a colonial power. All the considerations were fair enough. But when you are at war you cannot allow the difficulties to dominate your thinking:... And anyway what was the alternative? That a common or garden dictator should rule over the Queen's subjects and prevail by fraud and violence? Not while I was Prime Minister.”*⁸⁰

*“This decision was assumed as much as taken, a reflection of genuine indignation at the Argentine act of aggression and a determination to demonstrate that the Government was not completely helpless. Once it became apparent that a Task Force could be sent there was never any doubt that it would be sent.”*⁸¹

Britain’s Chief of the Defence Staff, Sir Terence Lewin, visiting New Zealand, is ordered to return to London.

A Soviet spy ship, *CCB-501 Zaporozhye*, diverts from its normal operations off the Atlantic coast of the USA and sails south.⁸²



At 1030, in New York, at the United Nations, Ambassador Parsons (left) addresses the Security Council.

*“As we sit here, a massive Argentine invasion of the Falkland Islands is taking place.”*⁸³

“(I) set out the salient facts and read out, in final form, the text of the resolution which I was tabling. I took the almost unprecedented step of bypassing the customary stages of circulating a 'working paper' leading to a preliminary draft resolution, a 'blue draft', in order to put the Council on notice that (a) we would not accept amendments to our draft,

78 Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Agency File, Secretary Haig's Evening Report (03/25/82–04/21/82)

79 Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D820173–1064.

80 *The Downing Street Years* Margaret Thatcher 1993

81 Freedman 2005 vol.2

82 The USSR would offer Argentina intelligence updates from such sources, although the extent of Russian assistance provided to Argentina remains unclear. This particular vessel spent 154 days at sea monitoring the British fleet.

83 *Ibid.*

and (b) we would, according to the conventions, insist on a vote within 24 hours of tabling. My first intention was to demand a vote the same day but I readily acceded to pressure from members of the Council to wait until 3 April as the Foreign Minister of Argentina, Mr Costa Méndez, was en route for New York to present his government's case to the Council.”⁸⁴

Argentina's Permanent Representative, Eduardo Roca, responds by arguing that British negotiators had refused to address the issue of sovereignty. He then restates his country's belief that the Islands had been seized by force from Argentina in 1833. Roca concludes by suggesting that the Security Council should be pleased that the long-running dispute has now been settled. The meeting is then ended in order that representatives can contact their various governments for instructions.

In the evening in New York, Jeane Kirkpatrick, the USA Ambassador to the UN, controversially attends a dinner given in her honour by the Argentine Embassy. Together with other leading figures from the US political establishment.⁸⁵

*“So ended a quite traumatic day: having one's home invaded, the established representative of the head of state being deported, and being confined to one's own home by the people who said they had come to liberate us from British oppression. I think that they had wanted us to have been down on the beach waving banners and shouting 'Viva'. What a silly idea, we don't even get excited about a church bazaar.”*⁸⁶



84 Parsons 1983

85 *Gambling with History: Ronald Reagan in the White House* L. I. Barrett 1984. In his memoirs, Alexander Haig noted that Kirkpatrick; “.. persevered in her intention to attend.” Kirkpatrick would later claim that she was misled.

86 *Neville's Diary* in Bennett 2021

Day 2

April 3rd – in London's *Guardian* newspaper.

“At a ... press conference in the Foreign Office Mr. Nott denied as "ridiculous and quite untrue" rumours at Westminster that he had offered his resignation., and Lord Carington rejected with a shake of his head any suggestion that he might resign. But the irony of a government elected to strengthen Britain's defence posture finding itself in this position will not be lost on MPs...”

At 0730, on South Georgia, the ARA *Bahia Paraiso* demands the surrender of British troops at Grytviken.

*“I have important message for you involving the successful operation by Argentine forces at Malvinas, the ex-Governor has surrendered the islands and Dependencies unconditionally and I suggest you do the same.”*⁸⁷

Lacking accurate information, Lieut. Mills, commanding the platoon on South Georgia, ignores the message.

In London, PM Thatcher speaks to an emergency session of Parliament.⁸⁸



*“The House meets this Saturday to respond to a situation of great gravity. We are here because, for the first time for many years, British sovereign territory has been invaded by a foreign power. After several days of rising tension in our relations with Argentina, that country's armed forces attacked the Falkland Islands yesterday and established military control of the islands.... I must tell the House that the Falkland Islands and their dependencies remain British territory. No aggression and no invasion can alter that simple fact. It is the Government's objective to see that the islands are freed from occupation and are returned to British administration at the earliest possible moment.... The Government have now decided that a large task force will sail as soon as all preparations are complete. HMS *Invincible* will be in the lead and will leave port on Monday. ... The people of the Falkland Islands, like the people of the*

United Kingdom, are an island race. Their way of life is British; their allegiance is to the Crown. They are few in number, but they have the right to live in peace, to choose their own way of life and to determine their own allegiance. It is the wish of the British people and the duty of Her Majesty's Government to do everything that we can to uphold that right. That will be our hope and our endeavour and, I believe, the resolve of every Member of the House.”

Leader of the Official Opposition, Britain's Labour Party, Michael Foot, responds in support of the Government.

“The rights and the circumstances of the people in the Falkland Islands must be uppermost in our minds. There is no question in the Falkland Islands of any colonial dependence or anything of the sort. It is a question of people who wish to be associated with this country and who have built their whole lives on the basis of association with this country. We have a moral duty, a political duty and every other kind of duty to ensure that that is sustained. The people of the Falkland Islands have the absolute right to look to us at this moment of their desperate plight, just as they have looked to us over the past 150 years. They are faced with an act of naked, unqualified aggression, carried out in the most shameful and disreputable circumstances. Any guarantee from this invading force is utterly worthless

87 Quoted in Freedman 2005 vol.2

88 *HC Deb* 03 April 1982 vol 21 cc633-68

— as worthless as any of the guarantees that are given by this same Argentine junta to its own people. We can hardly forget that thousands of innocent people fighting for their political rights in Argentina are in prison and have been tortured and debased. We cannot forget that fact when our friends and fellow citizens in the Falkland Islands are suffering as they are at this moment”

“The Prime Minister, shortly after she came into office, received a soubriquet as the “Iron Lady”. It arose in the context of remarks which she made about defence against the Soviet Union and its allies; but there was no reason to suppose that the right hon. Lady did not welcome and, indeed, take pride in that description. In the next week or two this House, the nation and the right hon. Lady herself will learn of what metal she is made.”⁸⁹

“Even with action in hand, however, the experience was a painful one. MPs from all parties spoke of their anger and disbelief. For a Government that was so avowedly patriotic it was galling to be castigated by an Opposition that was so clearly to its left for losing sovereign British territory to a military dictatorship...”⁹⁰

“The opening outburst of Michael Foot, in his speech of 3 April, was considered to be excessive not only by Labour left-wingers, but even by Denis Healey, the moderate deputy leader. Labour MPs were divided between those who declared their opposition to the task force expedition, and those who instead held the deployment of force in the Southern Atlantic to be inevitable. ... These divisions were destined to grow even more pronounced... The result was the continual re-positioning of the PLP. At first, the Party supported the sending of the task force, while insisting that it would be used only as a means of applying pressure to obtain the retreat of the Argentines via diplomatic actions.”⁹¹

During the debate, MP Edward (Ted) Rowlands reveals that the British security services have the ability to read Argentine diplomatic codes.⁹²

“It is unlikely we shall ever know how much damage this betrayal of trust did to national security, but if anyone else than an MP had given the information to the Argentines they would have been prosecuted.”⁹³

After the Commons debate, Conservative back-benchers (1922 Committee) hold a meeting.

“In the afternoon of 3 April, the 1922 Committee held a decisive meeting, during which the rancour of numerous back-benchers emerged with even greater vehemence. Both Nott and Carrington took part in this meeting. The former managed the encounter better than the latter. ... Additional heat arrived from critiques made by the press, starting with *The Times*. All these factors led to Carrington’s resignation ...”⁹⁴

From London, the US Embassy reports to Washington.

“The military difficulties for Britain of sustaining operations in the South Atlantic are awesome. If they want to go beyond gesture, Mrs. Thatcher’s government must reckon that the task would be not only to dislodge the Argentines and restore the status quo, but to defend the Falklands for an indefinite time in

89 J. Enoch Powell, MP for South Down, speaking during the debate April 3, 1982.

90 Freedman 2005 vol.2

91 *A Leader at War: Margaret Thatcher and the Falklands Crisis of 1982* Domenico Maria Bruni 2018 in *Observatoire de la société britannique*, 20|2018, 135-157

92 And rather more than Argentina’s diplomatic codes. Its navy was also compromised through their use of expensive, but compromised, European cipher machines purchased from a Swiss company, *Crypto AG*. Ostensibly a private company, this was in reality owned jointly by the CIA and the German secret service (BND). Britain’s GCHQ was apparently in receipt of the product of this decoding. Future researchers should consider the Maximator Alliance.

93 *Razor’s Edge: The Unofficial History of the Falklands War* Hugh Bincheno 2006. Rowlands was criticised but, protected by Parliamentary privilege, he could not be prosecuted. For Rowlands’ other dubious connections with Falklands history, see Paper 11

94 Bruni 2018

*the face of continued Argentine hostility. This certainly could not be done without a large and protracted diversion of military assets to the South Atlantic – where no other U.K. security interests are at stake. Conceivably, it could not be done at all.”*⁹⁵

1140 on South Georgia, Argentine troops are transported by helicopters from the *Bahia Paraiso* to King Edward's Point. Royal Marines engage the craft, bringing one down and damaging another.

1147 on South Georgia, ARA *Guerrico* provides supporting fire for Argentine forces, but her guns jam.

1159 small arms fire, and anti-tank rockets fired by the Royal Marines on shore, kill a seaman on *Guerrico*.

*“The Argentines later disclosed that 1,275 hits were scored on the Guerrico. The ship's detachment had knocked down two helicopters, killed an entire landing party and crew, and pretty much put a corvette out of action ..”*⁹⁶

Further reinforcements from the *Bahia Paraiso* land to cut off the Marines withdrawal. Outnumbered, Royal Marines commander Lieut. Keith Mills surrenders, together with 22 marines and 13 BAS staff.⁹⁷

*“One Royal Marine had been wounded, while the Argentines had suffered several killed (Endurance later reported three) and wounded, lost a helicopter and had the Guerrico extensively damaged.”*⁹⁸

In New York, at the United Nations, the Security Council resume their debate on the Falklands invasion.

“Costa Mendez spoke first, the burden of his statement, backed by a lengthy historical survey, being that Argentina had done nothing more than recover national territory which had been seized by the British by an illegitimate act of force in 1833. ... The debate continued and I spoke in refutation of the statement by the Argentinian Foreign Minister, in particular of the dangerous proposition he had put forward that the peaceful settlement Articles of the UN Charter applied only to disputes which had arisen since the Charter entered into force in 1945. At the close of the debate the Panamanian Foreign Minister tried to rob me of my vote by claiming that, under Article 27(3) of the Charter “in decisions under Chapter VI [Pacific Settlement of Disputes] of the Charter a party to a dispute-in this case the United Kingdom-shall abstain from voting”. I counter-attacked that the resolution had been drafted in relation to a breach of the peace and had been proposed with Chapter VII [Actions with respect to threats to the peace ...] of the Charter in mind: hence the provisions of Article 27(3) did not apply. I was supported by the Permanent Representative of Spain, an accepted expert on UN procedures, and Panama decided not to call for a procedural vote.

*Then, during the debate, he (Mendez) made one enormous mistake. I was really basing all my arguments, and I spoke again and again, on the breach of Article 2 of the Charter, about “peaceful settlement of disputes” and non-use of force. He asked to speak in right of reply to me at one stage. He said he thought that I, the British representative, did not realize that this provision only applied to disputes which had come into existence after 1945, when the Charter came into effect. When he said this, I could feel the whole atmosphere in the Security Council changing – because just about every delegation came from a country which was embroiled in disputes going back to the nineteenth century, if not the eighteenth century... That error of judgement on his part was very helpful to my cause.”*⁹⁹

⁹⁵ Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D820177–0587

⁹⁶ *Beyond Endurance: An Epic of Whitehall and the South Atlantic* N. Barker 1997

⁹⁷ Another 13 BAS staff in field parties were distributed around the Island. Also wildlife film-maker, Lucinda Catherine “Cindy” Buxton. Buenos Aries was informed of the locations of these groups on the 5th but no action appears to have been taken as they were all still in radio contact with the BAS station at Signy Island on the 12th. cf. *PREM19/617*. The Royal Marines arrived back in the UK on April 20, 1982. Mills was awarded a DSC.

⁹⁸ Freedman 2005 vol.2

⁹⁹ Sir Anthony Parsons interviewed in *Little Platoon* M. Charlton 1989 p.201. Also Freedman & Gamba-Stonehouse 1990 p.138

Australia's envoy to the UN, David Anderson, denounces Argentina's invasion.

"We have considered carefully the statements made in this Council yesterday and this morning... Nothing contained in those statements could justify the act of aggression which has been committed by the Argentine armed forces in clear violation of Article 2.3 and Article 2.4 of the Charter of the United Nations."

*"By going to the UN, Britain did not have to declare war on Argentina in order to use force, since its action fell under Article 51 of the UN Charter."*¹⁰⁰

US Ambassador Kirkpatrick is notably absent throughout the Security Council debate.

*"Britain's most strident opponent on the Security Council was Panama. Foreign Minister Illueca, whose statement was described by Parsons as 'long and vicious,' introduced his own draft resolution which went through all past UN and non-aligned resolutions on the topic and called upon Britain 'to cease its hostile conduct, refrain from any threat or use of force and cooperate... in the decolonization of the ... islands.' Illueca proposed suspending the meeting so that a draft could be prepared in all working languages for tabling. He lost the vote..."*¹⁰¹

The UN Security Council agree to adopt Britain's resolution.

"The result was better than we had dared to hope for – ten in favour (United Kingdom, United States, France, Guyana, Ireland, Japan, Togo, Zaire, Uganda and Jordan), one against (Panama) with four abstentions (China, USSR, Poland and Spain)." ¹⁰²

*"Only Panama voted against. The three communist states and Spain abstained. Illueca spoke again in heated tones but did not insist on a vote on his resolution... Costa Méndez spoke again to maintain Argentina's rights and express disappointment without explicitly rejecting the resolution. Parsons reminded him of Argentina's obligations under Article 25 to carry out the decisions of the Security Council."*¹⁰³

Security Council Resolution 502 -

"Recalling the statement made by the President of the Security Council at the 2345th meeting of the Security Council on 1 April 1982 calling on the Governments of Argentina and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to refrain from the use or threat of force in the region of the Falkland Islands (Islas Malvinas),

Deeply disturbed at reports of an invasion on 2 April 1982 by armed forces of Argentina,

At its 2349th meeting, on 2 April 1982, the Council decided to invite the representatives of Australia, Canada and New Zealand to participate, without vote, in the discussion of the question.

At its 2350th meeting, on 3 April 1982, the Council decided to invite the representatives of Bolivia, Brazil, Paraguay and Peru to participate, without vote, in the discussion of the question.

Resolution 502 (1982) of 3 April 1982

The Security Council,

Recalling the statement made by the President of the Security Council at the 2345th meeting of the Council on 1 April 1982⁹⁹ calling on the Governments of Argentina and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to refrain from the use or threat of force in the region of the Falkland Islands (Islas Malvinas),

Deeply disturbed at reports of an invasion on 2 April 1982 by armed forces of Argentina,

Determining that there exists a breach of the peace in the region of the Falkland Islands (Islas Malvinas),

- 1. Demands an immediate cessation of hostilities;*
- 2. Demands an immediate withdrawal of all Argentine forces from the Falkland Islands (Islas Malvinas);*

3. *Calls on the Governments of Argentina and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to seek a diplomatic solution to their differences and to respect fully the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations.*

Adopted at the 2350th meeting by 10 votes to 1 (Panama), with 4 abstentions (China, Poland, Spain, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics).

Decision

On 5 May 1982, following consultations of the Council, the President of the Council announced that he had been authorized to issue the following statement⁹⁰ on behalf of the members of the Council:

"The members of the Security Council express deep concern at the deterioration of the situation in the region of the Falkland Islands (Islas Malvinas) and the loss of lives.

"The members of the Security Council also express strong support for the efforts of the Secretary-General with regard to his contacts with the two parties.

"The members of the Security Council have agreed to meet for further consultations tomorrow, Thursday, 6 May 1982."

⁹⁰ S/15047.

100 *When Governments Collide in the South Atlantic: Britain Coerces Argentina during the Falklands War* P. Bratton & W. Thies 2011 p.7

101 Freedman 2005 vol.2

102 *The Falklands crisis in the United Nations, 31 March-14 June 1982* A. Parsons 1983. Surprisingly, the Soviet Union did not use its veto, despite having been requested to do so by Argentina. Russia's Ambassador later blamed communication problems for his abstention.

103 Freedman 2005 vol.2

Determining that there exists a breach of the peace in the region of the Falkland Islands (Islas Malvinas),

1. Demands an immediate cessation of hostilities;

2. Demands an immediate withdrawal of all Argentine forces from the Falkland Islands (Islas Malvinas);

3. Calls on the Governments of Argentina and the United Kingdom to seek a diplomatic solution to their differences and to respect fully the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations."¹⁰⁴

*"Predictably, Costa Méndez hastened to reject the terms of this resolution. The position would alter later when Argentina declared itself as accepting the mandate "in its entirety," stating that it only objected to the British interpretation of it."*¹⁰⁵

*"... in many instances, it is difficult to tell who violated the rules: which state "started" the crisis. But when that is clear, as it was in the Falklands invasion, then states tend to lean on the violator, as did Mexico, Colombia, Brazil and Chile, even while occasionally genuflecting to the cherished icons of hemispheric solidarity."*¹⁰⁶

*"Resolution 502 was taken as a clear statement of opposition to the Argentine action. It linked Argentina to a breach of the peace. Only Argentina was asked to withdraw its forces. ... The Resolution was a blow for Argentina. ... if implemented there would be nothing to stop Britain retaking the Islands ... It could then refuse to negotiate seriously in the future."*¹⁰⁷

*"It could hardly have been a worse setback for Argentina."*¹⁰⁸

*"It did not, however, go so far as to denounce Argentina as an aggressor. This would have implied an expectation of a collective response, in the form of economic sanctions if not military action. This could not have been extracted from the Council at this time. The objective was therefore more modest: to put the onus on Argentina to withdraw its forces after the cessation of the current hostilities but then respond to inevitable Security Council concerns by suggesting a peaceful, negotiated route out of the dispute."*¹⁰⁹

*"By insisting on the fact that the invasion of the Falklands was an unjustified act of aggression, a violation of the principle of sovereignty, and a suppression of the right of political self-determination, Margaret Thatcher was able to remain within the boundaries designated by the United Nations Charter, which sanctioned the right to self-determination as well as that of self-defence. This position gained solid support from Resolution 502 of the UN Security Council, approved on 3 April. This resolutions did not authorise London to use military force. It did, however, stigmatise the invasion as a breach of the peace, and it did request the government of Buenos Aires to withdraw from the Falklands, to respect the United Nations Charter, and to find a solution to the territorial dispute through negotiations between the two contenders. Moreover, appealing to the principle of self-determination, and emphasising the risks of appeasement made it more difficult for the United States not to support London."*¹¹⁰

¹⁰⁴ See [https://undocs.org/S/RES/502\(1982\)](https://undocs.org/S/RES/502(1982))

¹⁰⁵ *Falklands: The Secret Plot* O. Cardoso, R. Kirschboom & E. van der Kooy 1983. Argentina's attempt to reinterpret SC Resolution 502; "...depended on separating this first operative paragraph from the second..." (Freedman 2005 vol.2)

¹⁰⁶ *Dulce et Decorum Est: The Strategic Role of Legal Principles in the Falklands War* Thomas M. Franck in *The American Journal of International Law* vol.77 no.1 (Jan 1983)

¹⁰⁷ Freedman & Gamba-Stonehouse 1990 p.141

¹⁰⁸ Middlebrook 2003

¹⁰⁹ Freedman 2005 vol.2

¹¹⁰ Bruni 2018

In Buenos Aires, the Argentine Government issues a statement rejecting UN Security Council approval of SC resolution 502; claiming that it violates Argentine rights.

*"I was in the Argentine Foreign Ministry when officials testily tossed the cable down for me to see. They were dismayed that the resolution was not vetoed by the Soviet Union, Argentina's biggest trading partner, with which relations had grown greatly. Ministers believed they had lost the diplomatic initiative to Britain while securing their military objectives."*¹¹¹

Two Argentine postal officials are ordered to the Islands.¹¹² Forty Argentine journalists are flown to Stanley.¹¹³

*"... the military chartered the day after the invasion, on April 3, a plane so that about 40 reporters could portray the Argentinean occupation on the islands. That day, the military did not exercise censorship, although reporters who came in the afternoon could only take positive photographs because, ..., the prisoners were gone and there were no traces of the invasion, the amphibious tanks were gone and the soldiers were with their faces washed."*¹¹⁴

Arriving too late to assist its Marines, *Endurance* takes up station close to the southern tip of South Georgia. From there they send observations teams to overlook Grytviken.

Britain's Bank of England freezes all Argentine assets. Argentine imports are banned to which Argentina responds with a tit-for-tat freezing of British assets and imports. To avoid the possibility of a technical default on its debts, Buenos Aires announces that it will continue to pay interest via an escrow account in New York.¹¹⁵

*"The value of the Argentine assets involved was estimated to be approaching \$1.5 billion, almost one-quarter of Argentine total liquid assets in all financial centres. They would remain frozen except in rare cases where the Treasury might grant permission for release. Only later, after the higher figure had been given to journalists, was it realised that in the first few days of April substantial sums were transferred from London to New York, meaning that the actual amount frozen was \$900 million."*¹¹⁶



Britain approaches the European Economic Community (EEC) and, in particular, West Germany – Argentina's largest trading partner – for an embargo of Argentine imports and exports.¹¹⁷

At the same time, British Embassies throughout the world initiate approaches to the various Heads of State with requests for support. Chilean Air Force Intelligence contacts General Fernando Matthei; a member of Chile's ruling *Junta*, headed by General Pinochet. The message is; *"... that a Wing Commander of the Royal Air Force had arrived in Chile with a personal message from the Chief of the Air Staff of the RAF."*

111 Briley 2022

112 Argentine stamp clubs were ecstatic. During April the post office at Stanley recorded a daily average of over 7,000 letters and packages. *cf. Miniature Messages: the semiotics and politics of Latin American postage stamps* J. Child 2008.

113 They were able to visit for just a few hours before being returned to the mainland. Nicolas Kasanzew was the only Argentine journalist allowed to remain throughout the war.

114 Lavín & Gallardo-Camacho 2017

115 Already in financial difficulty, the effect was to push Argentina further into debt; borrowing \$7 billion in the remaining months of 1982. *cf. Institutions and Cooperation: Sanctions during the Falkland islands Conflict* Lisa L. Martin in *International Security* vol.16 issue 4 1992

116 Freedman 2005 vol.2

117 In 1980, EEC trade with Argentina had been worth \$4 billion.

*“It was Wing Commander Sidney Edwards, who at once presented his credential and asked me if I would be inclined to help the British at this hour. The help they were requesting was mainly in matters of intelligence... He also told me that he was empowered to negotiate directly any urgent requests in aeroplanes, spares or other equipment that the Chilean Air Force needed, ... He further pointed out that we should bypass diplomatic channels. That neither the British Ambassador in Chile, nor the British Defence Attaché had any knowledge of him...”*¹¹⁸

In Buenos Aires, Argentina's President summons the German Ambassador.

*“Galtieri, who looked nervous, began by saying that he wished to explain the Argentine position to friendly countries with the aim of bringing about a diplomatic solution to the Falkland crisis.... the German Ambassador asked whether Argentina was still prepared to hold talks aimed at reaching an honourable solution ... Galtieri replied that everything was negotiable with the exception of final recognition of Argentine sovereignty over the Islands.”*¹¹⁹

In Europe, France agrees to stop supplying Argentina with *Exocet* missiles, *Super Etendard* aircraft and *Pucara* aircraft engines, and also to withdraw her technical teams.¹²⁰

*“Using the Defence Attaché in Paris as a conduit, the British sought lists of military sales to Argentina, details of any imposed modifications/limitations to systems, precise capabilities of key aircraft as well as serviceability rates, spares consumption and know shortages, and proficiency of those Argentine pilots trained by the French. The French even sent over some aircraft to conduct mock dogfights against British pilots. Detailed technical information on the Exocet was also provided. Nott later observed that: In so many ways Mitterrand and the French were our greatest allies.”*¹²¹

America's Central Intelligence Agency presents an assessment for President Reagan.

*“The Argentines continue to provision and reinforce their initial landings ... The British, who will lack a land base and probably face logistical problems, will be hard pressed to oust a force of the size anticipated. ... Brazil, Bolivia, Peru and Ecuador have given unqualified support to Argentina's claims, but have expressed hope for a peaceful resolution of the conflict. Venezuela, traditional supporters of Buenos Aires's claims, has thus far withheld open support and called for a negotiated settlement. The Chileans, now negotiating with Argentina for control of the Beagle Channel, refuse to support Argentine claims.”*¹²²

118 Matthei Memorandum to Margaret Thatcher March 25, 1999. Unconfirmed

119 PREM19/614

120 *Exocet* missiles came in two types. The older *MM38* ship-launched missile, and the new *AM39*, which could be launched from an aircraft. Of an order for 10, France had only delivered 5 of the *AM39* by the start of the war. *Aérospatiale*, the French company that manufactured the missiles had sent a technical team to assist in adapting the *Exocets* to Argentina's aircraft. With the invasion, Paris ordered those technicians to cease work. There is some evidence that they disobeyed that instruction. However, a DGSE investigation after the war, did not lead to any prosecutions. See, *How France helped both sides in the Falklands War* Mike Thompson *BBC Radio 4* March 6, 2012. cf. May 7, 1982 below

121 Freedman 2005 vol.2

122 *CIA-RDP84B00049R000701780020-1*

Day 3

April 4th – in London’s Whitehall, the Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC) conclude that a daily briefing paper is required to cover Argentine military dispositions and intentions.¹²³ HMS *Conqueror* sails for the South Atlantic. Senegal offers staging facilities via Dakar airport for British military aircraft.

In the Falklands, Argentine troops occupy the settlements at Goose Green and Darwin. A Falklands lighthouse keeper establishes radio contact with the UK.

*“Reg Silvey, one of the keepers of the Cape Pembroke lighthouse and a keen radio ham, had managed to maintain a secure contact with another radio ham in Yorkshire... By keeping his despatches short and having disguised his high-power aerial rig as a washing line strung across the back garden ... Silvey's broadcasts thwarted all attempts at location detection and his identity remained undiscovered for the duration of the occupation.... Silvey was able to relay vital strategic details to London despite the enormous personal risk.”*¹²⁴

In Stanley, the Islanders have to deal with a new reality.

*“I spent part of the day burning up papers and documents which I had collected during my service as an elected member of the Falkland Islands Executive and Legislative Councils – nothing really incriminating but certainly not the sort of thing which should be allowed to fall into Argentine hands. I also put our large Union Jacks in a place of safety where hopefully they will not be found. With things as they are at the moment, though, it seems a bit doubtful if we will ever need them again.”*¹²⁵

In Buenos Aires, newspapers report that the loss of the Falkland Islands means that Britain will also have to forgo its claims to its Antarctic territories. *La Prensa* tells its readers that; *“The recovery of Malvinas, by our country, was a matter of international priority in the entire world.”*¹²⁶ Rear-Admiral Eduardo Girling summons the German *military attaché* to announce that the Falklands would be defended with all available means, including Soviet assistance; which would be accepted for this purpose.¹²⁷

A CIA telegram from Buenos Aires reports on information received.

*“When the decision was made to seize the Islands, the certainty that the British would not intervene militarily was shared by President Leopoldo (Galtieri) and by Brigadier Basilio ((Lami Dozo)), Commander in Chief of the Air Force and a member of the governing Junta. (Field Comment: The source has no information on the attitude of the Commander in Chief of the Navy.) The Argentine planning for the seizure was based on the premise that the British would react to the seizure as gentlemen react to a duel: when the first blood was drawn (the Argentine seizure), the winner (Argentina) would be declared, and the loser (the UK) would gracefully retire from the field.”*¹²⁸

In *The Washington Post*.

“Britain's Prime Minister spoke the simple truth when she labelled the Argentine act, "unprovoked aggression." It is more than likely that the Argentines have made a serious mistake ... for Mrs. Thatcher is a tough woman... the British do not appear to be in a mood to be pushed around.”

123 Seventy-five daily assessments were produced between April 4th and June 18th

124 Pinkerton 2007

125 Diary entry in Smith 1984 p.35

126 Article by Manfred Schonfeld quoted in *Representations of the enemy during Malvinas War. A contribution to the bicentennial* Federico Lorenz 2010

127 PREM19/615. The report was passed to the British Government on April 8, 1982

128 Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Cable File, Falkland File 04/06/1982

Day 4

April 5th – British aircraft carriers, HMS *Invincible* and HMS *Hermes*, sail for Ascension Island, as do warships *Alacrity* and *Antelope*. HMS *Yarmouth* and HMS *Broadsword* are ordered to Gibraltar. ¹²⁹

In Washington DC, a Department of State daily Press briefing deals with a question about Ascension Island. ¹³⁰

“Q, Has there been any British request for refueling or resupply facilities on the part of the United States?”

A. I noted some press reports regarding British use of the facility on Ascension Island. Our view on this is that Ascension Island is a British possession. The United Kingdom has the legal right to land military aircraft there after notifying the U.S. Air Force Commander at the airfield. The U.S. Government is obligated, under a 1962 agreement governing its use of the air field, to cooperate in the United Kingdom use of logistic, administrative, or operating facilities; and therefore, such use of the airfield does not, in any way, constitute U.S. involvement in the United Kingdom-Argentine dispute.”

Following recriminations in the press, Lord Carrington resigns as Foreign Secretary, together with Foreign Office Ministers Richard Luce and Humphrey Atkins. Lord Pym is appointed the new Foreign Secretary. Defence Secretary, John Nott, also offers his resignation, but Prime Minister Thatcher declines it.

“Personal relations between Thatcher and Pym were not of the best. In addition, Mrs. Thatcher harboured the same mistrust regarding the desire of the FCO to defend British interests that was diffuse among many Conservatives. In the case of the Falklands, the roots of the debates can be traced to the difference between pursued objectives. The FCO was fundamentally convinced that, even if they were reconquered, the Islands would have posed a problem for Great Britain. In any case, it would be necessary to sit down at the table with the Argentines, and reach some kind of an agreement. A war, however, would have inevitably made such negotiations impossible for many years to come. Thus the FCO’s goal was to resolve the crisis through a diplomatic process.” ¹³¹

Falklands Governor Rex Hunt, with the marines of NP8901, arrive back in the United Kingdom. Hunt reports.

“The Argentine occupation forces have imposed strict military rule ... The Islanders are under house arrest until further notice, and anyone defying this order is threatened with immediate imprisonment. ... Other penalties have been imposed in the face of growing hostility from the Islanders. These include 30 days in prison for rude gestures against the military, 60 days for irreverence to the Argentine flag... Messages from radio hams ... say that troops are searching homes and confiscating equipment.”

Royal Marine Majors Norman and Nott also brief the Prime Minister.

“The Prime Minister congratulated the party on the courage they had shown ... She ... enquired whether those in Port Stanley in the days preceding the invasion had been any more aware of the likelihood of an invasion. The Governor replied in the negative. He had been inclined to think that the Argentine President was sabre rattling as on previous occasions. ... Major Nott said that the Argentine forces had not appeared to be particularly skilled or brave. They had, for example, shown reluctance to go outside Port Stanley because they had heard that a section of six marines were still at large...” ¹³²

129 Stores were still being embarked as the vessels sailed down the English Channel.

130 The arrangement between the UK and the USA with regards to the American base on Ascension Island was, in 1982, covered by the *Agreement Relating to the Use of the Airfield at Widewake (sic) on Ascension Island by Aircraft of the Royal Air Force* of Aug 29, 1962. See footnote to April 2, 1982 above.

131 Bruni 2018

132 PREM19/614 f72

From New York, Argentina's Foreign Minister, Costa Méndez, speaks to the UN Secretary-General, who is in Rome, about the possibility of talks.

*"The Secretary-General now wanted to talk to the British to see if he could do anything. Parson's immediate response was that the only action open to him at present was to urge the Argentine Government to implement SCR 502 in all its parts. Perez de Cuellar did not see the merit in making a move at this stage... and had no intention of cutting short his trip lest he give the impression that he was seeking to mediate."*¹³³

Messages of support from the Dominican Republic, Sri Lanka, Belize, Nepal and Mauritius, arrive in London. Other countries make statements deploring the Argentine invasion. Portuguese Foreign Secretary, Dr. Leonardo Mathias, is reported as saying that if Britain asks to use the *Lajes* Air Base, in the Azores, to refuel, that request would probably be granted. The Government of New Zealand breaks off diplomatic relations with Argentina, while Australia recalls its Ambassador to Buenos Aires. Canada also recalls its Ambassador, and imposes an arms embargo on Argentina. Chile condemns Argentina's use of force.

In the South Atlantic, HMS *Endurance* sails north to rendezvous with HMS *Antrim*.

In Stanley, instructions are issued that, from henceforth, all vehicles will drive on the right.¹³⁴

*"The post office has now been closed until further notice. Cable & Wireless open for distress cables only ... Two armed guards on duty at the counter aged about eighteen, very dirty and fed up; gave one a cigarette."*¹³⁵



133 Freedman 2005 vol.2

134 Falkland Islanders took to driving down the center of the road, instead.

135 Diary entry in Smith 1984 p.37

Day 5

April 6th – British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher writes to US President Ronald Reagan.

*“I seek your personal backing for the urgent introduction of economic and financial measures against Argentina. I am already approaching our Community partners on this, since we are bound to consult together on many economic matters. But I very much hope that you will join us too. Coordinated action by the Community, the United States, Japan, Canada, Australia and New Zealand would bring home to Argentina the consequences of their illegal actions.”*¹³⁶

In London, the Cabinet meet again.

*“... the prime Minister explained that day-to-day political oversight was to be provided by a special Ministerial Sub-Committee of the Defence and Overseas Policy Committee (OD) on the South Atlantic and Falkland Islands (OD(SA)), which came to be known as the War Cabinet... Its terms of reference, as set down that day, were 'to keep under review political and military developments relating to the South Atlantic and the Falkland Islands, and to report as necessary to the Defence and Overseas Policy Committee.’”*¹³⁷

From the Foreign Office, instructions are sent to Britain’s Ambassador in Brazil to inquire whether that government would be prepared to assist.

*“Even though the Itamaraty (Foreign Ministry), at first, had been inclined towards the British, the Armed Forces tilted towards Argentina. On 6 April, Delio Jardim de Mattos, Minister of Aeronautics, announced a policy guideline that 'Brazil will not help supply the British fleet.'...”*¹³⁸

Robert Runcie, Archbishop of Canterbury, sends an envoy, Terry Waite, to the Vatican. Waite carries a request that the Pope appeal to Argentina to obey international law.

“The Archbishop believes the Pope has already done this privately but the Archbishop (whose Province includes the Falklands) believes that a public utterance by the Pope would have an impact on Argentinian opinion as it is a strongly Catholic country.”

In the Falklands, Argentina reinforces its garrison; despatching the 8th Regiment from its barracks at Comodoro Rivadavia. Orders are issued for the 5th Marine Infantry Battalion to follow. A letter is smuggled out of the Islands.

*“On behalf of the civilian population of the Falkland Islands, we, the undersigned Civil Servants and Administrators, request that a protecting power be appointed to help to arrange the temporary evacuation of the civilian population of these Islands under the terms of the Geneva Convention. We further request the immediate dispatch to Port Stanley of an Observer from that power.”*¹³⁹

“Senior Medical Officer, Dr Daniel Haines, ... decided that the civilians should demand to be evacuated from the war zone en masse. He produced a highly controversial draft letter to the British Secretary, requesting that all civilians, not just expatriate British Civil Servants, be evacuated from the Islands before any fighting commenced. There was spirited discussion for and against the letter, but eventually cautious agreement that

¹³⁶ Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S Special Handling Restrictions Memos 1979–1983, Lot 96D262, ES Sensitive April 1–9 1982

¹³⁷ Freedman 2005 vol.2. Comprising the PM, Foreign Secretary Francis Pym, Defence Secretary John Nott, Home Secretary William Whitelaw, Chancellor of the Exchequer Geoffrey Howe and Conservative Party Chairman Cecil Parkinson. The full Cabinet met twice a week throughout the campaign to review the situation.

¹³⁸ *A view from the South: The Falklands/Malvinas and Latin America* Stella Krepp 2017 p.358

¹³⁹ Received in London on the 9th but signed by only 13 people. Signatures included those of the Chief Constable and the Registrar General. cf. PREM 19/617 Telex 14 April 1982

such a request could be made. ... Dr Haines did get the letter to the UK with a departing Briton (the Argentines maintained their weekly LADE service for several weeks, and those who could afford to obtain passages on the increasingly congested planes, were free to do so). When word of the petition filtered out, many Islanders were furious. It seemed to many like the patronising of expatriate officers who did not share their deep bond with the Islands, Locals did not intend to abandon their homes. They knew that, once out of the Islands, a deal would be hammered out through the United Nations, and if they ever returned it would be to a place that had changed utterly.”¹⁴⁰

In Stanley, the Argentines demand that all civilians must carry identification documents and that all local (ham) radio transmissions must cease with the equipment to be handed over to the military forces.

“... now all communication between Camp settlements is cut off, resulting in complete isolation from each other and from Stanley.”¹⁴¹

“Daily life under occupation, with uncertainty about the long term, was inevitably difficult. The Islanders were, at least in Stanley, able to talk to each other and even hold meetings in the West Store... Argentine preparations for the civil administration had been rushed and were inadequate. Comodoro Carlos Bloomer-Reeve was appointed Head of the Secretariat and acted as a liaison officer between the civilian population and military administration. He was an Air Force officer who had spent time in the Falklands some years previously and was well known to and respected by many islanders. During the occupation he managed to retain that respect by being fair and considerate in his dealings with the islanders, in contrast to Dowling.”¹⁴²

From London, the US Embassy provides its view for the Department of State in Washington.

“So far our performance has been highly rated. But memories of Suez are just below the surface, especially in the Conservative Party. We cannot be sure HMG will do our bidding if we simply tell them to stop. They already fear being presented with an ultimatum by us, tying their hands militarily when diplomatic options fail. But they are anxious to have our help, knowing that probably only we have the weight to achieve a diplomatic solution. Indeed, their pugnaciousness aims in part to get us to act.”¹⁴³

In New York, Costa Mendez speaks to Kamanda wa Kamanda, President of the Security Council. He says that while Argentina respects SCR 502, the British Task Force is clearly in breach of the call for a cessation of hostilities. Informed, Parsons responds that SCR 502 is clear and that Britain will negotiate when Argentine forces are withdrawn.¹⁴⁴

US Secretary Haig and Britain’s Ambassador Henderson meet in Washington.

“The Secretary said that while we are confident of British naval superiority, a military clash would be politically disastrous for everyone. Therefore, we must accelerate diplomatic efforts over the next seven days in an attempt to achieve an agreement before the British fleet arrives near Ascension Island, which is close to the regional area covered by the Rio Treaty. Henderson said the fleet would not stop at Ascension and Article One of the Rio Treaty should prevent Argentina from invoking mutual assistance measures in the pact... When pressed by the Secretary about HMG views on the elements of a possible

140 *Invasion 1982: the Falkland islanders’ Story* Graham Bound 2007

141 Diary entry in Smith 1984 p.42

142 Freedman 2005 vol.2

143 *Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Europe and Soviet Union, United Kingdom (04/01/1982–07/31/1982 (3))*

144 Freedman 2005 vol.2

agreement, Henderson would only reply that the Argentine military must withdraw from the Falklands, even if it meant the fall of the Galtieri government. Anything less would topple Mrs. Thatcher.

The Secretary asked if the British fleet might be temporarily slowed if the Argentines agreed to a phased military withdrawal from the Falklands, and if there was an understanding that the task force would not return home until the US or some group of impartial nations assured the complete military evacuation. He added that it would assume no prior agreement on sovereignty, that the customs and way of life of the British Islanders be guaranteed, and that a UK-Argentine condominium- type administration could be arranged. Henderson reacted to the Secretary's suggestions. He noted that the British had poor experiences with condominium arrangements, that after what has happened, in the past weeks, a joint administration would not work, and in any case he could not imagine the Argentines accepting the formula.”¹⁴⁵

After Henderson leaves, Secretary Haig meets with Argentina's Ambassador Takacs.

“The Secretary told Takacs that he had called these meetings as follow-up to the President's offer of our good offices.... The Secretary suggested it might be desirable to set up a quadripartite group with Canada, the U.S. and two Latin American countries as members and that a satisfactory solution might involve some form of joint administration of the Islands under OAS or other auspices. Implicit in this context was the withdrawal of Argentine forces. The Secretary did not see how the sovereignty issue could be resolved now; that would take time. Asked for his opinion, Takacs described the Secretary's ideas as "at the extreme of what the Galtieri government might be able to accept." ...”¹⁴⁶

Haig also has a meeting with Argentine Minister Méndez.

“... the Secretary said he needed to know from the GOA if we can keep the sovereignty issue out for now, yet find a formula that will represent a sufficiently great change from the previous status so that the GOA can explain the partial back-down to its own people. The Secretary suggested that if the GOA can agree to defer the sovereignty issue in this fashion, he would be willing to go to London immediately and, depending on the response from Prime Minister Thatcher, from there to Buenos Aires. Costa Méndez said he would talk to President Galtieri tonight and get back as soon as possible.”¹⁴⁷

“Having met with Costa Méndez, ... Haig reported back to Henderson on what sounded to the latter like Argentine intransigence, arguably confirming the pressure was needed. This led Henderson to suggest that Buenos Aires should be Haig's first stop, on the grounds that he already knew the British position and he needed to see whether there really was any Argentine room for manoeuvre. Haig took the view that he had to go to the ally first, if only to dispel any suggestion that he was colluding with Argentina. Henderson was unconvinced...”¹⁴⁸

Shortly after leaving the meeting, Mendez telephones Haig to inform him that the offer of US assistance was acceptable to Argentina and that the US Secretary of State would be welcome in Buenos Aires.¹⁴⁹

Secretary Haig reports to Reagan.

145 Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Western Europe and Soviet Union, United Kingdom (04/01/1982–07/31/1982 (4))

146 Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Cable File, Falkland File 04/07/1982 (1)

147 Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Latin America/Central, Argentina (04/06/1982–04/10/1982). No memorandum of conversation from this meeting has been found. GOA = Government of Argentina.

148 Freedman 2005 vol.2

149 Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Cable File, Falkland File 04/08/1982 (1)

*“In keeping with the initiatives you have taken with both Prime Minister Thatcher and President Galtieri and your offer of our good offices to help settle this most unfortunate dispute, I have begun to explore what we might be able to do. Today, I have talked personally with the UK and Argentine Ambassadors, as well as with the new UK Foreign Secretary, Francis Pym, by phone following receipt of a letter from him. Tonight I met with the visiting Argentine Foreign Minister. My objective in these discussions has been to listen to both sides and look for opportunities for diplomacy. I believe we have found a few. We need now to move quickly, while there is still uncertainty on both sides and while each is having second thoughts. ... Subject to your approval, and an indication from the British that they agree, I propose to go to London and Buenos Aires, leaving tomorrow or Thursday. ...”*¹⁵⁰

America's Bureau of Intelligence and Research submits an analysis.

“The British fleet will reach the Falkland area around April 20. We believe that Thatcher will be under heavy pressure to order it into action if no compromise has been negotiated or is in prospect. She will not have the option of delaying indefinitely while diplomatic efforts continue. The effectiveness of the fleet, far from its maintenance bases, will rapidly deteriorate after its arrival on station. Her damaged leadership could not survive a futile “voyage to nowhere.”

To this, the Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs adds a military perspective which; *“... concludes that the UK naval force could inflict high casualties on the Argentinian Navy and possibly retake some territory, but recovering the main territory of the Falklands would be extremely difficult.”*¹⁵¹

Day 6

April 7th – Britain's War Cabinet (OD(SA)) meets in London. Part of the discussion focuses on how to remove the nuclear depth charges from the ships carrying them before they are engaged in combat operations.¹⁵²

Foreign Secretary Francis Pym addresses the House of Commons.

*“The whole House and the country is struck by the appalling nature of the aggressive action the Argentine regime has committed... The British ambassador in Buenos Aires and most of his staff are being withdrawn. ... A small British interests section will continue to work in the Swiss embassy, and we are most grateful to the Government of Switzerland, who are most expert in these matters, ... What we in Britain must now do, with the support and backing of all freedom-loving countries right across the world, is to see to it that Argentina's illegal and intolerable defiance of the international community and of the rule of law is not allowed to stand.”*¹⁵³

PM Thatcher agrees to set up a commission of inquiry into the Argentine invasion.

“Margaret Thatcher assumed responsibility for instituting a commission of enquiry into the events leading up to the Argentine attack, once the crisis was resolved. This move made it easier to have the collaboration of the

¹⁵⁰ Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Haig Papers, Department of State, Day File, April 6, 1982 Falklands

¹⁵¹ Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, P850056–1413

¹⁵² A number of options were considered, all of which would have meant at least a 36 hour delay for the vessels concerned. This was unacceptable, and so the decision was made on the 11th, that the depth charges would have to stay with the fleet. The instruction was that any vessel carrying a nuclear weapons could at no time sail into the 3-mile territorial waters of the Falklands (Amphibious Operations Area) as this could be viewed as a breach of the *Tlatelolco Treaty* of 1967. On May 28, 1982, a decision was made to move the weapons back to the UK, but this still encountered practical problems and it was not until June 26th that the last were taken off *Hermes*. cf. 1967 & April 30 & May 25, 1982 and also December, 2003

¹⁵³ HC Deb 07 April 1982 vol.21 cc959-1052

SDP and the Liberals, in order to guarantee political support for the armed forces that were about to be deployed in Southern Atlantic. It also further reduced Labour's margins of manoeuvre. To avoid appearing more interested in contesting the government rather than the Argentine invasion, even the Labour MPs decided to walk the path that the Prime Minister showed them. In this way, the debate over the government's faults was temporarily suspended,..."¹⁵⁴

From London, Britain's government declares a 200 mile 'maritime exclusion zone', to take effect on the 12th.¹⁵⁵

*"From the time indicated, any Argentine warships and Argentine naval auxiliaries found within this Zone will be treated as hostile and are liable to be attacked by British Forces. This measure is without prejudice to the right of the United Kingdom to take whatever additional measures may be needed in exercise of its right of self-defence, under article 51 of the United Nations Charter."*¹⁵⁶

*"It was called a 'maritime exclusion zone' and was set up initially because the first force to arrive there was the nuclear submarine. A nuclear submarine is very limited in what it can do. By international law it cannot sink merchant ships without first stopping them, warning them and giving the crew a chance to abandon ship. A nuclear submarine will not expose itself on the surface, because it is then at its most vulnerable... We set up the maritime exclusion zone at two hundred miles, which is where the submarines were operating to try and dissuade the Argentines from reinforcing the Falklands."*¹⁵⁷

*"A rider to this announcement, which went unnoticed at the time, stated that even though Britain had declared a 200-mile MEZ, this did not preclude "the right of the UK to take whatever additional measures may be needed in exercise of its right of self-defence, under Article 51 of the United Nations Charter." ..."*¹⁵⁸

SS Canberra is requisitioned as a troop carrier by the British Government.

In Washington, Haig notes; *"Proposals:... Argentina and Britain to negotiate ultimate disposition of Islands within framework of respect for sovereign rights and for the right of the inhabitants of the Islands to self-determination,"* before attending a meeting of the newly formed National Security Planning Group.¹⁵⁹

*"... a core-group get-together which the White House heavies use to avoid the sprawling group gropes and inevitable leakage which come with more formal sessions of the full NSC. ... Bobby Inman, truly one of the best and the brightest! He ... will shortly retire, but not before attacking Jeane Kirkpatrick's view that the key issue in the South Atlantic crisis is the preservation of the Inner-American System (whatever the fuck that is) and the viability of the Rio Pact. ... The main outcome of that meeting, however, was the decision to send Haig to the two feuding capitals, ..."*¹⁶⁰

In the Falklands, Brigadier General Benjamin Menéndez arrives to be sworn in as Garrison Commander and Military Governor of the Falkland Islands. Archbishop Desiderio Elso Collino, chaplain general, officiates.¹⁶¹

154 Bruni 2018

155 Pym provided Haig with advance warning; albeit without sufficient time to allow Haig to present an argument.

156 John Nott in *HC Deb 07 April 1982 vol.21 cc1045-1046*

157 Lord Lewin interviewed in Charlton 1989 p.214

158 Bratton & Thies 2011 p.9

159 *Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Haig Papers, Department of State, Day File, April 7, 1982 Falklands.*

160 *James Rentschler's Falklands Diary.* Attendees included President Reagan, Vice-President Bush, Judge Clarke (National Security Advisor), Defense Secretary Casper Weinberger, Ambassador Kirkpatrick, David Jones (Chairman joint Chiefs of Staff), Admiral Inman (CIA) and James Rentschler (National Security Council). No official minutes from this meeting have been published.

161 Burns 2002. The same title that Luis Vernet had been granted by Buenos Aires in 1829.

As part of the ceremony, a large flag of the Argentine Republic is hoisted on the only available flagpole outside the government offices.

*“By 10 o’clock the wind had got up again to 30-35 knots from the north-west, increasing during the afternoon to something over 50 knots... The tents up at the Ionospheric Observatory blew down; then the huge Argentine flag hoisted on the pole outside the Secretariat flapped itself out of control, snapped the pole and flew off in great confusion down Ross Road, chased by anguished soldiers and watched by delighted locals.”*¹⁶²



Rafael Wollmann 1982

After the ceremony, Menéndez circulates a message to the people of Port Stanley.

“Message of the Military Governor of the National Territory of the Malvinas and South Atlantic Islands.

To All Inhabitants of the National Territory of the Malvinas Islands, Georgias and South Sandwich.

The Argentine Republic has returned to these Islands on the sovereignty of which has undeniable titles, after 150 years of useless claims to the United Kingdom, which occupied them by force in 1833. Furthermore, we have had discussions for 15 years with the British Government to re-establish that sovereignty, without achieving any progress, notwithstanding the repeated resolutions issued by the General Assembly of the United Nations on this subject. The only progress made consisted in actions intended to improve our links with the Islands, to provide a minimum knowledge about our country and contribute to improve the standard of Living of their inhabitants, even at a high cost for us, in acts of good will often not appreciated.

We had no other way than the occupation to achieve the definitive integration of the National Territory waving our Flag again over the Malvinas that belonged to us since 1810, date of our Independence and as territorial heirs of Spain, whose possession of these Lands was effective and undisputable (sic).

162 Diary entry in Smith 1984 p.43. Apparently taken as a poor omen by some of Argentina's more superstitious troops.

I am deeply sorry that this fact has taken place in this way, in such circumstances that had to be violent instead of being pacific due to the obstinacy and stubbornness (sic) of the Colonial Government, with a sad toll of casualties on our side.¹⁶³ This covers with grief and sorrow a day which we could have wished to be one of calm and shared joy. But this will not change our spirit and attitude.

Therefore, I wish to state very clearly to you that we have not come here as conquerors to take possession of your property or to consider you our prisoners or vassals.

On the contrary, I reaffirm in this act that, as it has been pointed out permanently during the discussions held since 1967, we wish to respect in every possible way the present style of life of the inhabitants of the Islands, to make the strongest effort to maintain their present level of economic activity and personal welfare, respecting private property and the basic freedoms and rights of all. We also wish to perform a steady action to fully achieve the "Malvinas Program" which is being carried out, and study other tending to propel the rational exploitation of the natural resources of the Islands and their area of influence, so in this way provide better possibilities and progress for their inhabitants.

We wish, as soon as possible, to work together, in cooperation, with all men and women of this Land who wish to come to us with ideas, discuss measures in benefit of the Community or criticize what could be wrong. In this sense you will always be welcome, with an open spirit, either by me or by my assistants.

It should be clear that as from today on, we consider you all inhabitants of the Argentine Republic, with the full rights established by its Constitution, listed in its Article 14, such as, to work and perform any lawful industry, to navigate and to trade, to petition the authorities, to enter, to stay, to travel and to leave the Argentine territory, to disseminate their ideas through the press without previous censorship, to use and to dispose of their property, to associate with useful purposes, to profess freely their worship, to teach and to learn.

You can see that the Argentine Constitution, sanctioned in 1853, establishes the rights, freedoms and privileges of Citizens which are similar to those the British Subjects are accustomed to enjoy. Although some of these rights have been suspended on the mainland due to the anti-terrorist struggle, we hope that here they will be absolutely in force.

I know that you must have serious doubts and prejudice (sic) towards our presence here and your future life as inhabitants of the Argentine Republic. Anyone who wishes can take steps to become full citizens, as many aliens, including British subjects, have become since many years ago. We hope that future acts will allow us to clarify those doubts and open a venturous period of work and progress together.

Therefore, I ask for the protection of God and I hope to count with the cooperation and good will of everybody, putting at the service of this enterprise, all my will, my strength of spirit and understanding. At the same time I engage myself, my word as general of the Argentine Army to you."

From Washington, the US State Department announces that President Reagan has; "... directed Secretary of State Haig to continue consultations with the Governments of the United Kingdom and Argentina on the interests of assisting both parties in the search for a peaceful resolution of the dispute in the South Atlantic."

An American intelligence report notes; "Second thoughts are surfacing among Argentine politicians about the wisdom of President Galtieri's adventure as it becomes clear that the cheap victory so confidently expected may still elude them.."

163 The official figures were one dead and two wounded.

Day 7

April 8th – Australia bans Argentine imports; *“Mr. Fraser said that his Government would not have done this for any other country in the world.”*

In London, two brothers, Andrew and David Banks, are arrested outside Argentina’s Embassy on a charge of criminal damage having thrown tins of corned beef through the Embassy’s windows. ¹⁶⁴

Britain's Chiefs of Staff propose an operation (*Paraquet*) to retake South Georgia before the end of the month.

“... the Defence Staff have drawn a distinction between an operation against South Georgia (which they regard as certain) and operations against the Falkland Islands (which they regard as subject to parallel political or diplomatic activity).” ¹⁶⁵

With US Secretary Haig en-route from Washington, PM Thatcher is briefed; *“... you should be aware that the United States intelligence agencies are helping and supporting our own intelligence effort with unreserved openness and generosity. Mr. Haig himself has assured Sir Nicholas Henderson that if there is anything we need in the area of covert support and assistance we have only to ask. Profiting from this, a telegram of requests has already gone over to Washington.”* ¹⁶⁶

Following his arrival Heathrow, Haig is welcomed by Foreign Secretary Pym at the Foreign Office.

“In this initial meeting the resolute mood of the Brits is very clear, but only a mild taste of what we will soon get across the way in Number Ten.” ¹⁶⁷

“Thomas Enders asked point blank what way out the British were giving Argentina. Sir Antony Acland... asked about the way out the US would give Cuba if it invaded Puerto Rico.” ¹⁶⁸

Alexander Haig arrives at Downing Street at 7.30pm for a meeting with Margaret Thatcher. During the discussion Haig accepts that, although British Intelligence had failed to see the invasion coming, it had put together a compendium that was; *“... much better than anything which the United States had compiled.”* ¹⁶⁹

“The Secretary said he viewed the next 72 hours as very important in Argentina. While we need to demand withdrawal and achieve it, we need to do it by Monday (4/12/82). London was chosen to visit first because the British are our closest friends and allies and we wished to start discussions with them; it was pointless to go to Buenos Aires first and listen to macho rhetoric without a fundamental feel for Britain's limits. ... He foresaw that the British could succeed in military terms in a limited way. However, the Argentines would go into port and land-based air would become a problem. ... The Secretary said the hope was to work for withdrawal in such a way that Galtieri is not toppled and replaced by someone



US Secretary of State, Alexander Haig

164 UPI April 8, 1982

165 FCO 7/4472

166 AO8091 signed by the Secretary of the Cabinet, Sir Robert Armstrong on April 8, 1982

167 James Rentschler's Falklands Diary

168 Freedman 2005 vol.2

169 PREM19/616 f165

more rigid. He emphasized withdrawal of military and security related forces; to get that step he thought the Argentines need to be convinced that they are not losing face in the process. At the same time, there must be a victory for principle. ... The Secretary said he wanted to find some approach that protected principle ...”¹⁷⁰

Secretary Haig suggests a three part solution involving – a) Argentine withdrawal, b) a return to the administrative *status quo* that had existed before the invasion, and c) a return to negotiations between Britain and Argentina. He adds that stages a) and b) would be supervised by an international body.

*“Maggie is having none of it. Her position – strongly supported by Defense Minister John Nott and Admiral of the Fleet Lord Terry Lewin, somewhat less so by Francis Pym – calls for the status quo ante, period. High color is in her cheeks, a note of rising indignation in her voice, she leans across the polished table and flatly rejects what she calls the “woolliness” of our second stage formulation, conceived in our view as a traditional face-saving ploy for Galtieri: “... Interim authority! – to do what? ...” Tough lady. ... Al Haig sits there, nervously tapping his leg and chain-smoking his Merits, but at the same time keeping his cool, trying to reason, ever so gently encouraging the Brits to think through the course on which they have embarked and to recognize the limits – as yet unspoken – beyond which the US cannot and will not go in its support of this staunchest of all our Western allies, ...”*¹⁷¹

*“Thatcher insisted the people have a right to stay on the Islands. The Secretary replied that was what he was seeking to achieve in conformity with the UN Charter. The Prime Minister said rights under the UN Charter were removed by force. She indicated the Secretary was suggesting the Argentines get by force what they failed to get before. The Secretary said his intention was to achieve withdrawal of the force, restoration of an administration that could guarantee the freedom of the people while negotiations go on. The Prime Minister said the people had everything they wanted before. She sought withdrawal and restoration of British administration— which merged with sovereignty. Then there could be negotiations. As a guardian of the Islanders' rights, she cannot put up something these people turned down, she said. ... The Secretary said principles would be preserved; but the only way to get the problem turned around in the short term is to achieve an interim arrangement on authority in the Island. ... The Secretary asked what happened if we don't find a solution and conflict develops. The Prime Minister said it had developed and was initiated by the Argentines. The first principle of America, she said, is the right to use force to recover your own home. Once British administration is restored of course Britain will negotiate. ... she could not tolerate their getting by force what they failed to get otherwise.”*¹⁷²

*“The Secretary assured the Prime Minister that the U.S. had no intention of forcing the UK to negotiate under duress. Nothing could be further from the truth. The U.S. stood by the UK, we were allied, we had already shown we were not treating the UK and Argentina as equals through our vote on UNSC 502. ... all we could do now was continue on to Buenos Aires and probe the Argentines. We would be sure to carry with us the message of British unity and resolve and convey to them the strength of feeling which exists over the Falklands dispute. The Secretary went on to say that in all frankness he felt the British should be fully aware of the many factors at play in the present crisis, including the substantial interests we have in the hemisphere and the potential for Soviet exploitation of the crisis.”*¹⁷³

170 *Foreign Relations of the United States: 1981-1988 vol.XIII: Conflict in the South Atlantic 1981 – 1984* p.162

171 *James Rentschler's Falklands Diary*

172 *Ibid* p.165

173 *Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Cable File, Falkland File 04/11/1982 (1)*

*“The British assessment after the meeting, ... was that Haig did now understand the strength of British feeling. Ideas on an interim administration were imprecise, and apparently largely geared to saving Argentine face... The only work that it seemed necessary to set in motion was on how Argentine withdrawal could be organised and supervised, supposing it could actually be secured. The American assessment was slightly different. There was no doubting the Prime Minister's resolve... Nor had she actually tried to persuade the Americans against going to Buenos Aires. By the end of the evening she was prepared to see advantages if Haig was able to bring home to the Argentines the potential consequences of their action... The Americans had also been struck by the sharpness of Thatcher's exchanges with Pym, indicating that the British Cabinet was not of one mind...”*¹⁷⁴

*“The gap between Margaret Thatcher's and Francis Pym's positions was immediately clear to the US Secretary of State, Alexander Haig, during his first visit to London as a mediator. He not only was astonished by the fact that Pym "went surprisingly far" in expressing his own strong dissent in the presence of the Prime Minister. Haig also underlined how the modest results obtained were reached "only after much effort by me with considerable help not appreciated by Mrs. Thatcher from Pym".”*¹⁷⁵

Haig reports to Reagan.

*“The Prime Minister has the bit in her teeth, owing to the politics of a unified nation and an angry Parliament, as well as her own convictions about the principles at stake. She is clearly prepared to use force, though she admits a preference for a diplomatic solution. She is rigid in her insistence on a return to the status quo ante, and indeed seemingly determined that any solution involve some retribution. ... All in all, we got no give in the basic British position ...”*¹⁷⁶

From Buenos Aires, the US Embassy telegrams its counterpart in London with a message for Haig.

*“Under Secretary Ros called me in this morning to discuss arrangements for the Secretary's visit. He complained about the harsh statements coming out of London ... He emphasized that the Foreign Ministry wants and has always wanted a negotiated solution. The problem is that Ros and Costa Mendez do not speak for the navy. We are getting ultra-tough sounds out of that quarter, including statements that the Secretary (Haig) should not come here ... feelings are running high in the navy. One bitter complaint is that the commandos failed to have complete surprise and thus took casualties ... because we had given the British advance intelligence obtained by 'satellite'.”*¹⁷⁷

At the United Nations, Argentine representative Eduardo Roca condemns the 200-mile maritime exclusion zone announced by the UK. He adds that his country is also entitled to exercise a right of defence under Art.51 of the UN Charter.

*“... Roca, denounced this as a blockade and so an act of aggression as defined in Article 3 (c) of General Assembly 3314 (XXXIX). The response was that this was not aggression as Britain was not the first to use force and could not blockade its own territory.”*¹⁷⁸

From Washington, Britain Ambassador Henderson reports to London.

174 Freedman 2005 vol.2

175 Bruni 2018 citing James Rentschlers *Falklands Diary* p.11

176 Reagan Library, *Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Latin America/Central, Falklands War [Cables 090131, 091000, 091154, 091640, 181715, 191650, 191754, 192115]*. This memo is dated April 9, 1982.

177 State Department No.093478

178 Freedman 2005 vol.2

*“There is an intense debate among the OAS delegations here, including the American one, about the legal questions involved in invoking the Rio Treaty. Some contend that the Falklands dispute falls outside the legislative (not geographic) scope of the Treaty others are reluctant to see the Treaty invoked lest it be used by Argentina to legitimize its invasion. ... To convene the OAS under the Rio Treaty and to pass a Resolution requiring action would need 15 to 16 votes which it (Argentina) is not at present finding it easy to obtain.”*¹⁷⁹

America’s *Washington Post* reports:

*“Argentina will have to give first, for Britain is determined, as it must be, that the English-speaking Falklanders choose their own fate and affiliation. At issue is not so much a disputed claim to abstract sovereignty as the principle of negotiated self-determination on which Britain's peaceful dissolution of the Empire has been based since World War II.”*¹⁸⁰

*“Margaret Thatcher had absolutely no doubts: since the United Kingdom held sovereignty over the Falkland Islands, the invasion constituted a manifest violation of international law, which in addition denied the will of the Islanders to remain under the Queen’s rule. This allowed Mrs. Thatcher to turn to positive advantage the element that had determined her own and her predecessors’ incapacity to resolve the Falklands problem: the right of the Islands’ inhabitants to decide their own destiny. It was necessary to re-establish the status quo, in order to guarantee the Falklanders’ rights of self-determination, and to demonstrate in the clearest terms that acting in an illegal and violent manner on the international scene would not bring any advantage. For the Conservative leader, the ongoing crisis went beyond the contingent episode involving an archipelago in the South Atlantic Ocean. In reality, it involved a much more important matter: the necessity for Western liberal democracies to demonstrate to any kind of dictatorship their ability and readiness to fight for the defence of their political values, without being tempted by forms of appeasement.”*¹⁸¹

*“The lunchtime news from the BBC said that there was to be a blockade round the islands as of 0400 Monday, this would be midnight Sunday to us as our time was 4 hours behind GMT... there is a Task Force on the way, and talks are ongoing between Argentina and the United Nations. It would soon be all over and they could go home and leave us with the serious business of getting on with our own lives our own way.”*¹⁸²

179 *PREMI9/615*. OAS = Organisation of American States

180 *The Washington Post* April 8, 1982

181 Bruni 2018

182 *Neville's Diary* from Bennett 2021

Day 8

April 9th – 3 Commando Brigade (Royal Marines) sails from England aboard SS *Canberra*.

In Brazil, the *Jornal do Brasil* publishes an editorial:

“We are on the edge of a confrontation. The fact that a powerful fleet was ready to sail after only 5 days preparation when the normal time for an operation of such scope is usually much greater, is a clear indication of English intentions. ... It is important, however, not to lose sight of the fact that there took place a violent action – and that any possibility of a successful outcome to any negotiations depends on the fact that acceptable satisfaction is given to the country that suffered the action – in this case England.... The possibility that Argentina could invoke, in its defence, the Rio Treaty, is fading away:... it cannot, because it was, in this case, the aggressor. ...”

US intelligence notes; “... the Argentines are reportedly lengthening the air strip in Port Stanley to accommodate A-4, MIRAGE, PUCARA, and C-130 aircraft and reinforcing the island with additional troops and air defence equipment...”

At Brasilia, a Cuban plane bound for Argentina is found to be loaded with electronic surveillance equipment.

Flying to Buenos Aires, Haig sends a message to President Reagan.

*“In it, he expanded on his assessment of Thatcher's outlook on the crisis, noting that "it is virtually as important to us" that Thatcher achieve "success" in this situation "for the principle at stake is central to your vision of international order, in addition to being in our strategic interest." Haig also observed: "The key question is whether I can bring back enough from the Argentines to convince her [Thatcher] that she has within reach a successful, peaceful solution. Obviously, if Galtieri accepts a political defeat it's the end of him. Just as Mrs. Thatcher must be able to show that Galtieri got nothing from his use of force, he must be able to show that he got something. Whether this rules out a diplomatic solution, or whether there is a narrow band in which some ambiguity will permit both parties a way out of their respective corners, I do not know." ...”*¹⁸³

In Buenos Aires, US envoy Vernon Walters speaks to President Galtieri.

“I explained that I came at Secretary Haig's request to convey privately some thoughts to consider before our general discussion later in the evening. We understood that President Galtieri had unified his people in a way none of his predecessors could. His mandate in the Malvinas affair is clearly broad and sound. If we can resolve the matter without war, Galtieri will go down in Argentine history as the man who reconquered the Malvinas Islands without firing a shot. He will be perceived as a leader of the free world and a man of peace. If his government accepts a proposal that is recognized as reasonable and fair his place in history is secure even if the British reject it. A war between Argentina and England will serve only the Soviets and their allies. ...

*If he would not insist upon having his own governor, we would insist that the negotiations conclude by December 31, 1982 and in a manner to suit his domestic needs. Both sides must make concessions if peace is to continue. History, however, seems to favor the Argentines. The matter has been pending for 130 years and has now come to a head. An interim arrangement can hardly be seen as anything other than progress for Argentina. ... The Argentine choice today is to accept a half loaf now and wait to gain the rest in a year or to face a war. We are working on a draft we hope he will find acceptable. President Galtieri replied, “Walters, the one thing you cannot ask me to do is to haul down the Argentine flag. If I do that, I will be kicked out of this building. You must work out something that does not leave me empty-handed.”*¹⁸⁴

183 *Foreign Relations of the United States: 1981-1988 vol.XIII: Conflict in the South Atlantic 1981 – 1984* p.171

184 *Department of State, Executive Secretariat, Files of Alexander M. Haig, Jr., 1981–1982, Lot 82D370, (2)*

Secretary Haig arrives in Argentina at 10pm local time. He is greeted at the airport by Foreign Minister Costa Méndez before moving on to the city of Buenos Aires.¹⁸⁵

*“... the local patriots are waving their blue-and-white flags and chanting AR-GEN-TIN-A AR-GEN-TIN-A!”*¹⁸⁶

*“Many people carried signs, some in English, for the benefit of foreign television cameras: "We are people of peace / Death to Margaret's army. " Another said: "Goodbye Queen / God save Argentina. The more severe nationalists had written: "English, pirates, Masons, infidels, go home. " And some jumped and chanted: "No cabe duda I no cabe duda / la reina de Inglaterra Es la reina más boluda" ("There is no doubt / There is no doubt / The Queen of England / Is the biggest jerk of all").”*¹⁸⁷

*“Haig arrived in Argentina late in the evening of 9 April to a mass demonstration organised for his benefit. The Argentine Government was determined that the United States should be aware not only of the strength of patriotic feeling in Argentina, but also the extent to which support for Britain would jeopardise its position in Latin America.”*¹⁸⁸

Day 9

April 10th – in Moscow, *Pravda* reports.

“The times when disputes could be settled by gunboat diplomacy are gone ... it is clear that Britain is responsible for the consequences of this reckless policy, for it is precisely Britain that over many years stubbornly refused to carry out UN decisions on decolonization.”

Europe's Economic Committee (EEC) approve sanctions against Argentine imports for one month.

“The Ten have discussed the serious situation arising from the invasion of the Falkland Islands by Argentina.

The Ten recall that, by their statement of 2 April, they condemned the flagrant violation of international law constituted by the armed action of Argentina.

The Ten remain deeply concerned by the continuation of this crisis which endangers international peace and security. They therefore attach the greatest importance to the effective and immediate implementation of Security Council resolution 502 in all its aspects, namely, the cessation of hostilities, the immediate withdrawal of all Argentine forces from the Islands and the search, by the Governments of Argentina and the United Kingdom, for a diplomatic solution.

To these ends, and in a spirit of solidarity among the countries members of the Community, the Ten decide to take a series of measures with respect to Argentina which it is important to carry out as soon as possible.

In this connexion, the Governments of the Ten have already decided to apply a total embargo on the exports of arms and military equipment to Argentina.

They will also take the necessary measures to prohibit all imports of Argentine origin into the Community.”

185 No record of this conversation survives.

186 *James Rentschler's Falklands Diary*

187 *Graham-Yool 2007*

188 *Freedman 2005 vol.2*

As these measures are of an economic nature, they will be taken in accordance with the relevant provisions of the treaties of the Community.

*As the situation arising from the invasion of the Falkland Islands by the Argentine armed forces is a matter of serious concern for the international community as a whole, the Ten call upon other Governments to associate themselves with their decisions in order to ensure, within the shortest possible time, the full implementation of Security Council resolution 502.”*¹⁸⁹

*“The third aspect of our pressure against Argentina has been economic. We have been urging our friends and allies to take action parallel to our own, and we have achieved a heartening degree of success. The most significant measure has been the decision of our nine partners in the European Community to join us not just in an arms embargo but also in stopping all imports from Argentina. This is a very important step, unprecedented in its scope and the rapidity of the decision. Last year about a quarter of all Argentina's exports went to the European Community. The effect on Argentina's economy of this measure will therefore be considerable and cannot be without influence on her leaders in the present crisis. I should like warmly to thank our European partners for rallying to our support. It was an effective demonstration of Community solidarity. The decision cannot have been easy for our partners, given the commercial interests at stake, but they were the first to realise that if aggression were allowed to succeed in the Falkland Islands, it would be encouraged the world over.”*¹⁹⁰

*“... most EEC members were willing to support Britain with sanctions prior to military engagement, as long as they were assured that the rest of the Community would act in the same manner. ... Since the EEC accounted for approximately 20 percent of Argentina's exports, a Community-wide ban on imports could, politician's believed, put intense economic pressure on Buenos Aires.”*¹⁹¹

*“As it took time to sort out all the legal aspects of the ban, the sanctions did not come into effect until 17 April, and were to last, initially, for four weeks. Most member States were unlikely to authorise further export credits under the circumstances. The provision of new loans was also unlikely.”*¹⁹²

In London, the legality of the maritime exclusion zone around the Falklands, is considered.

“The General Assembly's definition of aggression (contained in Resolution 3314 (XXIX) recalls that it is for the Security Council, in accordance with Article 39 of the Charter, to determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of peace or act of aggression.

Article 2 of the definition states that - "The first use of armed force by a State in contravention of the Charter shall constitute prima facie evidence of an act of aggression." Resolution 502 (1982) adopted by the Security Council on 3 April 1982 referred to - "an invasion on 2 April 1982 by armed forces of Argentina" - and went on to determine that a breach of the peace existed ...

Article 3(a) of the definition states that - "the invasion ... by the armed forces of a State, of the territory of another State" - qualifies as an act of aggression.

Accordingly, a true reading of the definition of aggression together with resolution 502 (1982) leads inexorably to the conclusion that it is Argentina which is committing aggression by its invasion and first use of force in defiance of the appeal made by the President of the Security Council on behalf of the Council on 1 April 1982 (S/14944).

189 UN Document S/14976 of April 14, 1982

190 HC Deb 14 April 1982 vol.21 cc1148-1149

191 *Institutions and Cooperation: Sanctions during the Falkland islands Conflict* L. L. Martin 1992

192 Freedman 2005 vol.2

Moreover, Resolution 502(1982) leaves no doubt that it is Argentina which bears responsibility for the current breach of the peace in the region. ...

Article 3(c) of the definition of aggression lists - "the blockade of the ... coasts of a State by the armed forces of another State" – as an example of aggression. ...

*The UK is not "another State" because the maritime exclusion zone surrounds British territory.”*¹⁹³

At Ascension Island, HMS Antrim leads the first group of Royal Navy ships into the anchorage.

In the Falkland Islands, letters start to appear addressed to Argentine conscripts.

*“Dear Friend, Argentine Soldier – From the depths of my heart, today I send you these few lines and hope that as you receive them you find yourself in very good health. I hope that in defending our sovereignty you do it for the love of God and love for the Motherland. Every day we pray that God help you and that it might end soon, we are proud of you.”*¹⁹⁴

*“... among many examples is the corny, sentimental song popularized during the Falkland/Malvinas war, "Las Hermanitas Perdidas" ("The lost little sisters"). In terms of the fallacious discourse, the Falklands/Malvinas Islands are "sisters" of the "great Argentine family." This metaphor helps to consolidate a culture in which very few people think seriously and honestly about the people who inhabit the islands, at least as a priority issue. And the human rights or the right to self-determination of the Falkland Islanders becomes a laughable consideration when what is at stake is the amputation of one of the nation's hands or feet. One does not abandon a little sister who has been abducted and raped by perfid(ious) Albion. The call is to a holy war.”*¹⁹⁵

In Buenos Aires, during an initial meeting at the Casa Rosada, President Galtieri explains to Secretary Haig why Argentina sees itself as justified in its action.

“Since 1833 when the British took the Malvinas Islands by force, the Argentines have never ceased to claim sovereignty and to demand their return. The United Nations in 1965 recommended negotiations between the two powers in order to accomplish the transfer of sovereignty to Argentina. The United Kingdom accepted under the framework of decolonization. The Argentines tried for the next 17 years, by every possible means, to convince the British government to arrive at a solution. The British have never conducted any substantial discussions concerning the transfer of sovereignty of the territorial integration of the Malvinas into Argentina. No one can accuse the Argentines of a lack of patience or prudence throughout this period. Unlike the United Kingdom, the Argentines have not used diplomatic legerdemain and evasion.

The Argentine claims are and have always been clear. We are patient, but patience, like water, can run out. We now face a crisis initiated perhaps by Argentina but aggravated by the over-reaction of the United Kingdom government. The British reaction to the Argentine occupation of the Malvinas is out of all proportion to the Argentine action. ... I will talk to you about something quite frankly that the Argentine government does not like, and that is the furnishing of intelligence to Great Britain and the use of Ascension Islands for supply for the British. ... The measures taken by Mrs. Thatcher are creating a delicate domestic situation for us. Her statements lack balance. We want to help her to achieve a balanced position. ... The Argentine people tend to react instinctively and emotionally. I must lead them to a solution which will not recreate an Argentina of the 1940s. Our crisis today can easily result in the destabilization of South America and thereby weaken the defense of the West.

193 PREM 19/616 Telegram No. 440 of 10 April

194 Child 2008. Mostly from school children, and obviously dictated – many examples were found after the surrender.

195 Foreign Policy Theory in Menem's Argentina Carlos Escude 1997 p.44

The Argentine people took the decision on the second of April to recover our legitimate heritage. Our fleet and five thousand Marines acted. If the British want to send an expedition, we will receive this anachronistic colonial expedition with the appropriate honors..."¹⁹⁶

Denying that the USA has furnished intelligence or satellite information to the British, Haig responds.

*"... he had watched over the years with special concern the valiant struggle of the Argentine people against the dark forces of Marxism and radicalism. "Too often in my own country people forget the basic stake that we have is a fundamental struggle that is going on in the world against the threat of Russian and Marxist imperialists. We are grateful for the direction in which Argentina is moving." ... Today the same vital struggle continues in Central America. I know the President understands the character of this struggle and understands the essential character of the partnership which we have forged in recent months. We cannot allow this to be broken up by a "thousand Scottish shepherds." ..."*¹⁹⁷

President Galtieri assures Haig that he is prepared to negotiate anything and everything – except sovereignty.

*"Secretary Haig said perhaps he should now speak in specific terms. The first thing to be done is to break the ultimative character of Margaret Thatcher's proposals. We must find an integrated comprehensive program based on the UN resolution which includes simultaneous withdrawal, creation of a zone excluding UK forces, an interim administration, perhaps with an international entity of some sort to break the umbilical line of control from London to the islands, recognition of autonomy or local government or local institutions that will permit avoiding, from the Argentine point of view, appearing to return to the status quo ante. General Galtieri said that this would be very difficult. ... (and added) that with regard to the cessation of hostilities, the withdrawal of the Argentine fleet, and armed forces there are two points. He said there is one problem he could not see how to resolve. It is the question of the government of the islands. He was really regretful but the government must be Argentine with whatever entity the UN, the British, the US, or the Canadians might set up until normalization. The Argentines are prepared to offer the British facilities of every sort to join in developing the resources of the seabed, resources of fishing, for refuelling British naval ships or aircraft; but Argentina is not disposed to step back from what it considers to be its rights."*¹⁹⁸

Galtieri agrees to a further meeting later that evening, to allow the negotiating teams some time to draw up

proposals. Haig is persuaded to return to his hotel by helicopter, so that he can see the crowds gathered in the Plaza de Mayo.



*"...given the pitch of jingoistic sentiment whipped up hereabouts, I can't possibly see how he (Galtieri) is going to walk this cat back – a fact which adds to the pessimism I already felt anent our mission's prospects starting back in London..."*¹⁹⁹

*"The Secretary of State was frankly alarmed: the combination of Argentine-style demonstrations and men like Galtieri evoked fearful memories of Hitler and Mussolini."*²⁰⁰

196 Quoted in *Foreign Relations of the United States: 1981-1988 vol XIII: Conflict in the South Atlantic 1981 – 1984* pp.184-190

197 *Ibid.*

198 *Ibid.*

199 James Rentschler's *Falklands Diary*

200 Cardoso, Kirschboom & van der Kooy 1983 p.144

*“... a popular demonstration was planned to fill the Plaza de Mayo with the aim of demonstrating to the American envoy and international public opinion, the unity of the Argentines around the Falklands issue. Organized by the metropolitan radio station with the largest audience (Radio Rivadavia) and by ATC, the initiative was supported by political and trade union leaders, the newspapers published maps of the Buenos Aires center to facilitate access to The Square and, in order to achieve a massive turnout at the event, the public transport was provided free of charge that day.”*²⁰¹

Haig telegrams Thatcher noting “intense discussions” and urging that any military confrontation be avoided.

President Galtieri speaks to the rally in the Plaza de Mayo.

“The people of Britain have not yet heard a single word of attack or a single word outraging their honour and reputation, until now. I ask as President of the Nation to the English Government and the English people to moderate their expressions and show restraint in their actions. This Argentine Government together with the Argentine people, represented here in this meeting, will be very angry and will reply with strong emphasis if you continue to offend us. You know and the world knows that the Argentine people have a strong will. If they want to come, come and we will offer battle.”

*“... supporting a military action vindicating a claim that seemed to go beyond any political positioning, was not synonymous with support for the PRN, the Junta or Galtieri. That is why when the latter addressed those present and invoked himself as “president of the nation” he was booed, he must have noticed it.”*²⁰²

President Galtieri receives the Cuban Ambassador, Emillio Aragones Navarro at the Presidential residence. Aragones conveys from Fidel Castro an offer for Cuban troops to fly to the Falklands, in support of the Argentine garrison there.

*“However, Argentinean leader General Galtieri turned down the offer because he feared it would turn Ronald Reagan's US administration against him.”*²⁰³

From London, Prime Minister Thatcher responds to Haig's call for restraint.

*“I should certainly prefer to avoid military confrontation. But Argentina is the aggressor, and is still trying to build up the occupying force in the Falklands. The right way to prevent naval incidents is therefore for Argentina to remove all her naval vessels from the maritime exclusion zone. The Argentine Government has had plenty of warning. I am sure that you will have impressed this point upon the Argentine leaders.”*²⁰⁴

Haig, resuming talks with Galtieri and Méndez, is presented with their “minimum requirements.”

*“In the eyes of the State Department officials, the only thing to emerge as a half-hearted sign of flexibility was the fact that the draft memorandum suggested that Argentina would accept a British refusal to recognise its claims of sovereignty prior to negotiations. For compensation, the document contained provisions to ensure that the ... form of administration during this transition period should guarantee effective control by Buenos Aires.”*²⁰⁵

201 Carbone 2008

202 *Ibid.*

203 *Revealed: Tyrant Fidel Castro wanted to bomb British Ships in Falklands War* Steven Taylor in *The Sunday Express*, December 4, 2016

204 *Foreign Relations of the United States: 1981-1988 vol XIII: Conflict in the South Atlantic 1981 – 1984* p.193

205 Cardoso, Kirschboom & van der Kooy 1983

*“Argentina's position, as Haig discovered..., was that sovereignty over the islands was not negotiable. Moreover, the British fleet must turn away from the Falklands area before any Argentine forces would withdraw. However, once the British withdrew their naval task force, talks could begin that could discuss everything except sovereignty.”*²⁰⁶

Day 10

April 11th – in London, interviewed on BBC radio, Foreign Secretary Francis Pym is asked whether Argentine shipping will be sunk if found within the Falklands' exclusion zone. Pym replies; *“That is the position.”*

From Montevideo, information is received from the Swiss *charge d'affairs*, that the 22 Royal Marines, and three civilians, captured on South Georgia, are being moved. Their destination is unknown.

*“It was assumed that one reason why Argentina had repatriated British prisoners so quickly was to frustrate ICRC attempts to get to the Islands.”*²⁰⁷

In the USA, US Permanent Representative to the United Nations, Jeane Kirkpatrick, is interviewed on national television. Kirkpatrick says that she does not see a need for the US to make a choice between Argentina and Britain, and that the only appropriate action is for the US to help both countries avoid war. She goes on to state that the US has never taken a position on the Falklands, adding; *“... that if the islands rightly belonged to Argentina its action could not be considered as 'armed aggression'.”*²⁰⁸

Peru calls for a 72 hour truce; *“In order to avoid ... a serious threat to international peace and security.”*

HMS *Plymouth* and RFA *Tidespring* sail from Ascension, with HMS *Antrim* due to follow when unloaded. Designated TG 317.9, their orders are to sail towards South Georgia to rendezvous with *Endurance*.

At the Falklands, increasing numbers of Argentine troops continue to arrive.

*“... we are told that 9,000 are here now. Hardly seems possible but I think probably true. They are in tents as far out as Mount William, out along the Darwin Road and all over the Common towards Eliza Cove and Mullett Creek. God help them when the weather breaks. ... It has now been announced by the military that any soldier asking the civilian population for food will be shot. The civilian population may, however, give food if they wish.”*²⁰⁹

*“Malcolm made his milk deliveries to customers in a former military Land Rover. He was told by the Argentine authorities to paint an identifying mark on the doors. So, being a good Yorkshireman, of course he painted the White Rose on the door panels, and they stayed there right through the occupation.”*²¹⁰

From Buenos Aires, Secretary Haig sends a message to the White House for President Reagan.

“I have concluded nearly twelve hours of gruelling and emotion filled talks with President Galtieri and his Foreign Minister, amidst a public mood approaching frenzy. The proposals I introduced here were accepted in large part, except with regard to the pivotal question of interim governing arrangements... and Argentine insistence on an early date certain for completion of negotiations on a final settlement.

206 Bratton P. & Thies W. 2011 p.8

207 Freedman 2005 vol.2. ICRC = International Committee of the Red Cross

208 PREM19/616

209 Diary entry in Smith 1984 p.54

210 *Neville's Diary* in Bennett 2021

*These two issues will have to be resolved in order to trigger Argentine withdrawal and thus avert war. We made some progress on these issues, though very probably not enough to secure British agreement. The Argentines began by demanding that they, in effect, administer the island in the interim period, and that the British agree a priori that the outcome of the ensuing negotiations would provide for a transfer of sovereignty. In the end, we came up with a formula that would involve interim U.S.-UK-Argentine tripartite supervision of local administration, and we have blurred the question of whether the negotiations would result in Argentine sovereignty. We have specified December 31, 1982, as the date for completion of negotiations... At one point late in the day the Argentines returned to their demand for sovereignty, ... I am not optimistic ... ”*²¹¹

Haig then telegrams Thatcher.

“... I now expect to arrive in London about 0630 am Monday April 12. ... In the meantime, I am sure you would agree that any military confrontation must be avoided at all costs until you have been able to consider this draft proposal. Although it is clear serious problems remain; some progress has been made.”

*“Haig's request for restraint had in fact come at an awkward moment. As Haig well knew, the MEZ (exclusion zone) was about to come into force and in principle submarines might start attacking Argentine ships... If the new orders were implemented just as Haig was stepping off his plane, then it would appear, whatever the intention, as a serious rebuff and could have damaging political consequences internationally... There was a further problem. It might seem the easiest thing to send an order to an SSN to hold fire, but when the FCO first made investigations... they were told that, unfortunately, it took some 30 hours to be sure of communicating with SSNs... the Prime Minister did not make any promises.”*²¹²

About to depart for London, Secretary Haig is met at the airport by Foreign Minister Costa Méndez.

*“At the airport, ... Costa Méndez handed me a paper. It contained some personal thoughts of his own, he said. He hoped that I would read them on the plane. Aloft, I scanned the paper Costa Méndez had given me. It constituted a retreat from everything we had accomplished at the Casa Rosada the night before. The Argentinians were demanding either de facto authority over the islands through administrative arrangements that would give them immediate control of its government, or a British promise that sovereignty would be transferred to Argentina no later than December 31, 1982, regardless of the outcome of negotiations. This was a formula for war.”*²¹³

*“They were not aware that Haig thought he had a major concession. To the extent Haig did think this he was soon disabused.”*²¹⁴



Haig and Costa Mendez

211 Reagan Library, Executive Sec., NSC Country File, Latin America/Central, Argentina (04/11/1982–04/14/1982)

212 Freedman 2005 vol.2

213 Foreign Relations of the United States: 1981-1988 vol.XIII: Conflict in the South Atlantic 1981 – 1984 p.195

214 Freedman 2005 vol.2

Day 11

April 12th – at 0400 Britain's declared 200 mile maritime exclusion zone around the Falkland Islands archipelago, comes into effect.

*“... defined as a circle of 200 nautical miles from Latitude 51° 41' South and longitude 59° 39' West, approximately the centre of the Islands. The advantage of a circle was precision, although it did mean that some parts of the Islands were only 100 miles from the edge.”*²¹⁵

In Buenos Aires, the *La Prensa* newspaper announces that Peruvian armed forces have been put on alert to assist Argentina. This is quickly denied by Peruvian government in Lima.²¹⁶

Just prior to landing at Heathrow airport near London, Haig sends a radio message to Thatcher.

*“... our conversations have revealed tentative cracks in the Argentine stone wall on the withdrawal of military forces and the restoration of British administration... We are more than ever convinced that an Anglo-Argentine War would severely damage Western interests in containing Soviet expansionism.”*²¹⁷

Secretary Haig arrives in Britain's capital city to be greeted with the information that there are 34 Soviet fishing vessels in the area of the Falkland Islands; providing intelligence to the Soviet Union.²¹⁸

At the first of three meetings with Thatcher's team, Haig describes events in Buenos Aires.

*“The approach I took in BA was true to our discussion here. I was brutally frank with them. I said the UK was ready for war and that the nation was united. I said this was inevitable if Galtieri did not alter course. He was not bellicose but he has whipped up the people almost out of hand, though many of them are more pacific than jingoistic. The air force is fearful, the army is moderate, and the navy wants a fight. Your pressure has worked. There is an undercurrent of fear down there. The basic problem is that the threat of force alone is not enough to bring about withdrawal. Your fleet could be down there a long time. I think what they will try to do is run the blockade with Eastern European and Soviet ships. We have worked up proposals that they may be willing to accept. ... Every effort we made in BA was to support your aims: (1) withdrawal of the Argentines; (2) restoration of British administration; (3) preservation of self-determination. It was ideal for me to stop here first. The Argentines were totally intransigent. They wanted Argentine rule or a commitment on sovereignty within a fixed, short period. We brought them a long way. If they could confirm our final ideas, your needs would be met. The basic concept we have developed necessarily provides for some Argentine presence and a commitment on negotiations... but they pulled back. ...”*²¹⁹

*“Questioned by Thatcher, Haig agreed that Argentina probably was trying to seek practical arrangements that would enable them to change the character of the Falkland Islands, but he did not think that they could get very far by the end of 1982... If he could reach an agreement with Britain then he proposed to fly back to Buenos Aires. The meeting ended at 1100 to enable the British Government to consider the American text.”*²²⁰

Following the meeting, at 1545 the War Cabinet meet to discuss the American proposals. British and American teams reconvene at 1755.

215 *Ibid.*

216 The Peruvian government had little control over its armed forces.

217 Quoted in Freedman 2005 vol.2

218 See PREM19/616 f165, PREM19/617 f221, PREM19/617 f227 and PREM19/617 f189

219 *Department of State, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, Miscellaneous Files, March 1981–February 1983, Lot 83D210, D. Gompert.*

220 Freedman 2005 vol.2

*“... in the middle of the Brit team the Iron Maiden is really toughening up her already robust talk, especially on the question of the fleet standing off: “Unthinkable, that is our only leverage, I cannot possibly give it up at this point, one simply doesn’t trust burglars who have tried once to steal your property! No, Al, no, absolutely not, the fleet must steam on!” In this gutsy recital she is getting vigorous support from her Defense Minister, John Nott, who believes the Brits have already gone too far down Haig’s diplomatic track. “I wouldn’t do it, Prime Minister, I’m against it, we’ve really conceded too much as it is.” Thanks, John, you’re a great help – particularly now that you’ve got poor old Pym wringing his hands in anguish, the only British peace party we seem to have in this room! The spark of optimism which may have been generated earlier in the day looks pretty well snuffed in this session, ...”*²²¹

*“Haig did want the Task Force to stop and stand off, though not turn back, once the agreements were signed. The Prime Minister insisted that she would not survive in the Commons if the Task Force stopped before Argentina had completed its withdrawal... There was no basis of trust... The meeting ended at 2030.”*²²²

From London, Haig telegrams the US Embassy in Buenos Aires with messages for Galtieri and Méndez.

*“I have introduced ideas here along the lines discussed at the Presidential Palace Saturday night. ... The talks have been exceedingly difficult, but some progress has been made. I hope to leave here this evening for Buenos Aires, arriving around mid-afternoon tomorrow. Time is of the essence. The British will not withhold the use of force in the exclusion zone unless and until there is an agreement. I hope to bring to Buenos Aires a US proposal that holds the prospect of agreement, thus averting war. I urge you to hold off on any decisions until I have a chance to present the proposal. I am convinced that any substantial deviation by your government from the ideas discussed on Saturday night will doom this mission.”*²²³

Legal advice presented to the Cabinet confirms that no formal declaration of war is necessary.

*“War may begin, first, by a declaration of war. Second, it may begin after the commission of an act of force against another State which that State elects to regard as creating a state of war. We did not so elect following the invasion of the Falkland Islands but are relying instead on our inherent right of self-defence.”*²²⁴

Washington’s Ambassador in Buenos Aires informs Haig that Méndez is denying that negotiations have taken place; describing the talks with Haig as merely as “conversations.” Annoyed, Haig telephones Méndez.

“(Méndez) Let’s take things as they stand today. Our point – where we have control of the island – and then we can discuss self-determination and by the end of the year when all other points are decided on and we are assured self-determination will be granted by the end of the year, and then we can have a different way of governing the island. In order to comply with the solution, we will retreat from the islands by the end of April. Then, an interim government could be discussed along the lines you mentioned.

(Haig) I think that is very, very different from the conditions under which we started this talk – at least on which the U.S. entered the process.

221 James Rentschler’s Falklands Diary

222 Ibid

223 Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Cable File, Falkland File 04/12/1982 (1)

224 OD(SA)(82) 8 April 12, 1982 Formal Consequences of a State of war between the United Kingdom and Argentina:

Note by the Secretaries. In the UK, the formal method of declaring war is by proclamation, passed under the Great Seal.

(Méndez) It is the only thing that would constitute the same situation as before the 2nd of April. Even public opinion in Argentina is this.

(Haig) I think we have understood from the beginning – that is why substantial change was discussed in your place and here today. It is just patently impossible for us to go along a route where a priori it is decided this is concluded as a consequence of the actions of the earlier part of this month.

(Méndez) If Britain doesn't give us any assurance concerning transfer but, on the contrary, insists on discussion, what is our decision then? Where are we?

(Haig) The only thing Britain has been firm on is self-determination. Everything else is very, very easy. I thought I made it clear down there. How you will show that would be very clear in my view after another 9 months.

(Méndez) I am absolutely sure if this discussion were held ... Britain has retreated every year from what they said the year before. In 1968, when the document was drafted, they retreated. What are the assurances we could have? ... An Argentine island will be governed by an Argentine governor – if that is not done, the public reaction will be in a very negative way. We cannot tell them there were two governors and a committee and then we will discuss self-determination after all the risks we have taken. ... Mr. Secretary, I think you have witnessed the best good will possible. We have analyzed it with open mindedness. ...

(Haig) I think you have answered my question. I am in the position that the only alternative is to suspend this effort. We would stand by to be helpful if there is some interest in what I call negotiating solutions, but I don't see any. You answered in a way I hoped you wouldn't. No progress is not good enough. I hardly consider that a diplomatic solution.... This forces me to tell my President we are given an ultimatum.

(Méndez) I don't think this is an ultimatum if you bear in mind all the collateral offers we are making in order to give to the people on the Island. We mustn't forget the ultimate aim of this exercise. England has always fought. England at one time will be compelled to relinquish something. The whole idea in the UN came when Britain presented a list of places to be decolonized. Britain's list included the Falkland Islands. When we saw in the list the name of the Falkland Islands, then our presentation was made to the UN. This was created by Britain herself. We don't see why they would retreat now when they were the first to include it in the list of countries or colonies to be decolonized. I'm sorry to hear from you this is an ultimatum. On the contrary, we are ready to consider every aspect of lives and properties of the Island and of ourselves. ... What is the real difference that has not been reached yet.

(Haig) I think it is significant that you now insist on unilateral solution on the Island and on an interim solution in which the US engages to keep peace and being sure our relationships, which have taken a new and positive turn, will go sour; which will ultimately happen. That is a tragedy for both of us... Is there any sense in my coming down there and discussing this matter further?

(Méndez) I'm afraid you have to ask yourself. You know our position. We are willing to receive you; we are happy with you; we are optimistic about the possibility of discussion. You know our position.

(Haig) Then, you are giving an ultimatum.... You are saying 'come, if I am ready to give what you insist you must have.' That means there is no chance in coming, and that is clearly what I will have to say to the public in my own country.

(Méndez) We have made an offer. We haven't received the best answer to our position.

(Haig) I think you say take it or leave it – that is shorthand for an ultimatum.

(Méndez) I feel it is too early to negotiate.

(Haig) I am not dealing with that. I finished 12 hours with them.

(Méndez) To put it in other words, if you don't think there is room for continuing negotiations, I can't force you to continue.

(Haig) You are saying total sovereignty in 9 months or total control of the Island. ... This will be interpreted as insistence on your way totally – after you have applied force. We could realize every objective you are seeking with some clever drafting and clever negotiating, and some give and take. I can't see how it could ever be realized by insistence that it be black and white.

(Méndez) You know our position.

(Haig) I must admit I did not leave your country knowing it.

(Méndez) Our position has been very clearly stated.

(Haig) I made it clear in your country that would be grounds for not coming in the first place, with a clear indication that would not be the case. You have departed from the assurances which I had going into the negotiations. I must say it was the feeling of my colleague and myself.

(Méndez) I don't think it compares with my notes.

(Haig) I don't understand. We have ourselves in a very difficult position. ... think it is a tragedy if you tell me no negotiating can be done; then, you see, I am in an untenable position to try to be of help, and that is all I am trying to do. I am very happy to come down there under circumstances similar to the conditions I started on Friday. We are willing as rational men to craft some language that constitutes a political solution. ... ”²²⁵

Haig reports his conversation with Méndez to Britain's Foreign Secretary, Francis Pym.

“I have been on the phone with this lad for about an hour. He quibbles right and left. On the one hand, he says we cannot break this off; he would send somebody to London or he will come to Washington. On the other, he doesn't change his ultimatum at all.”²²⁶

At 2155, Haig speaks to Thatcher on the telephone.

“The Prime Minister urged that, if the ultimatum was still in place, then Washington should let it be known publicly why the effort to find a diplomatic solution had collapsed. Haig agreed.”²²⁷

A further conversation takes place between Haig and Méndez, before Haig informs Thatcher that he is undecided about flying back to Buenos Aires and will sleep on it.

At Stanley, the Argentine Governor announces military exercises for the new troops.

“A new flagpole has been erected outside the Secretariat to replace the one blown down a few days ago. It was made by our locals in the dockyard, who have cleverly arranged the band supporting the stays so far up the pole that it is impossible to fly anything larger than a very small flag from it.”²²⁸

225 Department of State, Executive Secretariat, Files of Alexander M. Haig, Jr., 1981–1982, Lot 82D370, (2)

226 Ibid.

227 Freedman 2005 vol.2

228 Diary entry in Smith 1984 pp.57-58

*“It's official: the Falklands are a war zone as of 0400 hrs. Started doing a pile of washing, but something went wrong with the machine so ended up at the hospital with the girls doing some. Early night, must have been the excess of gin in the system!”*²²⁹

From Buenos Aires, Argentina's government writes to the UN Secretary-General; *“(Announcing)... its readiness to withdraw its forces as called for under the 3 April Council resolution, on condition that the United Kingdom ceased hostilities and did not attempt to use the resolution to justify a return to the previous colonial situation...”*

In the South Atlantic, British submarine, HMS *Spartan*, arrives on station.



Day 12

April 13th – New Zealand bans all imports from, and exports to, Argentina.

In London, the American and British negotiators meet again.

*“... he had heard overnight from the Argentine Foreign Minister that his Government needed an outcome to the negotiations which embodied a de facto change in the administration of the Islands and a process leading to ultimate Argentine sovereignty. ... the proposal for an interim Commission did not represent a sufficient degree of change towards de facto Argentine administration. The provision for negotiations on the definitive status of the Islands was inadequate as a commitment to ultimate Argentine sovereignty.”*²³⁰

Haig relates his conversations with Ménde and outlines the five points that the Argentines are insisting upon. 1. The governor of the islands must be appointed by the Argentine government. The Argentine flag should continue to be flown on the islands; 2. Assurances should be given to the Argentine Government that at the end of negotiations there will be a recognition of Argentine sovereignty. Any formulation implying that sovereignty is being negotiated should be avoided; 3. Equal rights should be recognised for Argentines coming from the mainland as for the inhabitants of the islands; 4. The agreement on demilitarisation should be considered as complying with Resolution 502 of the United Nations Security Council; 5. The draft agreement should be made compatible with the above mentioned elements.

*“Costa Mendez had implied that the first two of these points were the most important, and Argentina needed at least one of them.”*²³¹

The London meeting ends at 1040. PM Thatcher considers the implications of Haig's information.

“By this stage it was becoming obvious that the proposals the Americans had presented to us the previous day had no measure of Argentine approval. In fact, the status of all these proposals was doubtful. The more closely I questioned Al Haig on this point, the more uncertain it became. Since these proposals had not been agreed by the Argentinians, even if we accepted them, they might therefore not form the basis of a settlement. ... This fact was made painfully clear at the meeting that morning when Mr Haig handed us a document embodying five points which he described as essential to the Argentine

229 Valerie's Diary in Bennett 2021

230 PREM19/617 f189

231 Freedman 2005 vol.2

position. As he himself said, the practical effect of the Argentine tactics was to buy time. I always thought that this was their main purpose in negotiating. I was becoming impatient with all this. I said this was essentially an issue of dictatorship versus democracy. Galtieri wanted to be able to claim victory by force of arms. The question now was whether he could be diverted from his course by economic sanctions or, as I suspected all along, only by military force.

*Mr Haig replied that he had made it abundantly clear to Argentina that if a conflict developed the United States would side with Britain. But did he wish to bring negotiations to an end today? He could say publicly that he was suspending his own efforts, making it clear that this was due to Argentine intransigence. But if he did so other less helpful people might try to intervene. I was keenly aware of that and I also felt that public opinion here required us not to give up on negotiations yet.”*²³²

Secretary Haig considers his next move.

*“There appeared to be no point in Haig returning to Buenos Aires unless he could take assurances on these matters, yet he also did not want to break off talks. Thatcher did not push for an immediate break, although she had a strong case for doing so. Instead she asked for definite progress to be registered ‘this week.’”*²³³

Secretary Haig and Minister Mendez speak again on the telephone.²³⁴

“(Méndez) We have been working the whole night. I have a formula. What would you like me to do?”

(Haig) Can you give me an idea what it contains. I have been waiting until I spoke with you before I speak to the press.

(Méndez) We will yield.. add “both parties affirm absolute sovereignty on the Island, but the British will relinquish their claim in the UN.” The interim period would be by government along the lines we discussed.

(Haig) The interim period would be along the lines we discussed?

(Méndez) Provided Britain says she will decolonize the Islands as announced in the UN. ...

(Haig) That offers some possibilities. What about in the context of self- determination. Would that then come in?

(Méndez) The General Assembly has ruled out self-determination in the case of the Malvinas. We can imagine some sort of minority status for the Islands in the meantime.

(Haig) Let me consider this. ...”

At 1240 Haig informs Pym of his conversation with Méndez. Pym promises to consider the matter; *“... if the Secretary of State believed that the Argentine suggestion was an opportunity to keep the dialogue going it was difficult for them to call a halt.”*²³⁵

“... a call from Costa Mendez suggests a tiny crack of Argentine daylight – language from some 1960 General Assembly resolution on decolonization which the UK had not voted against, merely abstained on, and which fudges the basic sovereignty/self-determination issues – and Foreign Secretary Pym is on his way over to the hotel to confer with Haig on this development. Who knows what's going to happen next? Pym, when we next meet him in the noisy little corner room at the end of the corridor,

232 Thatcher 1993 p.198

233 Freedman 2005 vol.2

234 Department of State, Executive Secretariat, Files of Alexander M. Haig, Jr., 1981–1982, Lot 82D370, (2)

235 Freedman 2005 vol.2

*overlooking the rush of Upper Berkeley Street traffic, seems open to exploring the Argentine move, and at the very least we may have bought some additional time... ”*²³⁶

Secretary Haig decides to return to Washington. Meeting Pym just before his flight, Haig assures the British Foreign Secretary that he stood by the rights of the individual, and mentions that a referendum on the Islands could be part of the solution.²³⁷ At London's Heathrow Airport, Haig speaks to the Press.

“As you know, yesterday I had planned to go on to Buenos Aires in continuation of our effort to help in this crisis, but difficulties developed to change those plans. We have now received some new ideas, and while the parties are considering those ideas it will provide an opportunity for me to return to Washington to report to President Reagan.”

Thatcher pens a personal letter to Brazil's President Figueiredo, requesting that he comply with UN SC Res 502.

*“The rather 'hard and harsh' communication profoundly irritated the military elements in the government. ... 'We have little leverage over Brazil and even less prospect of getting them to lean to our side', the British Ambassador in Brasilia reported back. ... Brazil as a traditional rival of Argentina, while publicly proclaiming neutrality, in secret decided to extend aid to the junta...”*²³⁸

In the Falklands, Stanley's Chief of Police, Registrar General and Chief Secretary, plus 10 other civil servants, are deported. Executive Council member, Bill Luxton, and his wife, are included for “*political reasons.*”

*“They have been picked up by helicopter from their farm at Chartres and brought to town... We shall all have to watch our step a bit now, if this sort of thing is going to happen ... A party of Argentine troops has been today searching the beach down past the FIC offices for bodies from one of their landing craft which was sunk during the invasion. Some have already been washed up.”*²³⁹

Calling Buenos Aires from London's Heathrow airport, Secretary Haig tells Costa Méndez that he believes there are grounds for a breakthrough, and that he'll return to Argentina after he's spoken to President Reagan. As Haig flies out, news reports arrive of US assistance to the UK in the form of intelligence, fuel and satellite communications.²⁴⁰ Responding to Peru's 72-hour truce proposal, the UK tells the UN that; “... *since Argentina had initiated the armed confrontation, the first requirement for any solution was the withdrawal of Argentine forces from the Islands and their dependencies, in accordance with the Council resolution of 3 April.*” In New York, Argentina responds; “... *the UK committed an act of armed aggression by decreeing a naval blockade...*”

*“Within the UN three countries on the (Security) Council appeared to anticipate any failure of the Haig mission as an opportunity for the UN to step in; Ireland, Spain and Japan, along with Ahmad of the Secretariat. On 13 April Parsons briefed the representatives of European Community members, including Dorr, the Irish delegate, explaining that so long as Haig was still in business Britain could not entertain any other moves at the UN, although nothing was ruled out for later. He then quizzed Dorr about reports from Dublin suggesting an Irish initiative, involving proposals for a tripartite administration with the UN as the third party. Dorr protested that the Irish had no intention of wrong footing Britain or of bringing anything into the Security Council that Britain might oppose.”*²⁴¹

236 James Rentschler's Falklands Diary

237 See 2013

238 Krepp 2017 p.358

239 Diary entries in Smith 1984 pp.58 & 60

240 This as a result of US Secretary of State Casper Weinberger's instructions to provide the British with everything requested; “*short of our actual participation.*” cf. PREM19/617 f76

241 Freedman 2005 vol.2

In Brazil, General Medeiros, the Minister in charge of Brazil's National Intelligence Service, speaks to US Ambassador George Harding.

“Medeiros ... said that he thought the Argentine action in invading the Falklands was completely crazy and incomprehensible. He did not see an easy way out of the present impasse.”

In Venezuela, a meeting of the Organisation of America States' Permanent Council, hears claims that Security Council Resolution 502 is biased against Argentina; which had suffered the theft of its territory and was; *“justly responding to that robbery.”* The final OAS Council resolution merely expresses the organisation's; *“profound concern.”*

Day 13

April 14th – *Atlantic Conveyor* is commandeered by the British Government.



In London, Prime Minister Thatcher addresses the House of Commons.

*“... we seek a peaceful solution by diplomatic effort. This, too, is in accordance with the Security Council resolution. In this approach we have been helped by the widespread disapproval of the use of force which the Argentine aggression has aroused across the world, and also by the tireless efforts of Secretary of State Haig, who has now paid two visits to this country and one to Buenos Aires. On his first visit last Thursday we ... made clear to Mr. Haig that withdrawal of the invaders' troops must come first; that the sovereignty of the islands is not affected by the act of invasion; and that when it comes to future negotiations what matters most is what the Falkland Islanders themselves wish. On his second visit ... Mr. Haig put forward certain ideas as a basis for discussion – ideas concerning the withdrawal of troops and its supervision, and an interim period during which negotiations on the future of the islands would be conducted. Our talks were long and detailed, as the House would expect. Some things we could not consider because they flouted our basic principles. Others we had to examine carefully and suggest alternatives. The talks were constructive and some progress was made. At the end of Monday, Mr. Haig was prepared to return to Buenos Aires in pursuit of a peaceful solution. Late that night, however, Argentina put forward to him other proposals which we could not possibly have accepted, but yesterday the position appeared to have eased. Further ideas are now being considered ... ”*²⁴²

In the South Atlantic, HMS *Antrim*, RFA *Tidespring* and HMS *Plymouth*, carrying Royal Marines and SAS specialists, rendezvous with HMS *Endurance*.

*“As we steamed up towards Antrim they 'cleared lower deck' for us. All their sailors manned the sides, hands on guard-rails, as we approached, and, as we passed them, they cheered to a man. It was quite unexpected.”*²⁴³

*“The opposition was building up, and there were guns and ammunition being moved through the town...Poor little Argies, all cold and hunched up in their thin cotton uniforms.”*²⁴⁴

242 HC 21/1146-50

243 Barker 1997

244 Neville's Diary in Bennett 2021

Brazil's *Jornal do Brasil* argues that the issue is not one of sovereignty, but of self-determination and the end of colonialism; questioning “... the right of Buenos Aires to replace British colonisation with Argentine colonisation ...”²⁴⁵

In letters to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, Panama expresses; “... concern and indignation at ... the punitive expedition by the United Kingdom whose naval combat forces, including nuclear submarines, were on their way to Argentine territorial waters...,” while Venezuela reaffirms its solidarity with Argentina and deplores; “... the fact that the alarming movement of British armed forces was being observed in silence by the Council...”

From Washington, Haig telephones Méndez to deny the reports of US assistance to Britain.

“In those hours, the journalist Carl Bernstein, through ABC News, informed his audience that the United States was providing satellite intelligence information to the British fleet. “Will Alexander Haig be able to continue his ‘good offices’ management?” the journalist asked. ... the Secretary of State for Latin American Affairs, Thomas Enders, called Ambassador Esteban Takacs to deny the news and explain that “since the beginning of the situation in the Malvinas, instructions had been given in the sense of not providing any type of data to the military intelligence of Great Britain, if it had been so, regardless of internal action, our government would be given immediate assurances that this would not happen again.” ..”²⁴⁶

Méndez raises the application of the 1947 Rio Treaty with the US Secretary.²⁴⁷

“... (Haig) our position is that the Rio Pact is going to be a very difficult legal question as to whether it is applicable. So we would be opposed to invoking it at this time. Secondly, if we were faced with a two-thirds majority, the great difficulty would be it would entail our having to apply sanctions and we have refused, as you know, to join the efforts to have us apply sanctions against you. You understand that. (Méndez) ... If we get into an OAS debate while these talks are still going on, it would serve no purpose other than to complicate our position of sketching a position.”²⁴⁸

Haig then calls Thatcher. Concerned about leaks regarding US assistance with arms, Secretary Haig says he intends to publicly reaffirm US neutrality.

“Thatcher was appalled... After discussing the matter with Pym, Thatcher rang back and insisted that this statement... would cause an adverse reaction in the UK. ... “There was already a feeling that the US was doing less for us than we deserved, given the support we had given to President Reagan and the help which Argentina seemed to be getting from the Soviet Union”... The British Government could not accept being placed “on an equal footing with the Junta.” ..”²⁴⁹

Secretary Haig speaks next to President Reagan.

“I am convinced that Mrs. Thatcher wants a peaceful solution and is willing to give Galtieri a fig leaf provided she does not have to violate in any fundamental way her pledge to Parliament... Her strategy remains one of pressure and threat; by and large, it's working. ... Galtieri's problem is that he has so excited the Argentine people that he has left himself little room for maneuver. He must show something

245 PREM19/618

246 'Fuck!': la furia de Haig por las duras negociaciones con Galtieri por Malvinas y el fracaso que llevó a la guerra J. B. Yofre 2022

247 Signed in September, 1947, the Rio Treaty is a mutual assistance pact in the event of any of the signature countries being attacked. cf. 1947

248 Department of State, Executive Secretariat, Files of Alexander M. Haig, Jr., 1981–1982, Lot 82D370, (1)

249 Freedman 2005 vol.2

for the invasion – which many Argentines, despite their excitement, think was a blunder – or else he will be swept aside in ignominy.”

Following his discussion with the US President, Secretary Haig calls a press conference.

*“As a result of my conversations in London, plus telephone conversations today,... I have developed new ideas which I have described to the Argentine Government. Based on these new ideas, the Argentines have invited me to return to Buenos Aires. I propose to do so tomorrow.”*²⁵⁰

Takacs sends a message to Buenos Aires, with a suggestion that Galtieri speak directly to the US President to reinforce Argentina's willingness to seek a peaceful solution to the dispute under the terms of SC resolution 502.

*“At 11:40 p.m. the same day, a secret cable was sent from Washington to Buenos Aires "for the exclusive information of the foreign minister." ... The text of the message written by Takacs reported that following instructions from Nicanor Costa Méndez, he had a meeting with North Carolina Senator Jesse Helms and his advisers. During the conversations, (Helms) mentioned the difficulties posed for Secretary Haig by the influence of individuals and groups, one of which stated before different personalities that in the event of a conflict, the United States must side with the British and that President (Ronald) Reagan is being influenced by a growing campaign that objects to (a) friendly approach towards Argentina.”*²⁵¹

The *New York Times* reports.

“The Argentine position, as outlined by officials here today, is that while it is willing to allow some form of transitional government that could include Britain and a third party such as the United States or the Organization of American States, Argentine sovereignty would have to be recognized by the transitional government. In addition, Argentina would be the final authority on the island even in the transitional phase. One high-ranking military official said that only the Argentine flag could fly.”

Day 14

April 15th – Britain's destroyer group, hold position in mid-Atlantic.

Haig departs Washington for another round of negotiations in Buenos Aires.

Overflying Brazil, Secretary Haig messages President Reagan.

“The situation has become distinctly more ominous. I base this assessment on several recent developments: a) today's Argentine press has an especially dark tone. Despite the fact that the British fleet is now entering the South Atlantic, Argentine commentary has become more inflexible and bellicose. This may be a response to British rhet(oric) and yesterday's tragic revelations about US intelligence and logistical support for the UK. More than anything, it betrays a self-hypnotizing war hysteria that may be taking over in Buenos Aires, with the prospect of military defeat, political isolation, and economic ruin eclipsed by patriotic fervor; b) I have also received the first detailed Argentine negotiating proposal. Although this gives us a clearer framework in which to engage the Argentines, the substance is little different than their basic demand all along: control of the Falklands, de facto if not de jure. ... I should have a much clearer fix on the Argentine state of mind by late tomorrow. But we should begin to prepare ourselves for the worst. In this regard, I may need very soon to seek your decisions on two critical questions: a) whether and how far to push Mrs. Thatcher to come

250 Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D840626–0175
251 Yofre 2022

forth with a significant concession; b) whether and how to break off this mission If its futility becomes clear. Whether you should, or could, push Mrs. Thatcher to this bitter conclusion – that they cannot in any event resist the course of history and that they are now paying the price for previous UK vacillation on the sovereignty question – with all that it would mean for her, for our relationship, and our own principles, will require very careful thought. On the second question, we must think – and think quickly – about whether there is value in continuing this process and our role even though it will lead nowhere... ” ²⁵²

From Buenos Aires, Galtieri telephones Ronald Reagan. ²⁵³

“(Galtieri) Mr. President, I think it is highly important for Argentina, for us to have assistance, the assistance of your government, in this very difficult situation, that we are experiencing in our relationship with Great Britain which, among other things, is affecting the solidity of the Western World.... Mr. President, it is the profound wish, my personal wish, and that of the government, and the people of Argentina, to see to it that this situation does not continue to deteriorate. And it is furthermore our wish that with the assistance of the United States, that both countries seek an acceptable solution within the framework of UN Resolution 502 taking into account the whole background of this problem that goes back 150 years both from the standpoint of the bilateral relationship as well as all that has been debated, all that has been, the way the problem has been dealt with, the whole record of the UN in its debates of the problem of the past 16 years with reference to the issue of decolonization around the world. ...

I also wish to have you realize that with the advance of the British fleet toward the South Atlantic region we feel that there is an increasingly dangerous situation, not only between our two countries, between the two countries involved in the South Atlantic, but it also our concern that this issue not deteriorate to a point where other nations might become involved and that this might not become tangled up and exacerbated by outside interests. ... it is my fear that if the British continue their hostilities in the direction of the South Atlantic region the situation may slip out of our grasp; may slip out of our control and become an extremely delicate issue for the world at large... ” ²⁵⁴

Reagan passes the gist of the conversation on to Thatcher, who responds; *“Any suggestion that conflict can be avoided by a device that leaves the aggressor in occupation is surely gravely misplaced. The implications for other potential areas of tension and for small countries everywhere would be of extreme seriousness. The fundamental principles for which the free world stands would be shattered.”* ²⁵⁵

In Buenos Aires, Argentina's Foreign Ministry deliver proposals to the US Embassy calling for – (1) cessation of hostilities, (2) withdrawal of both sides from the Falklands, South Georgia and the South Sandwich islands – Argentine forces to withdraw to the mainland and British forces to a distance of 3000 nautical miles within 7 days and to their “usual operating bases” with 15 days, and (3) Britain to adopt measures to comply with *Resolution 1514*, completing the decolonization by 31 December 1982 in accordance with *Resolution 2065*; “in this case the principle of Argentine territorial integrity is applicable.” In the interim period the Governor is to be an Argentine appointee.

252 Quoted in *James Rentschler's Falklands Diary*

253 Yofre 2022 gives the time as 7pm

254 *Foreign Relations of the United States: 1981-1988 vol XIII: Conflict in the South Atlantic 1981 – 1984* p.278

255 Thatcher 1993. Also *PREM19/618 f106 (T73/82)*

Argentina's ruling junta publicly announce the *South Atlantic Operations Theatre*.

"... is an important element of the defence of our national sovereignty in the large area it covers: 200 maritime miles from the continental coast and around the reconquered islands of Malvinas, Georgias and South Sandwich. Once the "Theatre" has been established, the military Committee may order actions of self-defence in situations that could endanger national security. Vice-Admiral Juan Jose Lombardo, Commander of Naval Operations, has been appointed Commander of the South Atlantic Operations Theatre." ²⁵⁶

Day 15

April 16th – Task Force ships start to sail from Ascension Island, while HMS *Sir Tristram* arrives from the West Indies. Ascension Island registers 300 aircraft movements, making the island's Wideawake Airport the busiest in



the world for a single day.

On reaching the US Embassy in Buenos Aires, US Secretary Haig immediately cables President Reagan in Washington.

"Today's Argentine press has an especially dark tone. Despite the fact that the British fleet is now entering the South Atlantic, Argentine commentary has become more inflexible and bellicose. ... More than anything, it betrays a self-hypnotizing war hysteria that may be taking over in Buenos Aires, with the prospect of military defeat, political isolation, and economic ruin eclipsed by patriotic fervor. I have also received the first detailed Argentine negotiating proposal. Although this gives us a clearer framework in which to engage the Argentines, the substance is little different than their basic demand all along: Control of the Falklands, de facto, if not de jure. ... It may well be that the Argentines make significant concessions and adopt a position that is fair and reasonable when seen in the historical context of this crisis. In that case, we should certainly go on to London and be prepared to place heavy pressure on the British, ... The burden of flexibility, and the onus for failure to achieve a peaceful outcome, will then be squarely on the British. If the Argentines are intransigent, we will have to consider having me

return to Washington. We may find that we are not in a position to make a basic decision on our role until after a full round in both Buenos Aires and London. But we must be ready to decide as early as this time tomorrow. At this point, the odds of avoiding war still appear very long." ²⁵⁷

²⁵⁶ Announced in *La Nacion* on April 23, 1982. It is worthy of note that while the UK had restricted its theatre of operations, Argentina chose a huge area of the South Atlantic. Particularly relevant when the Argentine warship *Belgrano* was sunk by a British submarine. See below.

²⁵⁷ *Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Cable File, Falkland File 04/16/1982 (1)*. Freedman (2005 vol.2) gives the date of Haig's arrival as April 15, 1982.

From London, Thatcher writes to Reagan.

"... We have done our utmost to put Al Haig in a position where he has reasonable proposals to offer the Argentine Government. I regret we have seen no corresponding flexibility on the part of the Argentines. ... General Galtieri has reaffirmed to you his desire to avoid conflict. But it seems to me ... that he fails to draw the obvious conclusion. It was not Britain that broke the peace but Argentina. The mandatory Resolution of the Security Council, to which you and we have subscribed, requires Argentina to withdraw its troops from the Falkland islands. That is the essential first step..." ²⁵⁸

A memorandum is prepared for consideration by Britain's OD committee. ²⁵⁹

"Surrender of our sovereignty in the Falklands and their dependencies might be interpreted as indicating a lack of resolution to press our claim to any Antarctic hydrocarbons... If, in the longer term, Argentina concluded that it had been worsted in their adventure in the Falkland Islands and dependencies, our long term position in the British Antarctic Territory would probably be politically strengthened. The converse, however, is also likely to be true." ²⁶⁰

To coincide with the arrival of the US Secretary, Argentine President Galtieri issues a decree (no.757). ²⁶¹

"HAVING SEEN that on April 2, 1982, the Argentine Nation has recovered for its patrimony the effective possession of the Malvinas Islands and their dependencies in the South Atlantic, and CONSIDERING:

That by Decree No. 681 of April 3, 1982, it constituted in the Military Government the territory of the Malvinas, Georgias and Sandwich del Sur Islands and its owner was designated.

That the Military Governor currently exercises his functions with a seat in the town known as "Port Stanley", a name that is alien to the history and traditions of our country.

That the realization of sovereignty over the aforementioned islands allows for the realization of government actions that demonstrate the will of the Argentine People and its Armed Forces, sustained throughout its history.

That the Ministry of Culture of the Presidency of the Nation has proposed as the new denomination of that town that of "Puerto Argentino".

For this reason, the President of the Argentine Nation Decrees:

Article 1.- The name of "Puerto Argentino" is hereby referred to the town of the Malvinas Islands, currently the seat of the Military Governor, which was previously known as "Port Stanley". ..."

In the Falkland Islands, defences around the town are reinforced.

"More anti-aircraft guns are going up onto Sapper's Hill and the surrounding area. Buenos Aires Herald reporters have been visiting the hospital." ²⁶²

258 PREM19/618 f86 (T77/82)

259 Hydrocarbon, minerals and fisheries potential of the Falkland Islands, their dependencies and Antarctica April 16, 1982 CAB 148/206

260 *Ibid.* quoted in *Britain and the Dictatorships of Argentina and Chile 1973-82* Grace Livingstone 2018

261 Official Gazette April 23, 1982. See also April 2, 1982 for a footnote on name changes.

262 *Valerie's Diary* in Bennett 2021

*"I was called up to the Secretariat building by Vice Comodoro Carlos Bloomer-Reeve ('Bloomer'). He had been in the Falklands during 1974-75 as the representative in the LADE office. ... 'Bloomer' had been given 24 hours to get from West Germany, where he had a position in the Argentine Embassy, to the Falklands – and wasn't all that thrilled about it. He was to replace the Falkland Islands Government Chief Secretary (Dick Baker), and even occupied his office. He asked me about the fire service... wanted to know how we would stand if there were to be air raids..."*²⁶³

A delegation of Anglo-Argentines arrive in Stanley.

*"It appeared their task was to allay the fears of the islanders about becoming part of Argentina ... 'in effect .. a form of plea to the islanders to accept what had happened and try and make a new life out of the situation.'... The visitors were allowed to hold a public meeting at Stanley, but all this produced were some bitter exchanges."*²⁶⁴

*"Eight members of the British Community in Buenos Aires arrived for the day. ... The eight got a very cool reception from the locals. They were accompanied by some press and TV people, said to be Italian.... People travelling into town on the Darwin Road during the past couple of days have passed several heaps of dead soldiers – the total varies between thirty and fifty – stacked up on the side of the road up near Sapper Hill. There are also a large number of soldiers on stretchers. Our climate is not agreeing with them; exposure seems to be the problem."*²⁶⁵

*"The idea seems to have originated from a proposal made to Dr. Richard Cutts, Anglican bishop of Argentina and the archbishop of Canterbury's Episcopal Commissary to the Falklands, to allow a group of Anglo-Argentines to join him on his planned pastoral visit to the Falkland Islands. But in the face of public controversy, the archbishop of Canterbury halted the proposal. Cutts apologized to the prime minister, explaining that his intentions had been "purely pastoral and non-political," and that he had acted on the archbishop of Canterbury's request to further "the cause of reconciliation and justice." But his stance on the crisis was no secret: his signature had featured very prominently in the telegram from the Emergency Committee to Mrs. Thatcher. The first delegation, made up of six Anglo-Argentines, and not including Cutts, finally traveled to the Falklands on 16 April. During this brief visit, they met members of the Falklands' Executive Council as well as several locals, whose reaction was almost uniform: distant, cool, and ultimately not prepared to accept any advice from the Anglo-Argentines."*²⁶⁶

Secretary Haig arrives at the Casa Rosada, to be greeted by President Galtieri.

"... he wished to assure the Secretary that he had full confidence in the U.S. Government, in President Reagan, and in the Secretary himself. But speaking with the frankness that is possible between members of a family, he would tell the Secretary that he is not pleased with the fact that a number of people in the American Embassy were asking for visas to go to Uruguay. After all, it is not the summer season for people to go to the beaches in Uruguay, and this evidence of evacuation by Embassy people caused a bad impression and gave people the feeling that the U.S. might be preparing for a break in diplomatic relations. ... there was a British Community here of over 20,000 people who, with the other members of their families, must total some 100,000 people, and they did not feel themselves in any danger. ... Secretary Haig must seek a peaceful solution for all of the reasons he had expressed; otherwise, we run the risk of splitting the Americas in two – those north of the Rio

263 *Neville's Diary* in Bennett 2021

264 Freedman 2005 vol.2. The group remained until the 23rd.

265 Diary entry in Smith 1984 p.71

266 *War of the British Worlds: The Anglo-Argentines and the Falklands* Ezequiel Mercau 2016 in *Journal of British Studies* vol. 55 January 2016 pp.145-168

*Grande and those south of it; some more and some less but such a split would alter substantially the strategic panorama of the world.”*²⁶⁷

Before meeting the Argentine negotiating team, Haig proposes a 7 point scheme:

- 1) withdrawal of Argentine troops and a halt to the progress of the British fleet;
- 2) Argentina's flag to remain flying on the islands under a tripartite administration (UK, Argentina & USA);
- 3) an expansion of Argentina's role in the islands during the interim period;
- 4) negotiations to conclude by the end of 1982;
- 5) negotiations to be guided by the principles of decolonization;
- 6) normalization of relations between the Islands and South America;
- 7) lifting of sanctions.

*“The negotiations proceeded throughout the whole of that day in two sessions ... Haig believed it appropriate on more than one occasion to warn that he was ready to call a halt to the whole procedure.”*²⁶⁸

Foreign Minister Nicanor Costa Mendez informs Haig that his government can accept the establishment of an interim government and undertake further negotiations, but that this had to be done within a framework guaranteeing sovereignty for Argentina. Importantly, the UK must abandon its interpretation that the Islanders' wishes are paramount under UN resolutions.

“The Secretary, after reading it, said that it was certain to be rejected in London. He asked whether the Foreign Minister had any flexibility on that paragraph. Costa Méndez replied that he had none;... The Secretary then said, "This means war." Ambassador Enders added that this is tantamount to a declaration of war. Costa Méndez replied that this was simply the position Argentina had always maintained and that the UN Resolution affirmed. Ambassador Enders said that there was quite frankly no mention of Argentine sovereignty in those resolutions. Costa Méndez replied that he honestly felt that the wording included the territorial integrity of Argentina. ...

Ambassador Enders then asked whether the authorities of this country knew that their inflexibility meant war. Costa Méndez replied that if the Secretary wanted to see the President and/or if President Reagan wanted to talk to the President, they could. He then asked whether the Secretary wanted to talk to the Junta. The Secretary replied that he did. He had earned and deserved the opportunity to speak to them and tell them the consequences of their decision. Costa Méndez replied that the Secretary had made superhuman efforts and deserved anything he wanted.

The Secretary said he would not want to go home without having had the opportunity to tell the Junta that their position probably means war as a consequence. He would not be hesitant to tell them. Costa Méndez, visibly shocked, said that he felt he had been clear and honest and had been consistent in what he was saying all along. The Secretary said that this would be a disaster for Argentina, and we would have to take a position in the case of an armed conflict. Costa Méndez said it was not a consequence of any intransigence on the part of the Argentines. The Secretary said he had made a real effort to bridge the gap between the two positions. He had told the Foreign Minister that neither side could obtain

267 Department of State, Executive Secretariat, Files of Vernon Walters, Lot 89D213, Trip to Buenos Aires
268 Cardoso, Kirschboom & van der Kooy 1983

everything it wanted. He thought that everyone had seemed to accept that. Costa Méndez then said that the Argentines had done their best. ... Secretary Haig said that he was sure the British would shoot when they received the message. ...

*Ambassador Enders asked whether they had any doubt that this meant war with the British. Costa Méndez said that the Argentines had not been in touch with the British; but he would rely on our word for it. He was surprised that the United Kingdom would go to the edge of war for such a small problem as these few rocky islands. Ambassador Shlaudeman said that they would. Ambassador Enders said they would fight for the same reason as the Argentines would fight – for honor.”*²⁶⁹

*“The account of the Military Junta goes on to say that Costa Méndez, at 10:45 p.m., held another meeting with Haig at the Sheraton Hotel in which he delivered the last Argentine objections to his proposals. However, the events actually happened differently: Nicanor Costa Méndez did not go to the hotel. “Take him the answer,” the foreign minister told Secretary Roberto García Moritán, who went to the Sheraton Hotel. After a few minutes, Haig greeted him in his pyjamas. He opened the envelope, read it and extemporaneously threw it in the officer's face exclaiming “fuck”.”*²⁷⁰

Annoyed, Secretary Haig demands to meet with all the members of the ruling Junta.

“... a Secretary of State who is becoming increasingly pissed. Why? Because it is more and more apparent that these clowns in the Foreign Ministry, led by Costa Méndez... are jerking him around. He has engaged in god knows how many hours of good-faith talks, works hard on the language they propose, develops some kind of working consensus at their level – only to have the junta at the end of the day reject these mutually agreed positions and take us back to a point which is even tougher now than it was at the start.

“A charade,” sez the SecState, “a fucking charade – these guys are diddling me.” “Of course they are,” chimes Shlaudeman, “they aren't hearing us, we can't negotiate with them, our relationship means nothing” – a line he was not giving us when we first arrived in these precincts! ... I think we are about to wrap it, boys. But the Secretary's idea is to have one last meeting with Galtieri tomorrow morning and possibly the whole junta as well, cable Francis Pym the key paragraphs in contention, and then head on back to D.C. Continues Haig: “We must tell these guys, and then we must tell our own public, one basic thing: it is unimaginable that a responsible democratic country could accept the position they have put forward. We can't reward the force of arms.”
*Punto.”*²⁷¹



General Galtieri, General Dozo & Admiral Anaya

²⁶⁹ Department of State, Executive Secretariat, Files of Vernon Walters, Lot 89D213, Trip to Buenos Aires (w/Secretary Haig); Spin-off to El Salvador/Honduras April 15–April 22, 1982.

²⁷⁰ Yofre 2022

²⁷¹ James Rentschler's Falklands Diary

Day 16

April 17th – Argentine submarine ARA Santa Fé sails from Puerto Belgrano with a compliment of marines and fresh supplies for the Argentine troops garrisoning South Georgia.

“... papers subsequently captured in the submarine, and discussions with her officers, indicated that she had been instructed to sink any British ships that she found off South Georgia.” ²⁷²

In Buenos Aires, Secretary Haig meets Junta members Galtieri, Anaya and Dozo.

“We must find a way to change the internal arrangements on the Islands but not in such a way as to cause a breakdown in relations between the US and the UK and, consequently, Western Europe. All of the Soviet efforts and policies were directed at splitting Europe away from the U.S. This we had to avoid at all costs. We could not, as a government, accept that the use of force, no matter how justified, could bring about changes. President Reagan himself could not survive such an acceptance. The Secretary had been in communication with other European governments, France, West Germany, Italy, and had found no support for the use of force, whereas there was widespread support for evolutionary change. ... he had last night received proposed wordings that would inevitably lead to war. That was the unanimous view of all of his colleagues. ... Where are we now? We are at a point that would lead straight to armed conflict. The tragedy is that such a conflict would inevitably push the US toward support of Great Britain... They would win. Our analysis is that, at the first shot fired, Argentine ports would be mined, the Argentine forces on the islands would be isolated, the first British objective would be the destruction of the airfield, and surface and air resupply for the Argentine forces would be increasingly difficult. Since both nations are limited in what they could do to one another, the only winner under such circumstances would be the Soviet Union. ...” ²⁷³

“Faced with an impasse resulting from the rigid Argentine position of last night, I insisted on a meeting this morning with President Galtieri and the other two members of the junta. I had nearly two hours with them and found them gravely preoccupied over the course on which they are embarked. The line-up within the junta is pretty much as we expected: the Air Force general is mod(erate), the Navy admiral is hawkish and ideological, while President Galtieri – no match intellectually for either of the other two – substitutes bluster for thought.” ²⁷⁴

“I can't speak for Mrs. Thatcher, at times I don't speak very well to her, but I know they don't care about the sovereignty of the islands. They are prepared to re-negotiate but we must permit her to do it gracefully and on honorable terms. But I can assure you we will drive it to a solution. Secondly, I personally am convinced that Britain wants this problem off the plate. They will never be able to face another crisis of this kind. They could not politically, and they could not by their own assessment of the cost.” ²⁷⁵

In Europe, EEC sanctions against Argentina take effect

“... Italy continued to express reservations about the proposed sanction and refused to approve the official documents until the last minute, on Friday, April 16th. Ireland and Belgium also showed a notable reluctance to impose sanctions. President Mitterrand and the rest of the governments fully supported the British effort ... In West Germany, public, government and press support appeared strong.” ²⁷⁶

272 Freedman 2005 vol.2

273 Dept. of State, Executive Secretariat, Files of Alexander M. Haig, Jr., 1981–1982, Lot 82D370, (2) Falklands Crisis

274 James Rentschler's Falklands Diary

275 From a transcription obtained for BBC's Panorama programme of April 16, 1984

276 Martin 1992

In London, the Joint Intelligence Committee notes a classified report.

*“A large part of the Argentine fleet is believed to be at sea. Argentina has requested LANDSAT photographic coverage of the Falkland Islands for 21-23 April. ... The Soviet Union is reported to be ready to offer Argentina ships, aircraft and land based missiles in exchange for grain. ... The high level of soviet photographic coverage of the area is unusual.”*²⁷⁷

Arriving back in Britain, Islander Bill Luxton is debriefed.

“Perhaps 40% of the former population of the town have moved out into the hinterland, where morale is high ... There has been no collaboration with the occupying forces. Indeed several Islanders have been openly defiant. ... Mr. Luxton was confident that many were determined to stay as long as possible, even if there was fighting. But some might well wish for temporary evacuation ... Nor is the Argentine's attitude to evacuation clear. They are making those who want to leave pay for their passage ... it may be that the Argentines would not wish to see a mass exodus.”

In Buenos Aires, early afternoon, Secretary Haig returns to the Casa Rosada.

*“Haig was again invited to meet at 2 pm on Sunday in the Situation Room of the Casa Rosada. On this occasion, after ten hours of discussions, Haig starkly saw that the Junta also lacked power, since each decision had to be approved by each Corps commander and their equivalents in the Navy and Air Force. “If I give in too much, I won't be in this position any more,” Galtieri told him in a moment alone. “I asked him how long he thought he would survive if he lost a war with the British.” ..”*²⁷⁸

After the meeting concludes near midnight, Secretary Haig prepares a report for President Reagan.

*On balance, I consider the meeting helpful because it heightened Argentine awareness that time is running out for a solution short of war. The leadership is now clearly reluctant to see our mission suspended – especially while we are now in Buenos Aires. The stakes are so high that we agreed to look at revised language now being prepared by the Argentine side on the critical issue of the islands' ultimate status, which they are bringing to the hotel later tonight. We discussed this one issue for nine straight hours today – and the future of our efforts may hang on a single word. To sum up, we emerged from today's marathon session slightly better off than we were when we ended last night. In all probability, however, I will conclude tomorrow that Argentine intransigence requires me to carry out your instruction to suspend the mission and return to Washington.”*²⁷⁹

Secretary Haig telegrams Washington.

*“It has become increasingly clear that we are not dealing with people in a position to negotiate in good faith. I have spent hours negotiating with the Foreign Minister, as well as time with Galtieri himself, only to find that what is agreed ad referendum is then toughened substantially each time the Junta gets in the act. ... If, as I anticipate, I make no headway in the morning, I should depart immediately for Washington. It would be fruitless and unfair to Mrs. Thatcher for me to carry these proposals to London, thereby shifting the spotlight and onus onto her.”*²⁸⁰

From Australia, Prime Minister Malcolm Fraser telegrams the US President.

277 *Spying on the World: The Declassified Documents of the Joint Intelligence Committee 1936 – 2013* Richard J. Aldrich & Rory Cormac 2014. LANDSAT was a NASA programme which entitled subscribing nations to satellite images.

278 Yofre 2022

279 James Rentschler's *Falklands Diary*

280 Reagan Library, Exec. Secretariat, NSC Country File, Latin America/Central, Argentina (04/15/1982-04/17/1982)

“In the aftermath of a failure of Al Haig's efforts, ... it would amount to a serious blow to western values, and to the western alliance itself, if the United States did not unequivocally support Britain.”

In Moscow, Russia's Foreign Ministry issues a statement.

“We consider impermissible the attempts by the United Kingdom to re-establish colonial status and we openly oppose such attempts. We qualify them as contradictory to the decision of the UN General Assembly on decolonization .. and as creating a threat to peace and security.”

From Washington, US President Reagan telephones PM Margaret Thatcher.

*“I know how far you've gone and how much you've compromised in an effort to settle this peacefully, and I don't think you should be asked to go any further than you have.”*²⁸¹

Governments in Peru, Venezuela, Bolivia, Ecuador and Colombia announce that they will increase trade with Argentina to compensate for the economic embargo imposed by the European Union, and other countries.

Argentina's government announces that three British journalists have been arrested on charges of espionage in Ushuaia. Simon Winchester (*Sunday Times*), Tony Prine and Ian Mather (*Observer*) are reported to have been discovered taking photographs near a naval air base.²⁸²

British submarine, HMS *Splendid*, arrives on station off the Falkland Islands.

Day 17

April 18th – in Buenos Aires, during the early hours, Haig receives a revised Argentine text referring to 1) a Special Interim Authority; 2) administration on the islands to return to that which existed before the invasion but to include Argentines with limited participation; 3) a 'definitive solution' to take account of the inhabitants' 'rights' but also to recognise the 'principle of territorial integrity'; 4) December 31st, 1982 to be the final date for agreement.²⁸³

*“... another note of last-ditch optimism is creeping into the game plan; the Argies have delivered their revised language on the interim arrangements for the Falklands, and there does indeed seem to have been some movement overnight – not much, really a fractional amount, but movement nevertheless, enough to warrant a bit more palaver. Haig will be reconvening with his charming hosts...”*²⁸⁴

Secretary Haig immediately telegrams London.

*“The Argentines delivered to me at the hotel at 2am this morning a revised text resulting from yesterday's marathon session. Although their revisions are still unsatisfactory, I believe we now have – for the first time since we began this mission – some movement towards a workable solution ...”*²⁸⁵

A 2pm meeting is scheduled for negotiations to continue at the Presidential Residence.²⁸⁶

281 Reagan Library, Executive Sec., NSC Subject File, Memorandums of Conversation – President Reagan (April 1982)

282 According to a New York Times report of April 25, 1982 seven other journalist had been detained in the two weeks leading up to these arrests. These British journalists were detained for 11 weeks before being released on \$20,000 bail.

No trial was ever scheduled. See <https://www.theguardian.com/media/2007/apr/01/pressandpublishing.business>

283 Cardoso, Kirschboom & van der Kooy 1983 p.178

284 James Rentschler's Falklands Diary

285 Telegram Secto 6037 to London, April 18; Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Latin America/Central, Argentina (04/18/1982–04/19/1982)

286 There is no record of the conversation from this meeting.

*“... there was another marathon negotiating session from 1500 on 18 April until 0155 the next day. Haig now believed that he was getting somewhere and praised the progress already made. But he needed more. For the Argentine team the problem was that they had no idea of whether or not Britain had shown any flexibility, whether their concessions were to be reciprocated. Moreover, they had interpreted Haig's encouraging views on the prospects for an eventual British climb down on sovereignty as being somehow subject to an American guarantee, rather than just the quality of the Secretary of State's political analysis... All the Junta could see was the creation of more opportunities for British procrastination.”*²⁸⁷

In Montevideo, 29 Royal Marines and 13 BAS personnel, deported from South Georgia, arrive.

After a series of threatening telephone calls, the British born editor of the English language newspaper, *The Buenos Aires Herald*, moves to Uruguay.

Brazil adopts a secret policy of providing aid for Argentina.

*“As the conflict intensified, Brazilian junta edged closer to the Argentine position and gave the order to grant 'favourable treatment' to any Argentine solicitude of arms or material. This was driven by the desire to balance out the US backing of the UK, which they considered unfair. However, Brazilian support was only given in unofficial capacity, as the Brazilian junta shied away from formally announcing their support ... In an effort to alleviate the economic hardship, Brazil also acted as intermediary for Argentine exports buying up and reselling them to the EEC.”*²⁸⁸

Day 18

April 19th – in Buenos Aires, Haig returns to his hotel at 2am to consider Argentina's proposals with his team.

*“It is now 3 a.m. and I have returned to the hotel after another 12 hours of up and down talks. Once again we were treated to the now familiar Argentine tactic whereby with agreement almost in hand the Junta stepped in and overruled its negotiators. There followed a soulful meeting at 10 p.m. with President Galtieri who then reconvened the Junta and the impasse was broken. We returned to the negotiating table and put together a draft text except for the single important paragraph covering the modalities for the respective withdrawal of forces. However, the text as it now stands will in all likelihood give the British genuine problems. We resume our talks later this morning at the Casa Rosada. At the conclusion of the round, I should be in a position to recommend – on the basis of the text then in hand—whether to proceed to London for consultations with Prime Minister Thatcher and her Ministers or to return to Washington briefly en route to London.”*²⁸⁹

After a few hours sleep, negotiations between Secretary Haig and the junta recommence at the Casa Rosada.

*“Later in the morning, I met with the Argentinians to clear up a number of unresolved points. This, too, was a strenuous session, but by 1 P.M., we had in hand a modified text that anticipated some of the British objections”*²⁹⁰

287 Freedman 2005 vol.2

288 Krepp 2017 pp.358-359

289 Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Latin America/Central, Argentina (04/18/1982–04/19/1982) in *Foreign Relations of the United States: 1981-1988 vol.XIII: Conflict in the South Atlantic 1981 – 1984* p.323. Francis Pym in London, received a similar telegram from Haig.

290 Haig 1984 p.289

From Washington, Ambassador Henderson contacts the Foreign Office in London.

*“I have just seen McFarlane at the White House who told me that Haig had been on the secure line. He was transmitting to the State Department ... the latest text of what the Argentinians were prepared to accept. Clearly, Haig did not think that it would be satisfactory ...”*²⁹¹

The revised Argentine proposals are: -

(1) an immediate cessation of hostilities, (2) neither side shall introduce more forces into the 'zone', (3) within 24 hours the UK is to rescind its *exclusion zone*, (4) withdrawal of half of Argentina's force within 7 days to Argentina and all of the UK's to a distance of 1750 nautical miles, (5) the UK's Task Force and submarines to return to their normal bases within 15 days, (6) Argentina to withdraw its remaining forces within 15 days, (7) all economic and financial sanctions to be terminated without delay, (8) a Special Interim Authority to verify compliance which will also oversee the local authority on the Islands, (9) the Executive and Legislative Councils to have Argentine members, (10) the flags of the UK, Argentina and the members of the Special Interim Authority to fly together, (11) rights of residence, and ownership of property, to be the same for Islanders and Argentinians, (12) *“December 31, 1982, will conclude the Interim Period during which the signatories shall conclude negotiations on modalities for the removal of the Islands from the list of non-self governing territories ... and on mutually agreed conditions for their definitive status, including due regard for the rights of the inhabitants and for the principle of territorial integrity applicable to this dispute. ...”*

Before leaving, Secretary Haig speaks briefly to his Argentine hosts.

*“Haig does conclude a few more hours of jawboning with the Argies, and though it looks like he may have achieved a small measure of flexibility by the time we move into the motorcade, an alert from the Foreign Ministry informs us that Costa Méndez will be out at the airport to convey an important last-minute message.”*²⁹²

From Buenos Aires, Secretary Haig sends a personal telegram to Foreign Secretary Pym in London.

*“My own disappointment with this text prevents me from attempting to influence you in any way. As you will see, there are significant steps back from the text you and I discussed in London... It is not clear who is in charge here, as many as 50 people, including Corps Commanders, may be exercising vetoes. Certainly I can do no better at this point... My best immediate judgement in this situation is that I should return to Washington and report to the President.”*²⁹³

At the airport, Costa Méndez has a final encounter with the US Secretary. The Minister hands Alexander Haig a copy of Argentina's proposals. However, some of the wording does not match the US copy of the earlier meeting.

*“It is absolutely essential and conditio sine qua non,... that negotiations will have to conclude with a result on 31 December 1982. This result must include a recognition of Argentine sovereignty.. ‘..”*²⁹⁴

“Around 4:00 p.m., when (Haig) was about to board, the Argentine foreign minister told him that the Junta had vetoed one of the central points that he had negotiated in those hours. Although it had agreed that an agreement should be reached on December 31, 1982, the military government had accepted that in that clause there was no mention of the conditional formula for the transfer of sovereignty. The new message established that if by that date an agreement had not been reached, the Argentine government reserved the right to

291 PREM19/619 Telegram 1343 of 19 April 1982

292 James Rentschler's Falklands Diary

293 Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Latin America/Central, Falklands War [Cables 090131, 091000, 091154, 091640, 181715, 191620, 191740, 191754, 192115]

294 Quoted in Freedman 2005 vol.2. This was not forwarded to London.

designate the leadership and administration of the Malvinas. The answer left the mediator no room to negotiate in London. In addition, he also announced that Argentina would denounce the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance in the OAS; a weapon that Washington planned to use if the situation in Central America got out of control."²⁹⁵

Junta member, Admiral Anaya, flies to the Falkland Islands.

At South Georgia, British submarine HMS *Conqueror*, commences a reconnaissance sweep of the Island.

At the UN building in New York, Secretary-General, Pérez de Cuéllar, offers his good offices and assistance should the Haig mission fail.

*"In separate meetings on 19 April with the Permanent Representatives of Argentina and of the United Kingdom and also with the Permanent Representative of the United States, I outlined the assistance that the United Nations could render, if requested, in pursuance of any understanding or agreement that the parties might reach consistent with Resolution 502 (1982). I stated that for example, a small presence of United Nations civilian and military observers could be used to supervise any agreed withdrawal of armed forces and civilian personnel, as well as any interim administrative arrangements. A United Nations "umbrella" for such arrangements could also be provided, as could a United Nations temporary administration. I indicated that any arrangements of this kind would require the prior authorization of the Security Council, that, as a practical matter, they would presuppose the consent of the parties and that such arrangements were mentioned without prejudice to the possibility of other types of action that the Security Council might decide upon. An informal note was given to the Permanent Representatives summarizing these ideas."*²⁹⁶

Argentina calls for an emergency meeting of the Organisation of American States in order that an invocation of the reciprocal defence agreement under the Rio Treaty can be discussed.²⁹⁷

Britain's Government issues a press statement.

*"We have just received the proposals which Mr. Haig has brought out of Buenos Aires. They are complex and difficult, and at first sight they do not meet the requirements strongly expressed by Parliament, particularly on the need to regard as paramount the wishes of the Islanders. We shall be studying them carefully..."*²⁹⁸

*"British patience with the American effort was starting to run out. Leaving aside the very attempt to broker an agreement as if Argentine claims had any real legitimacy, and that somehow saving Galtieri's face was a matter of real strategic importance, the American determination to put on a show of impartiality had been a cause of incessant irritation in London."*²⁹⁹

In Washington, Ambassador Henderson, accompanied by Britain's Naval and Air *attachés*, meets with Senator John Tower, Chairman of the Senate armed Service Committee. Tower asks Henderson to let him know what assistance the US could provide. Presidential permission has already been granted for a supply of Stinger missiles and night goggles.

295 Yofre 2022

296 Secretary-General addressing the Security Council on May 21, 1982. See *UN Doc S/PV.2350*

297 Art. 3 of the *Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance* (TIAR) 1947 stated that an armed attack against an American State be considered as an attack against all American States and required that assistance be given. *cf.* 1947

298 *PREM19/619*

299 Freedman 2005 vol.2

Day 19

April 20th – from Gibraltar, HMS *Hecla*, a hospital ship, sails for the south Atlantic. ³⁰⁰

In India, the British High Commission, aware that a meeting of the *Coordinating Bureau of the Non- Aligned Movement* (NAM) is being urged by Argentina, ask the Indian Government to press for a statement that is consistent with *SC Resolution 502*. An explanation is attached to the request.

“The fundamental element of the British Government's approach to the dispute with Argentina over the Falkland Islands is that the wishes of the Islanders themselves must be paramount. For their part, the Argentine's deny that the Islanders have the right to determine their own future and maintain that the issue is simply one of decolonisation. The Falkland Islands issue is not one of decolonization. As normally understood, decolonisation has consisted of the withdrawal of an alien administering power and the transition of new states to independence in accordance with the freely expressed wishes of their people, to whom sovereignty and the powers of sovereignty are transferred. The UN has never countenanced the decolonisation of a territory by agreeing to hand over its people to alien rule in the face of their persistent opposition. For Argentina to incorporate the Falkland Islands in its territory on the pretext of decolonisation would simply constitute the imposition of colonial status on the Islands by force in violation of all UN agreed norms of conduct ... It would offend the principle of self-determination...”

From Washington, Haig sends a message to Pym in London.

“I can appreciate your disappointment with the Argentine position. Your off-the-record press guidance is entirely proper. As you know, my aim in Buenos Aires was to squeeze as much as I humanly could out of the Argentines so that you and we could know what we are really up against. At no point did I tell them that what was developed in Buenos Aires would be acceptable to you. Nor did I associate the United States in any way with the position produced. ... Let me suggest that you now reflect on the text. In identifying specific areas where you believe changes are imperative, I suggest you work up formulations of your own. This will give us a precise idea of where we stand. It would have the additional advantage of denying the Argentines any basis for saying that they and they alone have taken a step toward peace. ...

I further suggest that you and the Prime Minister consider your coming to Washington as soon as you have arrived at a considered view of the text. I agree with you that this is not the time for me to come to London, but I also believe that we need a face-to-face discussion, so that I can clarify points and convey my feeling of Argentine attitudes and aspirations. I cannot reduce to writing the bitterness, resentment and sense of historic frustration I encountered in Buenos Aires. ... It is imperative that you maintain military pressure. I see no other way of bringing the Argentines to a position satisfactory to you. ...

As you know, Argentina has asked for an OAS Council meeting to convoke an organ of consultation under the Rio Treaty. ... We propose to abstain on the ground that the Rio Treaty was not designed to apply to cases in which members themselves took acts of force...” ³⁰¹

In London, Prime Minister Thatcher speaks to the House of Commons.

“The proposals are Argentine proposals. We are grateful to Mr. Haig for the patience and stamina that he has shown over the proposals, both in Buenos Aires and in his visits to this country, but they are

300 The border between Spain and Gibraltar was closed at this time. A limited opening had been planned by the Spanish authorities for April 20th, 1982, but with nationalism in Britain running high, this was postponed until December.

301 *Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Europe and Soviet Union, United Kingdom (04/01/1982–07/31/1982) (2)*

Argentine proposals. He has kept us fully informed, when he has been able to do so, about precisely what they are. We now have full details. ... We regard this as a stage in the negotiating process that must now be continued. We are examining the proposals very closely and will seek to put forward our own proposals to Mr. Haig. With that in mind, my right hon. Friend the Foreign Secretary plans to visit Washington on Thursday. I do not believe that there is much point in reporting to the House before my right hon. Friend has seen Mr. Haig in Washington. Among the many problems presented by the Argentine proposals is that they fail to provide that the Falkland Islanders should be able to determine their own destiny. The House has always said that the wishes of the islanders are paramount. As regards the proposals put forward by the right hon. Member for Leeds East that referred to United Nations administrators, we are in the process of one negotiation through Mr. Haig, and it would be better not to get our wires crossed but to go steadily forward on that proposal. I accept what the right hon. Gentleman said. We are trying to secure implementation of United Nations resolution No. 502, which is clear, but not so easy to implement. We also have rights on self-defence under article 51 of the charter... the House, in exercising its duty, has always said, not only in these negotiations, but on many previous negotiations, that the wishes of the islanders are paramount. Many previous negotiations have been on the basis that the Argentines wanted what is called decolonisation – that has a particular meaning in United Nations terms – but they have not been able or willing to grant self-determination to the islanders.” ³⁰²

Junta member, General Lami Dozo (air force), visits the Falklands.

In Montevideo, 12 teachers from the Islands arrive; having refused to work under the Argentine administration.

“Cold, dull, windy and wet. Real April weather. Reports of more Argentine deaths from exposure during the night; numbers vary from three to ten.” ³⁰³

In New York, a meeting of the Organization of American States convenes to discuss the applicability of the Rio Pact. While the majority of member countries are supportive of Argentina’s position, there is no consensus on action. Mexico's representative is clear that his country will not impose sanctions on the UK, regardless of whether or not the OAS vote for it. He declares that his country; *“... continues to believe that, except in the case of legitimate defence, the collective measures referred to in Article 8 cannot be applied in an obligatory form, given their coercive nature, without the authorisation of the Security Council of the United Nations.”* Further discussion is deferred to the 26th. *The New York Times* reports.

“Argentina has invoked the wrong Treaty at the wrong time to promote the illusion that all Latin American nations support its seizure of the Falklands. They don't, and some that do serve only their own territorial ambitions.” ³⁰⁴

Asked at a Washington press conference whether Secretary Haig's effectiveness as a mediator is now at an end, President Reagan responds; *“No, it is not. He's done a magnificent job. And let me just lay one thing to rest now regarding some of the rumours that have gone on. This idea of whether or not we've endangered any prestige of ours in doing what we've done – I think we would have lost prestige if we had not been willing to undertake this job of trying to broker an agreement between these two parties and forestall violence.”*

Flying from Ascension Island, an RAF Handley Page Victor conducts a radar reconnaissance of South Georgia. A flight of 14 hours 45 minutes and encompassing some 150,000 miles of ocean around the Island. ³⁰⁵

302 *HC Deb 20 April 1982 vol.22 cc119-22*

303 Diary entry in Smith 1984 p.80

304 *The New York Times* April 22, 1982

305 Two more of these missions, some 7000 miles from Ascension, took place on the 22nd and 24th.

Day 20

April 21st – from the United Nations building in New York, Britain’s Permanent Representative, Anthony Parson’s telegrams the Foreign Office in London.

“If the Argentines succeed on 26 April in getting a two-thirds majority in favour of economic or other measures against the UK, this will be a major defeat for us in UN terms. ... The Argentines are continuing to press hard for the early adoption of a communique by the [Non-Aligned Movement] Coordinating Bureau. A drafting group has been set up under Cuban Chairmanship consisting of Argentina, Bangladesh, India, Nigeria and Yugoslavia. The present plan is for the Coordinating Bureau to meet on 23 April. The Argentines have apparently shown some flexibility and indicated a readiness to accept a reference to SCR 502, provided that there is a resounding reaffirmation of previous NAM pronouncements on sovereignty. We are working hard on the Commonwealth members of the drafting group, amongst whom Bangladesh is being particularly helpful. ...”

In London, Thatcher is informed that the aircraft carrier *Veinticinco de Mayo*,³⁰⁶ has been located.

*“After this morning’s meeting of the OD(SA) the Chief of the Defence Staff told the Prime Minister that it had been possible to identify the location of the Argentine naval force including the aircraft carrier 25 de Mayo in a patrol area between the Argentine coast and the Falkland Islands Maritime Exclusion Zone (MEZ). He had ordered one of the SSNs in the MEZ to proceed in the direction of the area in which the Argentine naval force was patrolling. Its distance from the area was about two days’ steaming. The object of this manoeuvre was to reduce the time which it would take the submarine to carry out an attack on the Argentine naval Force, if Ministers were to decide that it should do so. This manoeuvre would take the SSN outside the MEZ. Outside the MEZ she would be under ‘high seas’ rules of engagement, and would not be authorised to attack an Argentine surface warship save in self-defence....”*³⁰⁷

Francis Pym makes a statement to Parliament regarding his imminent departure to Washington.

“Any negotiation which is concluded satisfactorily must deal with certain critical points: in particular the arrangements for the Argentine withdrawal; the nature of any interim administration of the islands, and the framework for the negotiations on the long-term solution to the dispute for which the United Nations resolution calls. We put to Mr. Haig, when he was in London, ideas which we believed would commend themselves to the House and accord with the wishes of the islanders. He subsequently took them to Buenos Aires. The latest Argentine proposals – despite Mr. Haig’s efforts – still fail to satisfy our essential requirements in certain important respects relating to these points. They reflect continuing efforts by Argentina to establish by her aggression and her defiance of the United Nations ... what could not be established by peaceful means.”

A final decision is taken to recover South Georgia. TG 317.9, and *Endurance*, is ordered to proceed. In appalling weather conditions, after two failed attempts, SAS Mountain Troop, are placed on the Fortuna Glacier.³⁰⁸

At the Falkland Islands, in Berkeley Sound, Argentine helicopters bomb some of the islets with napalm.

“This afternoon the Pucarás again bombed the Tussac Islands in Port William. Savage flames cover the ground while a huge pall of dense smoke rises hundreds of feet into the air. God knows what all this is doing to the wildlife out there. It is being said, though it is difficult to find evidence to support it, that

306 Launched in 1943 as HMS *Venerable*, the carrier was sold to Holland in 1948 and then to Argentina in 1968.

307 Cabinet Office Minute Ref: AO8179 of April 21, 1982. Leading to a change in the rules of engagement. See below.

308 Permission to proceed with the reconnaissance missions had been given on April 20, 1982.

*the Argentine dead still being recovered from the invasion, and the deaths from exposure, are being put on the islands so that no trace remains of their losses, which during the invasion period were far heavier than admitted.”*³⁰⁹

From Buenos Aires, Argentina's Foreign Ministry sends a letter to Secretary Haig.

*“You are aware that Argentina is willing to continue negotiations. ... As it has been remarked so many times, (the) result must include a recognition of the Argentine sovereignty over the Islands. Although said recognition may not be expressly stated in the agreement, nevertheless, the principle and the concept should arise clearly and unequivocally from the wording of the agreement.”*³¹⁰

Argentine Boeing 707's identify the *Hermes* group which is sailing south.³¹¹

*“Lewin made the point to the War Cabinet that by shadowing the Task Force, the 707s could direct combat units, including submarines, to attack positions. He proposed that all Argentine aircraft engaged in surveillance should be treated as combat aircraft... The FCO was uncertain about the advantages this surveillance gave to Argentina but very clear politically about how the Argentines might exploit the downing of a civilian aircraft. They would undoubtedly claim this was on a normal transatlantic flight with a filed flight plan. At this sensitive moment,... the diplomats wanted a more cautious approach.”*³¹²

Special Boat Service (SBS) reconnaissance teams land on South Georgia from *Endurance*.

In Washington, Ambassador Henderson quietly informs Haig of the decision regarding South Georgia.³¹³

“Haig's immediate reaction, when I told him, was one of surprise and concern ... He thought that our proposed action would aggravate the problem and make a return to negotiation more difficult ... After he had had time to think about it a bit longer, Haig seemed to me to come round more in support of our proposed action, he quite saw the need for us to show firmness, which was all that the Argentine leaders would understand ...”

*“A few hours later, however, Haig recalled him, having been worrying about the implications of the British decision if the Argentines could then accuse Washington of colluding with London. As the Americans now had their own independent intelligence about the British operation (although it is unclear where this could have come from) he felt he should give the Junta advanced notice, although not so advanced that they could act on the information. This would help him maintain a display of even-handedness. Henderson was aghast... Haig then assured him that no prior notice would be given.”*³¹⁴

From Buenos Aires, US Ambassador Shlauderman contacts Washington to report that Argentina is expecting an attack on South Georgia.³¹⁵

309 Smith 1984 pp.83-84. Similar reports for April 21 in Bennet 2021, which adds that when asked on the 23rd, Carlos Bloomer-Reeve called it “target practice”. There has been much speculation regarding this event.

310 *Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, P820069-0211*

311 Equipped with Israeli reconnaissance systems. See November, 1984

312 Freedman 2005 vol.2. Following legal advice, a warning was issued to Argentina via the Swiss Embassy on the 23rd.

Britain's naval units were also observed by Soviet reconnaissance aircraft operating out of Angola. It is now known that the Soviets were passing intelligence material to Buenos Aires.

313 *Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, P820069-0211*

314 Freedman 2005 vol.2. Pym was not impressed, and Freedman notes that from then on the British checked all the information being passed on to Washington fearing that; “*our greatest ally is not wholly on our side.*” Haig had attempted to pressure the Argentines into a deal on the 17th, by telling them of ‘*imminent*’ British action. He may even have mentioned South Georgia. However, see note below.

315 *Ibid. Neville's Diary* in Bennet 2021 notes a news report heard on an American radio channel to the effect that part of the Task Force was heading towards the Islands of South Georgia.

Day 21

April 22nd – Foreign Office advice issued to all British nationals in Argentina, is that they should now leave the country. In Brussels, the European Parliament announces that it is; *“.. profoundly shocked by the invasion of the Falkland Islands by Argentina and more than ever convinced that territorial disputes should be resolved by peaceful negotiations, ... Condemns unreservedly the invasion of the Falkland Islands...”*

General Galtieri arrives in the Falkland Islands where his speech is recorded for a television broadcast. ³¹⁶

“I am sure and confident that the pale blue and white will not be lowered,.. The necessary defensive measures have been taken on the island... Here is the Argentine flag and, with all due respect to Great Britain and its people, they will have to understand that the world has changed and certain things cannot come back” ³¹⁷

“The official news agency Telam said Galtieri was tearful as he spoke from Puerto Argentina, the island capital that was known as Port Stanley during 149 years of British rule.” ³¹⁸

Galtieri reviews his forces' defences.

“... the British were most likely to land near to Stanley, in which case the Argentine reserves were inadequate. It was also agreed that a further regiment of infantry was needed, although the local commanders stressed the need to address the logistical issues that the extra men would raise. On his return to Buenos Aires, and without consultation, Galtieri decided to send an extra brigade...” ³¹⁹

On South Georgia, still suffering severe weather conditions, an attempt to pick up the Special Air Service team on Fortuna Glacier goes wrong. Two Wessex helicopters crash in “whiteout” conditions. However, there are no casualties and the group, plus pilots, are successfully taken off by Antrim's helicopter.

HMS *Brilliant*, with its two helicopters, is ordered to reinforce the ships at South Georgia. ³²⁰

Now in Washington, Britain's Foreign Secretary, Francis Pym, has a two hour meeting with Secretary Haig.

“Secretary Haig opened by describing the negotiating process in Buenos Aires, emphasizing its incoherence, the difficulty of finding a negotiating partner who could speak authoritatively, the relative weight of the Argentine Navy and Admiral Anaya in particular, and the role of the corps commanders. Returning here after three days of negotiation he had asked Foreign Minister Costa Méndez for a letter indicating that Argentines would accept the text established if it were acceptable to Britain, and been promised it, only to have Costa Méndez fail to deliver the letter at the airport, and indeed to advance the specious and unacceptable proposal that Argentina assume the governorship of the islands if the negotiations on their long-term status were to fail. The Secretary described Galtieri as a “Patton-type”, not particularly bright, and intensely worried about his survival. ... The Secretary concluded that Galtieri's life expectancy as President was very short, that Costa Méndez was not a valid interlocutor and thus that there was no point in having Costa Méndez sit down with Pym, as the former had proposed. The Secretary said that he saw no alternative but to return to Buenos Aires. ... Foreign Secretary Pym thought the gap between the British position and the Buenos Aires text was enormous, particularly when it was so hard to tell whom one could deal with.

316 Apparently, Galtieri's visit was as 'military commander' rather than as Argentina's head of State.

317 *Our flag will stay in the Falklands, Argentine Chief says* George de Lama in the *Chicago Tribune* April 23, 1982

318 *Ibid.*

319 Freedman 2005 vol.2. No consideration appears to have been given as to how these men would be housed.

320 Further attempts to insert reconnaissance teams over the next two days were also hindered by the weather, but, eventually, TG 317.9 managed to put men on the ground. HMS *Antrim* remained near South Georgia to monitor communications.

*If it were possible for the Secretary's mission to succeed, he would be all for it. But one must face the probable outcome. Clearly time is running out. .. Prime Minister Thatcher is resolute and not inclined towards further compromise. .. Foreign Secretary Pym asked the Secretary what possibility of success he saw and what chance of success there is if he returns to Buenos Aires. Secretary Haig said he was not optimistic and would have given up much earlier if that had been the criterion. He was only going on because of the historic consequence of failure. If there is war, Latin America will (regardless of the finer judgments of some of its leaders) line up against Britain. This would come to a head at the OAS meeting. ... Secretary Haig said that there was also no question but that the U.S. would shift if talks collapsed. We had told that repeatedly to the Argentines, and we believe they do not question it. What they do question is whether Britain will actually go to war.”*³²¹

Pym and his team work to amend Argentina's proposals in an attempt to find some middle ground. As amended, the proposals are - (1) an immediate cessation of hostilities, (2) neither side shall introduce more forces into the 'zone', (3) within 24 hours the UK is to rescind its *exclusion zone*, (4) both sides will withdraw half of their forces and equipment within 7 days; with the UK's force standing off to a distance equivalent of 7 days steaming at 12 knots. Argentina's forces to be put into a condition whereby they could not be reinserted within 7 days, (5) both sides forces to return to their usual operating areas or normal duties within 15 days, (6) the USA to verify compliance, (7) all economic and financial sanctions to be terminated without delay, (8) a Special Interim Authority to verify compliance which will also ratify decisions made by the local authorities on the Islands, (9) the Executive and Legislative Councils to have Argentine members drawn from the local community, (10) the flags of the UK, Argentina and the members of the Special Interim Authority to fly together at its HQ only, (11) residence and ownership of property to be equal between Islanders and Argentinians without prejudice to the rights of the inhabitants, (12) *“December 31, 1982, will conclude the Interim Period during which the signatories shall complete negotiations on removal of the Islands from the list of non-self governing territories .. and on mutually agreed conditions for their definitive status, including due regard for the rights of the inhabitants and for the principle of territorial integrity ..”*

Pym asks that the USA be the third member of the proposed Special Interim Authority and offer guarantees of compliance; a request passed to President Reagan for consideration.

Haig telegrams a message to Méndez regarding the need for a negotiated settlement; adding a reminder.

*“... you will recall I indicated to you on Monday (19 April) that we should all be concerned about the possibility of imminent military action in the area of South Georgia.”*³²²

Under the LANDSAT agreement, Argentina submits a request to the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) in the USA. A request for the provision of satellite images of South Georgia on the 24th and 25th. NASA is also asked for images of the South Atlantic to the west of South Georgia on the 25th and 26th. Washington informs London, explaining that they have little alternative but to honour the agreement.³²³

From Argentina's Washington Embassy, Ambassador Takacs contacts the US State department, seeking further information about an attack by British forces on South Georgia.

*“The evening news started with a statement by Admiral Woodward (Sandy), that he was declaring an air blockade as well as a sea blockade around the Islands”*³²⁴

321 Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S Special Handling Restrictions Memos 1979–1983, Lot 96D262

322 Freedman 2005 vol.2

323 An international satellite project into which many nations had invested; including the UK and Argentina. However, the images available were not of a high resolution, and there is some doubt that they would have actually provided much information.

324 Neville's Diary in Bennett 2021

Day 22

April 23rd – in London, Defence Secretary John Nott supports the Ministry of Defence's suggestion of an early deployment of Vulcan bombers to Ascension Island.

“The Vulcans with air refuelling has a radius of action and bomb carrying capability to reach the Falkland Islands from Ascension Island which is 3,350 miles away. A force of 10 Victor tankers would be required to support a single Vulcan round trip from Ascension Island. There is enough fuel at Ascension to support this operation. ...”

In Buenos Aires, the Swiss envoy acting on behalf of the UK, delivers a warning to the Argentine Government.

*“In announcing the establishment of a Maritime Exclusion zone around the Falkland Islands, Her Majesty's Government made it clear that this measure was without prejudice to the right of the United Kingdom to take whatever additional measures may be needed in the exercise of its right of self-defence under article '51 of the United Nations Charter. In this connection, Her Majesty's Government now wishes to make clear that any approach on the part of Argentine warships, including submarines, naval auxiliaries, or military aircraft which could amount to a threat to interfere with the mission of British Forces in the South Atlantic will encounter the appropriate response. All Argentine aircraft including civil aircraft engaging in surveillance of these British Forces will be regarded as hostile and are liable to be dealt with accordingly.”*³²⁵

*“It is clear from the above text that the warning applied outside the Exclusion Zone as well as within it. This message was notified to the United Nations Security Council and circulated accordingly on 24th April. It was also released publicly.”*³²⁶

*“... the combination of the MEZ and separate warnings regarding Argentine ships and planes outside the MEZ had a confusing effect on both the British task force and the international community. ... the existence of two separate rules of engagement, ..., was seemingly lost sight of by the Argentines and the international community, both of which were intently focused on the 200-mile MEZ.”*³²⁷

In Washington, UK and US negotiating teams meet to discuss amendments presented by Haig's team overnight.

*“The Secretary said that the pressure to achieve a negotiated, political settlement would not dissipate once military action began. Military action was unlikely to be decisive, and would probably drag on. World public opinion would insist on a solution. Pym agreed with the Secretary's observation, but said that once military action began, "people will have different perceptions." Haig commented that it was easy to slip into thinking in terms of negotiations versus war. This was false. A political solution would become even more imperative if a war started. The Secretary then suggested to Pym that they work through the text ...”*³²⁸

At the UN in New York, Anthony Parsons considers another approach to the Security Council.

“Recent conversations which I have had confirm that the longer we can keep out of the Council the better. The Non-Aligned members are already feeling slightly uneasy that a combination of our tactics and Panamanian/Argentine clumsiness led them to support a Resolution which contained nothing about the Argentine case on sovereignty. I have also had reliable confirmation that, if we use force, and particularly if we inflict casualties, there will be an immediate return to the Council ... and that we will

325 PREM19/621

326 Thatcher to Foukes September 19, 1984

327 Bratton P. & Thies W. 2011 p.9

328 Department of State, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, Miscellaneous Files, March 1981 – February 1983, Lot 83D210, D. Gompert

be seriously isolated. ... If the Haig mission collapses, someone is bound to call the Council fairly soon and there will be precisely those calls on us which we wish to avoid, eg. the suspension of military preparations combined with some time-consuming and ineffective mechanism such as the Secretary-General's good offices. All the above reinforces my conviction that we should for the moment continue to soldier on here for as long as we can,... avoiding recourse to the Council..”

In the Falklands, the Anglo-Argentine group that had arrived on the 16th, make another attempt to persuade the Islanders to accept Argentine rule.

“Despite having failed on their first attempt, the delegation returned the following week to propose building a separate town for the Argentines, allowing the Islanders to keep their way of life and customs. They claimed they had submitted this scheme to Lieutenant General Leopoldo Fortunato Galtieri ... the deputation announced their proposal over the radio-telephone and summoned a public meeting at the post office, eliciting firm rejections from the Falkland Islanders. The post office meeting was particularly ill-tempered, to such an extent that “it almost broke into open violence and all you could hear were cries of ‘Get out, and stay out.’” The locals’ responses to the proposals reveal how suspicious the Falkland Islanders were of the British community in Argentina: “Most people here consider that they are only there as long as their pockets are full,” explained one. “Although most frightfully British,” added another, “they are completely in the grip of the Argentines. They don’t appear to have any real loyalty; only a noxious mixture of greed and snobbery, probably more dangerous than the Argentines themselves.” A young Falkland Islander grumbled, “[t]here is no creature worse than an Anglo-Argie, their loyalty is purely to their pocket and the country which best suits their pocket at the time and NOTHING else.” ...”³²⁹

A meeting also takes place at the Secretariat.

“Bloomer opened the proceedings by referring to someone who had told an Argentine officer to leave the West Store. ‘Well’, said Olga, ‘I didn’t know he was your Governor Menendez. He was just another soldier in a uniform’ ... Bloomer welcomed us as representatives of the population, not in any official capacity, but, so that ‘they’ could explain what the future was to be for the people and the Islands. ... The Islands would be Argentine, the people would have all the privileges and freedoms of Argentine citizens. ... All people who married after 2 April 1982 would not be permitted to divorce as that is the Argentine law. Children would be taught Spanish at school. The younger the pupil, the more lessons in Spanish. Teachers would be brought over from the mainland as they would be better than teachers from elsewhere. It was hoped that all adults would voluntarily learn the language. People would learn to drive on the right-hand side of the road. Arrows had already been painted on the roads to help the Islanders. ... We were invited to go to Government House on Monday to listen to Argentine Governor General Menendez who would be only too pleased to give us more detailed explanations.”³³⁰

On station off South Georgia, HMS *Antrim* and HMS *Plymouth* rendezvous with HMS *Brilliant*. HMS *Endurance*, closer to the Island, remains in contact with the observation teams. Commander Young on *Antrim* hears on the BBC World Service that a British fleet is approaching South Georgia.³³¹

329 Mercau 2016

330 *Neville's Diary* in Bennett 2021

331 This was also reported in the *Chicago Tribune* on Friday, April 23, 1982 and would seem to have followed comments from a 'US intelligence source.' British reporters were embedded among the various elements of the British Task Force and there was often conflict over what should, and what should not, be reported. See Freedman 2005 vol.2

Endurance picks up emissions from a submarine's radar and issues a warning. The British tankers withdraw. ³³²

From London, Defence Secretary Nott orders the British submarine HMS *Splendid*, to patrol north-west of the Falklands. In the area that Argentina's aircraft carrier was reported to be, on the 21st.

"This would create the option of being able to execute retaliation should ministers so decide following an attack upon a British ship in the South Georgia area. This indicates that politically the critical consideration was where, when and against whom the first shots were to be fired rather than the second shots." ³³³

In Washington, following an evening round of discussions between Pym's team and that of Secretary Haig, Minister Pym considers the results; "... although the Secretary had tried very hard, the Prime Minister would certainly have great problems with the US draft. Nevertheless, he would face that problem tomorrow." ³³⁴

"Most of these two days was taken up with Pym's team going over the issues again with Haig and his officials. At first Haig was hoping to go once again to Buenos Aires to present 'reasonable proposals from London'..." ³³⁵

Secretary Haig contacts Argentina's Foreign Ministry in Buenos Aires.

"Have just ended our second day of tiring discussions with Francis Pym and his colleagues. As we had anticipated, the text that I brought with me from Buenos Aires is unacceptable to the British. We found strong resistance in those areas I told you about. Nevertheless, we have made a serious effort and are trying to achieve some progress. Now I hope to have a new text soon that you and I can review when we meet..." ³³⁶

"Nicholas Fenn, the British spokesman, said there was still 'life to the Haig mission' but all signs tonight were gloomy, because Mr. Haig had clearly been unable to persuade Mr. Pym to accept compromise ideas that he could bring to the Argentines." ³³⁷

Day 23

April 24th – acting on President Galtieri's instructions, but without suitable equipment, Argentina's 3 Mechanized Infantry Brigade commences a deployment to the Falklands archipelago. ³³⁸ Meanwhile, Argentina's air force begin reconnaissance missions over South Georgia. A Boeing 707 overflies *Endurance*.

From Florida, NASA tells Argentina that the LANDSAT images requested on the 22nd are unavailable due to "technical problems."

"Eagleburger made two further points. First, it was vital that this should not leak. Second, it was obvious that the longer the 'technical problems' continued, the more clear it would become to the Argentinians what was happening... It would be of great help to him ... to know whether ... this could be of some military value to the Argentinians." ³³⁹

From Washington, US Secretary of State, Alexander Haig, telegrams PM Thatcher in London.

³³² *Brambleleaf* had joined *Tidespring* with TG 317.9

³³³ Freedman 2005 vol.2

³³⁴ Department of State, Executive Secretariat, Files of Alexander M. Haig, Jr., 1981–1982, Lot 82D370, No folder. Drafted by Smith. The meeting took place in the Secretary's Conference Room at the Department of State.

³³⁵ Freedman 2005 vol.2

³³⁶ Quoted in Freedman 2005 vol.2

³³⁷ *New York Times*, April 24, 1982

³³⁸ Lacking suitable accommodation, much of this Brigade would be sent on to West Falkland.

³³⁹ PREM19/621. Telegram No. 1441

“Francis Pym and I have just concluded our discussions ... He will be bringing back to London a text which I put forward as a basis for a peaceful settlement. Francis made it very clear that some of what I suggested presented problems ... Whether the text we have suggested would be accepted in Buenos Aires I cannot say. It would certainly require the Argentines to move well beyond their positions at the end of my latest visit there...” ³⁴⁰

Haig also messages President Reagan.

“... it would be most useful if you could make clear to Mrs. Thatcher that we now face the last chance for a settlement before hostilities escalate, possibly beyond control. She must be clear that you are prepared to advocate acceptance of the current text with the Argentines, and on the public record, but that you are not prepared to stand behind the text if she makes changes that exclude altogether the possibility of Argentine acceptance.” ³⁴¹

Britain’s Foreign Secretary Pym sends his own message to Thatcher.

“Although I was able to persuade him to modify his position in some important respects during our two days of talks, his final draft still falls far short in several places of what we have regarded as acceptable, notably in respect of Argentine representation in the Islands Councils (para 6), Argentine scope for influence in the economic and related fields (para 7) and in precluding the continuation of the present colonial status (para 8).”

Pym flies back into London with the latest version of Haig’s peace plan, to be presented to an OD(SA) meeting. However, less than enthusiastic, PM Thatcher announces that she is prepared to resign if Britain’s Cabinet agree with Pym’s proposals.

“The document [Pym] brought back was a complete sell-out... a Foreign Secretary of Britain recommended peace at any price. Had it gone through, I could not have stayed.” ³⁴²

“The moment was a tense one: the operation to retake South Georgia was still uncertain... (Pym) later told the Ambassador (Henderson) that "he failed to realise how feelings were hardening at home so that when he got back he felt light-years away from the sentiment there." To the Prime Minister Pym had come back with a document she saw as "conditional surrender."...” ³⁴³

“Pym decisively supported the opportunity to accept the final plan worked out by the Americans, to which he himself had contributed during his visit to Washington in the two preceding days. Mrs Thatcher was determined to reject it. The divergence of positions risked breaking the unity of the War Cabinet, in one of the most delicate moments of the crisis. The solution was the compromise formulated by Nott: the British government requested the US to present the proposals first to those who had set off the crisis.” ³⁴⁴

The Cabinet decision is not to reject the plan outright, but to rely on President Galtieri rejecting it first. Thatcher telegrams Secretary Haig.

“This whole business started with an Argentine aggression. Since then our purpose together has been to ensure the early withdrawal by the Argentines in accordance with the Security Council Resolution. We think therefore that the next step should be for you to put your latest ideas to them. I hope that you will seek the Argentine government's view of them tomorrow and establish urgently whether they can accept

340 Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Europe and Soviet Union, United Kingdom (4)

341 Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Latin America/Central, Argentina (04/24/1982-04/26/1982)

342 Thatcher quoted in *The Daily Mail* April 15, 2013

343 Freedman 2005 vol.2

344 Bruni 2018

them. Knowledge of their attitude will be important to the British Cabinet's consideration of your ideas."

Haig agrees to talk again to Costa Méndez and promptly telegrams Méndez.

*"We believe that full-scale conflict with the United Kingdom is imminent. This information comes from our own sources; the British do not consult with us on such matters; nor do we have any means of restraining them."*³⁴⁵

*"As far as the British understood, Argentina was being asked for a straight 'yes or no' answer by midnight on 27 April on a text that the Americans had put beyond alteration. This indeed was the case."*³⁴⁶

In the Falklands, General Oscar Joffre, with the Argentine 10th Infantry Brigade, and Brigadier General Omar Parada, with the 3rd Infantry Brigade, arrive.

Off South Georgia, HMSs *Brilliant*, *Antrim* and *Plymouth* regroup, while *Conqueror's* area of operation is moved towards the north and north-east of South Georgia.³⁴⁷

At the United Nations, a copy of the warning handed to Argentina on the 23rd, is delivered for the attention of the Secretary-General (right).

UNITED NATIONS
SECURITY
COUNCIL



Distr.
GENERAL
S/14997
24 April 1982
ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 24 APRIL 1982 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF THE UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

Further to Mr. Whyte's letter dated 9 April 1982 (S/14963), I have the honour, on instructions from my Government, to inform you that the following communication was conveyed to the Government of Argentina on 23 April 1982:

"In announcing the establishment of a maritime exclusion zone around the Falkland Islands, Her Majesty's Government made it clear that this measure was without prejudice to the right of the United Kingdom to take whatever additional measures may be needed in the exercise of its right of self-defence under Article 51 of the United Nations Charter. In this connection, Her Majesty's Government now wishes to make clear that any approach on the part of Argentine warships, including submarines, naval auxiliaries, or military aircraft which could amount to a threat to interfere with the mission of the British forces in the South Atlantic, will encounter the appropriate response. All Argentine aircraft including civil aircraft engaging in surveillance of these British forces will be regarded as hostile and are liable to be dealt with accordingly."

I request that this letter be circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) A. D. PARSONS

*"The Military Junta of the Argentine Republic informs the Nation and the international Community that by virtue of the arbitrary and unscrupulous decision of the British Government, informed by the Embassy of Switzerland in our country, according to which, since April 12, 1982 at 04:00 am Greenwich, a true zone of aggression is constituted in international navigation waters, it has resolved to adopt self-defense measures in the aforementioned zone of aggression, in accordance with art.51 of the Charter of the United Nations; therefore, you should note that navigation in the mentioned area has become totally unsafe due to the existence of war material in it. For the same reason, the ships that (use) Puerto Soledad and the coves of the islands, must embark practical (measures) to enter. The Argentine Military Junta holds the British Government responsible for the consequences of the critical situation created, produced in circumstances in which a mission of the United States whose intervention said government accepted, tries to find ways of understanding."*³⁴⁸

345 Quoted in Freedman 2005 vol.2

346 *Ibid*

347 An issue that kept reoccurring was how to identify whether a submarine was friendly or an enemy; anti-submarine operations always had to consider that a contact could be either. Time was therefore always wasted in making sure that the friendly submarines were out of the area, which could take up to 30 hours.

348 *Communique #24* of the Military Junta, dated April 25, 1982, provided by Fabian Turcato.

Day 24

April 25th – Britain's War Cabinet and Chiefs of Staff meet at Chequers. ³⁴⁹

“This was the critical day in the battle for South Georgia. The Haig plan was on the table and the Argentine reaction was awaited, and there was anxiety about the extent of the American pressure Britain would face if Argentina replied positively.” ³⁵⁰

ARA *Santa Fé*, having landed 50 reinforcements and supplies for the garrison on South Georgia, is seen leaving Grytviken by HMS *Antrim*'s helicopter. The helicopter crew attacks the submarine with depth charges while helicopters from the other British ships join in.

Badly damaged and with a casualty, *Santa Fé* is abandoned in shallow water at King Edwards Point. Its submariners flee towards Argentina's Grytviken base.

“There was no sign of any activity ashore, not of distinct observations posts or defensive positions, although machine gun fire was reported. All agreed that the momentum must be maintained and the garrison attacked as soon as possible.” ³⁵¹

Seizing the initiative, albeit contrary to the original plan, the British commander at South Georgia orders an immediate attack. By an *ad hoc* company of 72 men formed from those Royal Marines, Special Boat Service and Special Air Service personnel who are at hand. This diverse assortment of specialists land under covering fire from *Antrim* and *Plymouth*'s 4.5" guns.


“The first troops moved forward cautiously, but when they got close to King Edward Point at 1705 they saw a white flag flying, which had in fact been raised soon after the start of the intense naval bombardment” ³⁵²

Argentina's 137 troops, together with the submarine's crew, surrender without a fight. ³⁵³

“The fall of South Georgia marked the start of a massive distortion of events by the junta. Official communiques described a prolonged and heroic defence against overwhelming British forces, with commando parties dispersing into the wilderness and holding out long after the main fighting ended – the last part of which was completely untrue.” ³⁵⁴

BBC Radio reports.

“... at about 6 pm London time, the white flag was hoisted in Grytviken beside the Argentine flag. Shortly afterwards, the Argentine forces there surrendered to British forces. The Argentine forces offered only limited resistance to the British troops. Our forces were landed by helicopter and were supported by a number of warships, together with a Royal Fleet Auxiliary. .. So far, no British casualties have been reported...”



349 The country home of serving British Prime Ministers.

350 Freedman 2005 vol.2

351 *Ibid.*

352 *Ibid.*

353 With Davidoff's scrap-metal party, the total was 180 prisoners.

354 Middlebrook 2003

A message from South Georgia is relayed to London;

"Be pleased to inform Her Majesty that the White Ensign flies alongside the Union Jack in South Georgia. God Save the Queen."

Outside No. 10 Downing Street, Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher speaks to reporters.

"Just rejoice at the news and congratulate our forces and the Marines... Just rejoice."

Informed on his arrival in Washington, Argentina's Foreign Minister, Costa Méndez, says, in an off-the-cuff remark, that Argentina is now at war.³⁵⁵ At the United Nations in New York, Argentine representatives complain about British, "armed aggression."

News circulates quickly. From Buenos Aires, the BBC reports anti-British demonstrations, while in Venezuela shipping workers announce a boycott of British ships.

*"Father had heard on the radio that the British had bombarded the island and a helicopter had engaged a submarine, the Santa Fe, and the whole lot had surrendered. ... I suppose there won't be lots of happy smiling Argy faces round the town now. Best policy will be tunnel vision and not smile at anything, wonder if there will be reprisals."*³⁵⁶

At a UN press conference, Secretary-General Perez de Cuellar appeals to both belligerents; "... to comply immediately with the provisions of Security Council Resolution 502 (1982) and to refrain from any action that would broaden yet further the conflict which threatens to have serious consequences for world peace."

*"Parsons immediately went to see the Secretary General to explain that this suggested that Britain had failed to comply with SCR 502, yet only Argentina was in breach. Perez de Cuellar took the point and 'was most apologetic.' He had tried to produce a neutral text but now saw that it could be regarded as equivocal."*³⁵⁷

From Lima, Peru, Britain's Ambassador Charles Wallace reports to London.

"Sources close to the President told me yesterday that he was deeply worried about the present situation. It was also suggested to me that there might be in existence a secret undertaking between the Argentine and Peruvian armed forces dating from ... 1979. ... The terms of the undertaking would commit the armed forces of each country to the defence of the other in case of aggression by a third, clearly with Chile uppermost in mind."

355 Both London and Buenos Aires decided to ignore this remark due to the implications of a formal declaration.

356 *Neville's Diary* in Bennett 2021

357 Freedman 2005 vol.2. Parsons would not allow the apology given by Pérez de Cuéllar to be passed on to the press, as he feared that it would be to the detriment of the relationship that he had forged with the Secretary-General. The result, however, was that Thatcher had an uncomfortable few days under fire from the Opposition parties in the Commons for appearing to ignore an appeal from the UN.

Day 25

April 26th – Margaret Thatcher sends a message to Secretary Haig.

“Our repossession of South Georgia has radically changed the situation. In particular it enables us to deal with the Falkland Islands in isolation. Equally it should bring home to Argentina her interest in negotiating for a settlement, but time is desperately short. Our task force is approaching the MEZ and the next stage of operations will have to start very soon. ... There is now no time to negotiate in detail. What we have in mind is as follows.

*If the Argentinians withdraw their forces from the Falkland Islands we will stop our task force and turn it back once Argentinian withdrawal is completed, provided that from that time onwards the United States will militarily guarantee the security of the Falkland Islands. This would secure the withdrawal of Argentinian forces in accordance with Security Council Resolution 502 and would secure the way for immediate negotiations in a conference to resolve the dispute. ... In the meantime the traditional Administration would be restored to the Falkland Islands but for the time being we should be prepared not to send back the Governor and to appoint an officer to administer the Government ad interim. We should be ready, during that time, to have an Argentinian Resident at Port Stanley to look after the interests of the Argentinians living in the Falkland Islands. If this proposal commends itself to you we need to decide how it should be launched. It would of course need your own wholehearted agreement and backing. ...”*³⁵⁸

Australia's Prime Minister issues a press statement.

“The British Government's decision to use force to re-establish its administration in South Georgia is a natural consequence of the invasion of the Falklands and South Georgia by Argentine forces, and the failure of Argentina to comply with the demands of the United Nations Security Council to withdraw its forces. Argentina has refused to take effective action to settle the dispute by peaceful means, and has ignored repeated warnings... The British military action should therefore not have come as a surprise...”

Thatcher addresses the House of Commons.

*“There is no lack of will on our part to negotiate. The trouble is in getting Argentina to withdraw. It may not be possible to achieve an Argentine withdrawal by negotiation, but that is what we are seeking. Argentina has had more than three weeks in which to comply with the Security Council resolution, but it has shown no inclination to do so. Indeed, it has reinforced its troops.”*³⁵⁹

In the South Atlantic, a 'defence area' is declared around the main body of the British naval Task Group as it sails towards the Falklands archipelago. Thatcher tells the BBC that the time for diplomacy is running out.

*“Democratic nations believe in the right of self-determination. ... The people who live there are of British stock. They have been for generations, and their wishes are the most important thing of all. Democracy is about the wishes of the people.”*³⁶⁰

In Buenos Aires, an estimated crowd of 10,000 people demonstrate against the war.³⁶¹

358 Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S Special Handling Restrictions Memos 1979–1983, Lot 96D262

359 HC Deb 26 April 1982 vol.22 cc609-17

360 BBC's Panorama April 26, 1982

361 Carbone 2008

At Leith, on South Georgia, Lieutenant-Colonel Alfredo Astiz³⁶² agrees to surrender his forces.

*“It was decided that we would go in at 08.30 and accept the surrender on the football pitch. However, at about 07.30, I had second thoughts about trying to land in an area which was still effectively controlled by enemy troops. I changed the rendezvous at the last moment and Astiz reluctantly agreed. The surrender went smoothly enough and Astiz confirmed our assumption that the building was heavily mined. In fact ... our suspicions were further aroused. ... There were wires leading out to the middle of the football pitch where they had marked an H for the helicopter landing. ... Astiz told me he had found the prospect vaguely amusing. I told him that the white flag obviously meant nothing to him...”*³⁶³



*“... Captain Astiz formally surrendered on board Plymouth. Together with the 39 scrap metal workers this now meant that the Task Group had nearly 200 detainees and prisoners of war.”*³⁶⁴

*“The captain-tormentor on South Georgia was unable to command anything but an instrument of torture. “Commander of the Electric Prod,” people called Astiz, a man with French-Basque and Scandinavian ancestry. The “Blond Angel of Death” he was called by his victims. To the end, he was a nasty piece of work. He had mined the football field at Grytviken after he had surrendered, so as to cause maximum damage to captain Nicholas Barker’s landing party from HMS Endurance. The one hundred and fifty Argentine troops under Astiz’s orders and the thirty-nine scrap metal workers whose presence on South Georgia had precipitated the conflict returned to Buenos Aires in mid-May. They had been well treated by their British captors but English food was abominable. They were ordered to say no more.”*³⁶⁵

On the Falklands, Governor Menéndez appoints himself as Head of the ‘Malvinas Joint Command’.³⁶⁶

*“It is Argentine Army Day, which was celebrated on the radio with a great speech to the troops by Gen. Menéndez, preceded by lots of inspiring music. The theme seemed to be that they are to fight like lions for their fatherland. He obviously has not seen some of his lions lately. A vet might come in useful.”*³⁶⁷

US Secretary Haig addresses the Twentieth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the Rio Treaty in Washington.³⁶⁸

“All of us know that we are dealing today with an enormously difficult and sensitive problem. Both the Republic of Argentina and the United Kingdom assert that their rights to the Islands have been denied. Argentina is motivated by a deep national commitment to establish possession of the Islands. It is frustrated by years of what it considers to be fruitless negotiation. Britain emphasizes its long standing possession of the Islands and asserts that the wishes of the inhabitants must be respected in any lasting

362 Astiz had previously been associated with an interrogation centre in Argentina known as the School of Naval Mechanics. He was also wanted by a number of countries with regard to the disappearance of their nationals.

363 Barker 1997

364 Freedman 2005 vol.2

365 Graham-Yool 2007

366 As Mendez was actually junior to both Joffre and Parada, his orders were often viewed as ‘suggestions’.

367 Diary entry in Smith 1984 p.102

368 The Organization of American States (OAS)

settlement. To understand these competing claims and the emotions on both sides does not mean to pass judgment on their validity. But this organization—and the world community—long ago made the judgment that force should not be used to solve international disputes. We shall all suffer if this fundamental principle of both the international order and hemispheric order, which the Rio Treaty was designed to protect, is ignored. I think all of us are aware of how many members of the OAS are involved in a dispute over territory with one or more of their neighbors. In the current conflict, the surest guide to a peaceful settlement is to be found in United Nations Security Council Resolution 502. It requires an immediate cessation of hostilities, an immediate withdrawal of Argentine forces on the Islands, and that the resolution of the problem be sought through diplomacy.”

“... Most Rio Treaty signatories were represented ... Costa Méndez's violent speech was followed by warm applause. A firm statement by Haig that force had been used by an American State and Security Council Resolution 502 laid down the basis for a settlement was greeted with total silence. .. Costa Méndez claimed ... British aggression threatened not only Argentina but the peace and security of the whole Latin American region. The British attack on South Georgia demonstrated how the UK disregarded the course of peaceful negotiation. The UK had answered Argentina's peaceful intentions with “an act of war. ... Argentina would defend itself to the maximum extent: the Argentine flag would not be lowered until the last drop of blood had been expended by the Argentine soldiers...”

From Washington, Ambassador Henderson reports.

*“Haig has telephoned me following his speech at the OAS which he said went down like a lead balloon. Nobody was likely again to call him even handed. He had spoken to Costa Méndez and told him that time had run out. Haig said that he would be presenting his proposals to the Argentinians on a take it or leave it basis. They would have 24 hours in which to answer yes or no.”*³⁶⁹

Estanislao Valdes Otero, President of the OAS, sends a message to PM Thatcher.

“I have been instructed to transmit the appeal of the Foreign Ministers of the Americas that the Government of the United Kingdom ... immediately cease the hostilities it is carrying on within the security region defined by Article 4 on the Inter-American Treaty of reciprocal Assistance, and also refrain from any act that may affect inter-American peace and security and immediately to call a truce that will make it possible to resume and proceed normally with the negotiation aimed at a peaceful settlement of the conflict, taking into account the rights of sovereignty of the Republic of Argentina over the Malvinas (Falkland) Islands and the interests of the Islanders.”

Secretary Haig notes.

*“I met with Costa Méndez, telling him that within forty-eight hours, the British would almost certainly strike again, bombarding airfields, launching commando raids. ‘We have no more time,’ I said. ‘The American proposal is fair and reasonable. If necessary, we will go public with it and let the world judge why these negotiations have produced no result.’ In Costa Méndez, I sensed a reluctance to forward the U.S. proposal. He told me that there was a virulent anti-American and anti-Haig atmosphere building in the country and in the junta. I offered to return to Buenos Aires and deliver the text to Galtieri and the junta myself. ... I asked that the junta inform me within twenty-four hours whether they could receive me. Costa Méndez promised to pass on the message.”*³⁷⁰

369 PREM19/621 Washington to FCO Telegram No. 1465 of 26 April

370 Haig 1984 p.291

Day 26

April 27th – Thatcher is informed that Secretary Haig has transmitted his proposals to the Argentine junta via the US Embassy in Buenos Aires; rather than fly there.

In London, plans for the reoccupation of the Falklands, *Operation Sutton*, are presented to the War Cabinet. Sir Ian Sinclair QC advises that Argentine prisoners should be treated as prisoners-of-war; under the terms of the Geneva Conventions.³⁷¹

Britain's *Daily Star* newspaper speculates about Chilean cooperation with Britain, in exchange for arms sales. Argentine naval forces are deployed to intercept the British fleet.

On the Falklands, 14 Islanders, deemed 'troublemakers' are detained at Fox Bay East.³⁷²

*"... we saw large numbers of fresh troops, who had clearly just arrived on some of the C-130's which came in during the latter part of the morning. They seem to be a sort of commando unit, very professional in appearance And somewhat older than the majority of those already here; about mid-twenties to early thirties... Hard looking men. We were just having tea in the front room when I happened to look out of the window in time to see Martyn being taken into a military vehicle by the new men... Captain Ramanov said that they were Special Forces whose authority superseded all other military, that those detained were about to be taken to a nearby settlement... life is going to be a trifle different from now on."*³⁷³

*"The Argies have imprisoned several local people: the Haynes family were taken away at 4pm with a few others: Velma and George Malcolm, Gerald Cheek, Owen Summers, Stewart Wallace and family. We are ordered to observe curfew and blackout from 6pm. Crowds of folk are now looking for safe accommodation in the hospital."*³⁷⁴

*"The local announcements said that some members of the community had been taken to a place of safety for their own protection. They would be treated well and looked after properly. There was a great spiel about the blackout and curfew We had to comply with the edict of Governor Menendez or else."*³⁷⁵

In Washington DC, during the US 97th Congress, Senator Joseph Biden proposes a resolution for consideration by the US Senate.³⁷⁶

"Declares that the United States cannot remain neutral towards the enforcement of the Security Council Resolution calling for the withdrawal of Argentine troops from the Falkland Islands. States

371 Thatcher had previously told the House of Commons that Argentine prisoners would not be classed as POWs as war had not been declared. Arrangements were needed to secure the POWs in a place that was sufficiently far from the area of operations to be safe and, as a result, the UK would choose to repatriate Argentine POWs as soon as it could be arranged – with exceptions, including Astiz. Eventually 151 POWs were repatriated via Ascension Island where they were first seen by the Red Cross (ICRC). Astiz would remain at Ascension while a decision was made as to the legal requirements of his disposal; representations having been made by the Swedish and French Governments.

372 There are many instances of the Islanders passing information back to the UK. Reg Silvey, Terry Peck, Vernon Steen and Trudi Morrison to name only a few. *cf.* Bound 2002

373 Diary entry in Smith 1984 pp.103 & 104

374 *Valerie's Diary* in Bennett 2021

375 *Neville's Diary* in Bennett 2021

376 *S.Res 378 – A resolution urging a statement of United States policy regarding the Falkland Islands.* Senator Biden proposed a further resolution on the 29th:- *S.Res 382 – A resolution stating United States policy regarding the Falkland Islands.* This resolution was passed 79:1.

that the United States should continue to help in the diplomatic efforts to end the crisis but should also prepare to use all appropriate means to assist the United Kingdom in achieving full withdrawal of Argentine forces and implementation of the principle of self-determination.”

From Washington, the US State Department sends an update to its embassy in Buenos Aires.

*“Events are moving quickly here and we will have to take action tonight to continue our effort to find a peaceful solution. The Secretary has talked to Costa Méndez and proposed that he travel to Buenos Aires immediately with the agreement text, as it has been refined since we departed Argentina. The President is prepared to call Galtieri if that is necessary.”*³⁷⁷

Haig sends a message to Francis Pym in London.

*“We believe that your success on South Georgia may now give us greater reason to hope that the Argentines will regard the presently drafted framework as a preferred alternative to further armed conflict. ... we have proposed to the Argentines that I leave for Buenos Aires as soon as that can be arranged – perhaps in the next few hours. ... If I do not go to Buenos Aires, I will instruct our Ambassador there to deliver our text and ask for a prompt Argentine reply, thus ... we should know within a day or two whether there is reason to hope that a settlement can be reached..”*³⁷⁸

Haig receives an answer to his suggestion that he fly to Argentina; *“Costa Méndez informed me that his government could not receive me in Buenos Aires at this time.”*³⁷⁹

From Washington, Ambassador Henderson telegrams Secretary of Defence John Nott in London.

“.. had a general discussion with Weinberger... he is delighted by the South Georgia operation and tells me that the President is also. He is sceptical whether the current negotiations are going to get anywhere.”

As the OAS continue its discussions in Washington, only Guatemala and Nicaragua endorse Argentina's invasion. Mexico, Trinidad, Costa Rica and Colombia are all critical.

Day 27

April 28th – From Washington, Secretary Haig telephones Foreign Secretary Pym; *“Mr. Haig said that there was still no word from Buenos Aires. There appeared to be a stalemate, with the Navy in favour of action, and the Air Force and Army preferring negotiation. ... if there was still no reply by the morning of 29 April, the United States would go public. ...”*

*“Pym and Henderson pressed Haig to acknowledge failure and blame Argentina. This he was reluctant to do, and anxiety about how far he might be prepared to go in search of a deal grew in London. Haig appeared to be expecting Argentine amendments and while he was prepared to dismiss most of their likely demands, he seemed to think that it might be possible to offer more on Argentine representation on the Legislative Council. He was even suggesting that midnight on 27 April had not been so much a deadline as a time when, absent an Argentine reply, the ‘whole situation would change.’ When pressed by Henderson on Argentine stalling tactics he said that he had ‘to go right down to the end of the line before coming down on our side.’...”*³⁸⁰

377 Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Cable File, Falkland File, 04/27/1982 (1)

378 PREM19/622

379 Caveat: Realism, Reagan and Foreign Policy A. Haig 1984 p.291

380 Freedman 2005 vol.2

Francis Pym instructs Ambassador Henderson in Washington; “... report to us immediately, when there is any clear response from Galtieri and the Junta...”

From Switzerland, the Red Cross (ICRC) appeals to both Britain and Argentina to fully discharge their obligations under the Geneva Conventions.³⁸¹

In London, Defence Secretary Nott makes a statement to the House of Commons.

“The following statement was issued by the Government earlier today:

From 1100 GMT on 30th April 1982, a Total Exclusion Zone will be established around the Falkland Islands. The outer limit of this Zone is the same as for the Maritime Exclusion Zone established on Monday 12th April 1982, namely a circle of 200 nautical miles radius from latitude 51 degrees 40 minutes South, 59 degrees 30 minutes West.

From the time indicated, the Exclusion Zone will apply not only to Argentine warships and Argentine naval auxiliaries but also to any other ship, whether naval or merchant vessel, which is operating in support of the illegal occupation of the Falkland Islands by Argentine forces. The Exclusion Zone will also apply to any aircraft, whether military or civil, which is operating in support of the illegal occupation. Any ship and any aircraft whether military or civil which is found within this Zone without due authority from the MOD in London will be regarded as operating in support of the illegal occupation and will therefore be regarded as hostile and will be liable to be attacked by British Forces.

Also from the time indicated, Port Stanley airport will be closed; and any aircraft on the ground in the Falkland Islands will be regarded as present in support of the illegal occupation and accordingly is liable to attack. These measures are without prejudice to the right of the UK to take whatever additional measures may be needed in exercise of its right of self-defence, under Article 51 of the UN Charter.”³⁸²

In Buenos Aires, the Swiss Embassy, acting on behalf of the British Government, inform the junta of the new exclusion zone around the Falklands.

“By the end of April, with negotiations deadlocked, the British decided to switch to... a coercive strategy of denial. For a denial strategy to work, four types of Argentine threats to the British naval task force had to be degraded or eliminated. The first was the three remaining Argentine submarines ... The second threat consisted of two Argentine naval surface groups,... The third and perhaps the most serious threat took the form of Argentine military aircraft based on the mainland.... (The TEZ) expanded the MEZ to include aircraft in addition to naval vessels.”³⁸³

In Washington, a final resolution is adopted by the Organization of American States (OAS).

“RESOLVES:

1. To urge the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland immediately to cease the hostilities it is carrying on within the security region defined by Article 4 of the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, and also to refrain from any act that may affect inter-American peace and security.

2. To urge the Government of the Republic of Argentina likewise to refrain from taking any action that may exacerbate the situation.

381 *PREMI9/622*. The Conventions applied in any state of war; any other type of armed conflict or when territory was occupied. The Junta would not declare the first; was reluctant to recognise the second and denied that it occupied foreign territory. As a result Argentina viewed the ICRC with suspicion.

382 *HC Deb 28 April 1982 vol.22 cc296-7W*

383 Bratton P. & Thies W. 2011 p.10

3. To urge those governments immediately to call a truce that will make it possible to resume and proceed normally with the negotiation aimed at a peaceful settlement of the conflict, taking into account the rights of sovereignty of the Republic of Argentina over the Malvinas (Falkland) Islands and the interests of the islanders.”³⁸⁴

The USA abstains.

On leaving the OAS meeting, Argentina’s Foreign Minister, Costa Méndez, tells the waiting press that; “*The first phase – OAS endorsement of Argentinian sovereignty – is complete.*”

From London, Francis Pym telegrams Alexander Haig.

*“The (OAS) Resolution is not acceptable to us. We cannot forego our undoubted rights of self-defence under Article 51 of the UN Charter, as the Resolution suggests we should. The OAS Resolution is to be conveyed to the President of the Security Council. Argentina may additionally seek an early debate in the Council and the adoption of a Resolution on similar lines. We have so far been successful in keeping the issue out of the Council since the adoption of SCR 502. ... We will be working hard to achieve this.”*³⁸⁵

Argentina, in a letter to the UN, describes the declaration of the TEZ as a, “*new act of aggression*” and calls the British use of force; “*... an unjustified act of reprisal aimed at restoring colonial occupation of the Argentine islands;..*” Argentine representatives also asserts that it is; “*... impossible for the United Kingdom to claim the right of self-defence, under Article 51, in islands situated 8,000 miles from British territory.*”

In New York, Anthony Parsons provides details of the TEZ to the President of the UN Security Council, adding; “*Port Stanley airport will be closed, and any aircraft on the ground in the Falkland islands will be regarded as present in support of the illegal occupation and, accordingly, is liable to attack.*”³⁸⁶

Parsons also raises the issue of self-determination.

*“Self-determination is usually referred to these days in the United Nations not as a principle, but rather as an “inalienable right”; in other words, it is a right which cannot be taken away. This right derives principally from the Charter and the Covenants on Human Rights. Article 1(2) of the Charter refers to self-determination of “peoples” and article 73 recognises that “the interests of the inhabitants” of territories such as the Falkland Islands are paramount. Article 1 of the two international Covenants on Human Rights contains the following provision: “1. All peoples have the right to self-determination. ...” Paragraph 3 of the same article establishes that the duty to promote the realisation of this right is imposed upon all state parties and not only upon those administering territories. The Falkland Islanders are a people. The United Kingdom ratified both the Human Rights Covenants on their behalf. They are a permanent population. ... The United Kingdom cannot accept that the right of self-determination as enshrined in the Charter and the Human Rights Covenants is subject to a special exception in the case of the Falkland Islands. This conclusion is confirmed by the Friendly Relations Declaration, adopted by consensus in 1970. ...”*³⁸⁷ *Whilst no doubt much time and energy could be spent in reviewing the history of the Falkland Islands between the first settlement in 1764 (sic) and 1833, and whilst the United Kingdom is confident about the strength of its legal case over that period, these*

384 OAS Doc. OEA/Ser.F/II.20 Doc. 28/82 rev.3

385 Department of State, Executive Secretariat, Files of Alexander M. Haig, Jr., 1981–1982, Lot 82D370, (2) Falklands Crisis-1982.

386 PREM19/623 telegram No.627 1 May 1982

387 Resolution 2625 (XXV) - Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations A/RES/25/2625 1970

factors cannot be allowed to override the right of self-determination. ... If the international community were to discount 149 years of history, there would hardly be an international boundary which did not immediately become subject of dispute.” ³⁸⁸

In Peru, airport workers impose a boycott of British aircraft and cargoes.

Secretary Haig meets with Costa Méndez in Washington to convey the latest proposal.

“The essential message Costa-Mendez conveyed was the following: the GOA (Government of Argentina) believes the Rio Treaty MFM resolution strengthened its position with Argentine and world opinion, but realizes there are only two options for resolving the Falklands dispute: a continuation of the U.S. effort or through the U.N. The U.N. route would require major readjustments in Argentine foreign policy which the GOA does not want to make (and Costa-Mendez even less), and the outcome would be uncertain. Therefore, Argentina wants the U.S. effort to continue. However, it cannot accept the proposal as it stands; the GOA has difficulties with what it perceives as lack of a deadline for resolving the sovereignty issue, with the administrative arrangements for the interim period, and with the political resolution article, particularly the reference to the wishes and interests of the inhabitants.

The Secretary told Costa-Mendez that only the U.S. is in a position to achieve a satisfactory solution. He understood the reference to adjustments in Argentina's foreign policy, but did not believe any Argentine Government could undertake a close alliance with the Soviets. As for the text of the proposal, the Secretary told Costa-Mendez that we see no prospect for any significant changes being accepted by the British.

The UK has serious problems with it as it stands; however, if the GOA agrees to the proposal, we are confident that we can prevail upon the UK to accept, provided full-scale fighting has not yet begun. According to our information (the Secretary stressed again that the British are keeping their plans to themselves), a British attack could begin as early as Friday. ... The Secretary and Enders went over the three points Costa Mendez had listed as stumbling blocks, pointing out that the essential concerns of the GOA have been preserved with only minor modifications from the text at the time the Secretary departed Buenos Aires.... It is in our judgment a fair and reasonable proposal, one which the U.S. can stand behind. ... if the GOA concludes definitively that it cannot accept the proposal, there should also be no doubt that the U.S. will have to come down strongly on the side of the UK.” ³⁸⁹

Alexander Haig gives Costa Méndez 24 hours to respond.

“Costa Mendez did not make any proposals but went out and told the press that the American draft had not been rejected and negotiations continued.” ³⁹⁰

From Washington, Haig telephones Pym in London.

“Costa Méndez ... had made a clear and plaintive request for the negotiating process to continue. Costa Méndez has said that the alternatives were for Argentina to bring in "the others" (by which Haig presumably meant the Russians: Haig commented that he doubted that they would be interested) or go to the UN. He had asked Haig whether he would forward further suggestions to us. Haig had told him that the proposals as they stood offered Argentina more than she could reasonably have expected. There was no hope of improving them...” ³⁹¹

388 UN Doc A/37/582

389 Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Cable File, Falkland File 04/28/1982

390 Freedman 2005 vol.2

391 Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Cable File, Falkland File 04/28/1982

Day 28

April 29th – British Vulcan bombers arrive at Ascension Island. A meeting of the Ministry of Defence's Special Project Group notes a dispute with the BBC over the MOD's plan to broadcast to Argentine troops on the Falklands.

*"Mr. Douglas Muggerridge, Head of Overseas Broadcasting, has persuaded the FCO to oppose the proposal... Mr. Protheroe, Asst Director general and our earlier contact, does not seem to share his colleagues view."*³⁹²



British intelligence suggests that Brazil is selling aircraft to Argentina's Air Force.³⁹³

In London, the Cabinet meet at Downing Street; *"... that morning the Cabinet were being prepared for a possible situation in which it could no longer be assumed that Britain would retain American support, important though it was... The American effort to remain conspicuously neutral politically had taken its toll. There had been no economic measures taken by Washington, a refusal to take a stand on the sovereignty issue, and a readiness to conduct business as usual with Buenos Aires. After the Cabinet Pym wrote to Haig expressing the surprise of his colleagues that deadlines had passed without an American response..."*³⁹⁴

From London, Margaret Thatcher sends a message to President Reagan.

*"... the proposals must now be regarded as having been rejected by the Argentines, who have ignored the deadline and publicly restated that they are not prepared to alter their position on sovereignty. It made clear to Francis last week that, if Argentina did reject the proposals, the U.S. would consider its current peace-making efforts to have ended and would from then on give full public support to Britain. In the Cabinet's view, this point has now been reached. I cannot conceal from you how deeply let down I and my colleagues would feel if under these circumstances the U.S. were not now to give us its full support."*³⁹⁵

Reagan responds to PM Thatcher.

*"... There can be no doubt about our full support for you and the principles of international law and order you are defending. You can count on that support in whatever forum this issue is debated. You can also count on our sympathetic consideration of requests for assistance."*³⁹⁶

Argentina announces a 200 mile *exclusion zone* against British shipping and aircraft, extending from the Falkland Islands and South Georgia. Argentina's navy prepares to intercept Britain's Task Force. One attack group moves towards the north-west of the Falklands, while the other approaches the Islands from the south.

In Buenos Aires, Ernesto Sabato, a staunch opponent of the junta writes in *La Nacion*.

392 Information supplied by Chris Greenway, BBC Monitoring. Broadcasts went ahead despite the opposition.

393 A further report (*Telegram 291615*) suggested that Russia was offering support to Argentina up to, and including, military assistance. Source identified as the Buenos Aires correspondent of the '*Mañana*' journal.

394 Freedman 2005 vol.2

395 *Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Cable File, Falkland File 04/29/1982 (1)*

396 *PREM19/622 Prime Minister's Personal Message T91/82*

“In Argentina it is not a military dictatorship that is fighting. It is the whole people, her women, her children, her old people, regardless of their political persuasion. Opponents to the regime like myself are fighting for our dignity, fighting to extricate the last vestiges of colonialism. Don't be mistaken, Europe, it is not a dictatorship that is fighting for the Malvinas; it is the whole nation.”

In Washington, Costa Méndez finally reports his Government's rejection of Haig's final proposal.

*“As my Government has already indicated to you, Argentina's objective is the recognition of its sovereignty over the Malvinas Islands. That central element of our discussions is the ultimate justification for the actions undertaken by my country and ... is for us an unrenounceable goal. ... To the extent that the provisions relating to the recognition of our sovereignty are imprecise, we deem necessary, if we wish to avoid a return to the frustrating situation that existed prior to April 2, the establishment of mechanisms that give us greater powers for the administration of the Islands... As concerns the question of sovereignty, all precision regarding the concept of territorial integrity has been abandoned, and a new element has been introduced, a virtual referendum to determine the "wishes" of the inhabitants, in open opposition to United Nations Resolution 2065 we cannot accept these changes...”*³⁹⁷

*“Haig had another tough meeting with Costa Méndez at which he indicated what he considered to be the dire consequences of the Argentine position... When Costa Méndez asked whether the UK had rejected the American proposal, Haig replied that they did not like it all as the document offered a fundamental change in the status quo of the islands. Yet if Argentina accepted it, he would force Britain into doing likewise. He would not contemplate further changes to the draft.”*³⁹⁸

In London, updating Parliament, PM Thatcher deals with a suggestion of arbitration.

*“Although we have no doubt about our sovereignty over the Falkland Islands, South Georgia, South Sandwich or British Antarctic Territory, some of my right hon. and hon. friends have suggested that we refer the matter to the International Court of Justice. Since Argentina does not accept the compulsory jurisdiction of the court, the issue cannot be referred for a binding decision without her agreement. We have never sought a ruling on the Falkland Islands themselves from that court, but we have raised the question of the dependencies on three separate occasions—in 1947, 1949 and 1951. Each time Argentina refused to go to the court. In 1955, the British Government applied unilaterally to the International Court of Justice against encroachments on British sovereignty in the dependencies by Argentina. Again, the court advised that it could not pursue the matter since it could act only if there was agreement between the parties recognising the court's jurisdiction. In 1977, Argentina, having accepted the jurisdiction of an international court of arbitration on the Beagle Channel dispute with Chile, then refused to accept its results. It is difficult to believe in Argentina's good faith with that very recent example in mind. There is no reason, given the history of this question, for Britain, which has sovereignty and is claiming nothing more, to make the first move. It is Argentina that is making a claim. If Argentina wanted to refer it to the International Court, we would consider the possibility very seriously. But in the light of past events it would be hard to have confidence that Argentina would respect a judgement that it did not like.”*³⁹⁹

397 PREM19/622 Telegram 1517 of 29 April. Also Department of State, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, *Miscellaneous Files, March 1981–February 1983, Lot 83S210, Falklands [Folder 1]*

398 Freedman 2005 vol.2

399 HC 22/980-85

In Washington, Secretary Haig updates his country's Senate Foreign Affairs Committee.

“We went first to London, then to Buenos Aires, and then again to Buenos Aires, as you know. We had extensive discussions at the highest level. In Great Britain it was relatively easy because the government is structured and organised pluralistically and democratically. The Cabinet sits down with the Prime Minister, and business is done. In Argentina there is no one who can make a decision. There are variously from 20 to 40 people who can cast a veto on any decision that is made. And so instead of a consensus of what you would call a majority view, it is the lowest common denominator of the most extreme view that prevails... I must say that the British Government, from the outset, has been reasonable and easy to deal with. Their position has been that sovereignty is not a critical issue. What is a critical issue is that the will of the population, self determination is the key issue. And if the population decides to go with Argentina, so be it; if they decide to stay aligned with Britain or seek independence, so be it. The British are prepared to accept that. ... On the Argentine side, despite all our effort the Argentines have insisted bedrock, fundamental a priori relinquishment of sovereignty, either in the near term ... So it's not just a question of decolonization; its a question of recolonization on top of decolonization.”

Asked about taking the issue to either the ICJ or the World Court. Haig tells the Committee that such an approach would not be acceptable to Argentina.

*“I have talked adjudication by the World Court, by the UN, or by a special commission. It was rejected all.”*⁴⁰⁰

In Washington, the US Senate resolves.

*“... the United States cannot stand neutral with regard to the implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 502 and recognizing the right of the United Kingdom, and all other Nations, to self-defence under the UN Charter, should therefore prepare, through consultations with Congress, to further all efforts ... to achieve full withdrawal of Argentinian forces from the Falkland Islands.”*⁴⁰¹

“Earlier Thursday, the House Foreign Affairs Committee approved by voice vote another resolution expressing 'full U.S. diplomatic support' for Britain should it go to war with Argentina over the Falklands. The Senate resolution said 'the United States cannot stand neutral with regard to implementation of U.N. Security Council Resolution 502,' which accused Argentina of aggression and called for its withdrawal. Recognizing Britain's right to self defense under the U.N. Charter, it called on the administration 'through consultations with Congress, to further all efforts, pursuant to Security Council Resolution 502, to achieve full withdrawal of Argentine forces from the Falkland Islands.' Helms had threatened to filibuster if a stronger resolution he considered to be too offensive to Argentina was brought up. 'It would have been dangerous to throw away our coalition for cooperation we must have to prevent a communist takeover of Central America,' Helms said. But Sen. Joseph Biden, D-Del., a member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and author of the earlier resolution, said the one approved by the Senate 'clearly recognizes the United States is on the side it should be on, the side of Great Britain.'

400 Briefing by the Honorable Alexander M. Haig Jr. Secretary of State before Key House Leadership and House Foreign Affairs Committee – Room 2172, Rayburn Building, Washington DC 4/29/82. Worthy of note that this was the second time that Argentina had been offered the opportunity to take its arguments to the International Court of Justice (ICJ). See 1968.

401 PREM19/623 79 votes for, 1 against (Helms)

*'We stand four square with Great Britain. Argentina was wrong. Great Britain was right,' Biden said. Sen. John Warner, R-Va., said, 'We are gravely concerned that the Argentine government abandoned the rule of law and replaced it with the rule of force.' Sen. Daniel Moynihan, D-N.Y., paraphrased Dante, saying, 'The hottest spots in hell are reserved for those who in time of danger maintain neutrality. We have just avoided that by supporting Britain.' The Senate resolution noted that 'on April 2, 1982, armed forces of Argentina seized and occupied the Falkland Islands, a crown colony of the United Kingdom.' It added: 'The United States Government has provided good offices to the search for the diplomatic solution required by Security Council Resolution 502 and called for by the Organization of American States.' It noted that 'no treaty obligation of the United States requires or implies United States support of ... any act of international aggression' and that there are long standing bonds of friendship between the United States and the Britain. The House resolution also calls on Argentina to withdraw its military forces from the disputed Falklands Islands in accordance with U.N. Security Council Resolution 502.'*⁴⁰²

After the meeting, US Senator Joseph Biden is interviewed by CBC journalist Barbara Frum.⁴⁰³

"It's clear that the Argentinians are the aggressor; it's clear the British are right & it should be clear to the whole world where the United States stands."

At the United Nations, Argentina accuses the UK of; *"unleashing a new colonialist war."*⁴⁰⁴

From New York, Sir Anthony Parsons informs London; *"I have spent most of the day in the company of all other members of the Security Council. There is an atmosphere amongst them of great tension and expectation e.g., of a dramatic military move by us any day now, but no sign that any of them are contemplating calling the Council. This hesitation may disappear if Haig announces failure ... tomorrow..."*

At midnight in Buenos Aires, the US Ambassador is granted an audience with President Galtieri.

*"I asked to see President Galtieri and was received at midnight ... I told Galtieri that we came without instructions and with the only purpose of seeing what we could do to head off a fatal confrontation. I pointed out to the President that we had not received an adequate response to our proposal and that we would announce tomorrow several measures against Argentina. During more than an hour's conversation, he demonstrated no give whatsoever..."*⁴⁰⁵

Across Argentina, general censorship is imposed for reasons of - *"national security."*⁴⁰⁶

"All information and news from abroad, whatever its source or form, and all information related to aspects which pertain to the development of military operations and national security will be subject to control by the Joint Chiefs of Staff before publication by the news media, whether oral, written or televised."

402 UPI Archives April 29, 1982

403 Biden was elected US President in 2020. This news article circulated widely within Argentina during the election campaign.

404 UN Yearbook 1982

405 AMEMBASSY Buenos Aires to SECSTATE WASHDC FLASH 3485

406 Graham-Yool 2007

Day 29

April 30th – in the USA, investigative journalist Jack Anderson, speaking on the *Good Morning America* television programme, alleges that the British Task Force is armed with tactical nuclear weapons that they have US authority to use.⁴⁰⁷

*“Even taking nuclear weapons into the South Atlantic could appear as a violation of the Treaty of Tlatelolco (1967), which had established Latin America and surrounding waters (including the Falkland Islands and the Dependencies) as a nuclear weapon free zone. Strictly speaking there could be no violation because not all states had signed and ratified the Treaty, while extra-continental states with responsibilities for territories within the intended zone of application were required to sign and ratify Additional Protocol I, with nuclear weapons states also acceding to an Additional Protocol II. Argentina had signed the Treaty in 1967 and while it had publicly announced its intention to ratify it had not yet done so. The United Kingdom had signed both protocols in 1967 and ratified them in 1969. ... The presence of a nuclear-powered warship in Falkland islands territorial waters would not contravene the Treaty as it was so clearly unrelated to nuclear weapons.”*⁴⁰⁸

*“... we did have some nuclear depth charges. We did have some being carried with the Task Force and they were being transferred from ship to ship for safety reasons and to meet our obligations under the Treaty of Tlatelolco. The weapons themselves were not deployed in the course of the conflict. We said in 1982 that there was no question at all of our using nuclear weapons in this dispute....”*⁴⁰⁹

In Washington, Secretary Haig reports to a US National Security Council meeting.

“Unfortunately, the Argentine government which is, in fact, made up of many moving and conflicting parts could not agree to the plan. The Navy holds the veto and is even more intransigent after losing South Georgia, whose Argentine garrison surrendered without firing a shot – a fact known to the Argentine government, but not to the Argentine people.”

During the discussion, Bud McFarlane informs President Reagan that the Soviet Union has repositioned a satellite in order to keep track of the *Task Force*.

In a press statement, Haig announces Argentina's rejection of his peace proposals.

*“Argentina's position remains that it must receive an assurance now of eventual sovereignty, or an immediate de facto role in governing the islands, which would lead to sovereignty. For its part, the British Government has continued to affirm the need to respect the views of the inhabitants in any settlement. ... in the light of Argentina's failure to accept a compromise, we must take concrete steps to underscore that the U.S. cannot and will not condone the use of unlawful force to resolve disputes ... The President has therefore ordered: the suspension of all military exports to Argentina; the withholding of certification of Argentine eligibility for military sales; the suspension of new export-import bank credits and guarantees; and the suspension of commodity credit corporation guarantees.”*⁴¹⁰

407 It would take nearly 40 years before the details emerged fully. In fact, 31 WE177 nuclear depth charges had been taken south for the simple reason that there had been no time to offload those weapons before the fleet's hurried departure. As the Task Force sailed south, the depth charges were unshipped from their host vessels and by the middle of May, 1982, 12 were stored on HMS *Invincible* and 18 on HMS *Hermes*. RFA *Regent* had one in its hold. None of these vessels entered Falklands waters during the 74 day conflict.

408 Freedman 2005 vol.2. Argentina only ratified the 1967 Treaty of Tlatelolco in 1994.

409 Ministry of Defence April 2010

410 *Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Cable File, Falkland File 05/03/1982 (1)*. See May 2nd

*“On April 30, in light of Argentina’s continued unwillingness to compromise, we took concrete measures to under-score that the United States could not and would not condone the unlawful use of force to resolve disputes.”*⁴¹¹

*“... mediation attempts failed, and on April 30 the United States openly sided with Great Britain provoking feelings of betrayal in most Latin American nations.”*⁴¹²

In New York, and coinciding with Haig's press conference, Costa Méndez informs Secretary-General Pérez de Cuéllar that his country does not see the negotiations as 'dead'. Méndez asserts that Argentina is ready to abide by SC resolution 502 and accept a transitional administration; *“... until the exercise of full Argentine sovereignty became possible.”*

In London, responding to press inquiries, Francis Pym makes a statement to the Press.

“In deciding not to cooperate in negotiations for a peaceful settlement, the Argentines have confirmed their commitment to aggression in defiance of the UN ...”

Alan Copeland of the *Daily Express* asks whether Pym's planned trip, to see the UN Secretary-General, precludes any immediate use of force by Britain.

“No, because we are facing force now. As I have described they have a fleet at sea, they've got thousands of soldiers on the islands, they're occupying territory which they have no right to occupy. No. We are going to maintain our total exclusion zone. That is the position. If they challenge it, then of course there will be military action and that's how it is ...”

Ecuador's Foreign Minister issues a Press statement.

“I have just learnt with profound concern of the attitude of the United States in imposing sanctions against the Argentine Republic and in supporting Great Britain. I must point out that the Resolution of the ... (OAS).. is obligatory for all the States members of the Treaty of Inter-American Reciprocal Assistance. ... The Resolution recalls the declaration of the Inter-American Legal Committee in the sense that, “the Argentine Republic has an unimpeachable right of sovereignty over the Islas Malvinas.” This is a legal and moral obligation which the members of the Treaty have assumed by virtue of the Resolution. In these circumstances the support which has been announced and declared by the United States for Great Britain and the imposition of sanctions against the Argentine Republic constitute disregard of the obligation which the United States assumed ...”

Brazil writes to the UN Secretary-General requesting the use of his 'good offices' in finding a peaceful solution.

“It is the responsibility of the United Nations to take prompt and effective measures, including those of a preventative nature, to ensure the implementation of Security Council Resolution 502 (1982)..”

Peru’s representatives also objects to US sanctions.

“The Government of Peru deplores the fact that the Government of the United States has adopted measures that clearly place it in favor of one of the involved parties and that, in effect, virtually concludes Your Excellency's exercise of good offices. Furthermore, my government considers the offer

411 *The South Atlantic Crisis: Background, Consequences, Documentation* US Dept of State, Bureau of Public Affairs August 5, 1982 (evidence of Assistant Secretary Enders)

412 *All You Will See is the One You Once Knew: Portrayals From the Falklands/Malvinas War in U.S. and Latin American Newspapers* Carolina Acosta-Alzuru & EUi P. Lester-Roushanzamir 2000

*made by the Government of the United States to offer material military aid to one of the parties as contravening the purposes of Resolution 502 of the Security Council of the United Nations by potentially contributing to the aggravation of the hostilities.”*⁴¹³

In New York, Argentine Foreign Minister, Costa Méndez, contacts the President of the UN Security Council.

*“... (a) he reaffirmed Argentina's wish for a negotiated settlement: (b) Argentina was ready for the implementation of SCR 502 "as a package": (c) Argentina hoped that there would be no confrontation. The UK was using disproportionate force and an armed encounter could have unforeseen consequences: (d) Argentina was ready to accept a transitional period in which all aspects of the dispute could be resolved: (e) the question of sovereignty was of the greatest importance to Argentina. Argentina was disposed to accept a mutually agreeable formula on sovereignty during the transitional period: (f) so far as Argentina was concerned, Haig was still in action but his latest proposals on sovereignty had not been acceptable to Argentina: (g) Argentina would accept the presence of a UN force in the Islands in order to enable Argentina to withdraw and to begin the transitional period.”*⁴¹⁴

From the British Embassy in Washington, Ambassador Henderson reports on Argentina's economic position.

“Major US banks are seeking to limit use of Argentine short-term credit lines to the levels reached before the crisis. Smaller banks with a high exposure in Latin America are pulling out as soon as credits mature, and building their liquidity against the possibility of deposits being shifted away from them. One of these banks felt that even if there was an immediate political settlement, there was no way that Argentina could avoid going broke within 2 months or so, ...”

At the UN, Secretary-General Pérez de Cuéllar summons Sir Anthony Parsons.

“Costa Méndez had said that Argentina was ready to abide by SCR 502. There would of course have to be a phasing out period for the withdrawal of Argentine troops: and a transitional administration until the full exercise of Argentine sovereignty became possible. Recognition of Argentina's right to sovereignty was a basic condition. Apart from that, Argentina was ready to enter into negotiations on the widest possible basis. She was ready to take into consideration the “interests” of the Islanders but not their “wishes” which had been imposed by the Administering power. But she could accept a form of local administration which retained a British flavour ... Argentina was therefore open to all possibilities, except on sovereignty...”

I said that it was impossible for the British Government to concede sovereignty in advance, or to accept conditions implying that they were prepared to concede sovereignty. I thought that when Costa Méndez said that Argentina was ready to implement SCR 502 in its entirety, he was implying that he would start at the bottom end of the Resolution. ... Britain could not accept a process of mediation or negotiation while the Argentines dug themselves in... Finally, Pérez de Cuéllar said that, if Argentina stated officially that Haig's mission was dead, a void would exist which he and the Security Council would be expected to fill. ...”

Parsons telegrams the Foreign Office in London.

“Costa Méndez's various statements here today amount to a smart PR move... My guess is that his purpose has been to present the Argentine position in the most favourable light particularly in UN eyes

413 Unconfirmed intelligence reports suggested that Peru was in the process of loaning military aircraft to Argentina.

414 PREM 19/623 Telegram No. 612 of 30 April 1982

and try to distract attention from US and UK responses to the failure of Haig's mission. He has succeeded in creating the impression of a change in the Argentine position ... I do not think however that we need to take Costa Méndez's PR success too tragically. His statements have been small beer by comparison with those of Haig ... and they will soon be overtaken by a presumably less diplomatic response from the Generals in Buenos Aires ... ”

A UN spokesman announces that Secretary-General Pérez de Cuéllar has offered his “good offices.”

*“On 30 April I met at United Nations Headquarters with Mr. Nicanor Costa Mendez, Minister for Foreign Affairs and Worship of the Republic of Argentina. Later that day I received a letter from Mr. Alexander Haig, Secretary of State of the United States of America, which provided information on the American proposal which had been presented to the parties and a statement of the position taken by the United States in the light of the existing situation.”*⁴¹⁵

British intelligence suggests that Argentina's navy has been divided into three groups. That supporting Argentina's aircraft carrier, *25 de Mayo*, is sailing towards the north of Britain's declared TEZ. Another, led by *Belgrano*, is patrolling to the south of the archipelago. Reports suggest that a third group is also headed south.

In the South Atlantic, British submarine *HMS Conqueror* is ordered to search for the *Belgrano* group; “*One curiosity lay in the activity of the southern Argentine Task Force, composed of the Belgrano and two destroyers. A few days earlier it had appeared to be guarding against Chile, and was even believed to have infringed Chilean territorial waters... possibly trying to provoke the Chilean Navy. ... By the evening of the 29 April the group was noted to be patrolling between the Isla de los Estados and the Burwood Bank, in order to draw out British forces and test reactions within TEZ. The cruiser took up a course that would take it into the southern edge of the TEZ early Sunday morning where it would remain for a limited time before withdrawing. There were also indications that both Argentine Navy 209 submarines, were operating in the TEZ. Information on Argentina's offensive intent was distributed in intelligence summaries on the evening of 30 April...*”⁴¹⁶

In New York, Argentina submits a letter addressed to the UN Security Council.

*“... the United Kingdom has no legal grounds whatsoever for invoking the right of self-defence provided for in Article 51 of the Charter in justification of the military aggression it is carrying out in the South Georgia Islands. The fact that three weeks elapsed between Argentina's recovery of those islands for its national patrimony and the British attacks which began on 25 April, and the fact that the islands are 8,000 miles from the territory of the United Kingdom, clearly show how inappropriate it is to invoke Article 51 of the Charter as justification for this manifestly illegitimate use of force. ... The Argentine forces ... certainly exercising the right of self-defence in order to repel a grave and imminent danger, have continued their resistance in the South Georgia Islands, thus giving the lie to the United Kingdom's statements that its authority has been restored in those territories. ... continuation of the British Government's punitive actions compels my country to exercise its right of self-defence ... ”*⁴¹⁷

Exercising a right of reply, Parsons also addresses the Security Council.

“On 3 April 1982, notwithstanding current action in the Security Council and the adoption of SCR 502, Argentina carried out an armed invasion of the island of South Georgia. The small British garrison resisted but was eventually captured. On 25 April, in exercise of the inherent right of self-defence

415 Secretary-General addressing the Security Council on May 21, 1982. See *UN Doc S/PV.2350*

416 Freedman 2005 vol.2

417 This, of course, was nonsense – pure propaganda.

recognised by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, British forces re-established British authority on South Georgia. ... There is no question of the United Kingdom Government having acted aggressively, having in any way breached the terms of SCR 502 (implementation of para.2 of which by Argentina is still awaited by the international community) or of having caused a breach of international peace and security. ... ”

US intelligence reports Argentina's Air Force Chief of Staff, Juan Garcia, as saying that Argentina will not be the first to open fire but that an attack on Stanley will trigger a full scale attack on the British fleet.

“Garcia ... reiterated that the Argentine Government could not present a peace plan to its people that did not assure sovereignty over the Falklands. He also said that British commandos have landed on the islands and Argentine forces are attempting to locate them. If the commandos succeed in mingling with the local population, measures to control the civilians would be imposed.”

“... by the end of April Argentina had some 13,000 men in the Islands, the infantry component being eight regiments with between 5,000-6,000 men... They were equipped with 150mm and 155mm artillery, air defence weapons, APCs and perhaps some self-propelled antitank guns and so, in principle, should be able to inflict heavy casualties in any direct British assault against the capital.”⁴¹⁸



Day 30

May 1st – during the night, SAS and SBS reconnaissance teams land to reconnoiter enemy positions.

*“They hid so skillfully that the farm manager at Port San Carlos, Alan Miller, told me he was unaware they were hiding for days in hedges close to his house. He was surprised when an officer popped up from behind a gorse bush and greeted him, ‘Ah, good morning, Mr. Miller...’”*⁴¹⁹

Before dawn, after a long flight from Ascension Island, *XM607*, a *Vulcan* bomber, attacks the airfield near Stanley.⁴²⁰ Shortly after, *Sea Harriers* from *HMS Hermes* attack targets in, and around, Stanley and Goose Green.⁴²¹

*“I’m not allowed to say how many planes joined the raid, but I counted them all out and I counted them all back.”*⁴²²

*“At 4.37 this morning we were literally thrown out of our beds by the most fearful explosions. The house seemed to lift off its foundations... By the time we had got to the bottom of the stairs, a tremendous barrage of anti-aircraft and machine-gun fire opened up from all over the town.”*⁴²³

*“We could hear the reverberations from a series of heavy explosions and the distant rumble of large jet engines. I looked the clock: it was 4.30am. Then came the rattle of anti-aircraft gunfire. I said to Valerie: ‘I think the boys have passed by and dropped a calling card.’ She replied ‘Oh goodee!’... I went into the kitchen to make a pot of tea”*⁴²⁴



During the morning, *HMS Glamorgan*, *HMS Arrow* and *HMS Alacrity* bombard Stanley airfield. They are attacked by three Argentine *Mirages*; one of which is shot down.⁴²⁵ The ships sustain only minor splinter damage. An Argentine Canberra bomber is also shot down whilst within the *exclusion zone*. British special forces reconnaissance teams, land on the Falkland Islands.⁴²⁶

419 Briley 2022

420 *Operation Black Buck*. There were 5 bombing raids by these aircraft and although the actual damage caused is disputed, news of the attacks were well received by the public at home. The first attack was piloted by Flt. Lieut. Martin Withers, an Australian serving in the RAF. Middlebrook (2003) suggests that three Argentines died in this attack. In Bennett (2021) there is a reference to casualties taken to the local hospital.

421 48 bombs were dropped on or around Stanley airfield by *Sea Harriers* (SHARS). One of which suffered minor damage to its tail from a 20mm shell; there were no other casualties although Argentine records reported three *Harriers* shot down. Three SHARS attacked Goose Green. At least one *Pucará* helicopter was destroyed and its pilot killed (Argentine press reports would later laud his death in a gallant, lone attack on *HMS Hermes*). Two, possibly three, *Pucarás* were also damaged. Among relatively few troop casualties, two died of their injuries. See Middlebrook 2003

422 BBC News report by Brian Hanrahan

423 Diary entry in Smith 1984 p.112

424 *Neville’s Diary* in Bennett 2021

425 Apparently by Argentine anti-aircraft fire. See *Rachel remembers ...* in Bennett 2021

426 D Squad of the SAS together with elements of the SBS and Royal Marine Commandos.

*“The firing stopped after a while, causing someone to suggest it was about time we had a cup of tea, so we all trooped back up to the kitchen. We tuned into the BBC... but all we could get from England was a most interesting but unhelpful programme on birth control for overseas listeners.”*⁴²⁷

Following the air attack on Goose Green, 114 settlers from that settlement are interned at the Recreation Club. This wooden building has two toilets, a bar and running water, but no food supplies. After the civilians are moved, Argentine soldiers loot the houses and hide helicopters between the buildings to deter attack.⁴²⁸

*“I had already decided that, if air attacks came, I would move my defences from around the school, which was separate from the settlement, to new positions around the houses, with the idea that the British would never bomb the settlement area.... also, some of the civilians had seemed hostile and uncooperative.... I thought it was better to concentrate them all in one place...”*⁴²⁹

In London, the Ministry of Defence issues a statement.



“We have been enforcing the Total Exclusion Zone since noon London time on Friday, 30 April in exercise of the right of self-defence.”

At 1500, London time, HMS *Conqueror* sights the *Belgrano* group south of the Falklands archipelago. Britain's operations room at Northwood receive the information at 1629. HM Submarine *Splendid*, searching for the *25 de Mayo* to the north of the Islands, sights Argentina's frigates and destroyers, but not the aircraft carrier.

From Madrid, Spain's Government protests the British air attack, alleging that it; *“.. constitutes a serious escalation in the conflict. The possible outbreak of a more generalised and massive British action in the archipelago would mean a tragic loss of human lives and would signify great responsibility and a historic error. The Spanish Government ...deplores the fact that in spite of its efforts in the international fora and in bilateral contacts no account has been taken of the fundamental colonial problem which is the origin of the conflict and on which Spain has always supported Argentina's traditional position, ...”*⁴³⁰

Britain's Ministry of Defence issue a further statement.

“... an air engagement took place this evening within the Total Exclusion Zone between British Sea Harriers and Argentine Mirages. One Mirage was shot down. There are no reports of damage to British aircraft.”

427 Diary entry in Smith 1984 p.112

428 No food was made available for 48 hours. Such detention is illegal under the *Geneva Conventions*. Middlebrook (2003) suggests that the decision was made by First Lt. Esteban.

429 First Lt. Esteban quoted by Middlebrook 2003

430 Spain made little comment throughout the 1982 conflict; possibly because its application to join the EEC was pending.

*“The Argentine take on the events of 1 May varied considerably from that of the British. Unlike the British they knew that the damage to Stanley airfield was limited. They also believed that their air defences had shot down two Harriers during the dawn raids, and that they had inflicted serious damage on at least one warship.”*⁴³¹

*“The news from the Argentines was grim, and, we hope, wishful thinking on their part. They reported HMS Hermes had been badly damaged, with five of her Harriers lost. The BBC reported that there was no damage and that all her aircraft had returned safely.”*⁴³²

In New York, Argentine representative submits a letter to the UN Security Council.

*“... two Harrier aircraft were shot down, a third was hit ... In perpetrating this bloody aggression against my country, the United Kingdom is persisting in violating Security Council Resolution 502 (1982). In the light of these facts, not even the most distorted interpretation of that Resolution (which was adopted in the interests of peace) can be used by the United Kingdom in an attempt to legitimise its irresponsible conduct. The increasing aggression by the United Kingdom ... is today threatening to unleash an armed conflict of unknown dimensions and unforeseeable implications for international peace and security; the United Kingdom Government will be solely responsible for the breach of such peace and security. ... The United Kingdom ... cynically invoking the right of self-defence in seeking to justify an open and brazen act of aggression.”*⁴³³

With the President of the Security Council calling for information, Sir Anthony Parsons sends a reminder.

“In my letter of 28 April concerning the Total Exclusion Zone, I set out the text of an announcement by the Government of the United Kingdom to the effect that from 1100 hrs on 30 April 1982, “Port Stanley airport will be closed, and any aircraft on the ground in the Falkland Islands will be regarded as present in support of the illegal occupation and, accordingly, is liable to attack” ... ”

Following a telephone conference with Secretary Haig, President Belaunde of Peru contacts Galtieri in Buenos Aires, with proposals for a diplomatic solution.

*“1) An immediate cease fire. 2) Mutual withdrawal of forces. 3) Introduction of third parties to govern the Islands. 4) The two governments acknowledge the existence of conflicting views with respect to the Islands. 5) The two governments acknowledge the need to take into account the views and the interests of the Islanders in the final solution. 6) The third parties – or contact group – would be composed of Brazil, Peru, West Germany, and the United States. 7) A final solution will be reached not later than April 30th, 1983, under the guarantee of the contact group.”*⁴³⁴

*“Galtieri objected to the United States because of its recent ‘public attitude’. Belaunde said that Canada had been mentioned as an alternative, but it had been suggested that it was even less acceptable, and that anyway the United States was balanced by Peru (‘a country that’s frankly on Argentina’s side’). Brazil was the alternative.... The Argentine Foreign Minister also raised inevitable concerns ... Belaunde then worked with (US Ambassador) Ortiz on a redraft which was passed on to Costa Méndez...”*⁴³⁵

431 Freedman 2005 vol.2. Argentine commanders also asserted that the British had attempted a landing, but had had to abandon it in the face of Argentina’s superior defences.

432 Diary entry in Smith 1984 p.116

433 No Harrier losses were reported on May 1, 1982.

434 Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Cable File, Falkland File 05/02/1982

435 Freedman 2005 vol.2

In the South Atlantic, and believing that they have the advantage, Vice-Admiral Lombardo directs Admiral Allara in *25 de Mayo* to move towards the British fleet. At 2007 local time, Lombardo orders an attack.

*“I gave the order to attack on 1 May. When the British force set out to land would be the key moment of danger and their whole strategy would be to defend people who disembarked. Then they put all their elements, including submarines, to defend that position. That was the moment when we had to take the opportunity to do something.”*⁴³⁶

*“May 1st, the Argentine High Command told us the British were disembarking on the northern part of the Falklands. That evidently meant most of their ships would be concentrated, for a prolonged period of time, in that area. This, therefore, was a favourable opportunity for the mission of Task Force 79.”*⁴³⁷

*“It had been a very bad day for the Argentines. The runway at Stanley airfield had been badly damaged, and a Pucará had been destroyed and two more damaged at Goose Green airfield. Positions had been bombarded. Two Argentine ships had been damaged, one by the fire of its own side's aircraft. Three Argentine aircraft had been shot down by Sea Harriers and a fourth destroyed by the fire of its own side after being damaged in air combat. Seventeen Argentines were dead – four air-crew in the air, one pilot and seven technicians at Goose Green and five men killed around Stanley by the Vulcan bombs or by naval shelling. One officer and twenty-seven men were injured. Several observation parties of British troops had been successfully landed. The British casualties consisted only in superficial damage to two ships, a cannon shell hole through the tail fin of a Sea Harrier and one seaman slightly injured.”*⁴³⁸

In a radio address, President Galtieri informs the Argentine people of the day's events.

“Compatriots: the armed forces of the nation have today responded to a fresh act of war by Britain in the South Atlantic. They have used and they are continuing at this time to use fire against us. We have responded and shall respond with fire and that will always be our response if the enemy tries to turn Argentina land into a colony again. Prior to this attack, for day and whole weeks, unbelievable pressures were exerted against our national will. Attempts have been made to portray us as bloody aggressors when the truth, as everyone knows, is that in recovering unredeemed territory we prefer to die than to kill, and so, in an unprecedented military operation, neither the adversary nor the Malvinas population suffered a single casualty. We have been wronged by sanctions which the great powers do not apply to those they regard as their worst enemies, as though our being a young nation made us easy prey. ...

*We have been insulted: We have been slandered: and intimidation has been used against us, along with threats, intrigue and all imaginable manoeuvres to discredit us. We have given our reasons. We have said that for almost a century and a half we have obtained only intemperate refusals or the most cynical silence in response to our persistent claims for our proven rights. ... Now the British Empire, emboldened by the supposed results of its campaign of pressure, is resorting to the direct and overt use of force. There remains no other recourse but to respond with military action to this violence. ...”*⁴³⁹

436 Vice-Admiral Juan Jose Lombardo in an interview with *La Nacion* published March 31, 2001

437 Admiral Gualter Allara interviewed in Charlton 1989 p.216

438 Middlebrook 2003

439 *PREM19-0646*. Argentina news agency *Telam* claimed that this address was met with a gun salute by its forces on the Islands.

Day 31

May 2nd – from Washington, Haig telegrams President Belaunde in Lima, Peru.

“If the text is agreeable to President Galtieri and to the other members of the governing Junta, I will be pleased to present it to Foreign Secretary Pym with whom I will meet at 10 o'clock this morning.”

*“On the dramatic night of Sunday, May 2, the voice of President Belaúnde was heard on the radio announcing that in a few more hours the conflict would be resolved...”*⁴⁴⁰

A note from Costa Mendez is handed to Secretary Haig protesting the imposition of US sanctions on April 30th.

*“The gesture on the part of the United States Government is not only very unfriendly but also surprising. In fact, only a few hours before, the United States was acting as a friend to the parties, assisting them in the search for a just and honorable negotiated arrangement. Now, alleging that its efforts have failed, it takes upon itself the unilateral defense of one of the parties and imposes unacceptable sanctions against us, for the ostensible purpose of breaking our determination, of using force to impose upon us solutions that conform to the very particular views that the United States Government maintains on the matter. Your Excellency blames Argentina for the failure of the negotiations, emphasizing its inability to reach a compromise. Nothing is said of the intransigence of the British or of the aggressive posture they have adopted. You disregard the fact that at the time of your statement, a powerful British air and naval force was completing its preparations to attack my country. Quite to the contrary, the Secretary of State finds it just to aid in the aggression by providing the British forces with the material assistance they require, which is a very odd way of cooperating to keep the conflict from becoming worse. ... Your Excellency cannot fail to see that the position taken by your Government will have a significant impact on relations between our two countries. The Argentine people will never understand or forget that at one of the most critical moments in their history, in contrast to the solidarity that they received from all corners of the hemisphere, the United States preferred to take the side of an extra-hemispheric power, thereby abetting it in its aggressive designs. ...”*⁴⁴¹

In the UK, British intelligence, acting upon intercepted Argentine communications, conclude that Argentina's navy groups are set to deploy a pincer movement. The *25 de Mayo* is to attack the British fleet from the north, while the Belgrano group is to come from the south-west.

*“The Belgrano group, TG 79.3, ... was to deploy south to Burdwood Bank, and then close in on the British to deal with any surface units operating to the south of the Falklands, ... Lombardo urged an early reconnaissance followed by a massive attack on the British fleet before any units had a chance to withdraw. It was the receipt of the detailed offensive plan that caused the most stir. Within a few hours of the order being issued by Allara, this was being relayed to the (British) Task Force...”*⁴⁴²

Intelligence reports also indicate that Argentina now has 13,000 troops on the Falklands; supported by 42 105mm guns, 4 x 155mm guns, 23 quick-firing anti-aircraft guns plus surface-to-air missiles. Also 23 armoured cars.⁴⁴³

440 Bonifacio del Carril quoted in *Cómo se perdió la paz en 1982 (How the Peace was Lost in 1982)* in *La Nación* April 4, 1999

441 OAS Doc. OEA/Ser.F/II.20 Doc. 40/82, May 14, 1982

442 Freedman 2005 vol.2

443 Surprisingly accurate information

In Britain, in an article published in the *Observer* newspaper, Professor Rosalyn Higgins considers the situation under international law.

“Regardless of the turbulent history of the period 1765-1832, it is clear that Britain, having intervened in 1833 in protest against Argentina's attempts to assert authority in the islands, has established a good title. ... No tribunal could tell her (Argentina) that she has to accept British title because she has acquiesced in it. But what the protests do not do is to defeat the British title, which was built up in other ways than through Argentina's acquiescence. ... South Georgia and the other British dependencies in the South Atlantic have never been settled by Spain or Argentina. Only Britain has settled them to an extent regarded by international law as sufficient in that hostile environment.” ⁴⁴⁴

Spain's Prime Minister, Leopoldo Calvo-Sotelo, speaking at a rally, asserts that Britain has negotiated, “*little and badly,*” and adds that his country has a clearer claim to Gibraltar, than Argentina has to the Falklands.

Argentina attempts to jam the BBC's 'Spanish Service' to South America.

Informed that Argentine naval forces are preparing to attack the British Task Force, PM Thatcher calls a meeting at Chequers at 1245 local time. An agreement is reached.

“... that British forces should forthwith be authorised to attack any Argentine naval vessel...” ⁴⁴⁵

In the South Atlantic, at 1307 London time, Britain's fleet hear of the changes to the rules of engagement.

“The decision was taken because this was a military threat. ... I should make it clear that we did not order the submarine to sink the Belgrano. We told all submarines down there that they were now free to attack Argentine warships when they had an opportunity to do so. We did not say, to Conqueror, ‘Sink the Belgrano’, although we knew that was going to be the effect. We hoped it would be the effect. By the time she got the signal, she might possibly have lost contact.” ⁴⁴⁶

“Admiral Fieldhouse told us that one of our submarines, HMS Conqueror, had been shadowing the Argentine cruiser, General Belgrano. The Belgrano was escorted by two destroyers. The cruiser itself had substantial fire power provided by 6 inch guns with a range of 13 miles and anti-aircraft missiles. We were advised that she might have been fitted with Exocet anti-ship missiles, and her two destroyer escorts were known to be carrying them. The whole group was sailing on the edge of the Exclusion Zone. We had received intelligence about the aggressive intentions of the Argentine fleet. There had been extensive air attacks on our ships the previous day and Admiral Woodward, in command of the Task Force, had every reason to believe that a full scale attack was developing. ... Admiral Woodward had to come to a judgement about what to do with the Belgrano in the light of these circumstances. From all the information available, he concluded that the carrier and the Belgrano group were engaged in a classic pincer movement against the Task Force...” ⁴⁴⁷

“One of those present, William Whitelaw, later recalled it as 'one of the simplest decisions that I personally found myself involved in' once he understood the risk of losing contact with the Belgrano if Conqueror were not allowed to attack... All were asked for their views before the Prime Minister gave her own but the issue was not controversial.” ⁴⁴⁸

444 In 1982 Rosalyn Higgins was Professor of International Law at the University of London. President of the International Court of Justice at the Hague in 2000.

445 PREM19/623 f14

446 Lord Lewin, Chief of the Defence Staff, interviewed in Charlton 1989 p.212

447 Thatcher 1993

448 Freedman 2005 vol.2

At much the same time, in the South Atlantic, Argentina's Admiral Allara, commanding *Task Force 79*, decides to call off the planned attack on British ships.

*"As the hours passed, two things made me decide to call (the attack) off. First was confirmation the British were not landing, so not preoccupied with that operation. Second, the weather conditions. There was absolutely no wind. It was, therefore, not possible for our planes to take off from the carrier with the weapons, and fuel, needed. These weather conditions were forecast for the whole day of May 2nd. Therefore we called it off, and pulled the carrier back to shallow waters..."*⁴⁴⁹

Argentine orders to withdraw are passed to the various elements of *Task Force 79*, including *Belgrano*.⁴⁵⁰

*"It is quite untrue to say we knew the force had turned back before the Belgrano was sunk, or certainly before the signal changing the rules of engagement was sent. Even if we had known, it would not have changed our minds."*⁴⁵¹

*"... the big issue here was the sinking of the Belgrano. By the time I was appointed Official Historian I had already sought to debunk the core accusation – that the motives behind the sinking were more political than military, designed not so much to torpedo a ship which posed little threat at the time, but instead to torpedo a new Peruvian-led peace initiative. ... I challenged the supposition that any Argentine signals would be intercepted and decoded almost immediately and done so in time to influence Cabinet decisions."*⁴⁵²

In the US capital, Secretary Haig receives news from Lima.

*"In telegram 4510 from Lima, May 2, Ortiz reported that Belaúnde had telephoned at 10 a.m. (11 a.m. Washington time) to inform him that Costa Méndez had asked Belaúnde to convey that the Government of Argentina "in general" found the seven points of the Peruvian plan acceptable with "two changes on which the Argentines were very insistent." The first was a textual change to paragraph 5. The revised formulation read: "The two Governments acknowledge the need to take into account the views concerning the interests of the Islanders in the final solution." The second revision proposed the replacement of the United States with Canada as a member of the contact group, "because the United States was firmly on the side of the UK."..."*⁴⁵³

On his arrival in Washington, Foreign Secretary Francis Pym, hosts a press conference at the British Embassy.

"Last week I came here to see Mr. Haig in his role as a mediator, today I have come back to consult him as an ally. The British people are very grateful to the United States for coming down in their support. We never had any doubt that they would come down in support of the victim and against the aggressor ... but that does not end the search for a diplomatic solution."

Pym and Haig meet, privately.

"President Reagan had spoken to Mr. Haig by telephone today and said that the UK forces were quote 'doing the work of the free world' unquote, which would be strengthened by a British victory ... Haig went out of his way to explain that we should not take literally a public statement by President Reagan to the effect that US military support for the UK would be within the context of existing agreements, this was simply not so, the Americans were very keen that our military efforts should succeed... haig then explained the outline of a possible diplomatic solution, which had originated in a Peruvian

449 Admiral Gualter Allara interviewed in Charlton 1989 p.216

450 The exact time that *Belgrano* was informed of the cancellation of Allara's attack order is not known.

451 Lord Lewin, Chief of the Defence Staff, interviewed in Charlton 1989 p.212

452 Prof. Sir Lawrence Freedman interviewed on *Historical Research and Political Accountability: Trident, the Falklands and Iraq*. Strand Group 21, Kings College London. March, 2017

453 *Foreign Relations of the United States: 1981-1988 vol.XIII: Conflict in the South Atlantic 1981 – 1984* footnote p.440

*initiative, but had been modified by the Americans... Further pressure on Argentina would be needed before they were likely to agree to our basic requirements. Haig agreed that this was essential – we needed another day like yesterday. ...”*⁴⁵⁴

*“Pym replied cautiously. The proposals were not even at drafting stage, and while they might be useful at an appropriate time, he doubted that Buenos Aires was yet ready to meet Britain's basic requirements... Pym also observed that Parliament was unlikely to accept a change in status quo over South Georgia now that it had been recaptured successfully.”*⁴⁵⁵


Pym also meets US Secretary of Defence, Caspar Weinberger, who tells him; *“... that our arms supply effort would intensify, and that we would work as effectively as we could to support the British counterattack.”*⁴⁵⁶

Secretary Haig and Britain’s Ambassador Henderson, continue to discuss the Peruvian proposals, while Pym flies to New York for a meeting with the UN's Secretary-General. Haig makes it plain that; *“... Argentine compliance required,.. no further British military action in the meantime. Henderson replied that Britain would not agree to anything that inhibited it from maintaining the military pressure. The conversation concluded with Haig promising to get in touch as soon as he had heard again from Argentina.”*⁴⁵⁷

In the South Atlantic, south of the Falklands archipelago, some 30 nautical miles outside the TEZ, Britain's nuclear submarine HMS *Conqueror* closes in on ARA *General Belgrano*.

*“The Argentine leadership thought the British would not fight outside the maritime exclusion zone.”*⁴⁵⁸

Having turned towards the south-west, *Belgrano* is now heading west towards the Islas de los Estados, accompanied by the destroyers *Bouchard* and *Piedra Buena*.



*“I spent more than two hours working my way into an attack position on the port beam of the cruiser. It was still daylight. The visibility was variable; it came down to 2,000 yards at one time... They were not using sonar – just gently zigzagging at about 13 knots.”*⁴⁵⁹

At 1557 local time (1957 UK time), whilst approximately 35 miles south-west of the 'Total Exclusion Zone', HMS *Conqueror* fires three torpedoes at the Argentine light cruiser.

*“Conqueror fired three torpedoes at the Belgrano. They were the older Mark 8 torpedoes, relatively unsophisticated weapons but with huge warheads. Conqueror's captain chose those weapons because he knew that the Belgrano had a 6-inch-wide band of armour plating along most of the ship's side... the range was very close, only 1,400 yards, the recommended optimum for such an attack.”*⁴⁶⁰

454 PREM19-0646 UK Mission New York to FCO London May 2, 1982

455 Freedman 2005 vol.2

456 *Fighting for Peace: Seven Critical Years in the Pentagon* Casper Weinberger 1990 p.208

457 Freedman 2005 vol.2

458 US Admiral Harry Train in Charlton 1989 p.217

459 Captain Wreford-Brown quoted in Freedman 2005 vol.2

460 Middlebrook 2003

Two of the three torpedoes strike the warship, killing 200 men. *Conqueror* immediately turns away to avoid retaliatory attacks by destroyers. While doing so, *Conqueror* transmits an initial report (at 1630 local time). Less than 30 minutes after the torpedoes struck, the crew of *General Belgrano* are ordered to abandon the stricken ship by Capt. Héctor Bonzo. No distress signal is sent, and the escorting vessels only become aware of the severity of the attack when they observe the *Belgrano's* crew taking to the boats. ⁴⁶¹

Argentina's warship *General Belgrano* sinks. 321 crew and 2 civilian lives are lost. ⁴⁶²

"... although, in my country and abroad, many voices condemned the sinking of the *Belgrano*, I repeat that as a professional, and especially from a military point of view, I do not condemn it. That ship was in the area of operations."⁴⁶³



"By no means do I have any feelings of anger. ... I realized from the outset that the 200-mile limit had nothing to do with the mission

I had to accomplish. The limit did not exclude danger or risks; it was all the same in or out. I would like to be quite precise that, as far as I was concerned, the 200-mile limit was valid until 1 May, that is while diplomatic negotiations were taking place ..." ⁴⁶⁴

"The sinking of the *Belgrano* had significant diplomatic and military effects... Even though the attack on the *Belgrano* fell within the terms of (the) British self-defence rider, this was not well understood by either the Argentines or the international community, both of which focused on the MEZ/TEZ." ⁴⁶⁵

"In a graphic account of the dying moments of the cruiser, sunk 36 miles outside the war zone declared by Britain, Captain Bonzo said the 44-year-old vessel was steaming slowly at only ten knots away from the war zone towards Argentina when two torpedoes struck. The impact of the explosions tore through four decks killing sailors in their dormitories and in the canteen. She sank with an hour. ... he told of a disciplined evacuation into life rafts to become victims of the Atlantic gales with 75-mile-an-hour winds whipping up waves 25 feet high and temperatures way below freezing." ⁴⁶⁶

Conqueror's commander, Captain Christopher Wreford-Brown sends a brief signal to CINCFEET at Northwood.

"Successfully attacked *Belgrano*. Two hits with Mark Eights. Evaded to East."

⁴⁶¹ *Bouchard's* commanding officer reported the loss of communications with *Belgrano* but had not witnessed the explosions. *Bouchard* appears to have been hit by the third torpedo at the end of its run and without it exploding.

⁴⁶² There seems to have been an inordinate delay before a rescue effort commenced. 770 men were saved between the 3rd and 5th of May. ARA *General Belgrano's* commander, Hector Bonzo, subsequently described his vessel as a 'legitimate target' and confirmed that he did have orders to attack the Task Force.

⁴⁶³ Admiral Gualter Allara interviewed in Charlton 1989 p.216

⁴⁶⁴ Capt. Bonzo quoted in Middlebrook 2003

⁴⁶⁵ Bratton & Thies 2011 pp.11-12

⁴⁶⁶ Briley (2022) citing a news conference given by Capt. Bonzo on May 7, 1982

In London, a statement is issued by the Ministry of Defence.

TEXT OF MOD PRESS STATEMENT

" At approximately 8 p.m. London time this evening the Argentine cruiser General Belgrano was hit by torpedoes fired from a British submarine. The cruiser is believed to be severely damaged.

" On Friday, 23 April, HMG warned the Argentine Government that any approach on the part of Argentine warships, including submarines, naval auxiliaries or military aircraft which could amount to a threat to interfere with the mission of British forces in the South Atlantic would encounter the appropriate response. The cruiser posed a significant threat to the British Task Force maintaining the TEZ. The action taken was fully in accordance with the instructions given to the Task Force Commander based on the inherent right of self-defence under Article 51 of the UN Charter. The British submarine suffered no damage in the engagement and has resumed her patrol. Further details of the engagement will be given as soon as we have them.

[If pressed on whether the engagement took place within the TEZ the Ministry of Defence will reply that it was on the edge of and just outside the TEZ. In doing so however they will draw attention to the warning issued on 23 April, to the fact that the General Belgrano was posing a significant threat to the British task force and that action was taken in self-defence.]

"At approximately 8pm London time this evening the Argentine cruiser General Belgrano was hit by torpedoes fired from a British submarine. The cruiser is believed to be severely damaged. On Friday 23 April, HMG warned the Argentine Government that any approach on the part of Argentine warships, including submarines, naval auxiliaries or military aircraft which could amount to a threat to interfere with the mission of British forces in the South Atlantic would encounter the appropriate response. The cruiser posed

a significant threat to the British Task Force maintaining the TEZ. ... The British submarine suffered no damage in the engagement and has resumed her patrol."

*"It was one of the most bitter controversies of the Falklands war: the sinking of the ageing Argentine cruiser the General Belgrano, with the loss of 323 lives by a British submarine as it steamed out of the British maritime exclusion zone. It was regarded by some as a war crime. Now,... the commander of the Belgrano has broken a 21-year silence. He admits he had not only been commanded to attack the British fleet wherever he encountered it but was also 'anxious to pull the trigger'. Captain Héctor Bonzo also admits that, far from retreating from the British Task Force as he sailed west with two accompanying destroyers, his change of direction was a temporary manoeuvre. ... 'Our mission in the south wasn't just to cruise around on patrol but to attack,' says Bonzo in a previously unseen interview. 'When they gave us the authorisation to use our weapons, if necessary, we knew we had to be prepared to attack, as well as be attacked. Our people were completely trained. ... The surviving crew scrambled into life rafts to endure ocean swells, gusting winds and frigid sea temperatures. Rescue ships saved more than 700 men in what has been described as one of the most difficult rescue operations in naval history. Despite the rescue effort, some men died of exposure or injuries, bringing the total loss of life to 323 out of the 1,093 on board."*⁴⁶⁷

In New York, unaware of the *Belgrano* sinking, Pym and Parsons speak to UN Secretary-General de Cuéllar over dinner. Also at the meal is an assistant of the Secretary-General, Rafee Ahmed. Pérez de Cuéllar presents a paper.

*"In separate meetings on 2 May with the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs of the United Kingdom, Mr. Francis Pym, and with the Permanent Representative of Argentina, I handed over an aide-mémoire in which I expressed my deep concern over the grave situation and emphasized my conviction that the United Nations had a most serious responsibility under the Charter urgently to restore peace and to promote a just and lasting settlement. I stated that the implementation of Resolution 502 (1982) was imperative."*⁴⁶⁸

"... the two Governments agree to take simultaneously the steps set out below, which are conceived as provisional measures, without prejudice to the rights, claims or positions of the parties. (a) ... both Governments to complete their withdrawal by an agreed date, (b) both Governments commence negotiations

⁴⁶⁷ *Belgrano Crew Trigger Happy* in *The Guardian* May 25, 2003

⁴⁶⁸ See *UN Doc S/PV.2350*

to seek a diplomatic solution to their differences by an agreed date, (c) both Governments rescind their respective announcements of blockades and exclusion zones, and cease all hostile acts against each other, (d) both Governments terminate all economic sanctions, (e) transitional arrangements begin to come into effect to supervise implementation of the above steps and to meet interim administrative requirements. The Secretary-General wishes to reiterate his readiness to do all he can to be of assistance ... It would be appreciated if written communications in this regard were received in time for the Secretary-General to make a public announcement on 5 May..."

After the meal, Parsons sums up the presentation in a minute to Pym.

"Pérez de Cuéllar left it to Ahmed to introduce and defend his paper. He seemed to agree with many of your comments on it. Your firmness will, I think, have had a salutary effect on Ahmed who can no longer be under any illusions that his sketchy and ill-thought out ideas have much chance of acceptance. Nevertheless, the fact that the Secretary-General has given you and the Argentines some ideas, which will certainly become known here (I shall be surprised if Pérez de Cuéllar fails to allude to them when he briefs members of the Council), should enable us to gain a little more time here. It would be off-side for anyone to introduce a Resolution into the Security Council when the parties were considering ideas put to them by the Secretary-General."

News of Conqueror's attack reaches Buenos Aires.

*"The whole country supports its soldiers [...] The events unleashed by the unspeakable British aggression against the Malvinas Islands have moved our people, who are saddened by the fate of their children [...] These days, the simple people have contributed food or coats, have written to the soldiers, have taught their children the value of the Malvinas [...] has made all the gestures within their power to somehow star in the history of which they are part."*⁴⁶⁹

*"In Buenos Aires, the Military Committee's meeting began at 1900. ...When the news was confirmed the Junta was now unwilling to explore any negotiation involving the United States, assumed to be complicit in the British action..."*⁴⁷⁰

From Buenos Aires, the USA's Ambassador reports to Washington.

*"... we have a report from a reliable source in the Presidential Palace that the mood in the top levels of the military has turned very ugly against the U.S. The story is that the cruiser 'Belgrano' was 'pulverized' with heavy loss of life. Allegedly, the U.S. located the ship for the British and gave its permission for the use of a 'special weapon' against the 'Belgrano' (the implication being a nuclear weapon). The source advised one of our attaches 'to get out of town.' We are making appropriate representations to remind the GOA of its responsibility for the security of this mission and its personnel. However, in view of the 'Belgrano' incident and what seems to me the likelihood of new naval engagements in the South Atlantic, I request the Department's authorization to declare ... the relevant emergency levels. I ask for authorization for the departure of dependents of our military personnel, ... I also request authorization to prepare for the reduction in non-essential personnel and their dependents... The dependents of our military will depart by road or ferry for Montevideo once the Department has given its approval. We shall be in touch with the Department on the method and timing for the larger evacuation."*⁴⁷¹

469 Clarin May 2, 1982 p.16

470 Freedman 2005 vol.2.

471 Washington National Records Center, OSD Files, FRC 330-84-0003, Argentina (Jan-15 May) 1982

Day 32

May 3rd – a little after midnight, acting on earlier instructions from Pym, Ambassador Parsons telegrams the British Embassy in Lima with regard to Peru's peace proposals.

*“... please get in touch immediately with the Foreign Minister and/or President's office to ensure that no announcement is made that implies that we have agreed to these proposals or even had them formally presented to us ... We will be prepared to consider carefully any ideas presented to us which seem likely to ensure what must be the first requirement: a withdrawal of Argentine troops which unlawfully invaded and occupied the Falklands.”*⁴⁷²

Britain's Ambassador to Peru responds.

*“The Foreign Minister .. communicated to me a formal note .. about the sinking of the Belgrano. .. In the ensuing conversation Dr. Arias said he wished me to be in no doubt about the profound shock and consternation felt by the Peruvian Government on learning of the attack on the cruiser after President Belaunde had announced his peace initiative. Dr. Arias said that Costa Méndez had told him on the telephone that the 7 point plan was being considered by the military Junta in Buenos Aires when the news of the attack brought further consideration, and the meeting, to a conclusion ...”*⁴⁷³

At 0303, Galtieri calls Belaunde in Lima to tell him that Argentina is rejecting the Peruvian plan.

*“We would rather die on our feet than live on our knees.”*⁴⁷⁴

*“On Monday, May 3, I interviewed Costa Méndez, who introduced me to the text of the Belaúnde proposal. They were practically the ideas that we had been discussing since day one, during the conversations with Haig. The word 'wishes' of the inhabitants could easily be changed to 'aspirations', as Costa Méndez himself had already noted. I insisted with the greatest effort before Costa Méndez to do everything possible so that the proposal was accepted. He told me that the opposition was very great, especially from the Navy, after the sinking of the Belgrano. I told him that the opportunity might not present itself again and that everything depended on the form and time with which it was announced. He was very worried about the opinion of the street. He agreed to do what he could. He told me that Belaúnde was a peacock and that in any case he would resume the negotiations through some other country, Venezuela, for example.”*⁴⁷⁵

In Washington, Peru's Embassy passes on a message to the US Department of State for Secretary Haig.

*“Belaunde ... had just finished speaking with President Galtieri. He reported that Galtieri stated that the Argentine Government was prepared to study the Peruvian peace proposal with serenity and thoroughness. However, Galtieri said that owing to the quote unspeakable unquote British military actions of today's date, specifically the torpedoing and presumed destruction of the Argentine flagship 'Belgrano' there was nothing left for Argentina to discuss. All that remained was to fight. President Belaunde said that with this message from President Galtieri he considered the Peruvian peace initiative to be terminated. The President said it was very lamentable that the British actions should have occurred when serious negotiations were underway with a high chance for success. He condemned the UK's attacks and said they would enflame the Hemisphere.”*⁴⁷⁶

472 PREM19/624 Telegram 4 of 3 May 1982. The instruction from Pym appears to have preceded the news concerning ARA *General Belgrano*, reflecting Pym's concerns that Haig and Belaunde were getting ahead of themselves with what was little more than a draft. Nowhere near being presentable as a plan.

473 Message from Britain's Ambassador to Peru in PREM19/624 f114

474 *Signals of War: The Falklands Crisis of 1982* Lawrence Freedman & Virginia Gamba-Stonehouse 1990 p.286

475 Bonifacio del Carril quoted in *Cómo se perdió la paz en 1982* in *La Nación* April 4, 1999

476 Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Cable File, Falkland File 05/03/1982

Secretary Haig speaks to Ambassador Henderson, who reports the conversation to Thatcher.

*“He told me that ... It was being put about that the cruiser had been hit as a result of intelligence passed by US satellites and with the help of a special weapon provided by the Americans ... (Haig said) President Belaunde believed that something real must be done to bring about a ceasefire. He believed that the Argentinians would accept the seven proposals ... No less pressing, in his mind, was the need to do something immediately to stop the fighting. He thought it was desperately urgent for the Prime Minister to propose a ceasefire ... I told him that after waiting three weeks while the Argentinians reinforced the Islands we were not in a mood to rush to an armistice just because the Argentinians were losing...”*⁴⁷⁷

*“This began a series of pained conversations with Haig. Henderson was told of the bitter complaints from the Peruvian President, of the high price that may have to be paid in terms of a Soviet advance in Latin America, the possibility of an American veto being needed to prevent anti-British sanctions being adopted by the OAS, of western opinion turning against Britain. Henderson reminded him of the Argentine naval manoeuvres which formed the immediate background to the sinking, and that the Americans had also concluded that Argentine forces were determined to attack...”*⁴⁷⁸

In New York, Anthony Parsons is informed of the sinking on the Argentine warship.

“We have just heard that the Argentine cruiser General Belgrano has been hit by two torpedoes from the submarine HMS Conqueror. ... Although the incident took place outside the TEZ it was in accordance with the rules of engagement agreed on 2 May. ...”

In the South Atlantic, *Alferez Sobral*, an Argentine ocean-going tug armed with 20mm cannon, attacks a Sea King helicopter inside the TEZ. *Lynx* helicopters from HMS *Coventry* counter-attack, killing eight of the vessel's crew, and damaging the tug. At 0520, Vulcan bombers again attack Stanley airfield.

In the UK, the liner *QE2* is requisitioned as a troop carrier together with; “... two roll-on-roll-off ferries, *Baltic Ferry* and *Nordic Ferry* and a container ship, *Atlantic Causeway* ...”

From Buenos Aires, the junta issues a short statement.

“... as a result of the attack suffered at a point located at 55 degrees 24 minutes south and 61 degrees 32 minutes west by the cruiser General Belgrano, ..., indications exist that it must be presumed to have sunk.”

Argentina recalls its surface fleet to shallow waters.

*“The attack on the Belgrano was controversial in Britain and elsewhere, but it also proved to be a coercive success. After the sinking of the Belgrano, the Argentine Navy refused to take action against the British task force and remained close to port for the remainder of the conflict.”*⁴⁷⁹

In official statements, Brazil “disagrees” with the armed attacks which it describes as a violation of SCR 502; Cuba condemns the UK and calls for “solidarity” from all Latin American countries while Venezuela talks of “British aggression.” The USSR condemns attempts to “restore the Falklands colonial status by force” and China deplores military attacks against the – “Malvinas Islands.” Rather more mildly, Mexico “regrets” the outbreak of hostilities.

477 PREM19/624 Telegram No.1575 3 May 1982

478 Freedman 2005 vol.2

479 Bratton P. & Thies W. 2011 p.12

In New York, Foreign Secretary Francis Pym, due to leave for London, has a short meeting with the new President of the Security Council, China's Ling Quing. Pym then speaks to the Press.

"I ... had talks with the Secretary-General. We explored various ideas as to how the United Nations might be able to help in one way or another ... our strategy all along has been to maintain pressure on the Argentines, diplomatic, economic and military, and we declared several days ago the Total Exclusion Zone which we are now going to protect. Yesterday there was a very real threat to that zone posed by a cruiser. There was also an attack on a helicopter from two ships which were immediately counter-attacked by British forces. I want to make it clear that the British are not undertaking these military engagements by choice. We are there to defend British soil..."

From Washington, Haig sends Pym a message.

*"We are concerned that your military successes have not had the desired effect of making the Argentines more reasonable. Our assessment is that the fatalistic mentality characteristic of the Argentines is becoming stronger with each setback. Paradoxically — and tragically — the Argentines may well be waiting, and trying, for a military success of their own before making a serious move toward a settlement. Such a strategy would be consistent with everything we know about the Argentines. ... We suggest that the United States and Peru make a further peace proposal to the parties, stipulating that they have forty-eight hours in which to accept or reject it, with it understood that no response constitutes rejection. This period could begin at noon Washington time Wednesday. To maximize the pressure on the Argentines to accept a fair proposal, and to deal with the political problems I outlined above, we suggest that Her Majesty's Government announce, at the time of presentation of the proposal by the United States and Peru, that British forces will take no offensive action during the forty-eight hour period, provided the Argentines show corresponding restraint. ... Unless there is an arrangement for suspending military action for a brief, fixed period of intensive diplomatic effort, I am afraid that the Argentines and others will succeed in blaming failure to achieve a political settlement on your military actions..."*⁴⁸⁰

From New York, US Representative Kirkpatrick informs Haig that the Secretary-General is intent on pursuing his own peace initiative; believing the Peruvian initiative to have failed. Haig, however, still forwards Belaunde's outline plan to London.

In Argentina, propaganda reports falsely claim that its air force has attacked HMS *Exeter*, and sunk it; and that 11 *Harriers* and one helicopter have been shot down. Another claim is that Argentine forces have severely damaged four frigates, one aircraft carrier and one destroyer during raids on the British fleet. All resulting in – "serious casualties."

Britain's Ministry of Defence responds that only one aircraft has suffered damage – described as "minimal" – and that one frigate has suffered some minor splinter damage. The spokesman denies that *Exeter* has been involved in any fighting and that, contrary to claims of serious British casualties, only one seaman has been wounded. This casualty is described as, "safe and comfortable."

In Chile, the newspaper *Tercera* also comments on Argentine propaganda.

"Question: What news from Buenos Aires?"

Answer: The British sent three planes to the islands and the Argentines shot down seven of them."

480 Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S Special Handling Restrictions Memos 1979–1983, Lot 96D262, ES Sensitive May 1–5 1982

Day 33

May 4th – in Israel, press reports reveal arms sales to Argentina. ⁴⁸¹

“There were numerous intelligence reports implicating Israelis, some with governmental connections, in attempts to sell arms to Argentina. Most reports involved the transmission of weapons, and parts for existing systems, through third parties, When confronted by these allegations by the British Government, Israeli diplomats denied them vehemently. ... British troops entering Stanley at the end of the war came across Israeli equipment.” ⁴⁸²

“At the time, ties were strained between allies Britain and Israel over the First Lebanon War while charges emerged that then Israeli prime minister Menachem Begin had approved the weapons' supply to Argentina.” ⁴⁸³

From London, Britain's Prime Minister sends a message to President Reagan.

“Francis Pym has told me about the very useful talks he had with Al Haig about the Falkland Islands during his visit to Washington on Sunday. ... We should continue to build up the diplomatic, military and economic pressure on Argentina to put an end to its unlawful military occupation and, thereafter, to negotiate with us in good faith about the long term future of the islands. On the diplomatic front, I can assure you that we remain committed to the search for a negotiated solution which accords with the principles which our two countries have defended for so long. We are looking urgently today at Al Haig's latest ideas. In the military field, let me emphasise how much we appreciate your generous offer of material support for our forces. ... I am sure that, without effective military pressure, the Argentine leaders will not be brought to implement Security Council Resolution 502. But, with so many young lives at risk – British and Argentine – I feel that we must make a supreme effort to prevent a major military clash. That is why I attach so much importance also to the economic pressure which we and other friendly countries are bringing to bear. ...” ⁴⁸⁴

Francis Pym contacts Alexander Haig in Washington.

“Subject to your very early comments I would like out of courtesy to give these ideas direct to the Peruvian President –

(1) An immediate cease-fire, concurrent with:

(2) Mutual withdrawal of forces: (a) Argentine and British forces to begin immediately to withdraw from an area of 200 nautical miles radius from the Falkland Islands and to refrain from introducing any forces into that area. (b) The UK will ensure safe passage for the Argentine garrison to the mainland. (c) All British and Argentine forces to be withdrawn within 7 days from the area of 200 nautical miles radius from the Falklands and to remain outside that area.

(3) The immediate introduction of a Contact Group composed of Brazil, Peru, the Federal Republic of Germany and the United States into the Falkland Islands on a temporary basis pending agreement on a definitive settlement, the Group's tasks being: (a) to verify withdrawal; (b) to ensure that no actions are taken in the Islands, by the restored administration or otherwise, which would contravene this interim agreement.

481 See November, 1984

482 Freedman 2005 vol.2

483 *Declassified UK files reveal Israel sold arms to Argentina during Falklands War* in *Jerusalem Post* August 24, 2016

484 *Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S Special Handling Restrictions Memos 1979–1983, Lot 96D262, ES Sensitive May 1–5 1982*

(4) Britain and Argentina acknowledge the existence of differing and conflicting views regarding the status of the Falkland Islands.


(5) The two governments acknowledge that the views and interest of the Islanders must be determined, and be taken into account in the definitive settlement of the problem.

(6) The two governments will make every possible effort in good faith to reach a definitive agreement prior to 30 April 1983. The countries represented in the contact group will give every assistance in this.”

*“If you and the Peruvian Government were to call upon Argentina and Britain to accept within 48 hours an agreement in the terms I am enclosing, the British government would immediately announce that our naval forces in the South Atlantic had been given orders not to fire within or outside the TEZ unless directly threatened by Argentine ships or aircraft...”*⁴⁸⁵

*“Pym also sought a US guarantee of the security of the Falkland Islands, lasting from the seventh day after signature to implementation of a definitive agreement.”*⁴⁸⁶

In the South Atlantic, at 1100 local time, HMS *Sheffield*, a British Type 42 destroyer, is hit by an *AM39 Exocet* missile, fired from a *Super Etendard* of the Argentine Navy. It fails to explode, but causes an uncontrollable fire.



*“... three Type 42 destroyers were occupying air defence stations some 18nm west in front of the main body of the force. Glasgow was in the middle with Sheffield on its left and Coventry on its right... two Super Etendards approached the Sheffield group. ... they came across the three ships. It may be that the Glasgow's release of chaff caused them to swerve towards Sheffield, but it was probably that this was simply the first ship they picked up. The two Exocets were released. One passed by into the sea; and the other hit the destroyer. After a quick look to confirm a hit they veered back to the mainland and returned safely... the single Exocet hit Sheffield at the starboard side, leaving a large hole and causing widespread minor shock damage and an immediate loss of fighting capability. Fortunately the warhead did not detonate. Nonetheless large fires still broke out...”*⁴⁸⁷

485 Quoted in Freedman 2005 vol.2

486 *Ibid.*

487 Freedman 2005 vol.2. Out of a compliment of 281 men, 20 died and 26 were injured.

At 1200, *Sheffield's* Captain, Sam Salt, orders the ship to be abandoned.⁴⁸⁸

From the Pentagon, US Secretary of State for the Navy, John Lehman, contacts Peter Blaker, Minister for the Armed Forces. The message is that the US Navy stands ready to supply intelligence, logistical support and the procurement of weapons. Lehman was also prepared to step in personally if channels operated too slowly.

*"In addition, he said he would not rule out the possibility of moving US forces, for example one of the two Carrier Battle Groups currently in the Caribbean, to the South Atlantic as an indication of support. It appears to be at this point that the possible transfer of a US aircraft carrier was discussed... Lehman also made it clear that after the war the Americans would be looking to more support from Britain for their Central American policies and also a review of the naval cuts proposed in the 1981 defence review."*⁴⁸⁹

From Dublin, Ireland's Government issue a statement.

*"... appalled by the outbreak of what amounts to open war between Argentina and Great Britain in the South Atlantic and at reports that hundreds of lives have already been lost. ... see the present situation as a serious threat to world peace ... (and) regard the application of economic sanctions as no longer appropriate and will, therefore, be seeking the withdrawal of these sanctions by the Community"*⁴⁹⁰

Ireland's Permanent Representative to the United Nations, Noel Dorr, is instructed by his government to call for an immediate meeting of the Security Council. In order to prepare a new resolution calling for: 1. An immediate cessation of hostilities by both British and Argentinian forces, and 2. The negotiation of a diplomatic settlement under the auspices of the United Nations.

*"In reply to these escalating events the Irish Cabinet again hurriedly convened on the afternoon of May 4. Ministers agreed that the Republic would immediately take up a "neutral" stance on the Falklands issue and seek the withdrawal of EEC sanctions against Argentina. Haughey's decision to no longer support sanctions against Argentina stunned civil servants within the DFA. Dorr admitted subsequently that Haughey's new stance on the Falklands crisis took him by "complete surprise."..."*⁴⁹¹

In Washington, Britain's Ambassador Henderson receives a message from Haig at the US State Department.

"Haig's main emphasis this morning is on the real urgency, in his view ... for London to take an initiative. ... he regards the Irish decision as "totally irresponsible" and as, "likely to prolong the war"... He was convinced that London must come up with something to try and head off the inevitable emergence of opposition."

*"Almost as soon as he got the British draft, Haig rushed round to see Henderson, having cancelled a meeting in New York. There was 'no doubt about his great anxiety'. ... Haig expressed his view that it was 'now or never' if the fighting was to be stopped. The British draft would not work. There was not the slightest chance of Peru forwarding to Argentina anything that contained references to the former administration, the need for the wishes of the islanders to be respected, and doubt that a definitive agreement could be reached."*⁴⁹²

488 A Board of Inquiry subsequently reported a number of errors leading to the loss of the ship; including that the ship had been 'unprepared' for an attack and did not immediately go to 'action stations' when warned by HMS *Glasgow* that Argentine aircraft were approaching.

489 *Ibid* Unrealistic. The vessel would have arrived without any crew. With no time to train up a British crew, this was one of those "what if" conversations that neither of the parties subsequently recalled initiating.

490 *Irish Times* May 5, 1982

491 *How Charles Haughey launched an Exocet at Anglo-Irish relations during 1982 war* Stephen Kelly in *Belfast Telegraph* October 31, 2016

492 Freedman 2005 vol.2

From New York, Parsons reports an encounter with Ireland's Permanent Representative to the UN.

"I disembowelled him. When I had drawn breath, I summed up as follows: he could tell his Government following his conversation with me that ... such a debate at this stage would kill the current confidential initiative taken by the Secretary-General. Dorr was obviously shaken. He kept on saying that it was too late. .. However he could ask for an immediate meeting without insisting that the meeting should take place during the next day or so, ie he could give us and the Argentines a chance to respond to the Secretary-General's ideas. I said that he knew as well as I did that this idea would not fly ... As soon as he asked for an immediate meeting the nasties would press things to a head as quickly as possible." ⁴⁹³

The UN Secretary-General steps in. Pérez de Cuéllar asks Dorr not to press the matter until there is an answer to the peace 'ideas' put forward by himself on the 2nd. Dorr agrees. However, Chinese President of the Security Council, Ling Qing, having received a similar request from the Soviet representative, schedules an 'informal' discussion for the evening of the 5th.

"Parsons was content with this. ... a confidential venture by Pérez de Cuéllar was preferable to a formal council meeting at which Britain might find itself vetoing an apparently mild resolution calling for a cessation of hostilities. Given the alternatives, it was becoming in Britain's interest to boost the status of the Secretary-Generals efforts." ⁴⁹⁴

From the UN, Parsons telegrams Pym.

"You should be aware that the fact that the Secretary-General put specific ideas to you and my Argentine colleague over the weekend is now widely known here. This ... is, I suspect, largely accountable to Rafee Ahmed. It also results from speculation arising out of his and Ling Qing's consultations with members of the Council yesterday. ... At today's briefing the spokesman said that "peace plan" was not the term the UN was using, but the Secretary-General had put forward "various ideas" to you and the Argentines ... and both had agreed to consider them."

Argentine positions around Stanley are shelled. A British Sea Harrier is shot down over Goose Green.

"Three Sea Harriers from HMS Hermes were dispatched to carry out a bombing attack on the airfield at Goose Green, but an Argentine radar controller at Stanley detected the raid coming in and warned Goose Green. The anti-aircraft detachment at Goose Green was alerted, and its Skyguard radar picked up the Seas Harriers ten miles out at sea over the Choiseul Sound. Two of the Sea Harriers came straight in from that south-east direction ... one of the first two was hit by cannon shells fired by a 35-mm Oerlikon." ⁴⁹⁵

In Washington, President Reagan responds to Thatcher's letter.

"Al Haig has sent to Francis Pym new formulations which might provide a basis for a peaceful settlement if recent military developments have instilled a greater sense of realism in Buenos Aires. I am sure that the ideas sent to Al by your Foreign Secretary would not provide such a basis. Equally important, you will see that our suggestions are faithful to the basic principles we must protect. I urge you to agree to have these ideas proposed by US and Peru as soon as possible, recognizing that it will be difficult to get Peruvian agreement to join us in this initiative and more difficult still to gain Argentine acceptance. This, I am convinced, is now our best hope." ⁴⁹⁶

493 PREM19/624 Telegram 645 of 4 May 1982

494 Freedman 2005 vol.2

495 Middlebrook 2003. The pilot, Lieut. Nicolas Taylor was buried in a nearby paddock with full military honours; filmed and televised world-wide.

496 Reagan Library, Executive Sec., NSC Country File, Latin America/Central, Falklands War (04/22/1982–05/17/1982)

From the UK's Mission at the UN, Parsons telegrams the FCO.

"I think there is a reasonable chance that I will be able to keep the Council in informal consultations,... My insistence on ... not cutting across the Secretary-General's efforts will of course be only a pretext. I do not believe that the Secretary-General's ideas provide the basis for a negotiated settlement, and given the involvement of Rafee Ahmed, it is probably desirable to keep the United Nations out of the game, at this stage at any rate. My real purpose in delaying a formal Council meeting will be to gain time for the Haig/Belaunde proposals to mature and, of course, to put off as long as possible a possible UK veto of a seemingly mild Resolution calling for a cessation of hostilities. Such a veto would seriously undermine our position here and transfer the diplomatic advantage to the Argentines."

Day 34

May 5th – from Washington, Haig sends a message to Pym in London.

*"I appreciate the efforts your government has made to react quickly to the suggestion we made. But I must tell you with a candour possible only between closest allies that the ideas you have conveyed can lead to only one outcome: Argentine rejection and therefore resumption of hostilities after the forty-eight-hour period, with the prospects for eventual settlement having been damaged in the process. Beyond that, we have no reason to believe that the Peruvian Government would associate itself with your proposal. Indeed, our assessment is that even presenting it to them would drive Peru to a more pro-Argentine posture. Tragic as recent events have been, I believe we now have an opportunity to achieve an agreement which is consistent with our shared principles and impossible to construe as a success for the aggressor. ... We may not have another such chance before many more lives have been lost – if then. I am sending you a revised version of the seven points which attempts to take more of your concerns into account. ..., it includes our best effort to meet your concerns about a security guarantee. I will not deny that it is closer to the ideas we sent you than to those you sent us. ... Recognizing the burden it places on you, may I ask that you give me an indication as quickly as possible as to whether you would like us to proceed."*⁴⁹⁷

Ambassador Henderson telegrams Pym.

*"Haig does not consider that there is the slightest chance of the Peruvians being prepared to agree to our points or of being ready to transmit them to the Argentines. ... I asked him what, in the circumstances, he thought could be done and this led to a prolonged analysis of texts, the outcome of which was a new set of points ... that he hoped met some of our requirements, without involving language that would be rejected out of hand... Haig implores you to have another look at this ..."*⁴⁹⁸

In London, the War Cabinet meet to consider the latest peace plan; followed by a full Cabinet meeting.

*"The position was difficult, with American pressure and wavering in the EC following the Belgrano and then the loss of the Sheffield denting national confidence in Britain's military position... There was general unhappiness about Haig's ideas, ..., but it was judged that some response was needed."*⁴⁹⁹

497 Reagan Library, Executive Sec., NSC Country File, Latin America/Central, Falklands War (04/22/1982–05/17/1982)

498 PREM19/624 Telegram 1598 of 5 May 1982

499 Freedman 2005 vol.2

After four hours of debate, Pym telegrams Haig. Pym says that the British Government are prepared to accept his proposals as a basis for proceeding. However, the Dependencies are to be excluded and all Argentine forces must leave the Falklands. Also that during the extended negotiations the Islands must be administered according to the wishes of the elected representatives of the population.

*“I hope very much that Peru and Argentina will accept the proposals on the basis I have set out. Because of the danger that the Argentine response may be equivocal, like last time, the Cabinet feel strongly that (once you have got the Peruvians on board) Buenos Aires should be asked to signify acceptance by a precise and early deadline. If they fail to do so, or give any reply other than unqualified acceptance, they would be taken to have rejected the proposals and there would be no ceasefire.”*⁵⁰⁰

*“They would, however, also want a side letter confirming that the draft agreement incorporated a guarantee on the part of the US of the non-reintroduction of Argentine forces into the Falkland Islands pending a definitive settlement... Buenos Aires should be asked to give an answer by a precise deadline.”*⁵⁰¹

Thatcher answers Reagan's message of the 4th, explaining the need to amend the Peruvian/American peace plan.

*“... Above all, the present proposals do not provide unambiguously for a right to self-determination, ... We asked earlier that it should be included explicitly. Al Haig's reply was that it could not, because the Argentines would not accept it and there would therefore be no hope of a settlement. This has given me and my colleagues very great difficulty. This is why I have tried to temper Al Haig's latest proposal a little by suggesting that the interim administration must at least consult with the locally elected representatives. It is not much to ask ... I too want a peaceful settlement and an end to the mounting loss of life in the South Atlantic. ... That is why, with the changes Francis Pym has suggested to Al Haig, we are ready, with whatever misgivings, to go along with your latest proposal. Assuming that they are accepted by the Argentines, then during the negotiation period that will follow we shall have to fight fiercely for the rights of the Falklanders...”*⁵⁰²

From London, Pym telegrams Parsons in New York.

*“I am giving priority to the Peruvian/American initiative. We should not say anything to Pérez de Cuéllar that might encourage Argentine to look to his ideas rather than Haig's ... I should also wish you to make it clear that I am not in any way turning down his own ideas. ... we shall need his help in making it clear to Security Council members that diplomatic activity is continuing, that his own ideas are still under study and that the Council should do nothing that might cut across these efforts...”*⁵⁰³

Also from London, the BBC continue to broadcast family messages to the Islanders.

*“Good reception, or at least better than usual, for ‘Calling the Falklands.’ ... If only they could see us listening, huddled around the wireless on the kitchen table, with the windows blacked out with blankets;.. When the need arises we can all get into the bunker with remarkable speed in the darkness...”*⁵⁰⁴

In New York, the United Nations Security Council meet in informal session. The Secretary-General, Pérez de Cuéllar, reports that Argentina's Foreign Minister has agreed to accept his 'good offices.' Spain's Permanent Representative demands that hostilities should be 'frozen' pending a response to the Secretary-General's

500 Pym quoted in *Department of State, Executive Secretariat, Files of Alexander M. Haig, Jr., 1981–1982, Lot 82D370*

501 Freedman 2005 vol.2

502 PREM19/624 f47 (T97/82)

503 This was not passed onto the Secretary-General by Parsons, who saw that it would merely cause annoyance.

504 Diary entry in Smith 1984 p.121

initiative. Dorr (Ireland) asked the Council to consider how to achieve a ceasefire, without giving either side any 'advantage.' Responding for the UK, Parsons makes it clear that, "... there was no question of our suspending military operations, ..." Council members rejects Parsons' attempt to insert a reference to SCR 502 in the final statement. Adjourning, the Security Council issue a statement expressing their, "deep concern at the deterioration of the situation," but also their strong support for the efforts of the Secretary-General.

"We were almost entirely isolated, no-one expressed support or understanding for the military action we are taking. Apart from me, only Guyana mentioned withdrawal. I was alone in resisting pressure to include in the statement a call for 'cessation of hostilities' or 'restraint'. I received no support from Mrs. Kirkpatrick (US) and De Nanteuil (France) was actively unhelpful. The Council is to meet again tomorrow (6 May) in informal consultations. ... So far, so good. With luck, and assuming there are no major military developments overnight, we should avoid a formal Council meeting until 7 May at the earliest. But it was a disturbing meeting, which revealed how completely support for our position has been eroded since SCR 502 was adopted. The hostilities have caused most Members of the Council to lose their nerve and think of us and the Argentines as equally to blame for loss of life. ... no-one is prepared to speak out in support of our right to take action under Article 51. ... I think we were lucky to get away with tonight's harmless mouse (sic) without our isolation having the effect of turning the whole Council against us." ⁵⁰⁵

"Writing late from New York on 5 may, Parsons urged London to take note of the mood at the UN and find a more positive response to Pérez de Cuéllar, lest Britain was 'dangerously isolated here..' he wanted a substantive reply the next day that would affirm Britain's position but not cause embarrassment if published. It should give time for Peruvian ideas to succeed or fail, look positive and keep the ball in play 'but would contain conundrums which would give the Secretariat plenty to work on.' ..." ⁵⁰⁶

From Lima, President Belaunde of Peru has a telephone conversation with Galtieri in Buenos Aires.

"(Belaunde) said he advised Galtieri of the constructive UK response to the peace proposals. He told Galtieri the UK in essence accepted them with some changes. However, before he could elaborate Galtieri told him that Argentina had just communicated its agreement to the UN Sec-Gen to a mediating role for the UN. Galtieri did not reveal to Belaunde the conditions under which the UN mediation would be carried out. Belaunde told Galtieri that the British position on the Peruvian peace proposals would give the Argentines some idea of what would be acceptable to the UK. Galtieri expressed his gratitude for Peru's efforts." ⁵⁰⁷

"Haig telephoned Henderson at 2300 saying that Argentina was no longer interested in the US/Peruvian plan but was now committed to the UN route.... The sinking of the Sheffield had greatly emboldened them, with the result that they were now convinced that they would triumph militarily and politically." ⁵⁰⁸

In Washington, Britain's Chief of the Defence Staff, Admiral Lewin, meets with General David Jones, Chairman of the US Joint Chiefs, to hand over a list of military supplies that the UK is in need of.

In the South Pacific, a series of British reconnaissance flights commence, using San Felix Island, off the Chilean coast, where Chile's Navy maintains a runway. ⁵⁰⁹

505 UKMIS to FCO May 6, 1982 Telegram No. 658

506 Freedman 2005 vol.2

507 Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Cable File, Falkland File 05/06/1982


508 Freedman 2005 vol.2

509 Known as the ACME missions, the aircraft (Nimrod R. Mk.1s) flew down the length of Chile picking up intelligence from Argentina. There were six flights, the last on May 17, 1982.

Argentine newspapers continue the task of bolstering support for the war.

*"In a photo montage, a weekly newspaper showed an English soldier heading to the islands in disguise, facing an Argentine conscript in combat uniform and holding an artillery shell. At the foot of the British it reads "on board the Hermes. Lots of beer, antics, and little discipline. English sailors do not care about the war their rulers sought". The Argentine, on his part, is "willing to defend the land from him. Here everything is discipline and they know that a country is behind them." ..."*⁵¹⁰

In London, at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, consideration is given to the ways in which Argentine POWs should be repatriated.



⁵¹⁰ *Testigos de la derrota Malvinas: los soldados y la guerra durante la transición democrática argentina, 1982-1987*
Federico G. Lorenze 2006 citing *Siete Dias* May 5, 1982 pp.778-79

Day 35

May 6th – acting on Parson's advice, Pym sends a message to be passed on to Pérez de Cuéllar at the UN.

“Britain is willing to accept and immediately implement an interim agreement which would prepare the way for a definitive settlement. Such an interim agreement could provide for a cease-fire ... But such a cease-fire cannot simply leave Argentina in illegal occupation of the Islands, in contravention of Resolution 502 and with the ability to continue to build up the occupation forces.

Implementation of the cease-fire must therefore be unambiguously linked to the commencement of Argentine withdrawal... Withdrawal would be completed within a fixed number of days. The British forces would stand off at a reasonable distance ... After mutual withdrawal, the two sides would lift the exclusions zones ... (and)... economic sanctions... the United Kingdom would be prepared to accept an interim administration ... to be undertaken by a Contact Group ... which would act in consultation with the elected representatives of the population of the Islands ... Britain would be ready with Argentina to acknowledge the existence of different and conflicting views regarding the status of the Islands.

*We would be willing to engage in negotiations, without prejudice, for a definitive agreement and to accept a target date ... for conclusion of an agreement which would accord with the wishes of the Islanders. We should be willing to accept that the Contact Group ... should have a role in relation to these negotiations...”*⁵¹¹

From Ascension Island, the *Argonaut Group*, sails.⁵¹² Two British *Sea Harriers* crash in fog.

From Washington, Haig informs Pym that the Peruvian proposals have been rejected by Galtieri and that Argentina is now moving to the UN plan; *“(And) ... that was the end of that.”*

In London, Foreign Secretary Pym speaks to the Press.

“I am deeply disappointed that Argentine intransigence has once again frustrated a constructive initiative. Had they genuinely wanted peace, ... we could have had a ceasefire by 5pm tomorrow.”

In New York, UN Secretary-General, Pérez de Cuéllar, issues a statement. He says that he has received positive comments regarding his own initiative from Buenos Aires, and hopes to receive approval from London.

Sir Anthony Parsons telegrams Britain's Foreign Office.

“I recommend that I should be authorised to deliver our reply to the Secretary-General immediately. This will upstage the Argentinians whose reply consisted only of an acceptance of the Secretary-General's demarche, a call for a ceasefire, and an expression of willingness to discuss details. I should also get our reply in before Costa Méndez arrives here we must protect ourselves against the mounting pressure on us to accept calls for unqualified cease-fires, cessation of hostilities, maximum restraint, etc. These will undoubtedly be renewed at this afternoon's Security Council consultations and I intend to stand as firm as I did yesterday. Obviously we cannot accept calls for a cease-fire unless they are clearly linked to unequivocal Argentinian agreement to withdraw ...”

At 1230, New York time, Parsons has a meeting with the Secretary-General. Pérez de Cuéllar is said to be “pleased” with Francis Pym's message. The Secretary-General agrees that there is no need for a formal session of the Security Council to be called, and tells Parsons that he will seek a response from Argentina.

511 This was still being processed by the UK Mission in New York at the time news of the demise of the Belaunde plan reached Ambassador Parsons.

512 HMS *Argonaut* and *Ardent* escorting *Canberra*, *Elk* and *Tidepool*

*“Pérez de Cuéllar immediately issued a statement, describing the British response as substantive rather than procedural. Ahmed's attitude in the meeting had, however, been 'unremittingly critical and hostile,' as he demanded to know whether the new British proposals were, in effect, the Haig/Belaunde proposals already put to the Argentines and rejected by them. Ahmed, he described as a 'sinister and malevolent influence.’”*⁵¹³

In Washington, Haig tells Henderson that he is not convinced that Argentina is “serious” about negotiating.

In New York, Parsons is interviewed for Britain's *World at One* television programme. He is asked to make a statement about the Secretary-General's claim of a “positive reaction” from the Junta.

“I think there is a certain amount of exaggeration, at least there was last night, and I think it has been corrected in the American media this morning. ... I don't believe they've accepted all the propositions, all the range of ideas that he's put forward, in fact I am perfectly sure they have not. ... we are still ... at a very preliminary stage.”

Mexico's President tells the Press that Galtieri has offered to hold a face-to-face meeting with Margaret Thatcher, but that in no circumstances is Argentina willing to agree to any proposals put forward by, or otherwise associated with, the USA. He believed that the Peruvian proposals had been broadly acceptable.⁵¹⁴

In the UK, a planning paper considers the remaining options. Including an approach to the International Court of Justice (ICJ).

*“... the plan followed what was now a rather familiar model: cease-fire linked to mutual withdrawal; immediate negotiations at the UN about interim administration (rather than trusteeship); negotiations on the future of the Falklands or a reference to the ICJ, resulting in a negotiated agreement on a binding ICJ ruling; negotiations without prejudice to outcome. They were looking for some way to get the ICJ to consider self-determination as well as legal title, so that Argentina would probably reject referral and was more likely to lose the case if it did not.”*⁵¹⁵

In Buenos Aires, *GENTE* magazine announces on its front page *Estamos Ganando* – “We are winning”.⁵¹⁶



513 Freedman 2005 vol.2. Rafeeuiddin Ahmed was a member of the Secretariat from Pakistan. What is clear from this conversation is that the Secretary-General had very little idea of what the Belaunde plan had consisted of; probably as a result of Haig trying to keep the UN out of the loop.

514 PREM19/625 Telegram No. 366 of 6 May 1982

515 Freedman 2005 vol.2. Parsons was opposed and the plan was dropped.

516 See May 27 below.

Argentina's Defence Minister, Amadeo Frugoli, tells reporters that Argentina is not an aggressor country. That the aggression is being perpetrated by Great Britain and that his country will respond to that aggression with every means – at the right place and in due time.

NATO's 'Eurogroup'⁵¹⁷ issue a *communiqué*.

“Ministers condemned Argentina's armed invasion of the Falkland Island and the dependencies as well as the failure to comply with Security Council Resolution 502. Ministers noted the importance of maintaining the principle that aggression or occupation of territory by force should not be allowed to succeed and urged the need to seek a negotiated solution acceptable to all parties...”

Day 36

May 7th – from London, PM Thatcher sends a message to the EEC heads of Government.

“The collapse of the US/Peruvian initiative means that the focus of diplomatic activity moves to New York. In approaching this new phase of the crisis there is one point which I should like to put to you urgently, personally and with all the emphasis at my command. I want you to know that Britain will not acquiesce in the retention of the Falkland Islands by Argentina. The military means to terminate the military occupation are being assembled. They will be used, unless a diplomatic solution can be found. If events take this course there will be, I fear, the likelihood of destruction and casualties on a scale far exceeding what we have seen already. I am prepared for this and so is my government, and so is my country. You should be in no doubt about that...”

In Paris, President François Mitterrand, speaks to his doctor.

*“What an impossible woman, that Thatcher! With her four nuclear submarines on mission in the southern Atlantic, she threatens to launch the atomic weapon against Argentina unless I supply her with the secret codes that render deaf and blind the missiles we have sold to the Argentinians. I have been forced to yield. She has them now, the codes. If our customers find out that the French wreck the weapons they sell, it's not going to reflect well on our exports.”*⁵¹⁸

Argentina registers a complaint with the Red Cross (ICRC) in Geneva.

“(The UK).. in carrying out its acts of aggression against the civilian and military personnel in the region, has carried out continuous violations of the most elementary principle of humanitarian law. For example .. lack of information on the fate of the civilians captured in South Georgia; Lack of information on the situation of military personnel captured in South Georgia.

In addition the UK has carried out acts repugnant to the consciences of civilised peoples such as – the incorporation in the Royal Navy Task Force of British military personnel captured by Argentine forces in the Falklands and South Georgia and then repatriated to the United Kingdom; sinking by submarine attack of the cruiser General Belgrano, sailing outside the zone defined by the UK as the maritime exclusion zone and not engaged in hostilities at the moment of sinking; attacks on similar vessels going

⁵¹⁷ Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal and Turkey

⁵¹⁸ Quoted in *Rendez-vous: La psychanalyse de Francois Mitterrand* Ali Magoudi 2005. When published, this story was not given any credibility. However, in 2022, it was revealed that the French missiles were fitted with a 'kill switch', designed to prevent the weapons being used against their makers. That information had not immediately been provided to the UK by France, causing some annoyance within the UK. It now appears that, in 1982, British scientists took an *AM39 Exocet* missile to pieces and successfully identified the kill switch. Arising from that research, a number of countermeasures were devised including the use of chaff.

to pick up people shipwrecked in another incident, the attack on ARA Sobral, one such vessel, was even more blameworthy since it was unarmed.”

From Switzerland, the ICRC respond by noting that the British Government had provided information about captured Argentine troops within 5 days which; *“contrasted favourably with Argentine behaviour.”* Also that the *General Belgrano*, though outside the TEZ, was within the security zone of British ships in the area; was fully armed and engaged in operations.⁵¹⁹

At the United nations building in New York, Parsons speaks to Pérez de Cuéllar.

*“I wanted to explain exactly why the previous negotiations had collapsed. Essentially this was because the Argentines had insisted that the transitional arrangements and the diplomatic negotiations for a final settlement must be pre-judged from the outset by acceptance of Argentine sovereignty. This had in turn become a precondition for withdrawal. ... Pérez de Cuéllar took notes and said that he fully understood the position. He was alive to the possibility that the Argentines might simply be using him in order to get either a cease-fire and endless negotiations without commitment to withdrawal, or a British veto of a call for a cease-fire combined with negotiations. This putting them in a better diplomatic position...”*⁵²⁰

In London, the MoD announce, with immediate effect, an extension of the 'Total Exclusion Zone'.

“Her Majesty's Government has consistently made clear that the United Kingdom has the right to take whatever additional measures may be needed in exercise of its inherent right of self defence under article 51 of the United Nations Charter. Her Majesty's Government will take all necessary measures in the South Atlantic in the self defence of British ships and aircraft engaged in operations and in re-supplying and reinforcing British forces in the South Atlantic.

Because of the proximity of Argentine bases and the distances that hostile forces can cover undetected, particularly at night and in bad weather, Her Majesty's Government warns that any Argentine warship or military aircraft which are found more than 12 nautical miles from the Argentine coast will be regarded as hostile and are liable to be dealt with accordingly.”

Responding, Argentina claims that the extension of the zone demonstrates; *“... the British insistence on a military solution and desire to obstruct the diplomatic option then under consideration with the Secretary-General.”*

Fearless, Stromness, Norland, Europic Ferry and Atlantic Conveyor sail from Ascension Island.

Peru and Venezuela assure Argentina that they will provide military aid if so requested, under the *Rio Treaty*.

Argentina's Deputy Foreign Minister, Ernesto Ros, arrives in New York. Ros immediately calls on Pérez de Cuéllar to give him *“amplifications”* of the Argentine reply to the Secretary-General's proposals. He then complains to the Security Council about Britain's extension to the TEZ.

“This unlawful measure constitutes a further act of aggression ... which endangers the security of the Argentine Republic...”

Parsons contacts Britain's Foreign Office with regard to the extension of the Total Exclusion Zone around the Falklands archipelago announced by Britain's Ministry of Defence.

519 PREM19/625 Telegram No.224 of 7 May 1982

520 PREM19/625 Telegram No.672 of 7 May 1982

“The MOD statement ... has already caused a stir here. It has provoked a letter from Roca to the President of the Security Council, has worried Pérez de Cuéllar and is being presented dramatically in the New York media I have reassured Pérez de Cuéllar that the MOD statement should not be seen as a dramatic escalation of the conflict but rather as a clarification of earlier announcements...”

*“Although the new warning was seen as extending the Exclusion Zone right up to the Latin American coastline, this was not quite what was intended as, unlike the TEZ it only referred to Argentine warships and military aircraft. Nonetheless, the announcement immediately prompted queries from Chile and Uruguay as to how it might apply to them.”*⁵²¹

At the United Nations, US representative Jeane Kirkpatrick, contacts the Secretary-General to complain that his peace initiative is likely to “cut across” others that Secretary Haig is involved with.

Day 37

May 8th – from Lima, Peru issue a statement concerning Britain's extension of the zone.

“The Peruvian Government considers of the utmost gravity this extension of the area of conflict as far as the waters which, according to Argentine legislation, correspond to its sovereignty ... Faced with this new announcement of belligerent action on the part of the British forces, after the unjustified sinking of the cruiser 'General Belgrano', the Peruvian Government repeats its firmest protest ...”

HMS *Intrepid* sails from Ascension Island.

Argentina announces that they have converted a survey vessel, the *Bahia Paraiso*, into a hospital ship.

From New York, Parsons reports two meetings with the Secretary-General. Regarding the first:

“I saw the Secretary-General for an hour at 1530... Pérez de Cuéllar said that both sides agreed with the concept that his proposals were "provisional measures, without prejudice to the rights, claims or positions of the parties." I confirmed that we agreed with this, but said that we must have 100% precision from the Argentines on the point. Pérez de Cuéllar said that Ros had indicated that the Argentines envisaged a written agreement: their signature would give us the precision we needed. I said that it would depend whose signature was on the agreement.

All previous negotiations had foundered at the last minute on Argentine insistence that their claim on sovereignty should be accepted. ... On the terminal date for the negotiations for a diplomatic solution, Argentina had proposed 31 December 1982 and you had suggested "perhaps one year." Pérez de Cuéllar would value your reaction to the Argentine proposals. On transitional arrangements ... Pérez de Cuéllar went on to say that Argentina favoured "an exclusive UN role" whereas you had proposed a contact group of States acceptable to both parties. I repeated that we needed to define what we meant... what did an "exclusive UN role" mean? ... for us this would be a crucial question. ...

*On the format and venue of the substantive negotiations, Pérez de Cuéllar said that the Argentines wanted them to be conducted either by the Secretary-General or a representative appointed by him and that they should be held in New York. ...”*⁵²²

521 Freedman 2005 vol.2

522 PREM19/625 Telegram No.679 of 8 May 1982

Parson reports on the second meeting.

"I saw the Secretary-General and his team again at 2130 today. Pérez de Cuéllar said that he had asked Ros for an initial reaction to my request for clarification of what the Argentines meant by "an exclusive UN role" in the interim administration. Ros had replied that Argentina felt that since the interim period was likely to be fairly short it should be possible to adopt arrangements which, while not affecting individual rights, should necessarily come under the authority of the interim administrator, ie. the UN. ...

She (Argentina) felt strongly that, in order to avoid confusion and so as to ensure that the transitional period was truly transitional, it should be under a clear cut administration, with a presence from both the interested parties. Pérez de Cuéllar commented that this seemed to be a repetition of the position the Argentines had maintained all along on the transitional arrangements. I questioned this: ...

*Their reference to "individual rights" presumably meant existing law on property, family matters, etc. What in effect they were proposing was direct UN administration without any local political structures. This was a very different concept from ours and I did not believe that it would be acceptable.... Pérez de Cuéllar said that Ros had repeated very clearly this afternoon that it was not the purpose of Argentina to prejudge the question of sovereignty, although de Soto added that for the Argentines this depended on agreement on appropriate terms of reference for the negotiations ... we shall have to watch this..."*⁵²³

Parson sums up the day's meetings with the Secretary-General.

"After today's rounds, it is clear that the Argentines have organised their negotiating position very thoroughly. Perez de Cuellat told me in the strictest confidence that Ros has a prepared statement on every topic from which he reads verbatim as appropriate. I think that there are three possibilities.

The first, and least likely, is that the Argentines have decided to negotiate in good faith and play it straight ... Pérez de Cuéllar is as sceptical about this as I am. I hope we are wrong.

The second possibility is that the Argentines have realised that if the search for a diplomatic solution fails because of their insistence on prejudging the sovereignty question, it will be diplomatic game set and match to us... The third possibility is that they have decided that they cannot get what they want now, and that they should prepare the ground to get it the day after the interim period expires. This would mean that they would genuinely negotiate an agreement with us now ... But would refuse to accept anything in the agreement which envisaged prolongation of the interim period if agreement had not been reached. ...

*My suggestion is that I take the following line tomorrow (9 May). We are prepared to look more closely at the possibility of UN administration, but we could not accept the total exclusion of the Islanders, as proposed in the latest Argentine formulation: this is a great deal more rigid than the ideas they discussed with Haig where the problem was the disproportionate number of which they required on the two Councils. ... I could take this line as an exploratory move without conceding our position on the Contact Group for the time being... I realise that I have not tackled the answer to the third and perhaps most sinister (third) possibility.. It is extremely hard to see a way out of this dilemma. ..."*⁵²⁴

523 PREM19/626 Telegram No.686 of 8 May 1982. Álvaro de Soto was a Peruvian member of the UN's Secretariat.
524 PREM19/626 Telegram No.686 of 8 May 1982

Day 38

May 9th – from London, Pym relays instructions to Parsons.

“We agree that Britain should demonstrate full willingness to cooperate in the Secretary-General's negotiations. ... You should convey the following British position to the Secretary-General:

(a) ... We can agree that time 'T' should be set as soon after signature of an agreement as both parties can guarantee compliance by their forces to a cease-fire. For us, 24 hours after signature is acceptable ...

(b) ... We can accept a period of 14 days for withdrawal of all Argentine military personnel from the Islands; half of them should be withdrawn within 7 days.

(c) ... The arrangements for British withdrawal must be equal and parallel with those for Argentine withdrawal, thus involving no disadvantage to Britain. We can agree to withdraw all of our naval forces within 14 days, and half of them within 7 days, to outside a zone of 200 nautical miles from the Falkland Islands.

(d) ... It is unreal to set an absolute terminal date for negotiations when everyone knows that the parties, with the best will in the world, may not be able to conclude an agreement within a specified time. For this reason we hope that the Secretary-General will return to the expression "target date" which appeared in his original proposal of 3 May. On that basis we could accept that the named date be 31 December 1982. In order however to take account of reality, without stating directly that negotiations might go on beyond the target date, the agreement would have to say that the interim arrangements will continue until an agreement on the future of the Islands is implemented ...

(e) ... negotiations should take place under his (Secretary-General's) auspices ... perhaps Geneva or Ottawa... we must also insist most firmly that the new Argentine suggestions to the Secretary-General about the interim administration are unacceptable. ...

What Argentina is now suggesting is unprecedented and unreasonable. We can accept UN interim administration, but on the clear understanding that the Executive and Legislative Councils continue to function...”

Pym adds; “ ... any agreement must be about the Falkland Islands, thus keeping the dependencies out of it.”

*“... to help Pérez de Cuéllar, the Ambassador was permitted to hand over previous draft agreements. As the original Haig proposals contained many elements that Britain would not wish now to revive, it was best to stick with the draft that emerged out of the Peruvian effort.”*⁵²⁵

Interviewed on US television, Costa Méndez says that Argentina is not asking the UK to recognise Argentine sovereignty at the beginning of negotiations; provided that those negotiations conclude with confirmation of Argentina's sovereignty over the Falkland Islands and Dependencies.

In New York, Parsons sees the Secretary-General to set out the British position.


“... this brought me on to the all important question of Argentine acceptance that the interim arrangements would be without prejudice to the question of sovereignty. I had been seriously disturbed by Costa Méndez's television interview today. He seemed to me to have been saying that Argentina was not insisting that the UK should actually cede sovereignty before the negotiations started but that she insisted that those negotiations must conclude with confirmation of Argentine sovereignty and that they

525 Freedman 2005 vol.2

*would therefore be concerned not with sovereignty itself but with how the interests of the Islanders might be protected under Argentine sovereignty. If my reading of Costa Méndez's remarks was right, there had been a major change in the Argentine position as Pérez de Cuéllar had described it yesterday.... I next stated that I wished it to be quite clear that we were talking about the Falkland Islands alone, not about the Dependencies....”*⁵²⁶

*“... Ahmed referred several times to a joint communique issued in London and Buenos Aires on 27 April 1977 and conveyed to the Secretary-General in a letter dated 9 June 1977 for transmission to the special committee on decolonization. It dealt with negotiations about 'future political relations, including sovereignty, with regard to the Falkland Islands, South Georgia and the South Sandwich Islands.' Similar letters and communiqués were circulated thereafter... Parsons took the line that the Argentine invasion of the Islands 'created a new situation and that the precedent of earlier negotiations was no longer relevant.'...”*⁵²⁷

Pérez de Cuéllar agrees to seek clarification from Ros.



Off the Falklands, an Argentine spy trawler, *Narwal*, is attacked by *Sea Harriers*. It is then boarded by special forces (SBS). Thirteen of the crew are found to be injured; one dead. All surrender.⁵²⁸

*“It had an Argentine naval officer on board and had been in the Exclusion Zone for a week on surveillance. The Argentine reports of the trawler incident seem to differ considerably from the BBC ones.”*⁵²⁹

*“The presence of an Argentine naval officer and of certain documents confirmed the ship's intelligence gathering activity.”*⁵³⁰

HMS *Coventry* fires two *Sea Dart* missiles at an Argentine *Hercules* approaching Stanley airfield. The missiles miss, but in the attempt to get out of the way, the two escorting *Skyhawk* aircraft collide and crash.

An Argentine *Puma* helicopter is shot down by HMS *Coventry* with a *Sea Dart* missile.

From New York, Parsons reports reactions to the military exchanges to London.

“Today's military engagements have predictably fluttered the doves here. Roca complained to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council ... the Argentines are putting it about that at the Security Council's informal consultations on 5 and 6 May tacit agreement was established that there should be no hostilities while the Secretary-General pursued his initiative. ... I telephoned Pérez de Cuéllar and Ling Qing to remind them that I had made it absolutely clear at the informal consultations that there was no question of our suspending military operations...”

526 PREM19/626 Telegram No.691 of 9 May 1982

527 Freedman 2005 vol.2

528 Some sources spell the vessel's name as *Narwhal*

529 Diary entry in Smith 1984 p.134

530 Middlebrook 2003

At the UN, Pérez de Cuéllar and Parsons meet again.

“... he had told Ros that we did not consider that the Dependencies were included in the present exercise. Ros had objected strongly, saying that it would be impossible for the Argentine authorities to explain to their public opinion that Argentina would withdraw from the Falklands but that there would be no British military withdrawal from South Georgia. ... Ros had refused to accept our position... they wanted the lifting of the exclusion zones and of economic sanctions "to be effective as of time T", otherwise the impression might be given that their withdrawal was taking place under pressure...

On the interim administration, Pérez de Cuéllar said that the Argentines continued to object strongly to any role for the Islanders, even of an advisory character, because this would prejudice the outcome of the negotiations. ... Pérez de Cuéllar said that he had had a very difficult discussion with Ros about the terms of reference of the negotiations and the linked question of Costa Méndez's television interview. The kind of language the Argentines had in mind for the terms of reference was: "the negotiations would have to solve the disputes between the parties, taking into account relevant General Assembly Resolutions."

I said that this would not do. Costa Méndez's remarks today had been very close to Argentine statements which had caused the collapse of previous negotiations. We must have proper clarification. ... In order to remove any shadow of doubt, we would also have to insist that all three members of the Junta signed the agreement..."

Parsons telegrams London.

“This ball is now firmly in the Argentine Court and Buenos Aires will have to give Ros instructions on the sovereignty question before we come under further pressure. If they come up with the wrong answer, ie an answer unsatisfactory to us, the stage will be set either for a break down of the negotiations or for a final dramatic effort by Pérez de Cuéllar to persuade the Junta to think again.”

President Belaunde of Peru announces that he is sending his Prime Minister to Europe to argue for the lifting of sanctions against Argentina. Mexico's President, Lopez Portillo, asks the British Ambassador when he can expect a reply to his suggestion that General Galtieri and PM Thatcher have a face to face meeting.

From the UN, Pérez de Cuéllar's office issues a statement.

“The Secretary-General's discussions with the parties continued today and he met twice on separate occasions with the representatives of Argentina and the United Kingdom. The Secretary-General has also informed the President of the Security Council of his talks. Substantial progress has been made on several points but clarifications are still needed on others. The talks will continue tomorrow.”

Day 39

May 10th – in New York, Parsons hears from Britain's Foreign Secretary, Francis Pym.

“I endorse in particular your insistence on smoking the Argentines out on the question of sovereignty and the terms of reference for negotiations about the future of the Islands. If the Secretary-General's efforts were to collapse because Argentina insisted on a transfer of sovereignty or would not agree to a sensible provision about what would happen if negotiations had not succeeded by a target date, Argentina would clearly have been unreasonable and we think we could defend our position satisfactorily in Parliament and internationally. ... The question of the dependencies and of the traditional administration may, as you say, be the ones where the crunch will come. ... Meanwhile, the following comments ... are provided as general guidance for your meetings with the Secretary-General today.

Dependencies: ... you should argue that the status quo in the Dependencies is as it was before the unlawful occupation and that our purpose in the present negotiations is to deal with the new situation created by the continued unlawful occupation by Argentina of the Falkland Islands themselves...

Sovereignty: You should continue to insist on two major points of substance; (a) that the text of the interim agreement must not prejudice the outcome of negotiations about the future and (b) that the Argentines must state clearly to the Secretary-General that they accept this and will desist from declaring the opposite in public. Interim Administration: ... you should contest the unsupported and erroneous Argentine assertion that the involvement of the islanders in the interim administration would prejudice the outcome of negotiations...

Target Date for Conclusion of Future Negotiations: We see no reason why an interim agreement should not say that: (a) negotiations will start immediately, to produce an agreement by the target date of 31 December 1982; (b) the interim agreements will remain in force until implementation of a definitive agreement about the future of the Islands...”

At approximately 0730Z in the South Atlantic, *Sheffield* sinks in poor weather conditions while being towed by HMS *Yarmouth*.

Argentina's news agency, *Telam*, reports on *Narwal*'s capture by British special forces.

“British forces attacked and sunk the Argentine fishing boat Narwal which was in the area carrying out specific tasks that did not pose any threat to the British Fleet. The Narwal was sunk by a Sea Harrier which later did not hesitate to machine-gun the rafts that were hurled to the sea by the survivors, and even a raft that was filled with sick and wounded. This is an outrageous attack that violates the most elemental human feelings .. an inhuman deed, a hideous barbarian act that goes against all those values of the free world which the British Government has claimed to defend and uphold.”

From the UN in New York, Parsons sends a message to London.

“I asked my old Commonwealth colleagues, who have more time than I have recently to circulate amongst UN delegations, whether they felt that the overall attitude towards us was changing for the worse. They said it was not. There was still much sympathy for our position.” ⁵³¹

In London, Francis Pym is asked by the Foreign Affairs Committee about the Government's long term objectives. Pym responds that while British territory, the Government had never taken a view that the Falklands were under British sovereignty, *"for ever and a day."* Other forms of governance were available to ensure their future, including independence, associate status, condominium, UN trusteeship and others.

From Buenos Aires, the junta, in *Communique No. 40*, declares the whole of the South Atlantic a 'war zone'. Argentina submits its own amendments to the Secretary-General's proposals.

"(1) This agreement is concluded within the framework of the Charter of the United Nations and taking into account Security Council Resolution 502 (1982) and the relevant Resolutions of the General Assembly. (2) The agreement to which the parties commit themselves shall be without prejudice to the rights, claims or positions of the parties. (3) The geographical scope of this agreement shall comprise the three archipelagos considered by the United Nations. (4) The Government and the Administration shall be the exclusive responsibility of the United Nations. The observers of the parties may fly their respective flags. (5) There shall be freedom of transit and residence for citizens of the parties, who shall enjoy the right to acquire and dispose of real estate. (6) The withdrawal of forces shall be effected under the supervision of the United Nations. (7) The parties commit themselves to undertake in good faith negotiations under the auspices of the Secretary-General with a view to the peaceful settlement of the dispute and, with a sense of urgency, to complete these negotiations by 31 December 1982."

At the United Nations building, Pérez de Cuéllar has a meeting with Anthony Parsons.

"I had nearly two hours with the Secretary-General and his team this evening. It was a very discouraging meeting. Pérez de Cuéllar said that ... Ros had given him a paper... the paper had not originated in Buenos Aires but had been drafted in the course of the discussions here. It was therefore "negotiable." Ros had told him that the Argentines saw the paper as a "package" and thought it better to discuss all these points at the same time. Pérez de Cuéllar had said that the paper would be unacceptable to us but said he would convey it to me. I said that I was puzzled and disappointed ... it went back to general headlines (and, in its paragraph 5, added a major new point), without the detail on which I thought that Pérez de Cuéllar and I had been making progress..."

*At the end of the meeting de Soto said that as the Dependencies had been included in our earlier negotiations with the Argentines they could not be excluded from the next round. Did he understand that I wanted to exclude them from the interim arrangements? Surely, withdrawal from South Georgia, where we had few troops, would be a "painless gesture." I denied this firmly ... as far as we were concerned, the agreement under discussion related to the Falkland Islands alone... Withdrawal: A major new problem arose here. Ahmed said that the Argentines had said today that the proposals discussed with Haig had been based on the complete withdrawal of the British Task Force to its bases in the UK. I said ... since then, the situation had changed enormously and there was no question of us accepting such an arrangement. It was totally irrelevant to the real situation..."*⁵³²

Parsons opines on the day to London.

"Today's experience brings me very close to believing that they are still not interested in reaching a negotiated settlement on terms which would be acceptable to us, and that it is rapidly becoming a question of who wrong-foots whom when the negotiations break down..."

532 PREM19/626 Telegram No.703 of 10 May 1982

Cuba's Fidel Castro, current Chair of the Non-Aligned Movement at the UN, calls upon the other members to take whatever steps they can to delay further British action against Argentina.

US Ambassador Walters travels to Buenos Aires to; “.. *probe the possibilities of an alternative government there; to emphasis to Galtieri the danger of Soviet penetration, and to indicate US economic help would be forthcoming in the event of a UK/Argentine agreement.*”⁵³³

Argentina's Air Force issues a *communique* listing the names of 10 dead and 4 missing in action over the Falkland islands. 18 more are shown as wounded.

From Lima, Panama's President, in a telegram to the Secretary-General, condemns; “... *the United Kingdom's escalating aggression against Argentina as a collective affront to Latin America ...*”

At the Falklands, HMS *Alacrity* is ordered to conduct a reconnaissance through Falklands Sound, from the south.

Day 40

May 11th – at 0240, near the half-way point in Falklands Sound, a radar contact is detected by HMS *Alacrity*. High-explosive charges are fired at the unknown target before the British frigate moves on.

*“The whole engagement was carried out by radar on a dark night with heavy rain falling. At least three hits were seen through the rain. ... The ship attacked was the Argentine naval transport Isla de los Estados. ... The ship sank.”*⁵³⁴

At around 0300 local time, HMS *Alacrity* exits Falklands Sound at high speed, towing a decoy. Argentine submarine ARA *San Luis* sights *Alacrity* and fires a torpedo, before diving to avoid any counter-attack.⁵³⁵

*“The troops in the town are trigger happy. A youngster had let loose with a heavy-calibre machine-gun and sprayed a house opposite the Senior School. No one was hurt, only because the person in the room which was hit badly had just put out the light and laid down. ... Valerie was very chirpy; she had delivered a baby. A daughter for Jackie and Taff Davis. ... There was talk of a ship being sunk in the Falklands Sound. The Argies said it was carrying supplies for the locals on West Falkland.”*⁵³⁶

In the UK, the BBC is criticised for its “*biased*” reporting of the war. Anthony Grant MP complains to the Director-General.

“I do not expect the BBC to be biased in Britain's favour but, in the interests of 'balance' if nothing else, need they be so obviously on the side of the enemy?”

France's government informs London that they had delivered five *AM39 Exocet* missiles to Argentina before the start of the conflict; part of an order for ten missiles. They also confirm that they have an order for four *Exocets* from Peru. From London, Margaret Thatcher writes to the other EC Heads of Government asking them to support a renewal of the embargo on Argentina; due for review on the 17th.

533 FCO Sitrep 0730 11 May 1982

534 Middlebrook 2003. Unaware of *Alacrity's* passage, the Argentines were confused as to what had happened. Twenty-one Argentines died as a result of the engagement.

535 Information from a mixture of sources; some of who were there at the time. It appears that the torpedo hit the decoy, detaching it without exploding.

536 *Neville's Diary* in Bennett 2021

“... anything less than this could only encourage the Argentines to believe that our resolve is weakening, and that if they maintain their intransigence their aggression will eventually attain its objectives.”

In a message to Mexico, Thatcher also declines President Portillo's suggestion of a face to face meeting with Galtieri, as it may; *“... cut across what is happening in New York.”*

From the Foreign Office in London, Francis Pym responds to Parsons.

*“I agree that your talks yesterday with the Secretary-General were very discouraging... The Argentine paper ... having been drafted by Ros in New York, must incorporate negotiating fat. Moreover, it might be disowned by the Junta and, for this and other reasons, we should be careful not to get into the position of accepting it as the basis of further discussions. ... When you see the Secretary-General today, you may use the following ... (a) Dependencies: continue to insist on their exclusion. (b) Sovereignty: the formula is clear and easily explainable. You should continue to work for as much of it as possible. (c) ... the suggestion that we should retire 2000 nautical miles is completely unreal. (d) Withdrawal:... the State which would be best placed geographically and in terms of equipment to verify naval withdrawal effectively would be the US. (e) Interim Administration: you should suggest that the UN administration should be described as functioning "in consultation with the Executive and Legislative Councils in the Islands"... (f) Point 5 in the Argentine text about freedom of transit and residence is obviously designed by Argentina to flood the Islands and thus change the demographic facts during the interim period ... wholly unacceptable ...”*⁵³⁷

From Washington, Ambassador Henderson informs London.

“State Department have now advised us, with some embarrassment, that Landsat photography of the Falklands area has taken place during the period 7 – 12 May and that the Argentines have obtained the pictures.”

From Buenos Aires, Argentina's junta issues a statement.

“In view of the United Kingdom's persistence in its aggressive attitude, which is reflected inter alia in the restrictions it has attempted to impose on Argentine marine traffic in the South Atlantic, and in exercise of the right of self-defence established by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, it is decided that any vessel flying the United Kingdom flag which is navigating in the aforementioned zone towards the area of operations and/or which may be presumed to constitute a threat to national security shall be considered hostile, and action will be taken accordingly.”

At the UN, Pérez de Cuéllar meets again with Parsons.

“... on reflection, he had decided not to give me the "rough draft" until he had had a reply from Ros on the question of non-prejudgement... There was one point he wished to raise following his conversation with Ros this morning. ... Pérez de Cuéllar wondered whether we could find other ways to meet our concern about a vacuum occurring if agreement had not been reached by 31 December. ... It was left that the Secretary-General's team would think further on this...”

Later, Parsons is asked to return once again, to see the Secretary General.

537 PREM19/627 Telegram No.383 of 11 May 1982

“Pérez de Cuéllar said that at last he had good news for me. The Argentines had accepted that 31 December should be a target date and that the agreement should state that the outcome of the negotiations would not be prejudged. He then handed me the following text:

“The parties undertake to enter into negotiations in good faith under the auspices of the Secretary-General of the United Nations for the peaceful settlement of their dispute and to seek, with a sense of urgency, the completion of these negotiations by 31 December 1982, taking into account the Charter of the United Nations and the relevant Resolutions of the General Assembly. These negotiations shall be initiated without prejudice to the rights, claims or positions of the parties and without prejudgement of the outcome.”

*Pérez de Cuéllar said that he had put this text (which is a variant on the language I gave him on 9 May) to Ros as his own proposal. Ros had told him this evening that, “after consultation with everybody” Costa Méndez had instructed him to accept it. I said that this was an extremely encouraging development ... assuming that Ros was acting with full authority... There still remained a question about what would happen if no agreement had been reached by 31 December. Pérez de Cuéllar said that the Argentines had made a “tremendous concession.” They had also told him, on the interim administration, that they could accept that individual members of the Legislative Council, in their personal capacity, could be used by the administrator for advisory purposes, so long as the administration was also empowered to call on an equal number of other individuals from the Argentine population ... they hoped serious consideration could be given to the need to have as few restrictions as possible on communications, the transit of persons and the acquisition of property. ... Finally on zones of withdrawal, the Argentines had expressed the hope that agreement could be worked out on withdrawal distances for the Task Force which would dispel any impression that Argentines were withdrawing under pressure ... I said that, welcome as tonight's news was, there were still major difficulties ahead. One was the Argentines' proposals on representation of the Islanders. I did not believe that you would be able to accept that 1,820 Islanders should have the same representation as 30 Argentines. ...”*⁵³⁸

*“In his memoir Pérez de Cuéllar records Ros describing this as ‘an extremely difficult decision which had not easily been reached’ and his own belief that a ‘crucial breakthrough had been achieved.’... Pérez de Cuéllar was now keen to consolidate the progress but Parsons urged him not to do more until he had heard from his Government. One explanation for the Argentine concession was that it reflected concern that another attempt at a British landing was imminent and this represented an attempt to create the most difficult context for the British... The increase in military activity noted from 9 May had led to an Argentine expectation of a major operation on 12 May... The British were therefore taken by surprise, and had to assume that there could be some substance to the concession... Argentina was either sincere or trying to put Britain in the position of breaking negotiations and being put on the wrong foot.”*⁵³⁹

Parsons seeks instructions from London.

“I realise only too well that the pressure is now on us (This was inevitable if the Argentines gave way on the fundamental question) and that you face very difficult decisions.”

In Washington, Argentina's Ambassador to the USA, Estaban Takacs, approaches William Middendorf, the US representative to the Organisation of American States (OAS).

⁵³⁸ PREM19/627 Telegram No. 728 of 11 May 1982

⁵³⁹ Freedman 2005 vol.2. Argentine commanders were still convinced that they had successfully repulsed a British landing on May 1, 1982. As no landing was planned for the 12th, the British negotiating team were confused as to why Argentina had taken the step of giving a concession.

*“... he wanted to emphasize that there had been a definite Argentine change – Argentina has deliberately de-linked the sovereignty issue from the negotiating process and he asked that I pass this message on. He said this de-linkage was a major concession since the Argentine public feels strongly that “nobody should take us out of our islands.” Takacs added that he feels with this display of Argentine flexibility the ball is now in the British court... He also said that continued British shelling could be a disaster, provoking an escalation, in hostilities. He said thus far ten Islanders had been killed; many more were in peril if the British did not stop. ... He said that if negotiations go on over the next week or longer and the British at the same time show no sign of halting, he would hope the US would weigh in and ask the UK to stop.”*⁵⁴⁰

Day 41

May 12th – passenger cruiser, *QE2*, sails from Southampton, England, with 5 Infantry Brigade. Consisting of Scots Guards, Welsh Guards and Gurkhas.

Three Argentine *Skyhawk* aircraft are destroyed by HMS *Glasgow* and HMS *Brilliant* in a 42-22 deployment.⁵⁴¹ HMS *Glasgow* is hit by a 1,000lb bomb which fails to explode, but causes extensive damage.⁵⁴²



*“Girls and I watched two Argentine planes shot down about lunchtime. Sunny spells in afternoon – usual walk around town.”*⁵⁴³

Falkland Islanders note harsh discipline being exercised on the conscripts.

*“There have been a number of reports recently of cruelty and brutality to the Argentine soldiers by their officers and NCOs. A couple of days ago one soldier came in from the mountains to get more rations for his men. For this action he was stripped to the waist and made to stand all day in the freezing rain at the back of the town hall. Several people saw a young soldier at Government House being beaten with a fence batten, then kicked along the ground until he was almost senseless. There are also often disturbing incidents such as a single shot followed by a scream. It is impossible to prove what has actually happened, but does not leave a great deal to the imagination.”*⁵⁴⁴

British photographic reconnaissance of Stanley airfield suggests, that while its width had been reduced as a result of British bombing, Argentina's *Hercules* aircraft can still operate there.

⁵⁴⁰ PREM19/628 Telegram No. 1756 of 14 May 1982. There were no Islander casualties at this time.

⁵⁴¹ 42-22, so called because the Type 42's missiles could deal with enemy aircraft at medium range, whilst the Type 22's were better at close range.

⁵⁴² The Argentine bomb passed through the aft engine room and exited the ship on the far side. Fired by a Lt. Gavazzi, whose *Skyhawk* C-248 was brought down by friendly fire over Goose Green shortly afterwards. The pilot was killed.

⁵⁴³ *Valerie's Diary* in Bennett 2021

⁵⁴⁴ Diary entry in Smith 1984 p.140

In Buenos Aires, a Government advertisement in the journal *Siete Dias* picture a thumbs up sign.⁵⁴⁵

“Argentines: to win! For our flag and for our destiny [...] Because justice and law are on our side. Because we have faith in ourselves. For our children. Because the enemy is fighting for his past and we for our future.”

Meanwhile, in London, orders are prepared for *Operation SUTTON*; “To repossess the Falkland Islands as quickly as possible.” San Carlos is identified as the preferred landing site.

Instructions from Foreign Secretary Pym arrive in New York for Parsons.

“Ministers remain of the view the inclusion of South Georgia in the interim arrangements presents us with very serious difficulties. Quite apart from our title and the fact that we are in possession, there are practical considerations. ... we may need to use South Georgia during the period of withdrawal. Its anchorages will enable us to conduct this operation much more satisfactorily than if they were not available. ... Much the best course is to concentrate on the Falklands only... For your own information, if we were ever to come to contemplate withdrawal from South Georgia in the interim, we should have to insist upon total Argentine withdrawal from Southern Thule.”

In addition, Parsons is to maintain that the British Government have reservations about references to General Assembly resolutions that do not mention 'self-determination'; and remain concerned about the target date of 31 December. Further questions are to focus on the arrangements for verifying withdrawal of the two forces, and the role of the UN administrator. Argentine demands about rights of residence and the acquisition of property are to be rejected outright, although a vague reference to the *Communications Agreement* of 1971 is acceptable.

*“On Tuesday, the war cabinet had been content with Parson's general approach,.. Now on Wednesday, perhaps not appreciating just how much might be assumed in New York to have changed following the Argentine concession, they discussed whether there need be any movement in Britain's position....This was not the positive set of instructions for which Parsons had been hoping,..”*⁵⁴⁶

At the United Nations, Parsons informs Pérez de Cuéllar of the instructions he has received.

*“It was a grim meeting. ... The Secretary-General and his staff were clearly stunned ... The Argentines were coming to see him ... I had given him nothing to pass on to them in return for what they saw as yesterday's major concessions. ... He could not exclude the possibility that they would break off the talks immediately. ... I urged him to look at the problem from the London end. It was not we who had committed the aggression, we had nevertheless already made a number of major concessions ... Any arrangement which appeared to reward Argentine aggression would simply not be accepted in Britain... Bringing the meeting to a close, Pérez de Cuéllar said that he felt obliged to ask me formally to tell you that in his view his whole effort might now collapse if we could not moderate our position.”*⁵⁴⁷

Following the meeting, Parsons telegrams Pym.

“I explained ... that the basic British view was as follows. The only just outcome was that the aggressor should withdraw, the status quo ante be restored and the negotiations which had so rudely been broken off resumed. ... the plain if regrettable fact is that everyone here sees the situation quite differently. The majority of the Membership sympathise with our reaction to Argentine use of force, but they believe (this includes a number of western delegations) that the Falklands should belong to Argentina provided

545 *Siete Dias* May 12, 1982 p.67

546 Freedman 2005 vol.2

547 PREM19/627 Telegram No. 731 of 12 May 1982

*that the interests of the Islanders are safeguarded. The dominant view here is that the Argentine position is becoming more moderate and that we should respond... if we do not moderate our position ... we will be regarded as the culprits.”*⁵⁴⁸

In Buenos Aires, Argentina's Foreign Minister, Costa Méndez, is reported as saying that all negotiations must lead to a recognition of Argentine sovereignty.

From New York, Pérez de Cuéllar asks Secretary Haig to persuade London to make a “comparable concession” to that made by Argentina. However, speaking afterwards to Ambassador Henderson, Haig says that he; “.. fully understands the absurdity of this line of argument when Argentina up to now has made no movement whatsoever, but on the contrary has stepped up its demands.” He adds that Britain should not give way on South Georgia. At the end of the conversation, Haig reassures the British Ambassador.

“... there was widespread support for us over resistance to aggression. Most Latin American countries understood how impossible the Argentinians were. Their machismo made them intolerable to deal with, but Britain would put itself in the wrong, and as a result inflame the whole American hemisphere, if it attacked the Argentine mainland...”

In New York, Secretary-General de Cuéllar decides not to inform the Argentine representatives of the British position. At least, not in any great detail.

*“Pérez de Cuéllar decided on reflection that the best way to avoid a breakdown was not to describe Britain's position to Ros 'bluntly.'... Pérez de Cuéllar had only a fairly brief meeting with Ros... told Ros that Britain... already had fresh misgivings because of a recent statement by Costa Méndez.”*⁵⁴⁹

Parsons reports once again to London.

“In the event Pérez de Cuéllar decided not to call me back for a further meeting ... He told me on the telephone that the following points had emerged from his fairly brief meeting with Ros:

- (1) a private appeal to us ... for military restraint while serious negotiations were continuing,*
- (2) Pérez de Cuéllar told Ros that we were generally satisfied ... with the Argentine statement on non-prejudgement.*
- (3) Ros had nothing further to offer on the nature of the interim Administration,*
- (4) Ros re-opened the question of freedom for Argentines to acquire property in the Falklands and the point about their being able to buy shares in the Falklands Islands Company...*

*You and your colleagues are now faced with an immediate strategic decision. If tomorrow I stick to the positions set out to Pérez de Cuéllar today and he puts the to the Argentines, as he will feel compelled to do, I agree with his assessment that the negotiations will terminate there and then. We can only keep the talks going if we are prepared to make fairly substantial concessions on the nature of the interim administration and on our military withdrawal from South Georgia...”*⁵⁵⁰

548 PREM19/627 Telegram No.733 of 12 May 1982

549 Freedman 2005 vol.2

550 PREM19/627 Telegram No. 733 of 12 May 1982

Day 42

May 13th – on Ascension Island, 187 of the 188 Argentine prisoners captured on South Georgia are handed over to the Red Cross, and flown to Montevideo. Lieutenant-Colonel Astiz remains detained while a decision is made regarding French and Swedish requests to interview him, in connection with murder inquiries concerning their nationals.

British intelligence suggests that Argentina has only three AM39, aircraft launched, Exocet missiles left.⁵⁵¹

In the Falklands, an Argentine Hercules successfully lands at Stanley airfield, with supplies for the garrison.

*“This level of activity was still not enough to meet Argentine needs: many requests for supplies were left unmet. The estimate now was that by stretching rations and using local resources the Army could survive beyond 18 May to 26/27 May but if the force was to be fed even on reduced rations for ten days beyond that the some 75 tons of resupply would be necessary.”*⁵⁵²

*“(Lt. Vinelli (Navy)) ... told me that there were 15,000 men in the islands now; ... There seemed to be a lot of digging happening in Malvina House paddock too. A small mechanical digger was being employed, perhaps they are going to put an AA gun there. That’ll rattle our windows.”*⁵⁵³

In London, Foreign Secretary Francis Pym addresses the House of Commons.

“I shall not recall now the long and strenuous efforts that we made in co-operation with Mr. Haig, ending in failure because of Argentina's intransigence. ... But it is interesting that, in spite of Argentina's rejection then, the elements of an agreement about which I first spoke to the House as long ago as 21 April have remained as elements in subsequent negotiations. In that statement I told the House that they were the arrangements for the Argentine withdrawal, the nature of any interim administration of the islands and the framework for the negotiation for a long-term solution. That is still the case today. ...

The negotiations are now going on under the auspices of the Secretary-General of the United Nations. Senor Pérez de Cuéllar has shown great determination and diplomatic ability in his lengthy and frequent talks in recent days with the British representative, Sir Anthony Parsons. They have met at least once every day and sometimes more often. On Tuesday, those talks seemed to make a little progress. Yesterday, things went less well. Hopes have been raised before, only to be dashed, and many very serious difficulties remain. It would be quite wrong for me not to indicate that to the House. ...

It is not, of course, easy to negotiate with the Argentine authorities. While their representative in New York has appeared to be prepared to recognise many of the realities of the situation, there have been – even within the last two days – a number of unhelpful statements by other Argentine public figures, made in public.... On different occasions the Foreign Minister, one of his senior officials, a general and a junior Minister in another department have all referred to the process of negotiation as if this was designed solely to lead up to a handover of sovereignty to Argentina. That attitude is, I repeat, quite

551 France had confirmed that only five had been delivered, with a further five held back. Four ordered by Peru had been due for delivery on the 12th, but with information that these would be passed on to Argentina, the French Government managed to find sufficient reasons to ensure that they were not delivered while the conflict continued. See May 17, 1982 below. France had sold over 2,000 Exocets to twenty-six countries, but Argentine attempts to obtain more of them on the open/black market were unsuccessful. Defence Secretary Nott would later indicate that there had been a world-wide effort by MI6 to ensure that either the Argentines were outbid, or that the missiles were rendered inoperable.

Unsurprisingly, few details have been made available.

552 Freedman 2005 vol.2

553 Neville's Diary in Bennett 2021

unacceptable to us and we must be absolutely sure that Argentina does not adhere to it, privately or publicly, if a negotiated settlement is to be possible.... the outcome of long-term negotiations about the future of the Islands must not be prejudged in advance in any way. ...

*Present negotiations in New York are at an important point. Our resolve has not wavered. There have been some indications – actually the first since the crisis began – of genuine Argentine willingness to negotiate on some of the important points. There will have to be more if we are to succeed....”*⁵⁵⁴

Following concerns expressed by Brazil's President, that the UK was considering attacks against the Argentine mainland air bases, Ronald Reagan telephones the Prime Minister.

“(Reagan) ... we've been on the phone with the Secretary General, and he now suggests that the two sides are quite close. Is this the way it looks to you?”

(Thatcher) Wouldn't have said the two sides were quite close because there are two very big outstanding things, one, the interim administration. And of course they want an administration that is much, much more Argentinian than would suit us or our people. And also want to have movement of Argentinian people in constantly and possibly, and so on, and, and that just, just would not suit the Islanders at all. And, also, there's a question of South Georgia, which of course the title is totally different from that of the Falklands. ... there is the other thing as well, that you don't know quite who you're negotiating with and that what Ros says, we're ready to negotiate without any preconditions about sovereignty, we don't know whether it's true. But the other thing is, if they're saying that, what their ploy obviously is, is to try to arrange an interim administration and conditions to that administration, which would lead inevitably to sovereignty at the end of the period. And the third thing is, there's absolutely no guarantee that at the end of the period, if they haven't got what they want, they won't just invade again. ... They attacked our ships yesterday, so they're not holding off on military action. But even if they were, it's easy for them to hold off knowing that I with a task force bobbing around on the sea have not got the length of endurance on the sea which they have on the mainland.

(Reagan) Yes, that's right.

(Thatcher) It makes sense for them to say, look, don't have any military action while you're negotiating. And all they've got to do then is to go on and on and on. And we'd be able to get nowhere and have our capacity to take military action steadily whittled away. ... So I've said, continuously said, and still say, that the negotiations have not stopped military action nor can they, because the fact is, Ron, we're only getting anywhere as the military pressure builds up. ... the title of the Falklands, you know, is not necessarily by a long chalk the Argentinians, they've always refused to take it to the International Court of Justice. And knowing the title, I can see why. But as they say, because an island four hundred miles, is four hundred miles off the coast, there are a lot of islands, including Trinidad and Tobago, who would shake in their shoes, because they're much, much nearer South American continent.

(Reagan) Yes. ... Well, Margaret, I agree with you that one thing that has been neglected, particularly on the part of the Argentinians, in this whole thing, is consideration for the people on the island who live there. And when I talked to him that first night, trying to get him to turn his task force, his invasion fleet around, when we knew it was on its way, oh, he swore to me up and down that the culture and the lifestyle and the rights of the people on the island would go on just the same as they had always been. Well, we know that isn't true and we know they've made great changes already under this occupation.

(Thatcher) There you are, anyone in the government of Argentina who says that! But, you see, some of our people have been in the Falkland Islands for far more generations than some of the people in Argentina. I had some one in my room just a few days ago – seventh generation in the Falklands.”⁵⁵⁵

*“The Prime Minister was not in a receptive mood. While in public she had been cautious, in private she was becoming more anxious about the diplomatic trend... So this conversation with Reagan became for Thatcher yet another exercise in dispelling misapprehensions.”*⁵⁵⁶

In New York, Parsons and de Cuéllar meet again at the UN building.

“I judged that to make the points about South Georgia and the interim Administration ... would almost certainly precipitate an immediate breakdown. I therefore took the line that, because of the emergency debate in the House of Commons, you had not yet had time to send me substantive instructions on these two points ... (Pérez de Cuéllar said that he always preferred delays to bad news.)... I did, however, have an answer of substance on the risk of a vacuum after 31 December 1982 if no agreement had been reached... It was unrealistic to think that sufficient confidence could be generated between us and the Argentines for it to be safely left in the air. It seemed to me that it was an equally important point to the UN, the UK and Argentina. ...

Pérez de Cuéllar said that both sides were pressing him for ideas on it. The Argentines were prepared to let him ask for an extra month or two if no agreement was in sight at the end of the year. But they wanted to guard against the risk that the UN interim administration would last for ever. I said that we could trust the Secretary-General but not the Security Council. Might it be possible to devise some formula under which, if the Secretary-General decided that further time was needed ... the interim administration would remain in being unless the Security Council decided otherwise?

Ahmed and de Soto said that the Argentines also felt uncomfortable about involving the Security Council (because of our veto) and that the Secretariat were working on language which would contain no reference to the Security Council ... The trouble was that this formula would not meet Argentine concerns, unless it specified that only one extension would be possible.

*I indicated that the latter condition would not be acceptable to us. I was then subjected to a burst of rhetoric from Ahmed to the effect that we could not expect the Argentines to make another concession. I dealt very firmly with this ... Pérez de Cuéllar was obviously afraid that Ros would break off because of my failure to make any move on either the Dependencies or on the interim Administration. He said that he now felt that by Sunday (16 May) at the latest he would have to present some UN ideas to both of us. He recognised that one or both of us might reject his ideas, but he felt obliged to try.”*⁵⁵⁷

Parsons telegrams London.

“My theatrical performance this morning has helped us get through another day. The price of course was expectations that we will come up with something on the difficult subjects tomorrow. I am working on the assumption that we are on two tracks – genuine search for agreement and, if no agreement is possible, for the negotiations to collapse with us in the least disadvantageous position. I am also conscious of the need to buy as much time as we can.”

555 Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Subject File, Memorandums of Conversation; President Reagan (May 82)

556 Freedman 2005 vol.2

557 PREM19/627 f125

From the Foreign Office, Francis Pym responds.

“I realise that the negotiations have reached a very difficult position. ... our immediate purpose should be to keep the negotiations going, at least for some time yet. ... I see the scope for further discussion of certain of the problems with the Secretary-General before Ministers attempt to take a decision about a package covering all the outstanding questions. In particular, please pursue the following matters: (a) you should make full play with the continued statements ... that Argentina insists on having sovereignty... (b) you should say that the risk of a vacuum after an interim period is for us, one of the most important matters, and that more clarity must be achieved as soon as possible... I realise that you also need to say something about South Georgia and about interim administration. ... on South Georgia you may say that we should be willing to refer title over South Georgia to the ICJ, does the Secretary-General think that would help?..”

Ling Qing, President of the Security Council, calls for an informal discussion on the 14th.

Pérez de Cuéllar warns Parsons that he considers Ling Qing, “*biased and dangerous.*”⁵⁵⁸

Day 43

May 14th – the USA delivers two anti-missile gun systems for HMS *Illustrious*, and 100 AIM-9L Sidewinder missiles for the *Sea Harriers*.

*“During May Britain procured some \$120m of US material made available at very short notice (often 24 hours) and frequently from stocks normally earmarked for US operational requirements. This equipment had included the sidewinder missiles, Vulcan/Phalanx, 4,700 tons of airstrip matting for Stanley airport once it had been recaptured, conversion of the SS Stena Inspector for use as a repair ship... Shrike missiles for use by the Vulcans, helicopter engines, submarine detection devices for use by the Sea King helicopters, temporary accommodation on a large scale on ascension Island for British forces, Stinger ground-to-air missiles, as well as ammunition.”*⁵⁵⁹

In London, the War Cabinet meet.

*“The FCO's assessment was that it was still not clear whether Argentina's objectives were to negotiate seriously or gain time while the weather worsened in the South Atlantic, but it was certainly getting itself into a good presentational position in order to blame Britain if the talks collapsed... The real sticking point was not the Dependencies, where future concessions might be offered... but the interim administration... The debate in parliament the previous day convinced ministers that the Government's supporters would not welcome more concessions.”*⁵⁶⁰

Intelligence is received that the *Bahia Paraiso*, newly converted into a hospital ship, is loading large quantities of food and weapons at the port of Ushuaia. A decision is taken to request that the Red Cross inspect the vessel, but that if it has already left and is found within the *TEZ*, it should be stopped and searched. Buenos Aires is to be informed via the Swiss Embassy. With regard to future operations, permission is given to a plan to attack Argentina's mainland air-bases, and in particular the Rio Grande airfield in Tierra del Fuego; after first achieving a successful reconnaissance of the target.⁵⁶¹

558 *PREM19/627 Telegram No.748 of 13 May 1982*

559 Freedman 2005 vol.2

560 *Ibid.*

561 See May 17, 1982.

The meeting is also presented with plans for retaking the Falklands – Operation SUTTON.⁵⁶² A decision is made to recall both Parsons (from New York) and Henderson (from Washington) for consultations.

In the South Atlantic, 3 Argentine *Skyhawk* aircraft are shot down by *Sea Harriers*. Stanley airfield is bombed.

In New York, Belgium's Permanent Representative informs Parsons that members of the Argentine Mission have been visiting all the EEC Ambassadors; with a message.

*“(a) Argentina was negotiating in good faith, (b) sanctions had not helped the British: their effect had simply been to consolidate Latin American and Third World support for Argentina; their renewal would extend the confrontation and heighten north/south conflict, (c) the sovereignty question had been resolved as a result of an Argentine concession, (d) there remained three main issues, (e) the most important of these was the nature of the interim administration, where Argentina wanted purely UN administration, but the British were insisting on retention of “the colonial structures,” (f) the other two were withdrawal, where the Argentines had accepted the Secretary-General's concept of simultaneous or parallel withdrawal, but the British had not: and the substantive negotiations where the British were refusing to accept a deadline ...”*⁵⁶³

From Caracas, Venezuela, information is received to the effect that the Venezuelan Government is also sending out a mission to Europe at President Galtieri's request. Their itinerary includes Spain, the Vatican, West Germany, Belgium, Holland and France. The purpose is to show “solidarity” with Argentina by seeking the lifting of sanctions.

In the USA, on his return from Buenos Aires, US General Walters telephones Britain's Ambassador Henderson.

*“Walters went on to outline his visit to Buenos Aires, the main purpose of which he claimed was to limit the damage to American relations with Latin America which had been brought about by US support for the UK. He had found the Argentine Junta the most difficult people he had had to deal with since his encounters many years ago with MOSSAD. ... Galtieri told Walters that recent US statements, particularly by Weinberger, had raised strong anti-American feelings in Buenos Aires ... he felt that the Americans could have adopted a less partial course.... Galtieri was unyielding on access to the Islands for Argentine nationals. ... No mention was made of the Dependencies. ... Galtieri had also proposed that the dispute should be resolved by means of a summit meeting under the auspices of the UN Secretary-General and comprising himself, Mrs. Thatcher and President Reagan.”*⁵⁶⁴

From the State Department, US Secretary Haig sends his “latest thoughts” to Ambassador Henderson.

“(1) We should do everything possible to ensure that it was not we who were responsible, or held responsible, for any breakdown in the Secretary-General's efforts ... (2) withdrawal from the Islands should be based on parity of time in terms of the ability of both sides to reinsert their forces... (3) the focus of the discussions should be on the Falkland Islands and not the Dependencies. This had also been the view of President Figueiredo of Brazil.”

Meanwhile, at a fundraising event in Philadelphia, President Reagan speaks to the Press.

“The tragedy of the Falkland Islands the quarrel that's going on there – I'm worried as perhaps and I hope only temporarily slowed what we intend to be a real relationship and an accord with our neighbors to the south. We've done our best and are continuing to do everything we can to, again,

562 The FCO were not informed; at the insistence of Admiral Lewin.

563 PREM19/627 Telegram No.755 of 14 May 1982

564 PREM19/628 Telegram No.1773 of 14 May 1982

broker a peace down there. At the same time, we can't ignore the fact that the aggressor was our neighbor here in these continents, Argentina, who, with military force, invaded the Falklands and took over. And if we – we must establish that that cannot happen in the world that the rule of law prevails, not the rule of force.

Where would we draw the line if we say, "Well, it's all right there"? Then how many other places are there in the world where there are boundary disputes? And do we literally say, "Well, it's all right for the one that thinks they're strong enough to do it, to go grab the territory"?

And we've been trying, as I say, and it's been very frustrating. We sometimes come where it seems as if we're almost to agreement, and then there still seems to be one hitching point. But we're going to keep on trying to bring that peace."

In New York, Parsons seeks out de Cuéllar to inform the Secretary-General of his recall to London. Also to request a delay in the presentation of formal proposals until his return after the weekend. Believing that Parsons hoped to return with the UK's last ditch proposal, de Cuéllar agrees.

*"He also told Parsons that he had given Ros a hard time on the question of islander participation in the interim administration, arguing that it was inconceivable for any democratic country to accept that people should be robbed of democratic rights let alone accept parity between 2000 and 30... This provided some confirmation that the Americans had been putting pressure on Buenos Aires for a concession on the interim administration."*⁵⁶⁵

At the informal meeting of the Security Council called by Ling Quing, the Secretary-General outlines the progress he has made with his peace proposals.

"A broad framework of agreement was taking shape, covering ceasefire, mutual withdrawal, an interim Administration and negotiations under the auspices of the Secretary-General. There would be an important role for the UN, subject to the approval of the Security Council."

Spain's Ambassador calls for a cease-fire while negotiations continue. The suggestion is not taken up.

"Thanks to Pérez de Cuéllar's efforts, we have thus cleared another hurdle in the Council, but there was no mistaking the members' nervousness about hostilities if and when the Secretary-General's efforts should fail. The Council is all set to support a simple ceasefire plus a negotiations Resolution in that event."

Ambassador Henderson and Sir Anthony Parsons fly to London.

In the Falklands, British special forces attack an Argentine base on Pebble Island.⁵⁶⁶

*"The commandos touched down several miles from the target and took several hours to reach it across rugged country in the dark. In the dead of night, the battle exploded in front of me... From the sea the ships threw out orange flame and covering fire ... salvo after salvo of high explosives, whining away into the darkness to land on the defenders, twenty at a time, one shell every two seconds, a tempo designed to terrify as much to destroy... The commandos moved in, blew up an ammunition dump and destroyed eleven aircraft, six of them Pucarás used for ground attack against troops."*⁵⁶⁷

565 Freedman 2005 vol.2

566 Pebble Island lies to the north of West Falkland.

567 BBC News Despatch from Brian Hanrahan quoted in Briley 2022

A large ammunition dump is destroyed together with the fuel stores. Eleven aircraft are put permanently out of action. HMS *Glamorgan* shells the base as British forces withdraw.

*“The Argentine version is that only three aircraft were damaged and the attack was repelled. It seems that Chile has offered the research vessel *Piloto Pardo* to evacuate the Argentine dead and wounded from Stanley, which the (BBC) put as forty-one dead and thirty-eight wounded.”*⁵⁶⁸

*“A small Argentine naval air base had been established on the grass airfield here (Pebble Island). This was officially know as Base Aérea Naval Calderón,... there was only a small guard in a hut on the edge of the airfield on this wet and windy night when the SAS men and the shell fire both arrived without warning. ... There was an exchange of fire between the Argentine marines and the SAS; some men were wounded on both sides, but there were no deaths.”*⁵⁶⁹

Day 44

May 15th – Argentina successfully airlifts two 155mm L33 artillery field guns into Stanley.

*“The big gun on Davis Street is a 155-mm field gun, now positioned between Rag’s House and 94 Davis Street under thick camouflage. Very heavily guarded so unable to get too close. It’s a formidable-looking affair and will be very difficult to hit without blowing up the nearby houses. There is another one along towards Ross Road West just past the monument between Sullivan House and the doctor’s old house.”*⁵⁷⁰



Stanley airfield is bombed together with two other targets nearby.

*“A cheeky Harrier had flown up the Sapper Hill road beside the power station and fired some rockets and things at a missile site by the oil tanks...”*⁵⁷¹

An Argentine cargo vessel, the *Río Carcarañá* is strafed by two *Sea Harriers* and set on fire.

The Soviet Union repositions its 1365 satellite over the South Atlantic.

In Brussels, a decision to renew sanctions is referred by the Political Committee of the EC to the *Council of Ministers*.

568 Diary entry from Smith 1984 p.153

569 Middlebrook 2003. Only one British casualty was recorded as wounded.

570 *Ibid* p.150. It is a clear breach of the Geneva Conventions to place military hardware within civilian areas.

571 *Neville's Diary* in Bennett 2021

Day 45

May 16th – *Sea Harriers* again bomb Stanley airfield.

*“The Harriers have really had a field day, bombing mainly in the airport area, but occasionally dropping one somewhere else, so that the Argentine would not become too complacent about things. An unusually large number of folk turned out for Glory Hour in the pubs at lunch time, taking advantage of the sunshine plus the entertainment – not only the British bombing but the Argentine confusion.”*⁵⁷²

In Falkland Sound, two *Sea Harriers* bomb an Argentine merchant ship, *Rio Carcarana*, which is abandoned.⁵⁷³ The *Bahia Buen Suceso* is also observed at anchor in Fox Bay.

*“We were lucky. ... Only three of us were still aboard, getting our sleeping equipment together, when we heard the planes and the sound of the cannon shells. There were several hits, some near me – too many! ... by the grace of God no one was killed. The ship was badly damaged...”*⁵⁷⁴

HMS *Alacrity* passes through Falklands Sound; reporting no sign of mines.

In London, members of the Cabinet and the FCO, including Parsons and Henderson, meet to decide “the absolute minimum acceptable” in any potential agreement with Argentina.

*“We went over every point in detail, working as usual around the oblong table in the Great Parlour upstairs, remodelling the draft clause by clause. At hand were voluminous reference sources on the UN...”*⁵⁷⁵

*“The PM veered the whole time towards being uncompromising, so that the rest of us, and in particular the Fco participants, constantly found themselves under attack from her for being wet, ready to sell out, unsupportive of British interests etc. ... Did not people realise that it was the Argentineans who had committed aggression? Did the Foreign Office have no principles? She said that while we were content to be dishonest and consult with dishonest people she was honest. Were the Fco prepared to hand over people who believed in democracy to a dictatorship? She would never abandon the Falkland Islands any more than she would fail to uphold the principle of self-determination which must, indeed, be written into the draft agreement, not just once but several times – though we told her that to do so would make everyone think that we were not serious because the Argentineans would reject it out of hand.”*⁵⁷⁶

*“Other recollections suggest a less than harmonious day, with the Prime Minister in one of her more combative moods. ... All agreed that the aim was not to draft a document that reached out to Argentina.”*⁵⁷⁷

After 6 hours, the meeting draws up the minimum conditions that the UK can accept -

(1) no prejudice to the rights, claims or positions of either party in the ultimate peaceful settlement of their dispute, (2) no acts or activities taking place while the interim agreement is in force shall constitute a basis for asserting, supporting or denying a claim to territorial sovereignty, or create any rights of sovereignty, (3) 24 hours after signature (time 'T') each party undertakes to cease and thereafter refrain from all hostile actions, (4) both countries undertake – (a) to commence withdrawal at time 'T', (b) to withdraw half of her force 150 nautical miles within 7 days, (c) to complete withdrawal within 14 days, (5) exclusion zones to be lifted from time 'T', (6)

⁵⁷² Diary entry from Smith 1984 p.153. *Glory Hour* was so-called because of a local licensing law that only allowed the public houses to be open for one hour on a Sunday lunchtime.

⁵⁷³ Reported as on fire, she eventually sank.

⁵⁷⁴ Capt. Niella quoted in Middlebrook 2003

⁵⁷⁵ Thatcher 1993

⁵⁷⁶ *The Diaries of an Ambassador* N. Henderson 1994

⁵⁷⁷ Freedman 2005 vol.2

following completion of the withdrawal each party undertakes to refrain from reintroducing any armed forces within 150 nautical from the Islands, (7) economic measures to be lifted at time 'T', (8) both parties to jointly sponsor a Security Council *Resolution* to recognise the agreement and the Secretary-General's role, (9) the Secretary-General to appoint an Administrator acceptable to both parties, (10) the Administrator to ensure the continuing administration of the Islands in consultation with the representative institutions of the Islands in accordance with Article 73 of the UN Charter, with the exception that one representative from the Argentine population be appointed to each of the two institutions, (11) the UN Administrator to verify withdrawal, (12) each party to have no more than 3 observers on the Islands, (12) Negotiations in good faith under the auspices of the Secretary-General, for the peaceful settlement of their dispute and to seek, with a sense of urgency, the completion of negotiations by 31 December 1982 and without prejudgement, (13) this agreement shall remain in force until a definitive agreement about the future of the Islands has been reached and implemented by the parties. This '*bottom line*' only makes mention of the Falkland Islands; the Dependencies are not included.

Parsons' instructions are that there can be no amendments.

*"... although the right course would have been for the Argentines to implement SC Resolution 502, we have been negotiating in good faith for more than five weeks through various intermediaries. We are very grateful for the Secretary-General's latest efforts but we cannot allow matters to drag on much longer. Midday New York time on Wednesday 19 May is therefore an absolute deadline for the Argentines' reply. If not received by then we shall have to assume rejection..."*⁵⁷⁸

*"On 16 May, the government of London again offered that of Buenos Aires a final series of proposals for the suspension of hostilities, and the start of a pathway toward consensual solution to the dispute over the Falklands. Although with much reluctance, the Prime Minister had to bow down to pressure, and soften her position. She eventually accepted the impossibility of a full return to the status quo, the commitment to debating the sovereignty over the islands, and some form of provisional administration that foresaw a role, however limited, for the Argentines. At the same time, Margaret Thatcher deemed irrevocable the guarantee that the reaching of an accord with Buenos Aires would sanction the respect of two other principles: the reaffirmation of international legality, and the right of self-determination for the inhabitants of the islands. The withdrawal of the Argentines would be required, before the beginning of any negotiation. In addition, it had to be clear that the result of the negotiations would not necessarily be the handing over of the Falklands to Argentina. Finally, the Prime Minister was resolute in regard to the need for setting a time limit on the holding of negotiations, to avoid remaining enmeshed by the predictable dilatory tactics of the Argentines. On this point, Mrs. Thatcher succeeded in imposing her own viewpoint, despite the different approach of the FCO..."*⁵⁷⁹

Foreign Secretary Francis Pym leaves for EEC and NATO meetings in Luxembourg.

Germany's Chancellor Schmidt, and French President Mitterrand, meet in Hamburg.

"There was clear agreement on the need for solidarity with Britain on the basis of SCR 502. Sanctions involved sacrifices for both France and Germany, but it was clear that they would be renewed.."

In Europe for the NATO meeting, Haig speaks to Italy's Foreign Minister, Emilio Colombo, of the need for European unity in the UK's support.

"... he recognized the importance of what the Secretary was saying but that in present circumstances he was not permitted to join an EC consensus favoring renewal of economic sanctions. This fact was very disagreeable for him, but if he said yes, there would be a major political crisis in Italy. It is the military escalation in the

578 Thatcher 1993

579 Bruni 2018

*South Atlantic which has caused great problems in his country from psychological point of view; the reactions of the Argentine population to the sinking of the Belgrano had had a major impact on Italian public opinion, given the fact that millions of Argentines were of Italian origin and that many of these even held dual citizenship. Colombo added that the issues were very clear in his mind and that the points which the Secretary had made about the need to support the UK were correct but that unfortunately irrational situations sometimes prevailed ...”*⁵⁸⁰

In Luxembourg, Secretaries Haig and Pym meet. Pym shows the US Secretary a draft of that morning's conclusions by the British Cabinet.

“Haig seemed more confident than in earlier meetings of our ability to do the job militarily, and assumed that we would not be able to wait much longer. He argued strongly against action against the mainland, but seemed otherwise undisturbed about the military prospects ...”

Haig informs Pym that the Argentines in New York are “bragging” that their concession on the pre-judgment of sovereignty has thrown British negotiators into disarray.

Day 46

May 17th – from Luxembourg, Secretary Haig telegrams President Reagan.

*“British Foreign Secretary Pym has just shown me the UK negotiating position approved today by Mrs. Thatcher's War Cabinet. It is to be delivered to the UN Secretary General tonight as a final UK position which the Argentines have forty-eight hours to accept or not. The British have made a serious effort. But the position is less forthcoming than the proposal we put to the two sides at the end of April. In that the Argentines rejected that earlier US proposal, the British must realize that their current position is unlikely to be accepted. The forty-eight hour deadline may well coincide with a British landing on the Falklands. ... Pym did assure me that London is not now contemplating strikes against the mainland. There is of course the possibility that the Argentines will respond with relatively modest changes to the British text, which could give Mrs. Thatcher pause before ordering a landing. ... However, I doubt that the Argentines will come far enough to avert a British assault. Odds are that the battle for the Falklands will begin as early as this Wednesday or Thursday.”*⁵⁸¹

At the EEC meeting, Margaret Thatcher raises British concerns with France regarding Peru's order for four AM39 Exocet missiles. The French President assures her that completion of the order will be delayed; “... as long as is necessary.” Although opposed by both Italy and Ireland, EEC trade sanctions are renewed until the 24th.

The US Embassy in Luxembourg, reports to the White House on events in the city.

*“Despite some opening-ceremony pep talk earlier this morning by the .. Luxembourg hosts, the mood here is sombre and dominated by the South Atlantic issue. Though NATO is the nominal headliner, most eyes are on the following EC meeting scheduled later today and the uncertain status of the sanctions renewal. Leaving Ireland aside, the key to continued support for the UK may hinge on Italy. ... Al's talks with Pym last night were one on one, ... but two nuggets did filter down: 1) the Brits are reportedly incensed at what they see as less than wholehearted U.S. support for their position; and 2) the negotiating process still has some time, but not much.”*⁵⁸²

580 Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Cable File, Falkland File 05/18/1982

581 Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Haig Papers, Department of State, Day File, May 17, 1982

582 Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Cable File, Falkland File 05/17/1982

From Buenos Aires, US Ambassador Shlaudeman opines to Washington.

"I scarcely need to say that a bloody battle on the Islands leading to Argentine defeat would produce grave consequences for US interests here and elsewhere in Latin America." ⁵⁸³

HMS *Invincible* and *Broadsword* detach from the main Task Force near the Falklands. Both vessels sail towards the coast of Tierra del Fuego. *Operation Plum Duff* has the objective of landing an 8 man SAS reconnaissance team as near as possible to the Rio Grande airbase. ⁵⁸⁴

A letter from the British Community Council in Buenos Aires, calls upon PM Thatcher to accept a cease-fire while the children of the Falklands are evacuated to Anglo-Argentine homes in Argentina. ⁵⁸⁵

"... the idiots, wouldn't even entrust their children to the care of Anglo-Argentine families who offered to take them while the fighting went on." ⁵⁸⁶

"This plan seemed altruistic to the Anglo-Argentines but was spurned by Falkland Islanders. While there is no evidence of any official response from London, some London-based Falkland Islanders spoke out against it, stressing the level of mistrust for the Anglo-Argentines and asking them, instead, to persuade "the Argentines to remove themselves from the islands," while in the Falklands the proposal was not even considered." ⁵⁸⁷

Permanent Representative Parsons arrives back at the United Nations in New York. He carries two documents for Secretary-General de Cuéllar. The first, setting out the British position in full, is the draft of the proposed Interim Agreement worked out in London. Parsons emphasises that this is as far as Britain is prepared to go.

"... these were major concessions. We could make no more. All that Argentina had offered ... was a matching undertaking (if it could be believed) to put sovereignty on one side, and conditional agreement to withdraw, which could hardly be regarded as a concession when Argentina was the aggressor; withdrawal, for an aggressor, was an obligation not a concession. ... This represented the bottom line for HM Government. We could not accept any amendments to it. ... Negotiations could not be allowed to drag on ... we required a reply from the Argentines by 12 noon on 19 May. Any appeals for further time, or any proposals for substantive amendment, would be interpreted as a rejection of our proposals."

"Parsons suggested that he (de Cuéllar) should present it as a British draft, but one that was based on the negotiations that he had led and thus quite different to what would have appeared if he had not been involved. There were real concessions. He could say that he had imposed the deadline to stop the negotiations going on indefinitely." ⁵⁸⁸

Pérez de Cuéllar speaks to Parsons privately. When they are alone, Britain's representative hands over the second document: a letter making it clear that the Dependencies are not a part of the Interim Agreement. On his return to the UK Mission, Parson reports to London.

583 Quoted in Freedman 2005 vol.2

584 Sources suggest that B squad SAS were to assess the potential for another plan – *Mikado* – that called for a direct attack on the Argentine airfield at Rio Grande in an Entebbe style raid using *C-130 Hercules* aircraft (the proposal having been approved by the War Cabinet on the 14th). However, the helicopter taking them out would be at the limit of its range and was to be landed inside Chile. The squad to be extracted later by submarine. Unable to complete their task, the reconnaissance team were quietly flown out from Chile on June 8, 1982.

585 There was no acknowledgement or response, although the letter appears to have been passed on to journalists.

586 Quoted in Mercau 2016 citing *Nell Shakespeare to Deborah L. Jakubs, July 1982* in *Straddling the Fence No More: The Falkland/Malvinas War and Its Impact on the Anglo-Argentine Identity* Deborah L. Jakubs 1987

587 Mercau 2016 citing *G. T. Murchison (BCC) to Thatcher May 17, 1982*. Also *Truce Call to Take Children Away* Nicholas Timmins in *The Times* May 19, 1982

588 Freedman 2005 vol.2

*“Pérez de Cuéllar then went on to say that, between ourselves, he thought that our paper was perfectly reasonable and he appreciated the effort we had made... He also had some indications that the Argentines were beginning to get a bit desperate, and might genuinely want to get an agreement with us. His feeling was that they thought that we could recapture the Islands without much difficulty and that the only way to save themselves from this ultimate humiliation would be to get an agreement before it happened...”*⁵⁸⁹

Argentina’s Deputy Foreign Minister, Ros, is handed the proposal by the Secretary-General.⁵⁹⁰ Pérez de Cuéllar issues a Press statement.

“As you know, Sir Anthony Parsons returned from London this morning and immediately informed me of the British position as defined during the intense consultations he had with his Government over the weekend. This afternoon I conveyed to Vice Minister Ros the information I had received. You will understand that until I hear from the parties I have nothing to add except that I am more than ever convinced that time is not on the side of peace. Therefore efforts to find a peaceful solution will be pursued with vigour. The next few days will be decisive.”

A *Sea King* helicopter lands near Punta Arenas in Chile. It is promptly destroyed by the British crew.⁵⁹¹

*“The only snag we ever had was when a British helicopter carrying commandos force-landed on Chilean territory a few miles west of Punta Arenas. We had no knowledge of this operation, and as this violated one of the principles we had laid out, we had a very strong argument with Wing Commander Edwards, who promised it would never happen again. As the wreck of the helicopter burned, everybody in Punta Arenas, and later in Argentina, got wind of the mysterious helicopter. I informed General Pinochet immediately. He then gave the pertinent instructions to deny all Chilean knowledge of this to our own Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and I was given a free hand to help the crew out of Chile.”*⁵⁹²

*“There were two Argentine destroyers – Piedra Buena and Hipólito Bouchard – on radar watch off the coast and both reported the passage of the helicopter, but a considerable land search discovered nothing. ... a considerable effort by all three Argentine services would continue to be devoted to airfield and coastal protection on the mainland.”*⁵⁹³

At a “super-restricted” session of NATO in Luxembourg, all speakers including the Foreign Ministers of the USA, Portugal, Germany, France, Italy and Norway, express their solidarity with the UK on the question of the Falklands.⁵⁹⁴

589 PREM19/629 Telegram No.765 of 17 May 1982

590 Pérez de Cuéllar later told Parsons that Ros had looked, “disappointed.”

591 The *Sea King* used to transport the Operation *Plum Duff* SAS reconnaissance team. After a week, the three man helicopter crew gave themselves up to Chilean authorities, and were repatriated to the UK on the 26th. All crew members subsequently received gallantry medals for their part in what was always intended to be a one way flight (there was nowhere for the helicopter to return to). The official story was that the helicopter had got into difficulties, necessitating an emergency landing.

592 *Matthei Memorandum to Margaret Thatcher March 25, 1999.* See Day 2.

593 Middlebrook 2003

594 FCO Sitrep 0700 18 May 1982

Day 47

May 18th – in London, a meeting of the War Cabinet considers Operation SUTTON.

*“It was for the Chiefs of Staff to advise on the military feasibility of the operation. Their advice, presented first by CDS (Lewin), was that this was about the only option left that was feasible. There was no satisfactory settlement available to be negotiated nor was a long blockade viable. The recommendation was therefore that the landing should go ahead as soon as practicable... Individually the Chiefs made their own submissions, all pointing to the same conclusion... The War Cabinet accepted the advice: the landing and repossession operations would go ahead unless it was clear that an acceptable diplomatic settlement was available by the afternoon of 20 May... The decision was made...”*⁵⁹⁵

In Parliament, PM Thatcher makes a statement to the House of Commons.

*“Our representative at the United Nations has had a further meeting with Senor Perez de Cuellar. The negotiations are continuing and we are doing all that we can to reach a peaceful settlement, although there are principles on which we cannot compromise. There remain substantial difficulties. I believe that we shall know within the next day or two whether an agreement is attainable. We cannot have endless Argentine prevarication. We have been negotiating in good faith for six weeks and there has still been no sign of Argentine willingness to implement the Security Council's mandatory resolution. Our determination to ensure that all Argentine forces are withdrawn from the islands remains absolute. We have throughout made it clear that we shall take whatever steps are necessary to bring this about. We are meanwhile increasing the military pressures on the Argentine Government... I believe that any military action or option cannot and must not be delayed by people who are extending negotiations.”*⁵⁹⁶

In Washington, Stoessel reports to President Reagan.

“I had a long talk with UK Ambassador Henderson today. He expects the Argentinians will not accept the latest UK proposals, but will come back tomorrow with suggested changes. Henderson anticipates that these in turn will be unacceptable to the British and that the UN Secretary General will thereupon declare his mediation mission at an end. Henderson intimated that a major UK assault on the main island would ensue on the heels of the SG's declaration; he predicted with confidence that the operation would be successful and that the battle – while possibly involving high casualties on both sides – would be over “sooner rather than later.” Henderson thought that when the assault takes place there will be pressure in the UN Security Council for a simple ceasefire without withdrawal (which would be unacceptable to the UK) and that – in his “personal view” – the time would then be appropriate for the US again to come forward as the only power capable of bringing about a settlement.”

At the UN building in New York, Parsons speaks privately to the Secretary-General, before reporting back.

*“Pérez de Cuéllar was already regretting that British tactics had made it difficult for him to produce a paper of his own, as he had expected to do by this stage of the process... The end game was still going to be tricky, Parsons warned London. He could now see that Pérez de Cuéllar would probably want to put some proposals to both sides, just to say that he had done so, but without any expectation of success.”*⁵⁹⁷

Late in the evening in New York, Deputy Foreign Minister Ros submits a paper to the Secretary-General's office.

595 Freedman 2005 vol.2. The weather would be the determining factor of timing; lack of air superiority the biggest challenge once the operation had begun.

596 *HC Deb 18 May 1982 vol.24 cc189-90*

597 Freedman 2005 vol.2

“... a mixture of requests for clarification, re-statement of known Argentine positions and introduction of new points. ... (a) The Argentines said that they were not clear what we meant by "in consultation with".. Did it mean that the opinion of the Councils would be binding on the Administrator or not? .. (b) they did not like the references to Article 73 of the Charter, (c) they were prepared to change the date to 30 June 1983, but required a provision that if no agreement had been reached by then the General Assembly would intervene ... They needed a mechanism to ensure that the negotiations did not continue for ever, (d) they wanted the Dependencies included, (e) they wanted a reference to the relevant GA Resolutions in the preamble if possible, and in any case in the terms of reference, (f) they suggested that in the negotiations the Secretary-General should "resort to" a four State Contact Group, two States being nominated by each party, with each party having the right to veto one of the two States proposed by the other, (g) on withdrawal, they proposed a very general clause which would provide for complete withdrawal and return to normal areas of operations within 30 days, (h) there was also a point about communications and access to the Islands for the nationals of both parties during the interim period.”

After Ros has left, Pérez de Cuéllar summons Parsons. Britain's Permanent Representative then contacts the Foreign Office in London.

“He said that Ros had given him a document containing Argentine "ideas and views" to bridge the differences between us. De Soto then described these. ... I said that I would transmit all this to you ... but I could say right away that you would consider this Argentine response as completely unsatisfactory. It did not constitute a clear reply ... You would only be able to draw the conclusion that the Argentines were playing for time. ... I had made clear yesterday that such a response would be interpreted by HMG as rejection..”

Informed, the USA's Permanent Representative, Jeane Kirkpatrick, speaks to Ros and Eduardo Roca.

*“I attempted without success to persuade them that the British proposal is not so bad; that Argentina could, if she chose, accept it and declare she had won by the establishment of a UN authority responsible for the government...”*⁵⁹⁸

Following a two day conference, the North Atlantic Council (NATO) issue a final statement.

*“In view of the fundamental importance which they attach to the principle that the use of force to resolve international disputes should be resolutely opposed by the international community, the Allies condemn Argentina for its aggression against the Falkland Islands and Dependencies and deplore the fact that after more than six weeks she has still not withdrawn her forces in compliance with Mandatory Resolution 502 of the Security Council. They call for a continuation of the efforts to achieve a satisfactory negotiated settlement in accordance with this Resolution in its entirety.”*⁵⁹⁹

Near the Falklands' TEZ, two elements of Britain's naval force, the carrier group (TG317.8) and the amphibious group (TG317.0), rendezvous to facilitate a redistribution of men and supplies via ship-to-ship transfers. Over 4,000 troops are present.⁶⁰⁰ Reconnaissance teams land on West Falkland Island from *Sea King* helicopters.

598 Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Cable File, Falkland File 05/19/1982

599 American Foreign Policy Current Document 1982 Document 176 p.477 -: NATO Response to Continuing Threats to International Security

600 By the time everyone had arrived, the vessels in a relatively small area of the South Atlantic included *Fearless*, *Intrepid*, *Antrim*, *Argonaut*, *Ardent*, *Plymouth*, *Canberra*, *Elk*, *Norland*, *Europic Ferry*, *Atlantic Conveyor*, *Stromness*, *Tidepool*, *Pearleaf* and *Fort Toronto*; joined by *Hermes* and *Brilliant*. Redistribution of men and supplies was necessary for the proposed landing, but also because of fears about keeping too many men aboard *Canberra*.

Day 48

May 19th – from the United Nations building, Kirkpatrick, reports to Reagan.

*“This morning I spoke with SG Perez de Cuellar. He described the Argentine response as "terrible" for this stage of the negotiations, and the British proposal as rigid but fundamentally "not so bad," saying the Argentines must accept the fact that however justified their position may be, juridically they were wrong. ... He said he would present some proposals to the Argentines this morning and if they "can live with them" he will ask the British for 24 hours more.”*⁶⁰¹

In New York, Parsons records his thoughts.

“The Secretariat gave us their translation of last night's Argentine paper. This is even worse than Pérez de Cuéllar and de Soto led me to believe ... in particular, (a) the previously agreed language on pre-judgement has been omitted, (b) there is no reference to Councils as such, but only to "persons who are members of the population of British origin" who are to be appointed as advisors in equal numbers with Argentine residents in the Islands, (c) the provisions on freedom of movement are much worse... in short, the Argentines have reverted to the negotiating position they occupied at the very beginning of Pérez de Cuéllar's initiative.”

Argentina's proposals are summarised:- (1) withdrawal from the Falkland Islands, South Georgia and the South Sandwich Islands, (2) withdrawal to “normal bases of operation” within 30 days, (3) economic measures to be lifted from the date the agreement is signed, (4) supervision of withdrawal to be carried out by the UN, (5) the interim administration – (a) to be the responsibility of the UN, (b) the administration to perform all functions (executive, legislative, judicial and security), (c) local judicial functions may be exercised in accordance with the legislation in effect on 1 April 1982, (d) the administration to appoint advisers, persons who are members of the population of British origin and Argentine residents in equal numbers, (d) the flags of the parties shall fly together with that of the UN, (e) during the interim administration communications to be kept open, including freedom of movement and equality of access with respect to residence, work and property, (f) freedom of access for Argentina's airline (LADE) and Argentine television, (g) the way of life of the locals to be respected. (6) negotiations to be completed by 31 December 1982 with a single option to extend to 30 June 1983 – and if the period expires without agreement, the General Assembly of the UN to determine the final agreement.

In receipt of a copy from New York, Britain's Ambassador Henderson forwards it to Secretary Haig.

“... the Argentines have reverted to the negotiating position they adopted at the beginning of the UN Secretary General's initiative.”

The UN Secretary-General proposes a meeting over lunch. At a private meeting before the meal, Pérez de Cuéllar tells Parsons that Costa Méndez had suggested that the Secretary-General talk directly to General Galtieri. Costa Méndez had also suggested that the UN Secretariat send envoys to both London and Buenos Aires. Parsons dismisses this last suggestion as merely a tactic to prolong talks. Pérez de Cuéllar indicates that he is unable to refuse a direct call to Argentina's President, but that after he would make a similar call to Margaret Thatcher.

Parsons sends a report to London.

“Pérez de Cuéllar proposed a working lunch.. At my private meeting with Pérez de Cuéllar before the lunch I asked him to formally convey to Ros that HM Government found the Argentine response totally unacceptable. The Argentine position had not changed in substance since the beginning of the negotiations. It was clear that there was no hope of reaching an agreement ... We therefore had to draw

601 Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Cable File, Falkland File 05/19/1982

*a line... I told Pérez de Cuéllar that we recognised that this would enable Ros to wrong-foot us by blaming us for the breakdown of negotiations but this was something that we would have to accept.”*⁶⁰²

Parsons notes.

“I do not feel uncomfortable about our own position. First, ..., Pérez de Cuéllar will not consider that we have acted in bad faith in announcing to the House of Commons tomorrow that we regard the present round as having ended with the Argentine rejection of our proposals. Secondly, he will not accuse me of bad faith if HM forces land on the Falklands in the next few days. I made the deadline clear to him ... We are going to need all the support we can get from our friends and allies in the days to come – I even took the exceptional step of brain-washing Mrs. Kirkpatrick this evening on the flexibility we had shown in the negotiations, as opposed to Argentine obduracy. Some of my Community partners are so untrustworthy that I will not brief them until Friday ...”

*“When Pérez de Cuéllar rang Galtieri he did not make much progress. The Argentine President 'seemed somewhat confused, as if he had been drinking, and was being prompted by others on what to say.'... Galtieri complained about British deadlines, unreasonableness, and an imminent military offensive.”*⁶⁰³

After speaking to the Argentine President, Pérez de Cuéllar telephons Margaret Thatcher. The Secretary-General tells the PM that he has urged Galtieri to make further concessions, and will inform Parsons any further ideas coming out of Buenos Aires. Thatcher tells Pérez de Cuéllar that while Britain would always look at new proposals, the country had gone as far as it could with regard to peace proposals.

At the United Nations, Ling Qing, President of the Security Council, calls for an informal meeting in the afternoon to update the Council. After the event, Parsons reports on the discussion to London.

“There was no disposition to move into a formal meeting nor any proposals for Presidential statements which would have caused us difficulty. The Secretary-General and I reported briefly on the stage reached. ... In order to avoid provoking a wider debate, with the possible risk of a formal session tonight, I thought it better not to say explicitly that as far as we were concerned, the present round of negotiations had ended ... I gave no-one any grounds to claim that we had accepted the various calls for restraint and moderation.”

From studios in Mayfair, London, *Radio Atlantico del Sur* makes its first broadcast, bouncing off a requisitioned BBC transmitter on Ascension Island.⁶⁰⁴

*“The aim will be military and designed to maximise the use of radio to demoralise Argentine troops (particularly conscripted troops) currently occupying the Falklands, reinforcing (their) sense of isolation, and so reducing the willingness of the Argentine garrison to resist any landing. Responsibility would rest with the Ministry of Defence.”*⁶⁰⁵

During a period of unusually calm weather in the South Atlantic, ship-to-ship redistribution of men and supplies continues apace. During a transfer from *Canberra*, a *Sea King* helicopter crashes as it attempts to land on HMS *Intrepid*. 22 men are lost, 18 of them special forces.⁶⁰⁶

602 PREM19/629 Telegram No.786 of 19 May 1982 Sir Anthony Parsons to FCO

603 Freedman 2005 vol.2

604 Project Moonshine was opposed by both the FCO and the BBC. However, the Ministry of Defence took the project direct to the War Cabinet on May 18, 1982 where it was approved. The station made 47 broadcasts between May 19 and June 15, 1982.

605 MOD submission May 13, 1982

606 Ten, including the two pilots, were rescued.

Day 49

May 20th – just after midnight New York time, Parsons sends an urgent telegram to London.

*“... the Secretary-General has dropped an embarrassing bombshell ... he has now launched his own paper... When we remonstrated with his staff that this move was inconsistent with the British position as I had described it as recently as lunchtime today... they said he had been encouraged to make it by the Prime Minister's concluding remarks ... It looks therefore as though Pérez de Cuéllar, in his desperate desire not to sign off, has chosen to ignore the clarification of the Prime Minister's remarks which I gave him this evening. The paper is very cleverly drafted and is undoubtedly more favourable to us than to Argentina, but I fully realise that it has come too late ...”*⁶⁰⁷

UN Secretary-General Pérez de Cuéllar's paper identifies four areas where he believes that agreement can be reached – (a) certain aspects of the interim-Administration, (b) provision for the extension of the time for completion of negotiations and related duration of the interim-Administration, (c) certain aspects of mutual withdrawal of forces, and (d) the geographic area to be covered by the terms of the Interim Agreement.

His proposal also includes: (1) addition of the Dependencies within the Interim Agreement, (2) references to UN General Assembly resolutions, (3) the flags of the parties and the UN to fly over the Islands, (4) arrangements (undefined) to extend the UN administration if the target date is not met, (5) consideration of a relaxation of restrictions on residence and the acquisition of property.

*“In the early hours of that day, cable 'S' No. 1,517 entered the Palacio San Martín, from Washington, which summarized the last conversation that Esteban Takacs had had with Ambassador Jeane Kirkpatrick. The text, "for the exclusive and immediate knowledge" of Costa Méndez, had five points, in which the US ambassador asked for "one last effort (in diplomatic negotiations) after having participated in a special meeting at the White House". He requested an "affirmative" Argentine response to the proposal of the Secretary General of the United Nations. In point 3, Takacs relates that she asked Kirkpatrick if she believed that Argentine public opinion could accept the British conditions. "If you say yes, you are still the net winners in this conflict. The English will never return to the islands. Pérez de Cuéllar is doing a great job and can bring this to a successful conclusion for you in the framework of the United Nations," she replied. Point #4 was important on that day and recorded the following dialogue: Takacs asked if he "had any doubts about our military ability to respond to a larger-scale British attack." Kirkpatrick replied that he "didn't rule out that we could respond successfully, but he saw that even so, and despite the cost of lives, the conditions would improve because the subsequent escalation of British military actions could be very serious". Takacs, in the same text, clarified that Ambassador Kirkpatrick requested that her opinion be transmitted to President Leopoldo Fortunato Galtieri.”*⁶⁰⁸

In London, Britain's War Cabinet meet to discuss the unexpected turn of events.

*“This idea did not get very far, although there was reluctance to reject it out of hand.... it was apparent that there could be no question of holding up the landing because of these ideas... Parsons was instructed to make it clear that the search for a negotiated settlement would not interfere with military preparations...”*⁶⁰⁹

607 The Secretary-General appeared to have taken Thatcher's comment about being prepared to look at fresh proposals to heart, despite Parsons having clarified that this phase of negotiation was over.

608 *The beginning of the end of the war: the erosion of the peace proposals of the United Nations and the British landing in the Malvinas* Juan Bautista Tata Yofre in *Infobae* May 20, 2022.

609 Freedman 2005 vol.2

From the Foreign Office, Francis Pym telegrams Parsons to tell him that the Secretary-General's ideas represent “significant downwards from what was our absolute bottom line.” With regard to military plans, Parsons should; “.. emphasize, as has been constantly stated in Parliament, that our search for a negotiated settlement has not affected and cannot affect the pressures, including military, which we have been bringing to bear on the Argentines.”

In New York, Parsons speaks to de Cuéllar.

“I said that we appreciated the positive aspects of the aide memoire, but it differed in important respects from our bottom line. ... Even if acceptable to both sides as a basis for negotiations it would take days if not weeks to know whether success could be achieved. I had emphasised the importance of our deadline. ...”

In London, Margaret Thatcher presents Britain's rejected draft-agreement to the House of Commons.

“On Monday of this week our ambassador to the United Nations handed to the Secretary-General our proposals for a peaceful settlement of the dispute. These proposals represented the limit to which the Government believe it was right to go. We made it clear to Senor Pérez de Cuéllar that we expected the Argentine Government to give us a very rapid response to them. By yesterday morning we had had a first indication of the Argentine reaction. It was not encouraging. By the evening we received their full response in writing. It was in effect a total rejection of the British proposals. It was in effect a total rejection of the British proposals. Indeed, in many respects the Argentine reply went back to their position when they rejected Mr. Haig's second set of proposals on 29 April. It retracted virtually all the movement that their representative had shown during the Secretary-General's efforts to find a negotiated settlement. ... We have reached this very serious situation because the Argentines clearly decided at the outset of the negotiations that they would cling to the spoils of invasion and occupation by thwarting at every turn all the attempts that have been made to solve the conflict by peaceful means. Ever since 2 April they have responded to the efforts to find a negotiated solution with obduracy and delay, deception and bad faith. ... Argentina began the crisis. Argentina has rejected proposal after proposal. One is bound to ask whether the junta has ever intended to seek a peaceful settlement or whether it has sought merely to confuse and prolong the negotiations while remaining in illegal possession of the Islands. I believe that if we had a dozen more negotiations the tactics and results would be the same. From the course of these negotiations and Argentina's persistent refusal to accept resolution 502 we are bound to conclude that its objective is procrastination and continuing occupation, leading eventually to sovereignty. ... The Secretary-General, to whose efforts I pay tribute, has a duty to continue to seek agreement. But, as our representative is telling him in New York, his paper differs in certain important respects from our position as presented to him on 17 May and which we then described as the furthest that we could go. Moreover, it differs fundamentally from the present Argentine position as communicated to us yesterday. ... This is the seventh set of proposals that we have considered. We have considered them carefully. Each time we have met with tactics the object of which is procrastination leading to continued occupation of the islands. Because of the record on this matter we thought it best to put up our own specific draft interim agreement in writing so that our position was clear for the world to see and so that it was clear that we were not compromising fundamental principles, but that we were prepared to make some reasonable, practical suggestions if we could secure the prize of no further loss of life. The proposals have been rejected. They are no longer on the table...”⁶¹⁰

610 HC Deb 20 May 1982 vol.24 cc477-561. Thatcher's use of the term, “off the table” caused a good deal of inquiry as to why. Particularly from opposition MPs who were unaware of Operation Sutton.

Foreign Secretary Francis Pym, speaks towards the end of the Commons' debate.

*“... I remind the House of the basic requirements that we have set ourselves throughout these long weeks. Our first requirement has been to secure the withdrawal of Argentina forces, which was demanded as a matter of mandatory obligation by Security Council resolution 502. The second has been to establish a ceasefire to avoid further loss of life as soon as withdrawal could be agreed. The third has been to make satisfactory provision for the democratic administration of the islands in any interim arrangements that prove necessary. The fourth has been to ensure that the negotiations with Argentina over the future of the islands should be such as to conform with the principles so strongly supported in this House. We have made it clear in this connection that we remain prepared to negotiate with Argentina about the long-term future of the islands, as we and previous Governments were so prepared before the invasion, that we shall be ready to discuss anything which either side might wish to put forward, and that we insist only that the terms of reference of these negotiations should not be such as to predetermine or prejudge the outcome, whether on sovereignty or on other matters. The Leader of the Opposition said that he understood that there had been some movement by Argentina towards the position of non-prejudgement. That was right, but the position changed yesterday and on Monday, as it has before, and the Argentines withdrew that position and the reply that we received yesterday did not contain it...”*⁶¹¹

*“MoD were desperate that not only should there be no hint of what was to come but that, even if it succeeded, news should not be released until well after the event. It was conceivable that British forces could establish a beachhead without the Argentines being aware of British intent.”*⁶¹²

*“Finally, Labour split in two, on the occasion of the vote in the Commons on 20 May, which gave the green light to the counter-invasion of the Falklands: the majority of Labour MPs abstained, but more than thirty dissidents voted against military operations.”*⁶¹³

From Lima, Peru's President Belaunde announces a new peace initiative of his own. Belaunde asserts that he has been encouraged by a telephone call from Costa Méndez, to the effect that the Argentine Government are urgently re-examining Peruvian ideas.

*“(1) Each Nation subscribes unilaterally to the latest proposal for an agreement presented to the Secretary-General of the United Nations; (2) The Secretary-General fulfils the clauses in which there are points of agreement, such as – (a) ceasefire; (b) mutual withdrawal of forces; (c) Administration of the Government of the Islands by the UN or by a contact group, formed of various countries, within a period which is agreed in the two proposals; (3) The Secretary-General of the United Nations, Dr. Pérez de Cuéllar, or the contact group acceptable to both parties, which he will propose, will be responsible for organising and presiding over negotiations in pursuit of a permanent solution and for supervising the immediate withdrawal from the zone of conflict of the forces of both countries.”*⁶¹⁴

From the United Nations building, Parsons reports.

“The Secretary-General has spent the whole day waiting for an Argentine reaction to his aide mémoire of 19 May. At 2345z this evening he had still not had one.”

611 *HC Deb 20 May 1982 vol.24 cc477-561*

612 Freedman 2005 vol.2

613 Bruni 2018

614 *PREM19/629 Telegram No.187 of 20 May*. Peru's initiative was based on an idea that, as there was no one document that both sides were prepared to sign; then each would sign their own document. The word “unacceptable” is written across the Prime Minister's copy.

Pérez de Cuéllar tells Ros that, as he has not received a reply from Argentina, he has no choice but to inform the President of the Security Council that he cannot continue his efforts. Ros replies that he has been unable to get any response from Buenos Aires. ⁶¹⁵

“It appeared that with the military pressure reaching a climax the Argentine Government simply could not organise a sensible response.” ⁶¹⁶

Secretary-General Pérez de Cuéllar writes to the Security Council.

“I felt the time for reaching agreement through negotiations .. was extremely short. It remains my view that substantial progress was achieved in the past two weeks towards a diplomatic solution, but I must now state that the necessary accommodations which were still needed to end the conflict have not been forthcoming. ... I feel it my duty to inform you that, in my judgement, the efforts in which I have been engaged, with the support of the Council, do not offer the present prospect of bringing about an end to the crisis nor, indeed, of preventing the intensification of the conflict.” ⁶¹⁷

“At 4:00 p.m. (sic) on May 20, 1982, the Military Attaché in Washington, General Miguel Mallea Gil, communicated with Colonel Mario Zambonini (Undersecretary for Institutional Affairs of the Presidency of the Nation) through a code telephone (conversation that here it was recorded) and brought him up to date on the latest news circulating in the capital of the United States. He reported that Margaret Thatcher accused Argentina of rejecting all peace proposals and that Britain had withdrawn her proposals as a result. That Great Britain does not currently have any peace proposals on the table and that Admiral John Woodward has been ordered to carry out a series of landings and hit-and-run attacks.” ⁶¹⁸


In the South Atlantic, HMS *Glamorgan* bombards targets on the Falklands south coast to give the impression that a 'softening-up' is taking place ahead of a landing south of Stanley. ⁶¹⁹ To the north of West Falkland, *Fearless*, *Intrepid* and *Yarmouth* head towards San Carlos with *Plymouth* and *Brilliant* following.

Britain's Embassies and Missions throughout the world receive orders.

“If asked about the UN Secretary-General's last-minute proposals, you should say that we have throughout warmly appreciated Sr. Pérez de Cuéllar's efforts. However, given the hardening of the Argentine position in their latest text, it was clear that further negotiations would be fruitless.” ⁶²⁰

An RAF *Nimrod XV232*, sets out on a reconnaissance flight from Ascension Island. ⁶²¹

At midnight in the Falklands, Britain's forces are in position.



S E C R E T
SIC 19F
OPERATION SUTTON
1. THE EYES AND EARS OF THE WORLD ARE UPON US.
BE STEADY IN RESOLVE, STRONG IN BATTLE AND MERCIFUL IN VICTORY
BT

⁶¹⁵ PREM19/629 Telegram No.809 of 20 May.

⁶¹⁶ Freedman 2005 vol.2

⁶¹⁷ *Survey of Article 98: The Secretariat, United Nations Sup.6 Vol.6 (1979 – 1984)*

⁶¹⁸ *The beginning of the end of the war: the erosion of the peace proposals of the United Nations and the British landing in the Malvinas* Juan Bautista Tata Yofre in *Infobae* May 20, 2022. 4pm appears to be too early for such news to be circulating at the UN.

⁶¹⁹ *Operation Tornado*

⁶²⁰ PREM19/629 Telegram No.90 of 20 May.

⁶²¹ Covering some 8,453 miles of the South Atlantic in 18 hours 50 minutes, the crew broke the previous record set on May 15, 1982.

Day 50

May 21st – on East Falkland, 25 men from 3 Special Boat Service (SBS) attack Argentine positions on high ground to the north of San Carlos Water (Fanning Head), supported by covering fire from HMS *Antrim*.⁶²² Units of the Special Air Service (SAS) attack positions to the south of the landing site, supported by HMS *Ardent*.

An air attack from *Hermes* destroys a Chinook helicopter and a Puma helicopter on Mount Kent.

British forces commence their landings on East Falkland Island at San Carlos.

*“The assault force approached the Falklands in ideal conditions. Thick cloud, driving rain and a gale. I embarked with a parachute battalion in four landing craft, exactly the D-Day model.... It appeared that surprise was complete. Then the dramatic moment of the ramp going down and the dash up the beach... It is a very quiet night, a silent night and now we are ashore... Only one of the units, another paratroop battalion, encountered resistance ashore. They had a brisk firefight and there were Argentine casualties and prisoners...”*⁶²³

*“The landing was carried out by stealth rather than by force. The ships moved into the main channel between the Falklands and dropped anchor safe from the sight of an Argentine garrison only by the dark moonless night. For the next few hours, the troops clambered down scrambling nets lashed alongside into the landing craft that shuffled back and forth to the shore.. It was an agonisingly long operation, nearly four hours from start to finish. All carried out in total silence, both real silence and radio silence.”*⁶²⁴

In London, the effectiveness of economic sanctions is considered.

“... Externally, the most immediate impact has been the concern of international banking circles about Argentina's credit-worthiness. Argentina's total debt is US\$34 billion, of which US\$10 billion is short-term. Short-term credits are being rolled over, but longer term loans are not being replaced as they mature, and Argentina has not been able to raise any new loans since the invasion. The authorities have been obliged to introduce severe restrictions to prevent foreign currency outflows. There are now limits on imports and extensive controls on all foreign payments. ... Foreign currency reserves, which had fallen by US\$400 million in March, fell a further US\$500 million in April. Within Argentina, there has been a steady run on the banking system, as large number of people withdrew their deposits. At least 7 financial institutions have collapsed. Interest rates have risen sharply ... The economy was already in recession before the invasion: this has got worse...”

In New York, unaware of events in the South Atlantic, the UN Security Council decides that a formal meeting of the council will take place at 2.30pm New York time. However, before the UN SC can meet, Britain's Ministry of Defence make an announcement.

“The Task Force has landed a number of raiding parties on the Falkland Islands during the night. These raids are still in progress. Early indications are that they are achieving their objectives. Bombardment from ships in the Task Force continued in the vicinity of Port Stanley and other areas in East Falklands. Harriers from the Task Force have mounted attacks in the Fox Bay area. All these activities have been directed against Argentine military targets including fuel and ammunition dumps and military stores.”

622 Accompanying the SBS squad was a naval gunfire specialist, from 148 Commando Forward Observation Battery. At Fanning Head, the Argentine force of 67 suffered 11 dead and 6 captured. One fled.

623 BBC Correspondent Robert Fox's despatch quoted in Briley 2022

624 Brian Hanrahan's despatch quoted in Briley 2022

In mid-Atlantic, on Ascension Island, Lieut.-Colonel Alfredo Astiz is asked whether he is prepared to see Swedish and French officials with regard to their investigations about missing nationals in Argentina. The Red Cross (ICRC) refuse to be involved.

*“Unsurprisingly, neither the Argentine Government nor Astiz was prepared to agree to any sort of interrogation. Stockholm and Paris were both unhappy with this failure to move the issue forward and still demanded an opportunity to question him. The Swedish Foreign Minister appealed directly to Pym and offered his own interpretation of the Geneva Conventions. British legal advice still pointed to early repatriation... In the event he was repatriated.”*⁶²⁵

On East Falkland, 2 Para move five miles inland to secure the bridgehead. A bombardment from HMS *Ardent* destroys Argentine aircraft stationed at Goose Green. However, one *Pucara* manages to get airborne and report the activity at San Carlos, before being hit by an SAS *Stinger*. Argentina's command at Stanley send out reconnaissance aircraft, to check San Carlos.

An Argentine *Blowpipe* hits a *Sea Harrier* over Port Howard. Flt. Lieut. Jeffrey Glover, injured, ejects and is taken prisoner. Two British helicopters are also lost.

From London, Foreign Secretary Pym sends a message to the British Ambassador in Lima.

“Belaunde's new formula is very simplistic and offers no apparent means of bridging the very wide gap between our and the Argentine position. ... The essential first step is, as it has always been, an unequivocal Argentine commitment to withdraw its forces ... If President Belaunde were able to exert his considerable influence with President Galtieri in order to bring this about, the prospect for a peaceful and negotiated settlement would be immediately transformed.”

Argentine aircraft arrive over San Carlos.

*“The British realised a strike was coming and the ships were on full alert. The first wave of nine Daggars was detected visually coming in low as they entered the Sound near Swan Island... They went for the two most accessible targets, Antrim and Broadsword. Antrim was damaged and temporarily out of action, with eight wounded and an unexploded 1000-lb bomb lodged in the after heads, Broadsword received cannon fire, wounding eight men and damaging its ... Lynx helicopter. Another raid came in, with aircraft going straight for Antrim ... while another went for Fort Austin.. There was then relief for two hours...”*⁶²⁶



At 1400 local time, a second Argentine air attack fails to hit any British ships.

In Buenos Aires, President Galtieri responds to an initiative sent by President Turbay of Colombia.

625 Freedman 2005 vol.2

626 *Ibid.* The unexploded bomb was removed during the night, allowing *Antrim* to move away from San Carlos Water and out of range of further air attacks.

“I value and appreciate every effort directed towards a peaceful solution of the conflict ... Our Government has employed its maximum effort to help the steps being taken by the Secretary-General of the United Nations. We have shown that we are flexible and reasonable. We have abstained from using force and we have only done so in reply to Great Britain's military aggression. We are witnessing today a new and serious phase of this armed aggression. The intransigent attitude of the Government of Great Britain which, to restore a colonial, anachronistic and illegal situation, resorts to violent means, shows itself once again as an immovable obstacle to all diplomatic solutions, ... to negotiate and attack at the same time thus creating a serious risk for world peace. ...”

At around 1530 Falklands' time, a third wave of Argentine aircraft arrive over Falklands Sound. *Argonaut* is hit by two bombs which fail to explode, but immobilise her. Two of the ship's crew are killed by the impact.

*“Two bombs had hit Argonaut, but neither exploded because the Skyhawks were flying too low and this did not give the bomb fuses time to arm themselves after leaving the aircraft. But one of the bombs set off an explosion in the Sea Cat magazine,.. Two seamen were killed in the ship.”*⁶²⁷

Argentine aircraft cannon fire hits *Broadsword* and *Brilliant*.⁶²⁸ Four Argentine *Daggers* are shot down by *Sea Harriers*.

At 1600, *Ardent* is hit by three bombs launched by 3 *Naval A4Q's*. Two of the bombs explode. All three Argentine aircraft are shot down by *Sea Harriers*. Following a second attack on *Ardent*, with 22 men dead and a further 37 wounded, the ship is abandoned.⁶²⁹

In New York, at a formal (public) session of the Security Council, Pérez de Cuéllar gives an account of his activities since the adoption of SC resolution 502.⁶³⁰

*“Mr. President, I felt it my duty to inform you yesterday evening that my efforts to facilitate an agreement between the Republic of Argentina and the United Kingdom in respect of the Falkland Islands (Islas Malvinas), initiated in pursuance of my responsibilities as Secretary-General, did not offer the present prospect of bringing an end to the crisis. The armed conflict persists and threatens to grow worse. ... It remains my belief that an agreement along the lines developed in the exchanges over the past 2 weeks, incorporating the approaches suggested in my aide mémoire of 19 May, could restore peace in the South Atlantic and open the way for an enduring solution of the long-standing dispute between two Member States. By yesterday evening, however, the necessary accommodations had not been made.”*⁶³¹

“He concluded that, towards the end of the previous week, essential agreement had been reached on many points, leaving four crucial differences: namely, certain aspects of the interim administration of the territory; provisions for the extension of the time frame for completion of the diplomatic negotiations and the related duration of the interim administration; certain aspects of the mutual withdrawal of forces; and the geographic area to be covered by the terms of the interim agreement. The Secretary-General described how he had spoken by telephone to President Galtieri and Mrs Thatcher and drew attention to the subsequent aide-memoire which

627 Middlebrook 2003. *Argonaut* had to live with the unexploded bombs for a further six days before removal.

628 Despite suffering damage, both ships remained on station.

629 A subsequent board of inquiry concluded that it had not been necessary to abandon the ship at that time, and it seems likely that the ship could have been saved had the fires been fought. *Ardent* remained afloat for some 12 hours after the abandonment, and its fate was only sealed after the fires reached the ship's magazines.

630 This session would go on for 5 days. See <https://falklandstimeline.files.wordpress.com/2019/05/question-concerning-the-situation-in-the-region-of-falkland-islands-may-21-1982-decision-of-may-26-1982.pdf>

631 UN Doc S/PV.2350

he had presented to both parties. He finished his summary by stating that, by the previous evening, the necessary accommodations had not been made: he had therefore concluded that he must inform the President of the Council of his appraisal..."⁶³²

Argentina accuses the British of "rigidity," while Japan calls for a resumption of negotiations. Australia says that as Argentina began the crisis, it is responsible for the consequences of its own recklessness. Before adjournment, Brazil calls for implementation of SC resolution 502.

The British Government issue a statement.

*"1. It is now almost seven weeks since Argentina invaded the Falkland Islands. This unlawful use of force in unprovoked aggression threatened not only to destroy the democratic way of life freely chosen by the Falkland Islanders but also the basis on which international order rests. The invasion was also a singular act of bad faith: it took place when Britain and Argentina were engaged in negotiations in accordance with requests from the United Nations. 2. On 1 April the President of the United Nations Security Council had formally appealed to Argentina not to invade the Falkland Islands. Yet on 2 April Argentina invaded. On 3 April the United Nations Security Council passed its mandatory Resolution 502, demanding a cessation of hostilities and an immediate withdrawal of all Argentine forces from the Islands. The same day, Argentina took South Georgia. In the ensuing weeks she has shown no sign of complying with the Security Council Resolution: on the contrary, she has continued a massive build up of the occupying forces on the Falkland Islands. There could hardly be a clearer demonstration of disregard for international law and for the United Nations itself. ...13. The present crisis was brought about by Argentina's unlawful act of aggression. In their subsequent attitude the Argentine Government showed that they had no respect either for democratic principles or for the rule of law. Britain stands firmly for both."*⁶³³

Argentina submits a document explaining its position to the Organisation of American States.

*"Throughout this whole negotiation process conducted by the Secretary-General, Argentina has really acted in all good faith, and with discretion and moderation, and with the firm purpose of reaching a just and lasting settlement to a crisis which affects its territorial integrity and its dignity as a nation. The Argentine Government is persuaded that the international community, most of whose members have acknowledged Argentina's rights of sovereignty over the Malvinas, Georgias del Sur, and Sandwich del Sur Islands, will concur in this just position because history does not turn back, and restoration of colonialism by force is no longer countenanced by either the conscience or the morality of civilized nations."*⁶³⁴

In Washington, Britain's Ambassador Henderson speaks to Senator Biden.

"... support for our position reflects the closeness of Anglo/US relations rather than a feeling that important principles were at stake. ... We should not therefore assume that the Senate would support greater US involvement – or even maintain its present level of support for us indefinitely. ... Against this background, Biden said we should not be surprised that so many Senators had taken the view that the US could not afford to impair its interests for the rights of self-determination of 1800 sheep farmers. If, in any renewed negotiations, self-determination for the Islanders were to become the one issue on our side standing in the way

632 Parsons 1983

633 Dept. of State Bulletin, October 1982 pp.87-90

634 OAS Doc. OEA/Ser.F/II.20 Doc. 62/82, May 22, 1982

of a settlement, US support for us would evaporate. I said that I was astonished that self-determination could count for so little in the country that had invented it ... Biden said he agreed and would continue to be our strongest supporter but we should not delude ourselves that Congressional opinion was altogether solid. ...”⁶³⁵

By the end of the day 2,400 British troops have landed on East Falkland, and are dug in.⁶³⁶

*“The Battle for Malvinas started. This morning a fierce fight was waged against the British landing forces, which had managed, with heavy losses, to establish a beach head in the San Carlos area. 70% of Britain's naval units would have been knocked out, and 3 Sea Harrier planes and 2 attacking helicopters were destroyed. The Argentine air counterattack destroyed 4 frigates and damaged 4 ships. It was reported that 6 Argentine planes and 3 helicopters were lost.”*⁶³⁷

*“The battle of the Falklands began only a few hours after the collapse of diplomatic negotiations between the two countries. Royal Marine commandos and troopers of the Parachute Regiment stormed ashore in a half-dozen or more small-scale raids and landings, military sources reported. These were designed to destroy fuel and ammunition dumps and to divert attention from the simultaneous main invasion at Port San Carlos on East Falkland island. Dispatches from the scene said the landing took four hours. ... In Washington, the United States offered to help arrange a peaceful settlement of the conflict, but, with the breakdown of United Nations negotiations on the dispute, there was no diplomatic initiative under way. ... At first, military sources said, the amphibious assault at Port San Carlos was unopposed, but at dawn the Argentines hit back, and both sides took heavy casualties. Above the battlefield, the sources continued, 35 Royal Navy and Royal Air Force Harriers, launched from the aircraft carriers Hermes and Invincible, flew into the waves of Argentine planes, breaking up their formations. But a significant number got through, British officials conceded, and hit the five ships, which found it hard to maneuver in the narrow sound. One of the five was said by unofficial sources to be gravely damaged and in danger of sinking. ... Late tonight, The Press Association, Britain's national news agency, reported that a reliable military source said 2,500 British commandos were ashore on East Falkland, which represents almost all of the marines with the task force. They were said to have landed on four beaches. Casualties were reported to be "very light" so far. ... Officials gave little importance to a new Peruvian peace proposal, one of them describing it as "a nonstarter that would simply give the Argentines a new excuse for procrastinating." ..”*⁶³⁸

*“The day had been testing for both sides.... By no means all the (Argentine) sorties even got to the Falklands, but some 45 did. Of these ten were lost (five Daggars, three A4Q's and two A4Cs), and a number of others were caught by small arms fire and out of action until they could be repaired. Two Pucarás had also been lost. While conserving itself for this battle, the Argentine Air Force did not appear to have planned for it. In particular they had come without their own escorts and had not identified the most important targets, that is the amphibious ships, but instead attacked escorts as they came across them. In addition, although they were well aware of the problem they had not addressed the more technical issue of bomb fusing.”*⁶³⁹



635 PREM19/630 Telegram No.1856 of 22 May. In 1982, Biden was a leading Democrat and member of the US Senate's Foreign Relations Committee.

636 1,000 tons of stores had also been offloaded.

637 Argentine newspaper *Clarín* May 22, 1982

638 *New York Times* May 22, 1982

639 Freedman 2005 vol.2

Day 51

May 22nd – from the Vatican City, in Italy, Pope John Paul II, expresses his anguish and appeals for; “... *an immediate ceasefire that will open the way to a peaceful settlement of the dispute.*”

During the night, HMS *Ardent* sinks in Falklands Sound.

In London, an Ministry of Defence spokesman amends the previous day's statement.

“Further reports on yesterday's operations in the Falklands up-date Argentine aircraft losses as follows: 9 Mirages, 5 Skyhawks, 2 Pucaros and 4 helicopters. We have not received final casualty reports for yesterday's operations. Initial reports indicate British casualties of 27 wounded, 2 missing and 3 dead. The two ships reported yesterday as being seriously damaged were hit by bombs in the series of air attack launched against our forces. The other three ships remain operational.”

A little after midday, Britain's Defence Secretary, John Nott, makes a statement.

“This morning the Union Jack is once again flying on the Falkland Islands... A major bridgehead has been established in the area of San Carlos on East Falkland. The major amphibious landing yesterday was a complete success. Tactical surprise was achieved and our troops landed safely with almost no interference from Argentine forces. We are now ashore on British sovereign territory in considerable force and have three Royal Marine Commandos and two Battalions of the Parachute Regiment firmly in place with their supporting arms including artillery and Rapier and other air defence weapons. ...

*To compliment the landings there were raids yesterday in other parts of East and West Falklands. In one of these, Royal Marines captured an Argentine position on Fanning Head overlooking Falkland Sound. In another the airfield at Goose Green, and Argentine positions close by, were raided by our forces. Carrier based RAF Harriers launched attacks in the course of the morning against Argentine installations at Port Stanley airfield and the helicopters on the ground nearby, as well as military installations at Fox Bay. During these operations we lost two Gazelle helicopters, and one RAF Harrier is missing. The Argentine navy has so far made no attempt to intervene.. The Argentine force has, as expected, launched heavy raids on our ships... We are back on the Falkland Islands, and back in strength. We intend to ensure that aggression does not pay.”*⁶⁴⁰

Near the San Carlos beachhead, a field hospital is established at Ajax Bay. *Rapier* air defence systems are set up ashore to offer protection for the amphibious vessels which continue to unload weapons, ammunition, stores and equipment.

*“The air attack started an hour after dawn and continued right through the day. First came the small Pucara bombers ground attack, low and surprising. One of them got right into the bay to drop its bombs but without success. For a few moments the air was full of missiles as the defending ships fired back.... That set the pattern for the rest of the day. Wave after wave of air attacks came against the fleet. ...”*⁶⁴¹

In Choiseul Sound, two British aircraft attack an Argentine patrol boat, *Rio Iguazú*.

*“... the Rio Iguazú was at sea when daylight came, still 13 miles from its destination. In an example of sheer bad luck for the Argentines, the first two Sea Harriers of the day to take off from *Hermes* passed right over the ship, and one of them came down and seriously damaged it with cannon fire.”*⁶⁴²

640 *United Press International Archives*

641 Brian Hanrahan despatch May 22, 1982 quoted in Briley 2022.

642 Middlebrook 2003. Two of the crew were injured; one later dying of his wounds. The vessel was beached.

Two Argentine *Puma* helicopters and their escorting *Agusta A109* are fired on by *Sea Harriers*. One helicopter is shot down while the other two land. One *Agusta A109* is set alight by gunfire. Uruguay agrees that casualties may be repatriated via Montevideo.

From Lima, Peruvian President Belaunde announces that the Argentines have accepted “*in principle*” his latest proposals – albeit with certain reservations.

*“... which President Belaunde thought might not be insuperable. In particular, President Belaunde said that Galtieri had shown himself to be receptive to the idea of an "equidistant" withdrawal of forces. The Argentines feel that 150 miles is too near because their own bases are further away. ... The president also said that the Argentines are not opposed to a UN Group governing the Islands for six months or even one year during which negotiations could take place. If at the end of this period there was no agreement, the Argentines would propose to return the problem to the United Nations. ...”*⁶⁴³

At 1600 Falklands time, two *Dagger* aircraft and three *A4Bs* attack British ships at San Carlos. No vessels are hit or damaged. One *Sea Harrier* explodes shortly after take-off. Bad weather prevents further Argentine air attacks.

In New York, Parsons reviews his strategy.

“We have already got Canada and New Zealand on board, they will probably speak today, thus to some extent offsetting the torrent of Latin American rhetoric which is in store for us (... it will bore the Council to death). We are working on the Caribbeans, Americans and members of the Community... Abdulah (Trinidad) is on our side but gutless. ... The new Barbadian Ambassador is a man of sterner stuff and I have some hopes of him. Our African friends – Zambia, Botswana, Kenya etc. are cheering us vigorously from the pavilion but are reluctant to go to the wicket. ... The US and France are bound to make substantive comments at some stage but, given the personal qualities of Mrs Kirkpatrick and de Nanteuil, I suspect that the Guyanian statement will be more helpful. From the point of view of getting out Third World Commonwealth speakers, it might be worth your seeing if Ramphal would help.”



When the Security Council reconvenes, Argentina’s representative makes a statement.

“... this dispute... was not begun by the Argentine Republic but precisely by this British fleet which, in a full upsurge of British imperialism, came to our coasts, expelled our authorities, imprisoned our inhabitants and expelled them to Montevideo. This was the act of force which gave rise to this problem. It is not a

*problem of today, it is a problem which goes back a long way. My country never signed a treaty, never accepted any declaration. On the contrary, it constantly protested against this usurpation of its territory, of a piece of our territory on which a colonial regime was imposed, and today it is claimed that we should accept it as if it were a fact which all Argentine generations have constantly rejected.”*⁶⁴⁴

643 PREM19/630 Telegram No. 192 of 22 May

644 UN Document S/PV.2362 cf. 1833, 1849 & 1850

Spain, Uruguay, Venezuela, the Soviet Union, Mexico, Cuba, Bolivia, Panama, Canada, Guatemala and the United States, contribute views before the meeting is again adjourned.

*“Of the Latins, the Venezuelan and Panamanian Foreign ministers were abusive; the others made reasonably moderate statements, notably Guatemala. The Soviet Union was hostile but not abusive. Canada was excellent. The US statement was a little too even-handed. Mrs Kirkpatrick made small but important changes to the advance text.”*⁶⁴⁵

In Washington, Secretary Haig sees Ambassador Henderson privately to say that the US Government is increasingly concerned at the consequences for US interests.

Day 52

May 23rd – Argentina’s press reports on the previous day’s action.

*“The British nucleus in San Carlos is encircled. Argentine forces control the situation in the area. They are isolated while the ships of the fleet took refuge on the high seas Intense fighting is fought north of the San Carlos Strait in the north of Soledad Island, where members of the Argentine Army maintain a siege on the several hundred landed British soldiers who have been there for 36 hours and who are isolated without supplies and scarce food. ... The situation in the region where the vegetation is nonexistent, the rugged terrain, with some elevations not exceeding 250 meters, is fully controlled, and the objective of the archipelago's defense forces is to prevent the raiders from penetrating the island. ... It is estimated that the landed marines have a serious problem, since they cannot be supplied either by sea or by air, because they are abandoned by the fleet units that were on the high seas.”*⁶⁴⁶

In the South Atlantic, clearing weather allows Argentina's Air Force to return. At around midday, local time, HMS *Antelope* is attacked by A4Bs coming from the south. Hit by two 1,000lb bombs which fails to explode, the vessel is also damaged by small arms fire. In a second attack, one of the Argentine aircraft, hit by cannon fire, collides with *Antelope's* mainmast and crashes.

A Falklands' coaster, *Monsunen*, requisitioned by Argentine forces, is attacked by two British *Lynx* helicopters and put out of action. A second wave of A4Qs fails to hit any of the British ships. Work continues to remove the bomb on *Argonaut*.

A group of Argentine soldiers, fleeing San Carlos, stop off at Douglas Station. They take 22 civilians as hostages; holding them at gunpoint while robbing their homes.⁶⁴⁷

Argentine losses are reported by the Ministry in London.

“Five Mirage and one Skyhawk are known to have been shot down; a further one Mirage and two Skyhawks were probably shot down. During these attacks one of our frigates sustained some damage. No reports on the extent of the damage have been received, nor have we any indication of casualties. We have had no reports of other damage to British ships or aircraft. In a separate incident earlier, Sea Harriers from the Task Force on routine patrol saw two Argentine Puma helicopters and one Bell helicopter in Falkland Sound ... The Harriers attacked and one Puma exploded; the Bell helicopter landed but was seen to be on fire and the second Puma may have been damaged.”

645 FCO Sitrep 0700 23 May 1982

646 *La Razon* May 23, 1982. Information and translation by Fabian Turcato

647 The Islanders were held for 5 days before the approach of British troops forced the Argentines to flee again.

*“... the British thought that they were doing better than was in fact the case. Two Argentine aircraft had been shot down that day, but British assessments were between four and seven.”*⁶⁴⁸

From Buenos Aires, President Galtieri responds to the Pope's 'anguish' of the previous day, by asserting that Argentina is prepared to accept a cease-fire and negotiate.⁶⁴⁹

*“The Argentine radio says that the British are ready to surrender, having now been surrounded by Argentine soldiers, but then says their planes find them difficult to locate. All very confusing and conflicting.”*⁶⁵⁰

In New York, the Security Council reconvenes; hearing thirteen speakers before adjourning again until the 24th.

Parsons reports that support for the UK is “*stretching very thin*” and that a view is developing of the crisis bringing about a, “... *kind of cultural confrontation between Latin America and Western Europe/North America.*”⁶⁵¹

HMS *Antelope* moves to a sheltered position while a Royal Engineer bomb disposal team attempt to defuse the unexploded bombs. After three failed attempts, a fourth denotes the second bomb causing extensive damage.⁶⁵² *Antelope* is abandoned.

Day 53

May 24th – in London, Defence Secretary Nott makes a statement to Parliament.

“On the night of Thursday 20 May, Her Majesty's forces re-established a secure base on the Falkland Islands and the Union Flag is today flying over the settlement of San Carlos in East Falkland – where it will remain. The whole House will have been delighted to see the expressions of delight on the faces of the islanders and their children – published widely yesterday. The amphibious landing was the culmination of a long period of planning by the force commander and of preparation by the Royal Marine commandos, members of the Parachute Regiment and supporting arms during their six weeks voyage into the South Atlantic. Whilst they sailed south, the Government worked unremittingly to persuade Argentina to withdraw peacefully and honourably from the Falkland Islands. But the Government met only with Argentine intransigence.

Last week it became clear that the only possible course left open to us was the repossession of the Falkland Islands by military means. In this the Government have been encouraged – as I think has the country as a whole – that Her Majesty's Opposition and the other main political parties in the House have supported us. Certainly I believe that our Service men have been greatly encouraged by the support that they have received from right hon. and hon. Members of this House... We all feel deeply too for the constant concern and worry of the families and friends of our Service men. They are showing great patience and understanding in very difficult circumstances. Names of casualties will not be released until the next of kin have been informed, although to counter the false propaganda coming out of Argentina we have had to give some general information on the progress of military action as soon as it is confirmed.

648 Freedman 2005 vol.2

649 With a visit to the UK already planned, the Vatican announced that the Pope would also visit Argentina from 10 – 13 June, 1982

650 Diary entry in Smith 1984 pp.172-173

651 FCO Sitrep 24 May 1982

652 Staff Sgt. James Prescott was killed.

*Our forces are now established on the Falkland Islands with all the necessary supplies, together with their heavy equipment and air defence missiles. They have mobility with a large number of helicopters at their disposal – and their spirits are high. But I must emphasise that our men still face formidable problems in difficult terrain with a hostile climate. We must expect fresh attacks upon them, and there can be no question of pressing the force commander to move forward prematurely – the judgement about the next tactical moves must be his – and his alone. But, one thing is certain: the days of the occupying Argentine garrison are numbered and it will not be long before the Falkland Islanders once again have their democratic rights restored.”*⁶⁵³

Britain’s Ministry of Defence announces that HMS *Antelope* has sunk.

*“On Monday afternoon Antelope broke her back and as the sea rushed in a white cloud erupted, the hot metal was finally cooled. The bows and the stern rose from the surface then slowly sank.”*⁶⁵⁴



In Europe, the EEC extend economic sanctions against Argentina for an unspecified period.

In the Falklands, British aircraft attack Stanley airfield shortly after dawn; damaging a helicopter and a *Pucara*. Some minor damage is caused to the runway.

Late morning in the Falklands, five Argentine *Skyhawks* fly in over San Carlos Water. HMS *Sir Galahad*, *Sir Lancelot* and *Sir Bedivere* are hit in the attack. Fires break out on *Sir Galahad* and *Sir Lancelot*, although the bombs fail to explode. The bomb striking *Sir Bedivere* passes through the ship. In a second attack by four *Daggers*, HMS *Sir Lancelot* is hit for a second time but this bomb bounces off. Argentine cannon fire hits *Fearless* and *Sir Galahad*. British *Sea Harriers* shoot down three *Daggers* with *Sidewinder* missiles. Throughout the attacks, British ships continue landing stores, equipment and men.

*“Fused to provide enough time for the airplane to get clear before they exploded, the bombs had no time to arm at the low altitudes where the Argentines were flying. To arm and explode, they needed to be dropped from a greater height—at least 200 feet—and at that altitude, the aircraft became vulnerable to missiles. BBC World Service would reveal that little secret, but not until late May.”*⁶⁵⁵

Brig. Thompson receives a signal to say that there is concern at Northwood regarding the lack of movement. He should consider getting off the beachhead.⁶⁵⁶

653 *HC Deb 24 May 1982 vol.24 cc647-55*

654 Brian Hanrahan despatch May 24, 1982 quoted in Briley 2022.

655 *Air War in the Falklands: Grand miscalculations, unknown odds miserable weather, vast distances – and unlikely adversaries* Carl A. Posey *Smithsonian Magazine* September 2002. After a BBC report, Argentina changed its tactics so that their bombs, many made in the UK, exploded on impact.

656 Northwood, near London, is a military HQ. As HMS *Warrior* in 1982, it acted as the flagship of the Royal Navy's Commander in Chief Fleet (CINCFLEET). With staff from all three services, it oversaw operations in the Falklands.

In Argentina, journal *Conviccion*, keeps its readers informed.

“The marines, immobilized at San Carlos, await their Dunkirk. As Argentine troops concentrate to throw them into the sea, the British continue in the little beachhead without resupply.”

Panama's press report their Foreign Minister describing Margaret Thatcher as; *“Hitler with skirts.”*

In the USA, the *Washington Post* provides another perspective.

“Secretary of State Alexander Haig suggests that Britain's successful landings on the Falklands – plus the sacrifices sustained by both sides – may make enough of a difference to permit negotiations to resume. Surely he is right. In its bridgehead and in its evident capacity to sustain operations ashore, Britain has something real to convert into political coin. Argentina may hope to raise the cost to the British and limit their military gains, but it cannot expect to boot them off the Islands again. The 40 isolated marines it swept up on April 2 are one thing, the 5,000 troops ashore, with their fleet protection, are quite another.”

From Buenos Aires, Argentina calls for an urgent meeting of the Organisation of American States (OAS).

In New York, the UN Security Council debate continues.

“Maina (Kenya) made an admirably robust statement which was an effective antidote to all the Latins have been saying about a cultural confrontation between the West and Latin America. He said that the Breach of the Peace had started with Argentina's aggression on 2 April. That was a separate question from the rights and wrongs of Argentina's claims to sovereignty. Some of those who “felt obliged” to support Argentina's case on sovereignty had tried to treat the two problems as one. ...

The Decolonisation argument was irrelevant. All of North and South America had been colonised in the 18th and 19th centuries. ... That was a fact of the world's unfortunate past.

This was not a colonial issue: Argentina was engaged in the purely territorial claim, in total disregard of the inhabitants of the Islands. The Argentine claim could not be settled at their expense: their interests were paramount. If the principle of decolonisation was distorted to redistribute peoples, the United Nations would be in real trouble. ... Ling Qing (China) speaking in his national capacity, said that the failure of the Secretary-General's efforts and the arrival of British forces had brought about an escalation which China deeply deplored. ... There should be an immediate ceasefire and resumption of negotiations. The substantive problem was a legacy of colonialism.”⁶⁵⁷

In Washington, Haig expresses his fears to Britain's Ambassador Henderson.

“... Haig said that the US Government, by coming down on the British side, had already greatly jeopardised US interests in Latin America. What was at stake in the future was enormous. It was not simply a question of the economic sacrifices involved but of the enormous increase in Soviet and communist influence. Haig's problem therefore was somehow to avoid a resolution under the Rio Treaty later this week that would isolate the USA still further from the rest of the American hemisphere. ... Haig then suggested the sort of plan which I have already hinted to you might be on his mind: ceasefire and withdrawal, US/Brazilian interim administration and discussions without prejudice regarding the future – ideas that I told Haig have gone down in London like a lead balloon. ...”

Henderson informs London of Haig's wavering and, on receiving the telegram, Pym notes; *“It is disconcerting that Haig should be so volatile. Haig was urging us only a few days ago to take military action...”*

657 PREM19/631 Telegram No.836 of 24 May

In New York, at the Security Council meeting, Brazil's delegate puts forward a draft-resolution.

".. the Security Council of the United Nations can no longer delay taking firm and decisive action to restore international peace and security. ... there is no alternative but that the Security Council must take a decision to put an immediate end to the military confrontation and to establish the bases for a permanent settlement of the problem. The Brazilian Government wish to submit ... the following points which ... can be the basis for a Council Resolution that will ensure a just and honourable peace without winners or losers."

Brazil proposes:- (1) an immediate cessation of hostilities, (2) simultaneous withdrawal to equal distances, (3) withdrawal to be complete within 21 days, (4) a UN administration which will consult the "representatives of the inhabitants," (5) a Committee made up of both Britain and Argentina plus four other States with a mandate to conduct negotiations.

Reporting, Parsons comments to Britain's Foreign Office; "We have told the Brazilians here that the time for such arrangements is now past and that there could be no question of our allowing a Resolution on these lines to be adopted."⁶⁵⁸ Ireland's Ambassador Dorr, also tables a further draft-resolution which, *inter alia*, calls for a suspension of hostilities for 72 hours.

*"... the Non-Aligned members (excluding Panama) were annoyed with Dorr for going ahead and tabling a draft which he and everyone else knew that we would veto. The three Africans, Jordan and Guyana were desperately anxious to avoid a deadlock in the Security Council which could be followed by a major row generated by the Latin Americans in an emergency session of the General Assembly. This would only polarise relations between the regions, benefit the radicals and damage any prospect there might be of a peaceful outcome to the present crisis..."*⁶⁵⁹

In addition, representatives from Panama and Japan prepare draft texts. The *Non-Aligned Movement* submits a proposal for an amended version of the Irish draft before the *Council* meeting is adjourned until the 25th. Parsons seeks instructions from London.

In New York, interviewed by the BBC's 'Panorama' current affairs team, Argentina's Foreign Minister, Costa Mendez, asserts that Argentina would defend the Falklands as long as there is "one Argentine alive in either the continent or in the Islands." He tells his interviewers that Argentina had been seeking a peaceful solution for 17 years and that he considers the invasion to be part of that search for a settlement.

In Santiago, Chile, Argentina seeks support for an OAS condemnation of British aggression; calls for a cessation of hostilities with a return to 'natural' bases; a resumption of UN negotiations and the adoption by OAS States of measures to discourage the UK and assist Argentina. Chile's Foreign Ministry assures the British Embassy that they will vote against each point, except that calling for a resumption of negotiations.⁶⁶⁰

In London, intelligence is received from Caracas to the effect that the Venezuelan Government is attempting to persuade all Latin American countries to withdraw their Ambassadors from the UK, breaking off diplomatic relations.

In the Falklands, during the night, an SAS reconnaissance team arrive on Mount Kent. Unexpectedly, they find it deserted.⁶⁶¹

658 PREM19/631 Telegram No.839 of 24 May

659 PREM19/631 Telegram No.844 of 24 May

660 PREM19/631 Telegram No.259 of 25 May

661 The 140 Argentine troops, plus artillery, had been ordered to Goose Green to reinforce the garrison there.

Day 54

May 25th – Portugal grants permission for British *Nimrod* refuelling at its Lajes air base in the Azores. New Zealand's offer of a frigate, HMNZS *Canterbury*, is gratefully accepted by PM Thatcher. An additional *Blowpipe* battery is deployed to the South Atlantic, from British forces in Germany.

“There had been some small arms fire during the night. Someone in the drill hall had got a little nervous and put a few shots into St. Mary's house. No one was injured but some of Monsignors books had rather large holes in them.” ⁶⁶²

From London, Margaret Thatcher responds to President Turbay's initiative of the 21st.

“If you, Mr. President, can bring home to the Argentine Government not only the extent of our determination to achieve a just solution to this crisis, but also the imperative need to withdraw their forces from the Falkland Islands in accordance with Security Council Resolution 502, you would be making a contribution to the peace of South America and of the World which it would be hard to exaggerate.” ⁶⁶³

An Argentine *A4B* is shot down by a *Sea Dart* missile fired from HMS *Coventry*; sailing outside Falklands Sound with HMS *Broadsword* as a 42/22 defensive combination. A little later two *A4Cs* are brought down by fire from HMS *Yarmouth* and *Coventry*.⁶⁶⁴



Around 1400 Falklands time, *Coventry* and *Broadsword* are attacked by Argentine *Skyhawks*. *Broadsword* is hit first, but the bomb fails to explode.

A second wave attacks *Coventry* which is hit by three bombs, two of which explode (left). *Coventry* sinks with a loss of 19 lives.

Further away, two Argentine *Super Etendards* armed with *AM39 Exocet* missiles attack the carrier group. Two missiles are fired and the aircraft immediately break off.⁶⁶⁵ Escorting ships fire chaff to distract the missiles.

“The two missiles veered towards the chaff pattern laid by Ambuscade. Having flown through or under chaff and not been triggered, the homing head on Exocet tends to look to its left for another target and that is where both missiles found Atlantic Conveyor. The ship had no defences and was caught in the starboard quarter.” ⁶⁶⁶

⁶⁶² *Neville's Diary* in Bennet 2021

⁶⁶³ PREM19/631 Telegram No.108 of 25 May


⁶⁶⁴ One *A4C* pilot, Ricardo Lucero, was rescued and taken aboard HMS *Fearless*. At the time there was confusion as to his nationality and some believed that he was Peruvian. This was not the case.

⁶⁶⁵ Quite which vessel the Argentine pilots had targeted is moot. Almost certainly not *Atlantic Conveyor*. One possibility was RFA *Regent*, which was unloading ammunition from *Atlantic Conveyor* via helicopter. Evidence suggests that *Regent* was, on the 25th, carrying a live nuclear weapon described as a *Bomb Aircraft HE [High Explosive] 600lb MC* together with two inactive surveillance rounds and a training round. However, this engagement took place outside the Amphibious Operations Area. See *Malvinas, archivos desclasificados: el estudio inglés que afirma que dos misiles apuntaron contra un buque con armas nucleares* Alejandro Amendolara y Mariano Sciaroni in *Infobae* January 14, 2022

⁶⁶⁶ Freedman 2005 vol.2

With *Atlantic Conveyor* full of hazardous cargo, and suffering an uncontrollable fire, a decision is made to abandon her. Twelve lives are lost. Lost hardware includes three *Chinook* and six *Wessex* helicopters. Also, the tents for 4,500 men are left to burn.

*“... the successes of 25 May would prove to be the high watermark of the Argentine air effort. ... Unfortunately the Argentine propaganda service sullied the efforts of the air units by publishing outrageous claims on their behalf.”*⁶⁶⁷



*“While the loss of the Atlantic Conveyor complicated British plans, it was not quite the result Argentina had intended. They had been after the carriers and had now used up two Exocets in failing to do so. Moreover only one AM39 Exocet remained and efforts to obtain more from abroad had so far been unavailing... That evening the Argentine commanders accepted that their battle must now move on to the next phase.”*⁶⁶⁸

In New York, at the reconvened Security Council meeting, Foreign Ministers representing Argentina, Nicaragua, Panama and Venezuela circulate a 'Declaration.'

“We confirm the rejection by Latin America of the United Kingdom's military offensive against the South American continent ... We strongly protest against the British decision, officially communicated to the Government of Uruguay, to the effect that the United Kingdom has decided to extend its naval and air military action to the River Plate. This deplorable decision, in addition to violating general international law and the River Plate Treaty, carries the British aggression into the very heart of the continent.. This directly affects the integrity and security of Argentina, Bolivia, Paraguay and Uruguay, while at the same time aggravating and spreading the conflict which has resulted from the United Kingdom's military adventure ... We reject with righteous indignation the decision taken by the European Economic Community, with the honorable exception of Ireland and Italy, extending indefinitely the economic aggression which, under the pretext of 'sanctions,' has been imposed on Argentina. This act, which is offensive to the whole of Latin America, constitutes a serious threat to international peace and security and presages the generalization of a conflict which, day by day, is assuming the character of an intercontinental confrontation. We note with alarm that, although a number of weeks have elapsed since the beginning of the British fleet's armed attack on the Argentine Republic, the Security Council has taken no action ... This concern is seriously increased by the fact

667 Middlebrook 2003

668 Freedman 2005 vol.2

*that, after four days of debate in the Council, during which both the fighting and the loss of life have intensified, it has not proved possible to respond to the outcry of mankind, which demands an unconditional ceasefire ...”*⁶⁶⁹

Argentina's Foreign Minister Costa Méndez attacks the UK for, “unleashing war” in the South Atlantic. He rejects an accusation that it had been Argentina which had been the first to use force.

*“It was the UK which had used force to occupy the Islands in 1833. Colonialism was an act of force, permanent aggression and a crime: that was the true explanation of current events. It was not for the United Kingdom, the colonial power par-excellence, to give lectures on self-determination. The UK had abstained when the General Assembly adopted Resolution 1514, the Magna Carta of decolonisation. ... Self-determination for the Malvinas was a joke...”*⁶⁷⁰

Anthony Parsons responds to the verbal assault.

*“The Foreign Minister referred at length to self-determination.. It is true that we took the position in the 1960's that self-determination was a principle and not a right. However, in 1966 the two international Covenants on economic, social and cultural rights and on civil and political rights were adopted.... The United Kingdom has ratified both these Covenants, which have entered into force. Furthermore, in 1970, the General Assembly adopted by consensus – that is, with the United Kingdom joining in the consensus – the Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-Operation among States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations. ...”*⁶⁷¹

*Not only has my country endorsed the right to self-determination in the sense of the Charter, the Covenants and the Friendly Relations Declaration, but we have gone a great deal further to disprove the allegation that we are the colonial power par-excellence. Since General Assembly Resolution 1514 (XV) was adopted ... we have brought to sovereign independence and membership of this organisation no less than 28 States. We are proud of our record...”*⁶⁷²

From London, Francis Pym telegrams Parsons,

*“... our position now is that while we remain willing to agree to a ceasefire if Argentina clearly and irrevocably commits herself to very early and total withdrawal of her forces, we are not prepared to accept any other conditions. ... You should vote against the Irish draft Resolution if it is put to the vote as it stands ...”*⁶⁷³

From Washington, Ambassador Henderson informs London.

“I went over the ground with Eagleburger this morning. He assured me that instructions had been sent to Mrs Kirkpatrick that if the Irish Resolution came to a vote in its present form the United States should veto it.”

From New York, Parsons responds to Pym.

“Through the morning and at the Security Council lunch, I have negotiated firmly on the Irish draft as revised by the Non-Aligned Movement, ... we have carried almost all our points... We have a clear

669 PREM19/631 Telegram No. 852 of 25 May. Reference to River Plate appears to have been based on rumours concerning a British blockade of the Rio de la Plata. Seeking clarification, Uruguay had asked the UK only for London to deny that it had any such plans. The declaration's sponsors chose to believe the rumour, for the political capital that it offered.

670 PREM19/631 Telegram No.854 of 25 May

671 For UN resolution 2625, see 1970

672 For UN resolution 1514 see 1960.

673 PREM19/631 Telegram No.480 of 25 May

reaffirmation of 502.. I am under very strong pressure to agree this evening so that we can get out of the Council before this fragile near-agreement breaks down. ... I therefore recommend that I should be instructed to accept this with a suitable explanation of vote, after the vote...Guyana was first class, as was Chile given its circumstances. The other Non-Aligned were not at all bad.

Netherlands was as unhelpful as the other Europeans (except Belgium) have been, but Italy was a bit more robust. ... The Argentines had the better of the first two days, with a flood of Latin rhetoric, but by the end the general feeling, I think, was that we had won quite handsomely on points. For this we should be especially grateful to Kenya, Guyana and Belgium – the old Commonwealth support for us was taken for granted.”

Parsons informs the Security Council that Britain is ready to vote in favour of the draft, initially proposed by Ireland, and as amended by the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM). He emphasises that; “... *an Argentine withdrawal must now be totally unconditional and not linked to any parallel British withdrawal.*”

Argentina’s Foreign Minister Costa Méndez asks for time to consider the measure. A vote is deferred until the 26th.

From Washington, Alexander Haig expresses his thoughts to Francis Pym.

“I see major advantages in an effort by you to put forward terms of a just and reasonable settlement as soon as you are sure that you can and will succeed militarily.”

In the USA, NBC television, Reuters and Associated Press all carry news reports that Secretary Haig has called on the British Government not to “*crush*” the Argentines in the Falklands; but to “*think carefully.*” The reports suggest that Argentina would seek a scapegoat, and that scapegoat would be the United States.

Haig is said to be “*upset*” by the leak and to consider it, “*damaging.*”

From London, the Foreign Office instruct all Ambassadors and Missions in Non-Aligned Movement countries to speak to their counterparts and ensure that in the meeting scheduled for the 31st emphasis is laid upon the original aggression by Argentina. Also on their failure to comply with SCR 502.

In Europe, a meeting of EEC Foreign Ministers agrees an indefinite extension of European sanctions against Argentina in exchange for a reduced budget rebate of \$875 million for the UK.

*“Ireland and Italy remained 'neutral' on the sanctions decision and agreed not to circumvent the embargo. By conceding on the budget and CAP issues, Britain achieved a firm commitment to continued sanctions from the other EEC members.”*⁶⁷⁴

First elements of the Bristol Group of reinforcements arrive off the Falkland Islands. Destroyers *Bristol* and *Cardiff*; frigates *Active*, *Andromeda*, *Avenger*, *Minerva*, *Penelope*. Also fleet auxiliaries, RFA *Bayleaf* and RFA *Olna*.⁶⁷⁵

*“It's Argentine National Day. ... We could hear the sound of low flying aircraft, not the roar of jets, but a slightly softer note of the Pucara. ... There were several men ... watching the five planes. ... the five planes chased around the harbour and out through the narrows and back in over the ridge came four... Round they went again ... and back came three... I looked up and there he was, the dear little Harrier dropping some sort of bombs on the Pucarás as they flew at water level.”*⁶⁷⁶

674 Martin 1992

675 Majority had sailed from the UK on May 10, 1982, while *Cardiff* had joined the group en-route from Gibraltar.

676 *Neville's Diary* in Bennett 2021

Day 55


May 26th – in Stanley, Argentine authorities announce that they are to issue ID cards to every citizen. In accordance with Argentine law. ⁶⁷⁷

“The cards were to be issued to all persons aged between 16 and 65. This seemed to be an anti-infiltration scheme, but one which failed at the onset. George had a nice machine gun and the captain had a nice pistol, but they didn't have a camera” ⁶⁷⁸

HMS *Glamorgan* bombards targets around Stanley.

From the UN in New York, US Representative, Jeane Kirkpatrick, messages the State Department in Washington, with regard to a meeting with Argentine Air Force General Jose Miret.

“According to Gen. Miret the military situation was developing favorably for Argentina. Just that morning 21 Argentinian warplanes had attacked British ships and had inflicted severe damage to the Canberra troop carrier. Yesterday they had sunk a frigate. British were not accurately portraying their losses and he was sceptical that their San Carlos beachhead was as well established as they claimed. Although presently the military situation favored Argentina, Argentina was aware that ultimately Britain would prevail because Argentina could not expect to defeat a world power. Argentina naturally did not want to lose but neither did it find comfort in the thought of winning in a manner that would humiliate Britain. ... Britain's expansion of the war zone to include the River Plate estuary necessarily dragged Uruguay and probably Brazil into the conflict. Uruguayan Foreign Minister was coming to New York to raise the issue. As the conflict expands and its intensity increases, it will become increasingly difficult to foresee its consequences or to find an acceptable solution. Without an American restraining influence, Britain will insist on pursuing its military objectives until the bitter end.” ⁶⁷⁹



In Bonn, Germany, *Rheinische Post* asserts that its country's support for the UK is, “grudging and full of reservations stemming from incomprehension at many aspects of Mrs. Thatcher's Falklands strategy.” Also that Germany will not go, “through thick and thin,” with Britain.

In London, Defence Secretary John Nott makes a statement to Parliament.

“During the past seven weeks the Royal Navy has assembled, organised and despatched over 100 ships, involving over 25,000 men and women, 8,000 miles away to the other end of the world. The Task Force has recaptured South Georgia and successfully accomplished a hazardous amphibious landing of around 5,000 men without a single fatal land casualty. The morale of our forces is high. ... Our forces on the ground are now poised to begin their thrust upon Port Stanley; behind them are another 3,000 men of 5 Brigade, whilst reinforcements and resupply are virtually denied to the Argentine garrison on

677 Signed on the second page by Carlos F. Bloomer Reeve as 'Secretario General Gobernacion'.

678 *Neville's Diary* in Bennett 2021

679 *Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Cable File, Falkland File 05/26/1982*. Pure Argentine propaganda.

the island. Generally the military objective to repossess the Falkland Islands has gone forward exactly as we planned it. ”⁶⁸⁰

In Mexico, Britain's Ambassador Tickell updates President Portillo. He then reports to London.

*“(Portillo) asked me to convey his warm thanks to the Prime Minister. He deplored the loss of life and waste of resources involved in the conflict. He did not doubt our capacity to recover the Islands and indicated that he hoped we would not be too long about it...”*⁶⁸¹

Off South Georgia, 3,000 men are transferred from QE2 to Canberra, Stromness and Norland.

On East Falkland, C Company, 2 Para, set up a forward base at Camilla Creek House.

*“The radio announcer from the BBC said that the troops were preparing to move off from the northwest to attack an important strategic target. The only place they could go was Goose Green. Nice of them to warn the enemy – unless the attack had already begun ”*⁶⁸²

In Washington, Haig updates President Reagan.

*“Our latest exchanges with the British confirm that they are currently not of a mind to work toward a negotiated settlement which gives anything at all to the Argentines before they retake the Islands. ... The two sides could not be further apart. The Secretary General has asked us to put pressure on the British to accept mutual withdrawal, warning that he will announce Thursday evening that a ceasefire is not possible if the British have not moderated their position... Given the mood in London, American pressure would be in vain; ... There is virtually no hope of productive negotiations before the British complete their re-occupation of the Islands. Even then, the British will be reluctant to offer anything to the Argentines. ... they will not be flexible, at least in the short term, in the flush of victory.”*⁶⁸³

At much the same time in New York, the Security Council's debate continues.

“Spain and Togo listed the cessation of hostilities, negotiation and peace as the priorities of the Council's action, as did several other speakers who urged the Council to call for an immediate ceasefire. Jordan asserted that the Council should not resign itself to the role of onlooker while blood was being shed, and Brazil said the Council was duty bound to prevent a worsening of the situation. Greece said the Council's prestige would be enhanced if it unequivocally condemned all invasions and breaches of the Charter provisions. Colombia asserted that the United Nations would emerge greatly weakened if it failed to enforce international law and maintenance of international peace and security, while the United States considered that the Organization had functioned in the crisis in the manner foreseen by its founders and its Charter. ...

Several countries, among them Brazil, Cuba, Ecuador, Nicaragua, Panama, Uruguay and Venezuela, held the United Kingdom responsible for blocking the negotiating efforts. China said the negotiations had broken down due to a tough stand taken by the party with superior military strength. Bolivia asserted that any peace effort would be doomed to failure as long as the United Kingdom persisted in its equivocal stand. Panama and the USSR said the United Kingdom had resorted to the language of ultimatums and virtually broken off negotiations by resorting to the use of force. Antigua and Barbuda believed the United Kingdom had made genuine attempts to reach a negotiated settlement.

680 HC Deb 26 May 1982 vol.24 cc921-31

681 PREM19/631 Telegram No.441 of 26 May

682 Neville's Diary in Bennett 2021

683 Reagan Library, Dennis C. Blair Files, Country Files, Falklands Crisis 1982

The United States said the United Kingdom had indicated its willingness to consider, but Argentina had rejected or chosen not to consider, first the United States proposal and subsequently the Peruvian peace plan, both based on the Council's 3 April resolution. New Zealand said it was Argentina's obduracy and rigidity that had frustrated and blocked the Secretary-General's efforts just when it looked as if an agreement was within reach. ... Germany, Guyana, Jordan, Uganda and Zaire believed the mandate should be based on the Council's 3 April resolution. ... Australia said Argentina's invocation of paragraph 1 of the 3 April resolution in accusing the United Kingdom of hostile action was a perverted reading of that text, as that paragraph, it said, was directed to the state of armed conflict caused by the Argentine seizure of the Falklands.... the majority of Latin American countries, along with China, Equatorial Guinea, the Lao People's Democratic Republic, Poland, the USSR, Yugoslavia and Zaire, supported Argentina's territorial claim, while endorsing efforts to find a peaceful solution to the dispute. El Salvador asserted that Argentina's occupation of the Islands was in accordance with its lawful title to them, which led Panama to state that there had been no breach of peace on 3 April, when Argentina recovered the Islands.

Belgium and Kenya said territorial claims should not be allowed to override the interests of peoples in choosing democratically their own destinies. Australia considered that Argentina had been insistent on loaded arrangements in the Falklands which, if accepted, would lead to conceding its demand of sovereignty and ignoring the rights of the Falklanders; if Argentina's aggression was allowed to persist, it would itself amount to colonialism. In a similar vein, Kenya said Argentina could not claim any right to impose its own form of colonialism on the Islands' inhabitants. New Zealand added that the two aggrieved parties in the crisis were the United Kingdom and the people of the Falklands.

In contrast, Panama called it illogical to talk of the right to self-determination - the right of the oppressed - in the Malvinas case, when the inhabitants of the Islands were dependents of a British colonial company; ... Colombia, noting that the United Kingdom's policy of decolonization had allowed the independence of many countries by means of negotiations, believed it reasonable to expect that the Malvinas case could also be solved in that manner. Zaire also noted the United Kingdom's past record of decolonization, ... The Netherlands felt that Argentina's resort to force could not be justified in terms of international law. Antigua and Barbuda said that, as a small island State dependent for its security on the United Nations, it had to deplore Argentina's illegal use of force in seizing the Falklands in defiance of the Council. In a similar vein, Guyana rejected the attitude of those which held aloft the action of 2 April as an example to be emulated, and said aggression should not be rewarded." 684

Argentina's Costa Méndez indicates that Buenos Aires can accept the draft-resolution, as amended.

Put to a vote, the Security Council adopts the amended resolution.

Security Council Resolution 505 –

Reaffirming its resolution 502 (1982),

Noting with the deepest concern that the situation in the region of the Falkland Islands (Islas Malvinas) has seriously deteriorated,

Having heard the statement made by the Secretary-General at its 2360th meeting, on 21 May 1982, as well as the statements made in the debate by the representatives of Argentina and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland,

Concerned to achieve, as a matter of the greatest urgency, a cessation of hostilities and an end to the present conflict between the armed forces of Argentina and the United Kingdom,

- 1. Expresses appreciation to the Secretary-General for the efforts that he has already made to bring about an agreement between the parties, to ensure the implementation of resolution 502 (1982), and thereby to restore peace to the region;*
- 2. Requests the Secretary-General, on the basis of the present resolution, to undertake a renewed mission of good offices, bearing in mind resolution 502 (1982) and the approach outlined in his statement of 21 May 1982;*
- 3. Urges the parties to the conflict to co-operate fully with the Secretary-General in his mission with a view to ending the present hostilities in and around the Falkland Islands (Islas Malvinas);*
- 4. Requests the Secretary-General to enter into contact immediately with the parties with a view to negotiating mutually acceptable terms for a cease-fire, including, if necessary, arrangements for the dispatch of United Nations observers to monitor compliance with the terms of the cease-fire;*
- 5. Requests the Secretary-General to submit an interim report to the Security Council as soon as possible and, in any case, not later than seven days after the adoption of the present resolution."*

*"... the new mission was undertaken without enthusiasm by the Secretary-General. He told the Council: You've asked me to do this. I will try, but you should understand that what you are asking is practically impossible. A war is now underway, and it is simply not realistic to think in terms of achieving a cease fire."*⁶⁸⁵

In exercise of a right of reply, Britain's Representative, Anthony Parsons, addresses the Security Council.

"My delegation voted in favour of the Resolution just adopted ... We did so because it contains a clear reaffirmation of SCR 502. It registers beyond doubt that the Secretary-General's efforts have been, and will be, concentrated on ensuring the implementation of SCR 502. This is the key to the return of peace to the region... In particular, this key lies in the second operative paragraph of SCR 502, namely the unconditional demand for the immediate withdrawal of all Argentine forces from the Falkland Islands.

I must make clear, so that there is no misunderstanding, that for our part the only acceptable condition for a ceasefire is that it should be unequivocally linked to an immediate commencement of Argentine withdrawal. The history of the last two months has done nothing to create British confidence in the Government of Argentina ...

*Hence a simple verbal agreement by Argentina to withdraw its forces would not be sufficient for a ceasefire. Mr. President the Council should also be quite clear on another point. The situation has changed ... we are talking about Argentine withdrawal. We cannot now accept that Argentine withdrawal be linked in any way to parallel British withdrawal."*⁶⁸⁶

In a telegram to London, Parsons sums up the day's proceedings.

"We owe a lot to the old Commonwealth, Kenya, Guyana and Belgium for their robust support, slightly less to the FRG (Germany), little or nothing to the rest of our partners who spoke, including France: the US statement was too even handed for our liking. However, to a greater or lesser extent, all these statements offset the Latin American barrage ... The fact that we emerged without having to veto, which seemed most unlikely at the outset, was due to a number of factors – the firmness with which we stated

685 Freedman & Gamba-Stonehouse 1990 p.348

686 PREM19/631 Telegram No.858 of 26 May

our own positions both privately and publicly: the reluctance of the Non-Aligned members of the Council to allow a veto situation to develop both because of basic sympathy for us and because they realised that a deadlock would effectively deal the UN out of any further useful role in the crisis: the Irish tactics which the Non-Aligned found both irritating and unacceptable: and the Latin American desire to get out of the Council in order to leave their hands free for the OAS meeting in Washington on the 27th... It is ironic ... that our best support should have come from Africans, Asians and Caribbeans, with our partners and allies either useless or actively unhelpful.”

With only seven days available before he has to report back to the Security Council, Pérez de Cuéllar requests that Argentina and Britain provide, within 24 hours, the terms each consider acceptable for a cease-fire.

*“In the afternoon of 26 May, I met separately with the parties and requested that each provide within 24 hours a statement of the terms it considered acceptable for a cease-fire. It was my hope, as I explained to the parties, that, on the basis of their replies, terms could be developed which would be mutually acceptable. I indicated that arrangements for the dispatch of United Nations observers to monitor compliance with the terms of a cease-fire, as mentioned in resolution 505 (1982), could be made on short notice, with the approval of the Security Council.”*⁶⁸⁷

Parsons reports; *“Pérez de Cuéllar asked to see me privately ... Was it really the case that we could no longer contemplate any parallel British withdrawal? I confirmed that it was. ... He did not think that he would have any alternative but to report to the Security Council that mutually acceptable terms for a cease-fire were unobtainable. ... I urged him nevertheless to try to find some change in the Argentine position.”*

In Buenos Aires, Argentina's Central Bank announces that payments for imported goods can only be made 180 days after shipment.

“.. aimed at saving foreign currency to meet needs arising from the Falklands conflict. ...”

Day 56

May 27th – on East Falkland, a little before dawn, 45 Commando move towards Douglas.⁶⁸⁸

In London, PM Thatcher addresses the House of Commons.

“Yesterday the United Nations Security Council adopted unanimously a resolution on the Falkland Islands. It reaffirms resolution 502 and requests the Secretary-General to undertake a renewed mission of good offices, to enter into contact with Britain and Argentina with a view to negotiating mutually acceptable conditions for a ceasefire and to report again to the Security Council within seven days. We shall, of course, co-operate fully with the Secretary-General in that. In voting for the resolution our representative at the United Nations made it clear that, in view of Argentina's continued refusal to implement resolution 502, the only acceptable condition for a ceasefire is that it should be unequivocally linked with a firm and unconditional Argentine commitment immediately to commence withdrawal of its forces from the islands. ... In the published proposals that we debated last Thursday there was a linked withdrawal of British forces and Argentine forces. Those proposals have been withdrawn and as our ambassador to the United Nations made clear when he voted for the resolution, there can now be no question of a British withdrawal. He said: We are talking about Argentine

687 Interim Report by the U.N. Secretary General, Submitted to to the U.N. Security Council, June 2, 1982. UK responded on May 27, 1982. Argentina on May 27 & May 28, 1982. See below.

688 Moving over difficult terrain, it took some 36 hours for 45 Commando to reach its objective.

*withdrawal. We cannot now accept that Argentine withdrawal be linked in any way to parallel British withdrawal. ... The talks with the Secretary-General will be about unequivocal withdrawal of Argentine forces in accordance with resolution 502 as a condition for a ceasefire. After that, we shall be in re-possession of the islands. We then wish to restore British administration. Administration has to continue under existing British law and under existing democratic institutions. There will be a great deal of reconstruction work to do, and also talk about development of further resources. It will take some time for the islanders to crystallise their views, but then we must have discussions with them about the longer-term interests. It will be most unwise for us to give away any of that in advance.”*⁶⁸⁹

Francis Pym responds to Secretary-General de Cuéllar's urgent question.

*“You have asked about the British Government's definition of acceptable terms for a ceasefire. In our view a ceasefire that was not linked inseparably to Argentine withdrawal would give Argentina another opportunity for procrastination through intransigence. The British answer to your question is therefore that a ceasefire is highly desirable and would be acceptable if it was inseparably linked to the commencement of Argentine withdrawal and the completion of that withdrawal within a fixed period. ... A change of position by Argentina involving willingness to implement Resolution 502 could transform the situation. It would be most encouraging if in your resumed efforts for peace under the mandate of Security Council Resolution 505 you could obtain from Argentine convincing evidence of such a change. Argentina's immediate response to your question yesterday may not do this, in which case I hope you would go back to them on the point.”*⁶⁹⁰

In Dublin, Britain's Ambassador informs Taoiseach Charles Haughey that, as Ireland tabled a draft-resolution unacceptable to the UK, relations had taken a, “*considerable turn for the worse.*”

On East Falkland, during the afternoon, Argentina's air force attack the bridgehead at San Carlos. Six British men are killed and 30 injured. An Argentine *Skyhawk* is shot down over West Falkland.

From London, a BBC World Service broadcast reports that 2 Para have moved towards the Darwin area. Picked up by Argentina's command at Stanley, the report is dismissed as propaganda.⁶⁹¹

*“The broadcast was heard by the men of 2 Para – who were furious at what they saw was a stupid and dangerous disclosure – and also by the Argentines both at Stanley and at Goose Green. Contrary to British beliefs, however, no reinforcements of any kind were sent to Goose Green as a result of that radio broadcast. Most Argentine believed it was a bluff. Lieutenant-Colonel Piaggi's reaction was: 'I did not take it too seriously; I thought it was more a psychological action... I made no changes because of that broadcast.'...”*⁶⁹²

An observation team near Camilla Creek House is spotted by Argentine forces and fired upon. A *Harrier* is shot down covering the unit's withdrawal. A reconnaissance team consisting of Lt. Carlos Morales and three men is sent by Lieut. Col. Piaggi at Goose Green to investigate.⁶⁹³ It becomes apparent to British forces that the Argentines at Goose Green are well entrenched.

689 *HC Deb 27 May 1982 vol.24 cc1049-52*

690 *PREM19/631 Telegram No.475 of 27 May*

691 The source of this entirely accurate report caused a great deal of tension with the BBC. Robert Fox, the BBC reporter present in the Falklands, was not the source. Defence Secretary John Nott was also exonerated. The BBC do not appear to have commented; officially at least.

692 Middlebrook 2003

693 Captured by British forces.

“... (Jones) had brought only two 81mm mortars and a limited amount of ammunition for a quick action. The improving intelligence and the World Service report led 2 Para to signal back that: 'the task is a lot harder and amount of goods given are not sufficient, could 8Bty bring some more.' ...”⁶⁹⁴

In Argentina, GENTE magazine announces on its front cover – “We are still winning.”

In Washington, addressing the Twentieth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the Rio Treaty, Secretary Haig makes a “detailed and determined” speech. He focuses on the fact that, since it was Argentina which had committed the original act of aggression, it would be wrong to invoke the *Rio Treaty*.

“... the United States has not taken—and will not take—any position on the substance of the dispute. We are completely neutral on the question of who has sovereignty. Indeed, 35 years ago, at the 1947 signing of the Final Act of the Rio Conference which created the Rio Treaty, the United States Delegation made this clear at the same time it set forth our position that the Treaty is without effect upon outstanding territorial disputes between American and European states. ... We must search for ways in which we can all join in helping to bring about peace, not ask the Rio Treaty mechanism to adjudicate a conflict for which it was never conceived.”⁶⁹⁵

His speech is greeted in silence, while those delegates that attack the USA are given ovations.

“Costa Méndez set the tone with an intemperate onslaught against the US which had failed in its duty to join with its hemispheric neighbours against an external threat. He urged Argentina's true friends to unite in solidarity against the UK, which throughout the negotiations had acted with total intransigence. British actions were an insult to the Latin American continent. The Venezuelan Foreign Minister accused the British of having a punitive obsession which was shared by the EC, ... He asserted that the locus standi of the UN in this dispute was subordinate to that of the OAS and the Rio Treaty. ...

The Nicaraguan Deputy Foreign Minister maintained that in future the Rio Treaty signatories should meet in Latin America and not in Washington, which was “foreign territory.”... The US was an accomplice in British aggression... The Peruvian Foreign Minister maintained that Argentina had throughout been flexible... Colombia introduced a mild hand-wringing Resolution. Trinidad and Tobago repeated its support for self-determination and condemned Argentina for using force to resolve a dispute. Illueca (Panama) made his usual long-winded and abusive speech. Costa Rica, Uruguay, Bolivia and Guatemala spoke without adding anything, although the last three joined the mob in condemning the US.”⁶⁹⁶

“The U.S. position was that because the unlawful resort to force did not come from outside the hemisphere, this was not a case of extra-continental aggression against which we were – and are – all committed to rally.”⁶⁹⁷

Henderson reports that Washington is still concerned that their relations with Latin America are suffering due to the USA's support of the UK.

“As they see it, we are now insisting on surrender of the Argentinian garrison and a return to British rule without any definite commitment to an attempt to achieve a long-term solution. In effect, we are basing ourselves on a return to the status quo ante.”

694 Freedman 2005 vol.2

695 OAS Doc. OEA/Ser.F/II.20 Doc. 67/82, pp.28-35

696 PREM19/632 Telegram No.1941 of 27 May

697 *The South Atlantic Crisis: Background, Consequences, Documentation* US Dept of State, Bureau of Public Affairs August 5, 1982 (evidence of Assistant Secretary Enders)

Ambassador Henderson goes on to suggest that the Islanders' interests could be safeguarded by; “... some international group comprising say, two regional powers, plus the US and the UK, with the presence perhaps of the US and Brazilian forces and that, without prejudice to the future, in a given number of years this group will, in keeping with the wishes and interests of the Islanders, make proposals about the status of the Falkland Islands.”⁶⁹⁸

In London, after reading Henderson's suggestions, Thatcher scrawls the word “NO” across the last paragraph.

In the South Atlantic, *Atlantic Conveyor* sinks. *Argonaut's* unexploded bomb is finally removed and lowered into the sea; allowing repairs to begin.

“... by that night (27) *Europic Ferry* and *Sir Geraint* could leave and *Sir Galahad* was almost finished unloading. Unlike previous nights, no new ships were taken in for unloading. All the guns, vehicles and the bulk of the immediate stores and ammunition were ashore, as were eleven *Sea Kings*, Four *Wessex* and one *Chinook*... Only warships and the damaged *Sir Lancelot* and *Sir Galahad* remained in *San Carlos Water*... The battle of *San Carlos* was now definitely over.”⁶⁹⁹

At 2200 Falklands time, *HMS Arrow* moves into a position to bombard Argentine positions at Goose Green. 2 Para move forward under cover of the naval fire.

“From midday onwards I knew from various sources – particularly the disappearance of the *Land Rover* – that an attack was imminent. I did not think we could hold out for long...”⁷⁰⁰

The *Bristol* group of ships arrives off the Falklands, comprising *Avenger*, *Active*, *Andromeda*, *Cardiff*, *Penelope* and *Minerva*.

Day 57

May 28th – on East Falkland, at 0355 local time, British forces move on Goose Green. At 0430 a report is sent back from 2 Para that the assault is going as planned but, as dawn approaches, their momentum slows. Colonel Jones attempt to restore the initiative by leading a charge.

“... concerned about further delays, (Jones) concentrated on what he could control and focused on the obstacle ahead of him, the enemy position on Darwin Ridge leading towards the Hill... Jones decided to lead from the front... Armed with a sub-machine gun, he charged off towards the nearest enemy trench but was exposed to enemy fire from other trenches. Having been shot once he picked himself up and carried on firing but close to his target, he was hit again... He died before he could be evacuated.”⁷⁰¹

Citation – Lt. Colonel Herbert Jones London Gazette (Supplement) No. 49134

On 28th May 1982 Lieutenant Colonel Jones was commanding 2nd Battalion The Parachute Regiment on operations on the Falkland Islands. The Battalion was ordered to attack enemy positions in and around the settlements of Darwin and Goose Green.

During the attack against an enemy who was well dug in with mutually supporting positions sited in depth, the Battalion was held up just South of Darwin by a particularly well-prepared and resilient enemy position of at least eleven trenches on an important ridge. A number of casualties were received. In order to read the battle fully and to ensure that the momentum of his attack was not lost, Colonel Jones took forward his reconnaissance party to the foot of a re-entrant which a section of his Battalion had just secured. Despite persistent, heavy and accurate fire the reconnaissance party gained the top of the re-entrant, at approximately the same height as the enemy positions. From here Colonel Jones encouraged the direction of his Battalion mortar fire, in an effort to neutralise the enemy positions. However, these had been well prepared and continued to pour effective fire onto the Battalion advance, which, by now held up for over an hour and under increasingly heavy artillery fire, was in danger of faltering.

In his effort to gain a good viewpoint, Colonel Jones was now at the very front of his Battalion. It was clear to him that desperate measures were needed in order to overcome the enemy position and rekindle the attack, and that unless these measures were taken promptly the Battalion would sustain increasing casualties and the attack perhaps even fail. It was time for personal leadership and action. Colonel Jones immediately seized a sub-machine gun, and, calling on those around him and with total disregard for his own safety, charged the nearest enemy position. This action exposed him to fire from a number of trenches. As he charged up a short slope at the enemy position he was seen to fall and roll backward downhill. He immediately picked himself up, and again charged the enemy trench, firing his sub-machine gun and seemingly oblivious to the intense fire directed at him. He was hit by fire from another trench which he outflanked, and fell dying only a few feet from the enemy he had assaulted. A short time later a company of the Battalion attacked the enemy, who quickly surrendered. The display of courage by Colonel Jones had completely undermined their will to fight further.

Thereafter the momentum of the attack was rapidly regained, Darwin and Goose Green were liberated, and the Battalion released the local inhabitants unharmed and forced the surrender of some 1,200 of the enemy.

The achievements of 2nd Battalion The Parachute Regiment at Darwin and Goose Green set the tone for the subsequent land victory on the Falklands. The British achieved such a moral superiority over the enemy in this first battle that, despite the advantages of numbers and selection of battle-ground, the Argentinian troops never thereafter doubted neither the superior fighting qualities of the British troops, nor their own inevitable defeat.

This was an action of the utmost gallantry by a Commanding Officer whose dashing leadership and courage throughout the battle were an inspiration to all about him.

698 PREM19/631 Telegram No.1921 of 27 May.

699 Freedman 2005 vol.2

700 Lt.-Colonel Piaggi quoted in Middlebrook 2003

701 Middlebrook 2003. Colonel Jones was awarded a posthumous Victoria Cross for his actions.

*“He died on the battlefield. The dramatic message was relayed back to headquarters: ‘Sunray is down’. Five officers and men who charged forward with him were also killed.”*⁷⁰²

A few moments later, a British 66mm anti-tank rocket scores a direct hit on the trench from where Jones had been killed. White flags are seen arising from Argentine trenches on Darwin Ridge. 2 Para have six dead and eleven wounded.⁷⁰³

An Argentine *Pucara* shoots down a British *Scout* helicopter, but then crashes on its way back to Stanley.⁷⁰⁴

At 0710 Falklands time, Argentine positions at Boca House surrender after taking a heavy bombardment; leaving twelve dead. 2 Para continue to Goose Green. Shortly after 1400, Argentine white flags are seen, but not honoured, leaving three British dead.

*“In the advance on the airfield, Argentines were seen waving white flags in what seemed to be a local truce. Lieutenant James Barry and Corporal Paul Sullivan moved forward to accept what they assumed was surrender but the Argentines opened fire without warning. Barry got tangled in barbed wire and was killed, and Sullivan wounded. An Argentine crawled forward to shoot Sullivan in the head at point-blank range.”*⁷⁰⁵

Sgt. John Meredith charges forward with his machine gun, killing four Argentines and re-motivating the British platoon to overrun the Argentine position with fixed bayonets.⁷⁰⁶

In London, Brazil's Ambassador, Roberto Campos, calls on Francis Pym at the Foreign Office.

*“Matters were now at a critical point. British insistence on an unconditional Argentine withdrawal would have a destabilising effect both on Argentina and the Region. If Argentina were faced with military humiliation, it might have no choice but to turn to the Soviet Union. ... (he) wished to know whether the British position on Argentine withdrawal and on full restoration of British sovereignty was irreversible. He hoped not ... He hoped that we might indicate a continued willingness to negotiate a solution which might involve a phased and mutual withdrawal and interim administration arrangements. I said ... following our landing on the Islands, the circumstances were inevitably different. ... We intended to repossess the Islands and to restore our administration. ... Campos, who was in a waspish mood, went on to make some sharp criticism of our position on sovereignty ... It was not a productive exchange.”*⁷⁰⁷

Thatcher meets with Lords Buxton and Shackleton to discuss the economic future of the Falkland Islands.⁷⁰⁸

PM Thatcher asks Lord Shackleton to bring his 1976 report up to date.⁷⁰⁹

On East Falkland, Darwin is occupied by British troops at 1700 local time.

Local FIC agent, Robert Hardcastle, reports to the company.

702 Briley 2022

703 There are a number of Argentine soldiers who claim to have fired the shots that killed Colonel Jones, but there were no known Argentine survivors from the trench concerned. Argentina lost eighteen dead, with thirty-nine wounded.

704 There is some evidence that the *Pucara* had been attempting to drop napalm on British troops.

705 Briley 2022. The circumstances are disputed by Argentine sources who state that the white flags were shown from the British side. Some time later, on hearing that Lieut-Colonel Jones had been killed, Argentine commanders assumed that he had been the officer involved in the white-flag incident. This was not the case. See Middlebrook 2003

706 Meredith was awarded a gallantry medal. Briley (2022) notes that Meredith subsequently sold the medals for £150,000 to fund his retirement.

707 PREM19/632 Telegram No.141 of 28 May

708 Livingstone 2018

709 See 1976 & 1977

“Very thankful to be liberated. ... Some houses destroyed. All employees and visitors safe. ... Regret to advise goons occupied and looted all houses, stores, farm materials, Rovers, tractors and equipment. Settlement area a shambles. Much indiscriminate sheep killing for food by goons in helicopters ...”

Argentine forces at Goose Green receive an order to counter-attack.

*“I was in a raving fury at that order. Counter-attack! With what?... that order was impossible to carry out.”*⁷¹⁰

*“... directing fire onto the settlement ceased to be an option when the inhabitants of Darwin, who had been liberated, told the paratroopers that 112 civilians were locked up in the Community Centre in Goose Green, where they had been since 1 May.”*⁷¹¹

Pope John Paul arrives in Britain for a six day visit.

Peruvian Foreign Minister Javier Arias Stella, tells a Press Conference that his country is willing to consider providing Argentina with arms, including *Exocet* missiles.⁷¹²

Argentina answers Pérez de Cuéllar's urgent question of the 26th, providing their minimum terms for a ceasefire. These include a suspension of all operations by troops; monitoring by the UN; separate zones to be established on the Islands if necessary; no military reinforcement; the UN to provide food etc., to the troops and civilians; negotiations to take place on the withdrawal of both parties and an interim administration.⁷¹³

45 Commando take up their positions at Douglas. Islanders using tractors and trailers assist in moving equipment over boggy ground. At Goose Green, Argentine forces are reinforced by 140 men from Mount Kent.

British commanders make contact with their Argentine counterparts and a British ultimatum is delivered by two captured Argentine officers.

*“To the Commander, Argentine armed forces, Darwin/Goose Green area. Military options: We have sent a prisoner of war under a white flag to convey the following military options: That you surrender your force to us by leaving the township, forming up in a military manner, removing your helmets and laying down your weapons. You will give prior notice of the intention by returning the POW under the white flag with him briefed as to formalities no later than 0830 local time. You refuse on the first case to surrender and take the inevitable consequences. You will give prior notice of this intention by returning the POW without his white flag (though his neutrality will be respected) no later than 0830 hours local In any event and in accordance with the terms of the Geneva Conventions and Laws of War you shall be held responsible for the fate of any civilians in Darwin or Goose Green and we in accordance with those laws do give you prior notice of our intention to bombard Darwin/Goose Green. Signed: C. Keeble, Commander British Forces, Darwin/Goose Green area”*⁷¹⁴

*“... the senior British officer in 2 Para, Major Chris Keeble, tried that evening to persuade the Argentine garrison to surrender, or at least allow a safe withdrawal of the civilians if the Argentine decided to continue fighting the next day.... They were surrounded and without hope of further support. A bombardment by ships and artillery would take place the next morning if they did not surrender.”*⁷¹⁵

710 Lt.-Colonel Piaggi quoted in Middlebrook 2003

711 Freedman 2005 vol.2

712 *The Washington Post* May 29, 1982. Apparently Peru had possession of three ship launched *MM38 Exocets*.

713 *PREM19/632 Telegram No.884 of 28 May*. See June 2, 1982 below.

714 Quoted in Briley 2022

715 Middlebrook 2003

Day 58

May 29th – from Paris, President Mitterrand informs Mrs. Thatcher that he is under pressure to complete the order of *Exocet* missiles to Peru.

“Peru has made it known to other Latin American countries that France is declining to execute the contract. Consequently, France's contracts with other Latin American countries are in danger.”

At Goose Green, shortly after dawn, the two Argentine officers who had delivered the British ultimatum return with a message that a meeting of the two sides should take place at the airfield. Following two hours of talks, at 1050 local time, Lieut. Colonel Italo Piaggi and 1,400 Argentine troops surrender.

*“The Argentine authorities were severely shaken by the complete loss of the strong garrison and the air base at Goose Green in less than twenty-four hours of actual fighting. The news was not released on the mainland for some time...”*⁷¹⁶

*“The British lost eighteen killed (sixteen Paras, one Royal Marine pilot, and one commando sapper) and sixty-four wounded. The Argentines lost forty-five men killed and ninety wounded, and 1,100 taken prisoner.”*⁷¹⁷



Given medical attention, none of the 112 Goose Green civilians are found to have been harmed by their experience.

*“At one end of Goose Green settlement a Union Jack now flies high above the school. At the other end, the flag of the 2nd Battalion, the Parachute Regiment. After a whole day's bitter fighting and a morning's delicate surrender negotiations, the cheers of liberation came in the early afternoon. Women handed round cups of tea in Royal wedding mugs. Children carried round tins of sweets and biscuits to young Paras ... For nearly a month, 114 people had been shut up by the Argentinians in community hall. Their houses had been raided with furniture smashed and excrement on the floor. ... Now the 1200 or so prisoners are being made to clean up the mess...”*⁷¹⁸

To the north-east of the Falklands a British fuel tanker, *British Wye*, is attacked by an Argentine *C-130 Hercules*. Of eight bombs dropped, only one hits the vessel. It fails to explode. Late morning, elements of 3 Para arrive at Teal Inlet, reported clear of enemy troops by an SBS patrol.

“The Argentine troops are very apprehensive, in some cases very frightened, here in Stanley. One broke down and had to be carried away by his mates. Another wandered up the road in tears, dragging his rifle. There are hundreds of them about the streets, clustered in pathetic, depressed groups, their clothes

716 *Ibid.*

717 Briley 2022. Lt-Col. Piaggi was forced to resign his commission and later faced several trials questioning his competence. Finally, in 1992, Piaggi had his military rank and pay reinstated. Keeble was awarded a DSO.

718 From Robert Fox, BBC, embedded with 2 Para. Fifty-five Argentines died in the battle for Goose Green; many more were wounded although the exact figure is unknown. Some 1500 Argentines were taken as POWs. British forces suffered 17 deaths plus 33 wounded. See Middlebrook 2003

and boots sodden with rain and trench water. Very little spirit seems left in them. They are now realising that the push is about to hit them – and hit them hard... The food situation among troops in Stanley is becoming increasingly desperate. Jeremy says that yesterday when he was tipping out the rubbish at the dump the soldiers were waiting for his arrival with sticks for bits of food.” ⁷¹⁹

In New York, with both sides now aware of the other's 'minimum' for a ceasefire, Argentina's representative contacts the UN Secretary-General to claim that the British base line amount to terms, "for surrender." Pérez de Cuéllar tells Parsons, however, that the Argentines are displaying some interest in the reference to "international security arrangements," and wish to know what this means. Pérez de Cuéllar does assure Parsons that he will not expect clarification before the 31st.

In Washington, a new OAS resolution openly sides with Buenos Aires.

“The Twentieth Meeting of Consultation of Foreign Affairs, Resolves: 1. To condemn most vigorously the unjustified and disproportionate armed attack perpetrated by the United Kingdom, and its decision, which affects the security of the entire American hemisphere, of arbitrarily declaring an extensive area of up to 12 miles from the American coasts as a zone of hostilities, which is aggravated by the circumstance that when these actions were taken all possibilities of negotiation seeking a peaceful settlement of the conflict had not been exhausted. 2. To reiterate its firm demand upon the United Kingdom that it cease immediately its acts of war against the Argentine Republic and order the immediate withdrawal of all its armed forces detailed there and the return of its task force to its usual stations. 3. To deplore the fact that the attitude of the United Kingdom has helped to frustrate the negotiations for a peaceful settlement that were conducted by Mr. Javier Pérez de Cuéllar, the Secretary-General of the United Nations.” ⁷²⁰

While OAS members attack the USA for its economic sanctions against Argentina, US representative, William Middendorf, abstains.

“We believe the Resolution before us to be one-sided. It charges some; it ignores the actions of others. It ignores what the legal effects of first use of force should be. Further, there is no recognition that there must be compliance by both parties with all elements of UN Security Council Resolution 502 ...” ⁷²¹

An additional Declaration by the OAS assembly calls for assistance to be given to Argentina to “overcome the harmful effects of the British blockade and international sanction.” ⁷²²

“After 17 hours of emotional debate that ended early this morning, foreign ministers from Latin America today condemned Britain's attack on the Falkland Islands and urged the United States to halt its aid to the British. The action came in a 17 to 0 vote with 4 abstentions at the Organization of American States building here. The United States abstained, along with Chile, Colombia and Trinidad and Tobago, calling the resolution one-sided. The action appeared to represent a significant setback to United States relations with Latin America. Sources at the O.A.S. said they had seldom seen such emotion and frustration emerge over an issue. The resolution seemed to further confirm the view of many Reagan Administration officials that the Falklands conflict has created a major shift in attitudes and policies throughout South America that will inevitably harm United States interests. This gloomy analysis is said to be shared by many of the Administration's leading experts on Latin America.” ⁷²³

719 Diary entry in Smith 1984. p.189

720 OAS Doc. OEA/Ser.F/II.20 Doc 80/82 rev.2

721 Quoted in *Peace and Change* Denis R. Gordon 1987

722 OAS Doc. OEA/Ser.F/II.20 Doc 77/82 rev.2

723 *New York Times* May 30, 1982

Secretary Haig speaks to Ambassador Henderson with his thoughts on a ceasefire.

*“Haig ... gave me a piece of paper containing four points ... in connection with the American ideas – (1) restoration of local administration does not include return of a Governor; (2) avoidance of publicly espousing independence or semi-independence, as the British goal; (3) agreement on withdrawal would have to say something about non-reintroduction of forces; (4) contact group to stay on indefinitely.”*⁷²⁴

Henderson tells Haig that the British Government are considering some form of independence for the Islanders. Haig responds that the British should refrain from mentioning it, as such would be unacceptable to Argentina.

PM Thatcher, on receiving Haig's suggestions, writes “NO” against (2), (3) and (4).

Day 59

May 30th – 45 Commando arrive at Teal Inlet, while 3 Para move forward towards Estancia House. A forward party of 2 Para arrive at Swan Inlet House to be informed by the local manager that there are no Argentine troops at either Fitzroy or Bluff Cove.

In London, Thatcher responds to the French President's message of the previous day.

“If it became known, as it certainly would, that France was now releasing weapons to Peru that would be passed on to Argentina for use against us, France's ally, this would have a devastating effect on the relationship between our two countries. Indeed it would have a devastating effect on the alliance (NATO) as a whole.”

Pym diplomatically advises Henderson.

“Haig's ideas are being examined very carefully, but they require a good deal of further consideration by Ministers. We foresee that it will probably not, repeat not, be possible to transmit a full response to him through you before Tuesday 1 June..”

Parsons is informed that the British Government consider Argentine terms for a ceasefire as unacceptable. That Britain's position is as previously stated on May 27th.

“You should hold out no hope of our altering it in the face of the continued Argentine intransigence ... We naturally recognise that, in the circumstances, the Secretary-General may feel obliged to report failure to the Security Council...”

On the Falklands, Argentine special forces discover that Mount Kent, with its commanding view of Port Stanley, has been seized by Britain's Special Air Service (SAS). During a fire-fight, two Argentines are killed; five are wounded and one captured. Three SAS members are injured. Elements of 42 Commando land on Mount Kent in support of the SAS defenders. Argentine forces withdraw.


During the early afternoon two *Super Étendards*, escorted by 4 *A4Cs*, attack HMS *Avenger*. Erroneously, both pilots believe the frigate to be one of the British aircraft-carriers, *Invincible*.⁷²⁵

⁷²⁴ PREM19/632 Telegram No.1963 of 29 May

⁷²⁵ At least, that's what they subsequently claimed. HMS *Invincible* was actually some 30 miles away to the east when the attack took place. Assertions that it was damaged are based solely upon the evidence given by the two pilots. Witness evidence of the 170 crew members of HMS *Avenger* and/or *Invincible*'s 1,100 crew have proven insufficient in Argentina to counter this. The myth persists. The official Attack Report can be found here – <https://falklandstimeline.files.wordpress.com/2021/05/may-30-1982-attack-report.pdf>

“Argentina said tonight that its warplanes had attacked and put out of commission a British aircraft carrier, hitting it with bombs and an Exocet missile. The military command said in a communique that the aircraft carrier was attacked today by Argentine Super Etendard and Skyhawk fighters 90 miles east of the Falkland Islands. The communique said columns of smoke were rising from the crippled carrier. The British task force has two carriers, the Hermes and the Invincible. The communique did not say which of the two had been hit, but a spokesman for the military command said pilots suspected that it was the Invincible. In London, the British Ministry of Defense tonight denied that the Invincible had been hit. ... The (Argentine) command said the attack was "without precedent" and put the carrier "out of combat." ..”⁷²⁶

The Super Étendard approach, made without the benefit of up-to-date reconnaissance, was not far enough to the east and, instead of striking at the less protected rear of the task force where the aircraft-carriers were, came in amongst the outer Type 42 destroyer screen which was approximately thirty miles to the west of the carriers. The presence of the Super Étendard and the launch of the Exocet were detected... the Exocet did not hit a ship and eventually ran out of fuel and fell into the sea.”⁷²⁷



“They detected several echoes ahead of them in the target area, and, .., the missile was fired at what was believed to be Invincible 15 miles ahead. They then turned away to find their tanker. The target identified was not Invincible but Avenger.... The Avenger's chaff distracted the missile, which passed close to the ship but did no harm. Then came in the four A4s. One was caught by a Sea Dart... while another was hit by small arms fire from Avenger or debris from the explosion that had taken out the first A4. The other two dropped their bombs but missed and turned away to safety.”⁷²⁸

“Argentine pilots claimed they had attacked Invincible on 30 May with an Exocet missile and bombs, setting the carrier ablaze, but this was untrue. Admiral Woodward kept the carriers out of harm's way, prompting jokes that they were nearer South Africa than Argentina.”⁷²⁹

Off East Falkland Island, HMS Ambuscade and HMS Glamorgan bombard targets near Stanley.

⁷²⁶ *New York Times* May 31, 1982

⁷²⁷ Middlebrook 2003

⁷²⁸ Freedman 2005 vol.2. Argentina's pilots reported that *HMS Invincible* had been hit by the *Exocet* and bombs from the *A4Cs*. This has led to an enduring myth, alive today, that somehow the UK managed to cover up the loss of a carrier and replace it with another. *Invincible* was inspected by a Chilean officer, Andres Ortega, and reported in the Spanish Newspaper *El Pais*, July 12, 1982 (*El portaaviones británico 'Invencible', en perfecto estado, permanece vigilando las Malvinas*). No damage was seen. cf. July, 1982

⁷²⁹ Briley 2022

Harriers attack Argentine positions to the east of Mount Kent. One *Harrier*, having received damage from small arms fire, crashes into the sea. The pilot is rescued.

3 Para discover Estancia House devoid of enemy troops, and secure the position. An Argentine *Puma* helicopter crashes to the north of Mount Kent killing its seven passengers. The crew survive.

At Stanley, the Argentine administration extend the curfew. No civilian is allowed out of their houses between 4pm until 8.30am. An evacuation of houses to the south of Davis Street is ordered.

*“Last night’s bombardment must have really made the Argentine’s eyes water, especially up in the trenches and dug-outs at the back of the town. It was rather scary at times down here; it must have been bloody terrifying up there... There is the possibility of a total house curfew as the British troops continue their advance towards Stanley, so spent much of today storing water in the house.... The supply was cut off again at 4 this afternoon... On the Argentine news they admit to having lost contact with their troops at Goose Green. They also claim to have bombed HMS Invincible – Britain says this is untrue.”*⁷³⁰

In Buenos Aires, a report is submitted to the military leadership.

*“In the period from May 1 to May 29, 1982, forty (40) combat aircraft have been destroyed, which means 27% of the available supply of the FAA. Thirty-five (35) officers killed in combat.”*⁷³¹

Day 60

May 31st – on East Falkland, Mountain and Arctic Warfare Cadre troops attack Argentine special forces at Top Malo House, some nine kilometers south of Teal Inlet. The British force takes the position after a short but fierce firefight, in which two Argentines are killed and seven are wounded; five more are taken prisoner. Three British Paratroopers are injured.⁷³²

Reinforcements move forward to join 2 Para at Fitzroy/Bluffs Cove.⁷³³ *Sea Harriers* attack Stanley airfield.

In Argentina, newspapers report a successful attack on HMS *Invincible*.

“The "Invincible" Was Seriously Damaged. In a daring operation, Navy and Air Force aircraft yesterday carried out an attack on the British fleet and caused very serious damage to an aircraft carrier – the "Invincible" that left it out of combat. Two Exocet missiles, fired by the Super Etendart, and high-powered bombs dropped by A4C fighters hit targets on the ship that began to burn.”



⁷³⁰ Diary entry in Smith 1984 p.192. Many Argentines remain convinced, to this day, that *Invincible* was damaged or sunk.

⁷³¹ *Operations Report 214/82* quoted in *The tense conversation between Reagan and Thatcher in the middle of the Falklands war in which they spoke of "left Peronists"* Juan Bautista Yofre in *Infobae* May 31, 2020

⁷³² Contrary to Argentine reports, there were no British deaths resulting from this action. See Middlebrook 2003

⁷³³ Having moved forward with unexpected speed, there was now the logistical problem of moving up enough reinforcements and equipment to hold the position. A decision was made to reinforce by sea, but this would take some days. cf. 5/6 June.

Spain formally joins NATO as its sixteenth member.

From Paris, President Mitterrand informs Peru that its *Exocet* order cannot be met for; “*political reasons.*”

From the Cayman Islands, £500,000, much of it raised by public collections, is sent to the UK; “*at a time when their Mother Country is in need of help.*”

In Argentina, an order signed by Vice-Admiral Lombardo alerts local forces on the coasts of Patagonia to the possibility that the British may attack the continent.⁷³⁴

*“The losses in aeronautics caused a state of tension among the troops stationed at the bases of the South Air Force. This is the only way to understand the visit that Brigadier Basilio Lami Dozo made to Comodoro Rivadavia on May 31. To make matters worse, CEOPECON Agreement Act No. 12, of the same day, said that “it was agreed to alert the Maritime Littoral Defense System to the possibility that the English fleet would attack the continent seeking to affect its own air power.” On that occasion, Lami Dozo told the accompanying journalism that the air power was ready to respond to the UK attacks.”*⁷³⁵

At the United Nations building in New York, Argentina’s representatives circulates the Organisation of American States (OAS) resolution (No.29), claiming it to be a “*document of the Security Council.*” Parsons recommends to the Foreign Office, that he should respond by pointing out that the OAS resolution fails to refer to Security Council resolutions 502 and 505. Also that the Security Council has; “*the Primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security.*”

Parson's provides Britain's response to Pérez de Cuéllar's question, with regard to security arrangements.

*“You asked what terms for a ceasefire would be acceptable to us. ... Our answer to your question is that a cease-fire must be inseparably linked to the commencement of the withdrawal of Argentine troops and to the completion of the withdrawal within a fixed period. ... While we should be willing to consider in the longer term the possibility of alternative international security arrangements for the protection of the Islanders, there is no question of our agreeing to the withdrawal of British forces in parallel to Argentine withdrawal.”*⁷³⁶

The Secretary-General summons Argentina's Deputy Foreign Minister before ringing the British Mission with the result. Parsons reports.

“Pérez de Cuéllar telephoned me after seeing Ros to ask if I would receive De Soto in my mission: Pérez de Cuéllar had some questions .. De Soto turned up about two hours later. It emerged that a 5 point plan for the implementation of SCR 502 and 505 had been put to the Argentines who, after long deliberation amongst themselves, had agreed to forward it to Buenos Aires. However, Ros had not brought any fresh instructions to deliver to the Secretary-General: he had called only to hear our final response... Pérez de Cuéllar's 5 point plan is - (1) at time 'T' a ceasefire would come into force and be monitored by UN observers; (2) at time 'T' plus 24 hours, Argentine withdrawal would begin in implementation of SCR 502 (ie total Argentine withdrawal), (3) at time 'T' plus 24 hours, token British withdrawal would begin, (4) the withdrawals would be completed within 'X' days, (5) negotiations would begin under the auspices of the Secretary-General within the framework of SCR 505. De Soto summed up Pérez de Cuéllar's views as follows. Points (2) and (4) would give us total Argentine withdrawal, whereas point (3) would amount to the restoration of British Administration. ... He hoped this would enable us to consider “the longer term” more as “the near future”..”

734 *Malvinas: la visita de Edward Denmark, entre la admiración y la vergüenza* in *Tribuna* January 25, 2020. cf. 1984

735 Juan Bautista Yofre in *Infobae* May 31, 2020

736 PREM19/633 Telegram No.485 of 31 May

In a separate telegram, Sir Anthony Parsons opines.

“I believe that this is a genuine effort by Pérez de Cuéllar to try to find a last-minute solution ... I do not believe that he is playing some kind of double game. However, as I see it, his proposals are unacceptable. First, if UN observers were in situ under a mandatory Resolution, and the Argentines found pretexts not to withdraw, it would be very difficult for us to resume military action. Secondly, his plan involves some British withdrawal. Thirdly, it could resuscitate the whole idea of UN interim administration, target dates and UN supervision of the negotiations for a final solution. Nevertheless, it enables us to buy a little more time ... I recommend therefore that I should be instructed to give him a reasoned response. His proposals pose greater difficulties for the Argentines, since they involve total Argentine withdrawal ... This is another reason why it will be in our interests to talk to him ...”

In Washington, following a meeting with US Permanent Representative to the UN, Jean Kirkpatrick, President Reagan telephones Margaret Thatcher to suggest that the British call a halt to hostilities.

“Look, could I be impertinent and take the liberty of transmitting some of my thoughts about the Falklands situation right now? Because, well, your impressive military advance could perhaps modify the diplomatic options, as we see them, that we would have between today and next Friday. By the way, I would like to congratulate you on what you and your young people are doing there. They have taken great risks and have shown the world that unprovoked aggression does not end well. I know that Al Haig has conveyed to you some of our ideas on how we could capitalize on your success with a diplomatic initiative, and I support the concept that... given the actions of Argentina in all this matter, a new initiative might not be successful, but even if they rejected it, I think that the effort to show that we are willing to reach an agreement consistent with our principles could end the efforts of some leftists in South America who are actively trying to exploit the crisis.

Well, thinking about this plan ... Well, this is what you had in mind, but we believe that the only possibility of success would be before the capture of Port Stanley. We wanted Latin [American] support, and we spoke with the President of Brazil, Figueiredo, when he was here; He wants to help, but, knowing the Argentines, he believes that the best possibility of a peaceful solution would be before a total Argentine humiliation. ... I think you would be in a very favorable position.”

Irritated, Thatcher interrupts:

*“I didn't lose some of my best ships and some of my finest lives, to leave quietly under a ceasefire without the Argentines withdrawing... I'm not handing over the island now ... I can't lose the lives and blood of our soldiers to hand the islands over to a contact group. It's not possible... This is democracy and our island, and the very worst thing for democracy would be if we failed now ...”*⁷³⁷

*“President Reagan said that the USA considered it imperative that the UK should show that it was prepared to talk before the Argentineans were forced to withdraw. Willingness to talk now could prevent a Peronist take-over in Argentina in the future. ...”*⁷³⁸

*“He tried to avoid an English attack on Puerto Argentino and prevent a humiliating situation for Argentina.”*⁷³⁹

737 It is said that Reagan held the phone up so that his aides could hear the tirade. The President of the United States; Leader of the Free World, could not get a word in edgewise.

738 Thatcher was ready for Falkland Islands deal, *National Archives papers show* Richard Norton-Taylor & Owen Bowcott in *The Guardian* December 28, 2012

739 Juan Bautista Yofre in *Infobae* May 31, 2020

“Upping the ante, on May 31 Thatcher demanded even more support from Reagan under the guise of stopping the conflict as soon as possible and thus saving lives at risk. In reality, it seems that the “iron lady” wanted to destroy the Argentine economy in pursuit of a quick victory. “I wonder if I can ask you to consider,” Thatcher asks: “... go further and impose a total blockade of Argentine imports in the United States? I believe that this would be, by far, the single most effective measure you could take to bring this crisis to a solution by peaceful means and I feel that we must make every effort to achieve that ... it would also coincide with the action that our European allies and the Commonwealth have taken over... I know this will affect their economic interests... but the same is true for many European allies, especially Italy and Germany. They have been ready to take these radical measures despite their political and legal problems because they see the real danger it poses to the safety of all of us if the Argentine aggression is not reversed.”...”⁷⁴⁰

After finishing speaking to the President, Thatcher calls the British Ambassador in Washington.

“After the call, she immediately rang Henderson on an open line to complain. She had been ‘dismayed’ by Reagan’s attitude and wished the President to know how ‘upset’ she was at being presented with ‘another peace initiative’, one that was ‘pure Haigism.’ “We were prepared to negotiate before but not now. We have lost a lot of blood and it’s the best blood. Do they not realise that it is an issue of principle? We cannot surrender principles for expediency.”... Almost immediately after this conversation the Ambassador was contacted by Haig. He was full of admiration for the Prime Minister but concerned that relations were entering a difficult phase – “we can’t accept intransigence.”...”⁷⁴¹

On East Falkland, at dusk, an Argentine C-130 Hercules transport plane lands at Stanley airfield. On board is a platform designed to fire MM38 Exocet missiles, together with two MM38s.⁷⁴²

“... a complete system had to be designed. ..., consisting of an artifact to simulate the electrical signal that the ship’s computer sends to the missile in its original mounting on board, ..., a cart to transport the missiles, a target detection system and a generator to provide electrical energy. This equipment had to be built quickly, using only the elements that could usually be found in a naval workshop, ... This homemade system was developed by a naval officer and his small group of technicians, who in two weeks assembled it ... removing a couple of missile containers from a destroyer, placing them on a trailer, testing it manually in the Naval Base of Puerto Belgrano, “cheating” the missile by electronic means to behave as if you were on board a ship. Finally, after fifteen days of continuous work, the entire launch process could be simulated,... tested over a dozen times to make sure it worked correctly. Simultaneously, in the Naval Arsenal of Puerto Belgrano, (was) built a platform to mount the the missiles on the launch pad, and a old Siemens electric generator, with technology from the 1930s, ... With the construction work finished, the launcher of Exocet was now to be airlifted to the Falklands. Two Hercules planes remained available for loading the cart, the ramp, along with a couple of containers with their missiles, the Siemens electric generator and the simulated boxes with the ITB system, with a total weight in the order of eight tons.... The first Hercules landed, at dusk on the 31st of May, so that the ITB was finally able to reach the islands, after three weeks from its original conception.”⁷⁴³

During the night, British troops establish themselves on Mount Challenger, overlooking the Stanley/Bluff Cove road. A naval observation post is also set up on Mount Kent. Argentina’s Air Force commences night bombing raids.

740 *Guerra Fría e intervención estadounidense en Malvinas (1982)* Ana Laura Bochicchio 2021 in *Quinto Sol: Revista de Historia* vol.25 no.1

741 Freedman 2005 vol.2

742 The MM38 was a surface to surface missile designed for use on ships.

743 *Inventiva bajo presión: El lanzador costero de Exocet en la Guerra de Malvinas* Alejandro Amendolara 2012. ITB was the name given the device by its builders - Instalación de Tiro Berreta (Berreta Shooting Facility).

*“Their first attack in this new phase, by two Canberras against British troop positions in the San Carlos area, took place on the night of 31 May. This night raid took the British by surprise, but only minor damage was caused, with one man slightly injured.”*⁷⁴⁴

A group of women from the Anglo-Argentine community write to Queen Elizabeth II, appealing for pressure to be brought upon the British Government.

*“... in the hope that Her Majesty’s influence will rectify the erroneous course taken by Mrs. Thatcher and her Government regarding the Malvinas Question.”*⁷⁴⁵

*“Furthermore, by breaking a British “tradition of honour and behaviour,” the women continued, the actions of the previous weeks made the “British and their descendants resident in Argentina shameful of the acts and deeds of the actual [sic] British Government.” ...”*⁷⁴⁶

Day 61

June 1st – in London, during a television interview with the BBC, the Prime Minister is asked whether she sees a future role for Argentina on the Falkland islands.

“I cannot, myself, see a role in anything relating to sovereignty, for the Argentines on the Falkland Islands. You saw what happened in Goose Green and Darwin, how our people have been treated. They’d never wanted to go to Argentine before, they’ll be even less likely now.”

*“There was now no intention to use the promise of wider political negotiations with Argentina to get a ceasefire. The Government returned to its original objective of restoring British administration to the Islands, and this would continue until such time as their security and economic future could be guaranteed.”*⁷⁴⁷

British intelligence suggests that Libya is supplying missiles to Argentina in military and civilian Boeing 707’s; transiting via Cape Verde/Las Palmas and Brazil.

*“Argentine buyers have also been combing the world for Exocets, almost all the sources said. One diplomat close to the Argentine military and one arms salesman said they had obtained one or more Exocets, but it was unclear how many. The diplomat said the Libyan Government had arranged the purchase -- Libya does not have the missiles in stock -- but others said the private black market or Peru appeared more likely suppliers.”*⁷⁴⁸

*“Libya had emerged as a major supplier of arms to Argentina, with an air bridge between Tripoli and Recife, Brazil, using B707-320C aircraft of the Argentine Air Force and Aerolinas Argentinas, which allowed direct flights carrying substantial loads. Up to ten flights were made... Clearance was given to transit Moroccan airspace, much to British irritation.”*⁷⁴⁹

In the Falklands, an Argentine C-130 reconnaissance aircraft is shot down by two Sea Harriers with the loss of all seven crew.

“During Mass this afternoon firing broke out, accompanied by lots of cheering from the troops. Anya, who had been to Mass this morning, met us immediately afterwards to say that a Harrier had been shot down; she had watched the pilot eject and come down by parachute towards Eliza Cove. Shortly

744 Middlebrook 2003

745 Mercau 2016

746 *Ibid.*

747 Freedman 2005 vol.2

748 *The New York Times* June 6 1982

749 Freedman 2005 vol.2

*afterwards a Chinook took off to bring in the pilot, so we rushed down to the football field to watch it return. Quite a crowd had gathered, including an Argentine TV team, who were very excited at the prospect of filming the British aviator, as they put it. Their disappointment and embarrassment was extreme when an Argentine fighter pilot appeared at the back hatch of the Chinook in a not too happy frame of mind. It seems that once again they had shot down one of their own aircraft. Some little time beforehand the Harriers had brought down a C-130 Hercules just off Mangeary Point as it was coming to land at the airport; possibly the fighter shot down had been an escort.”*⁷⁵⁰

At San Carlos, 5 Brigade commences its disembarkation, with Norland first (1/7 Gurkha Rifles).

*“all the residents of Davis Street have been told to move down into the twon, They were given short notice to relocate and to take all their valuables with them; there had been some objections all to no avail. The street had to be cleared according to the rules of war – to protect civilians from over-shoots or short-fall shots.”*⁷⁵¹

In Washington, Ambassador Henderson speaks to US National Security Advisor, Judge William P. Clark at the White House.

“Clark said that he believed the President did understand the firmness of our position. Neither he nor Haig were wishing to undermine this. ... "We are in it with you," Judge Clark said. This was very much the President's conviction. But this did not prevent him from believing that considerable damage had already been done to the USA's relations with its Latin American neighbours, that the US should not neglect any chance of preventing further bloodshed and the humiliation of Argentina that could give a hostage to the future, and that in the long-term there had to be a settlement ...”

Henderson adds; *“Haig has spoken to me in the light of the Prime Minister's talk with the President and my talk with Judge Clark. He says that there is no good in pursuing his ideas. It is a pity, but he understands.”*

In Montevideo, Uruguay, Britain's Ambassador Hutchinson is invited to meet with the Uruguayan Minister of Foreign Affairs; in company with the Argentine Ambassador. To see; *“what could be done to achieve a cease-fire.”*

From Washington, Haig sends a further message to Henderson.

“He did not expect a Resolution to come forward for another day or two. The Argentinians were still putting forward wholly unrealistic requirements for a cease-fire, asking for mutual withdrawal. But he hoped that we could again manoeuvre, as we had so successfully last week, to avoid a situation in which we and the Americans were isolated in the UN. ... Haig thought we should be in a position to win militarily in the near future. ...”

From London, Foreign Secretary, Francis Pym, advises Parsons in New York.

*“Pérez de Cuéllar's five-point plan is certainly unacceptable as it stands. But I agree that without raising false hopes or misrepresenting our position you should give him a reasoned response... You should tell the Secretary-General that while other aspects of his plan give us difficulty we approve the emphasis on total Argentine withdrawal with a fixed period of time. We look forward to learning of the Argentine response.”*⁷⁵²

750 Diary entry in Smith 1984 p.201

751 Neville's Diary in Bennett 2021

752 PREM19/633 Telegram 488 of 1 June 1982

In the South Atlantic, HMS *Alacrity* bombards targets at Two Sisters, Moody Brook and Mount Longdon. Fire is directed from the naval observation post on Mount Kent. 45 Commando, with no helicopters available due to the landing of 5 Brigade, continue its long walk towards Mount Kent. A *Sea Harrier* is hit by a Roland missile fired by Argentine anti-aircraft defences near Stanley. The pilot ejects and is rescued.

At Stanley, Argentine Governor Menéndez issues an order to his forces.⁷⁵³

“The hour of the final battle has arrived.,

All our efforts, the hours of waiting, the cold, the tiredness, the vigilance, have come to an end.

The adversary is getting ready to attack Stanley with the audacious and odious intention of conquering the capital of the ISLAS MALVINAS.

Every man must fully understand what his duty is. The enemy will be destroyed by the decisive action of each one at his combat post. If each man with his rifle, his mortar, his machine-gun, or artillery piece fights with the valour and heroism which has already characterised us, Victory is certain.

The gaze of all Argentina is on us; our parents, wives, fiancées and children, all our families have total confidence in us. In the supreme hour we have the duty not to defraud them.

We have contracted a sacred responsibility before our comrades taken in action to convert their personal sacrifice into a page of glory for ARGENTINA, and we cannot allow their heroism to be in vain.

Not only must we beat them, we must do it in such a way that their defeat is so crushing that they will never again have the impertinent idea of invading our land ...

TO ARMS! TO BATTLE!”

At Goose Green, Argentine ammunition being moved by a volunteer prisoner work party, under the supervision of an Argentine officer, explodes. Three Argentines are killed, with another mortally wounded.⁷⁵⁴

An attempt is made to use the platform based MM38 Exocet missile launcher sited at Stanley.

“On the first attempt, although the doors were opened container lids, failed propellant ignition due to reasons that could not be determined. Quickly, it prepared to fire the second missile, but it was launched with wrong course caused by rushing to fire again before the enemy ship moved away. The Exocet left with an erratic course lighting the overflying waters, revealing the existence of the missile on the islands.”⁷⁵⁵

From Lima, Peru offers Buenos Aires the use of its Air Force, for the evacuation of Argentine wounded from Stanley.

HMS *Avenger* bombards Argentine positions on Pebble Island, while *Active* and *Ambuscade* pound targets around Stanley.

⁷⁵³ *Argentine Gazette* quoted in Smith 1984 p.252

⁷⁵⁴ One of the injured PoWs who could not be reached due to the flames, was shot. A mercy killing, initially misinterpreted by the Argentine officer. The incident was fully investigated and a report prepared in accordance with Art.121 of the third Geneva Convention.

⁷⁵⁵ Amendolara 2012. Target unknown, possibly HMS *Avenger*. This author believes that Britain was thereafter aware of the presence of MM38s on the Islands and started to search for them. I have found no information that confirms this. *cf.* June 5, 1982 below.

In New York, Parsons transmits Pym's points to the Secretary-General, who is; "... *disheartened by them.*" Argentine Deputy Foreign Minister, Eduardo Ros, tells Pérez de Cuéllar that Argentina is willing to accept his proposals. With conditions.

"(1) ... the completion of the total British withdrawal, whatever its rhythm, would be within Y days (2) It is clearly understood that in no case would British forces remain alone on the Islands. The Blue Helmets should be on the Islands before the completion of withdrawal of Argentine forces. The withdrawal of Argentine forces from the areas occupied by them should correspond with a gradual takeover of control of those areas by Blue Helmets (3) The British forces shall abstain from widening their areas of occupation at the date of ceasefire." ⁷⁵⁶

Parsons informs London.

"... what this amounted to was that a date would have to be agreed for the completion of total British withdrawal and that British forces would not be able to establish control over the whole of the Islands... Pérez de Cuéllar recognises that his current efforts have come to an end."

"Mrs. Thatcher had the undoubted ability not only to seize the opportunities offered her by the Argentines' imprudence, but also to construct the premises and the context which permitted her to exploit such opportunities to the full. Without her courage in taking determined decisions, and without her tenacity in following up on them, the Conservative leader would not have been able to turn her adversaries' weaknesses to her own advantage. Without her capacity to unite her resolve with diplomatic pliability, the Prime Minister could not have guaranteed the support of the US, nor could she have so thoroughly exploited the Argentine diplomatic suicide." ⁷⁵⁷

The new President of the Security Council, Luc de La Barre de Nanteuil, calls a meeting for the 2nd. To allow for a report from the Secretary-General on the Falklands question.

From Washington, Britain's Ambassador Henderson assesses the assistance provided by the United States to the United Kingdom.

*"I do not need to go into the details about the value of the intelligence cooperation which has been given, ... So far as communications facilities are concerned, the Americans have made especially available satellite communication channels at considerable cost to their own operations, communications sets for our special forces on the Islands, secure speech facilities with the fleet and satellite weather information. So far as equipment is concerned, we have over the last month procured at least \$120 million of US material made available at very short notice and frequently from stocks normally earmarked for US operational requirements. This equipment has included the latest air-to-air Side-winder missiles urgently required for use by the Harriers, the Vulcan phalanx anti-missile gun system for HMS *Illustrious*, 4700 tons of airstrip matting for the Port Stanley airport once it has been recaptured, conversion of the SS *Stena Inspector* for use as a repair ship in the South Atlantic, Shrike missiles for use by the Vulcans, helicopter engines, submarine detection devices for use by the Sea King Helicopters, Temporary accommodation on a large scale for Ascension Island for our forces, Stinger ground-to-air missiles (already used successfully against Argentine aircraft), as well as the usual array of weapons and ammunition..."* ⁷⁵⁸

756 Blue Helmets are UN sponsored troops

757 Bruni 2018

758 PREM19/633 Telegram No.1977 of 1 June 1982

Day 62

June 2nd – in a *blue-on-blue* incident in the early hours of the Falklands' day, an SBS Sergeant is killed by an SAS patrol. Off East Falkland, HMS *Arrow* bombards Fox Bay. 2 Para reach Bluff Cove. *Sea Harrier* reinforcements arrive from Ascension Island.

At San Carlos Water, *Canberra* disembarks the Welsh and Scots Guards.

*“Slept fairly well despite a naval bombardment and an artillery barrage somewhere to the south-west.... There was a great deal of activity during the night around the hospital ship; seemed to be unloading, which started late evening and continued till about 4.30 this morning. Lots of boat movements between ship and the jetty. Lorries on streets. Unable to see much because of black-outs and curfew. ... Lots of new troops digging in at the east end of town. It looks very much as if they arrived yesterday on the hospital ship.”*⁷⁵⁹

*“The Argentine Red Cross hospital ship bahia Buen Pataiso had been in the harbour yesterday and offloaded a lot of stuff in the hours of darkness. There are some new troops in evidence in the town, did they come in the 'hospital' ship and what exactly did a 'hospital' ship carry that warranted ofloading in the dark?”*⁷⁶⁰

Britain's hospital ship, *Hecla*, arrives in Montevideo; disembarking 24 Argentine prisoners and 18 British casualties.

From Bogota, Colombia's President Turbay writes to Thatcher in London.

“... consider the possibility of reaching an honourable peace agreement with Argentina, thus avoiding the unnecessary holocaust of many innocent lives.”

In New York, Sir Anthony Parsons informs Pérez de Cuéllar that the British Government are disappointed, though not surprised, by the Argentine response to the 5-point plan that the Secretary-General had proposed.

At an informal Security Council meeting called by its new President, the Secretary-General reports that he has been unable to negotiate mutually acceptable terms for a ceasefire.

*“It is my considered judgement that the positions of the two parties do not offer the possibility of developing at this time terms for a cease-fire which would be mutually acceptable. In accordance with the mandate given to me by resolution 505 (1982), I shall, nevertheless, maintain close contact with the parties in the event that an opportunity can be found in which the exercise of my good offices can contribute to bringing this tragic crisis to an end.”*⁷⁶¹

Panama calls for a formal meeting and the Security Council reconvenes. Spain and Panama immediately co-sponsor a draft-resolution for the Council's consideration; calling for an unconditional ceasefire.

“Ros spoke at length. The negotiations with the Secretary-General had shown that the UK did not intend at any time to heed the Council's appeals. Its only objective was to continue its aggression, with the intention of installing in the islands a military system as part of its plan to dominate the South Atlantic. The wishes of the Islanders were simply a mask. ... Argentina, on the other hand, had replied promptly and positively to the Secretary-General's efforts under SCR 505. ... The intransigence of the United Kingdom was evident. ...”

759 Diary entry in Smith 1984 p.203

760 *Neville's Diary* in Bennett 2021

761 *UN Doc S/15151*

After Brazil calls for an immediate cease-fire, Britain's Permanent Representative, Anthony Parsons, addresses the Council.

"I pay tribute once again to the Secretary-General for the efforts he has made during the past few days to implement Resolution 502 and 505. ... I have said before, but it cannot be repeated too often, that the current breach of the peace was caused by Argentina. It was Argentina which closed the diplomatic channels on 1 April. It was Argentina which remained silent in the face of the Security Council's appeal not to use force ... It was Argentina ... which invaded the Falkland Islands... It was, and is, Argentina which has failed to comply with Resolution 502 which demanded the immediate withdrawal of all Argentine troops. ...

It is the United Kingdom which was the victim of the Argentine act of aggression.... Everything we have done since has been in exercise of our inherent right to self-defence. ...

The plain fact is, Mr. President, that until the Government of Argentina changes its position it is clear that the conditions for a cease-fire do not exist. Against this background the call by the distinguished representatives of Spain and Panama for an unconditional cease-fire is not acceptable to my delegation. A cease-fire which is not inseparably linked to an immediate Argentine withdrawal would not be consistent with Resolution 502...

When we talk about security arrangements for the future, we are talking about security arrangements to shield the Islanders against any threat of renewed aggression – that is all." ⁷⁶²

Spain presses the Security Council for an immediate vote, but the meeting is adjourned until the 3rd. In order that delegates can obtain instructions from their respective Governments. Parsons advises London.

"Spain and Panama will press hard tomorrow morning for an immediate vote on their draft Resolution. They can count on six affirmative votes (China, USSR, Poland, Spain, Ireland, Panama). I think we can count on five negative votes or abstentions (France, UK, US, Guyana, Japan). Spain/Panama therefore have to get three out of the following four in order to get the necessary nine votes to turn our negative vote into a veto: Jordan, Togo, Uganda, Zaire... I recommend that the most urgent lobbying should now be carried out ..."

Surrender leaflets are dropped on Stanley.

"The Harriers have been dropping leaflets as well as other things, urging the Argies to surrender, offering free passage home and warning that they are surrounded by British troops." ⁷⁶³

762 PREM19/633 Telegram No.916 of 2 June 1982

763 Nevilles' Diary in Bennet 2021

Day 63

June 3rd – in the Falklands, HMS *Plymouth* bombards Argentine positions at Port Howard. Two *Harriers* are lost following attacks on other Argentine military installations, although the pilots are recovered safely.

On East Falkland Island, 3 Para establish a patrol base 2km west of Mount Longdon; commencing “aggressive” patrolling.

“There were quite a number of Argentine burials at the cemetery today; Jeremy saw them as he passed by on his dumper. They must have been victims of yesterday’s action... Now only the officer’s graves get marked with a cross. Other ranks are put two or three to a grave. There may be some sort of mass grave as well for rapid burials. All graves are very shallow; just a couple of scoops with a digger and that’s all.... Lorries were coming down the road with the dead and wounded... It seems to be mainly conscripts left in town now. As we watched, half a dozen of them came from the dockyard carrying armfuls of crosses, heading towards the cemetery. This is hardly the way to inspire an army;... Gen Menéndez has told his troops to fight to the last man.” ⁷⁶⁴

Canada's Ambassador to Buenos Aires is asked to leave the country following alleged pro-British remarks. Argentina recalls its own Ambassador from France. In New Zealand, a business man and his wife contribute \$NZ 1,000 for a supply of *Dunbar Whisky* to be sent to the troops in the Falklands, for; “immediate consumption.” ⁷⁶⁵

Following an operation over the Falklands archipelago (Black Buck 6), a *Vulcan* bomber heads north to rendezvous with a *Victor* for refuelling.

“The Victor turned up on cue, assisted by a Nimrod for the RV, and Neil’s attempt to connect with the basket on the first prod was rather abject. It was clear to us all that he was really fatigued but that was unsurprising. ... his final attempt resulted in the probe penetrating the basket, damaging its spokes and sending splinters of aluminium down the engine intakes, damaging the inlet guide vanes of numbers 2 and 3 engines, and leaving the tip of the probe embedded in the basket!” ⁷⁶⁶

Without sufficient fuel to reach Ascension, the *Vulcan* crew divert to Rio de Janeiro, Brazil. ⁷⁶⁷

“For the Brazilian military, this was a ‘menacing violation of our air, maritime and land space.’ More so, the government was quite unhappy about the incident because it forced them to position themselves publicly, something they had carefully tried to avoid...” ⁷⁶⁸



⁷⁶⁴ Diary entry in Smith 1984 pp.207 & 208

⁷⁶⁵ PREM19/633 Telegram 185 of 3 June 1982

⁷⁶⁶ *Falklands War 1982: Black Buck Six – Rio de Janeiro Diversion* David Castle 2022

<https://vulcantothesky.org/articles/black-buck-six-rio-de-janeiro-diversion/>

⁷⁶⁷ At the time of the accident, the aircraft was carrying two *Shrike* missiles. One was successfully fired, but the other stubbornly remained attached. All code books, charts and logs were ejected before the crew turned for Brazil. On arrival at Galeão airport, the aircraft was impounded and the missile removed. The crew were allowed to fly out of Brazil on June 10, 1982. The *Shrike* missile was eventually returned to the UK.

⁷⁶⁸ Krepp 2017 p.359

From Washington, Secretary Haig sends an instruction to Jeane Kirkpatrick in New York, directing the Representative to work closely with Anthony Parsons; to see if the proposed resolution can be made to work. If this is not possible, Kirkpatrick is instructed to join the UK in a veto.

France's Representative is also instructed by his Government to stay in close contact with Parsons. Japan confirms that its Representative will abstain.

At the United Nations Building in New York, Argentine Foreign Minister, Costa Méndez, attends a meeting of the Non-Aligned Movement. He makes a speech in which he compares Argentina with Algeria, India, Cuba and Vietnam, all of which had also needed to fight for their independence. In a similar vein, he also refers to the South African peoples fight against apartheid. His speech is greeted with laughter by some African representatives, who recall that Argentina had never previously supported their efforts against the Governments of South Africa.

*"Costa Mendez spoke to a half-filled hall at a meeting of the non-aligned movement, members of which consider themselves independent of either the United States or the Soviet Union. Many of the members are leftist governments hesitant to support the right-wing Argentine military junta in its dispute with Britain. This is the struggle all Latin American people for the defense of a continental territory,' he said. 'It is the struggle of all who confront colonial aggression.' He criticized the United States for its support of Britain in the Falkland Islands war, adding Argentina has faced aggression from the two countries since 'almost prehistoric times.' ..."*⁷⁶⁹

*"Costa Méndez's reference to Britain having expelled original inhabitants of Falklands does not seem to have misled most delegates."*⁷⁷⁰

At the UN, deliberations continue over the Spanish/Panamanian draft-resolution.

"Spain and Panama failed to line up nine votes for the draft Resolution ... The Americans, and to a lesser extent the French, made frenzied efforts to avoid a vote today, lest they had to veto with us. (Spain) finally agreed ... to postpone a vote until 2000z tomorrow (4 June). .. It was clear at the start of play today that we had six negative votes or abstentions (France, Guyana, Japan, Jordan, UK, US). ... Guyana pressed hard, with some support from Jordan, for major changes to the draft in order to make the cease-fire conditional upon the commencement of Argentine withdrawal. Panama was not prepared to accept these amendments. ... This led Panama to propose a new operative paragraph which would have asked the parties to implement immediately SCR's 502 and 505 in all their parts. This was acceptable to the Africans and Panama undertook to sell it to Spain."

The revised draft reads.

"The Security Council: Reaffirming its Resolutions 502 (1982) and 505 (1982) and the need for implementation of all the parts thereof,

(1) Requests the parties to the dispute to cease-fire immediately in the region of the Falkland Islands (Islas Malvinas) and to initiate, simultaneously with the cease-fire, the implementation of resolutions 502 (1982) and 505 (1982) in their entirety;

(2) Authorizes the Secretary-General to use such means as he may deem necessary to verify compliance with this resolution;,

⁷⁶⁹ Argentina asks non-aligned movement for support in UPI June 3, 1982. Costa Méndez also asserted that HMS *Invincible* had "disappeared."

⁷⁷⁰ PREM19/633 Telegram 170 of 4 June 1982

(3) Requests the Secretary-General to submit an interim report to the Security Council within 72 hours and to keep the Council informed concerning the implementation of this resolution.” ⁷⁷¹

Panama's suggested amendment is debated. Parsons asks for time to seek instructions, but says that he would expect further, and substantial, amendments to be suggested by London.

“De Pinies (Spain) said that there was no question of the Argentines and the Panamanians accepting the kind of amendments I was talking about. He saw no alternative to voting straight away. This led to frenzied efforts by the Americans to persuade the Argentines to discourage de Pinies from pressing for a vote (I dread to think what promises were made..). At the same time it became clear that both Zaire and Togo, in spite of their positions in the morning, were inclined to abstain on the revised draft. So de Pinies still had not got his nine votes and American and French efforts to postpone the vote met with success...” ⁷⁷²

Voting is deferred until the 4th. Parsons reports.

“I believe that our best tactic is firmly to put forward all the amendments we need to make the latest draft acceptable to us, ... Spain, Panama and the Argentine friends will explode, and may insist on an immediate vote on a text designed to leave us in maximum isolation. If they succeed, we will have to face it, something we always anticipated, in the not unsatisfactory knowledge that we have now held out for over 60 days.” ⁷⁷³

Day 64

June 4th – in Paris, France, prior to a G8 summit meeting, Margaret Thatcher meets Ronald Reagan at the US Embassy. She tells the President that Britain is willing to accept a ceasefire, provided it is irrevocably linked to Argentine withdrawal within 14 days.

In London, a *memorandum* is submitted for the consideration of Britain's OD Committee. An annex notes; *“Any transfer of sovereignty of the Falkland Islands (or the Dependencies) would be seen by the Argentines as strengthening their claim to parts of the British Antarctic Territory.”* ⁷⁷⁴

Argentina's Air Force mount raids against British patrols near Mount Kent; failing to inflict damage or casualties.

“Many troops use the church during the day; some come to pray for a few minutes, some just sit and shake. One sat in front of us shaking and trembling in a combination of exhaustion, fear and cold. Another cried uncontrollably. Most are very young. Their damp clothing smells of wet earth and camp fires.” ⁷⁷⁵

In New York, Argentina's Deputy Foreign Minister, Eduardo Ros, speaks to Thomas Enders at the US State Department, telling him that if the USA veto the UN SC resolution, then Argentina will break off diplomatic relations. Enders agrees to inform Haig in Paris. ⁷⁷⁶

In the reconvened UN Security Council meeting, Parsons tells Spain and Panama that he will not be proposing any amendments to their draft-resolution.

771 UN Doc. S/15156/Rev.2

772 PREM19/633 Telegram 924 of 3 June 1982

773 PREM19/633 Telegram 927 of 3 June 1982

774 British Policy in the Antarctic: Minerals June 4, 1982 CAB 148/206 quoted in Livingstone 2018

775 Diary entry in Smith 1984 p.209

776 Freedman & Gamba-Stonehouse 1990

“... in that case, there was no alternative to voting... There followed a delay of about two hours while both sides counted heads, and Mrs. Kirkpatrick made several efforts to persuade Haig in Versailles to switch ... to abstention. With abstentions assured from Guyana, Japan, Jordan and Togo, and probably from Zaire, it looked as though De Pinies would not be able to get his nine votes. But, at the last minute, my Japanese colleague, to his obvious chagrin, received instructions from Versailles to switch from an abstention to a vote in favour. He took with him Zaire, and nearly Jordan as well.”

The draft Security Council resolution is put to a vote. The UK vetoes the resolution. As does the USA, just moments before new instructions to abstain arrive from US Secretary Haig.

US Representative Jeane Kirkpatrick explains her vote to the Security Council.

*“My government has worked hard for mediation and settlement of this dispute. We have been rent by the clash of values, loyalties and friends. That clash continued down through the registration of the vote on this issue. I am told that it is impossible for a government to change a vote once it is cast, but I have been requested by my government to record the fact that were it possible to change our vote we should like to change it from a veto – a “no”, that is – to an abstention.”*⁷⁷⁷

*“The message to abstain came minutes after the SC vote. Since SC votes cannot be changed, Amb. Kirkpatrick was instructed to announce that we wished to record the change in any case. Amb. Kirkpatrick followed these instructions and added change of intention to the explanation of vote. Since then Kirkpatrick has explained the confusion was a result of short time and long distance.”*⁷⁷⁸

*“I spoke with Walt Stoessel and Tom Enders at 3:00 p.m. To inform them that Japan and Ireland would vote “yes” and that France was abstaining. I said that I wanted written instructions, and then spoke with Stoessel again to inquire if they were very sure that I was instructed to vote no. I reiterated what a disaster I thought a “no” vote would be, how unnecessary it was, how the U.K. frequently did not vote with US in the SC. Again, I said that to avoid any possible confusion, I wanted written instructions. I asked if they had spoken with Sec. Haig about the draft. They said yes. Again I repeated that I thought it would be an extremely controversial vote. I said that I thought they should discuss this again with Sec. Haig. At 4:00 I once again called Stoessel and Enders to say that I had received no written instructions. They said that my instructions were clear – I was to follow the British – but they could understand that I wanted written instructions. ... At 5:00 I called to report everything we knew about the line up: Japan, Ireland, Spain, USSR, Poland, Panama, Zaire would vote yes, and the U.K. would veto. I then said that the SC meeting was about to begin. They said that Sec. Haig was still out at the dinner and they had not yet heard from him. Later at 6:00 they said that they had spoken to Sec. Haig, explained the situation to him, but that he (Haig) wanted to reflect. I explained that the vote was rapidly approaching. ... At 6:30 I heard that the Secretary wanted to reflect further. I replied that time had run out, the SC meeting had been called for 4:00 and we had been delaying for 2 and a half hours by that point. At 6:35 the vote occurred, and we voted no...”*⁷⁷⁹

Other members of the UN Security Council, speak in explanation of their votes.

“France, which abstained, considered it understandable that one of the parties to the conflict felt it essential to obtain certain safeguards against continued non-compliance with the 3 April resolution; consensus should have been reached regarding its effective implementation. Similarly, Guyana abstained, saying that, while Argentine non-compliance with the 3 April resolution was both the cause and consequence of the current level of armed hostilities in the South Atlantic, the text failed to make an explicit link between a ceasefire and

⁷⁷⁷ UN Doc. S/PV.2373

⁷⁷⁸ Reagan Library, William P. Clark Files, Falklands War (UN/Kirkpatrick/Haig) 06/05/1982

⁷⁷⁹ Kirkpatrick to Clark, Reagan Library, William P. Clark Files, Falklands War (UN/Kirkpatrick/Haig) 06/05/1982

withdrawal of Argentine forces within a clearly defined time-frame. Japan supported the resolution with the understanding that Argentina would withdraw its forces within a reasonable period of time. Panama said the British veto had deprived the Security Council of a new chance to demonstrate its effectiveness, and had put that body back into a state of absolute impotence. Spain said the non-adoption of what it considered to be a highly balanced text represented a failure for peace. Ireland and Uganda felt the text clearly linked full implementation of the previous resolutions with the call for a cease-fire. Zaire supported the text as it called for the implementation of the previous Council resolutions. China also voted in favour, saying the Council should call for an unconditional cease-fire, resumption of negotiations and, at the same time, extend the Secretary-General's mandate..."

Britain's Anthony Parsons, also addresses the Security Council.

"The situation facing the Council this afternoon is straight forward. If Argentina had not invaded the Falkland Islands at the beginning of April there would be no crisis and we would not be meeting today. If Argentina had obeyed the mandatory demand in SCR 502 immediately to withdraw all its forces from the Falkland Islands, the crisis would have passed and we would not be meeting today. But Argentina did invade the Islands, and defied the mandatory demand of the Council to withdraw.... there is no direct and inseparable link between the ceasefire and immediate Argentine withdrawal with a fixed time limit. The wording of the draft, without any shadow of a doubt, enables Argentina to reopen the endless process of negotiation, thus leaving Argentine armed forces in illegal occupation of parts of the Islands. This is totally unacceptable to my Government." ⁷⁸⁰

Parsons reports to London.

"The Resolution secured nine votes only because of a last minute switch by Japan. After the vote, Mrs. Kirkpatrick astonishingly stated that she had been asked by her Government to say that if it were possible to change a vote once cast, the United States would like to change its vote from a veto to an abstention." ⁷⁸¹

Parsons concludes:

"It was a very close run thing. Had it not been for the last minute Japanese switch (for which my Japanese colleague was bitterly ashamed) the Resolution would have failed for lack of votes. I confess that, with the amendments, I expected it to do better. If anyone had told me on 9 April, when we notified to the Security Council the establishment of the EZ (exclusion zone), that we would last out until 4 June without having to veto a cease-fire Resolution and that the eventual Resolution would only scrape 9 votes, I would not have believed it. I think we owe this not unsatisfactory result to a number of factors. First, basic sympathy for our position amongst NAM members ... Argentine unpopularity, de Pinies' bullying methods: and powerful lobbying both here and in capitals. Another unexpected bonus was Mrs Kirkpatrick's truly grotesque intervention when she last received instructions from Haig to abstain having cast a negative vote. ... Her performance has already excited much more media attention than our veto. The important thing now is that we firmly kill any suggestion that we are isolated in the UN. ... The fact is that we are not. The Latins got a poor result for what looked like a reasonable Resolution to many people, and I have already received numerous expressions of sympathy and support from third world delegations from Africa and Asia. It is difficult to see what the UN will now do. There has been

780 PREM19/633 Telegram 935 of 4 June 1982

781 Kirkpatrick had not received Haig's change of instruction in time for the vote.

*very little talk about an emergency special session of the General Assembly and there would definitely not have been nine votes for such a proposition had it been tabled tonight... We owe a great deal to David Karran, the charge d'affairs of Guyana, who has been a tower of strength and helpfulness throughout..*⁷⁸²

*“Most embarrassed was President Reagan, who when questioned by reporters the next day while standing beside an evidently unimpressed Prime Minister, clearly had no idea what had been going on.”*⁷⁸³

In the Falklands, British patrols move into position.

*“3 Para remain in area of NW Mount Longdon. 45 CDO are moving from Teal Inlet to the area of Smoko Mountain. 2 Para are at Bluff Cove with 1/7 Gurkha Rifles moving forward from Goose Green to join. 2 Scots Guards and 1 Welsh Guards are moving to Bluff Cove area by the night of 5/6 June. It is intended that two CDO attacks will be made on Two Sisters Mountain within next 48 hours. ... Incidents: A 42 CDO patrol struck a minefield during the night of 2/3 June; one own forces wounded. ... an Argentine patrol of 5 was engaged and 3 enemy killed.”*⁷⁸⁴

Day 65

June 5th – 0320z HMS *Invincible* and HMS *Brilliant* rendezvous at Beauchene Island.⁷⁸⁵

In Brazil. Argentina asks the government to intern the British *Vulcan* bomber under the terms of the Rio Treaty, Brazil politely declines. In the capital, Brasilia, Britain's Ambassador presents a *bout de papier* condemning the decision to retain the *Vulcan* bomber; threatening “serious consequences” for friendly relations between the two countries.⁷⁸⁶

*“... it became very clear in the second half of the note, that it was not the incident in itself that had angered the British government, but the nature of Brazilian support for Argentina.. They were aware, the British government cautioned, of the Brazilian material support for the Argentines.... Ambassador Harding admonished that if the Brazilian government was truly serious about neutrality, then it could not detain British aircrafts, without also interdicting Argentine flights. He had 'clear evidence', Harding warned, that every day two flights from Libya, one by Aerolineas Argentinas and another by a military aircraft, stopped over in Recife, in north-eastern Brazil, on its way to Argentina.”*⁷⁸⁷

From the Falklands, HMS *Hydra* arrives in Montevideo with 51 British casualties. Argentina demands that Uruguay intern Britain's casualties under the Geneva Conventions. Uruguay refuses. Elsewhere ARA *Bahia Paraiso* accepts Argentine wounded from SS *Uganda*, while HMS *Intrepid* embarks Scots Guards for a journey to Fitzroy. Royal Marines move towards Mount Challenger.

In New York, the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) deplores the military operations being carried out by the UK, with US support, and reaffirms; “solidarity with Argentina in its efforts to end an outdated colonial presence.”

“The Latin Americans had taken the whole place over in a big way on the Falklands, with Castro acting as impresario for Costa Méndez. He frankly admitted that Britain's friends had been swept away by the torrent

782 PREM19/633 Telegram 935 of 4 June 1982

783 Freedman & Gamba-Stonehouse 1990

784 Situation Report handed to PM Thatcher the following morning, at the G8 meeting in Versailles.

785 Noted in the log of *Brilliant*. No reasons given, but there has been some suggestion that the fleet withdrew to a safe distance to rob the Argentine's of any more potential targets.

786 PREM19/634 Telegram 250 of 5 June 1982. See above.

787 Krepp 2017 p.359. Brazil's government did not acknowledge the protest.

of Latin American rhetoric, pressure and theatricality. All under the TV cameras. He had attended many NAM meetings over the years but had never heard anything like the violence of Costa Méndez's rhetoric. Pretty well every Latin American under the sun had spoken on similar lines. Almost all the vitriol had been directed against Britain, with the United States as a footnote ... Costa Méndez had received a long standing ovation with Castro capering in the public gallery ...”⁷⁸⁸

From New York, pleas from Pérez de Cuéllar are sent to both PM Margaret Thatcher and General Galtieri.⁷⁸⁹

“The armed conflict in the region of the Falkland islands threatens to enter into a new and extremely dangerous phase that is likely to result in heavy loss of life on both sides. This would gravely prejudice, for the foreseeable future, any prospect for a settlement of the underlying dispute... I feel it is my duty in this situation, in pursuance of the mandate entrusted to me by the Security Council, to appeal directly to Your Excellency and to President Galtieri, in the hope that a way can still be found to bring the fighting to a halt and to initiate negotiations towards a settlement of the crisis.”

The Secretary-General attaches a seven point plan. US Representative Kirkpatrick notes.

*“Basically this proposal spells out the modes for implementing Resolution 502 which was the British resolution and one which they have repeatedly described as the only basis for peace. The proposal addresses the U.K. objection that the 'Spanish' resolution provided no specific time frame for withdrawal of Argentine troops. It provides for removing all Argentine troops in 15 days and only makes a reference to British plans for "reducing" its forces. That is, it leaves the U.K. in control of the Islands, but it also provides for future negotiations. This gives the British everything they have said they wanted, but provides a fig leaf for Argentine pride (the fig leaf being, basically, the right to surrender and withdraw under U.N. auspices instead of British). ... If the President can help Mrs. Thatcher decide to accept this, lives and the U.S. interests would be saved.”*⁷⁹⁰

Parsons comments.

“I believe that this is another genuine last minute attempt by Pérez de Cuéllar to try to bring about Argentine withdrawal without further bloodshed. Obviously it has come too late ...”

Royal Marines Capt. Rob Bell, a Spanish speaker, establishes contact via the civilian medical network with Captain Melbourne Hussey of the Argentine Navy. There is an agreement that the network will be monitored at specific times in order that information can be passed if it should prove necessary.⁷⁹¹

An Argentine C-130 *Hercules* lands at Stanley airfield carrying two *MM38 Exocet* missiles.⁷⁹²

*“The ITB was ready again, but the movements of the British ships had been restricted by the threat of the Exocet, which avoided the area that was presumed to be within the range of the missile.”*⁷⁹³

A little before midnight, HMS *Cardiff*, HMS *Yarmouth* and HMS *Avenger* bombard Argentine positions on Mount Harriet and Two Sisters.⁷⁹⁴

788 PREM19/634 Telegram 958 of 7 June 1982. Conversation between Anthony Parsons and Amin Doha, (Bangladesh).
789 PREM19/634 Telegram 945 of 6 June 1982

790 Kirkpatrick to Reagan June 6 1982 Reagan Library, William P. Clark Files, Falklands War (UN/Kirkpatrick/Haig) 06/06/1982–11/04/1982

791 There is some unconfirmed evidence that an unnamed British Commandeer had a conversation, via this link, with General Menendez on June 8, 1982. Menendez apparently signed off saying he would call again on June 9.

792 Amendolara 2012

793 *Ibid.* cf. May 31 & June 1, above

794 In excess of 600 shells were fired at the Argentine defences.

Day 66

June 6th – as HMS *Cardiff* bombards Argentine positions, it mistakenly targets a British *Gazelle* helicopter of 656 Squadron.⁷⁹⁵ An Argentine patrol is ambushed near the Murrell River by a 3 Para squad resulting in the deaths of five Argentine soldiers. The British patrol takes fire from Mount Tumbledown, but withdraws without casualties. Unloading/loading at San Carlos are *Blue Rover*, *Elk*, *Nordic Ferry*, *Sir Geraint*, *Sir Tristram*, and *Sir Galahad*. *Sir Lancelot* is moored and acting as a temporary home for the SAS while repairs continue.

MV *Norland* (right) sails towards Montevideo with 1400 Argentine prisoners, as HMS *Hydra* arrives in there with 50 British walking wounded.⁷⁹⁶

RFA *Engadine* approaches the Falklands with four Wessex helicopters and fuel.

In New York, Parsons receives instructions to inform the Secretary-General that his proposals are unacceptable.

“I saw the Secretary-General at 2300z this evening, ie one hour before his deadline. He had not by then heard from the Argentines... I said that you (Pym) and the Prime Minister had studied the Secretary-General's message very carefully... But for the immediate future you had a single objective, namely to bring about Argentine withdrawal by one way or another and as quickly as possible. The military situation on the ground was now too complex to make it practicable for a third party to intervene. You could not at this stage accept an integrated package involving many other aspects of the crisis. Nor at this stage could you commit yourselves to any proposition about the reduction of UK forces or about long term security arrangements under the UN's or anyone else's auspices. These were matters that would have to be worked out after we had repossessed the Islands.

*I went on to say that we had become disillusioned by the course of negotiations during the last two months. ... Most recently our complete lack of confidence in the Argentines had been compounded by the Non-Aligned communique which had just been drafted in Havana. This had been an Argentine text. It showed absolutely no disposition on Argentina's part to compromise. ... Against this background you were not prepared to take another chance which would involve the risk of re-involving ourselves in interminable negotiations. ... It was clear that none of this came as any surprise to the Secretary-General. ... De Soto has since told me that the Argentine response was negative, he would not reveal the details ...”*⁷⁹⁷



795 Struck by the second of two *Sea Dart* missiles; four men died. For reasons unknown, Britain's Ministry of Defence covered up the details until 1988 when, under pressure from the mother of one of the deceased, Lance-Corporal Simon Cockton, a new inquest was held and the truth emerged. Seemingly, the Royal Navy had been told that nothing 'friendly' would be flying at that time. The MOD have never apologized.

796 MV *Norland* was a P&O roll on/roll off ferry from Yorkshire, requisitioned by the Ministry of Defence for use as a troop carrier.

797 PREM19/634 Telegram 949 of 6 June 1982. The mood among US officials was described as “glum”.

Day 67

June 7th – during the night, two SAS patrols set up observation posts on Beagle Ridge, overlooking Stanley airfield and Argentine positions on Wireless Ridge. ⁷⁹⁸

Argentine positions near Stanley are bombarded, while Gurkha patrols mop up pockets of resistance behind British lines. A night-time bombardment by *Active* and *Ambuscade* targets Argentine positions near Fitzroy. With 2 Para in need of reinforcement at Fitzroy, during the night HMS *Fearless* transports 5 Brigades two Guards battalions (Welsh & Scots) to Elephant Island to rendezvous with two landing craft (LCUs) from Bluff Cove. These do not appear and only half of the combined battalion can be ferried ashore with *Fearless's* own LCUs before dawn. HMS *Fearless* returns the remaining Guards to San Carlos. ⁷⁹⁹

“... a Harrier had made a mad dash down the valley towards the racecourse and had taken out a gun site as Felton's Stream. I hope everyone had some washing on their lines as it passed in case it was taking photos.” ⁸⁰⁰

An Argentine radio station, Radio Libertad, starts broadcasting propaganda to British troops in the Falklands.

“Using Tokyo Rose as its inspiration, Radio Liberty was created by the intelligence service of the Argentine Army. Its purpose was to demoralize British troops by playing Beatles songs and other British classics. The leading broadcaster was Silvia Fernandez Barrio, or 'Argentine Annie', as she was nicknamed by the British troops. "She was really fluent in those days, but she talked with a strong American accent. So we had to hire an Irish translator to help her sound more Victorian" recalled the radio producer.” ⁸⁰¹

In Ireland, in a letter to Taoiseach Charles Haughey, the Irish Exporters Association inform their Government that the policy of opposition to EU trade sanctions against Argentina had caused a severe trade backlash in the UK. ⁸⁰² Following Zaire's support for the vetoed UN Security Council resolution, London decides not to finance military equipment for the Zairean contingent in Chad, among other punitive actions.

After a meeting with the Italian Prime Minister in Rome, President Reagan and Secretary Haig fly to the UK.

Major-General Jeremy Moore, addresses Brigadier-General Mario Menendez over the radio; *“For God's sake let's stop the slaughter.”* ⁸⁰³

An Argentine *Learjet* is hit by a *Sea Dart* missile fired from HMS *Exeter*; crashing onto Pebble Island with the loss of all five onboard. ⁸⁰⁴

In Stanley, Argentine officers are unable to maintain discipline.

“... in excess of twenty-five homes have been broken into by Argentine troops, mainly during the hours of darkness. The sight for the owners next day must be sickening – excreta plastered about, remains of a fire often in the middle of the sitting-room carpet, and general dishevelled mess.” ⁸⁰⁵

⁷⁹⁸ There they remained, undetected, until hostilities ceased.

⁷⁹⁹ The operation had taken far longer than planned. Many of the Scots Guards landed soaking wet, and freezing cold. Some, unable to move, had to be lifted out of the boats.

⁸⁰⁰ *Neville's Diary* in Bennett 2021

⁸⁰¹ *Five Obscure and Curious Events from the Malvinas/Falklands War* Federico Sujarchuk (undated)

⁸⁰² Sales of Guinness beer were down.

⁸⁰³ Reported in *The Sun* newspaper, June 8, 1982.

⁸⁰⁴ See Middlebrook 2003. One of the passengers was Vice-Commodore Rodolfo de la Colina.

⁸⁰⁵ Diary entry in Smith 1984 p.215

Day 68

June 8th – during the night, the remaining Guards of 5 Brigade are transported from San Carlos by RFA *Sir Galahad*.

Just before dawn, *Sir Galahad* arrives at Fitzroy Sound; dropping anchor near *Sir Tristram*, which is still being unloaded of stores and ammunition. As a result, only one LCU is available to offload a field ambulance, a *Rapier* air defence battery and the Guards from *Sir Galahad*. However, the two ships are spotted by Argentine observers, and, from 500 miles away, Argentine aircraft are dispatched towards the archipelago.

A little after 1300 local time, Argentine aircraft drop three 500lb bombs on *Sir Galahad*. None explode, but fires break out. Thirty-two Welsh Guards lose their lives, together with five of *Galahad's* crew and eleven other army personnel. One hundred and fifteen are injured; seventy-five of them walking wounded. The order is given to abandon ship. ⁸⁰⁶ *Sir Tristram* is also hit by two bombs, neither of which explode but the strike kills two of the crew. ⁸⁰⁷ RFA *Sir Tristram* is also abandoned. ⁸⁰⁸

“The landing ships were unloading men and materials when a formation of Skyhawks came in low from the direction of the sea. Both ships were hit and sustained damage. From just over a ridge I watched a column of grey smoke slowly turn to black as fire aboard Sir Galahad spread swiftly. The sea around the ship blossomed in orange dots as men jumped over the side into life rafts... From the flames came a steady rattle of exploding ammunition.” ⁸⁰⁹

“Embarked in Sir Galahad were two companies, each of 120 men (Prince of Wales and No.3), plus 1 Mortar Platoon, 'A' Echelon and Engineers Troop, of 35, 45 and 40 men respectively. ... the Welsh Guards commenced loading into an LCU at 1630Z... with accurate intelligence about the landing craft at Fitzroy, four Mirage 3s and eight A4Bs were sent from Rio Gallegos, and six Daggers from Rio Grande... Argentine tactics were to use the Mirage 3s as a diversion, hoping to draw off any Harriers, while the Daggers and the A4Bs would fly low, hoping to stay undetected... At around 1650Z they reached the southern entrance to Falkland Sound.” ⁸¹⁰



⁸⁰⁶ All survivors were conveyed back to San Carlos Water. One of the most seriously injured, being Simon Weston CBE. *Galahad* was later towed out to sea and sunk; now listed as a war grave. A Hong Kong Chinese crewman, Chiu Yiu Nam, was awarded a George Medal in 1983 for his bravery in saving Welsh Guardsmen trapped inside the ship. An extremely modest man, he initially refused any recognition. Helicopter crews won praise for their bravery. One of the pilots was Prince Andrew.

⁸⁰⁷ Yu Sik Chee and Yeung Shui Kam were both from Hong Kong. One bomb passed right through the ship.

⁸⁰⁸ *Sir Tristram* was repairable, raising questions about whether she should have been abandoned at such an early stage.

The subsequent Board of Inquiry Report for both ships can be found here -

<https://falklandstimeline.files.wordpress.com/2022/06/board-of-inquiry-report-into-the-loss-of-rfa-sir-tristram-and-rfa-sir-galahad-june-8-1982.pdf>

⁸⁰⁹ Brain Hanrahan despatch in Briley 2022

⁸¹⁰ Freedman 2005 vol.2

Argentine *Dagger* aircraft engage HMS *Plymouth* off Chanco Point. Hit by four bombs, none of which explode, there are five casualties, but no deaths. Elsewhere two Royal Engineers and a member of the Field Ambulance lose their lives.

In London, US President Ronald Reagan addresses Parliament.

“On distant islands in the South Atlantic young men are fighting for Britain. And, yes, voices have been raised protesting their sacrifice for lumps of rock and earth so far away. But those young men aren't fighting for mere real estate. They fight for a cause – for the belief that armed aggression must not be allowed to succeed, and the people must participate in the decisions of government – the decisions of government under the rule of law. If there had been firmer support for that principle some 45 years ago, perhaps our generation wouldn't have suffered the bloodletting of World War II.”

In Paris, *Le Monde* declares that President Mitterrand does not endorse the British claim to sovereignty over the Falklands, and that while France agrees that international law must be upheld, Britain should negotiate with Argentina for a new status for the archipelago which would be fair for both sides. At the United Nations, Argentina's representative hands a note to Nepal's Ambassador demanding that Gurkha troops be withdrawn from the Falkland Islands. Katmandu responds that the Gurkhas are British troops.⁸¹¹

Far to the north of the conflict zone, a crude oil tanker, *Hercules*, owned by a Liberian corporation and unconnected with the conflict, is attacked and bombed by Argentine aircraft. The vessel is 600 nautical miles from Argentina and more than 500 from the Falklands. Unable to defuse one unexploded bomb, the vessel is scuttled by its crew. The hospital ship, HMS *Hydra*, sails from Montevideo to assist.⁸¹²

*“A 100,000-ton supertanker, bound from St. Croix in the Virgin Islands to Alaska, reported that it was bombed and hit by aircraft rocket fire 480 miles northeast of the Falkland Islands yesterday. British military sources in London said the planes that attacked the ship were apparently Argentine C-130 transports converted for use as bombers. As of late yesterday, the Argentine Government had made no comment on the attack. No injuries were reported by the tanker, the Liberian-registered Hercules.”*⁸¹³

Argentine *Skyhawks* return to Fitzroy in the evening; attacking a landing craft from HMS *Fearless*, killing four Royal Marines and two Royal Navy personnel.⁸¹⁴

*“When the Skyhawks returned to their base and reported the success, it was decided to send out two more formations of four Skyhawks to continue the attacks in an attempt to add to the damage already caused to the British . . . Four aircraft of the 4th Fighter Group made the first attack, roaring in over the British units deployed around Fitzroy. But this area was well defended, and the units there greeted the Skyhawks with a hail of fire from every type of infantry weapon and from Rapier missile launchers. This attack caused no casualties to the British troops. The four Argentine aircraft were all damaged... Four Skyhawks of the 5th Fighter Group found a lone British landing craft in the Choiseul Sound. The first two Skyhawks attacked, and a bomb and some cannon fire all but destroyed the small craft killing six (sic) of the men on board. But a pair of Sea Harriers saw the attack and swiftly disposed of three of the four Skyhawks...”*⁸¹⁵

811 UPI archives June 8, 1982

812 *Amerada Hess Shipping Corp v. Argentine Republic*, 830 F. 2d 421. 423 (2d Cir.1987). Decided on appeal 1989. The petitioners took their case to the US after failing to find an Argentine law firm that would represent them.

813 *Tanker Attacked in South Atlantic in The New York Times* June 9, 1982

814 Total British losses for the day amounted to 56 servicemen killed, and 150 wounded. Marking the greatest loss of life among British forces on a single day since World War II and accounting for 20% of British fatalities during the Falklands War. A third wave of A-4Cs attacked ground targets with no visible effect.

815 Middlebrook 2003

Day 69

June 9th – during the night, HMS *Yarmouth* pounds Argentine positions around Stanley; pulling away before dawn. Royal Marines patrol near Mount Harriet and Two Sisters. 170 wounded and badly burned men arrive at a field hospital in Ajax Bay run by Surgeon-Commander Rick Jolly.

Spain's daily newspaper, *Ya*, quotes a statement by President Galtieri.

“Argentina will not accept a return to the status of 1 April in the Malvinas.. but is willing to withdraw her forces at the same pace as the British, leaving a UN Administrator to govern the Islands.”

During an interview for NBC, Margaret Thatcher is asked about the chances of a political settlement

“We've been trying for a political negotiated settlement for 8 weeks. For 8 weeks the Argentines could have withdrawn at any time. They haven't withdrawn. It is now beyond a negotiated settlement.”

In Buenos Aires, newspapers headline a, “*serious British setback at Fitzroy Settlement,*” and talk of, “*British losses in landing attempt.*” *La Nacion* and *Clarín* (right) claim that a frigate has been sunk and three other Royal Navy vessels, “*destroyed,*” and that President Galtieri is saying that Argentina; “*is prepared to continue the war for as many months and years as necessary.*”

*“... the (British) Government agreed to a request from the Task Force commanders to hold back the full details of the casualties to encourage the mistaken belief in Buenos Aires that the blow had set back the British far more than was in fact the case. The Argentines believed that future British operations had been hampered because of the loss of some heavy vehicles, supporting arms and provisions as well as many men.”*⁸¹⁶

In Paris, President Mitterrand says that although he felt solidarity with Britain; “*This war must not turn into a war of revenge. There are limits to this conflict which I fully intend to make known at the right time, ...*”

Arriving at Stanley, the Argentine Hospital ship, *Bahia Paraiso*, unloads two *MM38 Exocet* missiles.

*“Two Exocets shipped in on a vessel marked as a hospital ship were detected by Islander Fred Clark, an aircraft engineer who had worked in France on Exocet production. In a dangerous pre-dawn recce in freezing weather to a banned military zone during curfew, he saw two Exocet missiles in a shed in Stanley jetty shed. He was challenged by a sentry whose thick winter gloves prevented him from firing his rifle. Fred Clark placated the guard with a cigarette and made his escape. Those missiles were never used.”*⁸¹⁷



⁸¹⁶ Freedman 2005 vol.2. A meeting between Media Editors and the MOD (PUS) on June 9, 1982 raised some frustrations regarding the lack of details regarding casualty figures from the Bluff Cove attacks. Excuses were offered, but no serious information given at that stage. A statement issued by the MOD shortly after the meeting ended, suggested that casualty figures were likely to be higher than first thought, but again no exact numbers were provided to the Press.

⁸¹⁷ Briley 2022. At the end of the war there appear to have been three *MM38 Exocet* missiles that had not been used which were seized by the Royal Navy.

Ten *Mirage* fighters fly into Argentina, a gift from Peru. With them are a supply SAM-7 missiles.⁸¹⁸

In London, Foreign Secretary Pym sends instructions to UK Embassies and missions around the world.

“Please deliver as soon as possible the following message from me – Quote – I am very concerned to ensure that, once Argentine forces have been obliged to leave the Falklands, all military action by Argentina against us in the South Atlantic must stop. We want the next period to be one of rehabilitation and reconstruction and not one of continuing bitterness and hostility. I hope that this would also be the Argentine mood, and presumably they will be concerned for the return of their prisoners of war... We do not want a situation where we have regained the Falkland Islands but Argentina refuses to give up the fighting against us. There may be a need to maintain economic measures until Argentina agrees to cease all hostilities in the South Atlantic.”

Day 70

June 10th – during the night, HMS *Yarmouth* shells Argentine positions to the west of Stanley. At first light, a Special Air Services (SAS) observation team near Port Howard, is spotted by Argentine troops and fired upon. The team escape with the loss of one life, their commanding officer, Captain G.J. Hamilton.⁸¹⁹

Four Argentine *Pucar*as from Stanley airfield, bomb 3 Para positions on Mount Kent.

In London, Defence Secretary John Nott makes a statement in Parliament.

*“Since I reported to the House on 26 May British forces have moved forward to positions surrounding Port Stanley and are in firm control of high ground on an arc surrounding the town. ... We are in constant contact with the International Committee of the Red Cross to see whether we can find some means whereby islanders who may be in a difficult situation in the town can, with Red Cross assistance, be brought out. The Red Cross is working with us on this. So far we had not had a satisfactory response from the Argentines. Our concern for the islanders is very great...”*⁸²⁰

Pope John Paul II flies towards Argentina.

*“The Pope is coming to Argentina in a hastily arranged trip to balance his tour of Britain, which ended eight days ago. Vatican officials have insisted that the Pope's visit will be pastoral and that he will not be playing an intermediary role between the two countries, which are fighting in the Falkland Islands. "The Holy Father will come with words of peace, faith, hope," Msgr. Ubaldo Calabresi, the Papal Nuncio here, said in an interview. ... Vatican officials, however, say they fear that Argentina's ruling military junta might seek to portray the Pope's 32-hour visit as support for their side in the conflict over the Falklands. Underlining those fears, Foreign Minister Nicanor Costa Mendez said today that while no negotiations were in the offing, the Pope's trip "could mean a great encouragement toward an end to the aggression and the establishment of a peace that recognizes our rights." ... ”*⁸²¹

818 These aircraft could not be readied in time to play a part in the conflict.

819 Hamilton's four man team had been deployed behind enemy lines on June 5, 1982, establishing an observation point on a ridge known as Many Branch Point. On this day, only Hamilton and a radio operator (Cpl. Roy Fonseca) were at the post. In the exchange, Hamilton was killed and Fonseca taken prisoner. Hamilton was posthumously awarded the Military Cross on evidence provided by the Argentine commander of Port Howard – Col. Juan Ramon Mabragana.

820 *HC Deb 10 June 1982 vol.25 cc399-405*

821 *The New York Times* June 11, 1982

The crew of Britain's *Vulcan* bomber detained by Brazil, are told that they may leave with an undertaking that it will take no further part in “warlike operations.” However, the missile removed from the aircraft is to remain in Brazil for the time being.⁸²²

“... the real reason we were released, according to the Brazilian colonel who was assigned as our mentor and escort, was that the day after our eventual release on the 11th July (sic) 1982, Pope John Paul II was travelling to visit Buenos Aires. On his way to Argentina, arrangements were rapidly being made for him to fly into Rio Galeão Airport where he was expected to say Mass to an invited congregation of nearly a hundred thousand followers. The altar for Mass was to be located on the hard standing next to where our *Vulcan* bomber was parked. The base commander requested that we taxied 597 to the other side of the airfield so that it would be out of sight. We politely declined but suggested that if he filled our tanks to full with AVTUR we would get out of his hair and fly back to Ascension forthwith. Our request was granted, probably to save embarrassing the Pope or the President – or both.”⁸²³

Brought from Montevideo on SS *Uganda*. representatives of the Red Cross (ICRC) finally arrive in the Falkland Islands.

“... we came very late (to the war)... We had been impeded in our efforts to come to the Islands. At the end we could come on the 10th of June thanks to the British Army.”⁸²⁴

At the United Nations, Secretary-General, de Cuéllar makes it known that he is thinking of asking the Pope to intervene with President Galtieri, in an attempt to persuade the Argentines to accept his proposals. Sir Anthony Parsons attempts to dissuade him.

Apparently oblivious to events around them, Argentina's postal services in Stanley issue a new stamp. Celebrating the 153rd anniversary of Luis Vernet's *Civil and Military Command* of 1829.⁸²⁵



822 Apparently the Pope was scheduled for a one-hour refuelling stop in Brazil en-route to Argentina. The retained missile was eventually returned to the UK.

823 *Falklands War 1982: Black Buck Six – Rio de Janeiro Diversion* David Castle 2022

824 *Falklands: Red Cross clear on Argentine families' wishes of identifying remains at Darwin cemetery* in *Mercopress* July 1, 2016.

825 See 1829

Day 71

June 11th – during the night, HMS *Active* shells Argentine positions in the mountains to the west of Stanley.

*“A very noisy night with bombardments from all quarters...”*⁸²⁶

MSA's *Cordella* and *Pict* reconnoiter Berkeley Sound; reporting that no mines have been found.

RAF *Harriers* bomb Argentine positions at Stanley airfield, Two Sisters, Mount Harriet, Mount Longdon, Mount Tumbledown and Moody Brook Barracks. A *Wessex* helicopter attacks the military command post believed to be situated in Stanley Town Hall.

*“... from the front porch saw huge bits of the police station roof flying about through the air with flashes, flames and lots of smoke. There was intense small-arms fire outside, the three spectacular eruptions as the Harriers bombed the Pucaras at the airport, which burned furiously and exploded... Uncle James was seen walking to work through the middle of it all.”*⁸²⁷

*“... the most unusual action of the day was a British attempt to kill Brigadier-General Menéndez. The British believed that Menéndez held a regular morning conference in the Town Hall/Post Office building on Stanley's waterfront, and a Wessex helicopter, hovering over the high ground three miles to the north, fired two AS-12 wire-guided missiles at the building. One missile failed; the second flew on, just missing the intended target and striking the Police Station on the other side of the road.”*⁸²⁸

France's Foreign Ministry propose that Britain should come to an arrangement with Argentina before driving them off the Islands. Arguing that relations between Europe and Latin America could be poisoned for years, if Britain does not seize the right moment to begin working towards a solution.

In London, PM Thatcher speaks to the House of Commons, with regard to the British dead.

*“It is a traditional and well understood practice, and one which provides equal treatment for all, that Service men who are killed in action on land abroad are buried in the first instance quickly and with all possible reverence close to where they fall. Once hostilities are over they are transferred to a permanent cemetery near to the scene of action. It has been the custom to offer the next of kin the opportunity to visit the site at public expense. Those who die at sea are buried at sea. The Government believe this practice should apply to those who die in the Falklands, but we recognise that this is an extremely sensitive question and we would not wish to make a final decision until all relevant factors, including the views of next of kin, have been taken into account...”*⁸²⁹

In Washington, Argentine Ambassador Takacs speaks to US Admiral Hayward

*“... the British were misrepresenting the military situation in the Malvinas and were predicting a quick military victory. This misrepresentation had removed the pressure for continued negotiations. He wanted Admiral Hayward to have an appreciation for the true military situation in the Malvinas and hoped that the United States would do all in its power to help force a diplomatic resolution. ...”*⁸³⁰

A member of Pérez de Cuéllar's staff flies to Buenos Aires to rendezvous with Pope John Paul II. In order to give him a full briefing of the Secretary-General's proposals of June 5th. Parsons reports.

826 Diary entry in Smith 1984 p.223

827 *Ibid*

828 Middlebrook 2003. Based upon faulty intelligence, Menéndez was actually some 600 yards away, in the main Argentine Command Post. A warning sent to local postal workers had not gotten through but, in the event, there were no casualties.

829 *HC Deb 11 June 1982 vol.25 cc168-9W*

830 *Washington National Records Center, OSD Files, FRC 330-84-0003, Argentina (June-Sept) 1982*

“This is tiresome. It is naive to suggest that De Soto will not be in contact with Ros in Buenos Aires and if his mission becomes public it will arouse expectations...”

In Lima, Peru's Foreign Minister, Dr. Arias, tells the British Ambassador that Costa Méndez had telephoned him to say that the Argentines will withdraw if, *“some suitable formula could be found.”*

Pope John Paul II arrives in Buenos Aires to be met by crowds shouting; *“Holy Father bless our just war.”* Radio broadcasts relay the news to the Argentine troops in the Falklands.

*“A curious atmosphere in the town, the troops are very withdrawn and quiet. Lots of military things have disappeared off the scene. John Street, which yesterday was like something out of the Western Front, was almost back to its former self. All the defences around the schools had gone. Very few of the troops have any weapons visible. The International Red Cross people are walking around the town with some senior Argentine officers. I do hope that they are not being taken in by this flagrant charade, put on for their benefit by the Argentines. They do not appear to have been allowed to make contact with many locals.”*⁸³¹

As dusk falls in the Falklands, British troops move towards Argentine positions on Mount Longdon.

*“The strength of the Argentine units was between 8,500 and 9,000 men, of whom maybe 5,000 could be classed as fighting troops... There were six infantry units – five army regiments and a marine infantry battalion – to face the seven infantry units which the British would be able to bring up for the battle.”*⁸³²

By 2130, Falklands' local time, all the British units are engaging Argentine troops and positions.

*“... (4 & 5) platoon were in an area vulnerable to a well-sighted (sic) Argentine position, from which they faced machine gun and sniper fire. A burst of fire killed one man of 4 Platoon and wounded six more, including the Platoon Commander. At this point Sergeant Ian McKay, taking control of 4 Platoon, determined to take out the Argentine position. He led four men, all of whom were killed or wounded, but he succeeded in knocking out the trenches supporting the machine-gun 'sangan'. Before he could attack this last position he was killed. For this brave action he was later awarded a posthumous VC.”*⁸³³

**Citation – Sgt Ian McKay
London Gazette Friday October 8th 1982**

During the night of 11th/12th June 1982, 3rd Battalion The Parachute Regiment mounted a silent night attack on an enemy battalion position on Mount Longdon, an important objective in the battle for Port Stanley, in the Falkland Islands. Sergeant McKay was platoon sergeant of 4 Platoon, B Company, which, after the initial objective had been secured, was ordered to clear the Northern side of the long East/West ridge feature, held by the enemy in depth, with strong, mutually-supporting positions.

By now the enemy were fully alert, and resisting fiercely. As 4 Platoon's advance continued it came under increasingly heavy fire from a number of well-sited enemy machine gun positions on the ridge, and received casualties. Realising that no further advance was possible the Platoon Commander ordered the Platoon to move from its exposed position to seek shelter among the rocks of the ridge itself. Here it met up with part of 5 Platoon.

The enemy fire was still both heavy and accurate and the position of the platoons was becoming increasingly hazardous. Taking Sergeant McKay, a Corporal and a few others, and covered by supporting machine gun fire, the Platoon Commander moved forward to reconnoiter the enemy positions but was hit by a bullet in the leg and command devolved upon Sergeant McKay.

It was clear that instant action was needed if the advance was not to falter and increasing casualties to ensue. Sergeant McKay decided to convert this reconnaissance into an attack in order to eliminate the enemy positions. He was in no doubt of the strength and deployment of the enemy as he undertook this attack. He issued orders and taking three men with him broke cover and charged the enemy position.

The assault was met by a hail of fire. The Corporal was seriously wounded, a Private killed and another wounded. Despite these losses Sergeant McKay, with complete disregard for his own safety, continued to charge the enemy position alone. On reaching it he despatched the enemy with grenades, thereby relieving the position of beleaguered 4 and 5 Platoons, who were now able to redeploy with relative safety. Sergeant McKay, however, was killed at the moment of victory, his body falling on the bunker.

Without doubt Sergeant McKay's action retrieved a most dangerous situation and was instrumental in ensuring the success of the attack. His was a coolly calculated act, the dangers of which must have been apparent to him beforehand. Undeterred he performed with outstanding selflessness, perseverance and courage. With a complete disregard for his own safety, he displayed courage and leadership of the highest order, and was an inspiration to all those around him.

In a separate action by 42 Commando, Mount Harriet is finally secured with two British fatalities and thirteen wounded. Argentine losses are ten dead and 53 wounded.

831 Diary entry in Smith 1984 p.225

832 Middlebrook 2003

833 Freedman 2005 vol.2.

“We were involved with one night attack on Mount Harriet, when the Welsh Guards were coming up as a back-up. This involved marching for several hours on a very dark night, through a minefield. Sporadic shellfire slowed our progress tremendously. Eventually we made the base of Mount Harriet, which was coming under incredible fire from a frigate off shore. The whole mountain seemed to erupt in flame. It seemed impossible that anybody could survive an attack like that. This went on for well over an hour, shell after shell whistling over our heads and hitting the mountain. Eventually this was lifted and the Marines went in. To our amazement, there seemed to be an incredible amount of fighting going on. There was a lot of tracer fire. The whole night was being lit up by flares, which cast a dead, unrealistic, pall over the whole scene” ⁸³⁴

To the south of Stanley, *Avenger*, *Glamorgan* and *Yarmouth* take up their designated positions. HMS *Arrow* moves into Berkeley Sound, ready for the planned midnight attack on Argentine positions around Stanley where an Argentine team wait with a *MM38 Exocet* loaded.

“On the night of June 11-12, three British ships were deployed for naval bombardment operations in support of ground attacks against the hills surrounding Puerto Argentino. They had to get too close, close to the reach of the Exocet, and while awaiting the order to open fire, ... They had to get back to the carrier group before the dawn, to avoid being caught in daylight by Argentine planes. Meanwhile, on land, the Argentine ITB team spent the nights in the midst of a tense wait for their prey. Somehow, the British ships were beginning to cover an erratic path and generally came within range of the RASIT radar, but not the ITB. This monotonous and frustrating wait generated a situation that, in the midst of the drama and tension that was lived, added a touch of humor. One of the team members suggested performing an Indian-style rain dance around the missile launcher. With nothing to lose, the initiative was authorized, thinking that, at least they would warm up with physical exertion. Thus, under oath never to tell what they were going to do, the men began to dance around the pitcher, shouting Uka-Uka imitating the Indians, hoping that some British ship would remain within range of the Exocet.” ⁸³⁵



834 John Witheroe, British War Correspondent, quoted in *Speaking Out: Untold Stories from the Falklands War* Andre Deutsch 1989 p.271

835 Amendolara 2012

Day 72

June 12th – shortly after midnight in the Falklands, the Royal Navy pound Argentine positions.

*“The results were impressive, marred by a stray round landing in Stanley, killing two civilians and wounding some others. A third died three nights later ...”*⁸³⁶



*“A most awful day. James came in early this morning to tell us the terrible news that Sue Whitley and Doreen Bonner were killed during the night when shrapnel from a shell went through John and Veronica Fowler’s house, in which they were staying. Old Mrs Mary Goodwin, well into her eighties, has also been very badly injured. So has Steve Whitley (Sue’s husband)... it is impossible to think straight and form a proper picture.”*⁸³⁷

*“By 0530Z (0130 local) Arrow had completed its task, and Glamorgan and Yarmouth stopped just over half an hour later. Avenger remained on the gunline.”*⁸³⁸

As HMS *Glamorgan* moves away from East Falkland, the ship is targeted by Argentina's shore-based MM38 Exocet missile platform.

*“Several difficulties were encountered in placing the launcher on a suitable flat surface. The launching ramp was fixed, therefore it couldn't aim, so it was only through the radar that they could detect an imprudent frigate passing in front of it. ... That early morning, a group of men, ... were watching the radar display. 'Come on, just two degrees more. Move. Just a little more, please!' And it happened. The ship crossed the line, and the radar operator shouted – 'Now!'.”*⁸³⁹

*“Some three hours later, the RASIT radar, operated by a non-commissioned officer from the Artillery Group 3 (GA 3) of the Argentine Army, with the support of a naval officer, detected a ship entering the firing zone, at its far end. Immediately, the firing procedure began, launching a missile towards contact. On this occasion, the target was the British destroyer HMS *Glamorgan* when she was moving away from the coast, after completing her naval fire support mission against Argentine land positions.”*⁸⁴⁰

Glamorgan's crew see the missile coming and attempt a high speed turn to present the stern to the incoming *Exocet*. The missile strikes the ship's port side near the stern hanger, skids onto the deck and explodes making a hole in the hanger deck and causing a fire in the galley area below. The ship's *Wessex* helicopter also explodes and creates a fire within the rear hanger. Despite being damaged, and on fire, *Glamorgan* is still seaworthy and moves out of range.⁸⁴¹ All fires are extinguished by 11.00am local time.

836 Freedman 2005 vol.2. Susan Whitley and Doreen Bonner were killed instantly. Mary Godwin died a few days later. A stray shot from HMS *Avenger* caused by a defect in a tracking radar system.

837 Diary entry in Smith 1984 p.228

838 Freedman 2005 vol.2.

839 Argentine account quoted in Middlebrook 2003

840 Amendolara 2012

841 The first warship to survive an *Exocet* strike, albeit at a cost of 13 dead and 15 injured. One of the wounded died of his injuries on August 19, 1982. The 13 dead were buried at sea the same evening of the attack.

Two Sisters ridge is secured by British forces at 0430 local time. Around 0630, reports confirm that Mount Longdon has also been taken. Elements of 3 Para move on towards Wireless Ridge. Around 0800 (1200z), British troops dig in on Mount Longdon, while artillery pounds Argentine positions on Mount Tumbledown.⁸⁴²

*“Went to Mass at 2.30. The church is a pathetic mess, with pools of mud and water on the floor; smelling dank with the sweat and fear of the troops... Harriers have been bombing continuously throughout the day, mainly on the Argentine artillery positions at the back of Davis Street and Callaghan Road. Kathy and Robert Watson’s windows were all blown in just after 10 this morning... The icy roads today have caused some spectacular disasters... One lorry towing a mobile soup kitchen went through Terry Binnie’s back fence, ending up in his garden, resulting in a fearful mess of fence battens, fresh vegetables and hot soup...”*⁸⁴³



Overnight fighting has cost the Argentines 69 dead, 220 wounded and 404 captured (right). British losses are 37 killed and 105 wounded.

*“All units ... are firm on high features Mt. Longdon, Two Sisters and Mt. Harriet.”*⁸⁴⁴

In Buenos Aires, the *junta* announces that British forces have attacked the hospital ship *Bahia Paraiso* – a claim immediately denied by representatives of the Red Cross, who are on board the vessel.

In London, *The Times* publishes an interview with Argentina's General Galtieri:⁸⁴⁵

Fallaci: *“... the islands are practically back in the hands of the British...”*

Galtieri: *“No, madam journalist. The Malvinas are not back in the hands of the British. The British have still to capture them, and the result of the battle which is going to take place at Puerto Argentino is not so sure as you expect. I am much more optimistic than you. However, even if Puerto Argentino should fall as you say, I should not ask myself “was it worth while,” even less would I think I had made a mistake. ... Listen to me, madam journalist, not even the fall of Puerto Argentino would be the end of this conflict and our defeat... In fact I am not alone in believing that what we did on the second of April was right. The whole Argentine people believe it. Madam journalist, for 149 years the Argentines have denounced the aggression by the British ..., and for 17 years they have tried to settle the problem through diplomatic channels, through the United Nations....”*

842 3 Paras Post Operation Report can be found here - <https://falklandstimeline.files.wordpress.com/2022/06/3-paras-post-operations-report-battle-for-mount-longdon-june-11-1982.pdf>

843 Diary entry in Smith 1984 p.231

844 PREM19/635 *Situation Report for Prime Minister as at 1200A Sun 13 Jun 82*. The attack on Mount Harriet had cost 2 British dead and 30 wounded. Argentina suffered 18 dead with 300 taken prisoner

845 Interview by Oriana Fallaci, an Italian journalist

Fallaci: *"But why do you say colonization? ...Whom did the British colonize in this case – the penguins?"*

Galtieri: *"They are all British because the British never permitted the Argentines to buy a piece of land there, to start a business, some kind of commerce or presence. ... The British ... kept these islands as a personal farm, and did not let any Argentine settle down."*

Fallaci: *".. you are a colonizer too, Mr. President.."*

Galtieri: *"... let's not go back that far in the past. Let's look at things as they are since the British stole the Malvinas from us. Let's observe where these islands are situated, how the under-water terrain extends itself in that area and connects with the islands. One can easily see the natural correlation existing between them and the terra firma. Not only historically, but geographically, the Malvinas belong to us..."*

Fallaci: *"But apart from that underwater terrain, what is it that appeals to you so much in those ugly islands? ..."*

Galtieri: *"You should ask Mrs. Thatcher, who is dealing death to us and to her people because of these islands, and because of these islands has lost half her fleet. Go ask her."*

Fallaci: *"Now I am asking you."*

Galtieri: *"Madam journalist, its the sentiment... the sentiment of the Argentine nation since 1833."*

Fallaci: *"... should I say illusions? To begin with the illusion that Great Britain would not react.."*

Galtieri: *"No, I'll tell you that though an English reaction was considered a possibility, we did not see it as a probability. Personally I judged it scarcely possible and totally improbable. In any case, I never expected such a disproportionate answer. Nobody did. ... It seems senseless to me."*

Fallaci: *"Haig claims that the fault is yours because he did not know with whom to deal ... Even on the 502 Resolution, the one that asked the Argentines to withdraw, he claims you and your generals had different views..."*

Galtieri: *"... the 502 Resolution contained a series of consequences that we could not accept because Argentina had not shed on drop of English blood to take back the Malvinas and the British were attacking us ..."*

Fallaci: *"... you said that the complete fall of the islands would not mean the end of the war..."*



Galtieri: *"... Argentina does not give up her rights on the Malvinas, on South Georgia, and on the South Sandwich Islands. It means that Argentine will never accept a return to where she was on the first of April. It means that we shall not have peace until we have obtained what we want."*

Fallaci: *"What is wrong with accepting, for example, the United Nations flag on those islands?"*

Galtieri: *"... the United Nations flag is alright until the negotiations take place. But not after. Not in the future. The future must see the Argentine flag on the Malvinas. And it will."* ⁸⁴⁶

846 Galtieri: *No regrets, No Going Back* by Oriana Fallaci June, 1982

Day 73

June 13th – off East Falkland Island, a little after midnight, *Arrow* and *Active* bombard targets at Moody Brook and Sapper Hill.⁸⁴⁷

*“It is impossible to adequately to describe the noise, which is now almost constant. The air is filled with the stinging smell of cordite... Our house, and I suppose everyone else’s, shakes and shudders continuously.”*⁸⁴⁸

*“The British were working furiously, bringing up ammunition and supplies for the attack they hoped to resume in the coming night. They received a nasty shock when eleven Skyhawks swept in from the mainland and nearly caught them by surprise. Some bombs narrowly missed a British headquarters near Mount Kent where a briefing of senior officers was taking place; several helicopters here were damaged, but there were no casualties.”*⁸⁴⁹



The *New York Times* reports.

*“... the independent news agency Noticias Argentinas quoted a military source this afternoon as having said that the British had "succeeded in some penetration of the first Argentine line of defense" about 10 miles west of the capital, which is the key Argentine stronghold on the islands called the Malvinas by Argentina. (In London, Defense Secretary John Nott said that British troops had advanced more than five miles before dawn in what he described as "a brilliant surprise night attack" that had caught the Argentine defenders asleep ... Heavy ground and air fighting was reported in the area of Mount Kent and Mount Two Sisters, west of the capital. The Argentine command reported that British ground troops attacked at dawn after what it said was a night of "indiscriminate bombardment" of the capital, known here as Puerto Argentino, by British warships. The command announced this afternoon that Argentine bombers "attacked and burned" one of the British frigates involved in the bombardment, leaving it "out of combat and abandoned by its crew.".. ”*⁸⁵⁰

At 0800 local time, Scots Guards move to an assembly area near Mount Harriet.

“On arrival the Battalion dug in. Enemy harassing fire, mainly from mortars was landing all over the Harriet-Two Sisters area and occasionally rounds landed within the Battalion position. Whilst only one casualty ... was caused by their fire most members of the Battalion experienced a near miss at one time during the afternoon.”

Gurkha Rifles move forward at midday.

One of three Argentine aircraft attacking British ships near Stanley, is shot down.

847 There is some evidence that the ITB land based *Exocet* platform fired a *MM38* missile towards HMS *Penelope* at around 0130 local time. The ship recognised that it was under attack and responded with *Seacat* missiles, one of which appears to have hit the target.

848 *Ibid.* p.232

849 Middlebrook 2003

850 *Argentines Report British Breached Stanley Defences* Richard Meislin in *The New York Times* June 13, 1982 p.1

*“About 11.30 this morning poor old Wilfred Newman’s house up on Davis Street received a direct hit and burned to the ground very quickly in a great mass of smoke and flames. The British are obviously trying to hit the Argentine 155mm that is between the houses up there.”*⁸⁵¹

In the late afternoon, British artillery pounds Argentine defences.⁸⁵²

*“The marines at Tumbledown were among the more effective Argentine troops and were well prepared for an assault. The defenders were on full alert. At 1600 hours, as the sun began to set and snow began to fall, the attack began.”*⁸⁵³



2100 local time (0100z) 2 Scots Guards cross their start line.

2130 local time, a diversionary attack is launched to the south of Mount Tumbledown.

*“Fences, streams, all were thoroughly checks before crossing and all likely 'come on' areas avoided. Now and then, the quietness of the night was abruptly shattered by Naval gunfire and our own Artillery, being directed on Tumbledown. After 3 or 4 kms, OC Recce Pl took over the lead. We had about 300m before coming to the target... Straight ahead we could just make out the bunkers and we could see the supporting 30mm tracer, stitched lazily towards the northern bunker. We crouched now as we moved, the Scorpions giving us cover. We had just moved down an embankment when we came under fire from 20m. We dashed forward returning fire, diving for cover... The GPMG section deployed on the right and put down really effective fire, as now I could see some Argies running away, (towards Stanley). ... Then there was an almighty bang, a Scorpion had hit a mine. We eventually reached our cover, only after some aid from the GPMG. ... Five minutes went by and all firing had stopped. A quick head count, two dead... and six wounded. ... after 1½ long hours or so, we reached our RV with the Scorpions. What a relief.”*⁸⁵⁴

851 Diary entry in Smith 1984 p.234

852 Twelve British 105mm howitzers fired in excess of 6,000 rounds onto Argentine positions before nightfall.

853 Freedman & Gamba-Stonehouse 1990. Argentine defenders on Mount Tumbledown numbered nearly a thousand men including 700 experienced Marines and Commandos supported by four 105mm recoilless rifles. Positioned in Moody Valley were another 23 105mm howitzers.

854 From 9 Para RE War Diary. At least three others were wounded by mines.

2 Scots Guards take advantage of the diversion.

*“Whilst enemy fire and illuminant had concentrated on the Deception Plan Grids, G Coy had taken their objective. Left Flank moved through G Coy's position and contact was made soon after. For several hours the company struggled through well prepared positions whilst friendly gun fire tried to assist.”*⁸⁵⁵

2140 local time (0140z), after bombardment by *Ambuscade, Yarmouth, Active* and *Avenger*, 2 Para move onto Wireless Ridge.⁸⁵⁶

*“D Company reached its first objective by 0140Z (2140 local), finding a few enemy dead. Most had withdrawn. A and B Companies began their advance, with the Argentine troops seen to be running away in front of them... The assault, when it started, still faced considerable resistance (including heavy machine gun, recoilless rifle, artillery and mortar fire) causing casualties. The enemy was withdrawing but fighting at the same time...”*⁸⁵⁷

*“The ridge itself is a long spine broken in the middle, with each section 800 metres in length. The first feature was taken unopposed. A delay then followed as artillery required readjustment. During this time the second feature was effectively suppressed by the CVR(T)s, Machine Guns Platoon, Milan detachments and Naval gunfire. ... When the assault started considerable resistance was at first encountered and casualties received as the enemy fought a fighting withdrawal from their bunkers. Suddenly, as the company closed with the enemy they broke and ran, harassed off the ridge by machine gun fire from the Blues and Royals and Machine Guns Platoon and pursued by D Coy. Immediately reorganisation began and D Coy came under heavy artillery fire, as well as effective small arms fire from the Tumbledown and Mount William features, which had not yet been captured by 5 Inf Bde. The enemy could be heard in the darkness regrouping east of the company further along the ridge and also to the south in the area of Moody Brook.”*⁸⁵⁸

*“Sleep was impossible: shells screaming and tearing overhead, the bursts rocking the house every few seconds; deafening noise from the Argentine guns – loud twanging cracks only yards away; crashes and crumps from the British shells landing. ... By looking through the black-outs we could see the sky alight with explosions, flares and tracer. The final stage in the battle for Stanley seemed imminent.”*⁸⁵⁹

*“What a noise. 'They' have moved a gun down into town, not to far along the road from us either. 'They are firing to the west and the shells crackle as they pass over our chimneys.... A rattling good noisy night. Peter King's message on 'Calling the Falklands' as usual: 'heads down, hearts high.' They are, don't worry.”*⁸⁶⁰

855 War Diary of 2 Scots Guards

856 Defended by some 500 men of Argentina's 7th Regiment with a company of the 3rd Regiment and a platoon of Paratroopers in support.

857 Freedman 2005 vol.2. After initial successes, 2 Para was pinned down by heavy fire from a height known as Apple Pie. An artillery bombardment was called in to decimate the ridge.

858 2 Para Post Ops Report for 13/14 June, 1982

859 Diary entry in Smith 1984 p.237

860 *Neville's Diary* in Bennett 2021

Day 74

June 14th – 2 Scots Guards continue up Mount Tumbledown.

*“As each position was cleared and prisoners held the numbers of advancing troops was reduced. By the time the summit of the mountain was reached there were only seven men, and of these three, including the Platoon Commander, were immediately cut down by a burst of machine gun fire. At 0800Z (0400 local) Kiszely found himself holding Tumbledown Mountain with three other men.”*⁸⁶¹

At 0430 local time, the 1/7 Gurkha Rifles move through the Scots Guards pushing on to Mount William.

Two Argentine Canberras carry out a high-level bombing raid over Mount Kent; failing to hit anything.

*“The British destroyers Cardiff and Exeter, on station to the south, plotted the flights by radar and launched several Sea Dart missiles. One of the Canberras was hit by Exeter at a near extreme altitude of about 40,000 feet... The pilot of the Canberra, captain Roberto Pastrán, managed to eject and was eventually retrieved by British forces... but his navigator ... was trapped in the aircraft and presumably died when it crashed into the sea.”*⁸⁶²

0500 (0900z) 2 Scots Guards stop.

*“The Battalion went firm having taken all of its objectives. The struggle to backload casualties, which had continued throughout the night was accelerated. Left Flank had suffered 7 dead and 19 wounded (only 4 of the assaulting team remained unhurt) and Right Flank suffered six wounded. Two platoon commanders were shot and wounded, one very seriously.”*⁸⁶³

Around first light, 2 Para reach the top of Wireless Ridge.⁸⁶⁴

*“With daybreak a rather strange and unexpected counter attack of about platoon strength developed from the area of Moody Brook, which was repulsed by small arms, mortar and artillery fire. With the failure of the counter attack the enemy resistance collapsed and shortly after they could be seen withdrawing in large numbers from Moody Brook, Mount William, Tumbledown and Sapper Hill. ... Throughout the battle for Wireless Ridge the Battalion had suffered 3 dead and 11 wounded. Lack of time precluded the counting of Argentine casualties, but of an original Argentine strength of about 500, up to 100 may have been killed and apart from the 17 prisoners, the remainder fled”*⁸⁶⁵

*“... we saw from the study window the amazing sight of hundreds of Argentine troops streaming like ants along Wireless Ridge, down through Fairy Grove towards the Camber. They were running before the British shells which were landing just behind them – almost keeping pace with them, throwing up great mounds of earth and rock... several houses seem to be on fire at the west end of town... from the BBC we heard that the International Red Cross had got a response from the Argentine Government that there was to be a designated ‘Safe Area’ for the civilian population... The Argentines could have least have let us know... the designated safe building was the cathedral, but we saw the back door of the West Store open, so stopped the Mini (van) and heaved ourselves inside... There were 126 of us in there...”*⁸⁶⁶

861 *Ibid.* The Scots Guards suffered 8 men dead and 35 wounded. Argentina – 16 dead and 45 wounded.

862 Middlebrook 2003

863 War Diary of 2 Scots Guards

864 British casualties amounted to 3 dead and 11 wounded. Argentine casualties were estimated at about 100 as most had fled. Only 17 prisoners were taken for the same reason.

865 2 Para Post Ops Report for 13/14 June, 1982.

866 Diary entry in Smith 1984 pp.238-240

From Stanley, Argentine Governor Menéndez manages to get a telephone call through to Galtieri; who reminds him that the Argentine military code calls for a commander to fight until he had lost 50% of his men, and 75% of his ammunition. Menéndez responds:

*"I cannot ask more of my troops, after what they have been through ... We have not been able to hold on to the heights ... We have no room, we have no support. I had to repeat to him what our situation was, but he didn't want to understand. Tactically, it was an unsustainable war. I ended the call. I thought, "This is the end." I knew my troops couldn't give any more."*⁸⁶⁷

Mount William is reported secure at 1300, by the Gurkha Rifles.

"Believed to be held strongly by a Battalion of enemy which, by all accounts, faced with the panache and reputation of the Gurkhas appeared to have turned tail and fled ... So no heads were cut off with kukris or anything messy like that... The mere presence of the Gurkhas actually helped to quicken the final stages and save casualties..."

With Argentine troops withdrawing in obvious disarray, the British forces' bombardments and air strikes cease. Elements of 2 Para enter Moody Brook, and the outskirts of Stanley, before stopping at the racecourse. Argentine troops are seen to throw down their weapons and surrender.

*"HQ 3 Cdo Bde were asked permission for the Battalion to advance down into Moody Brook and along the Port Stanley Road. This was not granted until the Bde Comd came forward to see the situation for himself. The order to advance was given at about 1300 hours. ... 30 minutes later the leading elements of 2 Para were the first British Troops to enter Port Stanley since the Argentine occupation 11 weeks before."*⁸⁶⁸

After a final skirmish with an Argentine position to the west of Sapper Hill, around midday, a message is circulated.

*"Check firing. Check firing. There are white flags in Stanley."*⁸⁶⁹

Following contact with Argentine Captain Hussey, made via the medical network established on June 5th, SAS Commander Michael Rose, Royal Marines Capt. Rob Bell and a signaller, fly to Stanley's sports pitch for a meeting with Governor Menéndez at 1500 local time.

*"I told Menéndez we did not want a bloodbath in Stanley, fighting building to building, and he would not want to be known as the 'Butcher of Stanley.'..."*⁸⁷⁰

At 2212 in London, Britain's Prime Minister, Margaret Thatcher, addresses the House of Commons.

"Mr. Speaker. May I give the House the latest information about the battle of the Falklands? After successful attacks last night, General Moore decided to press forward. The Argentines retreated. Our forces reached the outskirts of Port Stanley. Large numbers of Argentine soldiers threw down their weapons. They are reported to be flying white flags over Port Stanley. Our troops have been ordered

867 Unpublished interview with Mario Menéndez quoted in *The Telegraph* June 13, 2012. For a full account of the conversation, see *"Se combate cuerpo a cuerpo, esto se acabó"*, los últimos mensajes desde Malvinas y la dramática rendición Juan Bautista Tata Yofre in *Infobae* June 14, 2022.

868 2 Para Post Ops Report for 13/14 June, 1982

869 Unnamed British artillery officer quoted in Middlebrook 2003, who gives that time as between 1pm and 1.30pm. White flags were reported, but these may have been raised by small groups of Argentine troops outside the town, or some of the civilians within it. No white flag were seen flying over Stanley that could be considered as proclaiming the surrender of the military authorities there.

870 Michael Rose quoted in *The Telegraph* June 13, 2012

not to fire except in self-defence. Talks are now in progress between General Menendez and our Deputy Commander, Brigadier Waters, about the surrender of the Argentine forces on East and West Falkland. I shall report further to the House tomorrow.” ⁸⁷¹

At Stanley, at 2100 local time, after six hours of negotiations, Menéndez agrees to surrender all his forces.

“It then became apparent that the disconnected Argentine chains of command meant that Menéndez would be unable to surrender the Navy and Air Force. Menéndez then contacted Galtieri to obtain assurances on the control of these other forces... The administrative details were then finalised. It was agreed that the formal surrender would be 'low key' with no press present.” ⁸⁷²

Formal surrender is made in a private, unphotographed, ceremony. Attended by Argentine Governor Menéndez, Capt. Hussey and Vice-Comodoro Carlos Bloomer-Reeve for Argentina; Major General Jeremy Moore, Capt. Bell, Lieut. Col. Geoff Field, Col. Brian Pennicott, Col. Reid and Col. Tom Seccombe for the UK. ⁸⁷³


Instrument of Surrender

I, the undersigned, Commander of all the Argentine land, sea and air forces in the Falkland Islands surrender to Major General J.J. MOORE CB OBE MC as representative of Her Britannic Majesty's Government.

Under the terms of this surrender all Argentine personnel in the Falkland Islands are to muster at assembly points which will be nominated by General Moore and hand over their arms, ammunition, and all other weapons and warlike equipment as directed by General Moore or appropriate British officers acting on his behalf.

Following the surrender all personnel of the Argentinian Forces will be treated with honour in accordance with the conditions set out in the Geneva Convention of 1949. They will obey any directions concerning movement and in connection with accommodation.

This surrender is to be effective from 2359 hours ZULU on 14 June (2059 hours local) and includes those Argentine Forces presently deployed in and around Port Stanley, those others on East Falkland, [Menéndez's signature] West Falkland and all outlying islands.



2359 hours 14 June 1982

871 HC Deb 14 June 1982 vol.25 cc700-2

872 Freedman 2005 vol.2

873 Already June 15th in London. As a result the surrender was 'backdated' three hours.

At the moment of signing Menéndez strikes out the word “unconditionally” in the first paragraph between “Islands” and “surrender.”⁸⁷⁴

In a telex message to the Commander-in-Chief Fleet, General Moore reports.

“In Port Stanley at 9pm Falkland Island time tonight, 14th June 1982, Major General Menéndez surrendered to me all the Argentine Armed Forces in East and West Falkland, together with their impedimenta. Arrangements are in hand to assemble the men for return to Argentina, to gather in their arms and equipment, and to mark and make safe their ammunition.

*“The Falkland Islands are once more under the Government desired by their inhabitants.
God Save the Queen.”*

“General Menendez has surrendered forces on the Falkland Islands, both East and West, 11,000 of them, a lot to be sorted out. The Argentines have fought very bravely. I am not surprised at the outcome because of the superb quality of the men I have been commanding whose training is excellent, whose determination, drive and energy in very, very difficult conditions in the mountains, hard weather, hard country and a determined enemy, have made it a jolly hard slog. ... It has been a damn close-run thing. Some of my guns this morning with 400 rounds a gun were down to twenty.”⁸⁷⁵

“In the Malvinas, inexperienced youths faced a superior adversary under extremely bad environmental conditions (aggravated by the ineffectiveness of their bosses), and “offered” their lives. It is the regime that in good faith cheated the Argentines and killed them, not the British. The war was explained as a political decision of the military, nullifying collective responsibilities ...”⁸⁷⁶

“On the continent, the news of the defeat was made known through a brief communiqué, number 164, by which the Joint Chiefs of Staff officially communicated that “... the Commander of the Task Forces of Britain, General Moore and the Military Governor of the Malvinas Islands, General de Brigada Mario Benjamín Menéndez... (have) agreed (on) the conditions for a ceasefire.” ...”⁸⁷⁷

“On June 14, General Benjamín Menéndez, governor of Malvinas appointed by the Argentine Military Junta, surrendered to the British offensives. Thus began the peace negotiation process. Argentina's clear defeat meant the continuity of the previous status quo.”⁸⁷⁸

In New York, Anthony Parsons informs Pérez de Cuéllar.

“I saw the Secretary-General ... we have told the press that the meeting took place at my initiative: and I wished to inform the Secretary-General of the statement which the Prime Minister had made shortly beforehand in the House of Commons.... We have said nothing to encourage the speculation about a future role for the United Nations...”

874 Freedman (2005 vol.2) implies that it was actually General Moore who struck out these words as they may have been sufficient to prevent Menéndez from signing; resulting in a battle for the town that would have endangered civilians.

875 Major-General Moore interviewed by Brian Hanrahan immediately after taking the surrender. In Briley 2022

876 Lorenz 2006

877 Carbone 2008. A clampdown on news outlets was promptly put into place.

878 Bochicchio 2021

Messages of congratulation pour in from foreign nations. Television footage shows Margaret Thatcher shaking hands with members of the public among a cheering crowd in Whitehall. ⁸⁷⁹

“The victory in the South Atlantic was the triumph of Margaret Thatcher. If the Argentine invasion was the fruit of a lack of leadership in managing the Falklands issue, the positive resolution of the crisis owed much to Thatcher’s ability to react rapidly to the initial shock, to achieve and maintain firm control of the political handling of the crisis, to clearly identify objectives, and to pursue them with a persistence that never lost contact with diplomatic prudence. The episode, which could have caused her political death, ended up giving her unassailable force, for many years.” ⁸⁸⁰

Argentine troops on the Falkland islands had surrendered, but not Argentina. The surrender did not include Argentine naval forces or its air-force stationed on the mainland. Two questions immediately arose, firstly, would Argentina continue the battle from South America and secondly, what was Britain going to do with such a large number of prisoners of war?

Official casualty figures show that 649 Argentine⁸⁸¹, 255 British military personnel and 3 civilians died during the 74 days. 1,188 Argentines and 777 British are recorded as non-fatal casualties.

Paper 13 deals with the immediate aftermath both on the ground, and diplomatically.



Bibliography <https://falklandstimeline.files.wordpress.com/2019/04/bibliography-1.pdf>

⁸⁷⁹ *Falklands anniversary: Baroness Thatcher's sympathy for Argentine mothers. The Telegraph* June 14, 2012

⁸⁸⁰ Bruni 2018

⁸⁸¹ This is disputed. According to Argentina's Ministry of Defence records, the number is 651. See *Malvinas, los muertos que (no) tenemos* Alejandra Diaz Biglia 2015.