

Falklands Wars – the History of the Falkland Islands: with particular regard to Spanish and Argentine pretensions and taking some account of South Georgia, the South Sandwich Islands and Britain's Antarctic Territories by Roger Lorton ¹

Paper 11²

1972 – 1982

Negotiation

“the only other option open to the Argentine government is a resort to force.” ³



In 1965 the United Nations had called upon the UK and Argentina to commence negotiations with a view to resolve the single issue that lay between them – sovereignty over the Falkland Islands. Talks had started in 1968, but had been slow to produce anything tangible. Added to the different perceptions of historic rights, which neither side were prepared to discuss, there was an additional problem. Just the year after calling for negotiations, the UN had adopted the *International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights*. Unsigned by Argentina, and only reluctantly acknowledged by the UK, the Covenant confirmed that “*all people have the right of self-determination.*” Not a principle to be aimed for, but a human right. The Covenant acknowledged that only the Falkland Islanders could decide their future, giving them a power of veto over any deal that could be struck with Argentina. This paper considers the slow breakdown in negotiations and the changing political landscape in Argentina. Mixed together, they would produce a fateful decision.

1972 – January 7th, *Libertad* sails from Buenos Aires with tourists for Antarctica. On board is Britain's Ambassador to Argentina, Michael Hadow. With him is Mario Izaguirre, of Argentina's Foreign Ministry. Both bound for Stanley. ⁴

January 8th, Argentina's state-owned airline, *LADE*, initiates twice-monthly amphibious flights between Comodoro Rivadavia and the Falkland Islands. ⁵

In London, a briefing note on the Falklands is prepared by the Foreign & Commonwealth Office (FCO).

“At present the Islands are something of a liability to Britain; they no longer have a strategic value and they are difficult and expensive to defend, while remaining a constant source of friction in relations with Argentina and with Latin America as a whole.” ⁶

1 *Falklands Wars – the History of the Falkland Islands: with particular regard to Spanish and Argentine pretensions and taking some account of South Georgia, the South Sandwich Islands and Britain's Antarctic Territories* Roger Lorton LL.B(Hon), M.Phil. 2011 – 2019. Roger Lorton has asserted his rights under the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988 to be identified as the author of this work.

2 Citation = Lorton, Roger. *Falklands Wars: Timeline History of the Falkland Islands*. Wordpress 2011 Paper 11

3 Minister Vignes to the Argentine press March 19, 1975

4 *From Chapultepec to the Beagle. Argentine Foreign Policy 1945-1980* Juan A. Lanús 1984 p.478. I have found no British source.

5 *Líneas Aéreas del Estado (LADE)* was operated by the Argentine Air Force.

6 *FCO 7/2115 1972* quoted in *Far from Moderate: An account and appraisal of some aspects of the human involvement with the natural environment of the Falkland Islands and South Georgia* S. Palmer 2004

January 10th, in Stanley, Governor Lewis addresses the Legislative Council of the Falkland Islands.

*“May I turn now to external affairs, and in particular to our relations with the Argentine, much has been said and written and I do not intend to repeat it all. However, I would like to say that the agreements do reflect a degree of political maturity that is rare in these days and that we should not under-estimate what has been achieved. I would like to pay tribute to the work done by our negotiating team including the members from the Islands for the way in which they handled the talks. On the agreements reached in B.A. in June of course the acid test is going to be how these agreements work out in practice, We can only proceed step by step and see how things go: always prepared to talk but not to compromise on our basic position. And now we have to live by and adjust to the changing pattern of our communications network. So far the agreements have worked well and we can expect the first regular amphibian flight in a couple of days thus introducing the fortnightly service and there are many other areas in which the provisions of the agreement have been implemented — not quite as spectacular perhaps as the air link but in important fields such as medical, postal, telecommunications and education, We expect that a third round of talks will take place in Stanley in March...”*⁷

January 26th, in London, Viscount Eccles speaks during a House of Lords debate on Latin America.

*“Your Lordships will be glad to know that our political relations with the countries of Latin America are generally most cordial and there are remarkably few points of difference. ... in full consultation with the Islanders, and without prejudice to the question of sovereignty, the Argentine Government and ourselves have made arrangements for modern communications between the Islands, Argentina and the world beyond, both by air and sea. These arrangements when completed will make a material contribution to the welfare of the Island community. ... Now we are looking forward to a third round to be held in Stanley and we very much hope that holding the talks there will contribute to the process of greater mutual understanding between the inhabitants of the Islands and their Argentine neighbours.”*⁸

May 2nd, Argentina agrees to construct a temporary air strip at Hooker’s Point, near Stanley, to replace the sea-plane service.⁹ The steel mesh strip is to be provided by Britain at a cost of \$1 million, while Buenos Aires is to provide the workforce and construction equipment.¹⁰

May 14th, an Argentine transport ship, *Cabo San Gonzalo*, sails from Buenos Aires with 40 workmen and technicians. A local correspondent for the *Financial Times* watches them sail.

“The Argentines have finally established a beach-head on the Falklands.”

From Stanley, Governor Lewis proposes a permanent airport to eventually replace the temporary one to be built by Argentina. He applies to London for a grant of £1615 million.

*“Whitehall now experienced a severe bout of interdepartmental warfare. ... Approval was finally given for the project to go out to tender, but only for a short runway.”*¹¹

On East Falkland Island, the European Space Research tracking station ceases operations.

7 *Falkland Islands Gazette* 1972

8 *HL Deb* 26 January 1972 vol.327 cc333-407

9 Difficult sea conditions in Stanley harbour tended to frequently interrupt the service.

10 Lanús 1984

11 *The Battle for the Falklands* 1997 M. Hastings & S. Jenkins 1997 p.32

In **July**, the Falkland Islands Company (FIC) is acquired by Dundee, Perth and London Securities Ltd. The new owners grant the Falkland Islanders' Sheep Owners Association a right of first refusal should they decide to sell.

The Falklands Islands' Emergency Committee founded in 1968 is re-designated the United Kingdom Falkland Islands Committee at the Islanders' request; *“To assist the people of the Falkland Islands to decide their own future for themselves without being subject to pressure direct or indirect from any quarter.”*

September 27th, at the UN in New York, Argentina addresses the General Assembly.

“.. In order to encourage ties between the Islands and the mainland and as a result of instruments approved by both countries, efforts have been made to allow communications, to increase mutual knowledge and to benefit the population of the Malvinas. Despite these practical steps of undisputed importance, there still are differences outstanding between the two Governments regarding the circumstances that should exist for a final solution to be arrived at over the question of sovereignty. Further talks on the matter are to be held and we trust that they will be fruitful. The result can, in any case, be none other than the return of the Malvinas Islands to the Argentine territorial heritage”

October 23rd, the UK, in a letter addressed to the Secretary-General, responds that; *“... the efforts of our two Governments to solve our differences should be pursued in a climate of mutual understanding...”*

October 24th, an Anglo-Argentine agreement is reached to open an Argentine State Airline Agency (LADE) office in Stanley. Also confirmed is the initiation of a regular air service from Argentina.

*1. Air Lines of the State (LADE), an Argentine Company in charge of the regular as well as the temporary service, referred to in numbers (8) and (9) of the Joint Declaration, will open a commercial and operational agency in Port Stanley ... 3. The crews and airplanes with which the services referred to in numeral (2) of this Agreement are used, will carry the same flight documentation that is de rigueur for crews and airplanes that perform internal flights over the Argentine continental territory and its operators will be exempt from payment of landing fees, levies or other charges ...”*¹²

November 9th, tenders for the construction of a permanent airfield are received by the British Government.

November 16th, near Stanley, the temporary Falklands air strip comes into operation with a weekly air service.

*“As the temporary airstrip was down, the Overseas Development Agency, with far more pressing claims on its tight budget, began to wonder what possible reason there was for a permanent airport...”*¹³

*“Despite the good impression created by the Argentine workforce employed on the construction of the strips, (Governor) Lewis was confronted with the prospect of a demonstration on sovereignty by hardliners at the inaugural ceremony which was to be attended by numerous Argentine visitors, including press. This was only prevented by Lewis' persuasiveness, by a broadcast by a member of LegCo and by tight security measures.”*¹⁴

November 21st, in Stanley, a further round Anglo-Argentine negotiations commences.

*“When the negotiators met., the practical measures on communications and movement of persons were almost entirely in full implementation.”*¹⁵

12 Lanús 1984 p.496

13 Hastings & Jenkins 1997 p.32

14 David Taylor in *The Dictionary of Falklands Biography (including South Georgia): From Discovery up to 1981* D. Tatham (ed.) 2008 p.338. LegCo was an abbreviation of Legislative Council – the unicameral legislature of the Falkland Islands from November, 1845 until January 2009 when the Council became an Assembly.

15 *Las “Conversaciones Especiales” Argentina-Gran Bretaña sobre comunicaciones entre el Territorio Continental Argentino y las Islas Malvinas de 1970-72. Una negociacion Diplomatica Tipica* J. C. M. Beltramino 1997

November 24th, Governor Lewis informs London of local concerns regarding any Argentine monopoly over fuel supplies in the Islands.

December 18th, at the UN, the General Assembly defer any consideration of the Falklands question until 1973.

1973 – January 1st, the UK joins the European Economic Community (EEC); signing the Treaty of Rome of 1957. Argentina protests the inclusion of the Falkland Islands under Annex IV of the Treaty of Rome.

*“The special arrangements for association set out in Part Four of this Treaty shall apply to the overseas countries and territories listed in Annex IV to this Treaty.”*¹⁶

March 11th, elections in Argentina are in favour of a Peronist Government.

In **April**, during preparatory discussions regarding further talks, the Argentines indicate that they wish to reintroduce the 1968 *Memorandum* proposals, but are now opposed to any Islander representation at the talks. British negotiators respond that they are only prepared to discuss practical matters and not sovereignty. Britain also insists that Islanders must be present. Negotiations stall.¹⁷

May 14th, at the UN, an Argentine citizen addresses a private petition to the Special Committee on Decolonization; *“Mr. Jose Ramon Cornejo maintained that the Argentine claim to the Islands had been based on their proximity to Argentina and the inheritance of title from Spain. He added that the Argentinians did not believe that talks like those recently held between the two Governments could make any progress towards resolving the question of the transfer of the sovereignty of the Territory to Argentina.”*

May 25th, in Buenos Aires, following his official swearing-in as President of Argentina, Hector J. Campora, announces that the primary preoccupation of his Government will be to recover the Falklands.

*“In his inaugural speech, President Héctor J. Cámpora had a few words for the Malvinas. Its recovery would be one of the objectives of his government.”*¹⁸

*“... (there was) an immediate hardening of the Argentine line.”*¹⁹

June 20th, Juan Domingo Perón returns to Argentina from exile in Spain.

*“Buenos Aires, now overtaken completely by a Peronist revival, effectively abandoned the Scott-Beltramino 'hearts and minds' policy.”*²⁰

In **July**, Argentine President Campora steps down.

August 15th, in New York, Argentina's representative addresses a letter to the UN Special Committee on Decolonization.

“... his Government regretted to report that the negotiations had been virtually paralysed as a result of the attitude adopted by the United Kingdom, whose position, he said, had changed substantially from that which it had taken since contacts were first established in 1966. When... efforts were made to reactivate the negotiations, postponed since 1968, the United Kingdom took the position that the round of meetings could not be called negotiations on sovereignty since in its opinion they involved only talks or discussions, and it was

16 *Treaty of Rome Article 227:3*. This treaty was the foundation agreement for the European Union.

17 *Official History of the Falklands Campaign, Volume 1: The Origins of the Falklands War* L. Freedman 2005 p.25. In July, Campora resigned to force new elections with Perón as the official candidate.

18 Lanús 1984 p.479

19 Tatham (ed.) 2008 p.338

20 Hastings & Jenkins 1997 p.33

willing to discuss only the collateral question of communications rather than the basic issue of sovereignty over the territory... This position, Argentina considered, was not in conformity with the provisions of the Assembly's resolution of 16 December 1965. Argentina called on the United Kingdom Government to take measures to continue the negotiations without further procrastination, within the framework of that resolution and subsequent decisions, so as to bring about the speedy elimination of the territory's colonial situation."

In reply the UK's representative denies; *"... that there had been any change in its consistently upheld position on the scope of the discussions. It reiterated its readiness to renew discussions, bearing in mind that in accordance with the provisions of the United Nations Charter and the principles of the Declaration on the granting of independence, it was essential that any solution should recognize the right of the inhabitants of the Falkland Islands to self-determination and should provide for them to express their wishes in this connection."*²¹

August 17th, at the UN, the Special Committee on Decolonization meets to consider the question of the Falkland Islands. Argentina's Ambassador tells the Committee that; *"... failure to settle this dispute within a short and reasonable time will necessitate a thorough reappraisal of the policy (Argentina) has pursued until now..."*²²

August 21st, the Special Committee adopts a Venezuelan resolution calling for the acceleration of negotiations.²³

Responding, Britain writes to the UN Secretary-General.

*"It has been the common purpose of the Governments of Argentina and the United Kingdom since the adoption of General Assembly resolution 2065 (XX) to explore in accordance with that resolution all possible means of finding a peaceful solution to the problem defined in that resolution. The letters addressed to you and your predecessors in successive years,... constitute a record of progress endorsed by both Governments ... there have been no grounds for supposing that there has been any change in the consistently upheld position of the United Kingdom Government. At the meeting in London in April 1973,... after a restatement of the views of the United Kingdom Government, the Argentine delegation declined to continue the meeting ... For their part the United Kingdom Government reiterate their readiness to renew discussions bearing in mind that in accordance with the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations and the principles of resolution 1514 (XV) of the General Assembly it is essential that any solution should recognize the right of the inhabitants of the Falkland Islands to self-determination and should provide for them to express their wishes in this connection."*²⁴

October 3rd, in New York, Argentina's Foreign Minister addresses the General Assembly; *"My country ... is forced to state that the procedure cannot be indefinitely prolonged..."*

October 5th, at the UN, Argentina's Foreign Minister, Alberto Vignes, meets US Secretary Kissinger. Vignes complains that; *"... Argentina is concerned with the indifference of the US regarding the issue of the Falkland Islands, which is a colonial problem within the hemisphere. He could not understand how the US, which was once a colony, could take such an attitude."*²⁵

21 *UN Yearbook 1973*

22 *UN Doc A/9023/Rev.1*

23 *UN Yearbook 1973*

24 *Ibid.*

25 *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976, Documents on South America, 1973-1976 Memorandum of Conversation New York, October 5, 1973, 12.45pm.* Apparently, Kissinger's response was so general in nature that it is not clear whether he had heard the Argentine Minister at all.

October 12th, in Argentina, following his success in the elections brought about by Hector Campora's July resignation, 78-year old Juan Perón begins his third term as President with his wife as Vice-President.

*"The return of a Peronist Government brought an end to the Anglo-Argentine rapprochement."*²⁶

October 19th, in New York, the UK's representative informs the UN Secretary-General that; "... his Government was reluctant to believe that Argentina would wish for any solution of the differences between the two Governments which was contrary to the expressed wishes of the inhabitants of the territory."

October 25th, in the Falklands, a *Petroleum Products Bill* is debated at a meeting of the Falklands' Legislative Council. Concerns are raised over Argentina's monopoly of fuel supply to the archipelago.

*"... the Chief Secretary argued that Y.P.F. required a monopoly to guarantee a demand for its products. He also claimed that the price of petrol, which had more than doubled in the past two years, would fall by nearly a third. Adrian Monk, elected member for East Falkland, offered the only opposition and abstained in the vote. He stressed that, "What I do not like about it all is that the monopoly has been granted to the country which wants us." The British Government clearly hoped that the Islanders would accept closer ties with Argentina if they were shown the benefits of co-operation."*²⁷

November 5th, at the UN, Argentina responds to Britain's August letter to the Secretary-General. Quoting the first paragraph of resolution 2065, Argentina's representative points out that the resolution makes "no reference" to the wishes of the population or any right of self-determination.

*"... this tardy and misplaced concern for respect for the right to self-determination would be praiseworthy and legitimate if the United Kingdom had consulted the original population of the Malvinas Islands about their wishes before displacing them by force and replacing them by British settlers in 1833..."*²⁸

*"Towards the end of 1973 the Joint Intelligence Committee assessed that Argentine attitudes were hardening and for the first time there were indications that Argentina might be preparing contingency plans for an occupation of the islands."*²⁹

November 30th, Argentine law 20.561 re-establishes June 10th as the – "*Day of Affirmation of Argentine Rights over the Malvinas Islands and the Antarctic Sector.*"³⁰ A celebration of the appointment of Luis Vernet as Commander of the Falkland islands in 1829.³¹

In **December**, the *Falklands' Sheep Owners' Association* negotiates to sell carcasses to *Corporacion Argentina de Productores de Carnes*.

December 5th, at the UN, the Fourth Committee, sitting to consider the work of the Special Committee on Decolonization, approves that committee's annual report.

26 *British Interests in the Falkland Islands: Economic Development, the Falkland Lobby and the Sovereignty Dispute, 1945 to 1989* C. R. Ellerby 1990 p.178

27 Ellerby 1990 pp.176-177 citing *Leg. Co. minutes*, 25 Oct. 1973

28 Quoted in *UN Doc A/9623/Rev.1 vol.6 Chapter XXVI* p.112

29 Baroness Young in *HL Deb 25 January 1983 vol.438 cc136-247*

30 No holiday was announced. In 1983, the date was changed to April 2 and that was made a public holiday. In 1984 the public holiday was moved back to June 10 and in 1992, April 2 became Veterans Day but not a holiday. In 2000 June 10 lost its holiday status and April 2 gained it. Both days are currently celebrated, but only the April day is a public holiday.

31 Vernet had not been appointed Governor. See 1829

*“During discussion of the question .., Venezuela, Peru, Ecuador and Spain were among those supporting the contention of Argentina that the negotiations should be resumed with a view to finding a solution based on recognition of Argentine sovereignty over the islands. Argentina considered that the conflict of sovereignty, which dated from 1833, was the basic point to be resolved if an end was to be put to the colonial situation prevailing in the territory. The United Kingdom did not accept that interpretation; the essential problem was one of self-determination, complicated by a claim to the territory by another Government. The United Kingdom considered that any settlement of the differences between the two Governments must recognize the right of the inhabitants to self-determination and must be in accordance with their expressed wishes.”*³²

December 14th, taking up recommendations from the Fourth Committee, the UN General Assembly adopts resolution 3160 – Question of the Falkland Islands (Malvinas).

“Gravely concerned at the fact that eight years have elapsed since the adoption of Resolution 2065 (XX) without any substantial progress having been made in the negotiations...

2. Declares the need to accelerate the negotiations between the Governments of Argentina and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland called for in General Assembly resolution 2065 (XX) in order to arrive at a peaceful solution of the conflict of sovereignty between them concerning the Falkland Islands (Malvinas);

*3. Urges the Governments of Argentina and the United Kingdom, therefore, to proceed without delay with the negotiations, in accordance with the provisions of the relevant resolutions of the General Assembly, in order to put an end to the colonial situation;...”*³³

*“... Argentina had been back to the United Nations and emerged armed with yet another resolution, calling this time for ‘accelerated progress’ in resolving the Falklands dispute. To meet this pressure Julian Amery had approved exploring the chances of joint sovereignty, or condominium. It was a measure of growing desperation that this was put forward at all. ... For one thing it was regarded as a legal nightmare.”*³⁴

1974 – January 3rd, in London, the Foreign Secretary submits a memo to Cabinet.

*“Douglas-Home concluded that doing nothing would endanger the interests and security of the islands. He believed condominium was the best way of continuing a dialogue with both parties, reasoning that it would have a greater chance of acceptance from islanders than talks on an outright transfer of sovereignty.”*³⁵

January 4th, in Stanley, a meeting of the Falklands' Legislative Council adopts a motion; *“That this House objects strongly to any negotiations or talks being held with the Argentine Government without the prior full knowledge of the Falkland Islands people, ...”*

*“... despite ‘maximum arm-twisting’, Falklands Governor Ernest Lewis was unable to wring concessions from councillors about talks on a possible sovereignty transfer.”*³⁶

The Falkland Islands Legislative Council form a select committee to ascertain the views of the electorate on possible changes to the Islands' Constitution, and to make recommendations.³⁷

32 UN Yearbook 1973

33 See [https://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/RES/3160\(XXVIII\)&Lang=E&Area=RESOLUTION](https://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/RES/3160(XXVIII)&Lang=E&Area=RESOLUTION)

34 Little Platoon M. Charlton 1989 p.37

35 The British Government and the Falkland Islands, 1974-79 A. Donaghy 2014

36 Ibid

37 HC Deb 18 December 1974 vol.883 cc1565-6

January 25th, in Britain's House of Commons, the Government announce that they expect the contract for a permanent airfield in the islands to be awarded - "shortly." The project to be completed within two years.

Geology expert, Professor Donald Griffiths of Birmingham University, leads a team exploring possible oil resources in the Falklands. ³⁸

Off the Falklands, plaques confirming British sovereignty are cemented onto the Shag Rocks by a Royal Navy expedition. ³⁹

March 5th, in Britain, following the election of a (minority) Labour Government, James Callaghan is appointed as Foreign Secretary.

April 8th, from Buenos Aires, Britain's Ambassador to Argentina, Donald Charles Hopson, reports a conversation with Manuel de Anchorena, in which the latter insisted that negotiations must resume soon.

"One of the problems about the Falkland Islands was that from Her Majesty's government's point of view it was a marginal problem... always dogged by lack of ministerial time. In addition it was viewed by some senior people in the Foreign Office as an intractable problem about which nothing could be done." ⁴⁰

May 3rd, Foreign Secretary Callaghan submits an assessment of the Falklands issue to Cabinet.

"Callaghan's conclusion was forbidding: 'A policy of inaction would surely result in the Argentines progressively withdrawing their cooperation (e.g. the air service) and in a weakening of our position at the UN.' The ultimate political, financial and commercial penalties could be severe." ⁴¹

Callaghan's proposals call for the inclusion of island councillors as delegates at any talks. Also full consultation with the Islanders throughout any negotiation.

May 10th, after some debate, Britain's Cabinet approve Callaghan's proposals.

"Callaghan therefore recommended that (Ambassador Hopson) call on Vignes and explain that Britain would shortly resume a dialogue. There would be no mention of condominium until the islanders had been consulted by the governor. Care was also taken to avoid use of the term 'negotiations'. Callaghan believed its inclusion would only alarm islanders and give rise to hostile questions in Parliament..." ⁴²

May 22nd, Britain's Government approve the spending of £4.2 million on airport facilities for the Falklands.

June 4th, in Buenos Aires, Ambassador Hopson informs Minister Vignes of Britain's proposals.

June 7th, Falkland Island councillors are informed of Callaghan's proposals by the Governor.

"Lewis described the councillors' reaction as predictable, in that they saw acceptance of it, as infringing on their sovereignty. ... Adrian Monk, an outspoken opponent of Argentina's territorial claims, referred to the proposals as a 'dilution of sovereignty'. ... Councillors were reluctant to go far without consulting their constituents... The councillors did not object to the Foreign Office approaching Argentina, but acceptance of the proposal would ultimately depend on the attitudes of the 1,900 islanders." ⁴³

38 Griffiths had been commissioned by the UK Government in 1971.

39 *Who owns the Falkland Island Dependencies in International Law? An Analysis of Certain Recent British and Argentine Official Statements* C. R. Symmons 1984 p.729. Shag Rocks lie some 600 miles to the east of the Falkland Islands.

40 Hugh Carless quoted in Donaghy 2014

41 Donaghy 2014

42 *Ibid*

43 *Ibid*

*“In other words, the councillors would not go in to bat at any stage without a prior mandate.”*⁴⁴

June 11th, in Buenos Aires, a detailed proposal is handed to the Foreign Ministry by Ambassador Hopson.

*“I have now received instructions from Her Majesty's Government to propose that the discussions between Britain and the Falkland Islands should be resumed on the basis of the safeguards and guarantees to be extended to the Islanders in the **hypothesised** event of a condominium. These discussions would be without prejudice to the respective positions of the United Kingdom and the Argentine Governments with regard to territorial sovereignty over the Falkland Islanders. I am to explain that the main aim of Her Majesty's Government in entering into negotiations on the basis of a condominium would be to settle the dispute about sovereignty by accepting Argentine co-sovereignty over the Islands, ... the two parties would accept shared sovereignty over the Islands.*

The co-domini would be Her Majesty The Queen and His Excellency the President of the Argentina Nation. There are several forms which a condominium might take but the basic elements might include the following:

- 1) The British and Argentine flags would fly side by side and the official language would be English and Spanish;*
- 2) All 'belongsers' of the Islands would possess dual nationality;*
- 3) Existing colony passports would be replaced by travel documents issued in the co-domini;*
- 4) The present constitution, administration and legal system would have to be adapted to the needs of a condominium. The Governor might be appointed alternatively by the Queen and the President of Argentina;*
- 5) Further constitutional change would require the agreement of the co-domini.*

*I also have to inform you that a Joint Session of the Executive and Legislative Councils of the Islands have informed the Governor that they had no objection to talks being held with the Argentine Government on the safeguards and guarantees required in a condominium. However, I am to state that Her Majesty's Government would feel free to invite representatives of the Islands to form part of the British delegation, and that before final agreement the Islanders would have to be formally consulted and **their acceptance sought by some form of popular representation**. ... if the Argentine Government agree, official or preliminary official talks should take place in Buenos Aires as soon as possible.”*⁴⁵

*“Vignes responded cautiously. He promised to put the proposal to Perón, but believed that in view of Argentina's repeated declarations in the UN and elsewhere, it would be ‘extremely difficult’ to agree to share sovereignty with Britain.”*⁴⁶

Argentina's President, Juan Perón, is informed.

*“Let's accept. Once we have one foot in the Malvinas nobody will get us out and before long Argentina will have full sovereignty.”*⁴⁷

⁴⁴ FO 7/3198 March 8, 1976

⁴⁵ My emphasis throughout. On June 14th, 2012, Argentina's President Cristina Kirchner, read this “*secret document*” to the UN's Special Committee on Decolonization. Kirchner erroneously suggested that it was only Peron's death that had caused the proposal to fail.

⁴⁶ Donaghy 2014

⁴⁷ Quoted by ex- Ambassador Ortiz de Rozas in an article for *La Nacion*, March 2012.

June 12th, news of the offer by the British Government leak out from the Falklands.

*“Despite the fact that I stressed the secrecy of the discussions... some of our members are incapable of keeping quiet. On this occasion the leak may have been deliberate with a view to sabotaging our initiative.”*⁴⁸

June 16th, in Britain, both *The Times* and *The Sunday Express* newspapers report on news of negotiations.

June 20th, Argentina responds to the offer.

*“It proposed that recognition of Argentine sovereignty should be followed by a period of ‘joint administration’ for a term to be fixed in the negotiations... The fundamental objectives of the joint administration would be to facilitate the gradual integration of the population of the Islands into the political, social and institutional life of the Argentine Republic.”*⁴⁹

Vignes assures Ambassador Hopson that his country’s response is only a starting position, and that Argentina would not insist upon a prior recognition of sovereignty. That could be delayed to the end of the joint sovereignty period – 4 or 5 years.⁵⁰

*“This prior recognition of sovereignty, prior to any discussion, was unacceptable, obviously...”*⁵¹

*“... in his meeting with Vignes, Hopson found there was more room for manoeuvre. His optimism was not shared in Stanley, however, where Lewis was far less upbeat. The governor ... was pessimistic about the islander response. ‘I am certain that this would not be acceptable locally’, he declared.”*⁵²

June 24th, from London, Foreign Secretary Callaghan writes to Hopson regarding the meeting with Vignes.

*“The Argentine counterproposal certainly has constructive features... and we note his evident flexibility and readiness to compromise... (However) If the Foreign Minister and President Peron insist on including recognition of Argentine sovereignty in the basis for initiating talks, the islanders will refuse to take part: and **we cannot move without them.**”*⁵³

June 26th, an announcement is made to Britain’s Parliament, by the Government.

“With the agreement of the Falkland Islands Executive Council, we have been in touch with the Argentine Government about the possible resumption of discussions between our two Governments in connection with United Nations resolution 3160. If discussions are resumed, representatives of the Islanders will be invited to join the United Kingdom delegation.”

The company of Dundee, Perth and London Securities Ltd is taken over by Charington, Gardner and Locket.

Johnston Construction win the contract for a new Falklands Airport.

July 1st, unforeseen, President Perón dies of a heart attack. His wife, Isabel Martinez de Peron, takes over as Argentine President.

48 Gove Lewis to Callaghan & Hopson June 12, 1974 in FO 7/2699

49 Donaghy 2014

50 FO 7/2699

51 James Callaghan quoted in Charlton 1989 p.37

52 Donaghy 2014

53 FO 7/2700. My emphasis.

*“The Foreign Office was eager to act quickly. ‘Unless we seize this opportunity, there may be a coup or change of government in Buenos Aires within a matter of weeks’, Carless warned. ‘If so, we shall lose all the momentum we have gained’...”*⁵⁴

July 5th, from Stanley, Governor Lewis reports that attitudes are hardening against the proposals.

*“... it is most unlikely any councillor will be willing to join a British delegation to discuss condominium.”*⁵⁵

July 10th, in London, the Falkland Islands Committee host a reception at Lincoln's Inn attended by Earl Mountbatten of Burma. A message from Queen Elizabeth II is read to those present.

*“... attended by 50 MPs of all parties, 10 Members of the House of Lords, 20 representatives of the press and media, 10 Commonwealth representatives, 10 civil servants (including former Governors of the Falklands), and about 30 Islanders and Committee members. The presence of the Earl Mountbatten of Burma as special guest reflected the British Government's approval of the campaign. It was stated that the purpose of the gathering was, “... the rallying of support for the Islanders and of providing visiting Islanders with the opportunity of meeting people friendly to their cause.” The reunion became an annual event.”*⁵⁶

*“It was an astonishing example of the committee’s organisation and influence.”*⁵⁷

July 15th, in London, Foreign Secretary Callaghan concludes that talks on condominium cannot proceed.⁵⁸

August 8th, Argentina’s National Academy of History meets to consider a paper by Ernesto Fitte entitled *‘The National Academy of History and the blood in 1833 Malvinas.’* This concludes that the Falklands massacre of August, 1833, had no political character.⁵⁹

*“Two gauchos five Charruas Indians led by Antonio Rivero, who worked the cattle in the field, arrived in Port Soledad and because Juan Simon, had denied the change of metallic money, rather than vouchers they made a killing in cold blood of Vernet’s men namely the foreman Juan Simon permanent manager of the Argentine government, Brisbane, Vernet’s henchman, one German, one Spanish and Scottish Dickson.”*⁶⁰

August 14th, reacting to Governor Lewis's letter of July 5th, Callaghan writes to Ambassador Hopson in Buenos Aires, asking that a message be given to the Argentine Foreign Minister.⁶¹

*“Given the sensitivity of Parliamentary opinion in the UK to the issue of self-determination, HMG cannot possibly proceed without the concurrence of the islanders.”*⁶²

54 Donaghy 2014

55 *Lewis to Callaghan July 5, 1974 in FO 7/2700*

56 Ellerby 1990 p.181. These annual receptions still take place at Lincoln's Inn.

57 Donaghy 2014

58 *Falkland Islands Review Committee Report* Franks Committee 1983 para. 29

59 *cf.* August, 1833, March, 1956, November, 1965, January, 1966, April, 1966, April 1982, August 2012 and March 2015

60 Historian, and Academy member, Laurio H. Destefani *cf.* March, 1956, November, 1965, January, 1966, April, 1966, April 1982, August 2012 and March 2015

61 Hopson did not deliver the message. Dying from a heart attack on August 26, 1974, aged only 59. Vignes was only informed as to the collapse of the condominium proposal on August 27, 1974, by Britain’s *charge d’affaires*, Frank Maynard. Surprisingly, Vignes appears to have kept this to himself; not informing anyone else at Argentina's Foreign Ministry. His reasoning isn’t clear, and some confusion arose as a result.

62 Callaghan quoted in *FO 7/2700*

August 22nd, in New York, Argentina informs the UN Secretary-General that contacts with the UK have been re-established regarding future Falklands negotiations.

Having left in 1971, Britain resumes limited cooperation with the Special Committee on Decolonization. But only to the extent of providing the information required under the terms of *Art. 73* of the UN Charter. However, the UK does not take a seat on the committee; reserving only a right to speak on matters concerning the Falkland Islands. ⁶³

September 5th, at the UN, the Special Committee decides to defer the Falklands question until 1975.

September 13th, an agreement is quietly signed between Argentina and Great Britain, allowing for the supply of fuels and gas to the Falklands by Argentina. ⁶⁴

“... the Foreign Office reacts feebly to Argentinian encroachment, ... for instance, in the September 1974 Agreement, signed by our Secretary of State, giving the Argentine YPF government department the right to erect a fuel storage tank in Port Stanley with a monopoly of petrol and diesel oil throughout the islands.” ⁶⁵

“... agreed by the British and Argentine Governments in 1974 with regrettably little explanation or reference to the people of the Falkland Islands. The YPF (Yacimientos Petroliferos Fiscales) company was allowed to install a Plant at Port Stanley, which required a number of Argentine technical staff to be here permanently to look after it. This seemed to us to be the thin end of the wedge.” ⁶⁶

“It's purpose was to reduce high costs, by allowing the Argentine state oil company (YPF) to supply oil fuels to the islands at Argentine mainland prices. Yet there were more than fiscal concerns at hand. It was designed to demonstrate the government's willingness to cooperate with Argentina, as well as buttress its position at the United Nations.” ⁶⁷

September 23rd, at the opening of a new UN session in New York, Callaghan and Vignes meet in the sidelines; *“Vignes was downcast, ominously remarking that the situation ‘could not be held indefinitely.’* ⁶⁸

September 24th, in his annual speech to the UN General Assembly, Argentina's Foreign Minister; *“... made a moderate speech, which included the obligatory Argentine claim to sovereignty.”* ⁶⁹

In **October**, a local committee is formed in Stanley to liaise with the Falkland Islands Committee in London.

“... a ten member Falkland Islands Committee (Local Branch) was formed at a public meeting in Stanley with Jack Abbott (an expatriate of independent means who had married an Islander) as Chairman and Sydney Miller (a former Executive Councillor and farmer) as Secretary. The purpose of the Committee was to liaise with the UK (Committee).” ⁷⁰

October 18th, from Stanley, Governor Lewis writes to the FCO in London.

63 Every year a place is set out for the UK's representative, but not taken up. If someone from the British mission does attend, they sit at the back among the public. *cf.* 1971

64 *Exchange of Notes between the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Government of the Argentine Republic on the Supply and Marketing in the Falkland Islands of Argentine Petroleum-based Products* September 13, 1974 Treaty Series No.30 1975

65 *Infamous White Card* Molly Mortimer 1975 in *The Spectator* July 11, 1975 p.12

66 *74 Days: An Islander's Diary of the Falklands Occupation* John Smith 1984

67 Donaghy 2014

68 *Ibid.*

69 *Ibid.*

70 Ellerby 1990 p.182

*“I see no likelihood of islanders agreeing to participate in talks before the end of the year. In fact, unless we are prepared to tell the committee in London the facts of life, I see no hope of any dialogue being renewed with the Argentines in the foreseeable future.”*⁷¹

October 24th, the UK writes to the United Nations confirming that contact continues with Argentina on the subject of the Falkland Islands.

October 30th, Argentina also informs the UN Secretary-General that talks are on-going.

*“... the Government of the United Kingdom insists that the solution must be consonant with the 'wishes' of the inhabitants of the Malvinas... the Argentine Government wishes to reiterate that, .. the negotiations must take place exclusively between the Governments of the Argentine Republic and the United Kingdom. ...”*⁷²

In **November**, the FCO holds meetings with members of London's Falkland Islands Committee.

December 4th, in Stanley, a Legislative Council meeting considers a question of oil exploration licences.

“... the Colonial Government should take immediate steps to invite interested parties to apply for licences to examine the possibilities of drilling for oil, both on-shore and within territorial waters.”

Argentina reacts.

*“Within two weeks a bill had been presented to the Argentine Congress which would, if passed, 'authorise the government to use force to recover the Islands'. Maynard warned that supplying licences in Falkland waters 'would be an act of the utmost provocation'...”*⁷³

December 7th, in Lima, Minister Vignes has a conversation with Minister of State for the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, David Ennals, repeating that there are only two real options – negotiation or invasion.

*“Vignes was in a truculent mood, perhaps conditioned by an incident in Stanley earlier that morning, when the FIC had blocked an Argentine cargo of goods from docking. He complained that islanders opinion was monopolised by the FIC who were determined to prevent progress.”*⁷⁴

December 16th, after the comments of Vignes' are reported from Lima, Buenos Airean newspaper *Cronica* mounts a campaign advocating an invasion of the Falklands. The newspaper also reports that the Argentine Air Force has been requested to take a party to the Islands on January 3rd, to pay homage to Louis Vernet.⁷⁵

*“For its efforts the newspaper was provisionally closed by the administration of Mrs Peron for 'endangering peaceful relations with foreign countries', and legal proceedings were initiated according to the Penal Code and Law 20,840. A week later, a federal judge on hearing the case agreed that there had been an infringement of Article 219 of the Penal Code. Sr Hector Ricardo Garcia, the editor, was only released after paying a high sum and the case continued its normal procedural course.”*⁷⁶

December 13th, at the UN, the General Assembly decides, without a vote, to ask the Special Committee on Decolonization to keep the question of the Falkland Islands under review.

71 Lewis to Callaghan October 18, 1974 in FO 7/2701

72 UN Doc A10023/Rev.1 vol.4

73 Donaghy 2014. Maynard was the British *charge d'affairs* in Buenos Aires.

74 *Ibid*

75 *Ibid*

76 Makin 1983 p.396

1975 – January 3rd, on the 142nd anniversary of HMS *Clio*'s ejection of a Buenos Aires garrison from East Falkland (Soledad) Island, Argentina's Foreign Minister holds a press conference.

*“Argentina has decided in this case, even though there is usurpation, to continue to negotiate according to the Argentine pacifist tradition in the solution of international controversies.”*⁷⁷

Argentina unilaterally imposes immigration controls on all air travel between it and the Falkland Islands.

*“In January 1975 the Argentine Government imposed immigration controls on air travel to the Falklands in breach of the Communications Agreement. A declaration that the holder was an Argentine citizen of the Malvinas was added to the 'white card'...”*⁷⁸

*“The 'white card' was now replaced by one declaring the holder to be an Argentine citizen of the Malvinas.”*⁷⁹

January 20th, in London, aware that Prof. Griffiths is compiling his report into the existence of oil bearing regions around the Falklands' archipelago, the Department of Energy write to the FCO.

*“Our ministers are very interested in the possibility of exploring offshore oil around the Falkland Islands.”*⁸⁰

January 28th, Neville Arthur Irwin French is appointed Governor of the Falkland Islands.⁸¹

January 31st, Minister of State for the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, David Ennals, writes to Callaghan.

*“I am now moving towards the view that the best long-term aim might be a long-term leasing arrangement by which, under a treaty, we would cede sovereignty but would otherwise retain virtually all the arrangements on the Islands which exist now.”*⁸²

*“The foreign secretary reacted to the leaseback suggestion with disdain. ... Callaghan felt that Ennals overestimated Britain's hurdle at the UN, and underestimated its capability to counter an Argentine attack and the parliamentary difficulties which would arise.”*⁸³

In **February**, a representative for six oil companies visits Stanley to discuss the issue of exploration licences for an off-shore area known as Burdwood Bank.

In London, the Falkland Islands Committee is renamed the United Kingdom Falkland Islands Committee.

In Argentina, the government of Isabel Martinez de Peron, indicates its frustration with the lack of progress in negotiations over the Islands.

*“... the Ministry of Social Welfare instructed Argentine cruise ships not to show a courtesy Red Ensign when they entered Stanley harbour.”*⁸⁴

77 *La Nacion* January 3, 1975

78 Ellerby 1990 p.178

79 Hastings & Jenkins 1997 p.34

80 *Lindley to Carless January 20, 1975 FCO 96/369*

81 *The London Gazette* No. 46481

82 Quoted in *FO 7/2964*

83 Donaghy 2014

84 Ellerby 2009 p.178 citing *The Daily Telegraph* March 5, 1975

March 2nd, *Regina Prima*, an Italian liner chartered by an Argentine company, refuses to fly the Falklands flag when attempting to enter the port at Stanley. When the port authority complain, the ship leaves. ⁸⁵

March 13th, intelligence reports indicate that, without negotiations, Argentina is likely to resort to force. ⁸⁶

March 18th, in Britain's Parliament, the Government confirms that it has received Professor Donald Griffiths's report into the potential for oil exploration around the Falklands. No details are given.

"In 1971, the government commissioned a geology expert, professor D. H. Griffiths of Birmingham University, to carry out a geological survey of the waters around the Islands. Griffiths reported in early 1975 that the prognosis was 'sufficiently promising to encourage further commercial exploration'. The government submitted the findings to Sir Peter Kent, a former chief geologist at BP, who agreed..." ⁸⁷

March 19th, aware of Griffiths' report, Argentina's Foreign Ministry issues a *communiqué*.

"According to cabled information published in the press, the United Kingdom Foreign Office has received a scientific report, ... concerning the possible existence of petroleum deposits under the Argentine continental shelf near the Malvinas Islands. Since the Malvinas Islands and the above-mentioned areas constitute an integral part of the national territory, the Government of Argentina wishes to state that it does not and will not recognize the right of any foreign Government to explore for or extract minerals or hydrocarbons...."

Furthermore, the Argentine Government will regard the carrying out of activities of the kind referred to above to be contrary to United Nations resolutions and consensuses on the Malvinas Islands, ..."

"... at a press conference... Vignes suggested that if Britain was unwilling to negotiate, "the only other option open to the Argentine government is a resort to force."... Vignes said his remarks were made unwillingly, forced upon him by public pressure. "People are burning my feet", he claimed, warning that unless there was progress, grave consequences would ensue: "It would be the big thing, the breaking off of diplomatic relations and an armed conflict"..." ⁸⁸

Britain's new Ambassador to Buenos Aires, David Ashe, receives instructions to issue a warning that any military action will be met by force.

"The foreign secretary felt that an aggressive approach was required:..." ⁸⁹

March 26th, considering Prof Griffiths's report on the potential for Falklands' oil, the FCO notes; *"Of one thing we can be certain: there can be no exploration of any oil there may be around the Falklands except in collaboration with the Argentines."* ⁹⁰

85 *The Malvinas, the South Georgias and the South Sandwich Islands: the conflict with Britain* L. Destefani 1982.

Traditionally a ship, on entering a foreign port, displays the flag of that port. I am unable to confirm that this incident occurred.

86 *FO 7/2949*

87 *Britain and the Dictatorships of Argentina and Chile 1973-82: Foreign Policy, Corporations and Social Movements (Security, Conflict & Cooperation in the Contemporary World)* Grace Livingstone 2018 citing *Geology of the Region Around the Falkland Islands: Summary of Report by P.F. Barker, J. Burrell, F. Simpson and D.H. Griffiths April 11, 1975 and Review of Birmingham Report of Geology of the Falkland Islands Region by Peter Kent June 2, 1975 in FCO 96/369*

88 Donaghy 2014

89 *Ibid*

90 *Coles to Collins March 26, 1975 FCO 96/369*

April 3rd, a newspaper report in Britain's *Financial Times* claims that progress towards greater contact between the Falklands and Argentina has been delayed. Due to the possible existence of oil deposits.

April 7th, the Falklands Government submits a report concerning proposed changes to the Islands' Constitution.

April 10th, in Britain's Parliament, spokesman Goronwy-Roberts confirms that if talks take place, Islanders will be present.⁹¹

April 14th, in Buenos Aires, Ambassador Ashe delivers Britain's warning to the Foreign Ministry.

*"The Argentine Government must clearly understand that an attack on the Islands would be met with a military response. At the same time Her Majesty's Government wished to avoid any confrontation with Argentina. The only alternative to confrontation was negotiation and they stood ready to examine any proposal which the Argentine Government might wish to put forward."*⁹²

April 16th, in London, a meeting between Prime Minister Wilson, Foreign Secretary Callaghan and Minister David Ennals, considers the policy to adopt with regard to oil deposits on the Islands' continental shelf. Callaghan notes that the current Argentine regime is; "... so unstable that it was questionable whether a negotiated settlement would stand the test of time."

*"If we receive no warning of an invasion and we are obliged to liberate the Islands from an Argentine occupation, our political task at the United Nations, and in Washington, would be formidable. The Secretary of State for Defence should therefore advise on the practical aspects of defending the Islands."*⁹³

Between them, they decide; "... that economic cooperation and joint oil exploration would provide the basis for a new Anglo-Argentine dialogue, with the sovereignty issue being withheld for a later date."⁹⁴

April 25th, in Buenos Aires, a car bomb explodes outside the British Embassy, killing a guard.

May 5th, Britain informs the UN that it has no doubts about its exclusive sovereign rights to explore for natural resources of the continental shelf around the Falklands' archipelago.⁹⁵

Researcher's Comment: Before complaints arrive to say that the Falklands archipelago does not sit upon its own continental shelf – it does. Not geologically but in the theoretical world of international law. In December, 1950 a British *Order in Council* had extended the borders of the colony to include the adjacent continental shelf areas.

This was followed in 1958 by the UN's *Convention on the Continental Shelf* which recognised that, for the purposes of international law, islands had their own shelf areas. Unsurprisingly, Argentina declined to sign the convention.

May 8th, at the Foreign Office, Minister David Ennals hosts an informal seminar attended by the United Kingdom Falkland Islands Committee.

91 *HL Deb 10 April 1975 vol.359 cc180-1*

92 Quoted in Charlton 1989 pp.42-43

93 Callaghan interviewed in Charlton 1989 p.44

94 Donaghy 2014

95 *UN Yearbook 1975*

*“The agenda covered oil exploration, alginates, fisheries, welfare, the constitution and restrictions on foreigners owning land. There was no attempt to reach conclusions or recommendations, although ideas discussed were passed on to Governor French.”*⁹⁶

*“The U.K.F.I.C's representatives included Bill Hunter Christie, Frank Mitchell, Sir John Barlow and Jack Abbott (from the Local Branch in Stanley). Professor Donald Griffiths, a geologist from Birmingham University, and Dr. Peter Calvert, a Politics Lecturer at Southampton University, contributed their specialist knowledge of the region. Commercial interests were represented by the Chairman of the F.I.C., the Chief Manager of Lloyds Bank International's Latin American Section, the Managing Director of the Baring Bank, and a consultant for the Argentine National Bank. Twelve Members of Parliament attended including John Biggs-Davison, James Johnson, Nigel Fisher and Tam Dalyell. Finally, there were officials from the Foreign Office, Ministry of Defence and Department of Energy.”*⁹⁷

*“Large British corporations with investments in Latin America argued that Britain's commercial interests were being put at risk by the failure to resolve the sovereignty dispute with Argentina. This was the argument put forward by executives of Barings Bank, Lloyds Bank and a former director of Shell at a secret seminar on the Falklands organised by the FCO on 8 May 1975. The only business executive at the meeting who was in favour of maintaining the status quo was the chairman of the Falkland Islands Company.”*⁹⁸

May 14th, Foreign Secretary Callaghan proposes to the Prime Minister that dialogue with Argentina proceed through the offices of Britain's Ambassador in Buenos Aires. But in strict secrecy, to avoid leaks.⁹⁹

*“Foreign Secretary James Callaghan wrote to the prime minister in early 1975 warning that if Britain refused to talk to Argentina, not only would it lead to confrontation, but it ‘would also preclude any possibility of exploring or exploiting either oil deposits on the Falkland Islands Continental Shelf or the resources of the South Atlantic as a whole’. The paragraph on oil in this letter is completely redacted – as are many of the references to oil in the National archives collection of government papers,...”*¹⁰⁰

James Callaghan suggests that talks over the Falklands could be assisted by an offer of joint oil exploration.¹⁰¹

May 24th, in Buenos Aires, during an interview with Minister Vignes, Ambassador Ashe proposes *in camera* discussions with regard to a joint development of the resources of the south-west Atlantic. Vignes promptly counter proposes that any negotiations on economic cooperation should be linked to the immediate transfer of sovereignty followed by simultaneous leaseback for a period of 15 years.

*“Leaseback was a fusion of two basic principles: British administration, as desired by the islanders, and the concession of sovereignty to Argentina.”*¹⁰²

May 27th, in Stanley, Island councillors propose that an ‘economic study’ be pursued to advise on the long term prospects of both the Falklands, and the Dependencies.¹⁰³

“On the length of the airstrip at Stanley, lies the Falkland Islands' future. An entirely unpublicised, unofficial delegation from the islands is, I understand, currently engaged in discussion of the matter

96 Ellerby 1990 p.200 citing *U.K.F.I.C. archive (Sussex), group D, file 9: Coles to Christie, 7 Apr. 1975. Also Christie to Hall, 31 Dec. 1974*

97 *Ibid.*

98 Livingstone 2018 citing *FCO 7/2958*. Hardly a secret.

99 *FO 7/2950*

100 Livingstone 2018 citing *Callaghan to Wilson PM/75/38 May 14, 1975* in *FCO 7/3373*

101 This suggestion was approved by the Cabinet's Defence and Overseas Policy Committee in July, 1975

102 Donaghy 2014

103 *Ibid.* See October

with the Foreign Office. There is no other British territory which can only be reached by courtesy of a foreign country. The present airstrip being inadequate for the landing of long international-flight aircraft, islanders can only leave and return home by way of Argentina. Furthermore, these British, either leaving or entering their Islands, are obliged to get a White Card permit either from the Argentine Office in the Islands or in Buenos Aires, before the Argentine airline (LADE) will confirm a booking. Adding insult to injury, Argentine personnel enter the Islands without it. No such right is granted to Argentina by the Communications Agreement of 1971 with Britain. In present circumstances, Argentinians can enter the Islands and could well form a nucleus for takeover, before counter-action could be taken...

The key to development and control lies in communications. Conditions for these were laid down by the 1971 Agreement, by which the British government undertook to replace the temporary airstrip by a permanent airfield. Work on it is expected to start this year, but Argentina has refused any aid which will make an international airport and allow the Islanders direct flights to Ascension or the Cape (though this would be cheaper). The current field under construction has a runway of only 1,250 metres; 2,000 metres are needed for international jets. The Seychelles were provided with an international port by British aid; why not the Falklands? In the meantime, it has cost about £1 million to get Johnston Construction and their machinery to the Islands, and the decision whether to do the job properly or not must be made in the next few months.”¹⁰⁴

June 19th, in Buenos Aires, Ambassador Ashe again meets with the Foreign Minister. Vignes indicates that Argentina is prepared to start a discussion on economic cooperation. A condition, however, is that Argentina is allowed to occupy the uninhabited islands of South Georgia and the South Sandwich Islands, without condemnation by the UK.

“That proposal was unacceptable to Britain and the absence of talks on sovereignty unacceptable to the Argentines. For some time following that there were no negotiations.”¹⁰⁵

“We have undertaken a careful examination of the resolutions in question. They refer only to the Falkland Islands and do not explicitly mention the Dependencies. Moreover, the list of non-self-governing territories compiled by General Assembly Committees in 1946 and subsequently in 1964 referred exclusively to the “Falkland Islands.”...”¹⁰⁶

July 14th, in London, an announcement is made to Parliament

“The association of the Falkland Islands, as a dependent territory for whose external affairs the United Kingdom remains responsible, will, in accordance with Article 117 of the Act of Accession to the Community Treaties, take effect upon a decision of the Council of the European Communities. The Falklands Executive Council has approved.”¹⁰⁷

July 16th, in Buenos Aires, Minister Vignes repeats to Ambassador Ashe that talks on economic cooperation alone hold no interest for Argentina.

104 *Infamous White Card* Molly Mortimer 1975 in *The Spectator* July 11, 1975 p.12

105 Baroness Young in *HL Deb* 25 January 1983 vol.438 cc136-247

106 *PREM* 19-0625 6 May 1982

107 *HC Deb* 14 July 1975 vol.895 cc324-5W

July 31st, from Buenos Aires, Ashe informs London that the Peronist administration is unlikely to last much longer. However, Argentina's Foreign Ministry is demanding that sovereignty talks resume before September, when a meeting between Callaghan and Argentina's Foreign Minister is scheduled to take place at the UN.

August 11th, in Buenos Aires, Vignes is replaced as Foreign Minister by Angel Frederico Robledo.

"We have been some way across a diplomatic minefield with an Argentine foreign minister who has been thrown out of office just at the moment when there was a chance of launching a new dialogue. We must be extremely cautious before attempting to relaunch it." ¹⁰⁸

August 18th, an article in *The Times* newspaper reports on the activities of the United Kingdom Falkland Islands Committee; "... in the autumn they will lead a political campaign to challenge the Foreign and Commonwealth Office's view of the immediate and future needs of the Falkland Islands..."

August 20th, at the UN, the Special Committee refers the Falklands question to the General Assembly.

September 9th, at a meeting of the International Parliamentary Union in London, Argentina accuses Britain of an act of 'international piracy' in establishing a colony on the Falklands.¹⁰⁹ Unexpectedly, the meeting is picketed by Falklanders.

September 16th, in an interview with the press, Argentina's new Foreign Minister Robledo describes the wishes of the Falkland Islanders as "irrelevant."

September 18th, in Buenos Aires, Britain's Ambassador protests Robledo's comments. Minister Robledo questions Britain's insistence on Islander consent for talks to proceed.

September 23rd, in a speech at the opening session of the UN General Assembly, Robledo raises the question of the Falklands.

"We are a people convinced of the merits of negotiation. We apply this to what concerns us most directly. As is well known, my country suffers from the usurpation by a foreign Power of a part of its territory, namely the Malvinas Islands. For that question to be settled, there is no solution other than the return of those islands to the territorial patrimony of the Republic, since their occupation by force was carried out against every law..."

He claims that the application of self-determination to the Falklands; "... was excluded, in view of the fact that the British occupation constitutes a violation of the principle of territorial integrity specifically laid down in resolution 1514."¹¹⁰ Robledo also asserts that Argentina has the support of the Non-Aligned Movement. ¹¹¹

Researcher's Comment: Argentina has long claimed the support of a majority of the UN's member States although the evidence only supports the contention that a majority are in favour of talks taking place rather than favouring of any particular outcome from negotiations.

September 25th, in New York, Callaghan meets with Robledo at the Waldorf Towers.

"Robledo conveyed an invitation to Callaghan and the Queen to visit Argentina. He gave no commitment to Callaghan's proposals for economic cooperation, agreeing only to "consider them urgently." Consequently,

¹⁰⁸ Callaghan to Ashe August 15, 1975 in FO 7/2952

¹⁰⁹ Founded in 1889, this is the international organisation for Parliaments.

¹¹⁰ UN Doc A3125/Rev.1 vol.4. See 1960 for comments on the non-retroactive nature of resolution 1514.

¹¹¹ A forum for the UN members which are not formally aligned with any major power bloc. Currently some 120 of the UN's 193 members.

*Callaghan's suggestion that a senior official might go to Buenos Aires to discuss an agenda also went unanswered. Robledo accepted that economic cooperation would be mutually beneficial to promote stability and progress. He did not adopt the hard-line approach expected, nor emphasise the need for early progress on sovereignty. Far from being a source of distraction it appeared that the Falklands might even take a back-seat, as Argentina confronted its domestic woes. Like his predecessor, Robledo saw condominium as providing Argentina's best hope, suggesting that negotiations might be renewed in the near future..."*¹¹²

Minister Robledo assures the Foreign Secretary that there is; "... (no) question of an Argentine invasion of the Islands, nor of an attempt to solve the problem by force."¹¹³ Responding, Callaghan informs the Foreign Minister of plans for an economic survey, at the request of the Islanders; "... Its purpose is to quantify the options for future economic development..."¹¹⁴

*"There is no record of a response from Robledo to this, indicating that he had not grasped the magnitude of the enterprise to be undertaken."*¹¹⁵

October 2nd, after less than two months in office, Frederico Robledo is replaced as Argentina's Foreign Minister by Arauz Castex.

October 16th, in London, following the May suggestions from the Islanders, the British Government announces a comprehensive economic survey; to be led by Lord Shackleton. Its purpose to inquire into the development possibilities of the Falkland Islands.¹¹⁶

*"It appears that the economic survey was sanctioned by the British Government in response to the increase in Argentine hostility. In April 1975 the British Embassy in Buenos Aires reported the need for a diplomatic initiative after the Argentine Government warned that the only option open was a resort to force. ... The Government wanted to persuade Parliament and the Islanders through an "informed approach" that collaboration with Argentina was the answer."*¹¹⁷

*"Concerned about the continuing decline of the local economy, councillors had requested 'a comprehensive economic study' of the Falklands region, which would advise on long-term prospects and include the Dependencies. But for the British Government there were different motives at hand. The foreign secretary saw this as an ideal way to show the islanders that future development rested on cooperation with Argentina rather than dependence on Britain, and thereby encourage closer links... by the Autumn of 1975, certain factors had convinced the Foreign Office that the councillor's proposals justified investigation."*¹¹⁸

From Edinburgh, the firm of Christian Salvesen informs the FCO that they own two old whaling harbours on South Georgia, and are trying to acquire two more.

"It is a long shot, but I think that sometime in the future there may be use for these bases, either for fishing or for oil. I hope that HMG will not absent-mindedly hand it over to Argentina."

112 Donaghy 2014

113 Freedman 2005 vol.1 p.38

114 *HC Deb 14 January 1976 vol.903 cc391*

115 Donaghy 2014

116 Franks 1983, para.34. Son of the explorer, and a respected Labour peer, Shackleton was under no illusion that his report was to emphasise the importance of Argentine/Island relations and to included the possibility of a take-over.

117 Ellerby 1990 p.201 citing, *inter alia*, *J. Callaghan, Time and Chance (London, 1987)*

118 Donaghy 2014

At the Haig, on the same day, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) presents an Advisory Opinion (AO) regarding the situation in Western Sahara.¹¹⁹

"54. The Charter of the United Nations, in Article 1, paragraph 2, indicates, as one of the purposes of the United Nations: "To develop friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples..." This purpose is further developed in Articles 55 and 56 of the Charter. Those provisions have direct and particular relevance for non-self-governing territories, which are dealt with in Chapter XI of the Charter. As the Court stated in its Advisory Opinion of 21 June 1971 on The Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970):

*"... the subsequent development of international law in regard to non-self-governing territories, as enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations, made the principle of self-determination applicable to **all** of them. (ICJ reports 1971. p.31)"*

55. The principle of self-determination as a right of peoples, and its application for the purpose of bringing all colonial situations to a speedy end, were enunciated in the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV). In this resolution the General Assembly proclaims "the necessity of bringing to a speedy and unconditional end colonialism in all its forms and manifestations". To this end the resolution provides inter alia:

"2. All peoples have the right to self-determination; by virtue of that right they freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development

The above provisions, in particular paragraph 2, thus confirm and emphasize that the application of the right of self-determination requires a free and genuine expression of the will of the peoples concerned.

...

*59. The validity of the principle of self-determination, defined as the need to pay regard to the freely expressed will of peoples, is not affected by the fact that in certain cases the General Assembly has dispensed with the requirement of consulting the inhabitants of a given territory. Those instances were based either on the consideration that a certain population did not constitute a 'people' entitled to self-determination or on the conviction that a consultation was totally unnecessary, in view of special circumstances."*¹²⁰

*"... the first type of exception exist, for example, in the case of Gibraltar or Malvinas (Falkland Islands) where the General Assembly has requested the States concerned to negotiate the issue of sovereignty and the transfer of territory, and they have refused to accept the effects of a referendum or consultation to the present inhabitants of these territories."*¹²¹

*"The self-proclamation of a "people" and a subsequent claim of entitlement to the right to self-determination are ... insufficient."*¹²²

¹¹⁹ A disputed territory on the north-west coast of Africa.

¹²⁰ *Western Sahara, Advisory Opinion, ICJ Reports 1975* (advisory opinions have no mandatory effect). Sadly, the court offered no further explanation of paragraph 59, or provide any examples. Despite there being no evidence to support the contention, some Argentine commentators now argue that this paragraph refers to the Falkland Islanders. *cf.* Chagos A.O. of 2019. For the full ICJ report see <https://www.icj-cij.org/files/case-related/61/061-19751016-ADV-01-00-EN.pdf>

¹²¹ *Los Derechos Argentinas Sobre Las Islas Malvinas* Alfredo Bruno Bologna 1982

¹²² *The Malvinas/Falklands Between History and Law* M. G. Kohen & F. D. Rodriguez 2017 p.214. *cf.* January, 1952 & August, 1982

*“Although the ICJ approved of its earlier opinion in the Namibia proceedings that the principle of self-determination applied to ‘all’ Chapter XI Non-Self-Governing Territories, it cast doubt on the generality of this proposition in what is arguably the most ambiguous passage in the Western Sahara Opinion:... (para. 59) ... The fact that the passage is not supported by factual examples makes it particularly prone to a wide range of interpretations and to speculation regarding the specific anomalous cases the ICJ had in mind. ... it is important to recall that in the ICJ’s view, the fact that the General Assembly dispensed with a consultation of the inhabitants does not affect [t]he validity of the principle of self-determination, defined as the need to pay regard to the freely expressed will of peoples.’...”*¹²³

*“... in its decision the Court explicitly upheld the Saharawis’ right of self-determination, in paragraphs 70 and 162 of its Advisory Opinion of 16 October 1975 ... If the Falklands case were taken to the ICJ, the Court might decide along similar lines: that there were certain historical links between Argentina and the Falklands, but they were not sufficient to override the self-determination of the Falkland Islanders.”*¹²⁴

Researcher's Comment: Dealt with in a previous paper in this series, the United Nations determined in 1952 that a non-self-governing territory (NSGT) listed for decolonization required a people. A people that could be led to a full measure of self-government and, ultimately, independence. No people therefore equals no NSGT. The Falklands' are on the UN list of NSGTs, therefore it cannot be argued that the islanders are not a people. If the Falklanders are not a people, then the islands should be de-listed, as they do not qualify. Two chairs of the Special Committee on Decolonization have raised this possibility, but it has never been debated.

As is usual, some of the Judges publish separate opinions.

*“... it is for the people to determine the destiny of the territory and not the territory the destiny of the people.”*¹²⁵

*“... it follows ... that the principle of self-determination could be dispensed with only if the free expression of the will of the people was found to be axiomatic in the sense that the result was known to be a foregone conclusion or that consultations had already taken place in some form or that special features of the case rendered it unnecessary.”*¹²⁶

*“... it cannot be denied that self-determination has, at the very least, attained a position of high normative regard, being seen as a peremptory norm with regard to the issue of decolonisation.”*¹²⁷

October 22nd, from Buenos Aires, Argentina’s Foreign Ministry issues a press statement with regard to the Shackleton mission.

“In response to the proposal made by the British Government to send a mission to the Islas Malvinas with the object of carrying out an economic and financial survey of the archipelago and the surrounding areas, the Ministry of External Relations and Worship states that:-

- 1) It reiterates in full the communique issued by the Foreign Ministry on 19 March 1975;*
- 2) Contrary to a report appearing in a London newspaper, the Argentine Government has on no occasion given its consent to the mission in question;*

123 *Self-determination in Disputed Colonial Territories* Jamie Trinidad 2018 p.56 & 58

124 *Falklands Facts and Fallacies: The Falkland Islands in History and International Law* Graham Pascoe 2020 p.317

125 Judge Dillard ICJ ref: 061-19751016-ADV-01-07

126 Judge Nagendra Singh quoted in Trinidad 2018 p.57

127 *Uti Possidetis: The Procrustean Bed of International Law?* M. Wesley 2017

3) *Since the question of the Malvinas Islands is subject to the procedure recommended by the United Nations General Assembly in its resolution 2065 (XX) and 3160 (XXVIII), the parties to the dispute must abstain from any new unilateral action affecting the basic aspects of the question. Any such action will undermine the clear objective of the resolutions in question and will be contrary to the spirit which has prevailed in all the dealings so far between the two countries concerning the archipelago, and also is unacceptable to the Argentine Government;*

4) *The mission which Great Britain proposes to send would not be welcome because investigations to assess the possibility of the economic exploration of the natural resources of the Malvinas Islands – resources which therefore belong to the Argentine Republic – would violate the principle of not undertaking new action. Consequently, the sending of this mission constitutes an inconsiderate act which the Argentine Foreign Ministry would not wish to interpret as an attitude of provocation because this would imply that Great Britain does not accept the normal continuation of bilateral negotiations, a fact which could have unforeseeable and certainly serious consequences for which Great Britain alone would be responsible;*

5) *The essential factor in the process of reaching a final settlement of the dispute is negotiation between the two Governments and hence the initiation of acts which may prejudice this process will upset relations between the Argentine Republic and Great Britain and will impede the achievement of a peaceful settlement of the Malvinas question;*

6) *Once more, Argentina urges Great Britain to take the view that negotiations to settle the dispute concerning sovereignty over the archipelago is the best procedure and is in conformity with the decisions of the United Nations and the recognized standards of the civilized world.”*

In Buenos Aires, Ambassador Ashe is summoned to the Foreign Ministry to be presented with a communique complaining that the Shackleton mission; “... represents a step not previously concerted with the Argentine Government.” Ashe responds that Robledo had been informed in September, but had raised no objection.

October 23rd, Ashe informs London, warning that Shackleton’s plans need to ensure that he does not pass through Argentina, as he would make a “sensational hostage.”¹²⁸

October 28th, Argentina's Ambassador to London, Manuel de Anchorena, is summoned back to Buenos Aires for ‘consultations.’

November 5th, in Buenos Aires, Anchorena and Ambassador Ashe meet. Anchorena complains about Britain’s insistence that Islander consent is required before any progress can be made; and the emphasis being placed upon their ‘wishes’ rather than their interests.¹²⁹

“It is of course impossible to rule a people according to their interests but against their wishes, since their wishes define what their interests are. Interests are not an objective reality; they are defined by the perspective of the person defining them.”¹³⁰

November 10th, Argentina’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs announces that Lord Shackleton will not be permitted to transit through Argentina.

128 FO 7/2961

129 FO 7/2954

130 Pascoe 2020 p.311

November 13th, Ashe meets with ex-Minister Robledo and his successor, Arauz Castex, to seek an explanation as to why Argentina suddenly objects to the economic survey. Why Robledo had not argued against the idea in September. Initially Robledo denies that Callaghan had mentioned the survey but then, on seeing the notes from the meeting, excuses himself by saying that there had been too much to take in at that time, and there had been no talk of appointing Lord Shackleton.¹³¹

November 14th, Britain's Embassy in Buenos Aires is informed that the research ship, *RSS Shackleton*, will require Argentine permission to carry out any activity within 200 miles of the Argentine coast. Also that 'Argentine waters' is being interpreted to include the area around the archipelago in accordance with "Argentine law."

Britain's Ambassador informs Foreign Secretary Callaghan.

*"So, what had seemed to be a very fruitful means of keeping the Argentines engaged, and recognising some of their legitimate interests in the waters around the Falklands, disappeared. The Argentine government raised a lot of difficulty about the Shackleton expedition,..."*¹³²

November 21st, in Buenos Aires, Britain's naval *attaché* receives a warning that *RSS Shackleton* will be 'arrested' if found in seas that Argentina claims as its own.

December 5th, at the UN, the Fourth Committee recommend that the Falklands issue be deferred till 1976.¹³³

December 8th, Britain informs the UN General Assembly that; "... exchanges between the United Kingdom Government and the Argentine Government have continued over the past year with a view to finding a settlement of the differences between us. In seeking a solution, my Government has said repeatedly that we wish to observe the terms of resolution 1514 (XV). It is therefore the wishes of the people of the island which must be paramount, not an arbitrary idea of what their interests might be..."

Britain's representative also informs the Assembly that all information regarding possible oil deposits around the Falklands have been shared with Argentina and that the UK has no intention of acting unilaterally.

"My Government has similarly informed the Argentine Government, as a courtesy about its proposal for a survey of the economy of the island, and we regret that this survey is apparently regarded by the Argentine Government as an unacceptable innovation."

Exercising a right of reply, Argentina's mission writes to the Secretary-General.

"The Argentine Government reserves its position regarding the responsibility which rests with the British Government for the breaking-off of negotiations and will not fail to assert its rights in the form which it deems most appropriate."

*"... The limits of our patience and tolerance must not be underestimated should we be confronted with an obstinate and unjustified refusal to negotiate."*¹³⁴

December 17th, during an International Economic Cooperation conference in Paris, France, James Callaghan talks to Arauz Castex. Callaghan indicates his belief that progress can be made concerning economic co-operation.

131 Donaghy 2014. Neither side had taken an interpreter for the September meeting.

132 James Callaghan quoted in Charlton 1989 p.47

133 *UN Yearbook 1975*

134 Ortiz de Rozas in *La Nacion* December 12, 1975

Castex suggests that if Argentine scientists are added to Shackleton's team, it would change the surveys image in Argentina. Callaghan expressed his doubts, but agrees to put the proposal to Lord Shackleton.

December 18th, Shackleton agrees to accept the addition of a small Argentine contingent to his team. Informed, Castex, suggests that a retired Argentine Admiral, Jose Alvarez, be added to the party, but demands that he be given the position of 'deputy leader.' Castex also adds that Shackleton's conclusions, to be sent to both Governments, must be followed by sovereignty negotiations. Secretary Callaghan offers to take Alvarez on as 'chief Argentine scientist', but declines to reopen talks. Minister Arauz Castex protests. ¹³⁵

December 29th, Shackleton's team arrive in Brazil; from where he and his team join HMS *Endurance*. ¹³⁶

"... the mission was composed of five experts entrusted with assessing and making recommendations concerning the prospects for development in oil, minerals, fisheries, wool and alginates. The mission was further requested to advise on the need for capital expenditure over the next five years, and to assess the financial and social implications of any recommendations." ¹³⁷

1976 – January 2nd, Argentina's Government issues a statement asserting; *"... that the United Kingdom representatives had finally stated that they were not in a position to accept the reopening of negotiations aimed at solving the dispute on sovereignty;..."*

"(Shackleton) was portrayed as a 'pirate and buccaneer' to his evident delight." ¹³⁸

January 3rd, Shackleton and HMS *Endurance* arrive off Stanley, 143 years after Capt. Onslow in HMS *Clio*. Castex describes the timing as *"unfriendly and unthoughtful."* ¹³⁹ The Minister adds that, if the British Government refuses to resume negotiations, then the two countries are; *"... rapidly moving towards a head-on collision ... his Government could accept no responsibility for such a disastrous outcome."*

January 8th, in London, intelligence reports suggest that an invasion remains unlikely.

"... the JIC assessed that a sudden invasion was unlikely, but that there was an increased likelihood of Argentine political and economic action against British interests and that, as the sequence of Argentine measures proceeded, the possibility of military operations must be regarded as that much nearer." ¹⁴⁰

January 12th, Callaghan writes to Castex, referring to the dispute as *"sterile."* ¹⁴¹

"Great Britain, ... contrary to the letter and the spirit of Resolution 2065, at the beginning of 1976, insisted upon the right of self-determination of the Malvinas, refused to discuss the problem in-depth and attempted to replace the subject of sovereignty with Argentine-British economic cooperation in the region of the south-western Atlantic." ¹⁴²

As military aircraft overfly the Islands, Argentina suggests that Britain's Ambassador be recalled; *"... the Argentine Government have evidently reached the conclusion that they must make a gesture."* ¹⁴³

135 *Pink Ice: Britain and the South Atlantic Empire* K. Dodds 2002 p.151. Also Donaghy 2014

136 The original plan was that the team join *Endurance* at Montevideo. However, Uruguay was unwilling to offend Argentina, at least publicly. It was later claimed in South America's Press that *Endurance* waited at Montevideo for the arrival of Shackleton in Brazil, before sailing to meet an airlift. Other sources suggest that the team boarded the British ship at Montevideo as planned, but under some secrecy.

137 *UN Doc A3125/Rev.1 vol.4*

138 Hastings & Jenkins 1997

139 Onslow actually arrived on January 2nd, 1833 but did not cause Argentina's flag to be lowered until the 3rd. *cf.* 1833

140 Baroness Young in *HL Deb 25 January 1983 vol.438 cc136-247*

141 *The Falklands, Politics and War* G. M. Dillon 1989

142 General Juan E. Gugliamelli in *Estrategia* No. 43-44 1977

143 *FO 7/3208*

January 14th, in London, Foreign Secretary James Callaghan makes a statement to Parliament.

*“Our traditional friendship with Argentina is marred only by issues arising from the Argentine claim to sovereignty over the Falkland Islands, whose inhabitants wish to remain British. Successive British Governments have undertaken to respect their wishes. ... As the House is aware, the Argentine Government have stated that the Argentine ambassador, who returned to Argentina in October, will remain in Buenos Aires until further notice and that, in view of the present state of affairs over the Falklands question, it would be advisable for the British Government to withdraw our Ambassador. ... I shall shortly be recalling Her Majesty's ambassador for consultations.”*¹⁴⁴

*“Mr. Callaghan noted that the HMS Endurance of the Royal Navy was in the vicinity of the archipelago and that two other vessels were ready to proceed there,...”*¹⁴⁵

*“In a press interview the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Argentina said that the decision to request the recall of the United Kingdom Ambassador did not mean a break in diplomatic relations with that country.”*¹⁴⁶

*“Staff who remained ..., monitored these reports but they concluded that the tenor of press comment was predictable and that the Argentine Government seemed willing to control displays of anti-British sentiment. There had been no threats or demonstrations against the Embassy itself, for example, and no repetition of Cronica's invasion campaign of December 1974.”*¹⁴⁷

January 15th, in Argentina, Arauz Castex, is dismissed and replaced as Foreign Minister by Raul Quijano.

In London, on the same day, members of Britain's Foreign Office discuss the possibility that a prospect of oil exploration may sway the attitudes of the Islanders towards Argentina.

*“Some in the FCO saw oil primarily – in the words of one official – as ‘a lever to cajole the Islanders into accepting that there could be ... benefit from closer relations with Argentina’. ...”*¹⁴⁸

January 19th, Ambassador Ashe is recalled to London.

January 23rd, an FCO official complains about the Falkland Islands Committee's effectiveness in Parliament.

*“... their ability to manipulate a dedicated and vocal parliamentary lobby could limit severely HMG's room for manoeuvre.”*¹⁴⁹

February 4th, in the South Atlantic, an Argentine destroyer, *Almirante Storni*, attempts to stop and 'arrest' the unarmed RRS *Shackleton*. The British ship is 78 miles south of Stanley and some 450 miles east of the Argentine coast. The Argentine commander instructs the British vessel to steer for Ushuaia. Capt. Philip Warne radios the Governor in Stanley before responding.

“We are not in Argentine waters; we are more than 200 miles from the Argentine mainland and the British Government does not recognise these as Argentine waters. I have no intention of stopping.”

Shots are fired across *Shackleton*'s bows; an action observed by helicopters from HMS *Endurance*.

144 HC Deb 14 January 1976 vol.903 cc391

145 Permanent Representative of Argentina to the Chairman of the Special Committee on Decolonization May 6th 1976

146 UN Doc A3125/Rev.1 vol.4.

147 Dillon 1989

148 Livingstone 2018 citing *Heap to Hall January 15, 1976 FCO 7/3234*

149 *Hall to Carless January 23, 1976 FCO 7/3232*

“... an instruction was given for the vessel *Shackleton* to be intercepted for the purpose of inspecting the vessel. On 4 February the Argentine naval destroyer *Almirante Storni* approached the *Shackleton* and told it to stop its engines and to permit boarding for inspection, as is customary in these cases. The captain of the United Kingdom ship continued his course, disregarding the instruction and thus endangering the lives of the crew and the safety of the ship. In accordance with existing rules, warning shots were fired from small arms, but, in the knowledge that the United Kingdom vessel was carrying explosives and in order to exercise maximum prudence, the commander of the Argentine vessel was instructed not to use force., as would have been appropriate in the circumstances. The reckless and provocative attitude of the British captain is clearly indicative of the intention to conceal the activities in which the *Shackleton* had been engaged.”¹⁵⁰

“... to fire five shots at an unarmed research ship, and to threaten to fire to hit it, cannot be said to be part of a "peaceful solution" as required under Resolution 2065 – Argentina was treating Resolution 2065 as void.”¹⁵¹

Throughout the time it takes to sail to Stanley, RSS *Shackleton* is continually harassed by the *Almirante Storni* and by Argentine aircraft. One of these, a *Neptune*, flies at mast height above the British vessel. *Almirante Storni* only breaks away some six miles from the archipelago.¹⁵²

“London's intelligence sources later confirmed that the plan to intercept the vessel had been in existence for about six weeks prior to the incident, and that the action had been inspired by the armed forces rather than the Argentine Government. The JIC concluded, nevertheless, that Argentina's military commanders were opposed to military invasion and that a policy of 'continued pin-pricks' rather than a precipitated attack was likely.”¹⁵³

With Ambassador Ashe now in London, the *charge d'affaires* in Buenos Aires, John Shakespeare, receives instructions to register a formal protest. At the same time, Shakespeare is summoned by Argentina's Foreign Ministry to see the new Foreign Minister, Raul Quijano.

“I had not been with him more than thirty seconds before I realised that he in fact had summoned me to hand over an Argentine protest.”¹⁵⁴

“When the *charge d'affaires* sought an explanation in Buenos Aires, he discovered that the new Foreign Minister Raul Quijano had pre-empted his visit... Quijano blamed the British government for the incident...”¹⁵⁵

Shakespeare tells Quijano that the British Government; “... took the gravest view of the incident which, in other times, might well have been regarded as an act of war.”

In London, Argentina's *chargé d'affaires* is also summoned to the Foreign Office to receive Britain's protest. The *chargé*, Rafael Gowland, claims that the incident took place within Argentine waters.

February 5th, the incident is reported to Parliament by Edward Rowlands.

“The incident took place 78 miles south of Cape Pembroke as "*Shackleton*" was returning from a period of scientific work in the South-West Atlantic under an international programme. On learning of the incident, my right hon. Friend immediately instructed the *chargé d'affaires* at Buenos Aires to deliver

150 Permanent Representative of Argentina to the Secretary-General of the United Nations February 23rd 1976

151 Pascoe 2020 p.316

152 *The Falkland Islands as an International Problem* P. J. Beck 1987. Anecdotal accounts suggest that the two vessels came close enough together for the British sailors to respond by throwing turnips and potatoes at *Almirante Storni*'s crew. *Endurance*'s Captain, Philip Warne, subsequently received an OBE. Following this incident, an extension to the deployment of HMS *Endurance* was approved by Britain's Ministry of Defence together with the deployment of a support vessel from the Royal Fleet Auxiliary.

153 Dillon 1989. The same policy that Argentina had employed in the 1930s.

154 Quoted in Donaghy 2014

155 Donaghy 2014

the strongest protest to the Argentine Government and to request that the Argentine destroyer immediately be ordered to stop harassing the "Shackleton". I also protested to the Argentine chargé here in equally vigorous terms. The Argentine Government have been left in no doubt of the serious view we take of this incident."¹⁵⁶

Argentina responds to the UK's protest with a formal note verbale.¹⁵⁷

*"The Ministry of Foreign Affairs ... has the honour to refer to the activities of the British ship Shackleton in maritime areas under the jurisdiction of the Argentine Republic. The Argentine Government is aware of the fact that the said ship has been engaged in scientific research activities geophysical and geological surveys – on the Argentine continental shelf, without having complied with the prior requirements of Argentine legislation on the matter, which is in conformity with existing international law. In view of these activities an Argentine naval vessel told it to stop, with a view to exercising the right to inspect and board. This order was disregarded by the British vessel, which thus incurred another violation of the pertinent law. ... The situation is all the more serious in that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Worship had already reminded the Embassy, in its note of 14 November 1975, that if the planned research activities were to be conducted, the requirements of Argentine law must be respected, which was not done. In view of the foregoing, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Worship lodges the most formal and vigorous protest of the Argentine Government and demands, without prejudice to the continued exercise of the rights on which it is relying, that the British Government take measures to punish those responsible and to prevent the recurrence of such acts."*¹⁵⁸

In London, Britain's Defence Secretary agrees "reluctantly" to keep *Endurance* in service for at least another year.¹⁵⁹

February 6th, the UK writes to the President of the UN Security Council complaining of; "... an unlawful, and dangerous action by a warship of the Republic of Argentina against the Royal Research Ship *Shackleton* peacefully in passage on the high seas ... engaged in scientific research connected with the theories of the continental drift and was a British contribution to the International Geodynamics Project." The letter contains a demand that Argentina "... refrain from further harassment on the high seas of peaceful vessels in contravention of recognized international law, and reserved the right to request at a later stage appropriate action by the Security Council on this matter."

In Buenos Aires, the newspaper *La Nacion* reports.

"In spite of a request by the Command of Naval Operations, the Navy was not allowed to take more drastic action."

*"In the short term the incident prompted not only the precautionary deployment of a British frigate to the area and a reprieve for HMS *Endurance* (whose presence in the region was threatened by the 1974 Defence Review) but also the resumption of more meaningful negotiations on sovereignty."*¹⁶⁰

156 *HC Deb 05 February 1976 vol.904 cc1414-7*

157 A diplomatic communication drafted in the third person and unsigned. This is more formal than an *aide-memoire* but less formal than a *note*.

158 *UN Doc A3125/Rev.1 vol.4 Appendix II*

159 As ever, Britain's defence budget was under scrutiny and there was little support within the MoD for keeping a ship in the South Atlantic.

160 Beck 1987

February 9th, on completing their mission, the Shackleton team return to the UK.

February 10th, in New York, Argentina also complains to the UN Security Council of a; “... *serious violation of the legislation concerning Argentine maritime jurisdiction committed by the United Kingdom vessel Shackleton in consequence of the scientific-geophysical and geological research activities undertaken by that vessel on the Argentine continental shelf which were clearly directed towards geological surveying, with a view to the exploitation of hydrocarbons, if found.*”

February 11th, Edward Rowlands flies into the USA with instructions to inform Minister Quijano, and the UN, that the British are fully prepared to defend the Islands with force if necessary.

*“In February 1976 the chiefs of staff produced a paper on military options. It was the first of four such papers. According to the report all were similar in scope and the language used was substantially the same. Having noted the limitations of the airstrip at Port Stanley and other difficulties, the 1976 paper continued, it would not be practicable to provide, transport and support the force necessary in the Islands to ensure that a determined Argentine attempt to eject the British garrison was unsuccessful.”*¹⁶¹

*“At their rendezvous on 11 February, Quijano assured Rowlands that British ships would not be harassed ‘provided they took no survey work in the critical area’... Quijano wanted to return the dialogue along the lines of earlier formulas. Yet he did not suggest any particular proposal... Quijano was open to the idea of returning the ambassadors once a basis for resuming talks had been reached.”*¹⁶²

“On 11 February Ted Rowlands,.. held talks with the Argentine Foreign Minister in New York. He was instructed to ascertain Argentina's views on future sovereignty discussions and restate that the Islands would be defended. ... Ted Rowlands commented eleven years later that the Government had, “... no clear goal... [we] had to feel our way.””¹⁶³

February 17th, Argentine newspaper newspaper, *La Nacion*, reports that the British Government, in a *quid pro quo*, has promised that RRS *Shackleton* will not operate in Argentine waters. A report immediately denied by Rowlands.

Argentina writes to the UN’s Special Committee on Decolonisation disputing the UK's interpretation of UN General Assembly resolutions.

*“In presenting its case, the United Kingdom ... persists in citing resolution 2065 (XX) and 3160 (XXVIII) in such a way as to suggest that the question of the Malvinas is one involving self-determination. Both of these resolutions clearly refer to the "interests" of the population of the islands and not to its "wishes". When it is considered that Argentina was deprived of the islands by an illegitimate act of force, it becomes clear that the governing principle here is that of territorial integrity ... to take any other view would mean accepting this act of force, which also entailed the expulsion of the indigenous Argentine population and its replacement by subjects of the colonial Power.”*¹⁶⁴

161 Baroness Young in *HL Deb 25 January 1983 vol.438 cc136-247*

162 Donaghy 2014

163 Ellerby 1990 p.212 citing Rowlands interview with Charlton, *The Little Platoon (BBC Radio 3)*, broadcast on 3.5.87

164 *A/AC.109/520*. Those settlers to be found on East Falkland (Soledad) Island in 1833 were from France, Germany, Britain, Uruguay and the Argentine Confederation. They were most certainly not 'indigenous.' Nor were the members of the garrison from Buenos Aires, the only 'population' to be told to leave. *cf.* 1833

February 19th, in Britain, the Chiefs of Staff inform the government that it is not feasible to establish and maintain a garrison in the Falklands, capable of repulsing a determined Argentine attack. ¹⁶⁵

March 3rd, at the UN, and responding to Argentina's February letter, the UK tells the Special Committee on Decolonization that it does; "... *not accept that resolutions 2065 and 3160 entail a commitment ... to transfer sovereignty over the Falkland Islands. ... (and) they cannot agree to any settlement of those differences which is not in accordance with the wishes of the Islanders...*" ¹⁶⁶

"It may also be helpful (to) comment on the incident in 1833, ... when British sovereignty was confirmed. In January 1833, a British naval vessel peaceably reasserted British sovereignty, which was first established in 1765. ... It is a demonstrable fact that since 1833, that is to say for nearly a century-and-a-half, a period which, coincides very closely with the period during which the nation States of Latin America have been able to assert their own right to self-determination, the United Kingdom has maintained an open, continuous, effective and peaceful possession of the Falkland Islands." ¹⁶⁷

Researcher's Comment: Worthy of note as there have been remarkably few references by the British Government recalling the history of the British in the Falklands. English involvement in the Falkland islands actually goes back to 1592 – over 400 years of history. Argentina has hardly been in existence for half that.

March 4th, in London, Foreign Secretary Callaghan, after speaking to Lord Shackleton, suggests that the runway on East Falkland Island is extended. Reg Prentice, the Minister for Overseas Development, from whose budget the costs are likely to come, is less than enthusiastic.

"Shackleton pointed out privately that a longer runway would make rapid troop deployment possible in the event of a threatened invasion from the mainland." ¹⁶⁸

March 10th, following a review of policy initiated by James Callaghan, Britain's Cabinet approves proposals for fresh dialogue with Argentina on all aspects of the dispute. Including the possibility of Anglo-Argentine economic co-operation in the South West Atlantic, and *"the nature of a hypothetical future constitutional relationship."* ¹⁶⁹

"Any agreement we reach eventually with the Argentines will still be subject to the islanders' concurrence..." ¹⁷⁰

"... the then Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary was given a mandate to send a personal message to the Argentine Foreign Minister proposing that the two governments should start a fresh dialogue..." ¹⁷¹

"The closest Argentina has yet come to military action against the Falklands was in the months before the 1976 coup, ie at a time when the Government of the day were anxious to divert attention from internal problems. The heat was only taken out of the Falklands dispute in 1976 when HMG showed a willingness to negotiate." ¹⁷²

"As the Cabinet prepared to launch a fresh initiative to discuss the sovereignty of the Falkland Islands with Argentina in March 1976, the FCO's speaking notes for Foreign secretary James Callaghan warned that if

165 Ellerby 1990 p.212

166 Quoted in *UN Yearbook 1976*

167 *Ibid. cf.* 2012

168 Hastings & Jenkins 1997

169 Franks 1983 para.48

170 Callaghan memorandum quoted in *FO 7/3198*

171 Hugh Carless memorandum in *FO 7/3201* at 304a

172 *ALW 0420/325/1 (FCO 07-3801)* entitled *UK/Argentina dispute over the Falkland Islands – Policy 1980*

*Britain did not start serious negotiations, Argentina might attack the Islands or ‘a lesser but still harmful option open to the Argentines would be to terminate... valuable contracts for the equipment of their navy and merchant marine’. The rather strange logic was that the Argentine military posed a threat to the Falkland Islands; therefore talks should be pursued which would then enable Britain to sell more military equipment to Argentina.”*¹⁷³

March 18th, in London, a Cabinet meeting considers making an offer of talks to Argentina.¹⁷⁴

*“... the Labour cabinet agreed, on March 1976, to offer talks on sovereignty or ‘the nature of a hypothetical relationship’, with a view to offering Argentina a leaseback.”*¹⁷⁵

March 23rd, Argentina is informed of the willingness of the British government to enter into new talks, although it is made clear that discussions are to be on a ‘*without prejudice*’ basis. Also that - “*at the appropriate stage*” - the British delegation will include Islander representation.

*“Leaseback was not mentioned, I may say, at any time to the Argentines, even though I was prepared to consider it...”*¹⁷⁶

On the same day, the *International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights* (1966) comes into force.¹⁷⁷

“Article 1 – All peoples have the right of self-determination. By virtue of that right they freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development....

*Article 3 – The States Parties to the present Covenant, including those having responsibility for the administration of Non-Self-Governing and Trust Territories, shall promote the realization of the right of self-determination, and shall respect that right, in conformity with the provisions of the Charter...”*¹⁷⁸

*“Self-determination was thereby confirmed as a right of all peoples including those of non-self governing territories, and it became an obligation on states responsible for such territories to promote” the realization of the right of self-determination” for the peoples living in them. ... Thus Britain is obliged to promote external self-determination for the Falkland Islanders. To hand the islands to Argentina would be a breach of that obligation...”*¹⁷⁹

Argentina declines to ratify the Covenant as it objects to the emphasis on the right of self determination.¹⁸⁰

March 24th, Argentina’s President, Isabella Perón, is ousted in a military coup.

*“The Argentines have long held that they have only two possible policies: negotiation or invasion. We believe that invasion was spoken of, though not prepared for, during the last confused weeks of Isabel Perón’s administration.”*¹⁸¹

173 Livingstone 2018 citing *Speaking Notes for Secretary of State OPD(76)14: The Falkland Islands: Future Policy March 10, 1976 FCO 7/3198*

174 CAB 128/58/11

175 Livingstone 2018. Not entirely supported by other evidence. See below.

176 Callaghan interviewed in Charlton 1989 p.53

177 See December 16, 1966 & May 20, 1976. See also <https://treaties.un.org/doc/publication/unts/volume%20999/volume-999-i-14668-english.pdf>

178 The UK ratified the Covenant on May 20, 1976. See

[https://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/RES/2200\(XXI\)](https://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/RES/2200(XXI))

179 Pascoe 2020 p.312

180 Argentina eventually ratified the covenant on August 8, 1986. See below.

181 Hugh Carless *memorandum* in FO 7/3201 at 304a

A junta consisting of General Jorge Rafael Videla, Brigadier-General Orlando Agosti and Admiral Emilio Massera take command of the country. Videla takes the position of President with Admiral César Guzzetti as Foreign Minister.

*“The military closed Congress, banned political parties, dissolved the Supreme Court and arrested dozens of ‘left-wingers’, including former ministers, in pre-dawn raid, while hundreds of others simply disappeared... The day before the military took power, the British Government had given a message to the Argentine foreign minister offering secret talks on the Falklands. The Foreign Office’s top priority, therefore, on hearing of Isabel Peron’s overthrow, was to recognise the regime ‘as soon as practicable’ in order to ensure that Argentina’s new military leaders did not make Britain’s secret communication public.”*¹⁸²

Admiral Massera immediately proposes an invasion of the Falkland Islands – *Plan Goa*. This plan requires a surprise landing on the archipelago; the removal of the existing population to Montevideo and the introduction of Argentine settlers which would; “... neatly reverse the 1833 action and forestall any wrangling about the status of the islanders under Argentine rule.”¹⁸³

*“In Argentina there was a military coup on 24 March 1976, the sixth in the 20th century after those of 1930, 1943, 1955, 1962 and 1966. The armed forces seized power and set up a government with sinister Fascist leanings under a three-man military junta. The junta soon began to press the Falklands issue at the United Nations...”*¹⁸⁴

Concerned about Britain's submarine force, Massera's plan is not adopted by the junta.

*“The Argentine Government was in financial and political difficulties. General Jorge Videla, the Junta's leader, instituted a 'Process of National reorganization'. All forms of opposition to the regime – encompassing liberals, communists and trade unionists – were liquidated. In 1977 Amnesty International published a report on a mission to Argentina the previous November which accused the military of committing atrocities (by 1982 the 'dirty war' is estimated to have resulted in 20,000 arrests, 11,000 murders and 2 million people fleeing the country).”*¹⁸⁵

March 26th, Britain gives formal recognition to the new Argentine government.

*“The period since the overthrow of Perón in 1955 had been one of instability, growing social unrest, and a downward-spiraling economy. The British community deteriorated during this time, not only because of the financial strains it endured, but also due to cases of violent persecution. By the early 1970s, several left-wing armed guerrilla factions, and their right-wing counterparts (notably, the "Triple A" death squad), had been established. Members of the British community and their institutions became targets of terrorist acts, such as kidnapping and murder – generally from left-wing groupings – which explains why many in the community greeted the March 1976 coup with a sense of relief. The new Junta vowed to put an end to guerrilla terrorism; they would also implement a neoliberal economic system that favored many Anglo-Argentine business leaders.”*¹⁸⁶

182 *Britain and the Dictatorships of Argentina and Chile 1973-82* Grace Livingstone 2018 citing *Carless to Lamour March 26, 1976 FCO 7/3027*

183 Hastings & Jenkins 1997 p.39

184 Pascoe 2020 p.319

185 Ellerby 1990 p.212

186 *War of the British Worlds: The Anglo-Argentines and the Falklands* Ezequiel Mercau 2016 in *Journal of British Studies* vol. 55 January 2016 pp.145 – 168

April 5th, in Britain, James Callaghan takes over as Prime Minister following the resignation of Harold Wilson with Anthony Crosland as Foreign Secretary. Speaking in Parliament, Viscount Boyd refers to the rights of the Islanders; quoting a Canadian newspaper.

*“Somewhere in the Third World there must be hidden away the secret rules about who is entitled to self-determination. One suspects that they consist of just one rule and one exception. The rule seems to be that any colonial territory, however minuscule, is not only entitled to independence but obliged to demand it. The exception simply states that European populated territories are different.”*¹⁸⁷

In Argentina, the junta introduce a compulsory course on geopolitics in Argentine secondary schools designed to teach students about; *'Argentine National Sovereignty'*.¹⁸⁸

*“The new government has made a most promising start and hardly put a foot wrong during its first month in power.”*¹⁸⁹

*“Prime Minister Callaghan decided to undertake a major policy review. He suggested a fresh dialogue with Argentina on all aspects of the dispute, including possible economic cooperation and “the nature of a hypothetical future constitutional relationship”...”*¹⁹⁰

April 12th, in London, the FCO propose that Britain’s Ambassador return to Buenos Aires.

*“The Foreign Office had suggested reinstating a British ambassador to Argentina less than a month after the March 1976 coup, but Labour minister Ted Rowlands wanted to wait to see how talks on the Falklands progressed.”*¹⁹¹

April 29th, from Buenos Aires, Argentina’s new Foreign Minister responds to Britain’s March 23rd message.

*“Unlike his predecessor, Guzzetti sought clarification on the phrase about the future relationship between the Falklands and Argentina. He also ruled out the return of ambassadors until a basis for a new dialogue had been reached. Guzzetti did not object to islanders participating as part of a British delegation in talks over economic cooperation. However, this did not extend ... (to) sovereignty.”*¹⁹²

In **May**, elections are held for seats on the Falklands Legislative Council.

“Some 1,119 persons voted, representing 13.8 per cent of the electorate. ... Following the elections, the Governor nominated H. L. Bound and A. B. Hadden as members of the Legislative Council.”

In London, Lord Shackleton presents his 400-page report which, contrary to the previous assertions of the FCO, reveals that the Islands are not only self-supporting but make a profit for the Exchequer. Shackleton estimates that UK based companies had made a 4 million GBP *'profit'* between 1950 and 1970, even after defence costs, subsidies and grants had been taken into account.

“As the Shackleton Report showed (section 10.4), Britain exploited the Falklands for decades and made a handsome profit out of them, while at the same time strangling their growth and increasing the hardship of the Falkland Islanders. For over a century British officials filled the important executive positions and treated the

187 *Falkland Islanders cling to Britain* in the *Alberta* newspaper. *HL Deb* 20 April 1977 vol.382 cc222-66

188 Dodds 2002 p.161

189 *Shakespeare to FCO April 24, 1976 FCO 7/3034* quoted in Livingstone 2018. Shakespeare was Britain’s top official in the Buenos Aires Embassy at that time.

190 *Peaceful Territorial Change* Arie Marcelo Kacowiz 1994 p.155

191 Livingstone 2018 p.152 citing *Carless to Larmour April 12, 1976 FCO 7/3029*

192 Donaghy 2014

*Falklands like any other colonial territory in the British Empire, discriminating against the native-born islanders and keeping them out of participation in decision making.”*¹⁹³

Researcher's Comment: A huge surprise and the cause of much consternation at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, which would attempt to suppress the report. Lord Shackleton would be given an opportunity to update his report after the war of 1982.

Shackleton's report criticises the powers that the Falkland Islands Company has to make decisions affecting the lives of the Islanders. Noting that between 1951 and 1974 absentee landowners had taken £11.5 million more in profit than they had invested. Shackleton recommends public-investment projects totalling £13 million, in addition to the cost of the proposed runway.

*“A lot of the report was about the tremendous opportunities and enormous potential for development... our particular appreciation of the Shackleton Report... was that it would be just frankly physically, politically, militarily impossible to adopt. It was a grand scale concept of development without any form of negotiated settlement on the other issues.”*¹⁹⁴

May 7th, from Buenos Aires, Britain's *charge d'affaires*, Shakespeare, considers Shackleton's conclusions.

*“It will be highly unpalatable... It will hardly escape their notice that the whole thrust of the report's recommendations is in the direction of greater self-sufficiency for the Falkland Islands and thus greater independence from Argentina – the opposite, in fact, of what Argentina and, paradoxically, HMG have been trying to achieve...”*¹⁹⁵

*“Argentina wallows in a legalistic and declarative policy on the South Atlantic, ill-designed to profit from the crucial point made by Lord Shackleton that the Falkland Islands were neither economically nor demographically feasible unless they integrated with Argentina.”*¹⁹⁶

May 20th, the United Kingdom ratifies the *International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights* (1966). Under the act of ratification, the terms of the ICCPR are extended to Britain's Overseas Territories – including the Falkland Islands.¹⁹⁷

“Article 1 – All peoples have the right of self-determination. By virtue of that right they freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development.

Article 2 – All peoples may, for their own ends, freely dispose of their natural wealth and resources without prejudice to any obligations arising out of international economic co-operation, based upon the principle of mutual benefit, and international law. In no case may a people be deprived of its own means of subsistence.

Article 3 – The States Parties to the present Covenant, including those having responsibility for the administration of Non-Self-Governing and Trust Territories, shall promote the realization of the right of self-determination, and shall respect that right, in conformity with the provisions of the Charter...”

193 Pascoe 2020 p.296

194 Ted Rowlands interviewed in Charlton 1989 p.48

195 Shakespeare to Crosland May 7, 1976 in FO 7/3226

196 Macri's victory – the first election won by the establishment: Argentina now to be managed by its proprietors Guillermo Makin 2015. Nearly 40 years later, Shackleton remained misunderstood.

197 Argentina ratified in 1986.

Researcher's Comment: This was important. Self-determination as a concept had its roots in the First World War but only came to be accepted as a worthy concept after the 1945, with the formation of the United Nations. However, Britain in the 1940s and 1950s had been reluctant to see self-determination as anything other than a general principle and the adoption of the Covenant by the UN in 1966 was not welcomed by the UK. Ten years later, and still rather reluctantly, Britain came to the realisation that self-determination had to be accepted as a right. A human right. In many ways British apprehension was well founded as self-determination was more than capable of complicating international relationships. A simple idea. A dangerous simple idea. People power.

May 24th, at the Foreign Office in London, a policy paper is drawn up by Hugh Carless, on Britain's relations with the new regime in Argentina. This is sent to Rowlands.

"The ideal policy objective was to 'establish an across-the-board dialogue with Argentina ... with the aim of reducing the Falkland Islands dispute to more reasonable proportions'...." ¹⁹⁸

May 25th, Rowlands speaks to Lord Shackleton regarding the report's conclusions.

"Rowlands felt it was a fantasy to consider proposals without close cooperation from Argentina, and spelled out to Shackleton the international political repercussions which could arise." ¹⁹⁹

June 2nd, in Buenos Aires, *charge d'affairs* Shakespeare is informed by the Foreign Ministry that the junta wish to reopen talks. The Ministry suggest that a forthcoming conference in Paris may present a suitable opportunity.

June 10th, in Santiago, US Secretary Kissinger and Argentine Foreign Minister Guzzetti meet to discuss their country's relationship. Guzzetti tells Kissinger; *"Until now, the United States Government has abstained on the Falkland Island issue. The issue is very important to Argentina. We hope that the United States Government would reconsider its position and help us."* Kissinger responds; *"It is difficult for us to get involved... But I suspect that, even so, over time the problem can be solved. The original purpose of the British presence is no longer being served by the Falklands, which are no longer necessary to protect sea lanes."* Guzzetti answers; *"That is true, but what troubles us is that Great Britain wants self-determination for 2,000 people – and 1,600 of them are employees of the Falkland Island Company. This is not a question of historic rights. So long as this uncertain situation is unresolved it can always be complicated by collateral issues."* ²⁰⁰

June 11th, in London, Rowlands notes that Lord Shackleton's report is likely; *"... to embarrass and endanger HMG's policy of opening a new dialogue with Argentina... the inference that any Argentine government will draw is that this report is nothing more than an assertion of British sovereignty forever and a day."* ²⁰¹

On the same day, the FCO respond to the junta's requests for talks in Paris. In Buenos Aires, Shakespeare tells the Argentine Foreign Ministry that the British Government agrees to a conversation taking place provided that such is as; *"informal and free-ranging as possible."* Most importantly any conversation has to be, *"in confidence."* Ezequiel Pereyra responds that his delegation will be briefed only to cover the issue of sovereignty in any depth.

June 22nd, Shackleton acknowledges that his views are *"not palatable,"* coming at an, *"awkward moment."* ²⁰²

198 Livingstone 2018 citing *Carless to PS/Rowlands May 24, 1976 FCO 7/3029*

199 Donaghy 2014

200 *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976, Documents on South America, 1973-1976 Memorandum of Conversation, Santiago, June 10, 1976 8:10-9:15am*

201 *Rowlands to Croskland, June 11, 1976 in FO 7/3200*

202 Freedman 2005 vol.1 p.45

Under pressure from the Foreign Office, Lord Shackleton agrees to amend his introduction to the report. The revised introduction is to include a paragraph acknowledging a need for cooperation with Argentina. ²⁰³

June 29th, an FCO official, Hall, submits his thoughts on how handle the Falkland Islands Committee.

“We should not underestimate these people. They are skilled and persistent interrogators ... but they have a human weakness for flattery – which may be of use, must be subtle and I would like to see a rather broader based contact with them. A little pretence at consultation and some modest hospitality ... might pay dividends.” ²⁰⁴

In early **July** in London, Falkland Islanders hold meetings with MPs and the Foreign Office. They are not told of the Anglo-Argentine meeting due to take place in Paris. ²⁰⁵

July 10th, in Paris, delegates from Britain and Argentina sit down for informal, exploratory, talks. Argentina’s Deputy Foreign Minister, Gualter Allara, proposes that the two countries return to the idea of a joint administration of the Islands, similar to the previously abandoned condominium. Britain’s Robin Edmonds points out that Islander objection caused this to fail and that the Islands lobby could not easily be ignored. A copy of Lord Shackleton’s report is handed over to the Argentine team.

“The exploratory talks ... have so far remained strictly confidential and we have not informed the Islanders. They have been of use in initiating the fresh dialogue proposed by the then Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary in March ... the Argentines have predictably concentrated on moving towards their aim of bringing us to negotiate about the transfer of sovereignty. But, in contrast to their Peronist predecessors, they have shown some understanding of our position. In particular, they seem to accept that future discussions/negotiations should cover our theme of economic co-operation ... as well as their theme of sovereignty – which we have so far insisted on referring to as “the nature of a hypothetical future constitutional relationship between Argentina and the Falkland Islands.” ...” ²⁰⁶

July 13th, Minister Allara travels to Britain to speak to Rowlands. An agreement is reached that negotiations on the future of the Falklands should resume in August.

July 20th, in Britain, Shackleton’s report is published. Lord Shackleton speaks to the Press.

“In recent years instead of the Islands living on Great Britain, Great Britain has been living on the Islands. More has come out as taxes than has gone in as aid.”

“Shackleton rejected at a news conference the idea that development was doomed without Argentine collaboration but thought it would be “foolish” not to seek it.” ²⁰⁷

On the same day, the Argentine Minister of Finance is treated to lunch at No. 11 Downing Street by Britain’s Chancellor of the Exchequer, Dennis Healey. ²⁰⁸

“British banks, including Lloyds, Barclays, Midland and Natwest, showed their confidence in the new regime by offering US\$60m of new loans to the Argentine junta.” ²⁰⁹

203 Donaghy 2014

204 Hall to Sindall, Carless and Edmonds June 29, 1976 FCO 7/3232 quoted in Livingstone 2018. Various Committee members seem to have been wooed by the FCO at private dinners and meetings, without obvious effect.

205 *The Friends of the Falkland Islands: Newsletter* Nov 1976

206 Hugh Carless memorandum in FO 7/3201 at 304a

207 Ellerby 1990 p.205

208 Martinez de Hoz was on a tour of Europe in an attempt to persuade creditors to reschedule his country’s debts.

209 Livingstone 2018

August 2nd, Geoffrey Crossley, Britain's Ambassador to Colombia, writes to the FCO.

*"It is ludicrous that the interests of less than 2000 persons... should be allowed to be a thorn in the flesh of Anglo-Latin American relations... Surely the time has come for HMG to let the inhabitants of the Islands know that they are a nuisance..."*²¹⁰

August 7th, *in-camera* negotiations between Britain and Argentina are held aboard *Fragata Sarmiento*, at anchor off Buenos Aires. Argentina proposes a gradual transfer of sovereignty, with a provisional administration lasting for a single period of eight years under alternating British/Argentine Governors. Each serving for 2 years. Britain's delegation refer to the need for further Islander consultation.

*"What means were envisaged for ascertaining the views of the islanders both during the negotiations of the proposed Agreement and prior to the specified date?"*²¹¹

*"This question was avoided by the Argentines in their answer..."*²¹²

August 8th, talks continue off Buenos Aires. Minister Allara asserts that resolution 1514 limits the question to a matter of territorial integrity and that self-determination is inapplicable in this case. He considers the dispute, therefore, as a bilateral one that cannot involve the islanders, whose *interests*, only, may be considered. Allara adds that his proposals extend to the Dependencies.

*"At the second round of talks, the Argentines produced a paper proposing joint administration of the Islands to be followed, after 8 years, by the transfer of sovereignty to Argentina. As it stands, this paper is quite unacceptable..."*²¹³

*"... the British delegation made no written commitments. But Edmonds concluded by repeating that whatever the sovereignty model proposed, it would be examined by two interrelated criteria of great importance to the British government. (a) What was likely to be acceptable to the islanders? (b) What was likely to be acceptable to the British Parliament and public..."*²¹⁴

August 26th, in Britain, an article in *The Times* newspaper considers the Shackleton report and suggests that the Islands' Governor is in favour of an Argentine take-over.²¹⁵

September 14th, advice from the Foreign Office's legal advisers is sought and given.

*"... an agreement on the lines of the proposal as it now stands would contain an unconditional undertaking by HMG to cede the Islands on a specified future date. ... such an agreement could only be implemented by Act of Parliament,.. It would also be necessary to use an Act of Parliament if the new arrangements for the Falkland Islands had the effect of restricting the right of Parliament or the Sovereign to legislate for the territory, or were repugnant to any previous Act of Parliament..."*²¹⁶

September 17th, at the UN in New York, the Special Committee on Decolonization adopt a draft-resolution calling for the UK and Argentina to expedite negotiations concerning the dispute over sovereignty.

210 Crossley to Carless, August 2, 1976 in FO 7/3229

211 Quoted in FO 7/3201 at 283a

212 Legal advice in FO 7/3201 at 283a

213 Hugh Carless memorandum in FO 7/3201 at 304a

214 Donaghy 2014

215 Governor: *We must have cooperation with Argentina* Michael Frenchman *The Times* August 26, 1976

216 FO 7/3201 at 283a & 304a

Argentina lands a military expedition on Southern Thule, in the South Sandwich Islands. Twenty soldiers under the command of a Major. Weather and radio stations are established, jointly given the name Corbeta Uruguay. ²¹⁷

*“The idea of landing at Thule island allegedly dates back to 1974 and was first suggested to then president Juan Peron, by captain Juan Jose Lombardo (who later played a role as head of South Atlantic Theatre of Operations during the Falklands conflict). The purpose of such an action in the island of Thule was to test and assess the UK’s reaction. However Operation Sun did not receive the kick-off and full support until 1976, when a new military Junta was again in control of Argentina.”*²¹⁸

Researcher's Comment: An invasion. There is no other word for it. Southern Thule had been claimed by Britain since 1908. By Argentina only after 1938, although 1952 is legally the more correct. A secret. The action was covert and not published nor mentioned by Argentina in any forum.

At the end of the month, Argentina’s Minister for Marine Resources, Capt. Noe Guevara, visits the UK to discuss the purchase of ships and the regulation of fishing in the South Atlantic. During the visit, Guevara meets with the head of the FCO’s Polar Regions Section, John Heap. ²¹⁹

October 8th, in London, Hugh Carless submits an assessment of the situation for the Foreign Secretary.

“We have now reached a turning point where we must decide about the next stage in the dialogue. We cannot embark on a third round of talks without having some idea of where we intend to go thereafter, since our tactics will to some extent vary according to the strategy we choose.” ²²⁰

Carless lists four options; “... *in the short term.*” The first calls for talks to be stopped on the basis that the British side cannot accept any development into negotiations over sovereignty. His second option is to play for time - “*The aim would be to persuade the Argentines that we were serious about making progress, without in fact taking any substantive steps forward.*” Third is to develop the present talks into; “... *substantive, but still secret, negotiations...*” with the aim of securing Argentine acceptance of terms of reference for a series of negotiations about Anglo-Argentine interests. Finally, Carless suggests the option of going public about the intention to negotiate.

“If we chose this course, we must recognise (and probably state) that these negotiations could not exclude the question of sovereignty over the Falkland Islands. The experiences of Mr. Michael Stewart in the House in 1968 show that it would be essential to give assurances from its outset that we were being frank about the subject matter for negotiation and that the wishes of the Islanders would not be disregarded at any stage... This option would allow us to retain the initiative and of reducing the Falklands lobby’s ability to launch accusations of planning a secret sell-out.” ²²¹

Listing longer term objectives, Carless mentions ‘leaseback’, ‘joint sovereignty/condominium’, a ‘buy-out’ of the Islanders and ‘transfer of sovereignty.’ Concluding, he suggests that a public round of negotiations take place (option 4) with the long term aim of some ‘leaseback’ or ‘condominium’ arrangement.

“At every stage it will be essential to pay particular attention to nursing Islander opinion. Our ability to bring them along with us will be crucial to the success or failure of our strategy. Given that the

217 Some have seen this as the compensation offered to Admiral Massera for the junta's decision not to adopt *Plan Goa*.

218 *Thule island occupation: Argentine navy tested UK’s resolve as part of its long term plan to take the Falklands in MercoPress August 29, 2019*

219 Livingstone 2018. If Guevara was aware of the Southern Thule operation, he does not appear to have mentioned it.

220 Hugh Carless memorandum in FO 7/3201 at 283a

221 *Ibid.*

Islanders are likely to reject the idea of an early transfer of sovereignty to Argentina, however qualified, we may have to adopt a two-stage approach to negotiations. This would mean concentrating initially on a politico-economic package which would fall short of full transfer of sovereignty but which the Argentines would see as a stepping-stone to a fuller settlement at a later stage – by which time the Islanders would, we hope, have adjusted to the prospect of a change in sovereignty status.” ²²²

On seeing the Carless assessment, another official, Robin Edmonds, notes; “*The Falklands problem taken as a whole is complicated, but the nub of it is simple: Parliament.*” ²²³

October 14th, at the Foreign Office, Ted Rowlands notes; “*All that can be said of successive British Governments is that they avoided war and brought the Islanders and Argentines marginally closer together... we are trying to reconcile two apparently irreconcilable demands: the Argentine demand for us to hand over sovereignty – or at least to talk about handing it over – and the demand of the Islanders and the Lobby here that we do no such thing.*” ²²⁴

On the same day, the UK Falkland Islands Committee severs its link with the Falkland Islands Company.

Britain’s Overseas Development department rejects the Shackleton Report as overambitious. However, as regards the recommendations for an airport, a ‘*feasibility study*’ is promised.

“The British government was presented with a report containing proposals which it was incapable of fulfilling, and this could only spell further trouble for its relationship with the islanders...” ²²⁵

November 4th, three by-elections in England eliminate the Labour Party’s thin majority, rendering it a minority government. This increases the power of Parliament.

November 15th, at the UN, the Fourth Committee reviews the work of the Special Committee on Decolonization. Argentina’s representative makes a statement.

“General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) of 14 December 1960 established quite clearly, in paragraph 6, that in certain circumstances – including without any doubt, those deriving from acts of territorial usurpation against a country – the applicable principle was territorial integrity and not self-determination.”

He also refers to the 1975 International Court of Justice (ICJ) opinion concerning Western Sahara.

“... the Court, while recognizing the important role of the principle of self-determination, had pointed out that on a number of occasions the General Assembly had given priority to the principle of territorial integrity, particularly when the colonial Territory had been created to the prejudice of the country to which the Territory belonged originally. Furthermore, in paragraph 87 of the opinion, the Court had affirmed quite clearly that in all cases the “special characteristics” of the Territory should borne in mind.” ²²⁶

222 *Ibid*

223 Edmonds quoted in Livingstone 2018 citing FCO 7/3201

224 FO 7/3201/307

225 Donaghy 2014

226 Inaccurate. What para.87 actually said was – “*Western Sahara (Rio de Oro and Sakiet El Hamra) is a territory having very special characteristics which, at the time of colonization by Spain, largely determined the way of life and social and political organization of the peoples inhabiting it. In consequence, the legal régime of Western Sahara, including its legal relations with neighbouring territories, cannot properly be appreciated without reference to these special characteristics. The territory forms part of the great Sahara desert which extends from the Atlantic Coast of Africa to Egypt and the Sudan. At the time of its colonization by Spain, the area of this desert with which the Court is concerned*

*However, the most decisive paragraph on the subject was paragraph 162, from a reading of which it was perfectly clear that in those situations where there was a dispute regarding sovereignty over a colonial Territory, whether or not the principle of self-determination should be applied depended on the nature of the link between the Territory in question and the State in question at the moment of colonization.”*²²⁷

Britain exercises a right of reply.

*“The United Kingdom delegation was told that the Falkland Islands was a special case. It did not accept that. ... The people of the Falkland Islands had the right to be consulted and to have their wishes about their own future taken into account. Yet, the draft which was before the General Assembly deliberately set those wishes aside as though the views of the people of the Falkland Islands were of no account.”*²²⁸

The draft-resolution calling for negotiations on the issue of sovereignty receives the Fourth Committee's approval. However, more nations abstain than Argentina had anticipated, causing consternation among the Argentine delegation.

*“While his delegation respected the right of every delegation to change its position on a particular question when and for whatever reasons it deemed appropriate, he said that his delegation was surprised at the decision of certain countries which, having voted in favour of resolutions 2065 (XX) and 3160 (XXVIII), had, on the current occasion, taken a different position.”*²²⁹

December 1st, the General Assembly of the United Nations adopts Resolution 31/49 (XXXI).²³⁰

“... 2. Expresses its gratitude for the continuous efforts made by the Government of Argentina, in accordance with the relevant decisions of the General Assembly, to facilitate the process of decolonisation and to promote the well-being of the populations of the islands;

was being exploited, because of its low and spasmodic rainfall, almost exclusively by nomads, pasturing their animals or growing crops as and where conditions were favourable. It may be said that the territory, at the time of its colonization, had a sparse population that, for the most part, consisted of nomadic tribes the members of which traversed the desert on more or less regular routes dictated by the seasons and the wells or water-holes available to them. In general, the Court was informed, the right of pasture was enjoyed in common by these tribes; some areas suitable for cultivation, on the other hand, were subject to a greater degree to separate rights. Perennial water-holes were in principle considered the property of the tribe which put them into commission, though their use also was open to all, subject to certain customs as to priorities and the amount of water taken. Similarly, many tribes were said to have their recognized burial grounds, which constituted a rallying point for themselves and for allied tribes. Another feature of life in the region, according to the information before the Court, was that inter-tribal conflict was not infrequent.” (Western Sahara, Advisory Opinion, ICJ Reports 1975 para.87) See <https://www.icj-cij.org/files/case-related/61/061-19751016-ADV-01-00-EN.pdf>

227 Again inaccurate. Para.162 actually said – *“The materials and information presented to the Court show the existence, at the time of Spanish colonization, of legal ties of allegiance between the Sultan of Morocco and some of the tribes living in the territory of Western Sahara. They equally show the existence of rights, including some rights relating to the land, which constituted legal ties between the Mauritanian entity, as understood by the Court, and the territory of Western Sahara. On the other hand, the Court's conclusion is that the materials and information presented to it do not establish any tie of territorial sovereignty between the territory of Western Sahara and the Kingdom of Morocco or the Mauritanian entity. Thus the court has not found legal ties of such a nature as might affect the application of resolution 1514 (XV) in the decolonization of Western Sahara, and, in particular, of the principle of self-determination through the free and genuine expression of the will of the peoples of the Territory.”* (Western Sahara, Advisory Opinion, ICJ Reports 1975 para.162)

228 UN Doc A32/23/Rev.1 Chapter 28

229 This resolution passed 102:1 (UK) with 36 abstentions. 13 Commonwealth countries voted in favour – Bangladesh, Cyprus, Ghana, India, Lesotho, Malaysia, Malta, Mauritius, Sri Lanka, Swaziland, Uganda, Tanzania & Zambia.

230 Operative paragraph 4 is described in Ellerby 1990 (p.213) as a; *“veiled reference to the Shackleton Report.”* See https://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/RES/31/49

3. Requests the Governments of Argentina and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to expedite the negotiations concerning the dispute over sovereignty, as requested in General Assembly resolutions 2065 (XX) and 3160 (XXVIII);

4. Calls upon the two parties to refrain from taking decisions that would imply introducing unilateral modifications in the situation while the islands are going through the process recommended in the above-mentioned resolutions;..”

“Paragraph 2 is absurdly one-sided in thanking only Argentina – it was actually Britain that had been making efforts to “promote the well-being of the populations of the islands” .., whereas Argentina’s efforts had been devoted to taking over the territory against the wishes of those populations. ... Argentina continues to demand that Britain should respect Resolution 31/49 – an impossible demand since the premise on which it is based (ongoing negotiations) no longer applies.” ²³¹

December 8th, in London, the Cabinet approve a mixed approach to future talks with Argentina. ²³²

“It included two courses of action in the event of continued islander objections to leaseback. Firstly, the government would tell Argentina that it could not proceed with the negotiations against the islanders’ wishes. It could then buy time by making a series of minor arrangements (e.g. shared administration of the Dependencies) or a single large concession, such as an Argentine sovereign base on these uninhabited islands. In exchange Britain would seek Argentine economic cooperation covering fishing, oil exploration and research... This was to be followed by a ministerial visit to Stanley and Buenos Aires in February, the second stage of Crosland’s formula. Rowlands brief would be ‘to establish prospects for a move forward into some form of negotiations in 1977 which might lead towards the [politico-economic] package deal” ²³³

“... in December 1976, cabinet ministers noted that if they were to ‘state plainly’ their intention to talk to Argentina, there would be a ‘political storm’, so they agreed instead to play for time.” ²³⁴

December 16th, James Roland Walter Parker is appointed the Governor of the Falkland Islands. ²³⁵

Two British Petroleum (BP) executives visit Argentina to discuss the prospect of a joint approach to oil exploration. ²³⁶

December 29th, a helicopter from HMS *Endurance*, visiting Southern Thule to retrieve scientific equipment left earlier in the year, discovers the Argentine military presence.

December 31st, Britain’s Secretary of State for Defence, Fred Mulley, proposes that, with tensions with Argentina easing, now is the time for *Endurance* to be withdrawn.

“... when I have been obliged to accept cuts in the defence budget for 1977/78 and 1978/79, I cannot justify the expenditure of an estimated £1.8m for a purpose which has no relations to our NATO commitments...” ²³⁷

231 Pascoe 2020 pp.319-320

232 CAB/128/60/20

233 Donaghy 2014

234 Livingstone 2018

235 *The London Gazette* No. 47113

236 Livingstone 2018

237 Mulley to Crosland December 31, 1976 DEFE 24/911. Quoted in Donaghy 2014

1977 – January 5th, in London, Argentina's *charge d'affaires* is summoned to the Foreign Office to explain the presence of a military base on Southern Thule.

*“A JIC assessment in January 1977 concluded that the Argentine Government were unlikely to order withdrawal until it suited them to do so and, depending on the British Government's actions in the situation, could be encouraged to attempt further military measures against British interests in the area.”*²³⁸

January 7th, executives from the BP oil company meet with FCO officials to discuss the possibility of oil exploration around the Falkland Islands.²³⁹

January 14th, Argentina informs the UK Government that the purpose of the Southern Thule operation is to establish a scientific station within the jurisdiction of Argentine sovereignty. They express the hope that nothing will cloud the, *“auspicious perspectives”* for negotiations. News of the landings is not made public in the UK.

A 'Falkland Islands Office' opens in London.²⁴⁰

January 19th, Britain's Government formally protests the violation of British sovereignty on Southern Thule.

*“... (Admiral) Guzzetti said to Rowlands, "These Argentine scientists are only going to be there for a short summer season." We accepted that explanation at the time. We accepted it because we were at the beginning of the Crosland concept of long-term negotiation... We agonised over it considerably. But if we had made a public song and dance about it, we would then have had to decide whether to break off the whole negotiating process. We decided that negotiation was more important.”*²⁴¹

Researcher's Comment: Britain's Labour Government not only acted inadequately in the face of an Argentine invasion of British territory, but then compounded the offence by keeping it a secret from the British public. More importantly, kept from Parliament. There is no doubt that the Commons would have erupted. How this could have been viewed as a reasonable policy under any circumstances is unfathomable. It would be 1982 before the Argentines were ejected from the Corbeta Uruguay base and the island of Southern Thule.

The British Government receive intelligence that Admiral Massera's *Plan Goa* – an invasion of the Falklands – is being reconsidered by the junta.²⁴²

January 31st, following reports that Argentina is commissioning two American oil companies – Geophysical Services International and Western Geophysical – to carry out seismic surveys in the seas off the Argentine coast, a Labour MP, Colin Phipps, sends a warning to the Foreign Office.

*“The British were concerned that the Argentine-sponsored seismic studies would cross the (unofficial) median line between Argentina and the Falkland Islands. Although the British government had not formally claimed the waters beyond the 200-metre isobath from the islands, it wanted to reserve its rights to up to 200 miles of the continental-shelf.”*²⁴³

February 1st, Britain's Joint Intelligence Committee assess the Southern Thule occupation; describing it as a political act that may be considered so successful by Argentina as to encourage further displays.

238 Baroness Young in *HL Deb 25 January 1983 vol.438 cc136-247*

239 *Hall to Anglin January 7, 1977 FCO 7/3409*

240 This was under the control of the *UK Falkland Islands Committee* and the *Falkland Islands Research & Development Association*. Not the Falkland Islands Government, whose representative office opened in 1983

241 Hugh Carless quoted in Charlton 1989 p.60

242 Donaghy 2014. *cf.* March & June 1976

243 Livingstone 2018 citing *Philips to Rowlands January 31, 1977 FCO 7/3409*

February 2nd, Foreign Secretary Anthony Crosland, makes an announcement to Parliament.

*“... the time has come to consider both with the Islanders and the Argentine Government whether a climate exists for discussing the broad issues which bear on the future of the Falkland Islands, and the possibilities of co-operation between Britain and Argentina in the region of the South West Atlantic... I must make certain things absolutely clear. First, any such discussion, which would inevitably raise fundamental questions in the relationship between the Islands, Britain and Argentina, would take place under a sovereignty umbrella; that is, Her Majesty's Government would wholly reserve their position on the issue of sovereignty, which would in no way be prejudiced. Secondly, any changes which might be proposed must be acceptable to the Islanders, whose interests and well-being remain our prime concern. In consequence, thirdly, there must be full consultation with the Islanders at every stage; nothing will be done behind their backs.”*²⁴⁴

*“At the same time he announced that the Government did not accept the more costly recommendations in the Shackleton Report, notably the enlargement of the airport and the lengthening of the runway. At a time when Argentina had just occupied British territory, what sort of a signal was that?”*²⁴⁵

February 7th, intelligence suggests that *Plan Goa* has been placed on hold over fears that the United Nations will not support an Argentine invasion of the Falklands.

*“... later intelligence indicated that this plan had been shelved, not because of any action by the then British Government but because Argentina could not count on the support of the Third World or the Communist bloc.”*²⁴⁶

*“Argentina could count on ‘qualified’ support: backing its claim in the fight against colonialism, but was not considered strong enough to achieve a fait accompli.”*²⁴⁷

February 10th, from New York, Keith Unwin, Britain’s delegate to the UN Commission on Human Rights, seeks guidance from the Foreign Office on the subject of human rights in Argentina.²⁴⁸

February 15th, Minister of State at the Foreign Office²⁴⁹, Edward Rowlands, lands in Buenos Aires, en-route to the Falklands. He holds brief talks with the Argentine Foreign Minister before moving on.

February 16th, in Stanley, Rowlands is addressed by Islands’ councillors.

*“We wish to have co-operation with Argentina only in the form of a normal relationship between any two countries (Keep the Falkland Islands British).”*²⁵⁰

*“Initially councillors were non-committal, seeking to circumvent the sovereignty debate by stressing the need for a referendum. Yet Rowland’s patient, frank explanation turned their stance,..”*²⁵¹

244 *HC Deb 02 February 1977 vol.925 cc550-61* Crosland also provided the Government response to the *Shackleton Report*, rejecting the more costly recommendations and indicating that further inquiries would be conducted.

245 *Baroness Young in HL Deb 25 January 1983 vol.438 cc136-247*

246 *Ibid*

247 Donaghy 2014

248 *Unwin to Callan February 10, 1977 FCO 58/1165* in Livingstone 2018

249 A grand sounding title, but in reality this is only a mid-level government role in the UK.

250 The Falkland Islands Committee quoted in Ellerby 1990 p.214 citing *The Falkland Islands Times (Port Stanley), March 8, 1977*

251 Donaghy 2014

February 17th, from the Islands, the Falklands Legislative Council issue a statement.

“We understand that the Minister will have to have discussions on the sovereignty question while in Argentina. We realise that these discussions will take place under the sovereignty umbrella and so the stand of all parties concerned will remain unaffected...”

On the same day, Britain’s Foreign Office respond to Unwin’s letter of the 10th.

“We had in mind (a) general statement to the effect that HMG deplore violations of human rights wherever they occur rather than a statement specifically relating to the situation in Argentina. As you know, our relations with Argentina are especially sensitive in view of the Falkland Islands dispute.” ²⁵²

February 20th, Rowlands arrives back in Buenos Aires for talks.

February 21st, in Buenos Aires, following negotiations between Rowlands and Minister Allara, a joint-statement is released. This says only that there is a need for the two sides to consult their governments.

“In light of the concessions which we were able to bring them, the talks were much stickier than expected. It does not bode well for the next round, when the really difficult stage – of substantive negotiations – begins.” ²⁵³

In London, David Owen takes over as Foreign Secretary.

“It seemed to me that we had an obligation to try and ensure the economic prosperity of the islanders, to reduce its isolation, and to accept that they would live happily in the region if there could be a mutual understanding with Argentina. Did I believe that the Islanders should have a veto on negotiations? My answer to that, ... was no.” ²⁵⁴

February 22nd, Rowlands flies back to the UK.

“I came back convinced that it was a perfectly legitimate and, in my opinion, important right of British foreign policy to defend the rights of a minority. ... I came back convinced that while I believed I could carry the Islanders with me, if we could get a workable solution and something Argentines would agree to, I was also convinced that we could not actually over-rule the Islanders.” ²⁵⁵

February 23rd, in London, Guardian newspaper journalist Richard Gott, in a piece on Rowland’s round-trip, writes about the islanders.

“...(They) need to be told quite firmly.. that although they wish the islands to remain a British colony, the British in 1977 plainly do not. The Falkland Islands are an absurd colonial anachronism.”

March 3rd, in London, the Falkland Islands Research & Development Association is incorporated as a non-profit making business.

“Its objectives were to represent the interests of the Falklands and to promote the economic, social and cultural development of the Islands for the benefit of the inhabitants. The Association had four functions. First, to provide the U.K.F.I.C. and affiliated groups with an office and salaried staff in London. Secondly, to incorporate a members' organization to which sympathizers in Britain and the people of the Falklands could

252 Callan to Unwin February 17, 1977 FCO 58/1165 in Livingstone 2018

253 Shakespeare quoted in Donaghy 2014

254 Owen quoted in Donaghy 2014

255 Ted Rowlands interviewed in Charlton 1989 p.57

subscribe. Thirdly, to provide Islanders visiting Britain and anyone interested in the Falklands with an information centre. Fourthly, to stimulate the commercial implementation of the Shackleton Report's recommendations in accordance with the wishes of the Islanders.”²⁵⁶

March 8th, from Stanley, the Islanders respond to Gott's comments in the Guardian.

*“The South American way of life is as foreign to us as the oriental one is to you. Our cultures, laws, politics, language etc., are entirely different. If we wanted the South American way of life we would go there and live.”*²⁵⁷

March 11th, Argentina's Foreign Ministry proposes that there should be one set of negotiations; to include both sovereignty and economic cooperation. The British government agrees.

*“Allara was delighted. He emphasised the need to make a statement soon, since public opinion was getting 'restless.'... Shakespeare believed his desire for an early announcement was linked to his government's need to have something favourable to give the public, and offset the 'disastrous effect' of the forthcoming award to Chile.”*²⁵⁸

In **April**, it is reported that a prominent Argentine businessman, Cao Saravia is prepared to pay \$US 10 million for the Falkland Islands Company; at least \$1 million more than the asking price. Rowlands makes a statement to the House of Commons.

“... no land can be alienated on Falkland Islands without the permission of the Falkland Islands Government itself; the British Government would not support such a move.”

*“The Board of Directors of the Company announced that they would not agree to a transfer of ownership to Argentine interests and pointed out that in any event a pre-emptive right to purchase the Company is vested in the Falkland Islands Sheep Owners' Association Ltd. and that the Islands Government would need to approve any transfer of control to an alien.”*²⁵⁹

April 20th, in Britain's House of Lord, Lord Goronwy-Roberts makes a statement about the negotiations.

*“There is absolutely no doubt in this country in legal or Government circles about where sovereignty lies. It is here, in the United Kingdom.”*²⁶⁰

April 26th, Foreign Secretary, Dr Owen, gives the House of Commons the Government's *Terms of Reference for Negotiations* in a written parliamentary answer.

“The Governments of the Argentine Republic and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland have agreed to hold negotiations from June or July 1977 which will concern future political relations, including sovereignty, with regard to the Falkland Islands, South Georgia and South Sandwich Islands, and economic co-operation with regard to the said territories, in particular, and the South West Atlantic, in general. In these negotiations the issues affecting the future of the Islands will be discussed and negotiations will be directed to the working out of a peaceful solution to the existing dispute on sovereignty between the two states, and the establishment of a framework for Anglo-

256 Ellerby 1990 p.240

257 *The Falkland Islands Times* March 8, 1977

258 Donaghy 2014. The Beagle Channel arbitration decision had actually been reached 3 weeks before, but was not formally ratified by Queen Elizabeth II until April, 1977 and only announced in the May.

259 *The Friends of the Falkland Islands: Newsletter* June 1977. cf. July, 1972

260 *HL Deb 20 April 1977 vol.382 cc222-66*

*Argentine economic co-operation which will contribute substantially to the development of the islands. A major objective of the negotiations will be to achieve a stable, prosperous and politically durable future for the Islands, whose people the Government of the United Kingdom will consult during the course of the negotiations. The agreement to hold these negotiations, and the negotiations themselves, are without prejudice to the position of either Government with regard to sovereignty over the Islands. The level at which the negotiations will be conducted, and the times and places at which they will be held, will be determined by agreement between the two Governments. If necessary, special Working Groups will be established.”*²⁶¹

May 2nd, the decision of the arbitration panel considering the Beagle Channel dispute between Chile and Argentina is notified to the two countries. The decision is in favour of Chile.²⁶²

“... the Parties were agreed in principle that their rights in the matter of claims or title to territory were governed prima facie by the doctrine of the uti possidetis juris of 1810. This doctrine – possibly, at least at first, a political tenet rather than a true rule of law – is peculiar to the field of the Spanish-American States whose territories were formerly under the rule of the Spanish Crown, and even if both the scope and applicability of the doctrine were somewhat uncertain, particularly in such far-distant regions of the continent as are those in issue in the present case, it undoubtedly constituted an important element in the inter-relationships of the continent. As the Court understand the matter, the doctrine has two aspects.

First, all territory in Spanish-America, however remote or inhospitable, is deemed to have been part of one of the former administrative divisions of Spanish colonial rule (vice-royalties, captaincies-general, etc.). Hence there is no territory in Spanish-America that has the status of res nullius open to an acquisition of title by occupation.

Secondly, the title to any given locality is deemed to have become automatically vested in whatever Spanish-American State inherited or took over the former Spanish administrative division in which the locality concerned was stipulated (uti possidetis, ita possideatis, – the full formula). Looked at in another way, uti possidetis was a convenient method of establishing the boundaries of the young Spanish-American States on the same basis as those of the old Spanish administrative divisions, except that the latter were themselves often uncertain or ill-defined or, in the less accessible regions, not factually established at all, – or again underwent various changes.”

261 Quoted in *FCO 76/1892 Annex 2*. Also Franks 1983 para.60. Owen's willing inclusion of South Georgia and the South Sandwich Islands is unexplainable.

262 *Reports of International Arbitral Awards: Dispute between Argentina and Chile concerning the Beagle Channel* February 18, 1977 vol.xxi pp.53-264. See http://legal.un.org/riaa/cases/vol_XXI/53-264.pdf An arbitration agreement had been signed by the two nations in June, 1971. Both had agreed to abide by the decision of Queen Elizabeth II acting as arbitrator, on the advice of a panel made up of International Court of Justice judges. A right of appeal was included within the *Compromiso*. The decision of the arbitration panel was made known to Queen Elizabeth on February 18, 1977. She ratified the decision on April 18, 1977. There was no immediate response from either of the parties. In January 1978 a letter was sent to both Chile and Argentina to discover whether they were content that the arbitration process had been completed. Chile answered in the positive and to say that, as far as it was concerned the Award had been duly implemented. Argentina did not reply. Nor did Argentina reply to a further inquiry in March, 1978, despite having already contacted Chile. On July 10, 1978, the President of the Court of Arbitration notified Queen Elizabeth II that, in its opinion, “... the Award stands fully and materially executed.” The arbitration panel then stood down. *cf.* 1848 & 1978

*“... essentially an accord on boundaries between successor states of the same (Spanish) empire, not an assertion of sovereignty against outsiders.”*²⁶³

*“As a principle, it could be applied only to a dispute between Latin American nations... Whether it is applicable in a dispute with a non-Spanish American nation is open to doubt.”*²⁶⁴

*“In 1977, an arbitration award was favorable to Chile, but as soon as the Videla government received the result, it rejected it and declared its nullity. For its part, the Chilean government issued a statement stating that it was unwilling to restart discussions on an area that it now considered legitimately its own. This hardened relations between the two countries again...”*²⁶⁵

May 6th, Britain’s Department of Energy urge the Foreign Office to ensure that Argentina’s planned seismic studies off its continental shelf, do not cross the median line between the Patagonian coastline and the Falklands archipelago.

*“The worst would be to do nothing, ... as this could lead to ‘our giving up without so much as a whisper the title to any oil which might lie beneath the sea outside the 200 metres line’. ...”*²⁶⁶

May 7th, Following an attempted assassination of Argentina’s Foreign Minister, the Montoneros Group claim responsibility. They assert that Guzetti had been negotiating a deal with Britain over the Falklands, that would reduce Argentine sovereignty and allow for the exploitation of oil and the fisheries by British interests.

Argentina declares a 200-mile limit around the Falkland Islands.

*“... in May 1977 Argentina declared a 200-mile fishing right around the Falkland Islands. Despite United Kingdom official protests, Argentina subsequently contracted fishing rights in this area with Japan and West Germany. It must be as apparent to noble Lords as it is apparent to me that the commercial and strategic importance of these waters is evidenced by the attention being paid to them by nations other than the United Kingdom...”*²⁶⁷

*“During the 1970s, the United Nations was coordinating negotiations on a new Convention on the Law of the Sea, which included the concept of an Economic Exclusion Zone (EEZ) in which a sovereign state had the right to explore and exploit the maritime resources within 200 nautical miles. Although negotiations on the Convention (UNCLOS) did not end until 1982 and did not come into force until 1994, the concept of 200-mile maritime zones was very much in the minds of officials ...”*²⁶⁸

May 9th, a British Petroleum executive, Dr. J. Birks, writes to the Foreign Office to seek an opinion on the likely British Government attitude to BP setting up a consortium with Argentine companies. To search for oil around the Falklands archipelago.²⁶⁹

*“Birks added that the Falkland Islands Company had expressed an interest in joining such a consortium.”*²⁷⁰

May 18th, in London, a cross-departmental meeting to discuss Falklands negotiations, is held at the Foreign Office.

263 *Falklands Title Deeds* M. Deas 1982

264 *Falklands or Malvinas? The Background to the Dispute* J. Metford 1968

265 *Génesis de la Guerra de Malvinas (1976-1982)* Valeria Lourdes Carbone 2008

266 Livingstone 2018 citing *Brown to Cortazzi* May 6, 1977 in *EG* 14/38

267 Lord Morris in *HL Deb* 22 May 1979 vol.400 cc233-432

268 Livingstone 2018

269 *Birks to Rowlands* May 9, 1977 *FCO* 7/3409

270 Livingstone 2018

*“... Hugh Carless explained that the FCO envisaged splitting British possessions in the South Atlantic into four areas of consideration: the Falkland Islands; the 200 miles of sea around the Falkland Islands including their maritime and subterranean resources (oil and fish); the Dependencies of the Falkland Islands (South Georgia and the South Sandwich Islands); and their 200-mile maritime zones. While leaseback would be the most appropriate solution for the Falkland Islands themselves, said Carless, there should also be a separate leaseback arrangement for the maritime zones, ‘which would allow Britain to exploit the resources of the area’. In regard to the Dependencies and their maritime zones, Britain’s aims should be ‘to retain access to the economic resources’. ...”*²⁷¹

May 20th, in London, the Ministry of Defence warns the Foreign Office that it intends to withdraw *Endurance* in May, 1978.

May 23rd, in Buenos Aires, Oscar Montes is appointed as Argentina’s Foreign Minister.

May 31st, Britain’s *charge d’affaires* in Buenos Aires receives instructions from London to make a formal protest to the Argentine government regarding any seismic oil studies carried out in Falklands waters.

*“The FCO also feared that inaction would weaken Britain’s sovereignty claim, so in may 1977, it instructed its charge d’affaires to deliver a formal protest to the Argentine Government, noting: ‘We must make sure that we do not prejudice our rights ... over the Falkland Islands Continental shelf in advance’. ...”*²⁷²

June 13th, in London, the Falklands are discussed at a meeting Cabinet’s Defence and Overseas Policy Committee.

*“... Foreign Secretary David Owen felt that in order to secure the main objective of retaining the sovereignty over the Falkland Islands themselves, Britain should be prepared to concede sovereignty over the Dependencies and the maritime resources of both the Islands and the Dependencies. ... In speaking notes prepared for Owen, his case was made more explicit: ‘We have to get it across to Argentina that we are not after economic advantage at their expense, and that our concern for the Islanders is our real and genuine concern. I do not in any case believe that it is right for us to seek to secure for ourselves, economic resources 7000 miles away ... we should not lay ourselves open to accusations ... that we are economic imperialists.’”*²⁷³

July 4th, the Foreign Office prepare for negotiations with Argentina, with a paper presented to the Cabinet’s OD Committee by Secretary Owen.²⁷⁴

*“... serious and substantive negotiations were necessary to keep the Argentines in play, since the Islands were militarily indefensible except by a major, costly and unacceptable diversion of current resources.”*²⁷⁵

The Committee conclude that the Foreign Office should ‘play for time’ during the next round of negotiations with Argentina and not offer concessions.

“The Committee decided that the aim should be to keep the negotiations going... Broadly speaking it was the Government’s strategy to retain sovereignty as long as possible, if necessary making concessions in respect of

271 *Ibid.* citing *Record of a Meeting to discuss Anglo/Argentine Negotiations on the Falkland Islands Dispute May 18, 1977* in EG 14/38

272 *Ibid.* citing *FCO to British Embassy May 31, 1977 FCO 7/3409*. The protest was ignored, so Britain gave its own authorisation to the two American oil companies commissioned by Argentina, to survey within Falklands waters. Provided that the data was supplied to London.

273 *Ibid.* citing *Secretary of State’s Meeting on the Falkland Islands June 13, 1977 FCO 76/1616*

274 The minutes of this meeting remain embargoed in 2020.

275 Quoted by Baroness Young in *HL Deb 25 January 1983 vol.438 cc136-247*

the dependencies and the maritime resources in the area, while recognising that ultimately only some form of leaseback arrangement was likely to satisfy Argentina..."²⁷⁶

*"The British objective, yet again, was to play for time."*²⁷⁷

*"A proposal to offer 'concessions over maritime resources' was put to the cabinet's Defence and Overseas policy Committee in July 1977. The Department of Energy was vehemently against this; a briefing note for Tony Benn noted that separating the continental shelf from the Islands could set a dangerous precedent for British claims in other areas... David Owen's DOP paper argued that if concessions on maritime resources were not enough, Britain should consider offering full leaseback of the Islands themselves."*²⁷⁸

July 13th, delegations from Argentina and the UK meet in Rome for three days of talks.

*"A change of location did not alter proceedings... minimal progress was being made. Allara repeated that the principle of self-determination was 'absolutely inapplicable' to the Falkland Islands archipelago, and that the restitution of Argentine sovereignty took priority over the economic dimension. ... The British team were unimpressed. Cortazzi ... (re-emphasised) that no British government could conform to proposals which were being forced on the Islanders."*²⁷⁹

*"... the British put forward the 'mixed approach' in general terms (i.e. separating the Islands from their maritime zones and from the Dependencies), but did not make a specific offer to cede the sovereignty of the maritime zones. ... The 'mixed approach' concept bemused the Argentine delegation, which continued to demand sovereignty over the whole area,..."*²⁸⁰

July 14th, in Britain, the *Daily Mail* newspaper complains that talks are taking place "behind Islanders' backs."

*"The (Falkland Islands) Committee's relationship with the Foreign Office was contradictory ... antagonism derived from the campaign's propaganda, which centred on the accusation that the Foreign Office was secretly trying to persuade ministers to 'sell out' the Falklands – a charge FCO officials resented."*²⁸¹

The Labour Party's National Executive Council publish a resolution.²⁸²

"We call on the Government to ensure that under no circumstances will the inhabitants of the Falkland Islands be handed over to any Argentine regime which violates human and civil right."

*"... while the labour party's official statements did not persuade ministers to halt talks with Argentina, they did make them more cautious in their approach..."*²⁸³

July 15th, in Rome, negotiations come to an end without any clear way forward being found.

*"We are told that in the talks the British side put forward the idea that the sovereignty of the uninhabited dependencies might be "looked at separately" from the sovereignty of the Falkland Islands themselves. The Argentine reaction to that further signal is not recorded."*²⁸⁴

276 *Ibid*

277 Donaghy 2014

278 Livingstone 2018

279 Donaghy 2014

280 Livingstone 2018

281 *Ibid*. Bill Hunter-Christie, the FIC's secretary, was a particular cause for concern. An informal FCO rule required that no official meet him unaccompanied.

282 *Argentina, Chile, Brazil: A Statement by the NEC of the Labour Party* July, 1977

283 Livingstone 2018

284 Baroness Young in *HL Deb* 25 January 1983 vol.438 cc136-247

*“Argentine proposals to establish ‘working groups’ were rejected by Cortazzi, who felt the gap was too large to begin discussing compromises. Allara suggested further negotiations in September but Cortazzi, citing party conferences and South Africa, said there would be no ministerial time until November. Allara accepted this and the talks fizzled out.”*²⁸⁵

July 27th, in Britain’s House of Commons, 140 backbenchers from all parties sign a motion acknowledging the Falkland Islanders’ wish to remain British.

*“The fear of a ‘political storm’ was uppermost in ministers’ minds throughout the dispute. Every cabinet meeting which discussed the Falklands problem during Callaghan’s period of office discussed the possible reaction of parliament.”*²⁸⁶

July 28th, a meeting is held at the House of Commons, attended by the Falkland Islands Company, the Foreign Office and representatives of Britain's fishing industry.

*“It was sponsored by James Johnson, the Labour M P for Kingston-upon-Hull West (a constituency seriously affected by the decline in the distant-water fishing fleet) and chaired by Bill Hunter Christie. As a result the S.A.F.C.²⁸⁷ was formed composed of representatives from British United Trawlers, Christian Salvesens Ltd., the Confederation of Fried Fish Caterers' Associations, the National Farmers' Union, the National Fish Fryers' Federation, the White Fish Authority, Alginate Industries Ltd. and the F.I.C.”*²⁸⁸

In **August** an expedition from Cambridge University arrive in the Falklands to collect data on wrecks.²⁸⁹

In London; *“... a 'Falkland Islands Week' was held which included the presentation of a petition to 10 Downing Street. National newspapers produced photographs of Sukie Cameron, a daughter of Norman Cameron, modelling a 'Keep the Falkland Islands British' T-shirt.”*²⁹⁰

August 17th, the Special Committee on Decolonization refers the Falklands issue to the Fourth Committee.

In **September**, Argentine Navy vessels fire on Russian and Bulgarian fishing boats working in Falklands waters.

Adrian Monk, representing the Falkland Islands Legislative Council, attends the 23rd Commonwealth Parliamentary Conference in Ottawa.

“We ... wonder why, when the Argentinian claim to our country is discussed in the United Nations and elsewhere, so few Commonwealth countries support our desire to retain our democratic, British way of life. We are continually being pressured to join with that country, whose way of life is alien to us, a country often without even the pretence of a democratic government, a country where human rights are virtually non-existent, a country with different cultures and a different language. ... ”

September 23rd, in Britain’s Sunday Times.

“The Falkland Islands have undoubtedly suffered from the amalgamation of the Commonwealth Office with the Foreign Office; passing under the control of the Latin American department whose main care is to foster easy relations with those States, not to defend a handful of people's rights to self determination.”

285 Donaghy 2014

286 Livingstone 2018

287 South Atlantic Fisheries Committee

288 Ellerby 1990 p.250 citing *F.G. Mitchell papers, S.A.F.C. minutes, 28 July 1977. cf. 1980*

289 *Cambridge Expedition to the Falkland Islands 1977: Report to the National Maritime Museum*

290 Ellerby 1990 p.244

At the United Nations in New York, Britain's Foreign Secretary, David Owen, meets Argentina's Foreign Minister, Oscar Montes.

September 25th, in Britain, the *Observer* newspaper, asks whether the Foreign Office are intent upon "giving away" the archipelago.

Argentina's navy 'arrest' Russian and Bulgarian fishing vessels operating within Falklands waters.

October 4th, in London, the Foreign Office prepare for a new round of negotiations with Argentina, scheduled for November.

"Rowlands sent Owen a four-page minute outlining the FCO position. It contrasted sharply with the cautious approach adopted at Rome. Leaseback was now being pushed to the front of the agenda; a development which would again illustrate the differing views of Foreign Office diplomats and senior ministers." ²⁹¹

October 24th, the November negotiations are postponed to December.

October 26th, in Buenos Aires, Britain's *charge d'affaires* is summoned to the Foreign Ministry. He is told that Argentina intends to complete its installation on Thule Island.

"Unless we are prepared to deploy sufficient power physically to dislodge the Argentines from Southern Thule, we must surely tolerate them as squatters..." ²⁹²

October 28th, in London, Britain's Joint Intelligence Committee reports its concern regarding Argentina's increasingly hostile attitude. In particular, the belligerence of the Argentine Navy.

Stanley airfield's fuel supply is cut off by the Argentine navy, which announces its refusal to fly the Falklands' red ensign while in Falklands waters.

November 10th, at the United Nations in New York, the Fourth Committee considers the report of the Special Committee on Decolonization. Representatives of Ghana and Zaire assert the self-determination right of the inhabitants of the Falklands. Argentina claims that three General Assembly resolutions have established that the dispute could only be resolved through negotiations between itself and the UK. Taking into account the 'interests' of the inhabitants, but making no mention of the application of *self-determination*.

November 16th, in London, the Secretary of Defence accepts the need to retain *Endurance* in the South Atlantic for the foreseeable future.

November 21st, following an intelligence assessment concluding that Argentina may be planning an incident along the lines of the Southern Thule encroachment, British Ministers decide to establish a military presence in the area.

"We deployed forces in 1977 because we discovered that there were to be major problems in the negotiations. At that time I was an inexperienced Minister and therefore I approached the then Prime Minister, my right hon. Friend the Member for Cardiff, South-East (Mr. Callaghan), ... I put it to my right hon. Friend that the deployment of force could be an over-reaction that would lead to a reaction that would trigger a host of uncontrollable events. ... My right hon. Friend asked me, "Can you guarantee or assure me that there will not be a threatened invasion and that you will be able to keep the talks going?". I replied, "No, Prime Minister, I cannot guarantee that". My right hon. Friend responded by saying "Let me remind you of an old truth: it is better to be safe than sorry"..." ²⁹³

291 Donaghy 2014

292 *Carless to Owen October 27, 1977* in FO 7/3375

293 Rowlands in the House of Commons – *HC Deb 03 April 1982 vol 21 cc633-68*.

From Stanley, the Legislative Council urge the British Government to implement Shackleton's proposals.

*“We must not be deterred from initiating and developing such ventures as coastal and off-shore fishing and similar activities merely because this would be against the appeasement policy of the British Government towards Argentina.”*²⁹⁴

November 22nd, with talks deferred, the Foreign Office conclude that Islands' representatives should not be present in future

*“The newly elected councils had given no indication that islanders wished to participate at these talks (a similar stance to Rome). Instead it was agreed that Ted Rowlands, popular after his successful February visit, would meet islander representatives in Rio de Janeiro shortly after the New York summit had been concluded.”*²⁹⁵

November 24th, frigates HMS *Alacrity* and HMS *Phoebe* are ordered to proceed to the South Atlantic, and stand-off about a thousand miles distant from the Falklands (*Operation Journeyman*).²⁹⁶

Stanley Airport opens for operations.

November 26th, a nuclear submarine, HMS *Dreadnought*, is ordered to close on the Falklands from Gibraltar.

*“Commanding officers and aircraft captains are to respond to any aggression with tactful firmness and are to exhibit a determination to meet any escalation, though not to exceed that already carried out by the enemy. All use of force must be governed by the principle of using only the minimum force necessary to achieve the aim.”*²⁹⁷

*“The rules were quite explicit... If Argentine ships came within 50 miles of the Falkland Islands and were believed to have displayed hostile intent, the submarine was to open fire.”*²⁹⁸

*“According to the report, Ministers accepted that, such a force would not be able to deal with a determined Argentine attack”...*²⁹⁹

November 28th, at the UN, the General Assembly defer consideration of the Falkland Islands until 1978.

December 1st, in Britain, the *Financial Times* reports that “major international oil companies” are to carry out seismic exploration for oil in the waters around the archipelago.

December 7th, in Britain’s House of Commons, the Government is questioned as to why it is prepared to negotiate with a “Fascist-type dictatorship about the future of a democratic British community.” Minister of State, Rowlands, responds.

“... we are negotiating because, following my visit to the islands and by agreement with the islands council, it was decided that it was necessary to have negotiations on the economic and sovereignty issues. Otherwise we would let the stalemate of the position of the islands continue, and that would be a much worse prospect for the islanders themselves. ...”

294 Quoted in Ellerby 1990 p.218 citing *Leg.Co. minutes, 21 Nov. 1977*.

295 Donaghy 2014

296 *Operation Journeyman*. James Callaghan only revealed this operation to Parliament in 1982

297 Quoted in *Secret Falklands task force revealed* Ben Fenton in *The Telegraph* June 1, 2005

298 Foreign Secretary David Owen quoted in Donaghy 2014. Following the revelation in 1982 of this task force’s deployment there was some controversy over the accuracy of Owen’s memory regarding the rules of engagement. See Donaghy 2014, for a full account.

299 Baroness Young in *HL Deb 25 January 1983 vol.438 cc136-247*

MP Jeremy Thorpe asks a question.

“Will he confirm that Argentina has not accepted that part of the Hague Convention whereby it agreed to be bound by the decision of the International Court? Does this not shed some light on its lack of competence in international law in laying claim to the sovereignty of the Falkland Islands? May we take it that the question of sovereignty is not a matter that the Minister regards as being for negotiation in his New York meetings later this month?”

Rowlands responds.

*“On the first part of the question, yes, that is the position... Sovereignty has been part and parcel of the terms of reference of the negotiations and will therefore be subject to negotiation in New York. ... They are not just about sovereignty they are about the whole issue of political and economic cooperation between Britain, Argentina and the Falkland Islands. ... Sovereignty issues are also involved. I repeat yet again that we shall not bring any proposals to the House unless they are acceptable to the islanders.”*³⁰⁰

*“The Labour government also accepted the FCO's argument that Britain needed to pursue good relations with Argentina in order to resolve the Falklands dispute – ignoring the party's official policy that the Islanders should not be handed over to a regime that abused human rights.”*³⁰¹

December 8th, the London Falkland Islands Office organises a ceremony at the Cenotaph to commemorate Falkland Islands Battle Day 1914.³⁰²

December 13th, a further two days of talks between Britain and Argentina commence in New York.

*“Gaulter Allara opened proceedings by venting frustration over the lack of progress on sovereignty. ... Rowlands assured the captain that his government had no desire to conduct Byzantine (never ending) talks, pointing out that it had ‘crossed the Rubicon’ in February by taking the decision to discuss sovereignty. The Argentine premise, Rowlands argued, was that the negotiations were simply related to how and when Britain would transfer sovereignty. But the British government’s concern was with how a compromise could be reached.... If the issue was the principle of sovereignty there could be scope for discussion. But if Argentina wished to ‘transform the islanders, exercise all the actual attributes of sovereignty over them’, then there would be considerable difficulty.”*³⁰³

The Argentine delegation propose an 8-year joint administration before a recognition of total Argentine sovereignty by Britain. Rowlands rejects this; instead offering a ‘mixed approach’ - involving economic cooperation and the possibility of cessions from amongst the Dependencies. Allara rejects these proposals.

December 14th, a final statement emerges from the negotiation.

*“The two sides recognized that there was a wide range of issues involved which would require detailed study. They accordingly agreed to establish at official level two parallel working groups on political relations, including sovereignty, and on economic co-operation, to pursue these studies in depth and to report back to the heads of delegations. ... A further round of negotiations will be held ...”*³⁰⁴

300 *HC Deb 07 December 1977 vol.940 cc1359-64*

301 Livingstone 2018 p. 153

302 Now an annual event

303 Donaghy 2014. Also *Minutes of Anglo-Argentine Talks, December 13-15, 1977* in FO 7/3394

304 *UN Doc A3323/Rev.1 vol.4*

*“... there seems to be a difference of view between the then Prime Minister and the then Foreign Secretary about the events in 1977. The right hon. Member for Cardiff, South-East (Callaghan) said that this (task) force in 1977 became known and that a diplomatic solution followed, whereas the right hon. Member for Plymouth, Devonport (Dr. Owen) said yesterday on the radio that it was done in total secrecy but he added that it gave him confidence in his negotiations, whatever that might mean.”*³⁰⁵

*“Once the talks had started, the Argentines were allowed to learn of the existence of the naval force and soon afterwards the 50 Argentines on South Thule left and the status quo was restored.”*³⁰⁶

*“The broad Falkland Islands ‘lobby’ had both parliamentary leverage and informal social access to influence policy makers. It was strong enough to make ministers and officials extremely cautious in negotiations with Argentina and helped to ensure that no agreement on sovereignty was ever reached. Although the cabinet had agreed in principle to explore leaseback, it was never formally proposed to Argentina during Labour’s period of office.”*³⁰⁷

December 16th, in Britain’s House of Commons, a debate is held on Lord Shackleton’s Report.³⁰⁸

MP Hugh Fraser makes mention of the negotiations; *“Today, we have had an announcement in The Times of what has happened in the joint talks. It seems that the British and the Argentine Governments have agreed to form two joint working parties on the issues of sovereignty and economic development. I do not want to go into the issue of sovereignty, but I do not see how we can have an effective working party on a matter which should be a subject for a judicial decision. A working party seems to be a bit of a nonsense. The subject of that working party, I would have thought, should be one for The Hague court. With regard to the second working party, I would have thought that there was grave danger of burying the Shackleton Report before it is implemented. Lord Shackleton spent four months finding out what the developments were. I suggest that a further working party on economic development would only support what Lord Shackleton, recalling the 20 earlier reports, said in his report. When asked to define the Falkland Islands, he said: The Falkland Islands is a piece of land entirely surrounded by advice”. There is far too much of that already.”*

Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Overseas Aid, John Tomlinson, makes a statement.

*“British aid is not imposed on the Falkland Islands but is provided at the request of, and after discussion with, the Falkland Islands Government – we have to consider the amount of aid which the Falkland Islands can absorb without putting strains on its economy. The islands have hitherto been self-supporting, in the sense that the United Kingdom has not provided them with financial means to balance the budget.”*³⁰⁹

December 18th, in Rio de Janeiro, Edward Rowlands meets with the Governor and Falkland Island Councillors to update them on the progress of the negotiations.

December 20th, from London, and despite the doubts of the Foreign Secretary, the task force is instructed to quietly retire.³¹⁰

305 Defence Secretary John Nott in the House of Commons debate of April 3, 1982

306 Fenton in *The Telegraph* June 1, 2005 *op.cit.* There is no evidence for any of this. See Donaghy 2014

307 Livingstone 2018

308 *HC Deb* 16 December 1977 vol.941 cc1226-36

309 *Ibid*

310 Owen to Callaghan, January 6, 1978 in *PREM 16/1504*. Owen seems to have been concerned about Argentina’s ‘disreputable’ attitude regarding the Beagle Channel arbitration decision. Defence Secretary Mulley was opposed.

“66. Cabinet Committee papers show clearly that it was agreed that the force should remain covert. We have found no evidence that the Argentine Government ever came to know of its existence. In the event the negotiations went reasonably well. The Argentine threat receded, and it was agreed after the talks that the naval force could be withdrawn.”³¹¹

“No evidence has emerged that Argentina was made aware of the British defence plans... Owen, a close friend of Callaghan has always maintained that Operation Journeyman remained covert.”³¹²

“The more I consider the 1977 deployment, the more I realise what an irresponsible and useless act it was.”³¹³

Researcher's Comment: Following Argentina's invasion in April, 1982, the deployment of 1977 became public knowledge. During the 1982 conflict, a number of statements were made by Labour MPs suggesting that the 1977 deployment had been become known to the Argentine negotiating team and had assisted those talks. Used as a criticism of Thatcher's response to the threat of war in 1982. However, in the debate of January, 1983, following the issue of the Franks Report, ex-PM Callaghan declined to answer clearly whether or not the 1977 deployment had been made known to the Argentine negotiators. Callaghan declined to give evidence on the subject to the Franks Committee, which had to conclude that there was no evidence that the information had been supplied to the Argentines. Despite being pressed on the inconsistencies in Labour's 1982 claims, Callaghan remained evasive on the question before declining to answer at all.

1978 – January 9th, Argentina presses for talks earlier than planned. Britain's Foreign Secretary Owen accepts the proposal.

January 25th, in a letter to Chile, Argentina formally rejects the decision of the arbitral Court regarding its dispute over the Beagle Channel. Argentina does not bother to inform the arbitration panel or the Hague judges, however.

*“... the Government of the Argentine Republic, after carefully studying the arbitral Award by Her Britannic Majesty on the Beagle Channel dispute, has decided to declare the Arbitrator's decision irrevocably null and void under international law.”*³¹⁴

Researcher's Comment: On June 22, 1971 Chile and Argentina had signed an agreement to take their sovereignty dispute to an international panel of judges for resolution. Both nations had also agreed to abide by the decision which was given in February, 1977. A decision in Chile's favour. That Argentina, just a year later, refused to do so, irrevocably tainted its reputation and provided a permanent excuse for Great Britain not to enter into any similar agreement regarding the Falklands. A further accord would be signed between Chile and Argentina in 1979, to take the dispute to Papal arbitration. Argentina did not like that result either and again acted disgracefully in refusing to accept the result. A second Papal decision in 1982, also favouring Chile but much watered down, was finally accepted in Argentina following a national plebiscite. Any Anglo-Argentine agreement to take the Falklands question to arbitration, needs to be considered in light of this history.

311 *Falkland Islands Review Report of a Committee of Privy Counsellors Chairman: The Rt Hon the Lord Franks, OM, GCMG, KCB, CBE Presented to Parliament by the Prime Minister by Command of Her Majesty January 1983.* A copy of what is now commonly referred to as the Franks Report can be found here – <https://falklandstimeline.files.wordpress.com/2020/02/franks-report.pdf>

312 Donaghy 2014

313 John Nott quoted in Donaghy 2014 p.17

314 *Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Argentine Republic to the Ambassador of Chile in Argentina January 25, 1978*

*“... Argentina, having accepted the jurisdiction of an international court of arbitration on the Beagle Channel dispute with Chile, then refused to accept its results. It is difficult to believe in Argentina's good faith with that very recent example in mind. ... it would be hard to have confidence that Argentina would respect a judgement that it did not like.”*³¹⁵

Reviewing the situation following the Beagle Channel decision, Britain's Foreign Office conclude that Argentina's failure in its dispute with Chile has increased pressure on the junta to gain some success elsewhere. The Falkland islands are mentioned.

February 6th, in London, David Owen writes to the Prime Minister to explain the difficulties the Foreign Office has experienced maintaining a rational approach to talks with Argentina; in the face of the attitude of both Parliament and the British Press.³¹⁶

February 15th, in Lima, Peru, Anglo-Argentine talks resume. Argentina's head of delegation is Medina Muñoz, while for Britain, the delegation is led by George Hall.

*“No sooner had the British delegation taken their seats than a further complication arose. The head of the Malvinas department was attempting to separate the question of the continental shelf from the negotiations; a stance which would jeopardise any hope of reaching an agreement on economic or scientific cooperation.”*³¹⁷

Despite the 1958 Geneva Conventions³¹⁸, Argentina refuses to acknowledge that the Falklands have any continental shelf rights. The Argentine delegation also refuses to accept proposals for economic cooperation as they rest on Islander rights that Argentina does not recognise.

*“Argentina's new stance was linked to its quarrel over the Beagle Channel. If Britain were to cede sovereignty over the continental shelf, the Argentine position in the dispute with Chile would be strengthened.”*³¹⁹

February 17th, the Lima talks end.

“No joint communique was issued at the close of the meeting, which was characterized as preparatory to plenary round discussions scheduled to be held at a ministerial level during the second quarter of 1978.” Britain's delegation report back to London; *“Medina Muñoz made it absolutely clear that they saw these negotiations as a long process which should not be hurried...”*³²⁰

Argentina's military base on Southern Thule is observed by the crew of Antarctic survey ship RRS *Bransfield*. Information of this sighting is quickly relayed to London where Foreign Secretary David Owen, fearing a backlash once the occupation becomes public knowledge, warns the British Embassy in Buenos Aires.

*“... the crew might talk about this on their arrival in Port Stanley on February 20th.”*³²¹

*“Ministers were informed and it set in train a series of urgent messages between London and negotiators in Lima highlighting a possible plan to legitimise the base as a joint scientific station before it came to light. Officials warned the Argentines of the "danger of a leak" and urged them to agree quickly. ... In the event of a leak ... the British Government would need to make it clear publicly that they had protested to Argentina about a violation of British sovereignty. It would be a complicating factor in our negotiations.”*³²²

315 Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher speaking to the House of Commons *HC Deb 29 April 1982 vol.22 cc980-1059*

316 Owen to Callaghan February 6, 1978 PREM/ 16/1504

317 Donaghy 2014

318 cf. April & June 1958

319 Donaghy 2014

320 FO 7/3528

321 Owen quoted in *Royal Prayer: A Surprising History* David Baldwin 2009 p.25. cf. September & December, 1976

322 *The Telegraph* December 29th, 2008

March 23rd, in London, Minister Rowlands raises the issue of the continental shelf in the House of Commons.

“As a consequence of its sovereignty over the Falkland Islands, the United Kingdom enjoys sovereign rights over the continental shelf...”

April 7th, Argentina again refuses to accept that the Falkland Islands have their own continental shelf. ³²³

“Islands generate their own territorial sea and continental shelf. Furthermore, the principle that islands should be treated as any other land territory for the purpose of delimiting the territorial sea, contiguous zone and continental shelf was expressly recognised in Article 10(1) of the 1958 Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, and Article 1 of the 1958 Convention on the Continental Shelf. In so far as the continental shelf is concerned, the Convention on the Continental Shelf 1958, at Article 1(b) provided that the term 'continental shelf' is used as referring inter alia 'to the seabed and subsoil of similar submarine areas adjacent to the coasts of islands'. Any insular formation, which is above water at high tide, therefore possesses a territorial sea and a continental shelf.” ³²⁴

Researcher's Comment: Following the *Convention on the Continental Shelf* of April, 1958, the United Nations accepts that islands, in International Law, have their own continental shelves.

May 7th, news of the Argentine base on Southern Thule appears in the British press.

May 10th, in Britain's House of Lords, Lord Carington asks whether the newspaper reports are true regarding the Argentine presence in occupation of Southern Thule for 18 months. Lord Goronwy-Roberts responds on behalf of the Government.

“... it would be incorrect to assume that these activities were in any way concealed from public knowledge. I understand that they were reported at the time in the news media; that is, towards the end of 1976. As to the other two points made by the noble Lord, I entirely agree. It is the fact that we are pursuing negotiations across the board on all outstanding issues, including the general issue of the future of that part of the world, with the Argentinians. Indeed, we expect that the two working groups on political and economic matters will reconvene this summer, followed by a ministerial meeting. It is in that context that an incident or a situation like this – which, again, I agree is a serious matter and should not be allowed to prejudice the success of the larger negotiations – will be viewed...”

The Argentinians established a research station on Thule Island some time in 1976. We protested, and in that way protected our legal claim to sovereignty. We understood that the residence, if I may call it that, was to be temporary; and it is a fact that, because of climatic conditions, seasonal adversity, it is practically impossible to be there all the year round. In that sense, it is a non-continuous residence.

However, it is important, in the context of the larger negotiation now proceeding, in which we are seeking general accord and general co-operation for the development of the South-West Atlantic area, to the mutual benefit of all three countries – the United Kingdom, the Falkland Islands and Argentina – that incidents or situations like this, whether temporary or not, should not be allowed to grow out of proportion and imperil those larger and vital negotiations.” ³²⁵

323 Livingstone 2018 citing *Owen to Callaghan April 7, 1978 PREM 16/1504. cf. April, 1958*

324 *Islands* Andrew J. Jacovides in *Peaceful Order in the World's Oceans: Essays in Honor of Satya N. Nandan* Michael Lodge & Myron Nordquist (eds) 2014

325 *HL Deb 10 May 1978 vol.391 cc976-81*

Researcher's Comment: It cannot be denied that the Government lied to the House of Lords. A lie told, via Parliament, to the nation. In full knowledge that the 1976 occupation by Argentine forces had been kept a secret. Nothing notified to the Press. To suggest that Argentine troops were not on-station in Southern Thule all year round was another lie.

On the same day, the Argentine Government issue a statement affirming their sovereignty claim to Southern Thule and the South Sandwich Islands. They reject Britain's protest of January, 1977.

May 13th, in Berkeley Sound, a Polish fishery vessel, *Zulawy*, is harassed by an Argentine aircraft.

*"We have formally protested to the Argentine Government about this violation of Falkland Islands airspace and left them in no doubt of our concern about unauthorised overflights of any kind and the need to avoid their repetition."*³²⁶

On the same day, fishing some 63 miles from the archipelago, a Polish trawler, *Otol*, is stopped and boarded by marines from an Argentine destroyer. *Otol's* Captain is told that he is fishing in Argentine waters and ordered to leave the area.³²⁷

*"... may I ask the noble Lord whether Her Majesty's Government would not agree that the Argentinians' somewhat petulant belligerence, their recent boarding of a trawler under the threat of traversing guns, their buzzing of a trawler in Berkeley Sound, their continued occupation of Southern Thule... together indicate Argentinian frustration at Her Majesty's Government's most praiseworthy resolution and diplomatic determination over the question of the sovereign integrity of British possessions in the South-West Atlantic?"*³²⁸

May 16th, in London, Secretary of State Rowlands speaks to the Commons with regard to Southern Thule.

*"The Argentines carried out scientific work on Southern Thule in the 1954 and 1956 Antarctic seasons and established their present scientific station in late 1976. There have been no other cases of unauthorised foreign activity in the Falkland Islands, South Georgia or the South Sandwich Islands. Argentine Service personnel provide logistic support for Argentina's Antarctic scientific activities. We have remained in communication with the Governor throughout, and he has reported that the Islands councillors know of and fully support our actions to protect British sovereignty."*³²⁹

May 24th, Rowlands further informs Parliament that the Argentines have not left the Southern Thule base, and that a further protest has been sent to the Argentine Government.

A second weekly flight commences between Stanley Airport and Comodoro Rivadavia.³³⁰

June 10th, in Buenos Aires, President Vidella reaffirms his country's claim to the Falklands.

*"... on Malvinas Day, which they celebrated recently, President Videla referred to the successful outcome, as he hoped, of current negotiations;... This gives hope that the current negotiations based on the two working groups, political and economic, may possibly bear fruit."*³³¹

326 Mr. Luard in *HC Deb 19 June 1978 vol.952 cc79-80W*

327 *Falkland Islands Newsletter* June 18, 1978

328 Lord Morris *HL Deb 13 June 1978 vol.393 cc175-80*. Lord Goronwy-Roberts' muted response referred to "current negotiations."

329 *HC Deb 16 May 1978 vol.950 cc160-1W*

330 *MercoPress* November 29, 2019

331 Lord Goronwy-Roberts *HL Deb 13 June 1978 vol.393 cc175-80*

June 22nd, in Parliament, Goronwy-Roberts speaks regarding the measures proposed in Shackleton's report.

“... we have made further progress. We are financing the construction of an all-weather road from Darwin to Stanley and of a new school hostel in Stanley. We are also ... carrying forward our urgent discussions with the Falkland Island Government on expanding the internal air service...”

June 25th, after Argentina wins the FIFA World Cup. Admiral Massera argues that *Plan Goa* should start. ³³²

July 5th, in the House of Commons, Edward Rowlands again addresses the situation in Southern Thule.

“We are not dealing with an illegal occupation of the Falkland Islands themselves. ... Nor are we dealing at this time with a military occupation. It is important to say that. Although the Argentines use service personnel for logistic support in their Antarctic work, their activities on Thule are purely scientific. I do not think that anybody has challenged that assumption. ...

We object to the fact that they are being carried out on British territory without our permission. That is the bone of contention ... What the Argentines are doing there does indeed constitute a violation of our sovereignty, and, as hon. Members are already aware, we have firmly protested to them about this. Our sovereignty position has thus been protected fully and explicitly... When we learnt of it, we pursued the matter immediately.

We are going back 18 months, but at that time we had reason to believe that the dispute would be resolved speedily and satisfactorily. I had a difficult decision to make on how to handle the issue. I thought that it would be wrong for us to have a slanging match with the Argentine Government...” ³³³

Constantino Davidoff, a Buenos Aires scrap metal merchant, contacts *Christian Salvesen* seeking a contract to remove the old equipment from the whaling stations at Leith, Stromness and Husvik on South Georgia. *Christian Salvesen* seeks advice before proceeding. Governor Parker advises against allowing Davidoff into South Georgia. Britain's Foreign and Commonwealth Office, however, raise no objections. ³³⁴

Argentina's Admiral Massera visits London, holding meetings with the First Sea Lord, Sir Terence Lewin and senior officials at the Department of Trade and the Foreign Office. The Foreign Secretary declines however. ³³⁵

“It is extraordinary that the commander of the Argentine navy met the commander of the British navy four years before the Falklands war, yet all official files relating to the visit have been destroyed.” ³³⁶

August 24th, in London, Foreign Secretary Owen suggests that Anglo-Argentine talks recommence towards the end of September.

August 31st, Britain's naval attaché in Buenos Aires, Captain Leggatt, writes to the FCO to complain that a recent failure to win a contract to supply frigates to the Argentine Navy was a result of “*the Falklands issue*”. ³³⁷

September 29th, at the UN in New York, Owen meets Argentina's Foreign Minister. It is agreed that talks will resume in December.

332 Hastings & Jenkins 1997 p.39

333 *HC Deb 05 July 1978 vol.953 cc620-30*

334 Freedman 2005 vol.1 p.146. Negotiations between the company and Davidoff resulted in a contract being signed in September, 1979.

335 Owen was criticised for this decision by those vested interests that wished to sell arms to Argentina. No records survive, but Owen would later describe Massera as a “*little shi*”. See Livingstone 2018.

336 Livingstone 2018

337 Leggatt to Carless August 31, 1978 FCO 7/3450

“I make no secret of the fact that I would not transfer sovereignty to Argentina. ... I must make it clear that when in office I was never prepared to contemplate it. I never accepted lease-back, and have great difficulty with it. The furthest that I was prepared to go was a sharing of sovereignty. In those days, one of the options that I thought was most hopeful was that sovereignty over the uninhabited islands would be transferred to Argentina, and the inhabited islands—the greater space, I admit—would remain with Britain, with a shared economic unit covering all the islands, inhabited and uninhabited, and the territorial waters...” ³³⁸

In **October**, a request is submitted for permission to allow the testing of an Exocet missile, at a British firing range, for a group of Argentine officers.

“The Defence sales department ... asked that the Argentine navy be allowed to test Exocet missiles in Cardigan Bay, because ‘unless we demonstrate to the Argentinians our willingness to be helpful in all requests of a military nature then our chances of securing substantial military contracts likely to be awarded in the future are considerably diminished’. The French-made Exocet missiles were, of course, used to lethal effect against British forces in the Falklands War.” ³³⁹

November 1st, in the Commons, MP Michael Hutchinson speaks on the outstanding matter of Southern Thule.

“I am not convinced that a protest is sufficient. If the Argentine party has been in the island for more than 12 months, that strengthens Argentina's position and weakens ours. International law is by no means united on what the exact position is. Therefore, I should very much welcome a statement from the Minister concerned. It seems to me that there are two courses open to deal with the matter. One is to mount a small police expedition to remove the intruders. That is my instinctive reaction and choice. The other is to set up our own scientific party and to land it in the island so that the Argentine claim is reduced.” ³⁴⁰

Britain’s Labour Government approves the sale of blowpipe surface-to-air missiles to Argentina.

“... in order to protect employment at the Shorts Brothers factory in Belfast...” ³⁴¹

December 13th, at the United Nations, the General Assembly defers consideration of the Falkland Islands question until its 1979 session.

Tensions rise again between Argentina and Chile over the unresolved Beagle Channel dispute.

“In November and December 1978 a propaganda campaign was organised by the Argentines, with Army, Navy and Air Force units prepared to fight a just war against Chilean territorial encroachment.” ³⁴²

December 18th, in Geneva, a further round of negotiations take place between delegations from Argentina and Britain. Agreement is reached over scientific activities on Southern Thule and within the Dependencies.

“The Argentines accepted that, under such an agreement, these activities – including their station on Thule, would have no implications for sovereignty... We rejected the idea that the aim of the negotiations was simply to transfer sovereignty to Argentina.” ³⁴³

338 Dr. David Owen speaking in 1985 in *Falkland Islands (Foreign Affairs Committee Report) HC Deb 14 March 1985 vol.75 cc492-530*. A change in attitude from October, 1977 or a failure of memory?

339 Livingstone 2018 citing *Spencer to Keeling October 12, 1978 DEFE 68/377*

340 *HC Deb 01 November 1978 vol.957 cc9-156*

341 Livingstone 2018 p.151

342 *The Falklands War* D. George Boyce 2005

343 *ALW 045/325/1 Part A* filed at the Margaret Thatcher Foundation

*“The more problematic issue was co-administration of the Dependencies maritime zones. Allara agreed that Argentina and Britain should jointly declare a 200-mile fishing zone, but failed to explain how he planned to reconcile this with Argentina’s own sovereignty claim... Allara held out for a transfer of the Dependencies as his price for an agreement to the co-administration of a fisheries zone. Rowlands rejected this out of hand.”*³⁴⁴

The two sides agree to meet again towards the end of March.

Under pressure from Defence Secretary Mulley, and Trade Secretary Dell, Britain’s Foreign Secretary agrees to invite General Orlando Agosti, Argentina’s Air Force chief, to visit London to discuss the sale of a Lynx helicopter and Hawk trainer jets.³⁴⁵ Agosti agrees, but then suddenly cancels for ‘domestic’ reasons.

*“Although the Agosti visit was cancelled, there were numerous other visits by Argentine officers to the UK during Labour’s period of office and many British defence officials visited Argentina.”*³⁴⁶

1979 – January 7th, Falklands Councillors meet Rowlands in Rio de Janeiro for an update.

Britain’s Labour Government issue guidelines to restrict arms sales to Argentina. The Ministry of Defence is told that sales cannot be approved if they include equipment that could be directly used for internal repression. Or which could threaten the Falkland Islands.

*“In fact, as soon as they were introduced, Labour’s Defence Secretary, Fred Mulley said that, while he accepted the guidelines, each order should be looked at on a case by case basis, because ‘we would be reluctant to take any action which would seriously damage our prospects of obtaining at least a reasonable share of this market.’ Mulley then asked the FCO to approve sales of ammunition by British companies for use with weapons that had already been sold. Owen agreed... the first of many instances when the guidelines were bent.”*³⁴⁷

January 8th, militarily weaker than its neighbour, Argentina reaches an agreement with Chile to refer their dispute over the Beagle Channel islands to the Pope in Rome.

*“... an important by-product of this tension was that the Argentine Government spent billions of dollars on arms procurement, including 40 A-4 Skyhawk aircraft and five Chinook helicopters bought from the United States, and 42 Dagger aircraft purchased from Israel. The Argentine armed forces were therefore mentally and physically prepared for war...”*³⁴⁸

January 13th, in Stanley, the agreements achieved at Geneva are rejected by Islanders, with Councillors fearing an erosion of British sovereignty.

*“An Anglo-Argentine agreement over Southern Thule would have been difficult to digest; the inclusion of South Georgia made it nigh impossible.”*³⁴⁹

An American researcher visits the archipelago, noting that there are 10 US citizens living on the Islands. Also that all but one of them are associated with the religious sect 'Bahai'.

344 Donaghy 2014. See also *ALW 0420/325/1*

345 Two Lynx helicopters had been sold to Argentina earlier in 1978. The invitation would seem to have smoothed the way for an order to purchase a further eight helicopters.

346 Livingston 2018

347 *Ibid*

348 *The Falklands War* D. G. Boyce 2005

349 Donaghy 2014

*“Members abstain from political activity and alcohol, but are not rigidly organized or segregated. The reporting officer did not detect any aberration or coercion in connection with their presence or activities in Stanley.”*³⁵⁰

Argentina expresses an interest in the restoration of Ambassadors between itself and the UK.

*“The head of the FCO’s Latin America Department, John Ure, advised that reinstating ambassadors could facilitate talks over the Falklands, but that such a move could provoke criticism from the ‘human rights lobby’ and the Falkland Islanders and their lobby’. He suggested that Argentina be invited to appoint an ambassador to Britain, after which the British would consider re-appointing their ambassador. David Owen approved this, although his political advisor told FCO officials that this needed ‘very careful press handling’... With just weeks to go until the general election, the British ambassador was not reinstated until the Conservatives came to power,...”*³⁵¹

February 6th, in Parliament, Lord Goronwy-Roberts, speaking on behalf of the Government, explains the agreement over scientific activities in the Dependencies.³⁵²

“... it relates to a wide range of scientific questions, from meteorology to Antarctic questions generally. It is the kind of question that arises in conditions and circumstances of this geographical sort. The scope of the discussions, while not including hydro-carbons, is sufficiently wide not only to offer hope for development in the Dependencies but also perhaps to give added strength and confidence to the larger discussions which are proceeding amicably between us and Argentina in regard to the future of the Falklands. ...

The illegal station in South Thule remains illegal. We have asserted, and continue to assert without reservation, our claim to sovereignty over South Thule, as indeed over these Dependencies generally. However, any discussions specifically aimed at advancing matters in the Dependencies can only help to resolve not only the disagreement about the station in South Thule but, as I said, the larger question of our relations with Argentina, a country with which, historically, we have for many years enjoyed close and fruitful relations.”

Goronwy-Roberts confirms that the Government regard the continental shelf around the Falklands as British sovereign territory.

March 21st, three days of Anglo-Argentine talks commence in New York.

*“There is no question of any decisions being taken in New York this month; our intention is to pre-empt trouble and continue talking.”*³⁵³

*“Domestic considerations hindered meaningful dialogue... Hall explained that the scientific cooperation agreement could not proceed, due to the islanders’ ‘deep suspicion’ of Argentine motives... Subsequent discussions yielded no progress.”*³⁵⁴

350 *Foreign Relations of the United States: 1981-1988 vol.XIII: Conflict in the South Atlantic 1981 – 1984 p.9*

351 Livingstone 2018

352 *HL Deb 06 February 1979 vol.398 cc589-91. cf. 1958*

353 *ALW 045/325/1 Part A*

354 Donaghy 2014. In Britain, the winter of 1978/79 was known as the *Winter of Discontent* with action by unions over a pay freeze making life difficult and uncomfortable; undermining the authority of the Labour Government.

March 23rd, negotiations come to an end without a firm agreement, nor any decision as to future talks.

*“Anglo/Argentine exchanges on the Falklands date from 1966,... The most active periods have been 1967/8, 1972/3 and 1977/9. Differences over sovereignty have been central: we have never been able to get the Argentines to accept our view that sovereignty cannot be transferred against the wishes of the Islanders; we have refused to accept the Argentine formula recognising only the "interests" of the Islanders.”*³⁵⁵

*“Towards the end of Labour's period of office, Argentina expressed an interest in restoring ambassadors. The head of the FCO's Latin America department, John Ure, advised that reinstating ambassadors could facilitate talks over the Falklands, but that such a move could provoke criticism from the 'human rights lobby' and the 'Falkland islanders and their lobby? He suggested that Argentina be invited to appoint an ambassador to Britain, after which the British would consider re-appointing their ambassador. David Owen approved this, although his political advisor told FCO officials that this needed 'very careful' press handling. But a leaked press report, announcing that an exchange of ambassadors had been agreed to, led to an angry response from the Labour party. The party's national executive passed a resolution calling it 'totally inappropriate'. With just weeks to go until the general election, the British ambassador was not reinstated until the Conservatives came to power, but Labour ministers had not objected, in principle, to the move.”*³⁵⁶

An Argentine stamp-set celebrates 150 years since the 'Civil and Military Command of the Malvinas.'³⁵⁷

In the **April** Falkland Islands Newsletter.

*“Talks between the British and Argentine governments over the future of the Falkland Islands appear to have failed. ... The communique issued following the discussion gave no indication of their substance and was markedly less cooperative in tone ... ”*³⁵⁸

From Stanley, the Falklands' Legislative Council calls for a 200-mile maritime limit to be declared around the archipelago.

In London, 118 MPs sign a Commons *motion* demanding that the Government implement the Shackleton recommendations.

May 1st, in the islands, a refurbished airport is formally opened at Cape Pembroke by Sir Vivian Fuchs.

*“The construction of the permanent airfield had just been completed at a final cost of £6m million. Yet the new runway, measuring 1,370 yards, could only take short and medium-haul aircraft. The islanders thus remained reliant on the airport at Comodoro Rivadavia, southern Argentina, as their only available staging post for reaching the outside world.”*³⁵⁹

May 3rd, following a General Election, Margaret Thatcher becomes Prime Minister of the UK. Lord Carington is appointed Foreign Secretary.³⁶⁰

“Carless wrote again soon after Margaret Thatcher's election, saying: 'Since the British elections ... the concept of Argentina opting for a closer relationship with Britain would seem to have gained ground here.' He

355 FCO 76/1892 Annex 3. See October, 1979

356 Livingstone 2018 p.152

357 See 1829

358 Falkland Islands Newsletter No. 6 April 1979

359 Donaghy 2014.

360 Lord Carington would later refer to the Falklands question as having been “number 249” on his list of priorities, on becoming Foreign Secretary.

suggested that in exchange for granting Argentina ‘political recognition as a valid partner’, sharing military and nuclear technology, and a ‘symbolic’ agreement on the Falklands, British business could win lucrative contracts.”³⁶¹

May 10th, in London, John Ure, Under-Secretary in the Foreign Office's South American Department, minutes Nicholas Ridley, the new Minister responsible for the Falkland Islands.

*“There is a vociferous and highly organised Falkland islands lobby in this country with the capacity to enlist considerable support in Parliament and the media. Its function, in the name of the Falkland Islanders, is to monitor and oppose any attempt by the British Government to establish closer links between the Falkland Islands and Argentina. ... The Argentine claim enjoys widespread international support...”*³⁶²

May 14th, Minister Ridley responds to Ure.

“... I would hope to preserve the Falklands as British – maybe its not possible – in return for helping Argentina to carve up the Antarctic with us as a partner. I do think its important for me to go a) to the Falklands, b) to Argentina.”

*“The Foreign Office argued that good relations with Argentina were necessary in order to resolve the dispute – an assertion with which Nicholas Ridley agreed – noting, in an early meeting with officials, that it might be possible to persuade Argentina to accept a continuation of British sovereignty ‘if we acted in a friendlier fashion and tried to help them in other areas’, ...”*³⁶³

May 16th, from Buenos Aires, a paper entitled, 'The Malvinas (Falkland) Islands: A Political and Social Review' is transmitted by the US Embassy to the Department of State in Washington.

*“Argentina will eventually regain political sovereignty over the disputed Malvinas Islands, as a result of gradualist bilateral negotiations with Great Britain. Deterioration of the current talks could postpone but probably not avoid the eventual end of Britain's admittedly anachronistic colonial rule...”*³⁶⁴

May 22nd, in London, the issue of the Falklands' fisheries is raised in the House of Lords.

*“I beseech the Conservative Administration as a matter of urgency to review, report back upon and act upon the desk survey by the White Fish Authority, which was commissioned by the former Administration, and to do so in conjunction with the most admirable report of the noble Lord, Lord Shackleton. Although I appreciate that the survey has been on the Minister's desk only since 14th May last, many believe, as I do, that time is of the essence.”*³⁶⁵

May 24th, Margaret Thatcher invites Lord Carington and Home Secretary William Whitelaw to a working lunch at Chequers.

“Carington mentioned that one of the problems he faced was what to do about the Falklands. "I think we will soon be in trouble if we go on having meetings about them with the Argentines without saying anything at all,"

361 Livingstone 2018 citing *Carless to FCO June 11, 1979 FCO 7/3573*. Carless was Britain's *charge d'affaires* in Buenos Aires.

362 *ALW 045/325/1 Part B*

363 Livingstone 2018 citing *Minister of State's meeting, minutes May 16, 1979 FCO 7/3573*

364 *Foreign Relations of the United States: 1981-1988 vol. XIII: Conflict in the South Atlantic 1981 – 1984* p.1. Authorship not known.

365 Lord Morris in *HL Deb 22 May 1979 vol.400 cc233-432*

Carington said. "One of the options which seems to me worth exploring is a leaseback arrangement similar to what we have in Hong Kong." Lady Thatcher "erupted in anger", ... She spent the next ten minutes denouncing the very idea of exploring a Hong Kong solution. "That's the trouble with your Foreign Office," she said. "Everyone in it is so bloody wet!"³⁶⁶

June 4th, Ridley minutes Lord Carington, seeking a decision as to the policy to be adopted.

"I have been looking at the various options open to us. These seem to be: (a) thumbing our noses at the Argentines and provisioning and defending the Falkland islands – the "Fortress Falkland" option: (b) selling out the Falkland Islanders: (c) negotiating with Argentina. I think that negotiation is the only valid option.

*The Argentines will not negotiate unless the negotiations include questions of sovereignty so, although I am much more interested in negotiating with them about economic co-operation, we will have to agree to discuss sovereignty. If we are going to do this we must keep the Falkland islanders with us. If we do not they will complain and we will have a blow up in Parliament and in the press. I am therefore proposing to go out to the Islands in July..."*³⁶⁷

June 7th, in Buenos Aires, *La Prensa* reports that a further meeting has been arranged for later in the month between Deputy Foreign Minister Cavándoli and Nicholas Ridley. Topics are to include; "... an analysis of the state of negotiations on the Falkland Islands, the establishment of the basis for a formal meeting to be held at Buenos Aires in July 1979 following Mr. Ridley's visit to the Territory, and the resumption of bilateral relations at the ambassadorial level."

June 12th, Minister Cavándoli indicates that his Government requires sovereignty to be central to negotiations.

June 14th, Lord Carington responds vaguely that Britain is willing to continue with discussions.

*"The talks ... between 1977 and 1979 were based on the prospect of some deal on sovereignty being possible. We kept the Argentines in play only with difficulty and there was continuing suspicion among the Argentine officials about the genuineness of our intentions."*³⁶⁸

June 26th, speaking in Cordoba, Dr. Carlos Helbling, an Argentine banker, calls for; *"The reconquest of the Malvinas; effective control of the Antarctic and the reoccupation of the geopolitical area belonging to the nation."*³⁶⁹

July 4th, from Buenos Aires, Britain's *charge d'affaires* reports to London on the visit to Argentina by the Chairman of GEC, Lord Nelson, who has held meetings with the junta's military staff.

*"Lord Nelson,.. met the chief of the Argentine air force in July 1979 to discuss a nuclear contract and was told that 'Britain would never win any major contracts in Argentina unless progress were made over the Falkland Islands'..."*³⁷⁰

Nicolas Ridley arrives in the Falkland Islands.

366 *The Telegraph* October 12th, 2013

367 ALW 045/325/1 Part B

368 ALW 0420/325/1 (FCO 07-3801) 1980

369 FCO ALA 020/1 Part A Political Relations between UK and Argentina File No. 141/1. Helbling would seem, at that time, to have been Baring Bank's agent in Buenos Aires.

370 Livingstone 2018 citing *Carless to FCO* July 4, 1979 FCO 7/3574

*“He considered 'lease back' the best available option, ... but Thatcher was hostile and could sense unease among Conservative MPs who already resented the compromises that had been made to arrange a settlement in Rhodesia. Ridley was sent to the Falklands in July 1979 ... for discussions. The islanders were still firmly against a transfer of sovereignty.”*³⁷¹

July 11th, an Argentine executive decree announces; *“... the concession contract for the Rio Gallegos Area (8,700 km²) and the Magellan Area (4,700 km²) of the Austral Basin to Shell Hydrocarbons and Shell Argentina. This contract is closely related to the proposal of the Foreign Office to postpone any claim on our sovereignty in the Malvinas and to enter into negotiations on a vast program of (economic) cooperation, related in the first instance to the exploitation of oil in the Marine Basin Austral and Falklands Basin. ... the Minister of the Economy Dr. (Jose Alfredo) Martinez de Hoz in his various trips to London, has unconditionally accepted the program of "economic cooperation". So the contract with Shell is the principle of execution of a tacit agreement.”*³⁷²

July 21st, from Stanley, Ridley flies to Buenos Aires for preliminary talks with the Argentine Foreign Ministry. Agreement is reached on the reinstatement of Ambassadors – but little else. As Ridley is about to depart, the Argentine Foreign Ministry present an *aide-memoire* stating that they will find it unacceptable for the Islanders to become 'third parties' to any negotiations. Also that Argentina “demands” that negotiations move at a more dynamic pace.

*“Ridley returned to London determined to sort this one out once and for all.”*³⁷³

August 17th, in London, an internal Foreign Office *minute* considers negotiations.

“... we need to clear our lines with Cabinet on the next moves in our dispute with Argentina on sovereignty over the Falkland Islands. I recommend that the Secretary of State write to the Prime Minister and her OD colleagues seeking their agreement to resume negotiations with Argentina in the autumn, to see whether an overall solution involving a leaseback, or some other special status, is possible. ...

*No solution stands any chance of success if we do not take the Islanders with us.”*³⁷⁴

Following enquiries by the arms manufacturer Marconi, with regard to the promotion of the Stingray lightweight torpedo in Argentina, the Ministry of Defence argue that a sale will not be permitted. One of the factors presented is the possible threat to the Falkland Islands.

*“An MOD sales representative responded by saying: ‘I was surprised to see you making so much of a military threat against the Falkland Islands,’ adding: ‘I was under the impression that ... we had accepted that the Argentinians could take the Falkland Islands at any time they wish.’ ...”*³⁷⁵

September 19th, following extensive talks, Constantino Davidoff contracts with Christian Salvesen to recover whaling equipment on South Georgia during 1980.³⁷⁶

371 *Britain's International Role 1970 – 1991* Michael J. Turner 2010 p.207

372 *Contrato con Shell coopera con los ocupantes de las Malvinas* in *El Diario del fin del mundo* July 7, 2017, quoting Adolfo Silenzi de Stagni of the *Politica Petrolera y la Cuenca Marina Austral* from July 7, 1979. The implication is that this decree was prepared for the benefit of Ridley's visit, but there is no evidence that he was ever made aware of it.

373 Hastings & Jenkins 1997 p.47

374 *Ure to Hall August 17, 1979 ALW 045/325/1 Part C. OD* is short for the *Defence and Overseas Policy Committee*.

375 Livingstone 2018 citing *J.R. Hill to The Secretary RMI Sub-Committee, MOD August 21, 1979 DEFE 678/378*. A some lobbying, the sale of a version of the torpedo was approved.

376 *Davidoff to Williams March 25, 1982 in AW 040/325.12*

Under the agreement, any equipment remaining after March 1982, reverts to *Salvesen*.³⁷⁷

*“I can confirm that in the period leading up to the conclusion of the contract there were a number of exchanges between Salvesens, the FCO and the then Governor of the Falkland Islands. Mr. Davidoff also contacted the Embassy in Buenos Aires. ... While there were misgivings about the political implications of the contract, legal advice was that there was no lawful way of preventing Salvesens concluding the agreement if they were determined to do so. Accordingly Salvesens were not obstructed in their pursuit of a contract. Ministers were consulted at the time and approved. There is no letter from the FCO to Salvesens acquiescing in the arrangement.”*³⁷⁸

*“Thatcher's Foreign Office not only cleared the way for Salvesens to enter into a salvaging contract, but it also sweetened the deal. First the Foreign Office authorized Salvesens to acquire the Albion Star leases at Husvik and Grytviken, giving the company control over all four of the whaling stations on the island. Then, Salvesens offered Davidoff an option contract to dismantle the stations at Leith, Stromness, and Husvik, all located at Stromness Bay and one more than Davidoff originally sought. The fourth station, at Grytviken, twenty miles away from the other three, where the BAS were located, was excluded from the deal... Although Davidoff signed a three-year contract with Salvesens in September 1979, and despite the fact that scrap metal prices reached their historic peak in 1981, Davidoff's enterprise lay dormant until activated in late 1981.”*³⁷⁹

September 20th, Foreign Secretary, Lord Carington seeks consensus on policy within the *Defence and Overseas Policy Committee*. He puts forward options: 1) *Fortress Falklands*; 2) protracted negotiations with no concession on sovereignty; or 3) substantive negotiations on sovereignty.³⁸⁰ Carington favours the last option and again suggests that the best solution is some kind of *leaseback* arrangement with a preferred term of 99 years. He highlights that it will be necessary to ensure that the option has the support of the Islanders, and of Parliament.

“NO! ... I could not possibly agree to the line the foreign secretary is proposing. Nor would it ever get through the H of C – let alone the parliamentary party.”

*“(Margaret Thatcher) ... wrote angry notes on Carington's draft, rejecting the entire leaseback idea...”*³⁸¹

September 21st, Cabinet Secretary John Hunt, *minutes* the Prime Minister.

“Lord Carington... proposes that in the margin of the UN General Assembly meeting next week he should suggest to his Argentine Foreign Minister that negotiations should start soon ... In these negotiations we should, for the first time, formally put to the Argentine the suggestion that we might concede sovereignty over the Falklands and the Dependencies in return for a leaseback to ensure continued British rule for as long as possible...”

Thatcher writes on the top of the *minute*; *“I cannot possibly agree to the proposed course of action.”*³⁸²

September 22nd, Energy Secretary David Howell, also writes to Thatcher.

“I have seen Peter Carington's paper to you on the subject of the Falkland Islands ... It is true that the presence of oil (or gas) has yet to be proven, but the continued interest of the oil companies and the results of recent geophysical surveys ... lead us to think that there is at least a good chance that

377 This was subsequently extended to December 31, 1982 and then to March 31, 1983

378 *Falkland Island Dependencies: Whaling Stations February 1, 1983* FCO note to Downing Street.

379 *The Reagan Revolution II: Rebuilding the Western Alliance* Richard C. Thornton 2004

380 *PM/79/81*

381 Livingstone 2018 citing *Carington to Thatcher September 20, 1979 PREM 19/656*

382 *PREM 19/656 fl 14* Margaret Thatcher Foundation

hydrocarbons are there. We ought to be very careful about adopting a course which could lead to British oil companies losing a favourable position ... ” ³⁸³

“When, in late 1979, Lord Carington proposed a 99-year lease-back formula, the Secretary of State for Energy, David Howell, wrote to Margaret Thatcher ... He called for a full discussion of the economic implications of leaseback, warning that if sovereignty was transferred ‘it could also involve a substantial loss to the British economy if oil were found’. ... The Chancellor of the Exchequer, Geoffrey Howe, agreed...” ³⁸⁴

September 25th, after speaking to Thatcher, Carington informs Ridley that the Prime Minister will not be rushed into making a decision on his proposals and that Ridley should inform Argentina that this; “complex problem” was being considered. ³⁸⁵

At the UN, Argentina's Foreign Ministry proposes a “programme of work” in which Secretary of State Ridley meets with Argentina's Deputy Foreign Minister informally twice a year with an open agenda.

October 1st, in London, anticipating a discussion on the Falklands at the next Defence and Overseas Policy Committee (OD)³⁸⁶, John Ure circulates a memo. ³⁸⁷

“On historical and legal grounds we are confident that our sovereignty is soundly based. Nothing in the negotiations so far has eroded this. Equally, no progress has been made. ...

Our objectives in the dispute include the following (i) To defend the right of the British settlers to remain under British administration. (ii) To end a dispute which is damaging to trade; damaging to international relations (most of the UN vote against us) and politically explosive at home... (iii) To ensure that the UK derives advantage from the economic resources of the area: possibly oil and certainly fish. Argentine objectives appear to include: (i) achieving nominal sovereignty for reasons of national pride. (ii) Securing a share of the economic offshore resources. (iii) A possible non-national objective in providing a cause to further the ambitions of individual Argentine officers.” ³⁸⁸

Three options are raised for discussion: a refusal to negotiate; negotiation but a refusal to make concessions on sovereignty; or the adoption of: “... a more constructive approach... insisting on preserving our essential interests... On sovereignty, we could explore various arrangements, the most promising of which would appear to be a “leaseback” analogous to the New Territories in Hong Kong, under which Argentina would acquire nominal sovereignty while the Islanders continued to enjoy the security of British rule. ...” ³⁸⁹

Annex 3 to Ure's memo notes.

“The question of British sovereignty over the Falkland Islands and their Dependencies has not been submitted to the International Court of Justice or to any other international arbitration. Since Argentina has not accepted the compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice, and reference to the Court could only be made with the agreement of the Argentine Government.” ³⁹⁰

383 PREM 19/612

384 Livingstone 2018 citing Howell to Thatcher September 22, 1979 PREM 19/612

385 Franks 1983 para.73

386 A Cabinet Committee. Its existence was first announced in 1962 and was confirmed as still in being by Thatcher in 1979. Until 1992, the membership of Cabinet Committees, their remits and decisions were kept not made public.

387 The OD Committee meeting was scheduled for October 4, 1979. I have, as yet, found no record of it.

388 FCO 76/1892. Original emphasis.

389 *Ibid*

390 *Ibid*. In Annex 3, 1947's decision of the Law Officer was highlighted; while the 1966 legal advice which broadly agreed with that of 1947, was only mentioned. *cf.* 1947 & 1966

October 2nd, John Grundon, an Exploration and Commercial Manager for British Petroleum, informs the Government's Energy, Science and Space Department that; "... BP had all but written off the Falkland Islands as a prospective offshore oil area. This was not because of the political obstacles... The main reason for BP lack of interest was geological."³⁹¹

October 12th, Lord Carington again seeks a decision from Cabinet.

*"I ... invite my colleagues to agree that the FCO should resume talks with the Argentines at Ministerial level. The purpose of the talks in the first instance would be to explore, without commitment, political and economic solutions... We would seek not to rush matters: so long as the Argentines believe we are negotiating seriously, they will desist from precipitate action."*³⁹²

*"A memorandum by Foreign Secretary Lord Carington in late 1979 warned that if Britain refused to negotiate, the Islands could be blockaded or even invaded. But he also argued that if an agreement was not reached with Argentina, the Islands could fall into economic decline, British trade with Argentina could be damaged and that it would be impossible to exploit the economic resources (primarily oil and fish) of the South Atlantic. Long annexes attached to the memorandum outlined not only the cost of defending the Islands militarily, but also the threat to British commercial interests in Argentina..."*³⁹³

October 15th, Thatcher defers the issue.

*"The Prime Minister has seen the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary's memorandum of 12 October... She has asked that discussion of the Falkland Islands by OD should be postponed until after the Rhodesia issue has been settled."*³⁹⁴

Argentina's recently retired Admiral Massera, visiting Britain, has a meeting with Foreign Secretary Ridley.

*"During their meeting, the retired Admiral told Ridley that in ideal "military terms". Argentina wanted to "take" the Islands, but as this was 'unrealistic' they were seeking a compromise with Britain. The Foreign Office hosted a lunch for Massera at the Savoy..."*³⁹⁵

November 2nd, in London, Argentina's *charge d'affaires* invites Ridley to meet with Deputy Foreign Minister Cavándoli. Ridley turns down the invitation.

November 21st, in New York, the UN General Assembly defer consideration of the Falklands until 1980.

November 27th, the Governor of the Falklands writes to Christian Salvesen Ltd to express his "reservations" regarding that company's contract with Davidoff.³⁹⁶

In **December**, Argentina's Finnish Embassy complains about a scheduled television programme to be aired on MAINOS-TV; *Falkland Islands: Summer in the middle of Winter*. This refers to the archipelago as British. As a result of the protests, the recording is re-edited to avoid any political references. An internal FCO memo notes; *"The (Finnish) Foreign Ministry's rather silly reaction no doubt gave the Argentinians immense satisfaction."*³⁹⁷

391 *Ibid.*

392 CAB 148/183

393 Livingston 2018 citing DOP Committee October 12, 1979 CAB 148/183

394 ALW 040/325/14

395 Livingston 2018 citing Temple to Ure October 31, 1979 FCO 7/3589

396 *Falkland Island Dependencies: Whaling Stations February 1, 1983* FCO note to Downing Street. cf. September, 1979

397 ALW 0420/325/1

1980 – January 9th, Governor Parker gives his response to the suggestion of a *lease-back* arrangement; “... maybe I have been here too long but after even only three years among the Islanders I would instinctively find it as difficult to accept as they would.”

Facing pressure from arms manufacturers, unhappy that the Foreign Office keeps blocking sales to Argentina, Nicholas Ridley notes; “*The prime minister was most insistent when I saw her about the Falkland Islands that we should not sell Argentina any arms.*”³⁹⁸

January 24th, a confidential Foreign Office *memo* sums up an internal debate on recognition of Indonesia's *de facto* possession of East Timor. Occupied by force in 1975, FCO mandarins suggest that the result of such recognition could set an embarrassing precedent, the *memo* notes.

*“... there is a residual danger of an Argentine invasion of the Falkland Islands and should this take place, Britain's UN case would be seriously flawed were we to accord full legal recognition to the Indonesian seizure;...”*³⁹⁹

January 25th, Cabinet Secretary, Robert Armstrong, writes to the Prime Minister to remind her that any discussions on the Falklands should include the question of oil.

*“... ministers needed to consider ‘the possible oil and fishery benefits at stake’ and ‘the implications for our oil and fishery interests elsewhere of the possible cession of sovereignty over the Falkland Islands continental shelf. ...”*⁴⁰⁰

January 28th, from Stanley, Governor Parker, coming to the end of his 3 year term, sends a valedictory despatch to London.

*“(The) greater part of a Governor's time is taken up by the day-to-day maintenance of the community's services ... it is a necessary part of the job also devote time to the planning of the further improvement of those services, alongside long term schemes for urban and rural development - just as if the place had the longest of all futures. And then the cold thought comes: that all this work and planning could be set at naught because of the need to meet the emotional and nationalistic demands of a country, Argentina, 400 miles away across the sea ... It might clarify thinking considerably if Britain were to drop her attitude of apparent detachment, assess her advantages and interests, and openly meet the Argentines on the same terms in the dispute as they have chosen for themselves.”*⁴⁰¹

Robin Fearn, head of the FCO's South America department, receives Parker's communication.

*“Mr Parker tends to look at the problem from the islanders' viewpoint. ... We must try to ensure that the new Governor retains a more objective view of his mission and of the need to bring the Islanders to recognise the narrow options open to them and to us.”*⁴⁰²

Researcher's Comment: This sums up rather well the attitude displayed by the FCO throughout the 1970's. Hardly surprising that even today, 40 years later, the islanders' view the Foreign Office with suspicion.

398 Notes dated January 14, 1980 in *FCO 7/3730* and quoted in Livingstone 2018. Despite the Prime Minister's views, several arms contracts were approved and export licences granted, including, during 1980, military aircraft, surveillance equipment and a missile control system. It is not clear what was eventually supplied. See Livingstone 2018 for a full list.

399 *ALW 0420/325/1*

400 Livingstone 2018 citing *Armstrong to Thatcher January 25, 1980 PREM 19/656*

401 Parris & Bryson 2012

402 *Ibid*

January 29th, in London, an OD Committee meeting at Downing Street considers the relative strengths of Argentina and Britain regarding the Falklands.

*“Argentina's legal claim to sovereignty over the Falkland Islands was very weak. That was why they did not wish to let the matter go to arbitration. Any agreement to discuss sovereignty might damage Britain's strong legal position.”*⁴⁰³

Summing up the debate, the Prime Minister says; *“... that the nub of the problem lay in the danger that any resumption of talks might appear to foreshadow a surrender of sovereignty over the Falkland Islands at some time in the future. There was no legal basis for such a surrender.”* The meeting agrees to a new round of talks, but asks Carington to seek agreement from the Islanders that negotiations with Argentina resume.

*“In January 1981 at a further meeting of that committee – the eighth collective discussion – was held to review the situation in the light of the islanders' reactions to the leaseback proposal and the comments in both Houses on the Statement of December 1980. The committee endorsed the noble Lord, Lord Carington's, proposal that the aim should be to keep the negotiations going with a view to finding an acceptable basis for a negotiated settlement. They agreed to early talks for which Argentina was pressing, and at which the islanders were to be represented.”*⁴⁰⁴

*“Department of Energy officials, however, were concerned that the commitment to preserving Britain's oil rights was not strong enough when ministers agreed, in January 1980, to start exploratory ministerial talks with Argentina.”*⁴⁰⁵

February 5th, Energy Secretary David Howell writes to Lord Carington to emphasise the importance of retaining access for the UK, to any potential oil fields around the Falklands.⁴⁰⁶

February 7th, Stanley's *Penguin News* editorial says;

“We can trust the British Government as little as we trust the Argentina Government and feeble cries of 'Keep the Falklands British' and other cliches will win us no support. Instead we should look to ourselves and proclaim the Falklands belong to us, and not to Britain, Argentina or any other foreign country. ... independence.”

February 11th, an internal Foreign Office memo notes that with regard to Britain's dependent territories:

“The present British Government are fully committed to the policy followed by successive Governments since 1945 of giving every help and encouragement to those Dependent Territories which wish to become independent, while not forcing independence on those which do not wish it... Where local government have made it clear that they do not wish their territories to become independent, we are content to retain sovereignty for the time being. But we must also retain the legal powers necessary to ensure that we are able to fulfil the responsibilities that sovereignty entails. ... Each case will be considered on its merits, bearing in mind the constraints imposed by external political circumstances and the wishes of the local population.... Responsibility and power must go together. Political development must therefore stop some way short of full internal self-government where territories choose to remain dependent. In such cases the British Government, through the Governor, will retain overall responsibility for:-

403 CAB 148/189

404 Baroness Young in *HL Deb 25 January 1983 vol.438 cc136-247*

405 Livingston 2018 citing *Birchmore to D'Ancona January 30, 1980 EG 14/92*

406 *Ibid.* citing *Howell to Carington February 5, 1980 PREM 19/612*

- (i) external affairs;
- (ii) defence;
- (iii) internal security, ...;
- (iv) the administration of the police;
- (v) the administration of the public service;
- (vi) the judiciary... ”⁴⁰⁷

Anthony Williams arrives in Buenos Aires as British Ambassador to Argentina.⁴⁰⁸

“... a consistent advocate of closer ties with Argentina.”⁴⁰⁹

February 13th, in Stanley, the Falkland Islands Government agree to renewed talks, with an Islander present. This provided that the negotiations remain 'general,' 'exploratory' and 'without commitment.'

In London, briefing notes issued by the FCO call into question Argentina's interpretation of UN resolutions.

*“The UK does not accept the assertion by Argentina that the ‘illegality of the occupation of the Falkland, South Georgia and South Sandwich Islands by the United Kingdom has been recognised by the United Nations.’ Resolutions have simply called for the settlement of the dispute by negotiation between the two Governments.”*⁴¹⁰

March 18th, an internal FCO memorandum notes that British business is likely to side with Argentina on the subject of Falklands sovereignty, which is viewed as an obstacle to a good trading relationship.⁴¹¹

In **April**, a study into fish resources around the Falklands archipelago is released.

*“The study concluded that there were two principal species of fish found within 200 miles of the Falklands. Patagonian hake was fished intensively by Argentine, German, Japanese and Spanish vessels and was thought to have reached the maximum sustainable yield. The unexploited blue whiting stocks could produce an estimated yield of 800,000 to 1 million tonnes a year. There was an urgent need for conservation measures. The White Fish Authority identified a number of problems with the S.A.F.C.'s proposals. The fillet freezer trawlers, which were required for the exploratory voyage, had nearly all been sold or converted to whole fish freezing. The development of the fisheries would be constrained by Port Stanley's limited facilities. Finally, the declaration of a 200 mile fishing zone would be unprofitable to police.”*⁴¹²

April 28th, British and Argentine delegations meet in New York for two days of talks. Councillor Monk represents the Islanders. Nicolas Ridley's brief, supplied by the FCO, notes:

“Sovereignty Options: Points to Make (only if raised by Argentines)... this exploratory round is not the place to undertake any substantive discussion of sovereignty proposals. 3. All these have to be seen in the context of the paramountcy of Islanders' wishes... International Arbitration: Points to make (Defensive) 1. We should not raise this question and it is most unlikely that the Argentines will. If they

407 ALW 040/325/1. The first three appear reasonable. The remainder, less so.

408 His predecessor had been recalled in 1977.

409 Livingstone 2018

410 A4 ALW 0420/325/1

411 Malcomson to Bright, Duggan and Fearn March 18, 1980 FCO 7/3726

412 Ellerby 1990 p.252 citing F.I.A. archive (London), box file 6, V.F.A., Fisheries Dec. 1979

do ask whether we would consider taking the dispute to an international tribunal, Mr. Ridley should say that he will need time to consult his Ministerial colleagues before giving HMG's answer. ... Legal Advisers do not dissent from the views expressed by the Law Officers in 1966, nor do they consider the composition of the ICJ as any more favourable to the UK position than in 1966."⁴¹³

On the issue of a leaseback option.

*"It would be a formidable task to negotiate an agreement of this kind acceptable to Britain, Argentina and the Islanders. It would require Argentine agreement to leave the administration and way of life of the Islanders unchanged throughout the period of the lease. It would probably also require outside guarantees."*⁴¹⁴

April 29th, on the second day of talks, Argentina's Minister Cavándoli tells delegates; "*Sovereignty was a sine qua non, an underlying condition, for progress on the other questions,*" and that sovereignty must be discussed. By the end of the day, however, little has been achieved and an impasse arises over the wording of the final joint *communiqué*. Britain wishes to refer to the meetings as '*discussions*' while the Argentine's want to call them, '*negotiations*'. A decision is left to the next day.

*"Ridley, like the Foreign Office, saw oil as a way of resolving the dispute through Anglo-Argentine cooperation and, when he met Argentine deputy foreign minister Carlos Cavandoli, in April 1980, he proposed joint exploration ... But Argentina would only consider it as part of an overall deal on sovereignty."*⁴¹⁵

April 30th, in New York, a final *communiqué* states that; "*... the discussions were of a comprehensive and wide-ranging nature, and were conducted in a cordial and positive spirit,..*" and that the two governments, "*intend to hold future meetings in order to continue these exchanges.*"

May 21st, in a House of Lords debate on the Canberra Conference relating to Antarctic fishing and marine conservation, Lord Trefgarne offers assurances with regard to the Falklands.

*"There is no question of any change in sovereignty arising from this convention. Furthermore, the Falkland Islands fishing rights in the seas around the dependencies remain unaffected by this new convention."*⁴¹⁶

June 5th, in London, Dr. Jose de Hoz, Argentina's Minister for the Economy, has a meeting with PM Thatcher.

*"Yesterday, Dr Jose Alfredo Martinez de Hoz, the Argentine Minister of the Economy, who is on an official visit to Britain had discussions with ministers and officials and called on Mrs Thatcher, ... He said in an interview: "For the first time some progress has been made and there is a little light on the horizon ... and I think the economic side can help. We have two common interests, which could be oil and fishing. So long as some sort of discussions on sovereignty can go on at the same time we might be able to reach some kind of agreement on joint oil exploration or fishing which would be the beginning of a get-together on this issue". ..."*⁴¹⁷

June 27th, Lord Carington, in a *memo*, proposes an agreement involving transfer of title over the Falklands and the Dependencies, provided that these were immediately '*leased back*' to the UK for an indefinite period. Arrangements could then be made regarding co-operation on fishing and oil exploration.

413 *Brief No. A4 – A6 ALW 0420/325/1 (FCO 07-3801) 1980. cf. 1947 & 1966*

414 *Ibid – Brief No. A4*

415 Livingstone 2018

416 *HL Deb 21 May 1980 vol.409 cc955-1004*

417 *The Times* June 6, 1980

July 2nd, in London, the OD Committee consider Carington's proposals; *“In discussion there was general agreement with the practical advantages of the course of action proposed although considerable misgivings were expressed about its domestic political implications.”*⁴¹⁸ At the end of the debate, Lord Carington is authorised to initiate 'exploratory' and 'confidential' talks with Argentina.

*“Margaret Thatcher and members of the cabinet’s Defence and Overseas Policy (DOP) Committee ... agreed, in July 1980, to begin exploratory discussions on a solution that could include a ‘surrender of sovereignty and simultaneous leaseback arrangements’.*⁴¹⁹

July 30th, the British Government informs Parliament that it is to publish a White Paper on the issue of nationality. This will contain proposals for new legislation.

*“We have, ... been impressed with the argument that a separate citizenship should be established for the dependencies as a whole. We propose that this should be called citizenship of the British dependent territories. I emphasise that the establishment of this separate citizenship will not alter the United Kingdom's obligations and commitments to our overseas territories. Those who are now citizens of the United Kingdom and Colonies but do not qualify for British citizenship or for citizenship of the British dependent territories will become British overseas citizens.”*⁴²⁰

*“The perception of the Government trying to get rid of the islands was reinforced in 1980 when its work on a reformed British Nationality Law was widely discussed. ...”*⁴²¹

August 7th, Rex Masterman Hunt takes over as Governor of the Falkland Islands.⁴²²

Britain’s Minister for Trade, Cecil Parkinson, visits Buenos Aires together with company executives from Lloyds Bank, Hawker Sidley, GEC and Wimpey.

*“Neither the Falkland Islands nor human rights featured strongly in discussions...”*⁴²³

*“The drive to capture more of Argentina’s lucrative market was reflected in the growing number of British trade missions sent to Argentina in the Thatcher years: these rose from four in 1978 to eight in 1979, and ten in 1980. But ... British diplomats continued to lament that the Falklands factor inhibited trade and prevented British companies from winning large state contracts from the regime.”*⁴²⁴

September 10th, near Geneva in Switzerland, Nicholas Ridley and Minister Cavándoli hold secret talks.

*“Mr Ridley opened the proceedings by saying that he had the authority of his Ministerial colleagues to put forward the ideas which he was about to explain but that anything agreed at this meeting would have to be ad referendum and would be subject to endorsement by the British Cabinet and, no less important, would have to be acceptable to the Islanders.”*⁴²⁵

Ridley suggests a 200 year lease. Minister Cavándoli responds that; *“The only difficulty he saw was in the length of the lease ... a period of, say, 20 years would have to be ruled out as being much too short for the Islanders. We ought to think of some median figure (Comandante Bloomer-Reeve suggests 75 years).”*⁴²⁶

418 CAB 148/189

419 Livingstone 2018

420 HL Debate 30 July 1980 Hansard vol.412 cc891-8

421 Gustafson 1988

422 The London Gazette No. 48277

423 Ambassador Williams to FCO August 11, 1980 FCO 7/3728

424 Livingstone 2018

425 FCO 7/3808

426 Ibid.

Cavándoli goes on to propose that the British Government remove the Royal Marine detachment from the Islands, to underline to Islanders that Argentina was no longer viewed as a threat; and to please Argentine public opinion. He also suggests that the terms of any lease should include an Argentine right to buy or rent land.

September 11th, Ridley hands over an '*exploratory proposal*' to Cavandoli suggesting:-

1. Titular sovereignty to be transferred to Argentina;
2. Continued British administration via a lease-back arrangement for 99 years. Subject to periodic review;
3. British and Argentine flags to be flown side-by-side;
4. British Governor with locally elected Council responsible for the administration of the islands;
5. Argentina to be represented by a Commissioner-General; 6. a Joint-Council to arrange co-operation over economic development.

It is agreed that both parties will report back to their respective Governments.

September 12th, in London, the Falkland Islands office complains that the Nationality White Paper proposes; *".. second class citizenship on several hundred Falkland islanders who do not have grandparents who were born in the United Kingdom, but whose pure British nationality extends unbroken since the early nineteenth century, ..."* ⁴²⁷

On his arrival back in London, Secretary of State Ridley reports to Lord Carington.

"... we are left with a clear option ... We can either seek a solution by negotiation along the lines of the Geneva talks (to which I think we could get Argentina to agree), or we could say that the concessions are beyond our political ability to deliver, and break off the talks (with all the obvious consequences). I do not think that there is much to gain by attempting to find a different package: both sides are close to their rock bottom positions. ... I believe it can be sold to the Islanders, but I am not certain."

September 25th, in New York, Lord Carington and Argentine Foreign Minister Carlos Pastor meet. ⁴²⁸

October 29th, following a question asked by Ridley, an FCO official explains to him that the proceeds of any oil found around the Falklands would, by precedent, be paid to the Falkland Islands Government.

"(However)... in practical terms, we ought to be able to ensure ... that we get a substantial share of the action and the profit." ⁴²⁹

November 5th, from Buenos Aires, Ambassador Williams reports that the junta have endorsed the concept of *lease-back* but will wish to negotiate over the length of the lease.

November 6th, Argentina's State Petroleum Company (YPF) advertises for tenders for oil exploration licences over an area it calls, '*Magalenes Este*.' This extends to within 96 miles of the Falklands archipelago – crossing the median line between Argentina and the islands.

November 7th, at an OD Committee meeting in London, Prime Minister Thatcher is again presented with '*leaseback*' as an option to take talks forward. She agrees that the suggestion is probably the only way through the impasse.

427 Quoted in *The Sovereignty Dispute over the Falkland (Malvinas) Islands* L. S. Gustafson 1988

428 *A.AC.109/670*

429 *Duggan to Ridley October 29, 1980 EG 14/93*

*“It seemed likely that, on balance, given the bleakness of their present situation, the majority of Islanders would be ready to support negotiations with Argentina on the lines proposed, recognising that, while the Government would not go back on its commitment to defend them, it was not able to offer alternative ways of improving their position.”*⁴³⁰

*“... it is clear from the official record that, while she had misgivings, she saw no other alternative. Nor did any of the other ministers present at the meeting. But when Ridley proposed the plan to the House of Commons three weeks later, no other minister came to his defence.”*⁴³¹

The decision of the Committee is that Ridley should visit the Falklands in order to assess Islander views.

*“... Margaret Thatcher and the Defence and Overseas Policy Committee (DOP) agreed to seek the Islanders’ approval of leaseback. During this DOP meeting, ministers also noted: ‘It would be important to make satisfactory arrangements for any oil that might be discovered ... further thought should be given to ways in which the United Kingdom might be guaranteed entitlement to a substantial part of the revenues.’...”*⁴³²

November 11th, in New York, the General Assembly of the UN defers the question of the Falklands until 1981.

November 18th, Britain’s *Times* newspaper reports.

“... it is stressed in London that British policy towards the Falklands remains as it has always been, that no solution would be acceptable that was not agreed by both the islanders and the British Parliament.”

November 21st, Secretary of State Ridley, en-route to the Falklands, stops over in Argentina. Unaware that he was intending to do so, Argentine authorities are irritated.⁴³³ In speaking to the press, Ridley does not help matters.⁴³⁴

*“Argentine feathers have been ruffled ... The local press enjoyed an orgy of indignation, and the Foreign Ministry replied in a communiqué that the British Government had not made one positive move to solve the sovereignty question.”*⁴³⁵

*“Mr Ridley told reporters that he had come to meet the islanders on whose total acceptance depended any solution to the dispute.”*⁴³⁶

*“He made it clear that the Islanders’ wishes would be paramount and that their readiness to contemplate lease-back could not be taken for granted. He also made it clear that the concept was not regarded with any enthusiasm in London and it would not be easy to satisfy Parliament...”*⁴³⁷

November 22nd, Ridley arrives in Stanley with a set of objectives agreed in London.

“(i) to persuade Councillors (and through them Islanders) that the prolongation of the dispute is not in their interests or those of HMG: and that we must work towards a negotiated settlement with the Argentines; ii) therefore to obtain their agreement that we should enter into negotiations with

430 OD (80) 23rd Meeting, Confidential Record November 7, 1980 CAB 148/196 quoted in Livingstone 2018

431 Livingstone 2018

432 *Ibid.*

433 At a 1990 International Conference on the Falkland Islands, Argentine author Virginia Gamba-Stonehouse claimed that Ridley had agreed a ‘lease-back’ arrangement with Argentina before moving on to the islands. This would seem unlikely.

434 *Falkland Islanders at War* Graham Bound 2002

435 *The Times* November 23, 1980

436 *The Times* November 23rd 1980

437 PREM 19/656 f62 at the Margaret Thatcher Foundation.

*Argentina to explore the scope for a settlement based on leaseback; iii) to impress upon them our respect for their wishes to remain British, our interests in their welfare and our concern for their future.”*⁴³⁸

“When Ridley arrived in Stanley, the local paper Penguin News reported that “the burning question is, what is he here for?””⁴³⁹

November 24th, in Stanley, Ridley meets Island Councillors.

*“Mr. Bennet asked if the question could be taken to the ICJ. Mr. Ridley said that internationally, we were in a minority of one on the issue. The Argentines would not accept ICJ arbitration...”*⁴⁴⁰

At a public meeting, Ridley puts forward his three proposals.

*“There was the ‘freeze’ idea, whereby both sides would agree to disagree and take no action to further their claims for a specified time. But the minister pointed out that at the end of the moratorium period the old problem would return with a vengeance. Then there was the possibility of ‘condominium, joint government. The Argentine flag would need to fly alongside the Union Flag. There would also need to be two police forces, two governors, and two official languages. Even Ridley believed this was a non-starter. Finally he explained his preferred idea: ‘leaseback’. This, he suggested, was a workable solution. Britain would formally cede sovereignty to Buenos Aires, and before the ink had dried on that document would sign another, leasing the Islands back for an agreed period, say 99 years. The Falklands’ way of life would be maintained and everyone would be happy. Across Ridley’s face spread a cadaverous grimace, which was as near as he could get to a smile.”*⁴⁴¹

Nicholas Ridley’s proposals are met with annoyance and anger. He is shouted down by the audience. Clearly not expecting such a response, Ridley loses his temper and shouts; *“They (Argentina) cannot be strung along for much longer.”*⁴⁴²

*“Britain is suggesting that the sovereignty of the Falkland Islands be transferred to Argentina,... This is said to be one of a number of options which are being put to the islanders by Mr Nicholas Ridley ... who is now in the Falklands.... Air Commodore Frow said that the lease-back solution, which has been raised before, is the one which is preferred by Whitehall.... A spokesman at the Foreign Office said last night that he could neither confirm nor deny the reports... When asked if Britain intended to cede the sovereignty of the islands to Argentina the spokesman said ... no solution can be finally agreed without the endorsement of the islanders and Parliament...”*⁴⁴³

Ridley then says that the Islanders' would be to blame for any consequences.

“To many he had seemed aloof and intolerant of what he regarded as the short-sightedness of many Falklanders. ... A future member of the Islands Council, John Cheek, was harsher: “If anyone other than Ridley had tried to sell us leaseback, then it would have had a chance.””⁴⁴⁴

438 ALW 040/325/1

439 *Invasion 1982: the Falkland islanders’ Story* Graham Bound 2007

440 ALW 0400/352/12

441 Bound 2007

442 Quoted in Bound 2007

443 *The Times* November 26, 1980.

444 *Falkland Islanders at War* G. Bound 2002 p.10. Hastings & Jenkins 1997 p.49

November 25th, in Stanley, further meetings takes place between Ridley, the Islands' government and local commercial interests.

"During his meeting with the Sheep-owners, Mr Ridley said that another option would be to break off talks altogether but he felt that this might antagonize the Argentine Government." ⁴⁴⁵

Argentina's Postal Service announce the establishment of an office at Corbeta Uruguay on Southern Thule.

November 27th, in London, newspaper reports of Ridley's reception in the Islands, is raised in Parliament. Both MP's and Lords demand a statement from the government.

"Following an alarmist headline in The Times on 26th November, ... soothing answers were given to questions in Parliament.. These answers made clear that any solution to the dispute over the Islands would have to be endorsed both by the Islanders and by Parliament."

Unaware of the reaction in Britain, Ridley's staff send an optimistic telegram back to London.

"It will take time for a clear reaction to emerge and one cannot be optimistic on the prospects for leaseback." ⁴⁴⁶

November 29th, Minister Ridley's final meeting with the Islands Council fails to result in any decision.

"Ridley was not going to stay a day longer than necessary, but shortly before leaving he told Penguin News of his assessment of the situation. He studiously avoided the 'I-word', but in doing so could not find another to adequately describe the threat. "It's a mood of impatience, " he said of the climate in Argentina. "No, not of impatience; it's a mood of sooner or later, sometime, one way or another, we have to get further on. We have to make more progress. That's their mood, not my mood."..." ⁴⁴⁷

Interviewed by *Penguin News*, Nicholas Ridley is asked whether Argentina was prepared to make life difficult for the Islanders.

"I am a man of peace. I would feel that I had failed if that happened. I can't foresee what Argentina would do, your guess is as good as mine, because you live near them and know them perhaps better even than I do. I merely say that in the long term one has to come to terms with one's neighbours and one has to live in peace with them. What one cannot do is live in a perpetual state of siege and antagonism, suspicion and bellicosity." ⁴⁴⁸

As Minister Ridley departs on the *LADE* flight back to Argentina he is jeered by an angry crowd of Islanders.

On the same day, in Buenos Aires, it is reported that Argentina's State Petroleum Company has submitted a bid to drill for oil in an area straddling the median line between the Falklands and Patagonia.

November 30th, from Buenos Aires, Britain's Embassy reports that the Islands councillors are split on the proposal of leaseback.

"Councillors' general assessment was that of those in Port Stanley who had already declared their views the majority was strongly opposed to the leaseback concept ... There was however real division of opinion and everyone needed more time for thought." ⁴⁴⁹

445 *The Times* November 26, 1980

446 *PREM 19/656 Telegram No.183 of 27 November*

447 Bound 2007

448 Bound 2002 p.10

449 *British Embassy, Buenos Aires to FCO November 30, 1980 FCO 7/3809*

*“There are conflicting accounts of the islanders stance before the Ridley debate, some asserting that the population were always steadfastly opposed to leaseback. The correspondence in the newly-opened FCO files suggest a more mixed response: officials in the British embassy in Buenos Aires reported that four Island councillors would be ready to see leaseback explored, four were undecided and two against.”*⁴⁵⁰

December 2nd, back in London, Nicholas Ridley makes a statement to the House of Commons.

*“We have no doubt about our sovereignty over the Islands. The Argentines, however, continue to press their claim. The dispute is causing continuing uncertainty, emigration and economic stagnation ... Following my exploratory talks with Argentina in April, the Government have been considering possible ways of achieving a solution which would be acceptable to all the parties. ... we should be guided by the wishes of the Islanders themselves.... I have asked them to let me know their views in due course.”*⁴⁵¹

In the debate that follows, nine Conservative MPs denounce the ‘leaseback’ proposal, as do six Labour MPs. Among the latter is Labour’s shadow foreign affairs spokesman, Peter Shore. No Conservative MP speaks in support of Nicholas Ridley.

*“The House of Commons came together in total concord yesterday to voice its deep suspicion of the intentions of the Foreign Office and of Mr Nicholas Ridley, a Minister of State, for the future of the Falkland Islands and their relationship with the Argentine. Seldom can a minister have had such a drubbing from all sides of the House, and Mr Ridley was left in no doubt that whatever Machiavellian intrigues he and the Foreign Office may be up to, they will come to nothing if they involve harming a hair on the heads of the islanders. ... From the Conservative benches, Mr Julian Amery told the minister that his statement was profoundly disturbing. For years the Foreign Office had wanted to get rid of this commitment, although the islands had an important part to play in the future of the South Atlantic... A few moments later, Mr Ridley floundered into deeper water when he was asked whether the Government would accept the views of the islanders if they opted for the maintenance of the status quo. The minister seemed to many to be dodging the issue...”*⁴⁵²

*“No one listened. Alerted by the Falkland Islands Committee to the Minister's leaseback enthusiasm, MPs gave Ridley a battering worse than anything MPs could recall in the course of the Parliament.... One MP said that he had just watched a man wreck his career on a pile of rock.”*⁴⁵³

*“I have never seen such a mauling, of any of my colleagues, in all my life. Nicholas Ridley, who had shown great courage in putting this forward, was looking pretty white by the end of it, poor chap.... Now that rough ride was not just from the Conservative side; it was from the Labour side; it was from the Liberals. It was absolutely united in its violent sense of opposition to the idea of leaseback.”*⁴⁵⁴

*“The leaseback plan, ... was effectively killed on 2 December 1980 when MPs from all parties reacted with horror when it was proposed by Ridley in the House of Commons. ... Almost half on MPs who spoke were supporters of the Falkland Islands Committee or had previously taken a strong interest in the Falklands, which suggests that the Falklands ‘lobby’ was influential”*⁴⁵⁵

450 Livingstone 2018 citing *British Embassy, Buenos Aires to FCO November 30, 1980 FCO 7/3809*. Relying on the Buenos Aires Embassy for an assessment of Islanders’ views appears rather strange.

451 *HC Deb 02 December 1980 vol.995 cc128-34*

452 *The Times* December 3, 1980

453 Hastings & Jenkins 1997 p.50

454 Richard Luce quoted in Charlton 1989 p74

455 Livingstone 2018

Britain's Foreign Office send a telegram to Argentina's Minister Cavándoli, stressing the need for patience.

"Islander distrust of Argentines acute. Even if agree to lease-back being explored, eventual acceptance will depend on very long lease, no Argentine presence, international guarantees and probably financial assistance to develop economy." ⁴⁵⁶

In the Buenos Aires newspaper, *La Prensa*.

"15 years of useless negotiation: London's proposals are unacceptable from every point of view."

December 3rd, at Downing Street, a further meeting of the OD Committee considers the situation.

"The Prime Minister, summing up the discussion, said that the Committee would wish to resume consideration of the subject when the Islanders' leaders had reported further on local opinion. Unfortunately, Parliamentary hostility to the idea of a settlement was now so strong that, even if the islanders considered view was that one should be sought, this might be regarded as merely the result of pressure from Government. It should therefore be made clear that, if the islanders favoured maintaining the status quo, they would be fully supported. Further thought would need to be given to the way in which the proposed nationality Bill would affect the Islanders..."

"It agreed that this was a highly emotive issue for parliamentary and public opinion, while noting that the Islanders' hostility to Ridley's appeal seemed to have been exaggerated; and concluded that it would be 'tragic' if the Islanders' chances of escaping from economic blight were to be dismissed by the attitude of their champions at Westminster. This was not quite to appreciate the depth of the Islanders' feelings..." ⁴⁵⁷

December 9th, Britain formally protests to Argentina, regarding any licences issued for oil exploration that crosses into Falklands waters.

"The Argentinians refused the British note as 'flatly unacceptable' and went on to say 'there does not exist any boundary dispute in the area in question, for the simple reason that the whole area corresponds to Argentine sovereignty'. ..." ⁴⁵⁸

December 11th, in New York, the United Nations adopt Resolution 35/118 entitled - 'Plan of Action for the Full Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples.' ⁴⁵⁹

*"Annex – 8. Member States shall adopt the necessary measures to **discourage** or prevent the systematic influx of outside immigrants and settlers into Territories under colonial domination, which disrupts the demographic composition of those Territories and may constitute a major obstacle to the genuine exercise of the right to self determination and independence by the people of those Territories."* ⁴⁶⁰

Researcher's Comment: Worthy of note, as Argentina regularly argues that its citizens have never been allowed to settle in the Falklands archipelago.

On the same day, in London, Ambassador Ortiz urges Minister Ridley to arrange more talks.

456 Quoted in Freedman 2005 vol.1 p.112

457 Boyce 2005

458 *Towards a Theory of State and Sovereignty in Contemporary Britain* Ellen Kennedy in *Britain in the World* Lawrence Freedman (ed) 2010 p.154

459 See https://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/RES/35/118

460 My emphasis. Argentina had been pushing for greater freedom of movement to and from the Islands including the right for Argentines to buy and sell property, and to live there.

December 15th, referring to the question of Argentina's advertisement for oil tenders, Lord Carington makes a statement in Parliament.

"No agreement has been reached between the United Kingdom and Argentine Governments on the delimitation of the continental shelf as between the Falkland islands and Argentina. In the absence of an agreed boundary, neither party, in Her Majesty's Government's view, would be entitled to exercise continental shelf rights beyond the median line between the Falkland Islands and Argentina. We have protested to the Argentines about the YPF tender which does indeed go beyond the median line ..."

December 17th, in London, during an unattributable press briefing, Minister Ridley tells selected journalists that the dispute with Argentina blights the daily lives of the Islanders and cannot be ignored.

*"The Islanders were, (Governor) Hunt said, 'mature, intelligent, law-abiding people, not a bunch of impossible schoolchildren who need to be told what is in their best interests.'.."*⁴⁶¹

December 18th, in the House of Commons, Minister Ridley answers MPs' questions.

"... we want to maintain the British link, British rule and the British way of life, of which my hon. Friend and I are so proud. We desperately want to develop the economy of the islands. My hon. Friend mentioned improved farming and markets for farming produce. A great deal of credit is needed to open up those possibilities, and we must get commercial banks to perform their functions in the islands. There is also the question of revenue from the rich harvest of fish and the possibility – there can be no certainty – of finding oil. My hon. Friend wanted us to exert our undoubted rights over the fishing zones and the economic zones that surround not only the islands but our dependencies.

My hon. Friend mentioned the vexed question of Magellanes Este, the oil block that straddles the median line. Nothing would give us more pleasure than to be able to say that we had agreed the median line and that we and the Argentine respected that median line, so that oil exploration and exploitation could go ahead. That is also common ground. We hold the same view about control of the seas.

There have been two incidents recently, when seas that would have been in the Falkland Islands maritime zone were subject to harassment by Argentine vessels. My hon. Friend was right to raise the question of Southern Thule.

At the talks in New York in April, I protested again to the Argentine Foreign Minister about the presence of the Argentine mission on Southern Thule without the permission or consent of the British Government. It is impossible to establish any of these things because the Argentine Government have never conceded our sovereignty over either the Falkland Islands or the dependencies, nor have they agreed that we should declare the various zones of the seas around them to which we would normally be entitled...

*At present, the relationship between Great Britain and Argentina is good and friendly. We are still negotiating in a series of talks with the Argentine Government, as we were for many years before this Government took over. In spite of that, it is still not possible to declare those 200-mile fishery zones, to get the licence fees from foreigners fishing in those zones, to explore or exploit oil or to legalise the position of Southern Thule. Even the commercial banks are unwilling to set up in the islands because of the political risks. These hazards are real. It must be recognised that solving these problems requires an overall political settlement."*⁴⁶²

461 Boyce 2005

462 HC Deb 18 December 1980 vol.996 cc647-52

With regard to Shackleton's Report, Ridley adds; “... a very large number of the recommendations have been implemented – 49 out of 90. Of the remainder, 14 have been rejected, 20 are in train and 7 are undecided. I concede that the bulk of the recommendations in terms of money have not been implemented because we come immediately to the question of the runway.”⁴⁶³

In Buenos Aires, *La Nacion* publishes a private letter from banker César Alberto Cao Saravia, demanding that his Government interrupt communications to the Falklands; ban the importation of British goods and break off diplomatic relations with the UK.⁴⁶⁴

December 31st, from Stanley, Islander Adrian Monk addresses the Falklands people, in a speech broadcast on Falklands radio.

*“I think the whole campaign stinks... Don't be misled. Don't be worried about the consequences of saying “We are British.” Our country will remain British.”*⁴⁶⁵

*“(It) certainly changed the minds of a lot of people in the Falklands without doubt, and a lot of people will not now admit that they considered leaseback as a possibility.”*⁴⁶⁶

1981 – January 7th, in Stanley, Falklands Councillors issue a press statement.

*“While this House does not like any of the ideas put forward by Mr. Ridley for a possible settlement of the sovereignty dispute with Argentina, it agrees that Her Majesty's Government should hold further talks with the Argentines at which this House should be represented and at which the British delegation should seek an agreement to freeze the dispute over sovereignty for a specified period of time.”*⁴⁶⁷

*“At their next meeting in January 1981, a little over a year before the invasion, councillors agreed a motion stating that they did not like any of the Ridley proposals but that they could reluctantly accept a moratorium, or freeze. Only Adrian Monk opposed the motion. Of course this was a failure for London. The hopeless freeze concept had only been included in the Ridley package to make leaseback look more attractive. In Buenos Aires the British Ambassador, Anthony Williams, fussed around the Argentine Foreign Office, apologising for Islanders' hostility and trying to patch up relations. The Argentines issued a statement dismissing the importance of Islanders' opinions. They would, they said, only negotiate with Britain.”*⁴⁶⁸

January 13th, from London, Carington sends a message to Cavándoli in Buenos Aires.

“Ministers will need to give careful consideration to the Islanders' response and to next steps before any decision can be taken on a meeting... we may be unable to present firm proposals before the end of the month.”

January 20th, the US Embassy in London sends an assessment of the situation to Washington.

“The end-of-year push to achieve some movement toward a settlement with Argentina on the Falklands dispute came to naught. Ridley's efforts to employ a forcing strategy in negotiations with the Islanders were thwarted by a small but highly-effective Falklands lobby in London, concentrated in the House of Lords and the Conservative media. As a result, Ridley was forced to back off and give public assurances that nothing would

463 Quoted in Ellerby 1990 p.218

464 Savaria had previously been reported as willing to purchase the islands from Britain.

465 Quoted in Ellerby 1990 p.260. Also *United Nations A.AC.109/670*

466 P. Watts interview, *H. of C. Foreign Affairs Committee, Session 1982-83, Falkland. Minutes of Evidence (H.M.S.O., London, 4 Feb. 1983), p.293.*

467 *HC Deb 21 January 1981 vol.997 cc248-9*

468 Bound 2007

be done to change the status of the Islanders without their express approval. The Foreign Office, though discouraged, will probably have another go at moving things off dead centre before the current Parliament is dismissed. Ridley may have decided it is simply not worth the trouble.”⁴⁶⁹

January 27th, from Buenos Aires, Argentina’s Foreign Ministry demands that negotiations on sovereignty are resumed, “sooner, rather than later.” They also complain about a group of new emigrants to the archipelago.⁴⁷⁰

*“The Falkland government's plans to obtain a small number of immigrants from St. Helena have met with a large stumbling block in the form of Argentine official anger. Commodore Carlos Cavandoli told the British Ambassador to Buenos Aires that his government was concerned at reports from various sources of migratory movements towards the Falklands. Many Argentine newspapers appear to be disturbed that the potential immigrants may be black and are somewhat obsessed with the fact. There are very few black people in Argentina. The Penguin News has checked with the government here, and they have confidence that the race of potential immigrants is not being taken into consideration, and providing they are suitable in other ways, they will be welcomed regardless of race. Only four families are to be accepted for the present. Should this pilot scheme prove successful more families could follow at a later date.”*⁴⁷¹

January 29th, in London, a meeting in Downing Street authorises further negotiations with Argentina.

*“On 29 January 1981 the Defence and Overseas Policy Committee, chaired by the Prime Minister, endorsed Lord Carington's recommendation that the aim should be to keep the talks going and to let the Islanders come to see the need to explore a solution based on leaseback.”*⁴⁷²

February 23rd, in New York, representatives from Argentina and Britain meet for two days of talks. Adrian Monk and Stuart Wallace represent the Islanders.

Britain's delegation report back promptly to London.

*“Comodoro Cavándoli ... could not understand or accept that Argentina's one requirement, sovereignty, should be ignored permanently. The British side had said that Islander wishes had to be taken into account; why could not Argentine wishes be taken into account? ... any progress had to include the question of sovereignty... The two sides could not go on endlessly meeting in New York. Time for Argentina had now run out; these meetings could not continue year after year simply expressing views... Mr. Ridley wanted to make it quite clear that the British Government had no doubt at all of the legality and strength of their title to the Islands. He had always said to the Islanders that the legal position was not in doubt. It would indeed be possible to go on resting on that position for all time... Mr. Monk pointed out that one of the UN's basic principles was the right to self-determination. Why were the Argentines not prepared to accept the Islanders' rights to determine their own future? Sr. Ortiz de Rozas said that the relevant UN resolutions referred to the principle of territorial integrity. Argentina's had been harmed. Mr. Ridley said that the principle of self-determination was nevertheless overriding;...”*⁴⁷³

“The Argentines were in a belligerent mood even before the talks began. They were incensed by a proposal being considered by the Islanders to encourage the immigration of laborers from the British dependency of St.

469 Telegram 1165 from London, Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File D810029-0299

470 PREM 19/656 Telegram No. 27 of 27 January. In 1980, the FIG had advertised in St. Helena for people willing to live and work in the Falklands. With spare housing for three families, the FIG expected to get few applications. In fact, over 300 Saints applied to move.

471 *The Penguin News* March 5, 1981

472 Ellerby 1990 p.260

473 PREM 19/612

*Helena. The Falklands have a labor shortage and St. Helena has a labor surplus. What the Islanders viewed as a mutually beneficial economic arrangement sent the Argentines straight up the wall. They regarded it either as a scheme to ensure long-term British domination or as an insidious plot “to dilute Argentina's racial stock.” Not the best way to start negotiations, ...”*⁴⁷⁴

February 24th, on the second day of talks, Minister Cavandoli speaks directly to the Islanders' representatives.

*“He offered them 'most pampered region status' within Argentina; they could keep their laws, local government, language and customs, yet receive roads, school, television. Just let him have the one word: sovereignty.”*⁴⁷⁵

*“It was announced on Tuesday 24th February that the Falkland and British delegation to the latest round of negotiations in New York had failed to achieve their aim: the establishment of a freeze on all claims concerning sovereignty of the Islands... The leader of the Argentine delegation reaffirmed the Argentine rights of sovereignty over the Falkland islands... He went on to explain that the British proposal for a freeze on the sovereignty issue was unacceptable to the Argentine delegation, because it disregarded the request addressed to both parties by resolution 31/49 of the United Nations General Assembly to expedite negotiations with a view to resolving the dispute.”*⁴⁷⁶

*“It was a dismal meeting and it was announced on 24 February that the Argentines had thrown out the freeze concept. That was no surprise. Of more interest was the desperate personal appeal by the leader of the Argentine delegation to the two Islanders. Recognising that they hobbled British policy, Wallace and Monk were told that Argentina would give them all the material comforts and special status that they wanted in exchange for some symbolic gesture over sovereignty. Any mealy-mouthed mumbo-jumbo would do so long as the Argentines could hold a piece of paper up to their people saying that the 1833 score had been settled. It was clear that leaseback would have been seized enthusiastically by the Argentines.”*⁴⁷⁷

*“The Argentine ambassador promised the Islanders all sorts of advantages if sovereignty was transferred, but Falkland Islands councillor Stuart Wallace impressed on the Argentines that the Islanders ‘were primarily concerned with the structure of their way of life; that came before any economic benefit.’...”*⁴⁷⁸

February 26th, from New York, a final *communiqué* is released. Following a last minute intervention by the Argentine Embassy, this is a dramatically shorter version than the one agreed by the delegates. All the final *communiqué* says is that the question will be examined in “*further negotiations.*”⁴⁷⁹

*“The victor in the sterile talks had been Britain, since she had won time.”*⁴⁸⁰

*“With the failure of the talks in New York we are faced with the problem of deciding what to offer them (the British and the Argentines) next. The choice has been narrowed down, and of the Ridley proposals we are left with only one: leaseback. There is, however, one other choice that was not offered in Mr. Ridley's package. That is independence. More and more people are now beginning to give the idea some consideration and we have seen the subject brought up at recent Council meetings and even at the negotiations in New York. It is certainly not as ridiculous as many people like to think.”*⁴⁸¹

474 Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D810117–1025

475 Jenkins & Hastings 1997

476 *The Penguin News* March 5, 1981

477 Bound 2007

478 Livingstone 2018 citing *Anglo-Argentine ministerial Talks on the Falkland Islands February 23/24 1981 PREM 19/612*

479 See *PREM 19/612 Annex B (Original Joint Communiqué) and Annex C (Agreed Joint Communiqué)*.

480 Editorial in *La Prensa* March 6, 1981 quoted in *ALW 040/325/2 Part B 76-150*

481 Editorial in *The Penguin News no.12* March 5, 1981

February 27th, in Washington, Foreign Secretary Lord Carington and US Secretary Haig meet.

“Carington briefly outlined what he regards as the principal elements of the UK dispute with Argentina over the Falkland Islands. Argentina will not agree to put its claims before the International Court because they are not valid. Problem for Britain is similar to what they frequently encounter when they try to cast off a colony: The people who live on the Falkland Islands do not want to become Argentines. The British tactic is to keep the ball in the air as long as possible in order to avoid a showdown with Argentina. One idea the British are considering is to cede sovereignty of the Falkland Islands to Argentina on the understanding that Argentina would lease back the Islands to Britain for 99 years. The Falkland Islanders don't like this idea.” ⁴⁸²

February 28th, from New York, Islanders Adrian Monk and Stuart Wallace hold a press conference. Their comments receive international attention in the press, creating some difficulty for the Argentine delegation where news of the negotiations has not been made public in Argentina.

March 7th, in the Falklands, an Argentine ship *Yehuin*, is ordered away from Weddell Island.

“The Captain of Yehuin said that he was sheltering from south-westerly gales and he was instructed by the Master of Endurance to leave the harbour as soon as weather permitted. Weddell Island Manager Bob Ferguson reported that the Argentine ship had left later that day.” ⁴⁸³

March 13th, in London, Foreign Secretary Lord Carington tells the Prime Minister that there is little point in further talks while the Islanders remained hostile to the leaseback proposal.

“We can reach no conclusions now; ... If in the end the Islanders decide that they would prefer the status quo to any deal involving cession of sovereignty, then we must prepare for the possibility of a deterioration of our relations with Argentina:...” ⁴⁸⁴

March 17th, a Papal arbitration panel considering the Beagle Channel dispute between Argentina and Chile, gives its verdict. As with the 1977 arbitration decision, this favours Chile. Despite agreeing to abide by the panel's decision, Argentina immediately rejects the result. ⁴⁸⁵

Researcher's Comment: Once again Argentina proved that its word was not its bond.

March 30th, at the Foreign Office in London, British National Oil Company (BNOC) executives meet officials.

“During a meeting at the FCO, a BNOC executive emphasised: ‘The Government should be careful not to give away what could be of great worth i.e. the prospects for oil finds in the Falklands Continental Shelf.’ The chairman of the company, Philip Shelbourne, added: ‘Above all BNOC did not want to wake up one day to find that someone else had picked up concessions in Falkland Islands waters without their having been given a chance to compete.’” ⁴⁸⁶

April 30th, following interest by the oil company, Shell, Britain's Foreign Office takes out an advert in the *International Herald Tribune*. This restates Lord Carington's announcement of December 15, 1980.

482 *Foreign Relations of the United States: 1981-1988 vol.XIII: Conflict in the South Atlantic 1981 – 1984* p.13

483 *The Penguin News* no.13 April 19, 1981

484 *Carington minute to MT* March 13th

485 See 1977, January, 1978, 1980, 1982 & November, 1984

486 Livingstone 2018 citing *Record of Meeting with BNOC March 30, 1981 FCO 7/3984*

*“Her Majesty’s Government assume that oil companies will take the above into full account in considering whether to place tenders to drill for oil in the Magallanes Este block.”*⁴⁸⁷

*“Emphasising a need for action, a Foreign Office official wrote: ‘We must maintain that any oil in the Falkland Islands continental shelf is British, without specifying whether we mean HMG or Falkland Islands have the right to exploit it. The important point is that it is ours not Argentine.’ ...”*⁴⁸⁸

May 5th, from Buenos Aires, Ambassador Williams telegrams the Foreign Office to urge a further round of talks, which he sees as necessary to keep diplomatic channels open.

In Argentina, Admiral, Armando Lambruschini, speaks to an audience at the *Centro de Estudios Estratégicos de la Escuela Superior de Guerra* (Center for Strategic Studies of the Superior School of War).⁴⁸⁹

*“... as a sovereign nation, we must place ourselves on the international stage in our rightful position and play our rightful role accordingly... the South Atlantic is a vital area for the Argentine Republic, it has political, economic and strategic rights that arise from its geography, its history, its future projection, all of which legitimize and impose an adequate national presence in the area.... an approach to the current situation in the strategic area of the South Atlantic cannot dispense with the historical imperative of the return of the Malvinas Islands to the national heritage, as these represent a key factor in our strategic conception.”*⁴⁹⁰

May 29th, General Galtieri, C-in-C of Argentina's Army, refers to the Anglo-Argentine dispute in a speech.

“Neither are we prepared to allow those who are discussing with us the return of island territories that are Argentine by historical inheritance and legal right to interfere in the slightest way with the search for and exploitation of the wealth of our continental shelf... Nobody can or will be able to say that we have not been extremely calm and patient in our handling of international problems, which in no way stem from any appetite for territory on our part. However, after a century and a half they are becoming more and more unbearable.”

In London, the Ministry of Defence is asked by the Foreign Office for a short assessment of the UK's ability to respond to a range of possible Argentine actions.⁴⁹¹

June 2nd, Robin Fearn, head of the South American Department, lists the Foreign Office's objectives for a possible oil deal with Argentina.

*“1. We get the maximum possible preferential treatment for British companies in the issue of licences... 2. British equipment is used as much as possible. 3. A share of the oil goes to the UK... 4. FIG obtain an appropriate share of the proceeds consistent with its developmental needs and its capacity for absorption... 5. The impact of oil related development on the Islanders traditional way of life should be kept to a minimum. 6. The Argentines should not benefit to any greater extent that we can help...”*⁴⁹²

June 7th, in the South Atlantic, the base commander at Grytviken, South Georgia, reports that an Argentine C130 Hercules aircraft, with military markings, has flown over the base.

487 *Falkland Islands Newsletter No. 10 June 1981. HL Deb 10.11.1981 vol.425 c170 Hansard*

488 Livingstone 2018 citing *Smith to Williams December 4, 1981 FCO 7/3985*

489 Lambruschini was head of the Navy Chiefs of Staff. Jailed for crimes following the 1982 war, he was pardoned in 1990.

490 Quoted in Carbone 2008

491 It would take the Ministry of Defence five months to respond.

492 Quoted in Livingstone 2018 citing *Fearn to P. Harding June 2, 1981 FCO 7/3984*

*“It would seem that despite our protests Argentina overflights of Falkland islands and Dependencies are increasing. Such incidents only harden the Islanders' resolve to stand firm against any proposal to have closer links with the Argentines.”*⁴⁹³

On the same day, FCO assistant under-secretary John Ure flies into Buenos Aires to hold talks with Foreign Minister Camilion and Ambassador Enrique Ros.

“In Argentina, I found the Ministers and officials with whom I spoke reasonably relaxed about the progress – or lack of progress – on the Falklands negotiations and well disposed towards the lease-back idea... while they themselves appreciated the constraints on our progress in the Falklands negotiations, their military masters were less patient ...”

June 9th, Ure arrives in Port Stanley.

“I formed the impression that opinion was not yet irrevocably hardened against the lease-back proposal and that many of the better informed and more progressive islanders recognised that an accommodation with Argentina was necessary ...”

June 16th, aware of Ure's visit to the South Atlantic, Britain's Department of Energy suggests that the Falkland Islands Continental Shelf should be excluded from any deal on leaseback with Argentina.

*“... an official noting, ‘Such a surrender of sovereignty must surely make more difficult ... an oil regime which secures HMG control over those rights (e.g. to petroleum exploration and production activities).’ The Department recommended that, if the continental shelf were included in the leaseback, then Britain should have the ‘exclusive’ right to explore for oil within it and that there should be no joint administration with Argentina. ... while British oil companies had been a lobbying force for a sovereignty deal with Argentina in the 1970s, they had now become, if anything, a gentle brake on the process.”*⁴⁹⁴

June 18th, First Lord of the Admiralty Sir Henry Leach, has a meeting with PM Thatcher about defence cuts.

“The point he wished to emphasise was the most serious miscalculation which we would be making [if] we disregarded the deterrent effect of a major maritime capability in peacetime.”

June 30th, in London, a review of policy takes place at the Foreign Office in a meeting chaired by Secretary of State Nicholas Ridley. Falklands' Governor Rex Hunt is present, as is Ambassador Williams from Buenos Aires. Hunt makes it clear that the Islanders wish to have nothing whatsoever to do with Argentina, and that they do not believe that a leaseback settlement can provide the guarantees they want. The meeting concludes that the British Government should play for time; that the new Legislative Council, when elected, should be persuaded to allow negotiations to continue; that the Islanders should be educated as to the various pros and cons; and that contingency defence plans should be updated.

“While on leave in Britain, (Rex Hunt) attended a meeting with Nicholas Ridley, the British Ambassador to Argentina and other senior officials, at which the prevalent view was that Islanders should still be pressed to make concessions to the Argentines. It was reported that Argentina was well disposed towards the leaseback idea and that they were ‘reasonably relaxed’ about the progress of negotiations. However, Argentine diplomats had said their military compatriots were less patient. Rex Hunt listened, amazed, as the diplomats disregarded all the evidence that must have been gathered by Ridley and subsequently by a senior Foreign

493 ALW 040/325/5

494 Livingstone 2018 citing H.M.L. Ross to Mary Dickson June 16, 1981 EG 14/93 and Dickson to Fearn July 22, 1981 FCO 7/3985. Original emphasis.

Office official who visited Stanley to quietly confirm opinion. The tack was to change slightly. Rather than emphasising the supposed benefits of friendship with Argentina, Islanders should be educated about the dangers of hostility to change. It was suggested that Islander confidence could also be secured with offers of resettlement in the UK for those who could not accept leaseback, promises of more distribution of farming land and economic development initiatives. To his credit, Rex – who clearly risked confirming he had gone native – repeated the message that had been reiterated many times: Islanders were not going to buy any of this. "There was an air of unreality in the meeting, far removed from the realities of the situation in the Falklands," he wrote. Pouring cold water on the Foreign Office dogma might have had some impact. Rex recalled that by the end of the meeting it had simply been decided to play for time with Argentina, and persuade the new Falklands Council, when elected, to allow talks to continue."⁴⁹⁵

"The ambassador said: 'If we allowed the leaseback initiative to die then we would be left with no way out of our dilemma,' while Assistant Under Secretary John Ure, warned: 'Time is running out.' Ure argued that 'the most important single factor in influencing the Islanders views was the public debate in the UK.' Ridley was insistent that the Islanders should not be seen to be put under pressure, but agreed that a public relations campaign explaining leaseback should be launched."⁴⁹⁶

On the same day, Lord Trefgarne speaks to the House of Lords on the subject of defence cuts.

*"HMS Endurance will be paid off in 1982 on her return to the United Kingdom, following her deployment in the South Atlantic and the Antarctic Region later this year. There are no plans to replace her. However, the Royal Marines garrison in the Falkland Islands will be maintained at its present strength, and from time to time Her Majesty's ships will be deployed in the area."*⁴⁹⁷

In **July**, aware of the reports about *Endurance*, a response from the FIG is transmitted to the London.

"The people of the Falkland Islands deplore in the strongest terms the decision to withdraw HMS Endurance from service. They express concern that Britain appears to be abandoning its defence of British interests in the South Atlantic and Antarctic at a time when other powers are strengthening their position in these areas. They feel that such a withdrawal will further weaken British sovereignty in this area in the eyes not only of islanders but of the world. They urge that all possible endeavours be made to secure a reversal of this decision."

July 9th, in London, the Cabinet are informed that intelligence threat assessments suggest that Argentina is more likely to pursue diplomatic and economic measures than any use of force. However, an attempt to establish a foothold on one of the Dependencies, or even on one of the more remote Falklands Islands, is considered a possibility.⁴⁹⁸

From Buenos Aires, the British Embassy report that several Argentine newspapers are carrying articles about the withdrawal of HMS *Endurance* from the South Atlantic – claiming that Britain is; "*abandoning the protection of the Falkland islands.*"⁴⁹⁹

495 Bound 2007

496 Livingstone 2018 citing *Record of a Meeting held in 1 Carlton Gardens on 30 June 1981 FCO 7/3964*

497 *HL Deb 30 June 1981 vol.422 cc166-87*

498 Franks 1983 para.94

499 *Ibid.*

July 20th, Minister Ridley warns Lord Carington that if Argentina concludes, by early 1982, that the British Government is unable or unwilling to negotiate seriously; retaliatory action must be expected. ⁵⁰⁰

“Ridley wrote to Carington recommending that a PR campaign should be discussed at a meeting of the Defence and Overseas Policy (DOP) Committee. Officials drafted a paper for the committee, which said it was ‘increasingly urgent’ to find a solution, adding: ‘Simply playing for time ... is not a viable option.’ Three possibilities were outlined • to talk to Argentina without Islander concurrence. • to launch a PR campaign explaining leaseback; • or to break off negotiations and take contingency defence measures.” ⁵⁰¹

July 27th, in Buenos Aires, Dr. Oscar Camilion writes to Ambassador Williams expressing his concern at the lack of progress in the decade following the communication agreements.

“... to postpone further a profound and serious discussion of the complex essential constituents of the negotiations – sovereignty and economic co-operation – in a simultaneous and global fashion with the express intention of achieving concrete results shortly. A resolute impetus must therefore be given to the negotiations. The next round of negotiations cannot be another mere exploratory exercise, but must mark the beginning of a decisive stage towards the definitive termination of the dispute.”

That same day, Argentina declares, in a press statement, that negotiations to have become; “... an unpostponable priority for its foreign policy ... it is not possible to defer this question which affects territorial integrity and national dignity.”

“Ominously, there was an understated reminder that the air and fuel services could be withdrawn if there was no progress. These veiled threats were precisely what many Islanders had feared since the Communications Agreement was signed in 1972.” ⁵⁰²

In **August**, Argentine scrap metal dealer, Constantino Davidoff, applies to the Argentine Navy for permission to use one of its Antarctic transport ships to get to South Georgia. The stated purpose is the inspection of the whaling stations to assess what needs to be done in fulfilment of his contract to recycle abandoned equipment on the island. ⁵⁰³

“Ministry officials, acting on the perceptions of the moment regarding the need to reaffirm an Argentinian presence on all South Atlantic islands, enthusiastically recommended Davidoff to the Transportation Bureau of the Navy (auxiliary ships). The legal presence of Davidoff’s men would prevail long after the British Antarctic Survey left the place, ... In international forums this action would reassert Argentina’s interests in the sub-Antarctic.” ⁵⁰⁴

In early **September**, Argentine Admiral, Jorge Anaya, recognising that Davidoff’s venture on South Georgia offers a unique opportunity, instructs his planning staff to consider the options for establishing a presence there - ‘Project Alpha.’ ⁵⁰⁵

“... there was ... a scheme to take advantage of the Davidoff venture to establish a base covertly. ... This was to replicate the successful venture in 1976 when, in one of the first Junta’s earliest acts a presence had been established on South Thule in the South Sandwich Islands. ... The precedent was enticing. ... The plan was to

500 FCO 7/3964

501 Livingstone 2018. See September 7 below

502 Bound 2007

503 See July & September, 1979

504 *The Falklands/Malvinas War: A Model for North-South Crisis Prevention* Virginia Gamba-Stonehouse 1987 p.121.

505 *Painful Choices: A Theory of Foreign Policy Change* David A. Welch 2005 p.78

infiltrate Davidoff's workforce with military 'scientists' who would then be part of the 'legal' landing party on South Georgia. They would later be joined by a group of marines ... and establish a more permanent military base of some fourteen men from April onwards."⁵⁰⁶

Davidoff receives permission to use a Naval ice-breaker, the *Almirante Irizar*, from the Antarctic Squadron.

Britain's *defence attache* in Buenos Aires, supports an Argentine request to purchase 12 *Vulcan* bombers from the UK. He confirms that the aircraft would not be appropriate for use against the Falkland Islands.⁵⁰⁷

Argentina's *naval attache* in London, Rear-Admiral Walter Alara, is invited aboard HMS *Invincible*, to watch a *Sea Harrier* display.

September 7th, in London, at a meeting with Sir Ian Gilmour, Lord Carington decides against approving a public relations campaign to explain leaseback. Instead, he asks FCO officials to review the possibility of taking the Falklands dispute to the ICJ.⁵⁰⁸

*"... Carington settled instead for sending a letter to ministerial colleagues, recommending no new initiative except asking Argentina to put forward constructive proposals. Officials had warned that action was urgent and it was clearly a political decision not to act on their advice,..."*⁵⁰⁹

September 14th, in London, the Ministry of Defence (MoD) announces that HMS *Endurance* will be withdrawn before the end of March, 1982. Britain's Defence Secretariat prepares a draft-submission for the approval of the Chief's of Staff.

*"Military measures to deter or counter Argentine military action against the Falkland Islands would require the despatch to the area of additional forces, primarily naval, and possibly on a substantial scale. Any such deployment would be costly and pose considerable logistical difficulties. To deter or repel even a small scale invasion would require a significant commitment of naval resources at the expense of commitments elsewhere, for a period of uncertain duration. To deal with a full scale invasion would require naval and land forces with organic air support on a very substantial scale, and the logistic problems of such an operation would be formidable."*⁵¹⁰

*"She (Thatcher) quoted the September 1981 paper by the chiefs. They, ... concluded that to deter a full-scale invasion, a large balanced force would be required, ... There was a danger that its dispatch could precipitate the very action it was intended to deter."*⁵¹¹

An intelligence report quotes Argentine diplomatic correspondence as believing that; *"... the withdrawal of HMS Endurance had been construed ... as a deliberate political gesture."*⁵¹²

506 *Signals of War: The Falklands Conflict of 1982* Lawrence Freedman & Virginia Gamba-Stonehouse 1990

507 *The Daily Express* September 6, 2015. In fact these long-range aircraft could have been easily adapted to take a conventional bomb load. The purchase was cancelled in early 1982. Livingston (2018) suggests that Argentina chose another supplier.

508 Livingston 2018 citing *Fearn to Williams September 23, 1981 FCO 7/3965*. Also *ALW 040/325/1 Part B 26*. Noted in *the Franks Report*, there is no official record of the meeting between Carington and Gilmour.

509 *Ibid*.

510 *Defence Implications of Argentine Action Against the Falkland islands (A Note by MOD officials) COS (Misc) 268/742 at the Margaret Thatcher Foundation (50DBC02EAA664225AA8ECBE065CD1306)*

511 Charlton 1989 p.141

512 Franks 1983

September 15th, Lord Carington writes to Thatcher.

*“... the Argentines are showing renewed impatience ... They have sent a Note and circulated a Communique at the United Nations deploring the hitherto slow speed of negotiations and the lack of results and making clear that, if progress is not made soon, they may have to look to other means of achieving their purpose... In short, the present outlook is not good.”*⁵¹³

September 22nd, in New York, Dr. Camilion addresses the UN General Assembly.

“It is a strange paradox that our country, which was in the vanguard of the struggle for national independence, should still suffer from a breach of its territorial integrity, and anachronistic persistence of colonialism. The Malvinas Islands have not been restored to Argentina in spite of the long time elapsed since this General Assembly adopted Resolution 2065 (XX) in 1965. The Malvinas are still a colony to this day, ... Obviously, Mr. President, the Malvinas cannot remain a colony, nor can Argentina passively accept that part of its territory be one of the last colonies.”

September 23rd, at the United Nations building in New York, Lord Carington informs Dr. Camilion that the British Government cannot coerce the Islanders and that, therefore, it would be preferable if Argentina put forward proposals when talks resumed. Camilion responds that the key question remains that of sovereignty, which can only be negotiated between the UK and Argentina; and that the Islanders cannot be allowed a *veto*.⁵¹⁴

*“For the British, the Falklands are item 242 in the order of priorities in foreign policy.”*⁵¹⁵

*“HMG's Ambassador here, Anthony Williams, told me that Lord Carington made clear to Camilion in New York that the question is not one of respecting the "interests" of the Islanders, but rather of respecting their "desires." Williams says that the current elections in the Islands seem to be producing an even harder line there. The general sentiment in his understanding is against any more talks whatsoever with the Argentines. Williams nevertheless expects a new negotiating session, if not before the end of the year, in the early months of 1982. But he looks for nothing positive by way of results. In his view HMG has about exhausted its ingenuity, particularly with the idea of ceding sovereignty and then leasing back the Islands. The Argentines, on the other hand, seem unwilling or unable to go beyond saying "the Malvinas are ours."...”*⁵¹⁶

September 24th, in the Argentine press, Dr. Camilion is quoted as saying that; *“Lord Carington advanced to the point of saying that the present status quo is difficult to sustain today.”* Camilion is also reported as dismissing the forthcoming Island elections as of no importance to Argentina.⁵¹⁷ When questioned, Carington responds that the Argentine Minister; *“... can have been left in no doubt about our commitments to respect the wishes of the Islanders.”*

October 2nd, from Buenos Aires, Britain's Ambassador Williams expresses his opinion that there is now a clear risk that Argentina will conclude that talking is a waste of time. He believes it better to speak frankly, and face the consequences.

513 ALW 040/325/2 Part D 226

514 ALW 040/522/1 Telegram No. 909

515 Camilion quoted in *Falklands: The Secret Plot* Oscar Cardoso, Ricardo Kirschbaum & Eduardo van der Kooy 1983. This appears to have been 'borrowed' from a statement by Lord Carington referring to his appointment as Foreign Secretary.

516 *Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D810469–0965*

517 PREM 19/656 Telegram No. 259 of 24 September

October 4th, in Buenos Aires, Foreign Minister Oscar Camilion is interviewed by the press on his return from the USA.

*“The Minister replied to a question on the attitude of the inhabitants of the Islands with the statement that Argentina is committed to respect their interests but will not consult them. In his view, the Islanders have no right to veto in a negotiation that is between the UK and Argentina. According to the press, the Minister became irritated and refused to answer when questioned as to what specific steps the GOA (Gov of Argentina) might take to resolve the issue.”*⁵¹⁸

October 14th, in London, having reviewed a possible submission to the ICJ, the Foreign Office reports.

*“The question of British sovereignty in the area has not been submitted to the ICJ or to any other international tribunal. In 1947 and subsequently HMG offered to submit the dispute over Argentine claims in the Dependencies to the ICJ; and in 1955 HMG applied unilaterally to the Court against encroachments on British sovereignty in the Dependencies by Argentina and Chile. However, the matter could not be pursued since both Argentina and Chile declined to submit to the Court's jurisdiction in the matter. In 1966 the question arose as to whether in the course of negotiations with the Argentines, the UK should offer to refer the dispute over the Falkland Islands to the ICJ...”*⁵¹⁹

The question was not, however, pursued further. This was partly because reference to the Court would have had no attraction for Argentina (as Argentina does not accept the compulsory jurisdiction of the ICJ, any reference to the Court could only be made with the agreement of the Argentine Government.)...

*If for political reasons it seemed advisable to offer international adjudication or arbitration to the Argentines again as a method of resolving the dispute, the Law Officers would first need to be consulted. Legal Advisers also consider that reference to an ad hoc arbitration tribunal might be preferable to reference to the ICJ since the composition of the former would have to be agreed between us and the Argentines. But given the Argentines repudiation of the award made by an arbitration tribunal in the Beagle Channel case, despite their prior agreement to accept its findings, no reference to international arbitration is likely to help solve the dispute. The Argentines would be unlikely to accept a ruling that the Islands were British and it would be politically very difficult for the UK to hand them over to Argentina, if the ruling went the other way. If arbitration went in our favour we might gain some advantage at the UN, but this would be only temporary as the great majority of UN member-states will continue to see the dispute as a colonial problem.”*⁵²⁰

*“The PR drive in favour of leaseback was rejected even though, as newly-opened FCO documents now confirm, many of the government's most vocal critics expressed support for leaseback in private. By October 1981, a majority of the Falkland Islands Committee backed leaseback...”*⁵²¹

On the same day, from Buenos Aires, Ambassador Williams reports on a conversation with Dr. Camilion.

*“For serious and constructive negotiations it was necessary to tackle all the component parts of what was a complex issue.”*⁵²²

518 Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D810469–0965

519 See March 24, 1969. There is some evidence that an offer was made to Argentina that the question be put to the ICJ, but that this was turned down.

520 P. R. Fearn to Nick Ridley October 14th, 1981 ALW 040/325/1 Part B 26

521 Livingstone 2018. I can find no evidence for this, and Islander backing was not borne out by subsequent events.

522 Charlton 1989 p.106

"I was trying to convey first of all that it was necessary to start meaningful negotiations, and it was necessary to find a new approach. In those days I was toying with something like a Hong Kong style approach ..." ⁵²³

Talks scheduled to be held in Geneva in December are postponed, at the request of Argentina.

In the Falkland Islands, a new Legislative Council is elected.

October 30th, in Britain, the British Nationality Act receives Royal Assent; to take effect on January 1st, 1983.

"... Margaret Thatcher stripped them – and all other overseas territories – of (full UK citizenship) in 1981 in order to stop the people of Hong Kong moving to Britain before the handover to China." ⁵²⁴

Following budget cuts, the British Antarctic Survey suggests they close their base at Grytviken, South Georgia.

November 10th, in the House of Lords, the proposed withdrawal of HMS *Endurance* is opposed.

"... Argentina continues to press her claims to the Falkland Islands. The recent argument put forward is that they form part of the Argentinian continental shelf.... Against the general background of uncertainty in the region it seems improvident of the Ministry of Defence – one presumes with the tacit acceptance of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office – to withdraw the Royal Naval Ice Patrol Ship HMS "Endurance" from Antarctica in 1982 as part of the wider decision to reduce the size of the active fleet. ... Could this decision not be interpreted by all other involved nations as a sign of declining interest in the Antarctic by Great Britain? Obviously there can be no such intention. But the best and most obvious way to prove it, in my view, is to reverse the decision to scrap HMS Endurance." ⁵²⁵

November 16th, US envoy, Vernon Walters, arrives in Buenos Aires for discussions with General Galtieri.

"Walters was in Buenos Aires, intermittently, for many days, between October 1981 and February 1982. He discussed, inter alia, the establishment of a South Atlantic Treaty Organisation. He also discussed the advantages for such an organisation of an island-base in the Falklands, somewhat along the lines of Diego Garcia. However, the understanding was that the agreement on Hemispheric and other grounds should be between the United States and Argentina, the bulwark of American policy in the South Atlantic, and not between the US and Britain. Asked by the Argentine Military what Britain would do, the American replied to the effect that the British would huff, puff and protest, and do nothing, with the implication that the Americans could soothe the ruffled British feathers." ⁵²⁶

"When asked whether the United States would remain neutral in the event of a conflict, Walters intimated that neutrality would be contingent upon the absence of any British casualties from Argentine military action." ⁵²⁷

November 25th, at the UN, the General Assembly defer consideration of the Falklands' question until 1982.

In Buenos Aires, Davidoff puts his final plans together for the dismantling of the scrap on South Georgia.

"... in late November, two high-ranking naval officers and two foreign office officials met with Constantine Davidoff at a restaurant in Calle Florida a popular shopping district in down town Buenos Aires. One of the navy men was Captain Adolpho Palau, of naval transport command, and the other was Captain Cesar Trombetta, of the navy's Antarctic Squadron.... the purpose of their meeting was for the navy officers to tell

523 Oscar Camilion interviewed in Charlton 1989 p.107

524 *Banished Islanders are Citizens Again* Anthony Browne in *The Guardian* May 12, 2002

525 Lord Murton in *HL Deb 10.11.1981 vol.425* Hansard

526 *One Man's Falklands* Tam Dalyell 1982 pp.133-4

527 *The Reagan Revolution II: Rebuilding the Western Alliance* R. C. Thornton 2004

Davidoff that the Argentine navy was now prepared to transport him free of charge to South Georgia and for the foreign office officials to confirm that the scrap metal he brought back would enter duty-free, increasing his profit margin... Davidoff, never having been to South Georgia, proposed to make a brief trip to inspect the whaling stations. Trombetta agreed; it would provide an opportunity to take a closer look at the island and test the likely British reaction.”⁵²⁸

November 26th, at the Foreign Office in London, Fearn of the South American Department, writes to Ambassador Williams in Buenos Aires (cc.'d to Governor Hunt).

*“1. ... Research Department have now completed their paper(on which we were consulted while it was in draft) and I enclose a copy. 2. Our original intention had been, ... to produce a classified paper and an accompanying sanitised version for use with suitable contacts. However, the nature of the paper and its conclusions have led us to decide to have the whole classified secret and not to produce any companion unclassified paper. The facts would seem to be that our case rests almost entirely on 148 years of continuous settlement, and that while the Law Officers have previously been relatively certain that this would be sufficient in International Law to uphold our claim, there is certainly some risk in putting the contention to the test, particularly given the probable in-built anti-colonial bias of most of the international institutions which might be involved if the case went to arbitration. 3. This paper, the, is for the information of you and your staff only: I do not need to stress how potentially damaging the consequences would be if the Argentine's came to suspect that we doubted our ability to justify our claim to sovereignty before 1833.”*⁵²⁹

December 2nd, Foreign Secretary Lord Carington writes to the Prime Minister.

*“... talks are due to be held on 17 and 18 December in Geneva;... Islander opinion is even more strongly opposed to any 'deal' with the Argentines over sovereignty. ... We therefore have little room for manoeuvre,... Argentines have requested this meeting, so we can allow them to make the running.”*⁵³⁰

*“HMG views Argentina as the proposer and HMG as the responder in the upcoming talks. The sovereignty issue remains central, and the Islanders seem more determined than ever to remain British. HMG's position is straightforward: It seeks a resolution of the issue, but will not agree to a settlement "over the heads of the Islanders." ...”*⁵³¹

December 8th, in Buenos Aires, following a palace coup, a new junta takes over led by junta consisting of Army Commander General Leopoldo Galtieri, Admiral Jorge Anaya and Air Force General, Lami Dozo.

In a deal with Anaya, Galtieri becomes President-elect whilst retaining his position as head of the Army.

*“It is said by associates of both men that this agreement ... involved assurances on a number of policy issues. One of these was an understanding that the recovery of the Falklands should be achieved within the two years of Galtieri's presidency term, preferably before January 1983...”*⁵³²

528 Thornton 2004. There are different versions of this story; none of which can be confirmed.

529 *Fearn to Williams November 26, 1981* in *AW 040/325/1*. The attachments are subject to embargo. Closed for 47 years under exemption 27(1)(c) dated August 28, 2012. Likely to include the legal opinions of 1947 and 1966. The first can now be found at the PRO. *cf.* 1947

530 *ALW 040/325/2 Part E 301*

531 *Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D810588-0688*

532 *Jenkins & Hastings 1997*

*“(Anaya) was an ardent ‘Malvinist’, but the suggestion that he made the recovery of the islands a condition of his support for the new President is not supported by senior Argentine Admirals. They believe that when Galtieri became President he asked Anaya and Brigadier Lami Dozo, the air Force member of the junta, what future plans the old junta had been developing ... the head of the list for foreign policy was the resolution of the ‘Malvinas problem.’ ...”*⁵³³

*“Contrary to popular impression, however, Galtieri obtained neither a mandate nor a full term of office, and would be required to relinquish his army command in a year. In short, as president, Galtieri could count on exercising considerable power for a year, after which the junta would be enlarged by an additional member, Galtieri’s replacement as army chief. This arrangement was clearly an incentive for Galtieri to take action while his power was relatively unconstrained.”*⁵³⁴

In Buenos Aires, Dr. Nicanor Costa Mendez is appointed Foreign Minister by the junta.

*“According to the Rattenbach report, when he took over the Chancellery, Dr. Nicanor Costa Méndez had two meetings with Galtieri in which he was given the directive of activating as much as possible the diplomatic negotiations aimed at the recognition of Argentine sovereignty in Malvinas, adding that he would not rule out the need to reach something more than diplomacy in the event that Britain once again attempted to delay the resolution of the question. Thus, during the months that followed, the Junta appealed to both formal and informal channels to make British diplomats understand that the option of the invasion was a reality and not a mere bluff to coerce them to sit down and negotiate.”*⁵³⁵

December 14th, in London, dealing with a question regarding the occupation by Argentina of Southern Thule, Lord Carington states; *“... if my noble friend is suggesting the use of force, he will recollect that international law and the United Nations Charter require disputes to be settled by peaceful means. That is what we have been trying to do...”*⁵³⁶

December 15th, Argentina requests a postponement of the talks due to start on the 17th. Britain agrees.

*“On Tuesday 15 December 1981, Admiral Jorge Anaya flew from Buenos Aires to the main Argentine naval base at Puerto Belgrano, 280 miles away to the south-west. He went there to perform the official installation of Vice-Admiral Juan Lombardo as the new Chief of Naval Operations; ... After the ceremony, Anaya surprised Lombardo by quietly telling him to prepare a plan to occupy the Falkland islands: to ‘take them but not necessarily to keep them’ are the words Lombardo remembers.”*⁵³⁷

December 16th, from Argentina, Constantino Davidoff leaves for South Georgia aboard the *Almirante Irizar*, commanded by Captain Cesar Trombetta.

*“... Davidoff’s enterprise lay dormant until activated on late 1981. At that point scrap metal prices began to plummet from \$93 to \$63 per ton, suggesting that profit was not necessarily the reason for the venture...”*⁵³⁸

*“The business was inviting. It was estimated according to *The Sunday Times* that (for) those 35,000 tons of metal Davidoff had paid £115,000, when in 1979 a tonne of scrap was sold at £214, representing a profit of £7 million.”*⁵³⁹

533 *Argentine Fight for the Falklands* Martin Middlebrook 2003

534 Thornton 2004

535 Carbone 2008

536 *HL Deb 14 December 1981 vol.426 cc5-6*. At this time, Argentina’s meteorological station on Southern Thule was staffed by seven naval scientists and four civilians, of which three were radio technicians.

537 *Argentine Fight for the Falklands* M. Middlebrook 2003

538 Thornton 2004. There are different versions of this story. None can be confirmed.

539 *Malvinas: las causas inmediatas de la Guerra* M. Meneghini 2015

Davidoff's letter informing the British Embassy of the visit to South Georgia, is only delivered after his departure.⁵⁴⁰

*“Davidoff deliberately delayed sending the letter to the embassy, on Trombetta's advise, who intended it as a "provocation". But Davidoff also sent a telex to Christian Salvesens in Edinburgh, informing the company of his trip, and Salvesens had promptly informed the Foreign Office. London had thus been informed of Davidoff's visit well in advance of his arrival.”*⁵⁴¹

December 18th, in Buenos Aires, the new junta meet to discuss their approach to the Falkland Islands.⁵⁴²

*“(Dr. Méndez) ... briefed the Junta ... as to the dismal state of negotiations with Britain and the need to develop a policy prior to the resumption of talks in the coming February. ... From the Argentine perspective serious discussions, addressing the sovereignty issue, only took place for two short periods during ... sixteen years: between 1966 and 1967, and from 1977 to 1980. For the rest of the time the Falkland Islands lobby undermined the flexibility of the Foreign Office and its conduct of the negotiations. ...The immediate Argentine objective was to return to the original negotiating framework of 1965-7.”*⁵⁴³

*“Why Malvinas? ... it contained that element that would guarantee, in some way, unquestionable support from Argentine society as a whole. But in addition, it had the potential capacity to transform the character of the Armed Forces, since for the latter it could mean – in the words of Leon Rozitchner – to move from “dirty internal war to external clean war,” by recovering that part of a formerly usurped country, finally reestablishing true national integrity, and at the same time making the "enemy" of the Argentine people to England and not the Military Junta. In this way, what was intended was to "reconquer" the Falkland Islands to "conquer" the Argentine people.”*⁵⁴⁴

December 20th, *Almirante Irizar* arrives off South Georgia.

*“Trombetta traversed the 1,650-mile passage in four days maintaining radio silence, an unusual procedure, and without radioing the magistrate at Grytviken, the official port of entry, of his impending visit. Upon arrival on December 20, Trombetta declined to follow prescribed landing procedures by obtaining clearance at Grytviken. Instead he proceeded directly to Leith,..”*⁵⁴⁵

December 21st, Davidoff lands and inspects the whaling station at Leith.

*“There he inspected the material that (he) had purchased: 30 fuel storage tanks, cooking plant, diesel power plant of 1,500 kw, boiler and machinery, in Leith; other facilities in Husvik and Stromnes, plus two floating docks of 700 and 1,000 tons in the latter port.”*⁵⁴⁶

December 22nd, in his inauguration speech, President Galtieri surprisingly makes no reference to the Islands.

December 23rd, after the Argentine vessel has sailed from South Georgia, a member of the BAS checks the Leith station to find the phrase – '*Las Malvinas son Argentinas*' – scrawled on the walls.

540 In correspondence with the British Ambassador dated March 25th, 1982, Davidoff would later claim that this letter was delivered to the Embassy on December 11th.

541 Thornton 2004

542 Freedman 2005 vol.1 p.132

543 *Signals of War: The Falklands Conflict of 1982* L. Freedman & V. Gamba-Stonehouse 1990

544 Carbone 2008

545 Thornton 2004. This author suggests that the Argentine vessel remained only a few hours. Other sources suggest it was three days.

546 Meneghini 2015

*“... the task of preparing the Argentine people for the possible military operation to be carried out, was also in the hands of the Minister for Foreign Affairs. This task had begun in late December 1981 when Costa Méndez began to inform a select group of journalists about the government's intentions. He told them that Argentina was determined to recover the Malvinas by the end of 1982, through diplomatic channels if possible, by force if necessary.”*⁵⁴⁷

December 31st, London is informed of the unauthorised visit of the *Almirante Irizar*. Governor Hunt advises a strong protest and legal proceedings against Davidoff.

1982 – January 1st, from Buenos Aires, Ambassador Williams sends a report to the Foreign Office, evaluating the previous year's events with regard to the Falkland Islands.

*“... it has not been an easy year for the UK in its relations with the Argentine Republic, either politically or in export promotion. In the former, as regards the Falklands, we have had to walk like Agag all year to avoid offence to Argentine, Islander or Falkland lobby sensitivities ... We have come through without a bust-up, but certainly with the Argentines and the Islanders more on each others' nerves than a year ago.”*⁵⁴⁸

January 2nd, in Argentina, the junta meet to consider plans for a military solution to the Falklands' question.

*“... on 2 January 1982, the Junta considered the so-called "Alpha Project", first produced in May of the previous year at the request of the Alte. Lombardo and never executed. Seen against the success of 1976, when one of the first acts of the (military) had established a military presence in Thule, ... with the objective of founding a base with a view to the scientific research in the future. Despite English protests about this presence on "British territory", the program was not suspended, which made an attractive precedent. Supporters of the "Alpha Project" assumed that Britain would learn to tolerate an Argentine presence in South Georgia as they had in South Thule. However, at the request of the Naval Operations Command, it was again considered that the time to execute it was not appropriate, since any isolated action could be inconvenient in the circumstances in which the negotiations were held, and it was intended to avoid a potentially negative event for the development of future dialogue with the English. Despite this, the meeting was not unsuccessful as the Junta ... resolved "to explore the possibility of using military power to achieve the political objective"...”*⁵⁴⁹

January 4th, from London, Ambassador Williams is instructed to make a formal protest to the Argentine Foreign Ministry with regard to South Georgia. Governor Hunt is informed, however he is instructed not to start legal proceedings against Davidoff, as such an action would; *“... risk provoking a most serious incident which could escalate and have an unforeseeable outcome.”*⁵⁵⁰

January 5th, in Buenos Aires, the junta again meet to consider the Falklands issue; deciding; *“... to follow a double policy. It resolved to 'reactivate to the fullest extent all negotiations for the sovereignty of the Malvinas, South Georgia and South Sandwich Islands' and at the same time 'prepare a contingency plan for the employment of military power should the first alternative fail.'...”*⁵⁵¹

547 Carbone 2008

548 FCO Diplomatic Report 14/82 ALA 014/2

549 Carbone 2008

550 Franks 1983

551 Freedman & Gamba-Stonehouse 1990

*“It was only a contingency plan. The mood was dictated by the absolute lack of progress in negotiations... at that time, at the end of five years of fruitless negotiations, we had become very frustrated.”*⁵⁵²

January 6th, in Buenos Aires, Ambassador Williams formally protests Davidoff's violation of British sovereignty. He demands compliance with Falkland Dependency laws. Argentina's Foreign Ministry requests time to investigate. Williams also presents a proposal from Lord Carington that a further round of talks should take place in New York in February.

Argentine Foreign Minister Costa Mendez repudiates the arbitration treaty with Chile, regarding the Beagle Channel dispute between the two countries.⁵⁵³

January 12th, Argentina's governing junta establishes a planning group to refine Falklands invasion plans. This comprises Lombardo, Army General Garcia, and the Air Force's Brigadier Sigfrido Plessl. It is recognised that casualties amongst the Islanders would be politically unacceptable.

*“The first issue was logical since the population, although they were not sympathizers of Argentina as such were situated inside Argentine territory and therefore should be protected as much as possible. The idea of a bloodless operation also meant no unnecessary destruction should accompany the operation. On the issue of British troops this meant that the fewer the military casualties for Britain, the less the need for an emotive reaction on the part of the population or of the British Government.”*⁵⁵⁴

*“The other armed services soon became involved. Their work was overseen by a Comisión de Trabajo – a Working party – which held its first meeting at Army Headquarters in the Libertador Building in Buenos Aires in mid-January 1982. ... Admiral Anaya's initial plan to take the islands but not necessarily to stay or to defend them was abandoned at an early stage... A date of 15 September was given for the completion of the planning. No move was envisaged before that date...”*⁵⁵⁵

*“Its role would be to draw up a military plan that would be an alternative to the diplomatic strategy, envisaging the seizure of the Malvinas by the Argentine Armed Forces. ... From (Galtieri's) point of view, a "triumph" on the Falklands issue would have historically and definitively justified the Military Government and would support Galtieri's leadership electorally in a future civilian-military transitional government.”*⁵⁵⁶

January 19th, in Buenos Aires, the junta approves 'National Strategy Directive 1/82'.

“The Military Committee, faced with the evident and repeated lack of progress in the negotiations with Great Britain to obtain recognition of our sovereignty over the Falklands, South Georgia and South Sandwich Islands; convinced that the prolongation of this situation affects national honour, the full exercise of sovereignty and the exploration of resources; has resolved to analyse the possibility of the use of military power to obtain the political objective. This resolution must be kept in strict secrecy ...”

January 24th, Argentine newspaper, *La Prensa*, predicts that Argentina will present strict conditions for the continuance of negotiations with Britain. In an article, journalist Iglesias Rouco also refers to probable US support and expresses a belief that; *“... Buenos Aires will recover the islands by force this year... an ambitious diplomatic and strategic plan which would assure the country of a relevant role in the South Atlantic.”*

552 Rear-Admiral Gaulter Alara quoted in Middlebrook 2003

553 See 1881, 1971, 1977 & 1981

554 *Operation Rosario* Admiral Carlos Busser 1984

555 Middlebrook 2003

556 Carbone 2008

January 25th, commanding officer Captain Nick Barker takes *Endurance* into the southern Argentine port of Ushuaia. In contrast to previous occasions, he receives a frosty welcome.

*“They declined to play football against the ship and even refused the use of their ground for a match against a local civilian side. All this was completely against the pattern of cordiality we had experienced on previous visits to Argentine ports, even as recently as our visit to Puerto Belgrano two months earlier. There was a partial belief that this may have had something to do with the fact that we were going on to Punta Arenas in Chile, but was this enough to explain such a complete snubbing? I did not think so and reported my misgivings in a signal. When I went to call on Captain Russo, in the absence of Admiral Zaratiegui, I was informed that I was in the Malvinas War Zone... I laughed and asked who the Argentines were fighting. ‘You,’ he said without a flicker of emotion... All this I reported to London.”*⁵⁵⁷

*“As Endurance was leaving, the Argentine harbor pilot had confided to Barker that something was ‘very wrong’ with the Argentine navy.”*⁵⁵⁸

January 27th, in Buenos Aires, the governing junta responds to Lord Carington's proposal in a *bout de papier* delivered to the British Embassy. They agree to a fresh round of negotiations but call for them to be “serious,” “in-depth” and to culminate; “within a reasonable period of time and without procrastination.” Included is a pre-condition.

“... in the first place, British recognition of Argentine sovereignty ... It remains a sine-qua-non requirement for the solution of the dispute. So long as this question is unresolved the dispute will continue.”

Argentina also proposes the establishment of a permanent negotiating commission, to meet in the first week of each month; subject to denunciation by either side without notice.⁵⁵⁹

*“Argentina will set a series of pre-conditions before continuing talks with Britain on the future of the Malvinas/Falklands islands ... If not met, other forms of action, including recovery of the islands by military means would be considered.”*⁵⁶⁰

*“Argentina produced a proposal on January 27, 1982 to constitute a permanent negotiating commission, with a mandate of one year, with the purpose of concluding the negotiations on sovereignty. This initiative had a considerable impact in London, due to the peremptory deadlines it contained.”*⁵⁶¹

In Argentina, a very public discussion in newspapers *La Prensa* and *The Buenos Aries Herald* consider the advantages and disadvantages of military action to seize the Falkland Islands.

⁵⁵⁷ *Beyond Endurance: An Epic of Whitehall and the South Atlantic* Nicholas Barker 1997. Barker's warnings to the Admiralty appear to have been dismissed as an attempt to save his ship, which was due to go out of service. Captain Barker had been energetic in the defence of *Endurance* before the decision by the MoD, and had been active in the campaign to have that decision reversed. These actions had not endeared him to the MoD's political masters, in particular Michael Power, the Under-Secretary of State at the Ministry. Nor, indeed, Secretary of State John Nott. The Frank's commission of inquiry that followed the Falklands War do not appear to have been fully informed of the warnings given by Barker. This may be seen as some tactical whitewashing by the Conservative Government.

⁵⁵⁸ Thornton 2004.

⁵⁵⁹ *ALW 040/325/1 Part C 101*

⁵⁶⁰ *Latin American Weekly Report* February 12, 1982

⁵⁶¹ *La política británica hacia las Malvinas* Vicente Berasategui 2013

February 2nd, while the junta consider *Operation Alpha*, Davidoff is instructed not to visit South Georgia.⁵⁶²

In Britain, after considering an Argentine request to purchase 12 *Vulcan Bombers*, the MoD decide against the proposal; “... a sale of strategic bombers to Argentina would bound to be misunderstood or at least misinterpreted (by Chile).” At the FCO, Robin Fearn raises another issue; “On the face of it, a strike aircraft would seem to be entirely suitable for an attack on the Falklands.”⁵⁶³

February 8th, in Buenos Aires, Britain's Ambassador responds to the *bout de papier* of the 27th.

“(The UK) can not ... accept the Argentine assumption that the purpose of the negotiations is the eventual recognition by HMG of Argentine sovereignty in the area...”⁵⁶⁴

“... Ambassador Williams delivered a low-key response to the Argentine note, agreeing to resume talks on February 27, but loudly protested Davidoff's three-hour (sic) December stay on South Georgia.”⁵⁶⁵

February 9th, reported in *The Buenos Aires Herald*.⁵⁶⁶

“New Argentine Governments, no matter what their provenance or their ideology, have at least two things in common: they all aspire to reduce the inflation rate and they all strive to establish, once and for all, unquestioned Argentine sovereignty over the islands known in English as the Falklands ... This Government is no exception but ... its Falklands approach will be far tougher than anything we have seen so far. Besides the attendant historical rights and the infinite patience so far shown by Argentina, the truth of the matter is that the Malvinas situation is seriously interfering with our security in the South Atlantic, is limiting our economic and geopolitical plans, including ones relating to Antarctica, and bears moreover in a most negative fashion on our dispute with Chile over the Beagle.

Looking at the subject from an international, or western, viewpoint, the British presence there deprives Argentina of its proper participation in the defence of the region against constant Soviet penetration ... this makes any strategic planning for the area virtually impossible or of doubtful value. So if it is borne in mind that it is not only this country which finds itself daily more prejudiced by Britain's inexplicable obstinacy, it seems easy to predict that an initiative involving force could count not only on the understanding of the international community, particularly of the third world, but also on the support, or at least the interested tolerance, of NATO.”

February 13th, on South Georgia, two members of the Joint Services Expedition arrive at Leith harbour to find three yachts moored there. *Isatis* and *Kim* are French registered and have complied with entry procedures, although *Kim* has overstayed. *Caiman's* origins are unknown and she is flying the flags of the UK, Belgium and Panama. Her crew appear to be in radio contact with Buenos Aires.⁵⁶⁷

“Although flying the Panamanian flag, on board were an Italian crew of three and an Argentinean bank official, Adrion Marchessi. Marchessi claimed that his bank was financing Davidoff's enterprise and he was simply inspecting the whaling stations. Suspicions were raised when three "very sophisticated" radios were

562 Freedman & Gamba-Stonehouse 1990 p.44

563 Quoted in *The Daily Express* September 6th, 2015

564 ALW 040/325/1 Part C 101 Annex B

565 Thornton 2004

566 ALW 040/325/3. Documents released to the Margaret Thatcher Foundation per FOI request 0181-12.

567 *Caiman's* owner was an Italian, Giovanni Raggio. It has been suggested that this vessel, and possibly the French yachts too, were on a spying mission for Argentina. See *Large Animals and Wide Horizons: Adventures of a Biologist* Richard M. Laws Scott Polar Research Institute undated.

found aboard the yacht, and more so when Davidoff, contacted by the British embassy to verify Marchessi's story, denied it.”⁵⁶⁸

In the Falklands, aircraft overfly Stanley.

“By February the Argentines had become quite brazen in their sabre-rattling and intelligence gathering. There were unexplained nocturnal flights over Stanley. Those who heard the aircraft or saw the lights in the small hours believed that they were military Hercules planes. Twice they dropped flares as they flew over Stanley Airport. The flares may have been signals to LADE staff who would have confirmed the accuracy of their navigation.”⁵⁶⁹

February 15th, Lord Carington writes to the Prime Minister regarding Argentina's demands.

“The Argentine Government have given us, as a prior notification of their position and objectives at New York, a substantial and toughly worded document which asserts that the sole purpose of the negotiations is to cede sovereignty to Argentina, denies the relevance of the Islanders' wishes (as opposed to interests) and, without explicit threats, refers to the Islanders' dependence on services provided by the Argentines.”⁵⁷⁰

Thatcher responds that it should be made clear that the wishes of the Islanders remain paramount.⁵⁷¹

“... the British were pursuing two contradictory policies: (1) negotiate a settlement with Argentina over the Falklands; and (2) protect the rights of the Falkland Islanders as British citizens. Both were undermined by the inherent difficulties of doing things "in twos." Britain was unable to make the kind of offer to the Argentine government that would have settled the issue peacefully, because the islanders and their supporters in Britain would have seen this as betrayal.”⁵⁷²

February 18th, Argentina rejects Britain's February 8th protest regarding Davidoff. *La Prensa* reports.

“The least that can be asked of military governments is that they do not dither in the face of any military eventuality when questions of sovereignty are involved. After decades of fruitless negotiations, Argentina has good cause to know that Great Britain will not give up the Malvinas either voluntarily or via any agreement that would mean losing its administrative power in the islands... the time is approaching for Buenos Aires to think in terms of force.”⁵⁷³

February 23rd, in Buenos Aires, Davidoff turns up at the British Embassy and apologises. He informs the Embassy that he wishes to return to Leith on March 10th, with 30 workers, and expects to stay some 6 months. Embassy staff warn him that the appropriate formalities must be complied with on arrival at South Georgia.

“Davidoff was never, of course, given any permission by this Embassy but, on the contrary, warned personally in February ...”⁵⁷⁴

568 Thornton 2004

569 Bound 2007

570 *ALW 040/325/1 B 51-100*

571 Freedman & Gamba-Stonehouse 1990

572 *When Governments Collide in the South Atlantic: Britain Coerces Argentina during the Falklands War* Patrick Bratton & Wallace Thies 2011 in *Comparative Strategy* 30:1 1-27

573 Iglesias Rouco quoted in *ALW 040/325/3*

574 Ambassador Williams in a telegram to London dated March 20, 1982 quoted in *PREM 19/613*. The 'warning' was actually given by Richard Gozney, a junior member of the Embassy staff, and later described by *Endurance's* Capt. Barker as; “so weakly worded it was no more discouraging than a few dandelions in the lawn of opportunity.”

“... the time to conduct salvage operations on South Georgia was between November and March, not March and October. Yet, Davidoff's declared plan of operations called for his men to work for the next four months through the worst of South Georgia's winter when there would be nineteen hours of darkness out of every twenty-four, heavy winds and several feet of snow. This was a poor choice of timing for what purported to be a purely commercial enterprise.”⁵⁷⁵

“Whitehall's complacency was shared by the Ambassador in Buenos Aires, Anthony Williams, who, belonging to the Neville Henderson school of diplomacy, believed that even a horrible dictatorship like General Galtieri's would not stoop to actual aggression, especially if Britain kept on good terms with it. Williams, a 'brilliant' public-school and Oxford diplomat, carried weight in the Foreign Office; Rex Hunt, the Governor of the Falkland Isles, a plain commonsensical man who shared Barker's fears, did not.”⁵⁷⁶

February 26th, Anglo-Argentine negotiations resume in New York with Argentina's delegation led by deputy-Foreign Minister Enrique Ros. Britain's delegates are led by Richard Luce.

*“We knew before the talks took place in February 1982 what the Argentines were going to propose. Lord Carington agreed that I should accept their concept of a ‘negotiating commission’ which would look at every facet of the Falkland Islands problem, including sovereignty. However, I was to make it absolutely clear to them that, as far as sovereignty was concerned, there would be no change without the consent of the Islanders and of Parliament. Against that background I was given the broad brief to go into negotiations, to keep dialogue going and, to be quite blunt about it, if things were getting difficult, we would just have to buy time. ... I say, quite bluntly, that we were blocked in. Leaseback had not made any progress, and we saw no easy way out. We hoped, I hoped, that perhaps the Argentines would come forward with something positive out of the negotiating commission, which might lead us to a new way forward ... all we could do was buy time. We had run out of any innovating ideas. Of those, leaseback had been the most important.”*⁵⁷⁷

Representing the Islands people are Tim Blake and John Cheek.

*“Mr. Luce explained that he wished to make the British position clear from the outset. We had no doubts about British sovereignty over the Falkland Islands and the Dependencies. The wishes of the Islanders themselves were paramount ... Sr. Ros recalled that Argentina had been trying to reach a solution to this dispute for over 16 years ... He stressed that the principal question for Argentines' was sovereignty. The key to their position was the need for Britain to recognise Argentine sovereignty in the area. ... Argentina had no intention of disturbing the Islanders' style of life; what they wanted was a balance between Islanders' interests and Argentine sovereignty rights. ... For the Argentines it would not be possible to accept any agreement that excluded the Argentine claim to sovereignty. ...”*⁵⁷⁸

*“A bilateral meeting was scheduled in February to continue talks. It fell to Richard Luce, then Minister of State at the FCO who replaced Ridley, to represent London, with instructions to resist the deadlines set in the Argentine memorandum and maintain that any agreement on the Commission should be ad referendum.”*⁵⁷⁹

575 Thornton 2014. Thornton calls the Embassy reaction - “*nothing less than extraordinary*” after Davidoff's December inspection and the failure to follow established procedures. Thornton's consideration is sadly tainted by his adherence to the fantasy that Thatcher's government was complicit in the fomenting of a conflict for its own political ends.

576 *The High Cost of Cuts* Correlli Barnett in *The Spectator* May 16, 1997 p.42

577 Richard Luce interviewed in Charlton 1989 p.182

578 *ALW 040/325/1 Part C 101*

579 *La política británica hacia las Malvinas* Vicente Berasategui 2013

A telegram to the US State Department from the US Embassy in Buenos Aires reports on rumours.

*“Some of our contacts in the GOA have sought to convey a sense of urgency about the current round of negotiations... we have also heard references to an Argentine desire to accelerate the pace of the negotiations but it is hard for us to tell what precisely the Argentines hope to accomplish.”*⁵⁸⁰

*“At the end of day one we were going to continue discussing ways of cooperation, and ways forward. All we had to do after that was draft a communiqué. But they had obviously conveyed to BA what they thought had been agreed, and were told to go back and start again. So we covered exactly the same ground on day two. Then we drafted a communiqué, saying that we would aim to progress the relationship, and that we respected each others' position on the sovereignty dispute. It was another long grass' situation. We had no inkling that they were losing patience. It was odd. To this day I don't believe that the people in New York were aware of the level of planning in BA. The idea that we were [made] aware that they were going to invade is something that people have invented.”*⁵⁸¹

March 1st, in New York, a joint statement is released to the press by the negotiating teams.

“The meeting took place in a cordial and positive spirit. The two sides reaffirmed their resolve to find a solution to the sovereignty dispute and considered in detail an Argentine proposal for procedures to make better progress in this sense.”

*“Ros's superiors in Buenos Aires were furious. Here the assessment was that Britain was procrastinating once again. The aim of demonstrating British intransigence before the international community was not going to be helped by cryptic reports of cordial meetings. The key fact was that Britain had not formally accepted the Argentine proposal and had given no indication of when it intended to do so.”*⁵⁸²

From Buenos Aires, Argentina's Ministry of Foreign Affairs issues its own statement.

*“... the representatives of Argentina and Great Britain considered an Argentine proposal to establish a system of monthly meetings with a pre-established agenda, pre-arranged meeting place, and led by top-level officials. The aim of such meetings will be genuinely to speed up to the maximum the negotiations in train to achieve recognition of Argentine sovereignty ... The new system constitutes an effective step for the early solution of the dispute. However, should this not occur, Argentina reserves the right to terminate the working of this mechanism ...”*⁵⁸³

*“The talks appeared to go well and resulted in an agreement to set up a commission that would consider both parties' demands. The Argentines, however, decided to turn up the pressure on London rather than wait to see what the commission might accomplish.”*⁵⁸⁴

Britain's delegation in New York, respond that the Buenos Aires statement; *“... creates a more difficult and unhelpful climate for continuing the negotiating process.”*⁵⁸⁵

March 2nd, in Buenos Aires, the newspaper *Clarín* reports on the talks.

580 Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D820105–0567

581 Tim Blake quoted in Bound 2007

582 Freedman & Gamba-Stonehouse 1990 p.28

583 ALW 040/325/1 B 51-100

584 Bratton P. & Thies W. 2011 p.4

585 Freedman 2005 vol.1 p.137

“The press release stated that Argentina had negotiated for more than fifteen years with the UK, with patience, loyalty and good faith and within the framework of the UN and had proposed a new mechanism for negotiations which is to include South Georgia as well as the Sandwich Islands. If there was no agreement, Argentina retains the right to ... resort to whatever procedure is commensurable with the interests of Argentina. This last paragraph obviously does not exclude the possibility of military occupation of the islands.”

Brigadier-General Mario Benjamin Menéndez is informed that he will head the military government on the Falklands, once they have been seized.⁵⁸⁶

“On 2 March, (the military leadership) issued a statement in which it reported that, given the negative outcome of the negotiations, and in the absence of substantial progress in the short term, Argentina arrogated to itself “... the right to terminate the operation of this mechanism and to choose freely the procedure best suited to its interests” and then decided to launch the engine of the military operation. That same day, Brigadier General Mario Benjamín Menéndez was informed about the existing plans to militarily recover the islands and his intended role: Military Governor of the Malvinas.”⁵⁸⁷

Island delegates, Tim Blake and John Cheek return to the Islands but are unable to comment due to the level of confidentiality insisted upon by the Foreign Office.

“The meetings have been shrouded in secrecy to a degree that would not exist in most other democratic countries ... we, whose way of life is up against the wall are left uninformed and wondering.”⁵⁸⁸

“The councillors returned to Stanley on 2 March, exactly one month before the invasion, and reported confidentially to their colleagues on Executive and Legislative Councils (Exco and Legco). Even before their LADE plane touched down in Stanley the Argentine popular press was shrieking outrage at the ‘failure’ of the talks and quoting bellicose words from the military government.”⁵⁸⁹

March 3rd, Argentina’s *La Prensa* reports that Britain has only a limited time period in which to acknowledge Argentine sovereignty over the Falkland Islands.

“No diplomat can talk about the use of force. A decision of this nature is taken without any prior notice. We are willing, very firmly, to go as far as need be if the archipelago is not returned as soon as possible.”⁵⁹⁰

The *Buenos Aires Herald* sees the Foreign Ministry announcement as containing a “veiled threat”, and warns Britain that this time Argentina, “means business.”⁵⁹¹

“Even the Buenos Aires Herald (never a lapdog of the military government) soberly reported a source in the government, believed to be the Foreign Minister, Nicanor Costa Mendez, saying that Argentina was preparing to break off diplomatic relations with Britain unless there was a successful outcome very soon.”⁵⁹²

586 Cardoso, Kirschboom & van der Kooy 1983 p.52

587 Carbone 2008

588 *Penguin News*

589 Bound 2007

590 Foreign Minister Mendez quoted in Bound 2007

591 *ALW 040/325/1 B 51 – 100*

592 Bound 2007

On receiving news of the Argentine press reports, PM Thatcher *minutes*; “*we must make contingency plans.*”

“*On 3 March Mr Luce sent a personal message to Enrico Ros referring to the agreement that the discussions should remain confidential until Governments had been consulted. He said the communique and residual press comment had created more difficulty and an unhelpful climate for continuing the negotiation process. He added, 'I am deeply disturbed by what may be interpreted as threats...!...'*”⁵⁹³

March 5th, Britain’s Cabinet in London ask that the next OD Committee paper include; “*Annexes on both civil and military contingency plans for counter-action against Argentina.*”

From Stanley, unidentified military aircraft are reported to have flown over the town.

In Buenos Aires, Minister Costa Mendez tells Ambassador Williams that he is dissatisfied with the progress of negotiations, while David Joy, a member of the Embassy staff in Buenos Aires, reports a conversation with Raul Schmidt of the Chilean Embassy.

*“The Schmidt thesis is based essentially on the Argentine Navy’s need of a strategic port further south than its current and most secure port, Puerto Belgrano. The obvious option Ushuaia was not satisfactory from a security point of view because it is under constant Chilean surveillance. Therefore the Argentines are, according to Schmidt, desperate to have some other secure port further south, a goal that could be satisfied by having access to the islands south of Beagle or the Falklands. In this context, he believes the sovereignty disputes are linked.”*⁵⁹⁴

In London, Guy Huntrods, a director of Lloyds Bank International, complains at the implications of rising tensions for trade with Argentina, and Britain’s financial interests in that country.⁵⁹⁵

March 6th, an Argentine LADE Hercules transport aircraft lands unannounced at Stanley airport; citing an in-flight emergency (fuel leak).

*“Overflights by Argentine military aircraft were a frequent topic of conversation. The emergency landing of an Argentine C-130 at Stanley Airport ... had given the people the jitters. (As port Stanley reported by telegram, the plane arrived without formal warning and it was only thanks to a local ham radio operator that anyone knew it was coming in. The control tower was not manned since it was a Sunday, and the plane could presumably have landed before anyone could have got out to the airport. As it was there was still time for the Airport Manager, Mr. Gerald Cheek, and a contingent of armed marines, to drive out to the airport before the plane landed). The incident certainly demonstrated the relative ease with which unannounced military aircraft could land at Stanley ...”*⁵⁹⁶

*“Ricupero cited the recent surprise landing of an Argentine air force Hercules at Stanley and surmised that despite what Costa Mendez had told his own Ministers, this might indicate the sort of additional pressure which the Argentines might feel tempted to use.”*⁵⁹⁷

“With hindsight, Dick Baker saw the flight and the landing as either a spying mission or a rehearsal for an Entebbe-style raid. It was a quiet Sunday afternoon and the pilot had radioed Stanley claiming his Hercules,

593 Barker 1997

594 Quoted in *Daily Telegraph* 21.2.2013

595 Livingstone 2018

596 *ALW 040/325/1 Part C 101*. Hickson minute following duty call to the Island dated 19th March 1982

597 *PREM 19/657 Telegram No.42 of 11 March 1982*. This telegram details a conversation in Brasilia between Ambassador George Harding and the Head of the Brazilian America's Department.

supposedly on a routine mail dropping flight to an Antarctic base, was leaking fuel. He needed to land immediately. When Vice Comodoro Hector Gilobert disturbed the Baker household asking for permission, Dick did not refuse it, but decided he would drive to Stanley Airport to have a look at the aircraft. Dick watched with growing concern as a few dozen obviously senior officers disembarked. They were not the sort of men to go on supply flights, but they were the kind of invasion planners who would love to have a good look around Stanley. The Chief Secretary smelt a rat and the stench became stronger when one of the airport's technical staff told him that there was no firm evidence of a fuel leak.”⁵⁹⁸

In Mendoza, Alejandro Orfila, Argentine President of the Organization of American States (OAS), makes a statement; *“It will not be long before that corner of national territory flies the flag of the Fatherland.”*⁵⁹⁹

March 8th, in London, PM Margaret Thatcher asks the FCO and MoD to prepare for an Argentine blockade or invasion. HMS *Endurance* is instructed to remain 'on station' at the Falklands. Governor Hunt increases security at the Islands' airport. In the midst of these preparations, Lord Carington telegrams Governor Rex Hunt asking him to discern the views of local Councillors to a resumption of negotiations with Argentina.⁶⁰⁰

In Buenos Aires, Assistant US Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs, Thomas Enders, holds meetings with Foreign Affairs Minister Costa Mendez and Under-Secretary Ros. During these he raises the question of the Falklands negotiations.

*“We were contacted by the British government prior to my trip. They raised their fears about the unproductive character of these talks, and that they might be broken off. I raised that fear with the foreign minister of Argentina, saying that the United States did not intend to change its historic view – which was not to take a position, one way or the other, on the territorial dispute. We wanted countries with which we had friendly relations to solve that problem, but we were concerned that the talks appeared to be headed nowhere. Costa Mendez did not commit himself, although he was not negative.... He said they were ‘working on it’ and they ‘hoped to have something.’...”*⁶⁰¹

*“Ros presented a picture of British intransigence. The GOA has long been willing to accord the Islanders every kind of special status to safeguard their way of life, he said. However, the GOA insists that the British recognize Argentine sovereignty in the Malvinas and their dependencies. When Enders observed that HMG's position does not seem to be based on economic or strategic concerns but on its belief that the wishes of the Islanders must be respected, Ros said that UN decision on the Island clearly set aside the concept of self-determination for the Islanders. Ros said with emphasis that ‘the United Nations did not give the Islanders the right of veto.’ Ros stated that at the recent bilateral talks with the British, the GOA had proposed the establishment of a permanent high-level commission in London and Buenos Aires to seek out a solution. The GOA is now waiting for the British answer. Ros stated that his government is under increasing pressure from various sources to solve the Malvinas problem. Now the government is trying to see if the British are really interested in resolving the issue or instead are just looking for ways to procrastinate. Argentina is willing to do its utmost to find a negotiated solution but a solution cannot be delayed indefinitely, Ros stated.”*⁶⁰²

March 9th, in Argentina, the plan for an invasion of the islands nears completion.

598 Bound 2007

599 Cardoso, Kirschboom & van der Kooy 1983 p.51. Orfila would later deny any pre-knowledge of the *Junta's* plans.

600 PREM 19/657 Telegram No.30 of 8 March 1982

601 Thomas O. Enders interviewed in Charlton 1989 p.165. This 'historic' view had only become policy after 1945.

602 Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D820137-0228

*“The basic landing plan was ready by the third week in February and was presented to the junta on 9 March. The junta accepted it and forwarded it to Admiral Suárez del Cerro...”*⁶⁰³

*“... a plan was drawn up which envisaged: the landing in the Falklands ... the establishment of an Argentine government, and the immediate withdrawal of the troops involved, with the exception of the troops indispensable for maintaining security and control over malvinense territory. In addition, it was determined that, in order for the plan to succeed, it was necessary to meet two requirements: to act with "tactical surprise," that is to say, to disembark without prior warning and, if possible, without bloodshed; and to act under the greatest "strategic secrecy" to prevent England from having the opportunity to strengthen its reduced strength – of 40 Marines – on the islands. Once the military operation – which in the end only contemplated the landing of military forces in the Falklands – had been carried out, the stage of diplomatic negotiations with Great Britain would come. They would seek to convince the British government of the 'fait accompli,' offering concessions ranging from compensation to the Islanders and commercial companies, to offers of economic cooperation with British companies that would like to exploit with Argentina the oil from the Southern Basin or the Krill fishery. In addition, it was intended to involve the United States in the negotiation, to convince Britain that there was no 'reverse' and that they should accept the new situation in the South Atlantic as it was.”*⁶⁰⁴

March 10th, in Buenos Aires, the British Embassy receive a message from Davidoff to say that he is sending a party of 41 workers to South Georgia to dismantle the derelict whaling station at Leith, and that an Argentine naval support vessel, *Bahia Buen Suceso* has been chartered for the operation. Embassy staff try to contact Davidoff in order to remind him of his obligations, but are unable to locate him.

March 11th, Davidoff's lawyers are warned, by the British Embassy, that there will be consequences should he not comply with the landing restrictions. *Christian Salvesen* confirm that they are aware of Davidoff's plans, and that his contract has been extended to March 31st, 1984.

Bahia Buen Suceso sails for South Georgia from Buenos Aires, under the command of Captain Oswaldo Miello.

*“The ship carried Davidoff's equipment and the forty-one civilian workers of his party; it also carried some general cargo for delivery to the Argentine port of Ushuaia... Sr Davidoff was not on board the Bahia Buen Suceso when it sailed from Buenos Aires; one of his engineers would be in charge of the dismantling crew.”*⁶⁰⁵

Argentine military aircraft overfly South Georgia.

*“The Argentines are considering a wide range of options for 'unilateral action', according to sources in Buenos Aires, These include initiatives in the UN, a break of diplomatic relations and, in the final analysis, an invasion of the islands.”*⁶⁰⁶

In London, intelligence reports indicate that Admiral Anaya is behind the more belligerent press reports.

*“The military planning was, with the Falklands in Argentine hands, to invade the disputed islands in the Beagle Channel. That was the determination of the navy...”*⁶⁰⁷

603 Middlebrook 2003

604 Carbone 2008

605 *Ibid.*

606 *Latin American Weekly Report* March 12, 1982

607 *Memorias Políticas* Oscar Camilion 1999

March 16th, South Georgia's Magistrate leaves a prominent notice at the old whaling station at Leith. ⁶⁰⁸

'British Antarctic Survey... Leith Field Station... Unauthorised Entry Prohibited.'

March 18th, the US Embassy in London reports to Washington.

"FCO South America Department Head Robin Fearn has told us that the negotiations over the Falkland Islands are in real danger of breaking down. At the recent meeting in New York, he said, the Argentine delegation was "clearly uninterested" in discussing anything other than the early transfer of sovereignty. ... HMG is anxious to keep the negotiations going, fearing that Argentina might otherwise feel impelled to attempt a military solution. The British remain convinced of the legality of their position and the issue is an emotional one in Parliament, particularly in the House of Lords. Fearn fears that talks may be broken off if the Argentines refuse to take a more flexible approach. Should negotiations break down, HMG is considering the feasibility of bringing the question before the United Nations. The British believe they would stand a good chance of winning there, given the Argentine record on human rights, the UK's recent successes in decolonization (Zimbabwe and Belize), and the contrast between British democracy and the Argentine Junta. HMG would prefer, however, to avoid such a course if at all possible." ⁶⁰⁹

"In March 1982, in the light of the growing Argentine pressure, the Buenos Aires Embassy suggested that it might be worth offering to submit the Falklands to the (ICJ) 'as a last resort if things really turn nasty.' If the offer was refused, which was quite likely given the Argentine attitude, then Britain would have gained moral support; if accepted then the whole matter would be put on ice for a considerable period... In March the FCO saw insufficient merit in adopting this strategy, ..." ⁶¹⁰

March 19th, at South Georgia, *Bahia Buen Suceso* sails directly into Leith Harbour, bypassing Grytviken in defiance of British instructions to Davidoff. A large party of both civilian and uniformed personnel are observed to land; shots are fired, and the Argentine flag raised.

"The workers at Leith raised an Argentine flag, in a ceremony without much pomp. According to military sources, this act had previously been agreed by Davidoff with the Navy." ⁶¹¹

"... I was deeply concerned at the way this happened. Nevertheless, I was informed that, quite clearly, he had this contractual arrangement, it seemed to me that the problem really lay in the fact that he was there without clearance from our Embassy in Buenos Aires. The important thing therefore was for him to get his papers in order. My concern was to smooth this one over.... The advice from our Ambassador was "Look, I think we can see a way through this one, because all we need to do is to try and legitimize his papers..." Clearly Governor Hunt was concerned about the position, and saw it from a slightly different viewpoint..." ⁶¹²

608 Freedman 2005 vol.1 p.149

609 *Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D820146-0021*

610 *Official History of the Falklands Campaign, Volume 2: War and Diplomacy* Lawrence Freedman 2005. There is some evidence that an offer to take the issue to the International Court of Justice (ICJ) was taken by US Secretary Haig to General Galtieri in April, 1982. See April 29, 1982 for Haig's comments.

611 Cardoso, Kirschboom & van der Kooy 1983 p.67. Middlebrook (2003) gives the date of arrival as March 16, 1982. Carbone (2008) as March 20. Meneghini (2015) suggests that the shots were fired by a party from a French yacht, hunting deer, but, in support, erroneously quotes a message of the 17th. There are a few references to a 40' French yacht, *Cinq Gars Pour*, having arrived at Grytviken on, or around, the 14th. Damaged in a storm, the crew of three (Serge Briez, Olivier Gouon and Michel Roger) sought assistance from the BAS and hunted deer for their food supplies.

612 Richard Luce interviewed in Charlton 1989 p.184

Following an exchange of messages between the Falkland islands and London, instructions are sent to Grytviken requesting that the Magistrate, Peter Witty, demand that the Argentine commander lower his country's flag.

In London, Argentina's Minister is summoned and told that the incident is regarded as serious. He is also told that if the *Bahia Buen Suceso* does not leave forthwith, the UK will take whatever action it deems necessary.

March 20th, following the receipt of further instructions from London, two BAS staff on South Georgia deliver a message from Governor Hunt to the Captain of the *Bahia Buen Suceso*.

“You have landed illegally at Leith without obtaining clearance. You and your party must go back on board the Bahia Buen Suceso immediately and report to the base commander Grytviken for further instructions. You must remove the Argentine flag from Leith. You must not interfere with the British Antarctic Survey depot at Leith. You must not alter or deface the notices at Leith. No military personnel are allowed to land on South Georgia. No firearms are to be taken ashore.”

Argentina's flag is lowered 15 minutes later, but Leith's Customs House is found to have been broken into.

From Buenos Aires, Ambassador Williams telegrams London. ⁶¹³

“I suggest that great restraint be used at least until it is clear whether this is a deliberate challenge authorised at high level, or just a piece of low level bravura combined with Davidoff's well-known fecklessness.”

HMS *Endurance* is ordered to sail immediately with a combined detachment of marines. ⁶¹⁴

“The prompt dispatch of Endurance did not accord with the Argentine strategy. Buenos Aires was at this stage unprepared both militarily and diplomatically for a sudden escalation in the Falklands dispute. Yet Argentine citizens were ashore on territory which Argentina claimed as her own. The British were demanding the formal acknowledgement of sovereignty through the obtaining of permits, on pain of removal by force. This would constitute a conspicuous loss of face for Buenos Aires. ... The South Georgia incident had come at least six months too soon ... Endurance ... should have been safely back in Britain before any invasion.” ⁶¹⁵

March 21st, in Stanley, Captain Adolfo Gaffoglio, the LADE representative, informs Buenos Aires of the departure of *Endurance*. He also reports that his office has been broken into and the Argentine flag covered over with a Union Jack. “*Tit for tat you buggers,*” is written on the desk in toothpaste, and “*UK OK*” on the office windows.

“There was frustration in Stanley and relations with the few Argentines living there became fraught. The LADE air service was continuing, but on the night of Saturday 20th a few local youths, fuelled with bravado and beer from the dance, broke into Vice Comodoro Gilbert's office ... It was relatively harmless stuff, but Vice Comodoro Gamin, who had just replaced Hector Gilbert, was worried. The LADE Fokkers never scheduled overnight stops at Stanley, but on this occasion one of the aircraft had developed a fault and needed to remain on the tarmac. He insisted that Gary Noott's Marines guard it around the clock. This was not too much bother to Noott, as, unknown to Gamin, the Marines had been staking out the airport.” ⁶¹⁶

613 PREM 19/613.

614 PREM19/613 f53. Its own marines plus Naval Party (NP) 8901 amounting to 22 Royal Marines.

615 Hastings & Jenkins 1997 p.70

616 Bound 2007

*“We had been on a shorter state of alert for a couple of weeks. For a few days before the invasion we had a section [about seven men] in the airport terminal building every night. A few guys kept watch while the rest of us slept and were ready to move at very short notice.”*⁶¹⁷

In Buenos Aires, Costa Mendez tells Williams that the *Bahia Buen Suceso* is not in South Georgia officially; that it has no military personnel on board and that the ship will depart that day. He expresses the hope that the significance of the affair will not be exaggerated. Ambassador Williams makes it clear; “... *that if the party left without regularising their conduct at Gryviken they would have made an illegal landing and be liable to arrest.*”⁶¹⁸

In London, the Foreign Office informs Argentina's *charge d'affairs* that the British Government accept the explanations provided by Minister Mendez, and trust that the ship will depart with the landing party.

A British Antarctic Survey observation point is established overlooking Stromness Bay. At Leith, the *Bahia Buen Suceso* sails away early evening; but some personnel are seen to remain.

*“Contrary to some accounts, she did not take any of the scrap-metal workers with her; they were all left at Leith. The ship set course for Ushuaia, her captain and crew unaware of the intense diplomatic activity caused by the visit.”*⁶¹⁹

March 22nd, staff at Grytviken report to Stanley, which passes the information on to London.

*“Base Commander has confirmed presence of at least six Argentines still ashore at Leith... In addition to launch ... they had also seen a landing craft ... they also observed a vehicle with a mechanical arm on the jetty...”*⁶²⁰

Lord Buxton, visiting Stanley, telegrams the FCO in London; *“It has been naïve to regard Davidoff as a casual scrap dealer and it is abundantly clear that every move has been carefully researched, planned and timed throughout... If our reaction is placatory and is not firm and final this time I predict that more unopposed illegal landings will follow ... British reactions are being tested.”*⁶²¹

HMS *Endurance*, en-route to South Georgia, receives orders from London to remove any trespassers. Captain Barker's instructions clearly state that he is not to use force however and, if resisted, should withdraw and seek fresh instructions.

*“Ministers have agreed that HMS Endurance should continue to South Georgia in order to remove the remaining Argentines. The continued Argentine presence at Leith, ... leaves us no option but to take this action. ... It is hoped that the political consequences, with careful handling on both sides, can continue to be minimised. But it should be quite clear that this situation has not been of our seeking. It has been Davidoff's irresponsible action and the apparent inability of the Argentine Government to take the necessary remedial action which has brought it about.”*⁶²²

From Buenos Aires, Ambassador Williams also telegrams the FCO, urging; *“... no forceful action be taken which would irritate public opinion in Argentina.”*⁶²³

617 Acting-Sergeant Geordie Gill quoted in Bound 2007

618 PREM 19/657 Telegram No. 85 of 21 March 1982

619 Middlebrook 2003

620 ALW 040/325/12 Part A 1 – 100 Telegram No. 45 of 22 March Rex Hunt to FCO. In fact there were 39 still onshore.

621 Quoted in Freedman 2005 vol.1 p.154

622 Quoted in Cardoso, Kirschboom & van der Kooy 1983 p.71

623 Freedman & Gamba-Stonehouse 1990

*“The Argentines ... appreciate the gravity of the hoisting of the Argentine flag, but say that they have just received reports that there has been a parallel insult to the Argentine flag at the LADE office in Stanley.”*⁶²⁴

Capt. Barker reports that overheard radio traffic indicates collusion between Davidoff and the Argentine Navy.

*“The naval headquarters in Buenos Aires had congratulated the Bahia Buen Suceso on a successful operation and directed her to return to Buenos Aires as soon as possible.”*⁶²⁵

March 23rd, in Buenos Aires, Britain’s Ambassador Williams copies *Endurance*'s orders to Argentina's Foreign Ministry. On receipt Costa Mendez expresses surprise that the British are proceeding so rapidly to such very grave action, without exhausting the diplomatic options. He gives a warning that, if the action to remove the party on South Georgia is not postponed, those like himself, who are trying to deal with the dispute in a moderate way, will lose control of events. Mendez threatens that harsh action will precipitate a harsh response, and that perhaps the men should be removed by an Argentine vessel in order to take some heat out of the situation.⁶²⁶

Williams, conveying this to the FCO, adds that he considers the events at South Georgia as *“trivial and low-level misbehaviour.”* The Foreign Office respond; *“Our intention is to conduct this operation correctly, peacefully and in as low a key as possible. We hope that the Argentine Government will, if they are able to do so, advise the Argentine workmen at Leith to co-operate. ... any lesser action than we are now taking would not be defensible to public and parliamentary opinion.”*

In Britain, a statement is made to Parliament.

“We were informed on 20 March by the Commander of the British Antarctic Survey based at Grytviken on South Georgia that a party of Argentines had landed at Leith nearby. The Base Commander informed the Argentine party that its presence was illegal as it had not obtained his prior authority for the landing. We immediately took the matter up with the Argentine authorities in Buenos Aires and the Argentine Embassy in London and, following our approach, the ship and most of the personnel left... However, the base Commander has reported that a small number of men and some equipment remain. We are therefore making arrangements to ensure their early departure.”

There is uproar in the House of Commons; *“... if she [Mrs Thatcher] doesn't get the Argentines out by next week there will be a major disturbance.”*⁶²⁷

HMS *Endurance* is ordered to 'hold' off Grytviken.

“In view of continued diplomatic activity at ministerial level aimed at allowing Argentine authorities an opportunity to remove party and equipment by Argentine vessel, HMS Endurance should proceed to Grytviken and await further instructions.

*Pending these instructions, HMS Endurance should not, repeat not, enter nor conduct any Naval operations in the vicinity of Leith harbour.”*⁶²⁸

624 PREM 19/657 Telegram No. 82 of 22 March 1982

625 Franks Report 1983 para.175

626 *Ibid* para. 182

627 *Diaries: Into Politics* Alan Clark 2000 p.306.

628 Quoted in Barker 1997

From London, Lord Carington sends a message to Costa Méndez.

*“... it is now essential for the Argentine personnel that still remains in South Georgia to be evacuated promptly. If the Argentine Government can order the immediate return of the Bahia Buen Suceso to Leith Harbour to carry out this action, the use of HMS Endurance will not be necessary. If this is not done, we would have no alternative but to proceed. ...”*⁶²⁹

Argentina's Navy Command orders the ice-breaker *Bahia Paraiso* to take its marines as quickly as possible to Leith to protect the Argentine workers there.

*“In view of this, the Superior Command of the Armed Forces decided that another vessel – the ARA Bahía Paraiso – which at that time “coincidentally” was on the Orkney Islands completing a phase of Antarctic planning, would immediately be highlighted to the Georgias to disembark the “Alpha Group”, a curious name given that the operation of the same name had been abandoned. This group of “elite troops” of the Navy, with Lt. Alfredo Astiz at the head, had the objective of taking positions in the whaling facilities and protecting the Argentine workers from any future action by British forces. Apparently, given the seriousness of the situation, the Junta considered activating the plan that had been prepared at the beginning of the year...”*⁶³⁰

Vice-Admiral Juan Lombardo is; *“... directed by the junta to accelerate planning so that an invasion force could launch within 48-72 hours of notification.”*⁶³¹

*“They did not think that there would be a military reaction by the British.”*⁶³²

*“I immediately ordered an increase in my staff, and we worked all through that night and very hard in the next two days. We gave an answer to the junta on the 25th; I think that Admiral Lombardo went to Buenos Aires and told them that the decision was that it would be possible to land on the Malvinas on the 1st of April.”*⁶³³

From Buenos Aires, a message is sent by the US Embassy to the US State Department in Washington, reporting a conversation between the Argentine Foreign Ministry and the US Ambassador.

*“During a meeting March 23, the Foreign Minister and Under Secretary Ros at their initiative briefed the Ambassador on the Argentine version of this affair. They said a local entrepreneur had entered into a contract in London to take the scrap from the whale ‘factory’. He then hired a crew of workmen (four they thought) and bought passage for them on the ‘Bahia Buen Suceso’ which deposited them in Leith. Ros emphasized that the ship regularly plies those waters, is unarmed and crewed entirely by civilians. ... HMG protested because permission was not sought to land the workmen. As indicated in the press, the ship has departed; but, contrary to the impression left by the press accounts, the workmen are still there, according to Ros. He was unable to say how long they might remain, that presumably depending on the time required to finish the scrap job and on when the ship might come around again. It would seem, at least, that the incident may not be closed.”*⁶³⁴

629 Quoted in Freedman 2005 vol.1 p.157

630 Carbone 2008

631 *The 1982 Falklands-Malvinas Case Study* Douglas N. Hime 2010

632 Vice-Admiral Lombardo quoted in Middlebrook 2003

633 Rear-Admiral Büsser quoted in Middlebrook 2003

634 *Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D820154-0489*

March 24th, intelligence reports suggest that the forced removal of the workforce at Leith will be used by the junta as a pretext for military action. Either at South Georgia, or against the Falkland Islands. Lord Carrington, writes to the Prime Minister; “... *the situation on the dispute has developed to a point where we now face the prospect of an early confrontation with Argentina.*”⁶³⁵

In London, a House of Commons *motion* signed by 91 MPs calls for a tough line to be taken with Argentina.

A further telegram from the US Embassy in Buenos Aires, is transmitted to Washington.

*“... we doubt that an attempt at a "military solution" will be made any time soon. Foreign Minister Costa Méndez and others in the GOA are looking for ways to enlist U.S. support for the Argentine cause. This issue is likely to complicate Argentine-U.S. relations...”*⁶³⁶

Endurance arrives off Grytviken, where Capt. Barker liaises with the Base Commander.

March 25th, during the night, *Bahia Paraiso* arrives at Leith.⁶³⁷ *Teniente de navio* Alfredo Astiz and ten Marines disembark, together with a few sailors.⁶³⁸ Three landing craft and a military helicopter are seen by the BAS observation team; shortly after joined by Barker.

*“Tony Ellerbeck flew me to the top of one of the mountains and we landed at 3000 feet on a narrow section of flat ground with excellent binocular vision over Leith Bay... all we could do was to sit and watch. We noted the continuing disembarkation of stores from the Bahia Paraiso and it was clear to us that the operation had been long pre-planned.”*⁶³⁹

In Buenos Aires, Dr. Méndez suggests to Britain's Ambassador that the impasse could be broken if it is agreed that the workers at Leith now comply with the landing formalities – by going to Grytviken and having their 'white cards' stamped. Then returning to work on the whaling stations. Informed of this proposal, Lord Carrington's responds that; “*only passports will do.*” This is passed on to the junta.

*“A series of progressive demands culminated in the imposition that the Argentine workers of the Davidoff company – who were on land that we consider under a sovereignty dispute – should seal their passports at Grytviken, as if they were entering a foreign territory...”*⁶⁴⁰

*“Britain's escalation of the dispute – especially its demand about passports – came as a complete surprise ... There was unanimous agreement that we could not permit it.”*⁶⁴¹

Well informed, America's Embassy in Buenos Aires reports promptly to Washington.

*“It appears likely that the Argentine Navy will in fact act if the Endurance attempts to remove the working party.”*⁶⁴²

635 ALW 040/325/1 Part C 101

636 Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D820157–0409

637 Middlebrook (2003). Barker (1997) gives the vessels arrival as the 22nd.

638 Astiz had a reputation for violence, having earned the nickname of the *Blonde Angel of Death* due to his angelic features. He was implicated in the 1977 kidnapping of 12 human rights activists, including two French nuns; none of who were ever seen again. *cf.* 1982

639 Barker 1997

640 President Galtieri in *La Nueva Provincia* November 28, 1985

641 Interview with Larni Dozo quoted in Welch 2005

642 Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D820160–0043

March 26th, *Bahia Paraiso* is observed to sail away from Leith.

“Argentine party are still ashore at Leith. Although only two people were actually sighted this morning, smoke was emerging from several buildings and 2 boats were still alongside jetty. 65 blue drums had been stacked at inshore end of jetty. A large quantity of stores and equipment was visible, even dead reindeer. Consider shore party were working late into evening yesterday disembarking stores from Bahia Paraiso and are now established for a long stay at Leith. It is clear that this operation had been preplanned for some time as Bahia Paraiso came from Antarctic...”

Governor Hunt telegrams London regarding the authentication of the scrap metal workers' white cards.

*“... I am more than ever convinced that this whole exercise was carefully planned ... Proper documentation does not (repeat not) mean stamping of white cards. I am instructing the base commander to ask for passports and, if produced, to stamp them in the normal way with an entry permit...”*⁶⁴³

*“Now the British assert that the 1971 treaty does not extend to South Georgia, although it had always been understood that the dependencies of the Falklands were included. (I can confirm that this was also Ambassador Williams's understanding until yesterday.)”*⁶⁴⁴

Researcher's Comment: The agreement of 1971 made no mention of South Georgia, so how it could have been 'understood' to have applied to that island? When it came to contracts, treaties and formal agreements, the words used are important. Britain had never considered that the 'white card scheme' applied to its uninhabited dependencies.

A new Royal Marine attachment arrives at Stanley to relieve the garrison there.

*“Defence was the responsibility of the small Royal Marines detachment, NP 8901.”*⁶⁴⁵

In Buenos Aires, the junta meet to hear Admiral Lombardo. He informs them that an invasion force can be ready between April 1st and the 3rd, 1982. They are then addressed by Argentina's Foreign Minister.

*“Costa Mendez's view was that, from 1956, Britain's behaviour was always to deal, but not on the basis of force. Rhodesia was the most recent example. There Britain had abandoned 600,000 British subjects. The sum of perceptions led to the conclusion that Britain would not respond with force. ... How could we doubt his judgement?”*⁶⁴⁶

On hearing that a British submarine has been observed leaving Gibraltar, the junta agree to bring forward its invasion plans.⁶⁴⁷

*“We interpreted the sailing of an SSN from Gibraltar on 26th March as coming south and that the Brits would keep one on station indefinitely thereafter, so ... we had about twelve days in which to fix it.”*⁶⁴⁸

643 PREM 19/613

644 Shlaudeman to State Department March 26, 1982 in Dept. of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D820162-0574.

645 *Official History of the Falklands Campaign, Volume 2: War and Diplomacy* L. Freedman 2005 vol.2. Bad timing from Argentina's perspective.

646 Interview with Admiral Jorge Anaya, quoted in Welch 2005 p.87

647 Hastings & Jenkins 1997.

648 Admiral Jorge Anaya in an interview with Hugh Scully quoted in *The Falklands War* Andrew Dorman, Michael Kandiah & Gillian Staerck (eds) 2005 p.20. In Charlton (1989 p.187) it is suggested that news of the submarine's departure was published in the *Daily Express*. However, this particular submarine was actually headed north. No decision to despatch a submarine to the Falklands was made until March 29, 1982.

*“... that is what (Admiral) Anaya describes as a ‘war-starter.’ That announcement turned out to be false. But based on that announcement he decided to execute a contingency plan... He decided to advance it because, if he did not, he would never be able to do it.”*⁶⁴⁹

After the junta meeting, Dr. Costa Méndez makes a public statement.

“... a firm decision has been taken to give the men on South Georgia all necessary diplomatic protection... nor is this protection diplomatic only, since there is a navy ship called Bahia Paraiso in the area to provide any necessary protection.”

From Buenos Aires, US Ambassador Shlaudeman informs Washington; *“...it would appear from here that the Endurance is the key to the problem of the moment. If the ship moves in to take off the workmen, there will surely be trouble. If it stays where it is, the impasse and the tensions accompanying it will continue.”*⁶⁵⁰

Argentina’s naval planning committee informs the junta that their forces can be ready to sail on the 28th.⁶⁵¹

March 27th, backtracking on his previously held views, Britain’s Ambassador Williams reports his fears that Costa Méndez has been less than honest with him; that Argentina had been *“playing us along”* and that the *Bahia Paraiso* had armed marines on board.

*“I cannot, however, discount the possibility that any action on our part to disrupt the Argentine working party at Leith will be taken as a trigger for armed action by the Argentines.”*⁶⁵²

*“Anthony Williams and Whitehall making ‘Tut! Tut!’ noises is not impressing the Argentines. Rex Hunt and a few others taking a good firm stand. C-in-C (Fleet) is sailing some ships in support. In my view some Buccaneers are required.”*⁶⁵³

From Buenos Aires, Britain’s *defence attaché*, Stephen Love, reports a number of ships, and a submarine, leaving the Rio de la Plata.⁶⁵⁴

In London, PM Thatcher considers again the prospect of taking the question of the Falklands to the ICJ; *“... if we win or if we lose, at least we know where we are.”*⁶⁵⁵

March 28th, from The Foreign Office in London, Lord Carington telegrams US Secretary Alexander Haig. To update Washington as to the situation in the South Atlantic.

“I should accordingly be grateful, if you would consider taking the matter up with the Argentines. Stressing the need to defuse the situation and find a solution we can all accept. ... I fear the gravest consequences.”

*“To his astonishment, he received a message from Haig’s deputy, Walter Stoessel, pointing out that both Britain and Argentina were ‘good friends’ of the USA and counselling caution. America’s Ambassador ... would nevertheless see what he could do. ... Carington hit the roof.”*⁶⁵⁶

649 US Admiral Harry Train in Charlton 1989 p.116. Train interviewed Admiral Anaya immediately after the 1982 conflict.

650 *Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D820162–0574*

651 From an interview with Rear-Admiral Carlos Busser in Charlton 1989 p.115

652 Franks 1983 para.207. *PREM 19/613 Telegram Nos.110 & 113 of 27 March 1982*

653 From Capt. Barker’s *Endurance* diary in Barker 1997

654 Barker suspected that Love’s sources were local Argentine newspapers; and the information old or simply inaccurate.

655 Freedman 2005 vol.1 p.164

656 Hastings & Jenkins 1997 p.82

Furious with the equivocal response, Lord Carington summons the US *charge d'affairs*, Edward Streater.

*“(The UK had) supported American policy in Sinai, had supported it in El Salvador; that this support had not been particularly willing, not wholly consistent with our own better judgement, but we had given it; and now we expected a better response than this not very friendly message, equating our case and position with that of Argentina.”*⁶⁵⁷

In Argentina, all leave for military personnel and diplomatic staff is cancelled. Argentina's Embassies around the world are told to await new instructions.

*“There were no major setbacks, and the troops started loading in the ships at Puerto Belgrano at 8.00am on Sunday 28 March. Secrecy had been well maintained. ... The Argentine newspapers announced that a joint anti-submarine exercise was to be carried out with the Uruguayan Navy.”*⁶⁵⁸

In Buenos Aires, Ambassador Williams receives a statement from the Argentine Foreign Ministry.

“The activities of the group of workers disembarked at Leith are of a private and peaceful character based on the undisputed fact that they were known in advance by Her Britannic Majesty's Government and in any case on the fact that they are being carried out on territory subject to the special regime agreed in 1971 between the Argentine and Great Britain. It is moreover within Your Excellency's knowledge that these territories are considered by the Argentine Republic as her own and that the sovereignty dispute about them had been recognised by the United Nations in its relevant Resolutions.

Your Excellency's Government has accepted the existence of the sovereignty dispute. However the British Government has reacted in terms which constitute a virtual ultimatum backed by the threat of military action in the form of the despatch of the naval warship Endurance and a requirement for the peremptorily immediate evacuation of the Argentine workers from the Island. ...

*In light of this attitude my Government can only adopt those measures which prudence and its rights demand, in this context the Argentine workers in South Georgia must remain there since they have been given the necessary documentation to do so. ... the present situation is the direct result of the persistent lack of recognition by the United Kingdom of the titles to sovereignty which my country has over the Malvinas, South Georgia and the South Sandwich Islands. This is confirmed by the negative attitude of your Excellency's Government throughout many years of negotiations”*⁶⁵⁹

Williams reports to London and Stanley that Costa Méndez insists that South Georgia was included in the *white card* scheme arrangements. On receiving his copy of the Argentine message, Governor Hunt telegrams London.

“The 1971 Communications Agreement does not apply to the Dependencies ... (and) ... does not absolve the holder of the requirement to present himself to an immigration officer at a recognised port of entry ... I am appalled at the arrogance of the message which confirms my previous fears that the Argentine Government are using Davidoff as a front to assert with a physical presence their sovereignty claim over South Georgia.”

Elements of the Argentine fleet sail from Puerto Belgrano, including a tank landing ship, *Cabo San Antonio*, and a troop carrier, *Islas de los Estados*. Intelligence indicates that the Argentine submarine, *Santa Fé*, is making a reconnaissance of the beaches near Stanley.

Bahia Paraiso is observed holding station, 15 miles off the north coast of South Georgia.

657 Quoted in Freedman & Gamba-Stonehouse 1990

658 Middlebrook 2003

659 PREM 19/657 Telegram No.116 of 28 March 1982

*“Those of us who knew where we were going were very proud. We felt very lucky that we had been chosen and extraordinarily fortunate to have the opportunity to regain the Malvinas... April was a lovely month that year.”*⁶⁶⁰

March 29th, Margaret Thatcher and Lord Carington fly to Brussels for a meeting.

*“By the time their plane landed at Brussels, they had agreed that three nuclear submarines should be sent south immediately. John Nott at the MoD was telephoned from the airport and instructed accordingly. Considering the abuse heaped on British ministers and their cabinet staffs in the prelude to the Falklands invasion, it is worth pointing out that a submarine force was ordered to sea within two and a half days of the junta's probable decision to proceed with an early invasion.”*⁶⁶¹

HMS *Spartan*, a nuclear powered submarine, is directed to embark stores and weapons at Gibraltar. The support vessel, RFA *Fort Austin*, is ordered to sail from Gibraltar to resupply HMS *Endurance*. First Sea Lord Sir Henry Leach and his senior staff meet at the Ministry of Defence; after which Defence Secretary John Nott advises the Prime Minister that it will take a week to ready a “viable” naval force, then three more weeks to get them to the Islands; although a group of seven destroyers and frigates, on *Exercise Spring Train* in the mid-Atlantic, could be off the Falklands within two weeks.

In Buenos Aires, newspapers refer to the cancellation of all military leave, and report that five Argentine warships are heading towards South Georgia.

Ambassador Williams writes to the Foreign Office in London.

“I am receiving gestures of sympathy ... but I fear that in general, the Argentine Government will not only gain in popularity by playing the jingoist drum, but be accepted as doing the right thing in taking even the most extreme measures.”

Out in the Atlantic, Commander-in-Chief Fleet, Sir John Fieldhouse, observing *Exercise Spring Train* from HMS *Glamorgan*, is notified of events. Fieldhouse summons the flag officer in charge of the exercise, Rear Admiral Woodward, to a conference before flying by helicopter to Gibraltar, and then on to London.

From Buenos Aires, US Ambassador Shlaudeman reports to the State Department in Washington.

*“British Ambassador Williams called on me this morning... Williams is now persuaded that the Argentine military have stage-managed this entire incident as a means of pressing the British for accelerated negotiations on the Falklands/Malvinas without revealing their full intentions to the Foreign Ministry. One particular piece of evidence in this regard is the fact that the Bahia Paraiso has been unloading equipment at Leith Harbor. Costa Méndez told Williams initially that the ship had been sent there suddenly to watch over the working party and perhaps to evacuate them.”*⁶⁶²

At sea, Argentina's fleet encounters bad weather requiring a change in tactics.

*“The intention was to sail down the coast of Argentina until well past the Falklands and then approach the islands from the south, but a fierce storm which blew up on... Monday the 29th – lasted for forty-eight hours and spoiled that plan.”*⁶⁶³

660 Rear-Admiral Büsser quoted in Middlebrook 2003

661 Hastings & Jenkins 1997 p.76

662 Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D820165–0179

663 Middlebrook 2003

March 30th, in Britain's Parliament, Richard Luce announces that *Endurance* is to remain 'on station' for as long as necessary. Luce adds cryptically; *"The question of security in the Falklands area is being reviewed. Although the House will understand that I prefer to say nothing in public about our precautionary measures."*

From the opposition benches, James Callaghan reveals his deployment of a covert force to the South Atlantic in 1977.

*"... is the Minister aware that there have been other recent occasions when the Argentinians, when beset by internal troubles, have tried the same type of tactical diversion? Is the Minister aware that on a very recent occasion, of which I have full knowledge, Britain assembled ships which had been stationed in the Caribbean, Gibraltar and in the Mediterranean, and stood then about 400 miles off the Falklands in support of HMS "Endurance", and that when this fact became known, without fuss and publicity, a diplomatic solution followed? ..."*⁶⁶⁴

After an *in-camera* meeting of the Conservative back-bench committee, at which Luce refused to confirm anything, news leaks that a submarine force is heading south. Immediately broadcast by the *International Television News (ITN)* service.

*"The information was flashed to Buenos Aires where it confirmed rumours already current ... Britain's Parliament, ... had turned a covert deterrent to invasion into a public invitation to one."*⁶⁶⁵

Four more Argentine warships are reported sailing from Puerto Belgrano.

Unaware of what is happening, a large demonstration in Buenos Aires' Plaza de Mayo demands a return to democracy. Similar protests take place in other Argentine cities.

*"On the 30th, a protest was held that concentrated thousands of demonstrators in all the major cities of the country. And the government prepared to receive them: Plaza de Mayo was surrounded by patrol boats, fire trucks, police on horseback, assault cars and even helicopters. The restriction on access to the square provoked clashes between demonstrators and security forces, as happened in Pueyrredón Bridge – where a large column of workers was intercepted and repressed-courts and the port of Buenos Aires. Similar situations occurred in cities of the interior where there were acts: Mendoza, Rosario, Tucumán, Córdoba and Mar del Plata. The day of protest left more than a thousand detainees (including many union representatives), wounded and one dead in Mendoza."*⁶⁶⁶

From London, Britain's Foreign Office telegram Argentina's Foreign Ministry in Buenos Aires.

*"The potentially dangerous position which has now developed has in no way been of our seeking. ... A confrontation, which could have far-reaching consequences and which would seriously prejudice our attempts to resolve the whole Falklands issue through peaceful negotiation, is in neither of our interests."*⁶⁶⁷

In London, the Defence Operations Executive receives intelligence of an Argentine task force lying 800 miles north of the Falklands; consisting of an aircraft carrier, 4 destroyers and an amphibious landing craft.⁶⁶⁸

664 *HC Deb 30 March 1982 vol.21 cc163-70*. In fact, there is no evidence that Argentina ever became aware of the deployment of these vessels. *cf.* 1977

665 Hastings & Jenkins 1997

666 Carbone 2008

667 *PREM 19/657 Telegram No.77 of 30 March*

668 The DOE acted as the executive agency for the Chiefs of Staff. Franks 1983 para.224

A nuclear powered submarine, HMS *Splendid*, deploys from Faslane while another, HMS *Conqueror*, is readied. In New York, US Ambassador Shlaudeman calls on Minister Méndez and offers to mediate over South Georgia.

March 31st, all the Argentine fleet are reported to be at sea, albeit in poor weather conditions ⁶⁶⁹

“On the morning of Wednesday 31 march, with the planned landing less than twenty-four hours away, it became obvious that the proposed timetable could not be met, even by sailing directly to the Falklands from the north. It was decided to postpone the landings by one day, until Friday 2 April.” ⁶⁷⁰

Now aware of the submarines heading towards the South Atlantic, Costa Mendez is widely quoted in the press as saying; *“Argentina would not give way to threats of force, ...”* and that the workers at Leith are; *“... Argentine workers working on Argentine soil.”*

Intelligence reports received in London indicate that April 2nd has been appointed as the junta's 'day of action' and that an infantry brigade has been readied for an invasion.

In the UK, GCHQ Cheltenham reports Argentine radio traffic ordering a submarine, *Santa Fé*, to take reconnaissance troops to Mullet Creek, near Stanley. Defence Secretary John Nott seeks an urgent meeting with the Prime Minister who is at the House of Commons.

“John gave the MOD's view that the Falklands could not be retaken once they were seized. This was terrible, and totally unacceptable. I could not believe it: these were our people, our islands. I said instantly: "if they are invaded, we have got to get them back."...” ⁶⁷¹

Admiral Sir Henry Leach appears at the House of Commons unbidden. He asks to speak to the Prime Minister and is allowed into the meeting where he, in opposition to much of the advice already given, tells Margaret Thatcher that Britain could, and should, send a task force if any of the Islands are invaded.

“Because if we do not, or if we pussyfoot in our actions and do not achieve complete success, in another few months we shall be living in a different country whose word counts for little.”

“... the main thrust of this was that I left ... with full authority to assemble, but not yet sail, a task force.” ⁶⁷²

“Leach's advice was that whatever was done must not be half-hearted, for that was likely to result in a shambles. ... He argued for sending every element of the fleet of any possible value. ... Leach's conviction that a fleet able to look after itself if subjected to air and sea attack by Argentine forces would be ready to sail early the next week made a deep impression on the politicians present.” ⁶⁷³

HMS *Endurance* is ordered back to Port Stanley. Capt. Barker transfers a platoon of Royal Marines onto South Georgia to maintain a presence and protect the unarmed BAS civilians.

In Stanley, Governor Hunt, informed of the probability of an invasion, reviews his options. At his immediate disposal are the marines of NP 8901, their newly-arrived replacements, 11 Royal Navy personnel onshore from

669 Stephen Love would later accuse the Ministry of Defence of “burying” his reports and warnings. *cf. The Threads that Link the Falklands to Iraq* Simon Jenkins *London Spectator* March 30, 2007

670 Middlebrook 2003. April 2 was also an anniversary. It was the day in 1767 that the Spanish raised their flag over the French settlement and took control of East Falkland Island (Soledad). *cf.* 1767

671 Thatcher 1993

672 Sir Henry Leach in *The Falklands War* A. Dorman, M. Kandiah & G. Staerck (eds) 2005 p.28

673 Freedman 2005 vol.1 p.181

HMS *Endurance* and one Islander. Also one ex-Royal Marine, who had promptly re-enlisted on hearing rumours of an imminent attack. A total of 69. Of the civilian Falkland Islands Defence Force, 21 men report for duty. ⁶⁷⁴

“Major Gary R H Noot, the outgoing commanding officer, and his replacement, major Mike J Norman, were halfway through the administrative handover when the first hints of the impending invasion were received. The handover meant that the defending force was about twice what might otherwise have been expected...” ⁶⁷⁵

“On Wednesday afternoon, 31 March, the mood changed. The Marines' secure link with Britain was through their Commander in Chief, Rex Hunt, at Government House. He had received a message which was as confusing as it was disturbing. American intelligence had picked up a radio signal indicating that some action around the Falklands was imminent and they had passed it to London.” ⁶⁷⁶

In Washington, Britain's Ambassador Sir Nicholas Henderson calls on Alexander Haig to convey the intelligence from London. Disturbed to discover that US agencies, including the CIA, have no information, Haig immediately alerts the White House. At the same time, Thatcher telegrams US President Reagan requesting that he; *“... talk urgently with the Argentine President and ask him to give you an immediate assurance that he will not authorise any landing, let alone any hostilities.”*

At the United Nations in New York, Argentina's newly appointed Permanent Representative, Eduardo Roca, tells the President of the Security Council (SC) that his country is considering putting the issue of South Georgia before that body. ⁶⁷⁷

“It is appropriate for me to emphasise in the clearest possible terms that the means employed by the British Government and their unilateral acts have created a situation of serious tension whose continuation could jeopardise the maintenance of international peace and security.” ⁶⁷⁸

Pérez de Cuéllar, the UN Secretary-General, summons both Roca and Britain's Permanent Representative, Anthony Parsons, to see him.

“As the crisis developed on 31 March he was about to leave for a tour of Europe. He summoned both Roca and Parsons successively to express concern at the rising tension and urge a diplomatic resolution of the dispute... By this time Roca was already preparing the diplomatic ground for the invasion, circulating a letter to the President of the Security Council, referring to the South Georgia incident and the dispatch of British warships to the area, and complaining about Britain's 'obstinately negative' approach to Argentine efforts to find a peaceful resolution to the illegal occupation of the islands” ⁶⁷⁹

Security Council members, Russia and China, both receive a request from Argentina that they use their vetoes in the event of an unsupportive SC resolution.

674 Defence Force members were: Ally Biggs, Les Biggs, Fraser Wallace, Marvin Clark, Teddie Summers, Len McGill, Gavin Short, Brian Summers, Rag McAskill, Neil Ford, Robert King, Martyn Smith, Owen Summers, Phil Summers, Keith Summers, Les Harris, Derek & Tony Pettersson, Pat Peck, 'Tubby' Smith, Vernon Steen, Gerald Cheek, Kenneth McKay, Dougie Hansen, Stewart Wallace, Jeremy Smith, Duane Andrade, Charles Coutts, Robert Rozee, Irwan Summers, Robert Stewart and Anthony 'Taff' Davies. Information provided by Taff Davies.

675 Freedman 2005 vol.2

676 Bound 2007

677 *The Falklands crisis in the United Nations, 31 March-14 June 1982* Anthony Parsons in *International Affairs* vol.59 Issue 2 (Spring) 1983 p.169

678 Quoted in Freedman 2005 vol.2

679 *Ibid*

Argentina's Embassy in Moscow is informed that the; "... objective is that the USSR apply its veto in the Security Council to any proposal that goes against the interests of our country." ⁶⁸⁰

In Buenos Aires, Minister Costa Méndez hands a declaration to Britain's Ambassador Anthony Williams.

"Since the problem raised is disregard of Argentine sovereignty, I judge pointless the despatch of a person to examine the events in the Georgias since Argentina considers this incident resolved. ... I cannot omit to draw attention to the unusual British naval deployment towards our waters reported in the international press which can only be interpreted as an unacceptable threat ..." ⁶⁸¹

In the South Atlantic, at 1900 local time, HMS *Endurance* slips away from South Georgia. ⁶⁸²

From Buenos Aires, US Ambassador Shlaudeman telegrams Washington.

"Foreign Minister Costa Méndez called me in late this afternoon ... The Minister said he had conveyed my demarche of yesterday to the governing Junta. ... he gave me the following response from the three commanders: the GOA is prepared to accept the proffered good offices of the USG, but only on the basis that HMG first recognize the sovereignty of Argentina over the Malvinas and agree to deliver those Islands and their dependencies to Argentina within a reasonable period of time.

The good offices of the U(N)SG would then be employed to help arrange such details as the future status of the Islanders under Argentine rule and the establishment of a permanent British fueling station to support operations in the Antarctic. ... he reiterated that there would be no confrontation unless the British tried to take the working party off South Georgia. I said we would regard any confrontation as most serious. ...

Costa Méndez closed the meeting by delivering himself of some harsh observations on the British, asserting that the GOA had had enough, that HMG had tried to dupe and string along Argentina for years and that the GOA was prepared "to break relations" without any qualms." ⁶⁸³

Shlaudeman adds a comment; "It sounds like Galtieri playing Patton."

From Washington, Secretary Haig writes to the US Embassy in London.

"I am instructing our Ambassador in Buenos Aires to convey my concern to the Argentine Foreign Minister and to urge that his government take no steps which would aggravate the present crisis. Furthermore, I am urging the Argentine Government to abide by existing arrangements and understandings concerning regularizing the status of foreign residents on South Georgia Island. We will, of course, have a greater chance of influencing Argentine behavior if we appear to them not to favor one side or the other. We will continue quietly to try and move the Argentines away from taking further steps which would make a peaceful resolution more difficult to achieve." ⁶⁸⁴

680 Cardoso, Kirschboom & van der Kooy 1983 p.91. It is not clear how much information regarding Argentine intentions was attached to the request.

681 *Ibid*

682 Barker 1997

683 *Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Latin America/Central, Argentina (01/01/1982–04/02/1982).* Haig's message of the 31st did not arrive in Buenos Aires until after this meeting.

684 *Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Cable File, Falkland File 03/31/1982–04/01/1982*

April 1st, Secretary Haig also telegrams the US Embassy in Argentina.

“Request you contact Galtieri immediately. Tell him we have disturbing reports. Tell him that we don't want to overreact, but would like very much to be reassured. Tell him that from the US point of view we believe that we are embarked on one of the most fruitful periods in the history of our relationship, in which we can become not only the partners in the struggle against Communism in the Hemisphere, but together we can again achieve that standing in international life which we both can rightfully claim. Tell him that should any military action occur, for whatever reason, it is a simple fact that overriding internal and external pressure would be brought to bear on us to abandon the new and promising relationship we are building.” ⁶⁸⁵

At the UN, Britain's Sir Anthony Parsons, demands that the President of the Security Council, Kamanga, convene a meeting to call upon the Argentine Government to refrain from the use of force.

“... we had never been to the Security Council before with this dispute. It had only touched the Fourth Committee; it had scarcely been to the plenary of the General Assembly and it hit everyone by surprise. The day before the invasion I got word to call an emergency meeting of the Security Council which I did. I rang up colleagues in turn personally, saying would you be down at the Council in an hour's time, the invasion of the Falklands is pending. My American colleague (Jeanne Kirkpatrick), who was very mixed up with Latin American policy, said that I had gone mad and that she would block the vote.. I said that if you are going to block me from having a meeting you will have to do it in public and I shall insist on a public meeting so ...? My Russian colleague said: it is April 1st and I know this is an April Fool's joke, the kind of thing you do the whole time, but you don't know your own rules; it is after mid-day. I had quite a problem persuading him that this was serious ...” ⁶⁸⁶

“Kirkpatrick,.. was less than pleased, having told Roca that such a move was unlikely... Parsons was suspicious of Kirkpatrick's 'close and sympathetic relationship with Roca.' He suspected that she had given the Argentine Ambassador to understand that, if Argentina could support the US over Nicaragua, she would return the compliment over the Falklands.” ⁶⁸⁷

On being informed that a meeting of the Security Council is being called, Roca responds.

“It was ironic and inadmissible for the Council to be convened by the United Kingdom on that day to consolidate the spoils of colonial plundering. Argentina rejected being accused when in fact what should be judged, if justice was to be served and peace preserved, was the conduct of the accuser.”

US Secretary Haig sends a message to Lord Carington indicating that the USA will do all it can to help and that their Ambassador in Buenos Aires is seeking an urgent meeting with President Galtieri; who is resisting the invitation to hold a personal telephone conversation with President Reagan. ⁶⁸⁸

In Washington, Haig tells Argentina's Ambassador that any use of force; *“Would reverse our cooperation in Central America and the hemisphere. The reaction of the American people will be overwhelming, we will have to side with the British, and US-Argentine relations will be back to the worst days.”*

685 *Ibid*

686 Sir Anthony Parsons interviewed by Jane Barter March 22, 1996

687 Freedman 2005 vol.2

688 General Galtieri “*resisted*” for 4 hours. Haig's message had to be passed to Costa Mendez for delivery to Galtieri.

In Buenos Aires, US Ambassador Shlaudeman speaks to President Galtieri.

*“With respect to US/Argentine relations, the President insisted that Argentina has the support on this issue of the great majority of nations and that the failure of the U.S. to understand its position would do us damage in the Southern Cone and elsewhere. He referred several times to Argentine support for our position in Central America—support which I acknowledged—and seemed to suggest there should be a quid-pro-quo in this case.”*⁶⁸⁹

Informing Washington, Shlaudeman notes; *“Galtieri was emotional and, I believe, quite nervous. I'm still not certain that he means to take action tomorrow. It would be in his nature to run a bluff to the very end. On the other hand, his ego shows signs of serious inflation and I'm afraid that he is capable of doing something stupid.”*

Britain's Ambassador in Washington receives a message from the US State Department.

“... that their Ambassador has informed them from Buenos Aires of his meeting with the Argentine President. The latter would not say what the Argentines were going to do. The Americans have deduced from this that the Argentinians are therefore planning to go through with their military operation. The Argentine President muttered some mumbo-jumbo, to use the State Department's phrase, about the need for the British to talk about surrendering sovereignty...”

Information regarding the approaching invasion fleet is relayed to Governor Hunt

*“We have apparently reliable evidence than an Argentine task force will gather off Cape Pembroke early tomorrow morning 2 April. You will wish to make your dispositions accordingly.”*⁶⁹⁰

A signal from Buenos Aires to its invasion force informs General Garcia and Rear-Admiral Allara that the garrison at Stanley is larger than usual, and that they are aware of the Argentine approach.

*“This recent information undoubtedly came from inside Stanley, almost certainly from the Argentine airline office based there.... A LADE officer, Vicecomodoro Hector Gilbert, ... had just returned unexpectedly to Stanley, ostensibly to check some financial documents. This officer, experienced in local conditions, was probably the source of the intelligence now reaching the landing force.”*⁶⁹¹

Without the advantage of surprise, the invasion plans are quickly subject to revision. Afraid that the target beach will now be defended, another landing site is selected. A force supposed to head for Goose Green is diverted. Its troops will now reinforce those attacking Stanley.

*“... making a total of 940 Argentine troops who would be attacking eighty-one British marines and sailors.”*⁶⁹²

Government House is now to be seized by sixteen members of the Amphibious Commando Group, under the command of Lieut-Commander Pedro Giachino.

689 Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Latin America/Central, Argentina (01/01/1982–04/02/1982)

690 FCO 7/4490 f113 The Governor is alleged to have responded; *“They might have added goodbye and the best of British!”* cf. *The Guardian* November 12, 2012

691 Middlebrook 2003

692 *Ibid.*

In Stanley, at 2015hrs local time, Governor Hunt goes on Falklands local radio to warn the Islanders.⁶⁹³

“I have an important announcement to make about the state of affairs between the British and Argentine Governments over the Falkland Islands dispute. We have now sought an immediate emergency meeting of the Security Council on the grounds that there could be a situation which threatens international peace and security. I don't yet know whether it has been possible to arrange a meeting today, but our spokesman has been asked to make the following specific points. The Secretary General has today summoned the British and Argentine Permanent representatives to express his deep concern over the situation in the South Atlantic and has urged restraint on both sides. It is right that the Security Council should endorse and back up his approach. We, for our part, have continued to make every possible effort to resolve the current problems by diplomatic means. The British Ambassador in Buenos Aires yesterday delivered a further message to the Argentine government urging a negotiated settlement to current problems, and offering to send a senior emissary to Buenos Aires.

The Argentine Foreign Minister had today responded to this approach in negative terms. He had declined to discuss further the problems occasioned by the illegal presence of Argentine nationals on South Georgia, and he had specifically stated that he no longer wished to use diplomatic channels to discuss the situation in South Georgia. In addition to the Foreign Minister's unwillingness to pursue diplomatic exchanges, there is mounting evidence that the Argentine armed forces are preparing to invade the Falkland Islands.

In these circumstances it is essential that the Security Council urge that there should be no resort to armed force and that diplomatic negotiations should be resumed. In these circumstances, I think it is necessary to take certain precautionary measures here in Stanley. I have alerted the Royal Marines and I now ask for all serving members or active members of the Falkland Islands Defence Force to report to the Drill Hall as soon as possible. They will be on guard tonight at key points in the town. Schools will be closed tomorrow. The radio station will stay open until further notice. If the Security Council's urging to keep the peace is not heeded by the Argentine Government, I expect to have to declare a state of emergency, perhaps before dawn tomorrow. I shall come on the air again as soon as I have anything to report. But in the meantime I would urge you all to remain calm, and to keep off the streets. In particular, do not go along the Airport Road. Stay indoors, and please do not add to the troubles of the security services by making demonstrations or damaging Argentine property. This would play into their hands and simply provide them with the excuse they need to invade us.”⁶⁹⁴

“We were all dumb, ... We couldn't believe it. In the dining room, there were four English journalists, eight state gas operators, a British visitor by the name of Carisley, (and) the owners of the hotel... After the speech the silence continued ... We all watched, silent, but I felt that the eyes were fixed more on me because they knew I spoke English. Then they asked me what I thought. I told them I didn't believe that news. We got up, left the food almost intact (Lamb, as every night, every day) and along with the four English journalists we walked to (the) telex office to try to speak, each (man), to his country. They passed the news to their newspapers. I couldn't talk to Buenos Aires. Nothing could be heard across the line. Cut.”⁶⁹⁵

693 Times are complicated by the distances involved and there being more than one time zone. I have tried to use the local time wherever an event was occurring. The military campaign HQ at Northwood insisted the timing would be 'Zulu' time (GMT), despite the time in London being one hour ahead of that (BST), and the time in the Falklands, three hours behind GMT. I have chosen to use the 24 hour clock in the hope that it will be familiar to readers.

694 Bound 2007. Also *The First Casualty* R. Phillips 2017 pp.115-116

695 Rafael Woolman, Argentine photo-journalist, who had arrived in Stanley a few days before on a LADE flight. Quoted in *La Gesta de Malvinas y sus protagonistas, conocidos y no tanto* in *El Diario del Fin del Mundo* January 4, 2008 citing *Malvinas. El desembarco de una primicia* Rafael Woolman in *La Nueva Provincia de Bahía Blanca* April 2, 2007

Civilian F. I. Defence Force members make their way to the Drill Hall.

*“... corps spirit is a strong thing, and Anthony Davies, known as Taff, was the only experienced soldier among them. Taff had been a Marine and met his wife Jackie when serving with Naval Party 8901 in the late 1970s. He left the Corps in 1979 and settled in Stanley. That night he felt he had to do something to help and became the FIDF's newest member. Taff recalled that, in spite of the lack of experience and the understandable nerves, the men were calm.”*⁶⁹⁶

Capt. Barker and *Endurance* are ordered back to South Georgia.

*“I made for the south-east corner of the island. This was because we had a report that two corvettes, two destroyers, a submarine and a tanker were heading for South Georgia; the assumption was they would make their approach from the north.”*⁶⁹⁷

From Stanley, Governor Hunt reports to London.

*“(1) Royal marines disposition will be made near expected landing beach and will do what they can to contain landing and to defend airport. (2) FIDF will round up Argentines in Stanley before dawn tomorrow and bring them to Government House for safe-keeping. They will then deploy at probable helicopter landing sites. (3) Marines will fall back to outskirts of Stanley but will not fight in Stanley. Survival party will take off to the hills as Argentine forces reach Stanley. I shall remain at Government House. ...”*⁶⁹⁸

At South Georgia, *ARA Guerrico*, a corvette with two helicopters and 40 marines, joins the *Bahia Paraiso*.

Off the Falklands, Argentina's invasion force commences its attack.

*“At 9.30pm on 1 April, half an hour before President Reagan finally managed to speak to President Galtieri on the telephone, the Type 42 destroyer *Santisima Trinidad* anchored one mile south of the Falklands coast. Twenty-one inflatable rubber boats were lowered into the sea, and the marines of the Amphibious Commando Company transferred to the small craft.”*⁶⁹⁹

At 2210hrs, Buenos Aires time, Galtieri finally agrees to take a telephone call from US President Reagan –

Reagan: *“I have reliable news that Argentina is about to adopt force in the Falkland Islands. As you will understand, I am very worried about the repercussions such an action would have. I want to express to you Mr. President, the concern of United States in this matter and the need to find an alternative to the use of force.*

Galtieri: *“... I want to remind you that my country has always maintained a favourable attitude towards negotiations in this dispute with Great Britain. This is demonstrated by seventeen years of fruitless discussion under the auspices of the United Nations. We have conducted these negotiations with a nation which, more than a century and a half ago, used force to usurp a territory which by right belongs to Argentina. Our negotiating position remains the same – but the patience of the Argentine people has a limit. Great Britain has threatened Argentine citizens legitimately going about their business in South Georgia, and my government has an obligation to protect them. Besides, the United Kingdom persists in ignoring Argentine claims in order to put an end to the negotiations and has not responded – in spite of*

696 Bound 2007

697 Barker 1997

698 FCO 7/4490.f124 Telegram No. 64 of 1 April 1982. *Endurance* had left 57 marines at Stanley, 2 officers and 9 men.

699 Middlebrook 2003

our insistence – to the last proposal that we formulated in order to speed up the process. I want to repeat to you, Mr. President, that our negotiating stance has not changed...”

Reagan: *“I understand, Mr. President, but I consider it essential to continue the discussions and seek an alternative to force. ... Believe me, ... I have good reason to assure you that Great Britain would respond with force to any Argentine military action.”*

Galtieri: *“Argentina has always been in favour of a peaceful solution to this dispute. It will only be possible to find the alternative you seek, Mr. President, if there is recognition on the part of the United Kingdom of Argentine sovereignty over the Falkland Islands. And that recognition would have to be explicit and public.”*

Reagan offers mediation via Vice-President Bush and Jeanne Kirkpatrick, but Galtieri rejects the offer.

“... There are all those resolutions of the General Assembly, such as 1514, 2065 and others which repeatedly call on the parties to seek a negotiated settlement to this sovereignty dispute.”

Reagan: *“Mr. President, I believe that it is my obligation to bring to your notice that Great Britain is ready to respond militarily to an Argentine landing. This has been made known to me by the United Kingdom. Furthermore, Mrs. Thatcher, a friend of mine, is a very determined woman and she would have no other alternative than to make a military response. The conflict will be tragic and have grave consequences for the Hemisphere. ...*

*I want to make clear, therefore, that the relationship between your country and mine will suffer greatly. American and world-wide opinion will take a negative attitude to an Argentine use of force.”*⁷⁰⁰

At around the same time that Reagan put the telephone down, the first elements of Argentina's invasion force land on the Falkland Islands – *Operation Rosario*.⁷⁰¹

*“The ninety-two marines were all present. They removed their neoprene outer suits, took their weapons and other equipment out of waterproof packs and prepared to move. The small party under Lieutenant-Commander Giachino who were to capture Government House had the shortest distance to go – two and a half miles due north – but Moody Brook Barracks, the destination of the main party, was six miles away over a high ridge.”*⁷⁰²

*“The Marines split into two groups, the larger making for the Royal Marines barracks at Moody Brook, and the smaller for Government House.”*⁷⁰³

*“Once on shore at Mullet Creek, a few miles south of Stanley, the group divided into two – one to pin down, kill or capture the Marines at Moody Brook, and the other to snatch Rex Hunt from Government House, which, it was hoped, would be undefended.”*⁷⁰⁴

700 Quoted in full in Cardoso, Kirschboom & van der Kooy 1983 pp.83-86

701 Originally code-named *Azul*, the name was changed to honour the Virgin of Rosario. *cf. Argentina's Failed Crusade* J. Burns published in the *Tablet* 2002.

702 Middlebrook 2003. It would take the main group six hours to cross the difficult ground. Far longer than had been expected or planned for.

703 Freedman 2005 vol.2

704 Bound 2007

President Reagan telephones PM Thatcher with the result of his conversation with Galtieri.

“... I conveyed to him my personal concern about the possibility of an Argentine invasion. I told him that initiating military operations against the Falkland islands would seriously compromise relations between the United States and Argentina and I urged him to refrain from offensive action. I offered our good offices and my readiness to send a personal representative to assist in resolving the issues between Argentina and the United Kingdom.

*The General heard my message, but gave me no commitment that he would comply with it. Indeed, he spoke in terms of ultimatums and left me with the clear impression that he has embarked on a course of armed conflict. We will continue to cooperate with your Government in the effort to resolve this dispute. Both in attempting to avert hostilities and to stop them if they should break out. While we have a policy of neutrality on the sovereignty issue, we will not be neutral on the issue of Argentine use of military force.”*⁷⁰⁵

*“The over-riding complication is the President's closeness to Mrs. Thatcher. The President called Galtieri and Galtieri told him to mess out.”*⁷⁰⁶

From London, Governor Hunt is sent permission to destroy Stanley airstrip; *“... if you can do so, to prevent it being used after invasion to resupply an invasion force.”*⁷⁰⁷

In New York, the UN Security Council meets in public session.⁷⁰⁸

*“We decided in the Mission that if we were going to get a Resolution – we didn't think the odds were good but we must do it quickly, avoid all the negotiations over blue drafts and black drafts and I don't know what other drafts, we must slap down something we could live with – we must demand that Argentina withdraw and we must get a vote on it within 24 hours because if we allowed it to drag out it would be fatal. So we did exactly that;..”*⁷⁰⁹

Britain's Permanent Representative, Anthony Parsons, addresses the Security Council.

“As members of the Council will be aware, there have been differences for many years between my Government and the Government of the Republic of Argentina concerning the Falkland Islands. My Government has asked for this emergency meeting of the Council because it now has reason to believe that the Government of Argentina is planning to attempt to invade these Islands. ...

For several years, the affairs of the Falklands have been discussed by the General Assembly. The Falklands are one of those territories about which the United Kingdom reports to the United Nations under Article 73(E) of the Charter. At the most recent session of the General Assembly, a decision was adopted to the effect that the Committee of 24 should keep the situation in the territory under review. The Assembly has not adopted a Resolution on the subject for several years but has contented itself with taking note of developments. My Government and the Government of Argentina have held a series of meetings to discuss the situation in the Falkland Islands. In these meetings, elected representatives of the local population have regularly taken part. Reports have been submitted to the General Assembly about these meetings, most recently in Notes dated 1 April 1981

705 PREM 19/657 Telegram from White House to Cabinet Office, London

706 Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary International Security Affairs (Noel C. Koch) to the Senior Military Assistant to the Deputy Secretary of Defense April 2, 1982. Washington National Record Center, OSD Files, FRC 330-84-0003

707 FCO 7/4490 f104 Telegram No. 50 of 2 April 1982. A hand written note suggests that this was not received by Hunt.

708 See <https://falklandstimeline.files.wordpress.com/2019/05/security-council-discussion-1-to-3-april-1982.pdf>

709 Quoted in *British Diplomatic Oral History Project (Interviewing Sir Anthony Parsons)* J. Barder 1996

(document A.36/156). In this Note, it is stated that: "Both delegations agreed that this question should be examined in further negotiations at an early date." Such discussion did in fact continue, most recently in New York at the end of February. Representatives of the two Governments confirmed on that occasion their wish to continue their discussions within the negotiating framework referred to in the relevant resolutions of the General Assembly. But regrettably the Argentine Government appears to have decided, following those discussions, that it did not wish to continue on this course. The Joint Communique which had been agreed at these talks in New York was not published in Buenos Aires.

Recently, relations between the United Kingdom and Argentina deteriorated as a result of an incident in South Georgia, one of the Dependencies of the Falkland Islands,.. On 31 March the British Ambassador in Buenos Aires proposed to the Argentine Foreign Minister that a senior official should visit Buenos Aires to discuss a diplomatic solution, adding that the diffusing of this incident would help prepare the way for a resumption of a dialogue on the broader sovereignty issue. Earlier today, the Argentine Foreign Minister gave the reply of his Government to the British Ambassador in Buenos Aires. His reply was negative. He declined to discuss further the problems occasioned by the illegal presence of Argentine nationals on South Georgia. He specifically stated that he no longer wished to use diplomatic channels to discuss the situation in South Georgia.

Mr President, ... the purpose of my Government in calling this meeting of the Security Council is to consider the threat not to South Georgia but to the Falkland Islands,.. We have evidence that the Argentine Navy is about to launch an invasion, possible as early as tomorrow morning. ...

Mr President, my Government views the present situation with the utmost seriousness. We call on the Security Council to take immediate action in order to prevent an invasion. We ask this Council to exercise its responsibility under the Charter to maintain international peace and security. We ask this Council to call upon the Government of Argentina to refrain from the threat or use of force against the Falkland Islands and to exercise restraint. I can assure the Council that my Government has conducted the recent negotiations in perfect good faith and that the British Government stands ready to continue these negotiations in the future. What is unacceptable is an attempt to change the situation by force. ...”⁷¹⁰

“After a brief exchange between myself and Ambassador Roca, who appeared to be taken by surprise by this development, the (SC) President read out the statement. I immediately took the floor to assure the Council that my government would be guided by the Presidential appeal and challenged Ambassador Roca to respond similarly. He remained silent.”⁷¹¹

710 UKMIS to FCO April 2, 1983. Telegram 363. See <https://falklandstimeline.files.wordpress.com/2018/04/parsons-to-security-council-emergency-meeting-april-1-1982.pdf>

711 Parsons 1983 p.170

The die was cast. Argentina's military government had abandoned negotiation and chosen trial by combat. An historic approach to dispute resolution. Also, the final act of dispute resolution. There could only be one winner, and that winner must be seen to have right on its side – as tradition would have it.

Paper 12 considers the following 74 days in some depth but with particular emphasis on the diplomatic and political battles that surrounded the main fight. Lives would be lost and all for a 150 year old Argentine fantasy about inheritance. There should be better principles to die for.



Bibliography <https://falklandstimeline.files.wordpress.com/2019/04/bibliography-1.pdf>